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The Greek text in this volume is based upon the Codex Clarkianus and the Codex Venetus. Deviations from the readings of these manuscripts are noted in the margin at the foot of the page. In most instances disagreement between these two manuscripts, and occasionally readings found in inferior manuscripts or in ancient quotations, as well as emendations offered by modern scholars, are noted, even when they have not affected the text chosen.

The following abbreviations are employed:

B = Codex Clarkianus or Bodleianus, written A.D. 895.
T = Codex Venetus, Append. class. 4, cod. 1; twelfth century.
W = Codex Vindobonensis 54, Suppl. graec. 7.
D = Codex Venetus 185.
G = Codex Venetus, Append. class 4, cod. 54.
b t w = later hands of B T W.

The brief introductions aim merely at supplying such information as may aid the reader to appreciate these particular dialogues.

Harold N. Fowler.
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THEAETETUS
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEAETETUS

In the Theaetetus Eucleides the Megarian repeats to his friend Terpsion a conversation between Socrates, the mathematician Theodorus, and the youth Theaetetus, who was himself a mathematician of note. The subject is the nature of knowledge, and the discussion is interrupted and furthered by two digressions, one concerning midwives, in which Socrates likens his method of investigation to the activities of the midwife, the other contrasting the lawyer and the philosopher.

The definition of knowledge is hard to attain, and is, in fact, not attained in this dialogue. The confusion between knowledge and various kinds or applications of knowledge is first cleared up, and then the discussion centres upon three definitions: (1) Knowledge is sensible perception; (2) Knowledge is true opinion; (3) Knowledge is true opinion with reasoned explanation.

The discussion of the first definition contains as one of its most important parts the refutation of the doctrine of Protagoras that "man is the measure of all things"; but it includes also a discussion of the doctrine of Heracleitus, that all things are always in
motion. Here Plato distinguishes two kinds of motion—movement in space and change of quality—and asserts that constant motion of the first kind must be accompanied by change, because otherwise the same things would be at the same time both in motion and at rest. This obvious fallacy Plato appears to ascribe to Heracleitus and his school. The result of this discussion is that if nothing is at rest, every answer on whatever subject is equally correct.

The possibility of false opinion is discussed in connexion with the second definition. This part of the dialogue contains many subtle distinctions and interesting comparisons. The errors of memory are illustrated by the wax tablets which, on account of their imperfections, fail to receive and preserve clear impressions from sensible objects, and the confusion of our recollections by the aviary, the possessor of which takes in his hand one bird when he wishes to take another, though all the birds have previously been caught and imprisoned by him.

The third definition is explained in various ways, none of which is found to be satisfactory, and the dialogue closes with its avowed purpose—the complete definition of knowledge—unaccomplished. Nevertheless the rejection of the definitions proposed is a gain in itself, and the dialogue may be said to prepare the way for the acceptance of the theory of ideas. It serves also as an example of the importance of the dialectic method, and shows Plato’s interest in combating the theories of other philosophers.

The Theaetetus contains many interesting similes and comparisons, and is, like the Sophist and the
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEAETETUS

Statesman, pervaded by a subtle and at the same time ponderous kind of humour which is rather irritating to some, at least, among modern readers. The reasoning is careful and accurate, but the exposition is somewhat too prolix for modern taste.

The date of the Theaetetus is uncertain, but it cannot be one of the early dialogues. The mention of the Athenian army at Corinth makes any date much earlier than 390 impossible. At the very end the reader is prepared for a continuation of the conversation, and this takes place in the Sophist, but that dialogue and the Statesman may very well have been written some years later than the Theaetetus, from which they differ considerably in style.

There are separate editions of the Theaetetus by Lewis Campbell (Oxford, 1861 and 1883) and B. H. Kennedy (Cambridge, 1881 and 1894), both with translation and notes.
ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΕΤΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΘΕΑΙΤΗΣΟΣ

A

I. Et. "Αρτι, ὃ Τερψίων, ἡ πάλαι εξ ἀγροῦ; τερ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι. καὶ σὲ γε ἐξήτων κατ' ἀγορὰν καὶ ἔθαυμαξὼν ὅτι οὐχ οἶδος τ' ἡ εὑρεῖν.

ΕΤ. Οὐ γὰρ ἡ κατὰ πόλιν.

ΤΕΡ. Ποῦ μὴν;

ΕΤ. Εἰς λιμένα καταβαίνων Θεαίτητος ἐνέτυχον φερομένω ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου Ἀθηναῖς.

ΤΕΡ. Ζῶντι ἡ τετελευτηκότι;

B

ΕΤ. Ζῶντι καὶ μάλα μόλις. χαλεπῶς μὲν γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν, μᾶλλον μὴν αὐτῶν αἰρεῖ τὸ γεγονός νόσημα ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι.

ΤΕΡ. Μῶν ἡ δυσεντηρία;

ΕΤ. Ναι.

ΤΕΡ. Οἶον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι.

ΕΤ. Καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὃ Τερψίων, ἐπεὶ τοι
THEAETETUS
[or ON KNOWLEDGE, TENTATIVE]

CHARACTERS

EUCLEIDES, TERPSION, SOCRATES, THEODORUS, THEAETETUS

EU. Just in from the country, Terpsion, or did you come some time ago?

TERP. Quite a while ago; and I was looking for you in the market-place and wondering that I could not find you.

EU. Well, you see, I was not in the city.

TERP. Where then?

EU. As I was going down to the harbour I met Theaetetus being carried to Athens from the camp at Corinth.

TERP. Alive or dead?

EU. Just barely alive; for he is suffering severely from wounds, and, worse than that, he has been taken with the sickness that has broken out in the army.

TERP. You mean the dysentery?

EU. Yes.

TERP. What a man he is who you say is in danger!

EU. A noble man, Terpsion, and indeed just now I
καὶ νῦν ἥκουν τινων μᾶλα ἐγκωμιαζόντων αὐτὸν 
περὶ τὴν μάχην.

ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οὐδὲν γ’ ἀτοποῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ θαυ-
μαστότερον, εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν. ἀτὰρ πῶς οὐκ
C αὐτὸν Μεγαρὸι κατέλυεν;

ΕΤ. ’Ηπείγετο οὖκαδε: ἐπεὶ ἔγγον ἐδεόμην καὶ
συνεβούλευον, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἦθελεν. καὶ δὴτα προπέμ-
ψας αὐτὸν, ἀπὸν πάλιν ἀνεμνήσθην καὶ ἑβαϊμασα
Σωκράτους, ὃς μαντικῶς ἀλλὰ τε δὴ εἰπε καὶ περὶ
tοῦτου. δοκεὶ γάρ μοι ὄλγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου
ἐντυχεὶν αὐτῷ μειρακίῳ ὄντι, καὶ συγγενόμενός
tε καὶ διαλέχθη τὰ πάντα ἀγάθθηναι αὐτοῦ τὴν
φύσιν. καὶ μοι ἐλθόντι ’Αθήναζε τοὺς τε λόγους οὕς
D διελέχθη αὐτῷ διηγήσατο, καὶ μάλα ἁξίους ἁκοῆς,
εἰπὲ τε, ὅτι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη εἰς τοῦτον ἐλλόγημον
gενέσθαι, εἰπερ εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι.

ΤΕΡ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε, ὡς έσκεν, εἰπεν. ἀτὰρ
τίνες ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι; ἔχοις ἂν διηγήσασθαι;

ΕΤ. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία, οὐκοιν οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στό-

ματος· ἀλλ’ ἐγραφάμην τὸτε εὐθὺς οὖκαδ ἐλθὼν
ὑπομνήματα, ύστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμμη-
νόμενοι ἐγραφὼν, καὶ ὅσακις ’Αθήναζε ἀφικοίμην,
ἐπανηρώτων τὸν Σωκράτη δ’ ἡ ἐμεμνήμην, καὶ
δεῦρο ἐλθὼν ἐπηνορθούμην· ὥστε μοι σχέδον
τι πᾶς ὁ λόγος γεγραπται.

ΤΕΡ. ’Αληθῆ· ἦκουσά σοι καὶ πρότερον, καὶ
μέντοι αἰὲ μέλλων κελεύσειν ἐπιδείξαι διατέτριφα
δεῦρο. ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει νῦν ἡμᾶς διελθεῖν; πάντως
ἔγγυε καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι, ὡς ἐξ ἀγροῦ
ήκων.

Β ΕΤ. ’Αλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς μέχρι ’Ερινοῦ

8
THEAETETUS

heard some people praising him highly for his conduct in the battle.

TERP. That is not at all strange; it would have been much more remarkable if he had not so conducted himself. But why did he not stop here in Megara?

EU. He was in a hurry to get home; for I begged and advised him to stop, but he would not. So I went along with him, and as I was coming back I thought of Socrates and wondered at his prophetic gift, especially in what he said about him. For I think he met him a little before his own death, when Theaetetus was a mere boy, and as a result of acquaintance and conversation with him, he greatly admired his qualities. When I went to Athens he related to me the conversation he had with him, which was well worth hearing, and he said he would surely become a notable man if he lived.

TERP. And he was right, apparently. But what was the talk. Could you relate it?

EU. No, by Zeus, at least not offhand. But I made notes at the time as soon as I reached home, then afterwards at my leisure, as I recalled things, I wrote them down, and whenever I went to Athens I used to ask Socrates about what I could not remember, and then I came here and made corrections; so that I have pretty much the whole talk written down.

TERP. That is true. I heard you say so before; and really I have been waiting about here all along intending to ask you to show it to me. What hinders us from reading it now? Certainly I need to rest, since I have come from the country.

EU. And I myself went with Theaetetus as far as
ΠΛΑΤΟ

Θεαίτητον προὔπεμψα, ὡστε οὔκ ἄν ἄηδῶς ἀναπαυόμην. ἀλλ’ ἱώμεν, καὶ ἦμῖν ἁμα ἀναπαυομένοις ὁ παῖς ἀναγνώσεται.

τερ. Ὁρθῶς λέγεις.

ετ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ βιβλίον, ὁ Τερψίων, τούτι· ἐγραφήμην δὲ δὴ οὕτως τὸν λόγον, οὔκ ἐμοὶ Σωκράτη διηγούμενον ὃς διηγεῖτο, ἀλλὰ διαλεγόμενον οἷς ἐφή διαλεκθήναι. ἐφή δὲ τῷ τε γεωμέτρῃ Θεοδώρῳ καὶ τῷ Θεαίτήτῳ. ἦν οὖν

C ἐν τῇ γραφῇ μὴ παρέχοιν πράγματα αἱ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων διηγήσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ τε ὅποτε λέγοι οὐκ Ἀδάμης, οἶνον, καὶ ἔγω ἐφή ἢ καὶ ἔγω εἶπον, ἢ ἄπειροι τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου, ὅτι συνεφή ἢ σύντομος ἡ ὁμολόγησιν, τοῦτων ἐνεκα ὡς ἀυτῶν αὐτοῖς διαλεγόμενον ἐγραφα, ἐξελῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα.

τερ. Καὶ οὐδὲν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου, ὁ Εὐκλείδης.

ετ. Ἀλλά, παῖ, λαβὲ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε.

D 2. ση. Εἰ μὲν τῶν ἐν Κυρήνῃ μάλλον ἐκηδόμην, ὁ Θεόδωρε, τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄν σε καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἂν ἠρώτων, εἰ τινὲς αὐτὸθι περὶ γεωμετρίαν ἢ τινὰ ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν εἰσὶ τῶν νέων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιοῦμενοι· νῦν δὲ ἤττου γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἢ τούπος φιλῶ, καὶ μάλλον ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι τίνες ἡμῖν τῶν νέων ἐπίδοξοι γενέσθαι ἐπιεικεῖς· ταῦτα δὴ αὐτὸς τε σκοπῶ καθ’ ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ οἷς ἂν ὅρω τοὺς νέους ἐθέλοντας συγγίγνεσθαι. σοὶ δὴ οὖκ ὀλίγωστοι πλησιάζοντο, καὶ δικαῖως. Ἐ ἐξίος γὰρ τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ γεωμετρίας ἐνεκα. εἰ
Erineum, so I also should not be sorry to take a rest. Come, let us go, and while we are resting, the boy shall read to us.

TERP. Very well.

Eu. Here is the book, Terpsion. Now this is the way I wrote the conversation: I did not represent Socrates relating it to me, as he did, but conversing with those with whom he told me he conversed. And he told me they were the geometrician Theodorus and Theaetetus. Now in order that the explanatory words between the speeches might not be annoying in the written account, such as "and I said" or "and I remarked," whenever Socrates spoke, or "he agreed" or "he did not agree," in the case of the interlocutor, I omitted all that sort of thing and represented Socrates himself as talking with them.

TERP. That is quite fitting, Eucleides.

Eu. Come, boy, take the book and read.

soc. If I cared more for Cyrene and its affairs, Theodorus, I should ask you about things there and about the people, whether any of the young men there are devoting themselves to geometry or any other form of philosophy; but as it is, since I care less for those people than for the people here, I am more eager to know which of our own young men are likely to gain reputation. These are the things I myself investigate, so far as I can, and about which I question those others with whom I see that the young men like to associate. Now a great many of them come to you, and rightly, for you deserve it on account of your geometry, not to speak of other

Erineum was between Eleusis and Athens, near the Cephissus. Apparently Eucleides had walked some thirty miles.
δὴ οὖν τιν ἐνέτυχες ἄξιω λόγου, ἢδεως ἀν πυθοῖμην.

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατε, ἐμοὶ τε εἰπεῖν καὶ σοὶ ἀκοῦσαι πάνυ ἄξιον, οἷς ἡμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν μειρακίω ἐντετύχηκα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν καλὸς, ἔφοβομὴν ἂν σφόδρα λέγειν, μῆ καὶ τῷ δόξῳ εἰν ἐπιθυμίᾳ αὐτοῦ εἶναι νῦν ἐκεῖ—καὶ μή μοι ἄχθου—οὐκ ἔστι καλὸς, προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τὴν τε συμότητα καὶ τὸ ἐξώ τῶν ὁμιμάτων· ήττον δὲ ἦ σῦ ταῦτ' ἐχει. ἀδεώς δὴ λέγω· εὗ γὰρ ἐσθι ὅτι ὃν δὴ πώποτε ἐνέτυχον—καὶ πάνυ πολλοῖς πεπλησίακα—οὐδένα πω ἡθόπημην οὔτω θαυμαστῶς εὗ πεφυκότα· τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθῆ ὄντα, ὡς ἀλλω χαλεπόν, πρῶν αὐ εἶναι διαφερόντως, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀνδρεῖον παρ' ὀντινοῦν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτ' ἀν φώμην γενέσθαι οὔτε ὁρῶ γιγνόμενον. ἀλλ' οἱ τε δοξεῖς ἐωσπερ οὔτος καὶ ἄγχινῳ καὶ μνήμονες ὡς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὁργὰς ἀξύρροποι εἰς, καὶ ἄττοντες φέρονται ἂν ποτὲ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα πλοῖα, καὶ μανικώτεροι ἢ ἀνδρεῖοτεροι φύνονται, οἵ τε αὐ ἐμπριθέστεροι νωθροὶ πως ἅπαντωσ πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ λήθης γέμοντες. ὃ δὲ οὔτω λεῖως τε καὶ ἀπταῖστως καὶ ἀνυόμως ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τὰς μαθήσεις τε καὶ ξητήσεις μετὰ πολλῆς πραότητος, οἶον ἐλαίων ῥέμα ἀφοβητὶ ρέοντος, ὡστε θαυμάσαι τὸ τηλικοῦτον ὄντα οὔτως ταῦτα διαπράττεσθαι.

Ἐ. Εὐθ ἀγγέλλεις. τίνος δὲ καὶ ἔστι τῶν πολιτῶν;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μνημονεύω δὲ σοῦ. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἔστι τοῦνδε τῶν προσιόντων ὁ ἐν τῷ

1 γιγνόμενον T ut videtur, Burnet; γιγνομένους B, Berol.
THEAETETUS

reasons. So if you have met with any young man who is worth mentioning, I should like to hear about him.

THEO. Truly, Socrates, it is well worth while for me to talk and for you to hear about a splendid young fellow, one of your fellow-citizens, whom I have met. Now if he were handsome, I should be very much afraid to speak, lest someone should think I was in love with him. But the fact is—now don't be angry with me—he is not handsome, but is like you in his snub nose and protruding eyes, only those features are less marked in him than in you. You see I speak fearlessly. But I assure you that among all the young men I have ever met—and I have had to do with a great many—I never yet found one of such marvellously fine qualities. He is quick to learn, beyond almost anyone else, yet exceptionally gentle, and moreover brave beyond any other; I should not have supposed such a combination existed, and I do not see it elsewhere. On the contrary, those who, like him, have quick, sharp minds and good memories, have usually also quick tempers; they dart off and are swept away, like ships without ballast; they are excitable rather than courageous; those, on the other hand, who are steadier are somewhat dull when brought face to face with learning, and are very forgetful. But this boy advances toward learning and investigation smoothly and surely and successfully, with perfect gentleness, like a stream of oil that flows without a sound, so that one marvels how he accomplishes all this at his age.

SOC. That is good news; but which of our citizens is his father?

THEO. I have heard the name, but do not remember it. However, it does not matter, for the youth is
μέσω. ἄρτι γὰρ ἐν τῶ ἔξω δρόμῳ ἠλείφοντο ἐταίροι τέ τινες οὐτοὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτὸς, νῦν ὁμοί, μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀλευφάμενοι δεύρο ἴέναι. ἀλλὰ σκόπει, εἰ γυγώσκεις αὐτῶν.

ἐσ. Γυγώσκω· ὁ τοῦ Σουνιέως Εὐφρονίου ἔστιν, καὶ πάνυ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἀνδρὸς οἶνον καὶ σὺ τοῦτον διηγεῖς, καὶ ἄλλως εὐδοκίμου, καὶ μέντοι καὶ οὐσίαν μάλα πολλὴν κατέλιπεν. τὸ δ' ὄνομα οὖκ οἶδα τοῦ μειρακίου.

D ὁεο. Θεαίτητος, ὁ Σώκρατες, τό γε ὄνομα· τῆν μέντοι οὐσίαν δοκοῦσι μοι ἐπίτροποι τινες διεφθαρκέναι: ἀλλ' ὀμοίως καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἑλευθερίαττα θαυμαστός, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ἐσ. Γενικὸν λέγεις τὸν ἄνδρα. καὶ μοι κέλευσιν αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε παρακαθίζεσθαι.

ὁεο. 'Εσται ταῦτα. Θεαίτητε, δεύρο παρὰ Σωκράτη.

ἐσ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὁ Θεαίτητε, ἢν κάγῳ ἐμάντον ἀνασκέψοιμαι, ποιόν τι ἔχω τὸ πρόσωπον. Ἐφησοῦν γὰρ Θεόδωρος ἔχειν με σοὶ ὀμοίον. ἀτὰρ εἰ νῦν ἔχοντον ἔκατέρων λύραν ἔφη αὐτὰς ἡρμόσθαι ὀμοίως, πότερον εὐθὺς ἢν ἔπιστευόμεν ἢ ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἃν, εἰ μονοίκοις ὅν λέγει;

ὁεαί. Ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἃν.

ἐσ. Οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτον μὲν εὐρόντες ἐπειθόμεθ' ἃν, ἀμοῦσον δὲ, ἠπιστοῦμεν;

ὁεαί. Ἀληθῆ.

ἐσ. Νῦν δέ γ', οἴμαι, εἰ τι μέλει ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν 145 προσώπων ὀμοιότητος, σκεπτέον, εἰ γραφικὸς ὅν λέγει ἡ οὖ.
the middle one of those who are now coming toward us. He and those friends of his were anointing themselves in the outer course, and now they seem to have finished and to be coming here. See if you recognize him.

soc. Yes, I do. He is the son of Euphronius of Sunium, who is a man of just the sort you describe, and of good repute in other respects; moreover he left a very large property. But the youth’s name I do not know.

theo. Theaetetus is his name, Socrates; but I believe the property was squandered by trustees. Nevertheless, Socrates, he is remarkably liberal with his money, too.

soc. It is a noble man that you describe. Now please tell him to come here and sit by us.

theo. I will. Theaetetus, come here to Socrates.

soc. Yes, do so, Theaetetus, that I may look at myself and see what sort of a face I have; for Theodorus says it is like yours. Now if we each had a lyre, and he said we had tuned them to the same key, should we take his word for it without more ado, or should we inquire first whether he who said it was a musician?

theaet. We should inquire.

soc. Then if we found that he was a musician, we should believe him, but if not, we should refuse to take his word?

theaet. Yes.

soc. But now, if we are concerned about the likeness of our faces, we must consider whether he who speaks is a painter, or not.

1 The scene is evidently laid in a gymnasium; the young men have been exercising.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι.
ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ξωγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔχ, ὅσον γέ με εἰδέναι.
ΣΩ. Ἀρ’ οὖδὲ γεωμετρικός;
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντως δὴ ποιεῖ, ὁ Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογιστικὸς τε καὶ
μουσικὸς καὶ Όσα παίδειας ἔχεται;
ΘΕΑΙ. "Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τοῦ σώματός τι ὁμοῖον
φησὶν εἶναι ἐπαινῶν τῇ ἡ ὕψος, οὐ πάντως αὐτῷ ἄξιον
τὸν νόην προσέχειν.
ΘΕΑΙ. "Ἰσωσ οὖν.
Β. ΣΩ. Τί δ’, εἰ ποτέρον τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπαινοῖ πρὸς
ἀρετῆν τε καὶ σοφίαν; ἄρ’ οὖν ἄξιον τῷ μὲν
ἀκούσαντι προθυμεῖσθαι ἀνασκέψασθαι τὸν ἐπαινε-
θέντα, τῷ δὲ προθύμως ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύναι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὁ, ὁ Σώκρατες.
3. ΣΩ. "Ὡρα τοῖνυν, ὦ φίλε Θεαῖτη, σοι μὲν ἐπιδεικνύναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ σκοπεῖσθαι. ὡς εὖ ἐσθί ὦτι
Θεόδωρος πολλοὺς δὴ πρὸς με ἐπαινέσας ἕξενοι
τε καὶ ἄστους οὐδένα πω ἐπήμεσεν ὡς σὲ νῦν δή.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐάν ἴνα ἔχοι, ὁ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα μὴ
Σ παῖζων ἔλεγεν.
ΣΩ. Οὔχ οὐσίς ὁ τρόπος Θεοδώρου· ἀλλὰ μή
ἀναδύον τὰ ὁμολογημένα σκηπτόμενοι παῖζοντα
λέγειν τόγε, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀναγκασθῇ μαρτυρεῖν·
pάντως γὰρ οὐδὲς ἐπισκῆμει αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ χαρᾶν
ἔμμενε τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ ἥρθ᾽ ταύτα ποιεῖν, εἰ σοι δοκεῖ.
ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοι· μανθάνεις ποι παρὰ Θεοδώρου
γεωμετρίας ἄττα;
ΘΕΑΙ. "Ἐγὼ γε.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. I think we must.

soc. Well, is Theodorus a painter?

THEAET. Not so far as I know.

soc. Nor a geometrician, either?

THEAET. Oh yes, decidedly, Socrates.

soc. And an astronomer, and an arithmetician, and a musician, and in general an educated man?

THEAET. I think so.

soc. Well then, if he says, either in praise or blame, that we have some physical resemblance, it is not especially worth while to pay attention to him.

THEAET. Perhaps not.

soc. But what if he should praise the soul of one of us for virtue and wisdom? Is it not worth while for the one who hears to examine eagerly the one who is praised, and for that one to exhibit his qualities with eagerness?

THEAET. Certainly, Socrates.

soc. Then, my dear Theaetetus, this is just the time for you to exhibit your qualities and for me to examine them; for I assure you that Theodorus, though he has praised many foreigners and citizens to me, never praised anyone as he praised you just now.

THEAET. A good idea, Socrates; but make sure that he was not speaking in jest.

soc. That is not Theodorus's way. But do not seek to draw back from your agreement on the pretext that he is jesting, or he will be forced to testify under oath; for certainly no one will accuse him of perjury. Come, be courageous and hold to the agreement.

THEAET. I suppose I must, if you say so.

soc. Now tell me; I suppose you learn some geometry from Theodorus?

THEAET. Yes.
PLATO

D ἡμ. Καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ λογισμοῖς;

ὁεαἰ. Προθυμοῦμαι γε δή.

ἡμ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὃ παί, παρά γε τούτων καὶ παρ’ ἄλλων, οὔς ἂν οἶμαι τι τούτων ἐπαίειν. ἀλλ’

ὁμις τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, συμικρὸν

de τι ἀπορῶ, ὃ μετὰ σοῦ τε καὶ τῶνδε σκεπτέον.

καὶ μοι λέγε: ἄρ’ οὐ τὸ μανθάνεις ἐστὶν τὸ σοφώτε-

ρον γίγνεσθαι περὶ δ’ μανθάνει τις;

ὁεαὶ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;

ἡμ. Σοφία δὲ γ’, οἶμαι, σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοί.

ὁεαὶ. Νάι.

E ἡμ. Τοῦτο δὲ μῶν διαφέρει τι ἐπιστήμης;

ὁεαὶ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ἡμ. Ἡ σοφία. ἢ οὐχ ἄπερ ἐπιστήμονες, ταῦτα καὶ σοφοὶ;

ὁεαἰ. Τί μήν;

ἡμ. Ταύτων ἄρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία;

ὁεαἰ. Νάι.

ἡμ. Τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ τοῖνυν ἐστὶν δ’ ἀπορῶ καὶ οὐ

dύναμαι λαβεῖν ἰκανῶς παρ’ ἑμαυτῷ, ἐπιστήμη δ’ τί

146 ποτε τυχάνει ὦν. ἄρ’ οὖν δὴ ἐχομεν λέγεων

αὐτό; τί φατέ; τίς ἂν ἡμῶν πρῶτος ἐ’ποι; τὸ

de ἄμαρτων, καὶ ὃς ἂν ἄει ἄμαρτάνη, καθεδεῖ-

ται, ὥσπερ φασίν οἱ παῖδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὅνος:

ὡς δ’ ἂν περιγένεται ἀναμάρτητος, βασιλεύει

ἡμῶν καὶ ἑπιτάξει τί τι ἂν βούληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

τί σιγάτε; οὐ τί που, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ἐγὼ ὑπὸ φιλο-

λογίας ἄγροικίζομαι, προθυμούμενος ἡμᾶς ἕνοικοι

διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε καὶ προσηγόρους ἄλλη-

λοις γίγνεσθαι;

1 ἡμᾶς] ἡμᾶς T.
THEAETETUS

soc. And astronomy and harmony and arithmetic?

THEAET. I try hard to do so.

soc. And so do I, my boy, from him and from any others who I think know anything about these things. But nevertheless, although in other respects I get on fairly well in them, yet I am in doubt about one little matter, which should be investigated with your help and that of these others. Tell me, is not learning growing wiser about that which one learns?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. And the wise, I suppose, are wise by wisdom.

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And does this differ at all from knowledge?

THEAET. Does what differ?

soc. Wisdom. Or are not people wise in that of which they have knowledge?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. Then knowledge and wisdom are the same thing?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Well, it is just this that I am in doubt about and cannot fully grasp by my own efforts—what knowledge really is. Can we tell that? What do you say? Who of us will speak first? And he who fails, and whoever fails in turn, shall go and sit down and be donkey, as the children say when they play ball; and whoever gets through without failing shall be our king and shall order us to answer any questions he pleases. Why are you silent? I hope, Theodorus, I am not rude, through my love of discussion and my eagerness to make us converse and show ourselves friends and ready to talk to one another.
Β θεο. Ἡκιστα μὲν, ὦ Σῶκρατες, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀν εἰς ἄγροικον, ἀλλὰ τῶν μειρακίων τι κέλευε σοι ἀποκρίνεσθαι· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἀἵθης τῆς τοιαύτης διαλέκτου, καὶ οὐδ’ αὖ συνεθήκασθαι ἥλικιαν ἔχω· τούτῳ δὲ πρέποι τε ἂν τοῦτο καὶ πολὺ πλέον ἐπιδιοῦσεν· τῷ γὰρ ὅντι ἡ νεότης εἰς πᾶν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει. ἀλλ’, ὦσπερ ἢρξῳ, μὴ ἀφίεσο τοῦ Θεατήτου, ἄλλ’ ἐρώτα.

σω. Ἀκούεις δή, ὦ Θεατήτε, ἃ λέγει Θεόδωρος. C ᾗ ἀπειθεῖν,1 ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὔτε σὺ ἐθελήσεις, οὔτε θέμις περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ ἐπιτάττοντι νεώτερον ἀπειθεῖν· ἀλλ’ εὖ καὶ γενναῖως εἰπέ· τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην;

τε. Ἀλλά ἥρη, ὦ Σῶκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ ὑμεῖς κελεύετε. πάντως γὰρ, ἂν τι καὶ ἀμάρτω, ἐπανορθώσετε.

4. σω. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἂν πέρ γε οἴοι τε ὁμεν. τε. Δοκεῖ τοῖνυν μοι καὶ ὁ παρὰ Θεοδώρου ἂν τις μάθοι ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, γεωμετρία τε καὶ ἄς νῦν δὴ σὺ διήλθας, καὶ αὐτὶ σκυτοτομίκη τε καὶ D αἱ τῶν ἄλλων δημουργῶν τέχναι, πάσα τε καὶ ἐκάστη τούτων, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἡ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι.

σω. Γενναῖως γε καὶ φιλοδόρως, ὃ φίλε, ἐν αἰτηθεὶς πολλὰ δίδως καὶ ποικίλα ἀνθ’ ἀπλοῦ.

τε. Ἡδ’ τί τούτο λέγεις, ὦ Σῶκρατες;

σω. Ἰσως μὲν οὐδέν’. ὃ μέντοι οἶμαι, φράσω. ὅταν λέγης σκυτικῆν, μὴ τι ἄλλο φράζεις ἡ ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίας;

τε. Οὐδέν.

Ε σω. Τί δ’, ὅταν τεκτονικῆν; μὴ τι ἄλλο ἡ ἐπιστήμην τῆς τῶν ξυλῶν σκευῶν ἐργασίας;

1 ἀπειθεῖν W; ἀπίστειν BT; ἀπελθεῖν al.
THEAETETUS

theo. That sort of thing would not be at all rude, Socrates; but tell one of the youths to answer your questions; for I am unused to such conversation and, moreover, I am not of an age to accustom myself to it. But that would be fitting for these young men, and they would improve much more than I; for the fact is, youth admits of improvement in every way. Come, question Theaetetus as you began to do, and do not let him off.

soc. Well, Theaetetus, you hear what Theodorus says, and I think you will not wish to disobey him, nor is it right for a young person to disobey a wise man when he gives instructions about such matters. Come, speak up well and nobly. What do you think knowledge is?

THEAET. Well, Socrates, I must, since you bid me. For, if I make a mistake, you are sure to set me right.

soc. Certainly, if we can.

THEAET. Well then, I think the things one might learn from Theodorus are knowledge—geometry and all the things you spoke of just now—and also cobblerly and the other craftsmen's arts; each and all of these are nothing else but knowledge.

soc. You are noble and generous, my friend, for when you are asked for one thing you give many, and a variety of things instead of a simple answer.

THEAET. What do you mean by that, Socrates?

soc. Nothing, perhaps; but I will tell you what I think I mean. When you say "cobblerly" you speak of nothing else than the art of making shoes, do you?

THEAET. Nothing else.

soc. And when you say "carpentry"? Do you mean anything else than the art of making wooden furnishings?
PLATO

συ. Όποιον ἐν ἁμφῶν, οὐ ἑκατέρα ἐπιστήμη, τοῦτο ὅριζεις;

θεαί. Ναί.

συ. Τὸ δὲ γ’ ἐρωτηθέν, ὁ Θεαίτητε, οὐ τοῦτο ἦν, τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὅποσαί τινὲς· οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμῆσαι αὐτὰς βουλόμενοι ἡρόμεθα, ἀλλὰ γνώναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὃ τί ποτ’ ἐστίν. ἡ οὐδὲν λέγω;

θεαί. Πάντα μὲν οὖν ὅρθως.

147 συ. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τόδε. εἰ τις ηἱμᾶς τῶν φαύλων τι καί προχείρων ἐροῦτο, οἶπον περὶ πηλοῦ, ὃ τί ποτ’ ἐστίν, εἰ ἀποκριναίμεθα αὐτῷ πηλὸς ὃ τῶν χυτρέων καὶ πηλὸς ὃ τῶν ἀποκριμένων καὶ πηλὸς ὃ τῶν πλυστηρίων, οὐκ ἂν γελοῖοι εἶμεν;

θεαί. Ἰσως.

συ. Πρῶτον μὲν γε ποι ὅπως οἰδόμενοι συνείλαν ἕκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀποκρίσεως τῶν ἐρωτῶν, ὅταν εἰπωμεν πηλὸς, εἴτε ὃ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσθέντες Β εἴτε ἅλλων ὀντικικῶν δημιουργῶν. ἦ, οἴει, τίς τι συνήσιν τινος ὄνομα, ὃ μὴ οἴδεν τί ἐστιν;

θεαί. Ὀδδαμῶς.

συ. Όυδ’ ἄρα ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνήσιν ὃ ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδώς.

θεαί. Οὐ γὰρ.

συ. Σκυτικὴν ἄρα οὐ συνήσιν ὃς ἃν ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοή, οὐδὲ τινὰ ἅλλην τέχνην.

θεαί. Ἐστιν οὕτως.

συ. Γελοίᾳ ἄρα ἡ ἀπόκρισις τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι ἐπιστήμην τί ἐστιν, ὅταν ἀποκρινηταί τέχνης τινὸς

1 τὸ δὲ γ’ ἐρωτηθέν Burnet; τὸ δὲ γε ἐρωτηθέν W, Berol.; τὸ δ’ ἐπερωτηθέν BT.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. Nothing else by that, either.

soc. Then in both cases you define that to which each form of knowledge belongs?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. But the question, Theaetetus, was not to what knowledge belongs, nor how many the forms of knowledge are; for we did not wish to number them, but to find out what knowledge itself really is. Or is there nothing in what I say?

THEAET. Nay, you are quite right.

soc. Take this example. If anyone should ask us about some common everyday thing, for instance, what clay is, and we should reply that it is the potters' clay and the oven-makers' clay and the brickmakers' clay, should we not be ridiculous?

THEAET. Perhaps.

soc. Yes; in the first place for assuming that the questioner can understand from our answer what clay is, when we say "clay," no matter whether we add "the image-makers'" or any other craftsmen's. Or does anyone, do you think, understand the name of anything when he does not know what the thing is?

THEAET. By no means.

soc. Then he does not understand knowledge of shoes if he does not know knowledge.

THEAET. No.

soc. Then he who is ignorant of knowledge does not understand cobblerly or any other art.

THEAET. That is true.

soc. Then it is a ridiculous answer to the question "what is knowledge?" when we give the name of
C ónoma. τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἀποκρίνεται οὐ τοῦτ ἐρωτηθείς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικεν.

ς. "Επειτά γε που ἐξὸν φαύλως καὶ βραχέως ἀποκρίνασθαι περιέρχεται ἀπέραντου ὁδὸν. οἶον καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει φαύλων που καὶ ἀπλοῦν εἰπεῖν ὅτι γῆ ὑγρῷ φυραθείσα πηλὸς ἄν εἴη, τὸ δ' ὅτου ἐὰν χαίρειν.

5. ΘΕΑΙ. Ράδιον, ὢ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε οὕτω φαίνεται· ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύεις ἐρωτάν ὁιον καὶ αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν ἐναγχος εἰσῆλθε διαλεγομένοις, ἐμοὶ δὲ καὶ τῷ σοὶ ὀμοιώμω τοῦτῳ Σωκράτει.

ς. Τὸ ποιόν δή, ὦ Θεαίητη; 

ΘΕΑΙ. Περὶ δυνάμεων τι ἡμῖν Θεόδωρος ὅδε ἔγραφε, τῆς τε τρὶπόδος πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος ἀποφαίνων 1 ὃτι μῆκει οὐ σύμμετροι τῇ ποδιαίᾳ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην προαιρούμενος μέχρι τῆς ἐπτακαίδεκάποδος· ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ πως ἐνέσχετο, ἡμῖν οὖν εἰσῆλθε τι τοιοῦτον, ἐπειδή ἀπειροὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἂι δυνάμεις ἐφαίνοντο, πειραθήναι συλλαβεῖν Εἰς ἐν, ὅτι πᾶσας ταύτας προσαγορεύσωμεν τὰς δυνάμεις.

1 ἀποφαίνων om. T.; Burnet brackets.

1 A simple form of the first statement would be: The square roots of 3, 5, etc., are irrational numbers or surds. The word δύναμις has not the meaning which we give in English to "power," namely the result of multiplication of a number by itself, but that which we give to "root," i.e. the number which, when multiplied by itself, produces a given result. Here Theaetetus is speaking of square roots only; and when he speaks of numbers and of equal factors
some art; for we give in our answer something that knowledge belongs to, when that was not what we were asked.

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. Secondly, when we might have given a short, everyday answer, we go an interminable distance round; for instance, in the question about clay, the everyday, simple thing would be to say "clay is earth mixed with moisture" without regard to whose clay it is.

THEAET. It seems easy just now, Socrates, as you put it; but you are probably asking the kind of thing that came up among us lately when your namesake, Socrates here, and I were talking together.

soc. What kind of thing was that, Theaetetus?

THEAET. Theodorus here was drawing some figures for us in illustration of roots, showing that squares containing three square feet and five square feet are not commensurable in length with the unit of the foot, and so, selecting each one in its turn up to the square containing seventeen square feet; and at that he stopped. Now it occurred to us, since the number of roots appeared to be infinite, to try to collect them under one name, by which we could henceforth call all the roots.¹

he evidently thinks of rational whole numbers only, not of irrational numbers or fractions. He is not giving an exhaustive presentation of his investigation, but merely a brief sketch of it to illustrate his understanding of the purpose of Socrates. Toward the end of this sketch the word δίναιμος is limited to the square roots of "oblong" numbers, i.e. to surds. The modern reader may be somewhat confused because Theaetetus seems to speak of arithmetical facts in geometrical terms. (Cf. Gow, Short History of Greek Mathematics, p. 85.)
"Τιν ή καὶ δοκούμεν, ἵνα σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ."

『Λέγε.』

『Τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν· τὸν μὲν δυνάμενον ἵσον ἰσάκις γίγνεσθαι τῷ τετραγώνῳ τὸ σχῆμα ἀπεικάσαντες τετράγωνόν τε καὶ ἴσῳ-πλευρον προσεῖπομεν.』

『Καὶ εὖ γέ.』

『Τὸν τούτων μεταξὺ τούτο, ὅν καὶ τὰ 148 τρία καὶ τὰ πέντε καὶ πᾶς ὁ ἄδυνατος ἵσος ἰσάκις γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἢ πλείων ἐλαττονάκις ἢ ἑλάττων πλεονάκις γίγνεται, μεῖζων δὲ καὶ ἑλάττων ἀεὶ πλευρὰ αὐτὸν περιλαμβάνει, τῷ προμῆκει αὐτῷ σχήματι ἀπεικάσαντες προμήκῃ ἄριθμον ἐκαλέ-σαμεν.』

『Καλλιστα. Ἀλλὰ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο;』

『"Οσαι μὲν γραμμαί τὸν ἴσοπλευρόν καὶ ἐπίπεδον ἄριθμόν τετραγωνίζουσιν, μήκος ἄριστό-μεθα, ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἐτερομήκῃ, δυνάμεις, ὡς μήκει B μὲν ὦ συμμέτρους ἐκείνας, τοῖς δ' ἐπίπεδοις ἄρ- δύναται. καὶ περὶ τὰ στερεὰ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.』

『"Ἀριστά γ' ἀνθρώπων, ὦ παῖδες· ὅστε μοι δοκεῖ ὁ Θεόδωρος οὐκ ἐνοχὸς τοῖς ψευδομαρ-τυρίως ἐσεσθαι.』

『Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σωκράτε, ὦ γε ἔρωτάς περὶ ἐπιστήμης, οὐκ ἄν δυναίμην ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὡσπερ περὶ τοῦ μήκους καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως. καίτοι σὺ γέ μοι δοκεῖς τοιούτον τι ἦντείν· ὅστε πάλιν αὕτη φαίνεται ψευδὴς ὁ Θεόδωρος.』

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THEAETETUS

soc. And did you find such a name?

theaet. I think we did. But see if you agree.

soc. Speak on.

theaet. We divided all number into two classes. The one, the numbers which can be formed by multiplying equal factors, we represented by the shape of the square and called square or equilateral numbers.

soc. Well done!

theaet. The numbers between these, such as three and five and all numbers which cannot be formed by multiplying equal factors, but only by multiplying a greater by a less or a less by a greater, and are therefore always contained in unequal sides, we represented by the shape of the oblong rectangle and called oblong numbers.

soc. Very good; and what next?

theaet. All the lines which form the four sides of the equilateral or square numbers we called lengths, and those which form the oblong numbers we called surds, because they are not commensurable with the others in length, but only in the areas of the planes which they have the power to form. And similarly in the case of solids.¹

soc. Most excellent, my boys! I think Theodorus will not be found liable to an action for false witness.

theaet. But really, Socrates, I cannot answer that question of yours about knowledge, as we answered the question about length and square roots. And yet you seem to me to want something of that kind. So Theodorus appears to be a false witness after all.

¹ That is, cubes and cube roots.
C. Τί δέ; εἰ σε πρὸς δρόμουν ἑπαίνων μηδενι
οὐτω δρομικῷ ἐφή τῶν νέων ἐντετυχηκέναι, εἰτα
διαθέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστον ἡττηθής,
ήττον τι ἄν οἷει ἀληθή τοῦ ἐπαινέσαι;

ΤΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγγυη.

ΣΠ. 'Αλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὡσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ
ἐλεγον, σμικρόν τι οἷει εἶναι ἐξευρεῖν καὶ οὐ τῶν
πάντη ἄκρων;

ΤΕΑΙ. Νὴ τὸν Δί' ἔγγυη καὶ μάλα γε τῶν ἀκρο-
tάτων.

ΣΠ. Θάρρει τοίνυν περὶ σαυτῶ καὶ τί οὖν

D. Θεοδώρων λέγειν, προθυμήθητι δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ
τῶν τε ἄλλων περὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον, τί
ποτε τυγχάνει οὖν.

ΤΕΑΙ. Προθυμίας μὲν ἑνεκα, οὐ Σώκρατες, φα-
νεῖται.

6. ΣΠ. 'Ἰθι δὴ—καλῶς γὰρ ἁρτὶ ύφηγήσω—
πειρῶ μμοῦμενος τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπό-
κρισιν, ὡσπερ ταύτας πολλὰς οὕσας ἐνὶ εἶδει
περιέλαβες, οὕτω καὶ τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐνὶ
λόγῳ προσεπεῖν.

Ε. ΤΕΑΙ. 'Αλλ' εὖ ὑσθι, οὐ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις δὴ
αὐτὸ ἐπεξείρησα σκέφτασθαι, ἀκούων τὰς παρὰ
σοῦ ἀποφερομένας ἐρωτήσεις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε
αὐτὸς δύναμαι πείσαι ἐμαυτὸν ὡς ἰκανῶς τὶ λέγω,
οὔτ' ἄλλου ἀκούσαι λέγοντος οὕτως ὡς ὑπὸ διακε-
λεύει· οὐ μὲν δὴ αὕτ' ἀπαλλαγήναι τοῦ μέλεων.1

ΣΠ. 'Ὀδύνεις γὰρ, ὁ φίλε θεαίτητε, διὰ τὸ μὴ
κενὸς ἀλλ' ἐγκύμων εἶναι.

ΤΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οἶδα, οὐ Σώκρατες· ὃ μέντοι πέπονθα
λέγω.

1 μέλεων B, Berol. et γρ. W (and Burnet); μέλλεων T; εὑρέων W.
soc. Nonsense! If he were praising your running and said he had never met any young man who was so good a runner, and then you were beaten in a race by a full grown man who held the record, do you think his praise would be any less truthful?

THEAET. By Zeus, I think it is a task for the very ablest.

soc. Then you must have confidence in yourself, and believe that Theodorus is right, and try earnestly in every way to gain an understanding of the nature of knowledge as well as of other things.

THEAET. If it is a question of earnestness, Socrates, the truth will come to light.

soc. Well then—for you pointed out the way admirably just now—take your answer about the roots as a model, and just as you embraced them all in one class, though they were many, try to designate the many forms of knowledge by one definition.

THEAET. But I assure you, Socrates, I have often tried to work that out, when I heard reports of the questions that you asked, but I can neither persuade myself that I have any satisfactory answer, nor can I find anyone else who gives the kind of answer you insist upon; and yet, on the other hand, I cannot get rid of a feeling of concern about the matter.

soc. Yes, you are suffering the pangs of labour. Theaetetus, because you are not empty, but pregnant.

THEAET. I do not know, Socrates; I merely tell you what I feel.
149 ση. Εἶτα, ὦ καταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὡς ἐγὼ εἶμι ὑσ παῖς μᾶλα γενναῖας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαυναρέτης;

θεαί. Ἡδὴ τοῦτό γε ἡκουσα.
ση. 'Αρα καὶ, ὥσ ἐπιτυδεύω τὴν αὐτὴν τέχνην, ἀκήκοας;
θεαί. Οὐδαμῶς.
ση. Ἀλλ' εὖ ἵσθι ὅτι· μη μὲντοι μου κατείπης πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους. λέληθα γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ταύτην ἐχων τὴν τέχνην· οἱ δὲ, ἀτε ὦκ εἴδοτες, τοῦτο μὲν οὐ λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν. ἢ καὶ τοῦτο ἀκήκοας;

B θεαί. Ἐγώγε.
ση. Εἶπο δὲν σοι τὸ αὐτίουν;
θεαί. Πάνυ μὲν δὲν.
ση. Ἐννόησον δὴ τὸ περὶ τᾶς μαίας ἀπαν ὡς ἔχει, καὶ ράον μαθήσει ὁ βούλομαι. οἴσθα γάρ ποὺ ὡς οὐδεμία αὐτῶν ἐτί αὐτὴ κυσκομένη τε καὶ τίκτουσα ἀλλὰς μαιεύεται, ἀλλ' αἱ ἤδη ἄδυνατοι τίκτειν.

θεαί. Πάνυ μὲν δὲν.
ση. Αἰτίαι δὲ γε τοῦτον φασίν εἶναι τὴν Ἄρτημιν, ὅτι ἄλοχος οὔσα τὴν λοχείαν εἰληχε. στερί-

C φαίς μὲν οὖν ἀρα οὗκ ἔδωκε μαιεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἡ λαβεῖν τέχνην ὁν ἂν ἡ ἀπείρος· ταῖς δὲ δι' ἑλικίαν ἀτόκοις προσέταξε τμῆσα τὴν αὐτῆς ὁμοιότητα.

θεαί. Εἰκός.
ση. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε εἰκός τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον,
THEAETETUS

soc. Have you then not heard, you absurd boy, that I am the son of a noble and burly midwife, Phaenarete?

THEAET. Yes, I have heard that.

soc. And have you also heard that I practise the same art?

THEAET. No, never.

soc. But I assure you it is true; only do not tell on me to the others; for it is not known that I possess this art. But other people, since they do not know it, do not say this of me, but say that I am a most eccentric person and drive men to distraction. Have you heard that also?

THEAET. Yes, I have.

soc. Shall I tell you the reason then?

THEAET. Oh yes, do.

soc. Just take into consideration the whole business of the midwives, and you will understand more easily what I mean. For you know, I suppose, that no one of them attends other women while she is still capable of conceiving and bearing but only those do so who have become too old to bear.

THEAET. Yes, certainly.

soc. They say the cause of this is Artemis, because she, a childless goddess, has had childbirth allotted to her as her special province. Now it would seem she did not allow barren women to be midwives, because human nature is too weak to acquire an art which deals with matters of which it has no experience, but she gave the office to those who on account of age were not bearing children, honouring them for their likeness to herself.

THEAET. Very likely.

soc. Is it not, then, also likely and even necessary,
τὰς κυούσας καὶ μὴ γυνώσκεσθαι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν μαίων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων;

ἡκαὶ.

καὶ μὴν καὶ διδοῦσαι γε αἰ μαίαι φαρμάκια δ καὶ ἐπάδονται τίνη ἐγείρειν τε τὰς ὀδὸνας καὶ μαλακώτερας, ἂν βούλωνται, ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτειν τε δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ εἰνάν νέον ὅν ἡ δόξη ἀμβλύσκειν, ἀμβλύσκουσιν;

ἡκαὶ. Ἡστι ταῦτα.

ἀρ' οὖν ἔτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἡθησαι, ὅτι καὶ προμνήστριαὶ εἰσὶν δεινόταται, ὡς πάσοσοφοι οὖσαι περὶ τοῦ γνώμαν ποίαν χρή ποιῶ ἀνδρὶ συνοῦσαι ὅς ἀρίστους παῖδας τίκτειν;

ἡκαὶ. Οὔ πάνυ τοῦτο οἶδα.

Ἀλλ' ἵσθι ὅτι ἐπὶ τούτω μείζον φρονοῦσιν ἐπὶ τῆς ὁμοφαλητομίας. ἐννόει γάρ· τῆς αὐτῆς ἡ ἄλλης οἷς τέχνης εἶναι θεραπείαν τε καὶ συγκομιδὴν τῶν ἐκ γῆς καρπῶν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ γυνώσκευν εἰς ποίαν γῆν ποίον φυτὸν τε καὶ σπέρμα καταβλητέον;

ἡκαὶ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς.

Εἰς γυναῖκα δὲ, ὃ φίλε, ἄλλην μὲν οἷεὶ τοῦ τουτοῦτου, ἄλλην δὲ συγκομιδῆς;

ἡκαὶ. Οὐκοῦν εἰκὸς γε.

150 ἑπὶ. Ὅψιν γάρ. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἄδικον τε καὶ ἄτεχνων συναγωγῆν ἄνδρος καὶ γυναικὸς, ἡ δὴ προςαγωγία ὅνομα, φεύγουσι καὶ τὴν προμνήστριν ἂτε σεμναὶ οὖσαι αἰ μαίαι, φοβοῦμενα μὴ εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν αἰτίαν διὰ ταῦτην ἐμπέσωσιν· ἐπεὶ

1 νέον ὅν of the mss. is impossible; Schanz suggests νόμον "lawful," Adam νηδόν "the womb." Possibly Plato wrote ἀνετέον "permissible."
that midwives should know better than anyone else who are pregnant and who are not?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And furthermore, the midwives, by means of drugs and incantations, are able to arouse the pangs of labour and, if they wish, to make them milder, and to cause those to bear who have difficulty in bearing; and they cause miscarriages if they think them desirable.

Theaet. That is true.

Soc. Well, have you noticed this also about them, that they are the most skilful of matchmakers, since they are very wise in knowing what union of man and woman will produce the best possible children?

Theaet. I do not know that at all.

Soc. But be assured that they are prouder of this than of their skill in cutting the umbilical cord. Just consider. Do you think the knowledge of what soil is best for each plant or seed belongs to the same art as the tending and harvesting of the fruits of the earth, or to another?

Theaet. To the same art.

Soc. And in the case of a woman, do you think, my friend, that there is one art for the sowing and another for the harvesting?

Theaet. It is not likely.

Soc. No; but because there is a wrongful and unscientific way of bringing men and women together, which is called pandering, the midwives, since they are women of dignity and worth, avoid match-making, through fear of falling under the charge of pandering.
PLATO

taîs ge òntow s maïais mînais pou prôsîkei kai
prommûzasaî bôrodôs.

Ωeai. Phaînetai.

Σn. Tò mèn toînun tòw maïów tosoûton, élattôn
dè toû èmôv drâmatoû. Oý gâr prôsûstei gûnaiçîn
B ènîote mèn eiîwala tîktein, èstî ð' òte èlôthînà,
touto dé mî bâdion eînai diângwônai. Eî gâr
prôsîn, mégiöstôn te kai kàllîsston èrjgon ãn
taîs maïais tô krîneîn tô èlîthês te kai mîh. ãn
ouk oîeî;

Ωeai. "Egôye.

7. Σn. Tê dé ã' èmî têxh tês maieûsèwos
tà mèn allà ùpàrxei ðsa èkeînai, diaferei dé tòw
tê àndras allà mî gûnaiças maieûsèthai kai tòw
tàs fûxhâs autôn tûktoûsas èpistikopeîn allà mî
tà sômata. Mégiöstôn dé toût' ën tê ëmetèra
C têxh, basanîzièn dûnatôn eînai panti tròpou,
pôtetôn èiîwlon kai fêdôs àpòtîktei toû néou ã
diànoia ã gônymôn te kai èlîthês. ëpetî tôde ge
kai èmîl' ùpàrxei, õper taîs maîais: ägonôs èimû
sofîsías, kai õper ãîðî polloi môi ónveîdisan, ãs
toûs mèn allous èrwortô, autôs dé oûdên àpokrî-
nomai õpê oûdenos diá tò mhdên èxein sofôn,
èlîthês ónveîdîsouôn. Tô dé àitîoun toûtou tôde:
maieûsèthai me ð theôs ânagkàžeî, gennân dé àpekô-
îsouen. ëimî ãî dî ouû autôs mèn ou pànu tis sofôs,
D oûdè tî mói èstîn eûrîmà toînûton gegovôs tês
èmîs fûxhîs èkgyonon. Oû ð' èmîl' suvgyngînomenô
n toû mèn prîtûnon fâînontai ènou môn kai pànû ãtâthês,
pántes dé prôîouûs tês sînuouíais, õîsteîr ãv ð
theôs parêîkê, thámastôn òsson èpîxîdôntes, ãs

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And yet the true midwife is the only proper match-maker.

Theaet. It seems so.

Soc. So great, then, is the importance of midwives; but their function is less important than mine. For women do not, like my patients, bring forth at one time real children and at another mere images which it is difficult to distinguish from the real. For if they did, the greatest and noblest part of the work of the midwives would be in distinguishing between the real and the false. Do you not think so?

Theaet. Yes, I do.

Soc. All that is true of their art of midwifery is true also of mine, but mine differs from theirs in being practised upon men, not women, and in tending their souls in labour, not their bodies. But the greatest thing about my art is this, that it can test in every way whether the mind of the young man is bringing forth a mere image, an imposture, or a real and genuine offspring. For I have this in common with the midwives: I am sterile in point of wisdom, and the reproach which has often been brought against me, that I question others but make no reply myself about anything, because I have no wisdom in me, is a true reproach: and the reason of it is this: the god compels me to act as midwife, but has never allowed me to bring forth. I am, then, not at all a wise person myself, nor have I any wise invention, the offspring born of my own soul; but those who associate with me, although at first some of them seem very ignorant, yet, as our acquaintance advances, all of them to whom the god is gracious make wonderful progress, not only
αὐτοὶς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσιν· καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργεῖς ὅτι παρ' ἐμοῖς οὔδὲν πώποτε μαθόντες, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ παρ' αὐτῶν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ εὐρόντες τε καὶ τεκόντες.1 τῆς μέντοι μαιείας ὁ θεός τε καὶ ἐγὼ αἴτιος. ὥδε δὲ δῆλον· πολλοὶ ἦδη

Ε τοῦτο ἀγνοήσαντες καὶ ἔαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι, ἐμοὶ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ αὐτοὶ ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλων πειθόντες ἀπήλθον πρωΐτερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἀπελθόντες δὲ τὰ τὰ λοιπὰ ἐξήμβλωσαν διὰ πονηρὰν συνοπτικάν καὶ τὰ υπ' ἐμοῦ ματειβέντα κακῶς τρέφοντες ἀπώλεσαν, ὑσευδή καὶ εἰδωλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἁλθοῦς, τελευτώντες δ' αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδοξαν ἀμαθείς εἶναι. ὅν εἰς γέγονεν

151 Ἀριστείδης ο Λυσσαμάχου καὶ ἄλλοι πάντες πολλοὶ οἶς, ὅταν πάλιν ἐλθωσί δεόμενοι τῆς ἐμῆς συνουσίας καὶ θαυμαστὰ δρώντες, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενον μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλόμενος, ἐνίοις δὲ ἐὰ, καὶ πάλιν οὕτοι 2 ἐπιδιδόσας. πάσχοσι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ συγγεγυμνομένοι καὶ τοῦτο ταύταν ταῖς τικτούσαις· ὑδίνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπτύππαλανται νῦκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκεῖναι 3 ταύτην δὲ τὴν ὑδίνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀποπούειν ἢ ἐμῇ τέχνῃ δύναται. καὶ οὕτως μὲν Β δὴ οὕτως. ἐνίοις 4 δὲ, ὦ Θεαῖττη γς, οἱ ἄν μοι μὴ δόξωσί πως ἐγκύμωνες εἶναι, γνοὺς ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δέονται, πάντα εὐμενῶς προμνώμαι καὶ, σὺν

1 καὶ τεκόντες W, Berol.; κατέχοντες BT.
2 οὕτοι Τ; αὐτοὶ B.
3 ἐκεῖναι B; κεῖναι T.
4 ἐνίοι Berol., Burnet; ἐνίοτε BT; ἐνιοὶ W.
in their own opinion, but in that of others as well. And it is clear that they do this, not because they have ever learned anything from me, but because they have found in themselves many fair things and have brought them forth. But the delivery is due to the god and me. And the proof of it is this: many before now, being ignorant of this fact and thinking that they were themselves the cause of their success, but despising me, have gone away from me sooner than they ought, whether of their own accord or because others persuaded them to do so. Then, after they have gone away, they have miscarried thenceforth on account of evil companionship, and the offspring which they had brought forth through my assistance they have reared so badly that they have lost it; they have considered impostures and images of more importance than the truth, and at last it was evident to themselves, as well as to others, that they were ignorant. One of these was Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus, and there are very many more. When such men come back and beg me, as they do, with wonderful eagerness to let them join me again, the spiritual monitor that comes to me forbids me to associate with some of them, but allows me to converse with others, and these again make progress. Now those who associate with me are in this matter also like women in childbirth; they are in pain and are full of trouble night and day, much more than are the women; and my art can arouse this pain and cause it to cease. Well, that is what happens to them. But in some cases, Theaetetus, when they do not seem to me to be exactly pregnant, since I see that they have no need of me, I act with perfect goodwill.
PLATO

θεῶ εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἰκανῶς τοπάζω οἷς ἂν συγγενόμενοι ὤναιτο· ἂν πολλοὺς μὲν δὴ ἐξεδώκα Ἀριστοτέλη, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλοις σοφοῖς τε καὶ θεσπεσίοις ἀνδράσι.

Ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ὦ ἄριστε, ἕνεκα τοῦτο ἐμήκυνα, ὑποπτεύων¹ σε, ὅσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς οἶει, ὦδόν τι κυνόντα ἐνδον. προσφέρου ὅσιν πρὸς μὲ ὦσ πρὸς

C μαίας ὅσιν καὶ αὐτῶν μαυετυκῶν, καὶ ὃ ἂν ἔρωτο προθυμοῦ ὅπως οἷός τ’ εἶ ὦτος ἀποκρίνασθαι· καὶ ἐὰν ἁρα σκοποῦμενός τι ὅσιν ἂν λέγησι ἡγήσωμαι εἶναι ὑπεξαίρωμαι καὶ ἀποβάλλω,² μὴ ἀγρίανε ὦσπερ αἱ πρωτοτόκοι περὶ τὰ παιδία. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἦδη, ὦ θαυμάσει, πρὸς μὲ ὦτοι διετέθησαν, ὅσιε ἀτεχνῶς ἀκνευν ἐτομοὶ εἶναι, ἐπειδὰν τινα λήρων αὐτῶν ἀφαιρώμαι, καὶ ὦκ οὐνταί με εὐνοία τοῦτο ποιεῖν,

D πόρρω ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδεὶς θεός δύσνοις ἄνθρώποις, οὐδ’ ἐγὼ δυσνοία τοιούτων οὐδεν δρώ, ἀλλὰ μοι ᾨσίδος τε συγχωρήσαι καὶ ἁλθῆς ἀφανίσαι οὐδαμῶς θέμας. πάλιν δὴ ὅσιν έξ ἁρχῆς, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὁ τί ποτ’ ἐστίν ἐπιστήμη, πειρῶ λέγειν· ὅσι δ’ οὐχ οἷός τ’ εἶ, μηδέποτ’ εἴπης. ἐὰν γὰρ θεός ἐθέλη καὶ ἀνδρίζῃ, οἷός τ’ ἐσεί.

8. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοὶ γε ὦτω παρακελευμένου αἰσχρόν μὴ οὐ παντὶ Ετρόπωσ προθυμεῖσθαί, ὁ τί τις ἔχει λέγειν. Δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὅ ἐπιστάμενος τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο ὁ ἐπιστάται, καὶ ὅς γε νυνὶ φαίνεται, οὖκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἡ αἰσθήσις.

¹ υποπτευων B; υποπτευω al.
² ἀποβάλλω Τ; υποβάλω B; ἀποβάλω W.
as match-maker and, under God, I guess very successfully with whom they can associate profitably, and I have handed over many of them to Prodicus, and many to other wise and inspired men.

Now I have said all this to you at such length, my dear boy, because I suspect that you, as you yourself believe, are in pain because you are pregnant with something within you. Apply, then, to me, remembering that I am the son of a midwife and have myself a midwife's gifts, and do your best to answer the questions I ask as I ask them. And if, when I have examined any of the things you say, it should prove that I think it is a mere image and not real, and therefore quietly take it from you and throw it away, do not be angry as women are when they are deprived of their first offspring. For many, my dear friend, before this have got into such a state of mind towards me that they are actually ready to bite me, if I take some foolish notion away from them, and they do not believe that I do this in kindness, since they are far from knowing that no god is unkind to mortals, and that I do nothing of this sort from unkindness, either, and that it is quite out of the question for me to allow an imposture or to destroy the true. And so, Theaetetus, begin again and try to tell us what knowledge is. And never say that you are unable to do so; for if God wills it and gives you courage, you will be able.

Theaet. Well then, Socrates, since you are so urgent it would be disgraceful for anyone not to exert himself in every way to say what he can. I think, then, that he who knows anything perceives that which he knows, and, as it appears at present, knowledge is nothing else than perception.
PLATO

ση. Ἐν γε καὶ γενναίως, ὦ παῖ: χρῆ γὰρ οὕτως ἀποφανόμενον λέγειν. ἀλλὰ φέρε δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῆ σκεφτώμεθα, γόνυμον ἢ ἀνεμαιῶν τυγχάνει ὦν. ἀισθήσεις, φής, ἐπιστήμη;

ὁεϊ. Ναὶ.

ση. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαύλον εἰρη-152 κέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ' ὦν ἐλεγε καὶ Πρωτ-

αγόρας. τρόπον δὲ τινα ἄλλον εἰρήκε τὰ αὐτὰ
tαύτα. φησι γὰρ ποὺ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον

ἀνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἐστὶ, τῶν δὲ

μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἐστιν. ἀνέγνωκας γὰρ ποὺ;

ὁεϊ. Ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις.

ση. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἐκα-

στα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἐστὶν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ

σοὶ, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὐ σοί: ἀνθρωπος δὲ σὺ τε καγώ;

ὁεϊ. Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτω.

Β ση. Εὐκός μέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν. ἐπ-

ακολουθήσωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ. ἂρ' οὐκ ἐνίοτε πνεον-

tος ἀνέμου τού αὐτοῦ ὃ μὲν Ἦμων ῥίγοι, ὃ δ' οὖ;

καὶ ὃ μὲν ἧρέμα, ὃ δὲ σφόδρα;

ὁεϊ. Καὶ μάλα.

ση. Πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸ ἔφ' ἐαυτοῦ τὸ

πνεῦμα ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν; ἡ πεισόμεθα

τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ὅτι τῷ μὲν ρίγοιντι ψυχρόν, τῷ

dὲ μὴ οὖ;

ὁεϊ. ᾠΕοκέν.

ση. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτω ἐκατέρω;

ὁεϊ. Ναὶ.

1 ἐαυτοῦ W, Berol.; ἐαυτὸ BT.
soc. Good! Excellent, my boy! That is the way one ought to speak out. But come now, let us examine your utterance together, and see whether it is a real offspring or a mere wind-egg. Perception, you say, is knowledge?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And, indeed, if I may venture to say so, it is not a bad description of knowledge that you have given, but one which Protagoras also used to give. Only, he has said the same thing in a different way. For he says somewhere that man is "the measure of all things, of the existence of the things that are and the non-existence of the things that are not." You have read that, I suppose?

THEAET. Yes, I have read it often.

soc. Well, is not this about what he means, that individual things are for me such as they appear to me, and for you in turn such as they appear to you—you and I being "man"?

THEAET. Yes, that is what he says.

soc. It is likely that a wise man is not talking nonsense; so let us follow after him. Is it not true that sometimes, when the same wind blows, one of us feels cold, and the other does not? or one feels slightly and the other exceedingly cold?

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Then in that case, shall we say that the wind is in itself cold or not cold; or shall we accept Protagoras's saying that it is cold for him who feels cold and not for him who does not?

THEAET. Apparently we shall accept that.

soc. Then it also seems cold, or not, to each of the two?

THEAET. Yes.
PLATO

ςω. Τὸ δὲ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐστιν;

θεαί. Ἕστων γὰρ.

ςω. Φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταύτων ἐν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. οἶα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἐκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἐκάστω καὶ κινδυνεύει εἰναι.

θεαί. Ἕνικεν.

ςω. Αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος αεί ἐστιν καὶ ἀφευδές ως ἐπιστήμην οὖσα.

θεαί. Φαίνεται.

ςω. ὁ Ἁρ' οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσσοφός τις ἦν ὁ Πρωταγόρας, καὶ τούτῳ Ἦμιν μὲν ἦν ἄκητο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐλέγεν;

θεαί. Πῶς δὴ, ὡς Σώκρατες, τοῦτο λέγεις;

ςω. Ἔγω ἐρῶ καὶ μάλ' οὐ φαίλον λόγον· ὅσ ἄραι ἐν μὲν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἀν τι προσείποις ὅρθως οὐδ' ὑποιονούν τι, ἀλλ', ἐὰν ὡς μέγα προσαγορεύῃς, καὶ σμικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρύ, κοῦφον, ἐξυπαντά τε τούτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἐνός μῆτε των μῆτε ὑποιονοῦν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἀλληλα γίγνεται πάντα α' δὴ φαίνει εἶναι, οὐκ ὅρθως προσαγορεύοντες· ἐστὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ' οὐδέν, ἀεὶ ὑπὲρ λέγεται. καὶ περὶ τούτων πάντως ξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδον συμφερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ άκροι τῆς ποιησεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὁμηρος, ὡς 2 εἶτὼν Ὁμηρόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν

1 συμφερέσθων B (ut videtur), Burnet; συμφέρεσθον TW, Berol., Eus.; συμφέροντα Stobaeus.
2 ὡς add. Heindorf.
soc. But "seems" denotes perceiving?

THEAET. It does.

soc. Then seeming and perception are the same thing in matters of warmth and everything of that sort. For as each person perceives things, such they are to each person.

THEAET. Apparently.

soc. Perception, then, is always of that which exists and, since it is knowledge, cannot be false.

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. By the Graces! I wonder if Protagoras, who was a very wise man, did not utter this dark saying to the common herd like ourselves, and tell the truth¹ in secret to his pupils.

THEAET. Why, Socrates, what do you mean by that?

soc. I will tell you and it is not a bad description, either, that nothing is one and invariable, and you could not rightly ascribe any quality whatsoever to anything, but if you call it large it will also appear to be small, and light if you call it heavy, and everything else in the same way, since nothing whatever is one, either a particular thing or of a particular quality; but it is out of movement and motion and mixture with one another that all those things become which we wrongly say "are"—wrongly, because nothing ever is, but is always becoming. And on this subject all the philosophers, except Parmenides, may be marshalled in one line—Protagoras and Heraclitus and Empedocles—and the chief poets in the two kinds of poetry, Epicharmus, in comedy, and in tragedy, Homer, who, in the line

Oceanus the origin of the gods, and Tethys their mother²

¹ An allusion to the title of Protagoras's book, Truth.
² Homer, Iliad. xiv. 201, 302.
πάντα εἴρηκεν ἐκγόνα ῥοῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως. ἦ
οὐ δοκεῖ τούτῳ λέγειν;

τοῖς οὖν ἀν ἔτι πρὸς γε τοσοῦτον

υμηρον δύνατο ἀμφισβητήσας μὴ οὐ 1 καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι;

Ωδίου, ὥς Σώκρατες.

σο. οὐ γὰρ, ὥς Θεαίτητε. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε τοῦ

κάτω γεμιζαὶ ἵκανα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ

gέγενοσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ

ἀπόλλυσθαι ἥσυχία. τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν τε καὶ πῦρ,

δὴ καὶ τάλλα γεννᾶ καὶ ἐπιτροπεύει, αὐτὸ γεννᾶ-

tαι ἐκ φοράς καὶ τρίψεως. τούτῳ 2 δὲ κινήσει.

ὁ οὐχ αὕται γενέσεις πυρὸς;

B ΘΕΑΙ. Αὕται μὲν οὖν.

σο. Καὶ μὴν τὸ γε τῶν ζωῶν γένος ἐκ τῶν

αὐτῶν τούτων φύεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὖν;

σο. Τί δὲ; ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἔξις οὖχ ὑπὸ ἥσυ-

χίας μὲν καὶ ἄργιας διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ

καὶ κινήσεων ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ 3 σφίζεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

σο. Ἡ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξις οὖχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως

μὲν καὶ μελέτης, κινήσεων ὄντων, 4 κτάται τε

μαθήματα καὶ σφίζεται καὶ γίγνεται βελτίων, ὑπὸ

d' ἥσυχίας, ἀμελητησίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας οὕσης.

ὁ οὖτε τι μανθάνει ἢ τε ἄν μάθη ἐπιλανθάνεται;

1 μὴ οὐ W, Eus., Stobaeus; μὴ BT.
2 τούτῳ B¹W, Berol.; τούτῳ BT, Stobaeus.
3 ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ B, Stobaeus; ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ T (ὡς above the

line); ἐπὶ πολὺ Burnet.
4 κινήσεων οὕσων Stobaeus; κινήσεων ὄντων Buttman.
THEAETETUS

has said that all things are the offspring of flow and motion; or don't you think he means that?

THEAET. I think he does.

soc. Then who could still contend with such a great host, led by Homer as general, and not make himself ridiculous?

THEAET. It is not easy, Socrates.

soc. No, Theaetetus, it is not. For the doctrine is amply proved by this, namely, that motion is the cause of that which passes for existence, that is, of becoming, whereas rest is the cause of non-existence and destruction; for warmth or fire, which, you know, is the parent and preserver of all other things, is itself the offspring of movement and friction, and these two are forms of motion. Or are not these the source of fire?

THEAET. Yes, they are.

soc. And furthermore, the animal kingdom is sprung from these same sources.

THEAET. Of course.

soc. Well, then, is not the bodily habit destroyed by rest and idleness, and preserved, generally speaking, by gymnastic exercises and motions?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And what of the habit of the soul? Does not the soul acquire information and is it not preserved and made better through learning and practice, which are motions, whereas through rest, which is want of practice and of study, it learns nothing and forgets what it has learned?
PLATO

θεαί. Καὶ μάλα.

σὲ. Τὸ μὲν ἀρα ἀγαθὸν κύνης κατὰ τε ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τούναντίον;

θεαί. "Εσούκεν.

σὲ. "Ετι οὖν σοι λέγω νηπεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὁσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἥσυχαί σήμουσι καὶ ἀπολλύσαι, τὰ δὲ ἐτερα σώζει; καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφώνα ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζον, 1 τὴν χρυσῆν σειράν ώς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡ τὸν ἠλιον "Ομήρος λέγει,

D καὶ δὴλοι ὅτι ἐως μὲν ἂν ἡ περιφορὰ ἢ κινουμένη καὶ ὁ ἠλιος, πάντα ἔστι καὶ σώζεται τὰ ἐν θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις, εἰ δὲ σταῖη τοῦτο ὡσπερ δεθέν, πάντα χρῆματ' ἂν διαφθαρεῖν καὶ γένοιτ' ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἂνω κάτω πάντα;

θεαί. 'Αλλ' ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὡ Σωκράτες, τάῦτα δηλοῦν, ἀπερ λέγεις.

10. σὲ. 'Ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὡ ἀριστε, οὔτωσι· κατὰ τὰ ὁμματα πρῶτον, δὴ καλεῖς χρώμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἐτερὸν τι ἐξώ τῶν σῶν ὁμμάτων μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὁμμασί· μηδὲ τιν' αὐτῷ Εχώραν ἀποτάξῃς· ἦδη γὰρ ἂν εἰή τε δὴπου 2 ἐν τάξει καὶ μένων 3 καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν γενέσει γίγνοιτο.

θεαί. 'Αλλ' Πῶς;

1 ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζον TW, Berol.; ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζον B, Stobaeus; προσβιβάζω (omitting ἀναγκάζω) Cobet, followed by Burnet. Possibly ἀναγράφω προσβιβάζον.

2 δήπου Schanz; ἂν ποὺ BT.

3 καὶ μένων Stobaeus: κείμενοι pr. B (corr. καὶ μένοι); κείμενον T.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. Certainly.
soc. Then the good, both for the soul and for the body, is motion, and rest is the opposite?
THEAET. Apparently.
soc. Now shall I go on and mention to you also windless air, calm sea, and all that sort of thing, and say that stillness causes decay and destruction and that the opposite brings preservation? And shall I add to this the all-compelling and crowning argument that Homer by "the golden chain"\(^1\) refers to nothing else than the sun, and means that so long as the heavens and the sun go round everything exists and is preserved, among both gods and men, but if the motion should stop, as if bound fast, everything would be destroyed and would, as the saying is, be turned upside down?

THEAET. Yes, Socrates, I think he means what you say he does.

soc. Then, my friend, you must apply the doctrine in this way: first as concerns vision, the colour that you call white is not to be taken as something separate outside of your eyes, nor yet as something inside of them; and you must not assign any place to it, for then it would at once be in a definite position and stationary and would have no part in the process of becoming.

THEAET. But what do you mean?

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\(^1\) Homer, *Iliad*, viii. 18 ff., especially 36. In this passage Zeus declares that all the gods and goddesses together could not, with a golden chain, drag him from on high, but that if he pulled, he would drag them, with earth and sea, would then bind the chain round the summit of Olympus, and all the rest would hang aloft. This "crowning argument" is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the habit of using texts from Homer in support of all kinds of doctrine.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

σ. Ἐπώμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐν ὦν τιθέντες· καὶ ήμῖν οὐτω μέλαν τε καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ὅτι οὖν ἄλλο χρώμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγενημένον, καὶ ὁ δὴ ἐκαστὸν εἶναι

154 φαμεν χρώμα, οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἐσται, ἄλλα μεταξὺ τι ἐκάστῳ ἰδιον γεγονός· ἡσυχασίᾳ ἂν ὡς, οἶον σοὶ φαίνεται ἐκαστὸν χρώμα, τοιούτοι καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὄτωθεν ζῷῳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγνωγε.

σ. Τί δὲ; ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπῳ ἀρ' ὀμοίων καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὅτι οὖν; ἔχεις τοῦτο ἰσχυρῶς, ἡ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὅτι οὐδὲ σοὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτον διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ὀμοίως αὐτὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦτο μᾶλλον μοι δοκεῖ ἡ ἐκεῖνο.

σ. Ὑποκοῦν εἰ μὲν Ὅ ἐπαρμετρούμεθα ἡ σοῦ
Β ἐφαπτόμεθα, μέγα ἡ λευκὸν ἡ θερμὸν ἢ, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἄλλῳ προσπεσοῦν ἄλλῳ ἄν ἐγεγόνει, αὐτῷ γε μηδὲν μεταβάλλον· εἰ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ παραμετρούμενον ἡ ἐφαπτόμενον ἐκαστὸν ἢ τοῦτον, οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ ἄλλου προσελθόντος ἢ τι παθόντος αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθῶν ἄλλο ἄν ἐγένετο. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε, Ὅ φιλε, θαυμαστᾶ τε καὶ γελοία εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα λέγειν, ὡς φαίνῃ ἄν Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ πᾶς ὁ τα αὐτὰ ἐκείνῳ ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν.

1 Ὅ mss. ; Ὅ Cornarius.
soc. Let us stick close to the statement we made a moment ago, and assume that nothing exists by itself as invariably one: then it will be apparent that black or white or any other colour whatsoever is the result of the impact of the eye upon the appropriate motion, and therefore that which we call colour will be in each instance neither that which impinges nor that which is impinged upon, but something between, which has occurred, peculiar to each individual. Or would you maintain that each colour appears to a dog, or any other animal you please, just as it does to you?

THEAET. No, by Zeus, I wouldn't.

soc. Well, does anything whatsoever appear the same to any other man as to you? Are you sure of this? Or are you not much more convinced that nothing appears the same even to you, because you yourself are never exactly the same?

THEAET. Yes, I am much more convinced of the last.

soc. Then, if that with which I compare myself in size, or which I touch, were really large or white or hot, it would never have become different by coming in contact with something different, without itself changing; and if, on the other hand, that which did the comparing or the touching were really large or white or hot, it would not have become different when something different approached it or was affected in some way by it, without being affected in some way itself. For nowadays, my friend, we find ourselves rather easily forced to make extraordinary and absurd statements, as Protagoras and everyone who undertakes to agree with him would say.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς δή καὶ ποιὰ λέγεις;

Σ. Σμικρὸν λαβὲ παράδειγμα, καὶ πάντα εἴσει ἄ βουλομαι. ἀστραγάλους γάρ ποι ἐξ, ἂν μὲν τέτταρας αὐτοῖς προσενέγκης, πλεῖον φαμὲν εἶναι τῶν τεττάρων καὶ ἡμιολίους, ἕαν δὲ δώδεκα, ἐλάττους καὶ ἡμίσεις· καὶ οὐδὲ ἀνεκτὸν ἄλλως λέγειν· ἥ σοι ἀνέξει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Σ. Τι οὖν; ἂν σὲ Πρωταγόρας ἔρηται ἥ τις ἄλλος· ὃ Θεαίτητε, ἐσθ' ὅπως τι μείζον ἡ πλέον γίγνεται ἄλλως ἡ αὐξηθέν; τί ἀποκρινεῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Εὰν μὲν, ὃ Σώκρατες, τὸ δοκοῖν πρὸς ὃ τὴν νῦν ἐρώτησιν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν. ἕαν δὲ πρὸς τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἶπω, ὅτι ἔστιν.

Σ. Ἐν γε νὴ τῆν Ἡραν, ὃ φίλε, καὶ θείως. ἀτάρ, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἕαν ἀποκρίνῃ ὅτι ἔστιν, Εὐριπί- δεῖον τι ἔμμβησεται· ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλώττα ἄνελεγκτος ἧμῖν ἔσται, ἡ δὲ φρήν οὐκ ἄνελεγκτος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ σοῦ ἦμεν, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἐξητακότες, ἦδη ἄν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ περιουσίας ἄλληλων ἀποπειρώμενοι, Εὐσυνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τουιάτην, ἄλλη- λων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν· νῦν δὲ ἄτε ἰδίωται πρῶτον βουλησόμεθα θεάσασθαι αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ, τὶ ποτ’ ἔστιν ἃ διανοούμεθα, πότερον ἥμιν ἄλληλοις ἔμμβωμει ἡ οὐδ’ ὀπωστιοῦν.

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THEAETETUS

THEAET. What do you mean? What statements?
SOC. Take a little example and you will know all I have in mind. Given six dice, for instance, if you compare four with them, we say that they are more than the four, half as many again, but if you compare twelve with them, we say they are less, half as many; and any other statement would be inadmissible; or would you admit any other?

THEAET. Not I.

SOC. Well then, if Protagoras, or anyone else, ask you, "Theaetetus, can anything become greater or more in any other way than by being increased?" what reply will you make?

THEAET. If I am to say what I think, Socrates, with reference to the present question, I should say "no," but if I consider the earlier question, I should say "yes," for fear of contradicting myself.

SOC. Good, by Hera! Excellent, my friend! But apparently, if you answer "yes" it will be in the Euripidean spirit; for our tongue will be un-convinced, but not our mind.¹

THEAET. True.

SOC. Well, if you and I were clever and wise and had found out everything about the mind, we should henceforth spend the rest of our time testing each other out of the fulness of our wisdom, rushing together like sophists in a sophistical combat, battering each other's arguments with counter arguments. But, as it is, since we are ordinary people, we shall wish in the first place to look into the real essence of our thoughts and see whether they harmonize with one another or not at all.

¹ Eurip. Hippol. 612, ἡ γλῶσσα διώμοχ', ἡ δὲ φρήν ἄνωμοτος, "my tongue has sworn, but my mind is unsworn."
ΩΕΑΙ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν ἐγώγε τοῦτ' ἄν βουλοῖμην.

II. Ξ. Καὶ μὴν ἐγώ. οὔτε δ' οὔτως ἔχει, ἀλλ' τι ἡ ἡρέμα, ὡς πάντα πολλὴν σχολὴν ἄγοντες,

155 πάλιν ἐπανασκεφόμεθα, οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὃντι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἔκεκτάζοντες, ἄττα ποτ' ἐστὶν ἡντα τὰ δύσματα ἐν ἡμῖν; ὃν πρῶτον ἐπισκοποῦντες φήσομεν, ὡς έγὼ οἶμαι, μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἀν ἑλλάδι μηδὲ ἐλαττόν γενέσθαι μήτε ὅγκῳ μήτε ἀριθμῷ, ἐως ἵσον εἰ ἀυτὸ ἑαυτῷ. οὐχ οὔτως;

ΩΕΑΙ. Ναι.

Σ. Δεύτερον δὲ γε, ὦ μήτε προστυθοῖτο μήτε ἀφαιροῖτο, τοῦτο μήτε αὐξάνεσθαι ποτε μήτε φθίνειν, ἀεὶ δὲ ἵσον εἶναι.

ΩΕΑΙ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.

Β Σ. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ τρίτον, ὦ μή πρῶτερον Ἦ, ύστερον ἀλλὰ τοῦτο εἰναὶ ἄνευ τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον;

ΩΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ γε δή.

Σ. Ταύτα δή, οἶμαι, δομολογήματα τρία μάχεται αὐτὰ αὐτῶς ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ, ὅταν τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀστραγάλων λέγωμεν, ἡ ὅταν φώμεν ἔμε τηλικούνθε ὁντα, μήτε αὐξηθέντα μήτε τούναντίου παθόντα, ἐν ἐναυτῷ σοῦ τοῦ νέου νῦν μὲν μελίζω εἶναι, ύστερον δὲ ἐλάττω, μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὅγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος

C ἀλλὰ σοῦ αὐξηθέντος. εἰμὶ γὰρ δὴ ύστερον δὴ πρῶτερον οὐκ Ἦ, οὐ γενόμενος· ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ γενέσθαι γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον, μηδὲν δὲ ἀπολλύς τοῦ ὅγκου οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐγιγνόμην ἐλάττων. καὶ ἀλλὰ δὴ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίους οὔτως ἔχει, εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα

1 ύστερον ἀλλὰ ΒΤ (schol. ὁ Πρόκλος τὸ ἀλλὰ παρέλκειν λέγει, ἵε. ἀλλὰ is transposed to the second place); ἀλλὰ ύστερον Stephanus et al.

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THEAETETUS

THEAET. Certainly that is what I should like.

soc. And so should I. But since this is the case, and we have plenty of time, shall we not quietly, without any impatience, but truly examining ourselves, consider again the nature of these appearances within us? And as we consider them, I shall say, I think, first, that nothing can ever become more or less in size or number, so long as it remains equal to itself. Is it not so?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And secondly, that anything to which nothing is added and from which nothing is subtracted, is neither increased nor diminished, but is always equal.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. And should we not say thirdly, that what was not previously could not afterwards be without becoming and having become?

THEAET. Yes, I agree.

soc. These three assumptions contend with one another in our minds when we talk about the dice, or when we say that I, who do not, at my age, either increase in size or diminish, am in the course of a year first larger than you, who are young, and afterwards smaller, when nothing has been taken from my size, but you have grown. For I am, it seems, afterwards what I was not before, and I have not become so; for it is impossible to have become without becoming, and without losing anything of my size I could not become smaller. And there are countless myriads of such contradictions, if we are to accept these that I have mentioned. You follow
παραδέξομεθα. ἐπεισεν γὰρ ποι, ὧν Θεαίτητε- δοκεῖσ γοῦν μοι οὐκ ἀπειρος τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι.

_thenai. Καὶ νὰ τοὺς θεοὺς γε, ὡ Σῶκρατες, ὑπερ-

φυῶς ὡς θαυμάζω τὶ ποτὲ ἐστὶ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐνίστε ὡς ἀληθῶς βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδινῶ.

 DEM. Θεόδωρος γὰρ, ὧ φίλε, φαίνεται οὐ κακῶς
tοπάζειν περὶ τῆς φύσεως σου. μάλα γὰρ φιλο-

σόφον τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν’ οὐ γὰρ ἀλλή ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἡ αὐτή, καὶ ἐοικεν ὁ τὴν Ἰρμ Θαύμαντός ἐκγονὸν φήσας οὐ κακῶς γενεα-

λογεῖν. ἀλλὰ πότερον μιαθάνεις ἡδὴ δὲ ὁ ταῦτα
tοιαῦτ’ ἐστίν ἐξ ὅν τὸν Πρωταγόραν φαμέν

λέγειν, ἡ οὔπω;

_thenai. Οὔπω μοι δοκῶ.

DEM. Χάριν οὖν μοι εἴσει, ἐὰν σοι ἀνδρός, μᾶλ-

λον δὲ ἀνδρῶν ὀνομαστῶν τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην σωμφοριευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν;

_thenai. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ εἴσομαι, καὶ πάνυ γε πολλὴν;

12. DEM. Ἀθρεῖ δὴ περισσοτέρων μή τις τῶν ἀμυντῶν ἐπακούῃ. εἰσίν δὲ οὗτοι οἱ οὐδὲν ἀλλος

οἵμονοι εἶναι η ὡς ἂν δύνησαι ἀπρίξ τοῖς χερῶιν

λαβέσθαι, πράξεις δὲ καὶ γενέσεις καὶ πάν τὸ ἀφρα-
tον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει.

_thenai. Καὶ μὲν δή, ὡ Σῶκρατες, σκληροὺς γε

156 λέγεις καὶ ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους.

DEM. Εἰσίν γὰρ, ὧ παῖ, μᾶλ’ εἰ ἄμουσοι· ἀλλοι
dὲ πολὺ κομψότεροι, ὡς ἦλιοι σοι τὰ μυστήρια

λέγειν. ἀρχή δὲ, ἐξ ἓς καὶ ἂ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν

πάντα ἡρτηται, ἢ δε αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πάν κύνηγος ἢ

καὶ ἀλλο παρὰ πάντο τοῦτο οὔδέν, τῆς δὲ κυνήσεως δύο

1 ἐπεῖ Heindorf; εἰπὲ BT.

2 ἐξ ἓς W²b; ἐξῆς BTW.
me, I take it, Theaetetus, for I think you are not new at such things.

Theaet. By the gods, Socrates, I am lost in wonder when I think of all these things, and sometimes when I regard them it really makes my head swim.

Soc. Theodorus seems to be a pretty good guesser about your nature. For this feeling of wonder shows that you are a philosopher, since wonder is the only beginning of philosophy, and he who said that Iris was the child of Thaumas¹ made a good genealogy. But do you begin to understand why these things are so, according to the doctrine we attribute to Protagoras, or do you not as yet?

Theaet. Not yet, I think.

Soc. And will you be grateful to me if I help you to search out the hidden truth of the thought of a famous man or, I should say, of famous men?

Theaet. Of course I shall be grateful, very grateful.

Soc. Look round and see that none of the uninitiated is listening. The uninitiated are those who think nothing is except what they can grasp firmly with their hands, and who deny the existence of actions and generation and all that is invisible.

Theaet. Truly, Socrates, those you speak of are very stubborn and perverse mortals.

Soc. So they are, my boy, quite without culture. But others are more clever, whose secret doctrines I am going to disclose to you. For them the beginning, upon which all the things we were just now speaking of depend, is the assumption that everything is real motion and that there is nothing besides this,

¹ Hes. Theog. 780. Iris is the messenger of heaven, and Plato interprets the name of her father as "Wonder" (ṇaṇuàma).
εἰδή, πλήθει μὲν ἁπειρον ἐκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὀμλιάς τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται ἔκγονα πλήθει μὲν ἁπειρα, δίδυμα δὲ, τὸ μὲν Β αἰσθητόν, τὸ δὲ αἰσθησις, άεί συνεκτίπτονυσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. αἱ μὲν οὐν αἰσθή- σεις τὰ τοιάδε ἤμιν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὀψεις τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὀσφρήσεις καὶ ψύξεις τε καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἱδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λύπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι κεκλημέναι καὶ ἄλλαι, ἀπέραντοι μὲν αἱ ἀνώνυμοι, παμπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ἀνομισμέναι· τὸ δ' αὖ αἰσθητόν γένος τούτων ἐκάσταις ὀμόγονον, ὀψεῖς μὲν χρώ- ματα παντοδαπαῖς παντοδαπά, ἀκοαῖς δὲ ὠσάντως

C φωναί, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεις τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητά ἐξαγενῆ γιγνόμενα. τί δὴ οὖν ἡμῖν βουλεῖται οὕτως ὁ μῆθος, ὁ Θεότητε, πρὸς τὰ πρότερα; ἄρα ἐννοεῖς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ, ὡς Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἄθρει, ἐάν πως ἀποτελεσθῇ. βουλεῖται γὰρ δὴ λέγειν ὡς ταῦτα πάντα μὲν, ὦσπερ λέγομεν, κανεῖται, τάχος δὲ καὶ βραδυτῆς ἐνι τῇ κυνήσει αὐτῶν. ὅσον μὲν οὐν βραδύ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πλησιάζοντα τὴν κύνησιν ἱσχει καὶ οὕτω δὴ

D γεννα, τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὕτω δὴ θάττῳ ἐστὶν. φέρεται γὰρ καὶ ἐν φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἡ κύνησις πέφυκεν. ἐπειδὰν οὐν ὃμα καὶ ἀλλο τῷ τούτῳ ξυμ- μέτρων πλησιάσαν γεννήσῃ τὴν λευκότητα τε καὶ αἰσθησις αὐτῇ ἔγινον, ἄ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐγένετο ἐκατέρου ἐκείνων πρὸς ἄλλο ἐλθόντος, τότε δὴ μεταξὺ φερομένων τῆς μὲν ὀψεῖς πρὸς τῶν ὀφθαλ-
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but that there are two kinds of motion, each infinite in the number of its manifestations, and of these kinds one has an active, the other a passive force. From the union and friction of these two are born offspring, infinite in number, but always twins, the object of sense and the sense which is always born and brought forth together with the object of sense. Now we give the senses names like these: sight and hearing and smell, and the sense of cold and of heat, and pleasures and pains and desires and fears and so forth. Those that have names are very numerous, and those that are unnamed are innumerable. Now the class of objects of sense is akin to each of these; all sorts of colours are akin to all sorts of acts of vision, and in the same way sounds to acts of hearing, and the other objects of sense spring forth akin to the other senses. What does this tale mean for us, Theaetetus, with reference to what was said before? Do you see?

THEAET. Not quite, Socrates.

SOC. Just listen; perhaps we can finish the tale. It means, of course, that all these things are, as we were saying, in motion, and their motion has in it either swiftness or slowness. Now the slow element keeps its motion in the same place and directed towards such things as draw near it, and indeed it is in this way that it begets. But the things begotten in this way are quicker; for they move from one place to another, and their motion is naturally from one place to another. Now when the eye and some appropriate object which approaches beget whiteness and the corresponding perception—which could never have been produced by either of them going to anything else—then, while sight from the eye and white-
Ε μόν, τής δὲ λευκότητος πρὸς τοῦ συναπτόκτοντος τὸ χρώμα, ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἁρα ὤφεως ἐμπλεως ἐγένετο καὶ ὅρα δὴ τότε καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ τι ὄφις ἀλλ' ὀφθαλμὸς ὅρων, τὸ δὲ ἐγυγγενήσαν τὸ χρώμα λευκότητος περιπλήσθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ λευκότης αὐτὸλα λευκόν, εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε ὅτουον ¹ ἁυνέβη χρώμα ² χρωσθήναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι. καὶ τάλα δὴ οὗτω, σκληροὶ καὶ θερμοὶ καὶ πάντα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑποληπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ 157 μηδὲν εἶναι, δὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἐλέγομεν, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἀλληλα ὅμιλα πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ τὴς κινήσεως, ἐπει καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναι τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ ἔνος νοῆσαι, ὡς φασίν, οὐκ εἶναι παγίως. οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἔστι τι, πρὶν ἂν τῷ πάσχοντι συνελθῇ, οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι· τό τε των συνελθὼν καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλως αὐτὸ προσπεσον πάσχον ἀνεφάνη. ὡστε εξ ἀπάντων τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τῳ ἄει γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ εἶναι Β πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον, οὐχ ὅτι ἥμεις πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι ἡγακόμεθα ὡτὸ συνηθείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημο- σύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ. τὸ δ' οὐ δεὶ, ὡς ὁ τῶν σοφῶν λόγος, οὔτε τι συγχωρεῖν οὔτε τον οὗτος ἐμοῦ οὔτε τόδε οὔτε ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄνομα ὃ τι ἀν ἱστητ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι γιγνόμενα καὶ ποιοῦμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα· ὡς εάν τί τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὐθελεγκτος δ' τοῦτο

1 ὅτουον Schanz; ὅτου οὖν BT; ὅτῳον Campbell; ὅτων vulg., Burnet.
2 χρώμα BT; χρῆμα Heindorf, Burnet; σχῆμα Schanz.
ness from that which helps to produce the colour are moving from one to the other, the eye becomes full of sight and so begins at that moment to see, and becomes, certainly not sight, but a seeing eye, and the object which joined in begetting the colour is filled with whiteness and becomes in its turn, not whiteness, but white, whether it be a stick or a stone, or whatever it be the hue of which is so coloured. And all the rest—hard and hot and so forth—must be regarded in the same way: we must assume, we said before, that nothing exists in itself, but all things of all sorts arise out of motion by intercourse with each other; for it is, as they say, impossible to form a firm conception of the active or the passive element as being anything separately; for there is no active element until there is a union with the passive element, nor is there a passive element until there is a union with the active; and that which unites with one thing is active and appears again as passive when it comes in contact with something else. And so it results from all this, as we said in the beginning, that nothing exists as invariably one, itself by itself, but everything is always becoming in relation to something, and "being" should be altogether abolished, though we have often—and even just now—been compelled by custom and ignorance to use the word. But we ought not, the wise men say, to permit the use of "something" or "somebody's" or "mine" or "this" or "that" or any other word that implies making things stand still, but in accordance with nature we should speak of things as "becoming" and "being made" and "being destroyed" and "changing"; for anyone who by his mode of speech makes things
ποιών. δεὶ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ
περὶ πολλῶν ἄθροισθέντων, ὡ δὴ ἄθροίσματι
C ἁνθρωπόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἐκαστὸν ζῴόν
τε καὶ εἶδος. ταύτα δὴ, ὃ Θεοίτητε, ἀρ' ἥδεα
dokeῖ σοι εἶναι, καὶ γενόμοι ἂν αὐτῶν ὡς ἀρεσ-
kόντων;

θεαί. Οὐκ οἶδα ἐγώγε, ὃ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ
οὐδὲ περὶ σοῦ δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι, πότερα δοκοῦντά
σοι λέγεις αὐτὰ ἡ ἐμοὶ ἀποπειρᾶ.

σμ. Οὐ μνημονεύεις, ὃ φίλε, ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτ'
οἶδα οὕτε ποιοῦμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμὸν, ἀλλ'
eimi αὐτῶν ἄγονος, σὲ δὲ μαιεύμαθα εἰς τοῦτον ἐνεκα
ἐπάδω τε καὶ παρατίθημι ἐκάστῶν τῶν σοφῶν ἀπο-

D γεύσασθαι, ἐως ἂν εἰς φῶς τὸ σὸν δόγμα ξυν-
exagαγών. ἔξαχθέντος δὲ τὸτ' ἡδη σκέψομαι εἰτ'
ἀνεμιαίον εἴτε γόνιμον ἀναφανῆσεται. ἀλλὰ
θαρρῶν καὶ καρτερῶν εὖ καὶ ἄνδρειως ἀποκρίνου
ἀν φαίνηται σοι περὶ ὑν ἂν ἐρωτῶ.

θεαί. Ἡρώτα δή.

13. σμ. Λέγε τοῖνυν πάλιν, εὑρὶ σοι ἀρέσκει
τὸ μὴ τι εἶναι ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι ἂν ἄγαθὸν καὶ
kalον καὶ πάντα ἑ ἀρτι διήμεν.

θεαί. Ἀλλ' ἐμοιγε, ἐπειδὴ σοῦ ἀκοῦω οὕτω
dieξίοντος, θαυμασίως φαίνεσθαι ὡς ἔχεω λόγον
καὶ ὑποληπτέον ἱπτερ διεληλυθὰς.

Ε σμ. Μή τοῖνυν ἀπολίπωμεν ὁσὸν ἐλλείπον
αὐτοῦ. λειπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε πέρι καὶ νόσων,
tων τε ἄλλων καὶ μανίας, ὃσα τε παρακούειν
ἡ παρορᾶν ἢ τι ἄλλο παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται.

1 ἄγαθὸν καὶ kalὸn mss.; secl. Ast.
THEAETETUS

stand still is easily refuted. And we must use such expressions in relation both to particular objects and collective designations, among which are “mankind” and “stone” and the names of every animal and class. Do these doctrines seem pleasant to you, Theaetetus, and do you find their taste agreeable?

THEAET. I don’t know, Socrates; besides, I can’t tell about you, either, whether you are preaching them because you believe them or to test me.

SOC. You forget, my friend, that I myself know nothing about such things, and claim none of them as mine, but am incapable of bearing them and am merely acting as a midwife to you, and for that reason am uttering incantations and giving you a taste of each of the philosophical theories, until I may help to bring your own opinion to light. And when it is brought to light, I will examine it and see whether it is a mere wind-egg or a real offspring. So be brave and patient, and in good and manly fashion tell what you think in reply to my questions.

THEAET. Very well; ask them.

SOC. Then say once more whether the doctrine pleases you that nothing is, but is always becoming —good or beautiful or any of the other qualities we were just enumerating.

THEAET. Why, when I hear you telling about it as you did, it seems to me that it is wonderfully reasonable and ought to be accepted as you have presented it.

SOC. Let us, then, not neglect a point in which it is defective. The defect is found in connexion with dreams and diseases, including insanity, and everything else that is said to cause illusions of sight and hearing and the other senses. For of course
οίσθα γάρ ποι φι τι ἐν πάσι τούτοις ὁμολογομένως ἐλέγχεσθαι δοκεί ὃν ἄρτι διήμεν λόγον, ὡς παντὸς 158 μᾶλλον ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς αἰσθήσεις ἐν αὐτοῖς γιγνομένας, καὶ πολλοὶ δεὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάν τοῦναντίον οὔδεν ὅιν φαίνεται εἶναι.

 theano. Ἀληθεστάτα λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ση. Τίς δὴ οὖν, ὁ παῖ, λείπεται λόγος τῷ τῷν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιστήμην τιθεμένῳ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἰναι τούτῳ ὅιν φαίνεται;

 theano. Ἐγὼ μὲν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὅκιν ἐπείδη ὅτι οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω, δοτὶ μοι νῦν δὴ ἐπέπληξας εἴπόντι B αὐτῷ. ἐπεί ὃς ἀλήθως γε οὖν ἀν δυναύμην ἀμφισβητῆσαι ὅσ τι μανύμενοι ἢτι ἀν ὑπορῶττοντες οὗ τευδή δοξάζονσιν, ὅταν οἳ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν οὖνται εἶναι, οἳ ἐτ πηροὶ τε καὶ ὅσ περόμενοι ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ διανοῶνται.

ση. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐδὲ τῷ τοὐνδὲ ἀμφισβητῆσαι ἐνοσεῖς περὶ αὐτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τοῦ ὄναρ τε καὶ ὑπαρ;

 theano. Τὸ ποῖον;

ση. Ὁ πολλάκις σε οἶμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἔρωτῶντων, τί ἂν ταῖς ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδείξει, εἰ τις ἔροιτο νῦν οὕτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πότερον καθεύδομεν καὶ πάντα δι διανοούμεθα ὑπερώττομεν, ἥ ἐγρηγόραμεν C τε καὶ ὑπαρ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμεθα.

 theano. Καὶ μήν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀποροῦν γε ὅτῳ χρή ἐπιδείξει τεκμήριῳ πάντα γὰρ ὅτι προ ἀντιστροφα τὰ αὕτα παρακολουθεῖ. ᾧ τὲ γὰρ νῦνι διειλέγεμεθα, οὔδεν κωλὺς καὶ ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ δοκεῖν

1 δεὶ mss.; δὲν Heindorf, followed by Schanz and Wohlrab.
2 χρη TW; χρόνω χρη B; χρεὼν Hultsch. 62
you know that in all these the doctrine we were just presenting seems admittedly to be refuted, because in them we certainly have false perceptions, and it is by no means true that everything is to each man which appears to him; on the contrary, nothing is which appears.

THEAET. What you say is very true, Socrates.

soc. What argument is left, then, my boy, for the man who says that perception is knowledge and that in each case the things which appear are to the one to whom they appear?

THEAET. I hesitate to say, Socrates, that I have no reply to make, because you scolded me just now when I said that. But really I cannot dispute that those who are insane or dreaming have false opinions, when some of them think they are gods and others fancy in their sleep that they have wings and are flying.

soc. Don’t you remember, either, the similar dispute about these errors, especially about sleeping and waking?

THEAET. What dispute?

soc. One which I fancy you have often heard. The question is asked, what proof you could give if anyone should ask us now, at the present moment, whether we are asleep and our thoughts are a dream, or whether we are awake and talking with each other in a waking condition.

THEAET. Really, Socrates, I don’t see what proof can be given; for there is an exact correspondence in all particulars, as between the strophe and antistrophe of a choral song. Take, for instance, the conversation we have just had: there is nothing to prevent us from imagining in our sleep also that we
πον, Όρας οὖν ὅτι τό γε ἀμφισβητήσαι οὐ χαλεπόν, ὄτε καὶ πότερον ἐστίν ὑπαρ ἦ ὄναρ ἀμφισβητεῖται, καὶ δὴ ἵσον ὄντος τοῦ χρόνου ὃν καθεύδομεν ἢ ἐγρηγόραμεν, ἐν ἐκατέρω διαμάχεται ἡμῶν ἡ ἐφικῇ τὰ ἀεὶ παρόντα δόγματα παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὡστε ἵσον μὲν χρόνον τάδε φαμὲν ὄντα εἶναι, ἵσον δὲ ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ὀμοίως ἐφ᾽ ἐκατέρως δισχυρίζόμεθα.

θεαί. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

σημ. Ὅγκοιν καὶ περὶ νόσων τε καὶ μανιῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, πλὴν τοῦ χρόνου ὃτι οὐχὶ ἵσος;

θεαί. Ὅρθως.

σημ. Τῇ οὖν; πλὴθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλιγότητι τὸ ἀληθῆς ὀρισθήσεται;

Ε θεαί. Γελοίον μὲν τὸν ἐν εἰ̇ν πολλαχῇ.

σημ. Ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄλλα ἐχεῖς σαφῆς ἐνδείξασθαι, ὅποια τούτων τῶν δοξασμάτων ἀληθῆ;

θεαί. Ὅμω μοι δοκῶ.

14. σημ. Ἐμοὶ τοῖνν ἄκουε οἷα περὶ αὐτῶν ἃν λέγοιεν οἱ τὰ ἀεὶ δοκοῦντα δριξόμενοι τῷ δοκοῦντι εἶναι ἀληθῆ. λέγουσι δὲ, ὡς ἔγω οἶμαι, οὕτως ἐρωτῶντες. "ὡ Θεαίτητε, ὃ ἀν ἔτερον ἢ παντάπασιν, μὴ τῇ τινα δύναμιν τὴν αὐτῆν ἐξεῖ τῷ ἔτερῳ; καὶ μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταύτων εἶναι ὃ ἐρωτῶμεν, τῇ δὲ ἔτερου, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἔτερον."

θεαί. Ἀδύναται τοῖνν ταύτων τί ἐχεῖν ἦ ἐν

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are carrying on this conversation with each other, and when in a dream we imagine that we are relating dreams, the likeness between the one talk and the other is remarkable.

soc. So you see it is not hard to dispute the point, since it is even open to dispute whether we are awake or in a dream. Now since the time during which we are asleep is equal to that during which we are awake, in each state our spirit contends that the semblances that appear to it at any time are certainly true, so that for half the time we say that this is true, and for half the time the other, and we maintain each with equal confidence.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. And may not, then, the same be said about insanity and the other diseases, except that the time is not equal?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Well, then, shall truth be determined by the length or shortness of time?

THEAET. That would be absurd in many ways.

soc. But can you show clearly in any other way which of the two sets of opinions is true?

THEAET. I do not think I can.

soc. Listen, then, while I tell you what would be said about them by those who maintain that what appears at any time is true for him to whom it appears. They begin, I imagine, by asking this question: “Theaetetus, can that which is wholly other have in any way the same quality as its alternative? And we must not assume that the thing in question is partially the same and partially other, but wholly other.”

THEAET. It is impossible for it to be the same in
159 δυνάμει ἡ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὀτιωθήν, ὅταν ἡ κομιδὴ ἔτερον.

ση. Ὄρι οὖν οὐ καὶ ἀνόμιοιον ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τοιοῦτον ὁμολογεῖν;

θεαί. ἔμοι γε δοκεῖ.

ση. Εἴ άρα τι συμβαίνει ὁμοιόν τῷ γίγνεσθαι ἡ ἀνόμιοιον, εἴτε έαυτῷ εἴτε ἄλλῳ, ὁμοιούμενον μὲν ταύτῳ φήσομεν γίγνεσθαι, ἀνόμιογμενον δὲ ἔτερον;

θεαί. Ἀνάγκη.

ση. Οὐκοῦν πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν ὡς πολλὰ μὲν εἴῃ τὰ ποιοῦντα καὶ ἀπειρα, ὡσαύτως δὲ γε τὰ πάσχοντα;

θεαί. Ναί.

ση. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ συμμιγνύμενον καὶ ἄλλῳ οὐ ταύτα ἄλλ' ἔτερα γεννήσει; 

Β θεαί. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ση. Δέλαμεν δὴ ἐμὲ τε καὶ σὲ καὶ τάλλα ἡδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ Σωκράτη αὗ ἄσθενοντα. πότερον ὁμοιον τοῦτ ἐκεῖνω ἡ ἀνόμιοιον φήσομεν;

θεαί. Ἅρα τὸν ἄσθενοντα Σωκράτη, ὅλον τοῦτο λέγεις ὅλῳ ἐκεῖνω, τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι Σωκράτει; 

ση. Κάλλιστα ὑπέλαβες· αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγω.

θεαί. Ἀνόμιοιον δήπολ.

ση. Καὶ ἔτερον ἔρα οὕτως ὥσπερ ἀνόμιοιον;

θεαί. Ἀνάγκη.

ση. Καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ὃ νῦν δὴ

1 Κ διήλθομεν, ὡσαύτως φήσεις;

1 νῦν δὴ Heindorf; νῦν BT.
THEAETETUS

anything, either in quality or in any other respect whatsoever, when it is wholly other.

soc. Must we not, then, necessarily agree that such a thing is also unlike?

THEAET. It seems so to me.

soc. Then if anything happens to become like or unlike anything—either itself or anything else—we shall say that when it becomes like it becomes the same, and when it becomes unlike it becomes other?

THEAET. We must.

soc. Well, we said before, did we not, that the active elements were many—infinitely in fact—and likewise the passive elements?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And furthermore, that any given element, by uniting at different times with different partners, will beget, not the same, but other results?

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Well, then, let us take me, or you, or anything else at hand, and apply the same principle—say Socrates in health and Socrates in illness. Shall we say the one is like the other, or unlike?

THEAET. When you say "Socrates in illness" do you mean to compare that Socrates as a whole with Socrates in health as a whole?

soc. You understand perfectly; that is just what I mean.

THEAET. Unlike, I imagine.

soc. And therefore other, inasmuch as unlike?

THEAET. Necessarily.

soc. And you would say the same of Socrates asleep or in any of the other states we enumerated just now?
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. "Έγωγε.

ΣΝ. "Εκαστὸν δὴ τῶν πεφυκότων τι ποιεῖν ἄλλο τι, ὅταν μὲν λάβῃ ὑγιαίνοντα Σωκράτη, ώς ἔτερῳ μοι χρήσεται, ὅταν δὲ ἁσθενοῦντα, ώς ἔτερῳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ’ οὐ μέλλει; 

ΣΝ. Καὶ έτερα δὴ ἐφ’ ἐκατέρου γεννήσομεν ἐγώ τε ὅ πάσχων καὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΝ. "Ὅταν δὴ οἶνον πίνω ὑγιαῖνον, ἡδὺς μοι φαίνεται καὶ γλυκύς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΣΝ. Ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογημένων τὸ τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύτητα τε καὶ αἰσθήσεις, ἀμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα, καὶ ἡ μὲν αἰσθήσεις πρὸς τὸν πάσχοντος οὖσα αἰσθανομένην τὴν γλώτταν ἀπειράσατο, ἢ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τὸν οὖν περὶ αὐτῶν φερομένη γλυκύν τὸν οἶνον τῇ ὑγιαίνουσῃ γλῶττῃ ἔποιησεν καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν τὰ πρότερα ἡμῖν οὕτως ὁμολόγητο.

ΣΝ. "Ὅταν δὲ ἁσθενοῦντα, ἄλλο τι πρῶτον μὲν τῇ ἄληθείᾳ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν; ἀνομοῖο γὰρ δὴ προσήλθεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΕΣΝ. "Ετερα δὴ αὐτή ἐγεννησάτην ὁ τε τοιοῦτος Σωκράτης καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἶνου πόσις, περὶ μὲν τὴν γλώτταν αἰσθήσεων πικρότητος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἶνον

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THEAETETUS

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Then each of those elements which by the law of their nature act upon something else, will, when it gets hold of Socrates in health, find me one object to act upon, and when it gets hold of me in illness, another?

THEAET. How can it help it?

soc. And so, in the two cases, that active element and I, who am the passive element, shall each produce a different object?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. So, then, when I am in health and drink wine, it seems pleasant and sweet to me?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. The reason is, in fact, that according to the principles we accepted a while ago, the active and passive elements produce sweetness and perception, both of which are simultaneously moving from one place to another, and the perception, which comes from the passive element, makes the tongue perceptive, and the sweetness, which comes from the wine and pervades it, passes over and makes the wine both to be and to seem sweet to the tongue that is in health.

THEAET. Certainly, such are the principles we accepted a while ago.

soc. But when it gets hold of me in illness, in the first place, it really doesn't get hold of the same man, does it? For he to whom it comes is certainly unlike.

THEAET. True.

soc. Therefore the union of the Socrates who is ill and the draught of wine produces other results: in the tongue the sensation or perception of bitter-
γιγνομένην καὶ φερομένην πικρότητα, καὶ τὸν μὲν οὐ πικρότητα ἄλλα πικρόν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐκ αἰσθησιν ἄλλ' αἰσθανόμενον;

ὁεαί. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.

σώ. Οὐκομὲν ἐγὼ τε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποτὲ γεννήσομαι οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος· τοῦ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλη αἰσθησις, 160 καὶ ἄλλοιον καὶ ἄλλοι ποιεῖ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον· οὕτ' ἐκεῖνο το ποιοῦν ἐμὲ μήποτ' ἄλλως συνελθὸν ταὐτὸν γεννήσαν τοιοῦτον γένηται· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλο γεννήσαν ἄλλοιον γενήσεται.

ὁεαί. "Εστι ταῦτα.

σώ. Οὐδὲ μήν ἔγγυνε ἐμαυτῷ τοιοῦτος, ἐκεῖνο τε ἐμαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γενήσεται.

ὁεαί. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

σώ. Ἀνάγκη δὲ γε ἐμὲ τε τινὸς γίγνεσθαί, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος γίγνωμαι· αἰσθανόμενον γὰρ, μηδενὸς δὲ αἰσθανόμενον ἀδύνατον γίγνεσθαι· ἐκεῖνο B τέ τινι γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν γλυκὰ ἢ πικρὸν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται· γλυκὸ γάρ, μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκὸ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι.

ὁεαί. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

σώ. Λείπεται δή, οἶμαι, ἥμιν ἄλληλοις, εἰτ' ἐσμέν, εἶναι, εἰτε γιγνόμεθα, γίγνεσθαι, ἑπείπερ ἥμιν ἢ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐδένα συνδεῖ μὲν, συνδεῖ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὔτ' αὖ ἥμιν αὐτοῖς. ἄλληλοις δὴ λείπεται συνεδέσθαι· ὥστε εἰτε τις εἶναι τι ὀνομάζει, τωὶ εἶναι ἢ τινὸς ἢ πρὸς τι βητέον αὐτῷ,
ness, and in the wine—a bitterness which is engendered there and passes over into the other; the wine is made, not bitterness, but bitter, and I am made, not perception, but perceptive.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Then I shall never have this perception of any other thing; for a perception of another thing is another perception, and makes the percipient different and other: nor can that which acts on me ever by union with another produce the same result or become the same in kind; for by producing another result from another passive element it will become different in kind.

THEAET. That is true.

soc. And neither shall I, furthermore, ever again become the same as I am, nor will that ever become the same as it is.

THEAET. No.

soc. And yet, when I become percipient, I must necessarily become percipient of something, for it is impossible to become percipient and perceive nothing; and that which is perceived must become so to someone, when it becomes sweet or bitter or the like; for to become sweet, but sweet to no one, is impossible.

THEAET. Perfectly true.

soc. The result, then, I think, is that we (the active and the passive elements) are or become, whichever is the case, in relation to one another, since we are bound to one another by the inevitable law of our being, but to nothing else, not even to ourselves. The result, then, is that we are bound to one another; and so if a man says anything "is," he must say it is to or of or in relation to something,
eîte γίγνεσθαι: αὐτὸ δὲ ἐφ' αὐτοῦ τι ἡ ὄν ἡ
C γιγνόμενον οὔτε αὐτῷ λεκτέων οὔτ' ἄλλου λέγοντος
ἀποδεκτέον, ὥς ο λόγος ὅν διεληλύθαμεν σημαίνει.

ὁεαί. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, Ὡ Σώκρατες.

σπ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε δὴ τὸ ἐμὲ ποιοῦν ἐμοὶ ἔστιν
καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῳ, ἐγὼ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι αὐτοῦ, ἄλλος
ἀδ' οὐ;

ὁεαί. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

σπ. Ἀλήθης ἂρα ἐμοὶ ἡ ἐμὴ αἴσθησις . τῆς γὰρ
ἐμῆς οὐσίας αἰ ἔστιν. καὶ ἐγὼ κριτὴς κατὰ τὸν
Πρωταγόραν τῶν τε ὄντων ἐμοὶ, ὡς ἔστι, καὶ τῶν
μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.

ὁεαί. ὩΕοικεν.

D 15. σπ. Πῶς ἄν οὖν ἄφενδὴς ὁν καὶ μὴ
πταίων τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἡ γιγνόμενα οὐκ
ἐπιστήμων ἄν εἰγν ὄνπερ αἴσθητής;

ὁεαί. Οὐδαμῶς ὅπως οὖ.

σπ. Παγκάλως ἂρα σοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἐπιστήμη
οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἔστιν ἡ αἴσθησις, καὶ εἰς ταύτων συμ-
πέπτωκεν, κατὰ μὲν ὁμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ
πᾶν τὸ τοὐτὸν φύλον οἰον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ
πάντα, κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον
πάντων χρημάτων ἀνθρώπων μέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ
E δὲ Θεαίτητον τοῦτων οὔτως ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν
ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι. ἡ γάρ, Ὡ Θεαίτητε; φῶμεν
tοῦτο σοὶ μὲν εἶναι οἶον νεογενεῖς παιδίον, ἐμὸν
dὲ μαλεύμα; ἡ πῶς λέγεις;

ὁεαί. Οὔτως ἀνάγκη, Ὡ Σώκρατες.

σπ. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ, ὡς ἐοικεν, μόλις ποτὲ ἐγεν-
THEAETETUS

and similarly if he says it "becomes"; but he must not say it is or becomes absolutely, nor can he accept such a statement from anyone else. That is the meaning of the doctrine we have been describing.

THEAET. Yes, quite so, Socrates.

SOC. Then, since that which acts on me is to me and to me only, it is also the case that I perceive it, and I only?

THEAET. Of course.

SOC. Then to me my perception is true; for in each case it is always part of my being; and I am, as Protagoras says, the judge of the existence of the things that are to me and of the non-existence of those that are not to me.

THEAET. So it seems.

SOC. How, then, if I am an infallible judge and my mind never stumbles in regard to the things that are or that become, can I fail to know that which I perceive?

THEAET. You cannot possibly fail.

SOC. Therefore you were quite right in saying that knowledge is nothing else than perception, and there is complete identity between the doctrine of Homer and Heracleitus and all their followers—that all things are in motion, like streams—the doctrine of the great philosopher Protagoras that man is the measure of all things—and the doctrine of Theaetetus that, since these things are true, perception is knowledge. Eh, Theaetetus? Shall we say that this is, so to speak, your new-born child and the result of my midwifery? Or what shall we say?

THEAET. We must say that, Socrates.

SOC. Well, we have at last managed to bring this
νήσαμεν, ὃ τι δὴ ποτε τυγχάνει ὃν. μετὰ δὲ τὸν τόκον τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ ὃς ἄλθεός ἐν κύκλῳ περιβρεκτέον τῷ λόγῳ, σκοπουμένου μὴ λάθῃ ἦμᾶς οὖκ ἄξιον ὃν τροφῆς τὸ γεννόμενον, ἀλλὰ ἀνεμιαίον τε καὶ ψεύδος. ἦ σὺ οἴει πάντως δεῖν τὸ γε σὸν τρέφειν καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθέναι, ἦ καὶ ἀνέξει ἐλεγχόμενον ὅρῶν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπανείς, ἐάν τις σοῦ ὡς πρωτοτόκου αὐτὸ ὑφαιρῇ;

θεό. Ἄνεξεται, ὡ Σώκρατες, Θεαίτητος: οὔδαμῶς γὰρ δύσκολος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν εἰπέ, ἦ αὕ οὐχ οὖτως ἔχει;

ζ. Φιλόλογος γ' εἰ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ χρηστός, ὡ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι με οἴει λόγων τινὰ εἶναι θύλακον καὶ βαδίως ἐξελόντα ἔρειν ὡς οὐκ αὕ ἔχει οὖτω ταῦτα.

Β τὸ δὲ γεννόμενον οὖκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι οὖδεὶς τῶν λόγων ἐξέρχεται παρ' ἐμοῦ ἄλλ' ἀεὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμοὶ προσδιαλεγομένου, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον πλὴν βραχέος, ὅσον λόγον παρ' ἐτέρου σοφοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι μετρίως. καὶ νῦν τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι, οὒ τι αὕτως εἴπειν.

θεό. Σὺ κάλλιον, ὡ Σώκρατες, λέγεις: καὶ ποίει οὖτως.

16. ζ. Οἴσθ' οὖν, ὡ Θεόδωρε, ὃ θαυμάζω τοῦ ἐταίρου σου Πρωταγόρου;

C θεό. Τὸ ποίον;

1 The rite called amphidromia took place a few days after the birth of a child. After some ceremonies of purification the nurse, in the presence of the family, carried the
forth, whatever it turns out to be; and now that it is born, we must in very truth perform the rite of running round with it in a circle— the circle of our argument—and see whether it may not turn out to be after all not worth rearing, but only a wind-egg, an imposture. But, perhaps, you think that any offspring of yours ought to be cared for and not put away; or will you bear to see it examined and not get angry if it is taken away from you, though it is your first-born?

Theo. Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates, for he is not at all ill-tempered. But for heaven's sake, Socrates, tell me, is all this wrong after all?

Soc. You are truly fond of argument, Theodorus, and a very good fellow to think that I am a sort of bag full of arguments and can easily pull one out and say that after all the other one was wrong; but you do not understand what is going on: none of the arguments comes from me, but always from him who is talking with me. I myself know nothing, except just a little, enough to extract an argument from another man who is wise and to receive it fairly. And now I will try to extract this thought from Theaetetus, but not to say anything myself.

Theo. That is the better way, Socrates; do as you say.

Soc. Do you know, then, Theodorus, what amazes me in your friend Protagoras?

Theo. What is it?

infant rapidly about the family hearth, thereby introducing him, as it were, to the family and the family deities. At this time the father decided whether to bring up the child or to expose it. Sometimes, perhaps, the child was named on this occasion. In the evening relatives assembled for a feast at which shell-fish were eaten.
πώς ἡ δὲ άρχή τού λόγου τεθαύμακα, οὕτῳ οὐκ εἶπεν ἄρχόμενος τῆς ἀληθείας ὃτι πάντων χρημάτων μέτρων ἐστὶν ὡς ἡ κυνοκέφαλος ἢ τι ἀλλο ἀτοπώτερον τῶν ἐχόντων αἰσθήσεω, ἢν μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ πάνυ καταφρονητικῶς ἢξατο ἡμῖν λέγειν, ἐνδεικνύμενος ὃτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν ὑσπέρ θεόν ἔθαυμαζομεν ἐπὶ σοφία, ὃ δ’ ἀρα ἐτύγχανεν ὡν εἰς φρόνησιν οὐδέν 

D betaivn batrâchoun gurînou, μὴ ὅτι ἀλλον του ἀνθρώπων. ἡ πῶς λέγομεν,1 ὁ Θεόδωρε; εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐκάστῳ ἀληθεία ἐσται δ’ ἂν δ’ αἰσθήσεως δοξάζῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἀλλο πάθος ἄλλος βελτιών διακρινει,2 μήτε τὴν δόξαν κυριωτέρου ἐσται εἰσικεύσασθαι ἐτερος τὴν ἐτέρου, ὁρθῇ ἡ ψευδής, ἄλλ’ ὁ πολλάκις εἰρήται, αὐτὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἐκαστος μόνος δοξάσει, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὀρθα καὶ ἀληθῆ, τὶ δὴ ποτε, δ’ ἐταίρη, Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφὸς, ὡςτε καὶ ἄλλων 

Ε διδάσκαλος ἀξιοῦσθαι δικαίως μετά μεγάλων μυθῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθέστεροι τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἡμῖν ἦν παρ’ ἐκεῖνον, μέτρω ὁντι αὐτῷ ἐκάστῳ τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας; ταῦτα πῶς μὴ φῶμεν δημούμενον λέγειν τὸν Πρωταγόραν; τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς μαιευτικῆς συγω, ὅσον γέλωτα ὀρφλουκάνομεν· οἷμαι δὲ καὶ ξύμπασα ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία. τὸ γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν3 ελέγχειν τὰς ἀλλήλων φαντασίας τε καὶ δόξας, ὀρθὰς ἐκάστου οὐσίας, ὑ μακρα 

1 λέγομεν BT; λέγομεν vulg.
2 διακρινεῖ most editors; διακρίνῃ B (emendation) T.
3 ἐπιχειρεῖν TW; om. B.
soc. In general I like his doctrine that what appears to each one is to him, but I am amazed by the beginning of his book. I don’t see why he does not say in the beginning of his *Truth*¹ that a pig or a dog-faced baboon or some still stranger creature of those that have sensations is the measure of all things. Then he might have begun to speak to us very imposingly and condescendingly, showing that while we were honouring him like a god for his wisdom, he was after all no better in intellect than any other man, or, for that matter, than a tadpole. What alternative is there, Theodorus? For if that opinion is true to each person which he acquires through sensation, and no one man can discern another’s condition better than he himself, and one man has no better right to investigate whether another’s opinion is true or false than he himself, but, as we have said several times, each man is to form his own opinions by himself, and these opinions are always right and true, why in the world, my friend, was Protagoras wise, so that he could rightly be thought worthy to be the teacher of other men and to be well paid, and why were we ignorant creatures and obliged to go to school to him, if each person is the measure of his own wisdom? Must we not believe that Protagoras was “playing to the gallery” in saying this? I say nothing of the ridicule that I and my science of midwifery deserve in that case,—and, I should say, the whole practice of dialectics, too. For would not the investigation of one another’s fancies and opinions, and the attempt to refute them, when each man’s must be

¹ *Truth* was apparently the title, or part of the title, of Protagoras’s book.
162 μὲν καὶ διωλύγιος φλυαρία, εἰ ἀληθῆς ἢ ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλὰ μὴ παίζουσα ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βίβλου ἐφθέγξατο;

ΘΕΟ. Ὡ Σώκρατες, φίλος ἀνήρ, ὡσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ εἴπες. οὐκ ἂν οὖν δεξαίμην δι' ἐμοῦ ὀμολογοῦντος ἐλέγχεσθαι Πρωταγόραν, οὐδ' αὖ σοι παρὰ δόξαν ἀντιτείνειν. τὸν οὖν Θεαίτητον πάλιν λαβέ· πάντως καὶ νῦν δὴ μάλ' ἐμελέως σοι ἐφαίνετο ὑπακούειν.

ση. Ἀρα κἂν εἰς Δακεδαίμονα ἐλθὼν, ὦ Θεό-Βδωρε, πρὸς τὰς παλαιότρας ἁξιόις ἂν ἄλλους θεώμενος γυμνοὺς, ἐνίους φαύλους, αὐτὸς μὴ ἀντεπιδεικνύαι τὸ εἴδος παραποδοῦμενος;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν δοκεῖς, εἴπερ μέλλοιέν μοι ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ πείσεσθαι; ὡσπερ νῦν οίμαι ὡμᾶς πείσεν ἐμὲ μὲν ἐὰν θεάσθαι καὶ μὴ ἔλκειν πρὸς τὸ γυμνᾶσιν σκληρὸν ᾑδὴ ὡντα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε καὶ ἰγροτέρῳ ὄντι προσπαλαίειν.

17. ση. Ἀλλ' εἰ σὺτως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, σοὶ C φιλον, οὐδ' ἐμοὶ ἐχθρόν, φασίν ὦ παροιμιαζόμενοι. πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐπὶ τόν σοφὸν Θεαίτητον ἱτέον. λέγε δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πρῶτον μὲν ἄ νῦν δὴ διῆλθομεν, ἄρα οὐ συνθαυμάζεις; εἰ ἔξαΐφνης σὺτως ἀναφανήσει μηδὲν χείρων εἰς σοφίαν ὅτου ἄνθρωπον ἢ καὶ θεῶν; ἣ ἦπτον τι οὐεί τό Πρωταγόρειον μέτρον εἰς θεοὺς ἢ εἰς ἄνθρώπους λέγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἐγνωγε· καὶ ὡσπερ γε ἑρωτᾶς, πάνυ θαυμάζω. ἡμίκα γὰρ διῆμεν ὄν τρόπον D λέγουεν τὸ δοκοῦν ἕκαστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τῷ δοκοῦντι, πάνυ μοι εὐ ἐφαίνετο λέγεσθαι· νῦν δὲ τούναντίον τάχα μεταπέπτωκεν.

1 συνθαυμάζεις BT; σὺ θαυμάζεις W.
right, be tedious and blatant folly, if the Truth of Protagoras is true and he was not jesting when he uttered his oracles from the shrine of his book?

Theo. Socrates, the man was my friend, as you just remarked. So I should hate to bring about the refutation of Protagoras by agreeing with you, and I should hate also to oppose you contrary to my real convictions. So take Theaetetus again; especially as he seemed just now to follow your suggestions very carefully.

soc. If you went to Sparta, Theodorus, and visited the wrestling-schools, would you think it fair to look on at other people naked, some of whom were of poor physique, without stripping and showing your own form, too?

Theo. Why not, if I could persuade them to allow me to do so? So now I think I shall persuade you to let me be a spectator, and not to drag me into the ring, since I am old and stiff, but to take the younger and nimbler man as your antagonist.

soc. Well, Theodorus, if that pleases you, it does not displease me, as the saying is. So I must attack the wise Theaetetus again. Tell me, Theaetetus, referring to the doctrine we have just expounded, do you not share my amazement at being suddenly exalted to an equality with the wisest man, or even god? Or do you think Protagoras's "measure" applies any less to gods than to men?

Theaet. By no means; and I am amazed that you ask such a question at all; for when we were discussing the meaning of the doctrine that whatever appears to each one really is to him, I thought it was good; but now it has suddenly changed to the opposite.
PLATO

σω. Νέος γὰρ εἰ, ὥς φίλε παῖ, τῆς οὖν δημηγορίας ὁξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθεις. πρὸς γὰρ ταῦτα ἐρεῖ Πρωταγόρας ἢ τις ἄλλος ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ. ὥς γενναίοι παῖδες τε καὶ γέροντες, δημηγορεῖτε συγκαθεζόμενοι, θεοὺς τε εἰς τὸ μέσων ἄγοντες, οὓς ἐγὼ ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ Εαὐτῶν, ὥς εἰσίν ἡ ὥς οὐκ εἰσίν, ἔξαιρῶ, καὶ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ ἂν ἀποδέχοντο ἄκοιντες, λέγετε ταῦτα, ὥς δεινόν εἰ μηδὲν διοίσει εἰς σοφίαν ἐκαστὸς τῶν ἀνθρώπων βοσκήματος Ὀτούν. ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδὲ ἤρτυνον λέγετε, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρήσθη, ὦ εἰ ἔθελοι Θεόδωρος ἡ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖν, ἄξιος οὖσ᾽ ἐνὸς μόνου ἢ ἐν οἷς σκοπεῖτε οὖν σὺ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος, εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογία τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ

163 τηλικούτων ² λεγομένους λόγους.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'ΑΛΛ' οὖ δίκαιον, ὥς Σώκρατες, οὔτε σὺ ὃς οὔτε ἂν ἡμεῖς φαίμεν.

σω. "ΑΛΛῇ δὴ σκεπτέων, ὥς ἕοικεν, ὥς ὃ τε σὸς καὶ ὁ Θεόδωρος λόγος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ἄλλῃ.

σω. Τῇ δὲ σκοπῆσαι εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ ἁίσθησις ταύτον ἢ ἐτερον. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο ποὺ πᾶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔτεινεν, καὶ τοῦτο τὰ πόλλα καὶ ἀτοπα ταῦτα ἐκδικάσαμεν, οὖ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Β σω. 'Η οὖν ὁμολογήσομεν, ἃ τῷ ὅρᾳν ἁίσθα-νόμεθα ἢ τῷ ἄκοινεν, πάντα ταῦτα ἁμα καὶ ἐπιστα-σθαι; οἶον τῶν βαρβάρων πρὶν μαθεῖν τὴν φωνήν πότερον οὐ φησομεν ἄκοινεν, ὅταν φθέγγωνταί, ἥ

1 μόνου] Adam, Class. Rev. iv. p. 103, suggests νόμου, "a coin, a copper."
soc. You are young, my dear boy; so you are quickly moved and swayed by popular oratory. For in reply to what I have said, Protagoras, or someone speaking for him, will say, “Excellent boys and old men, there you sit together declaiming to the people, and you bring in the gods, the question of whose existence or non-existence I exclude from oral and written discussion, and you say the sort of thing that the crowd would readily accept—that it is a terrible thing if every man is to be no better than any beast in point of wisdom; but you do not advance any cogent proof whatsoever; you base your statements on probability. If Theodorus, or any other geometrician, should base his geometry on probability, he would be of no account at all. So you and Theodorus had better consider whether you will accept arguments founded on plausibility and probabilities in such important matters.

THEAET. That would not be right, Socrates; neither you nor we would think so.

soc. Apparently, then, you and Theodorus mean we must look at the matter in a different way.

THEAET. Yes, certainly in a different way.

soc. Well, then, let us look at it in this way, raising the question whether knowledge is after all the same as perception, or different. For that is the object of all our discussion, and it was to answer that question that we stirred up all these strange doctrines, was it not?

THEAET. Most assuredly.

soc. Shall we then agree that all that we perceive by sight or hearing we know? For instance, shall we say that before having learned the language of foreigners we do not hear them when they speak,
άκούειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἄ λέ γουσι; καὶ αὐτῷ γράμματα μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι, βλέποντες εἰς αὐτὰ πότερον οὐχ ὅραν ἢ ἐπίστασθαι εἴπερ ὅρωμεν δι-ισχυριούμεθα;

θεαὶ. Αὐτὸ γε, ὦ Ἐκβαλνε, τούτῳ αὐτῶν, ὅσερ ὅρῳμεν τε καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν· τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ χρώμα ὅραν τε καὶ θέτομεν τῶν δὲ τὴν ὄξυτητα καὶ βαρύτητα ἀκούειν τε ἀμα καὶ εἰδέναι· ὧς δὲ οἱ τε γραμματι- σταὶ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ ἔρμηνεῖς διδάσκουσιν, οὕτε αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ ὅραν ἢ ἀκούειν οὕτε ἐπίστασθαι.

18. ἔν. Ἀριστά γ', ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐκ ἀξιών σοι πρὸς ταύτα ἀμφισβήτησαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ. ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ καὶ τόδε ἀλλο προσιόν, καὶ σκόπει τῇ αὐτῷ διωσόμεθα.

θεαὶ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ;

ἔν. Τὸ τοιόντε· εἰ τις ἔροιτο, "ἀρα δυνατὸν, ὅτου τις ἐπιστήμων γένοιτο ποτε, ἐτὶ ἔχοντα

Δ μνήμην αὐτοῦ τούτου καὶ σωζόμενον, τότε οὗτος ὅτε μέμνηται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτὸ τούτο ὁ μέμνηται;" μακρολογῶ δὲ, ὡς ἔοικε, βουλόμενος ἐρέσθαι, εἰ μαθῶν τίς τι μεμνημένος μὴ οἴδε.

θεαι. Καὶ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατε; τέρας γὰρ ἄν εἴη ὁ λέγεις.

ἔν. Μὴ οὖν ἐγὼ ληρῶ; σκόπει δὲ. ἀρα τὸ ὅραν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγεις καὶ τὴν ὁψιν αἰσθησι; 

θεαὶ. "Ἐγώγε.

ἔν. Οὐκοῦν ὁ ἴδιων τι ἐπιστήμων ἔκεινον γέγονεν 

Ε ὁ εἴδεν κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον;

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or that we both hear and know what they say? And again, if we do not know the letters, shall we maintain that we do not see them when we look at them or that if we really see them we know them?

THEAET. We shall say, Socrates, that we know just so much of them as we hear or see: in the case of the letters, we both see and know the form and colour, and in the spoken language we both hear and at the same time know the higher and lower notes of the voice; but we do not perceive through sight or hearing, and we do not know, what the grammarians and interpreters teach about them.

soc. First-rate, Theaetetus! and it is a pity to dispute that, for I want you to grow. But look out for another trouble that is yonder coming towards us, and see how we can repel it.

THEAET. What is it?

soc. It is like this: If anyone should ask, "Is it possible, if a man has ever known a thing and still has and preserves a memory of that thing, that he does not, at the time when he remembers, know that very thing which he remembers?" I seem to be pretty long winded; but I merely want to ask if a man who has learned a thing does not know it when he remembers it.

THEAET. Of course he does, Socrates; for what you suggest would be monstrous.

soc. Am I crazy, then? Look here. Do you not say that seeing is perceiving and that sight is perception?

THEAET. I do.

soc. Then, according to what we have just said, the man who has seen a thing has acquired knowledge of that which he has seen?
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ς. Τί δέ; μνήμην οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ς. Πότερον οὐδενὸς ἦ τινός;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τινός δὴποι.

ς. Οὐκοῦν ὃν ἔμαθε καὶ ὃν ἦσθετο, τοιούτων τινων;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ς. Ὁ δὴ εἰδέ τις, μέμνηται ποι ἐνίοτε;
ΘΕΑΙ. Μέμνηται.

ς. Ἡ καὶ μύσας; ἢ τοῦτο δράσας ἐπελάθετο;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλα δεινῶν, ὡς Σώκρατες, τοῦτο γε φάναι.

164 ς. Δεῖ γε μέντοι, εἰ σῶσομεν ὁ τῶν πρόσθε λόγον· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐχεταί.
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἐγώ, νη τὸν Δία, ὑποπτεύω, οὐ μὴν ἴκανῶς γε συννοῶ· ἂλλ' εἰπὲ τῇ.

ς. Τῇδε· ὃ μὲν ὅρῶν ἐπιστήμων, φαμέν, τούτου γέγονεν οὔπερ ὅρῶν· ὦμις γὰρ καὶ αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταυτῶν ὁμολόγηται.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω γε.

ς. Ὅ δέ γε ὅρῶν καὶ ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς οὐ εὖρα, ἐὰν μύσῃ, μέμνηται μὲν, οὖν ὅρα δὲ αὐτό. ἦ γάρ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

Β ς. Τὸ δέ γε οὐχ ὅρᾳ οὐκ ἐπίσταται ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ὅρᾳ ἐπίσταται.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλήθη.

ς. Συμβαίνει ἄρα, οὗ τις ἐπιστήμων ἐγένετο,
THEAETETUS

THEAET. Yes.
soc. Well, then, do you not admit that there is such a thing as memory?

THEAET. Yes.
soc. Memory of nothing or of something?

THEAET. Of something, surely.
soc. Of things he has learned and perceived—that sort of things?

THEAET. Of course.
soc. A man sometimes remembers what he has seen, does he not?

THEAET. He does.
soc. Even when he shuts his eyes, or does he forget if he does that?

THEAET. It would be absurd to say that, Socrates.
soc. We must, though, if we are to maintain our previous argument; otherwise, it is all up with it.

THEAET. I too, by Zeus, have my suspicions, but I don't fully understand you. Tell me how it is.
soc. This is how it is: he who sees has acquired knowledge, we say, of that which he has seen; for it is agreed that sight and perception and knowledge are all the same.

THEAET. Certainly.
soc. But he who has seen and has acquired knowledge of what he saw, if he shuts his eyes, remembers it, but does not see it. Is that right?

THEAET. Yes.
soc. But "does not see" is the same as "does not know," if it is true that seeing is knowing.

THEAET. True.
soc. Then this is our result. When a man has acquired knowledge of a thing and still remembers
ΕΓ ΜΕΜΗΜΕΝΟΝ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΜΗ ἘΠΙΣΤΑΣΘΑΙ, ἘΠΕΙΔΗ ΟΥΧ ὌΡΑ. Ὅ ΤΕΡΑΣ ἘΦΑΜΕΝ ἌΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΕῚ ΓΓΥΝΟΙΤΟ.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἈΛΗΒΕΣΤΑΤΑ ΛΕΓΕΙΣ.

ΣΩ. ΤΩΝ ἈΔΥΝΑΤΩΝ ΔΗ ΤΙ ΣΥΜΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ ΦΑΙΝΕΤΑΙ, ἘΑΝ ΤΙΣ ἘΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΝ ΚΑΙ ΑΙΣΘΗΣΙΝ ΤΑΥΤΩΝ ΦΗ ΕΙΝΑΙ.

ΘΕΑΙ. ἘΟΙΚΕΝ.

ΣΩ. ἈΛΛΟ ἍΡΑ ΕΚΑΤΕΡΟΝ ΦΑΤΕΟΝ.

ΘΕΑΙ. ΚΩΝΔΥΝΕΥΕΙ.

ΣΩ. ΤΙ ΟΥΝ ΔΗΤ' ἌΝ ΕΙΗ ἘΠΙΣΤΗΜΗ; ΠΑΛΙΝ ΕΞ ἈΡΧΗΣ, ὍΣ ΕΟΙΚΕΝ, ΛΕΚΤΕΟΝ. ΚΑΙΤΟΙ ΤΙ ΠΟΤΕ ΜΕΛΛΟΜΕΝ, ὌΘ ΘΕΑΙΤΤΕ, ΔΡΑΝ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ΤΙΝΟΣ ΠΕΡΙ;

ΣΩ. ΦΑΙΝΟΜΕΘΑ ΜΟΙ ἈΛΕΚΤΡΟΝΟΣ ἈΓΕΝΝΟUS ΔΙΚΗΝ ΠΡΙΝ ΒΕΝΙΚΗΚΕΝΑΙ ἈΠΟΤΗΘΗΣΑΝΤΕΣ ἈΠΟ ΤΟΥ ΛÓΓΟΥ ἍΘΕΩΝ.

ΘΕΑΙ. ΠΩΣ ΔΗ;

ΣΩ. ἈΝΤΙΛΟΓΙΚΩΣ ΕΟΙΚΑΜΕΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑΣ ΤΩΝ ὈΝΟΜΑΤΩΝ ὈΜΟΛΟΓΙΑΣ ἈΝΟΜΟΛΟΓΗ΢ΑΜΕΝΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΩ ΤΩΝ ΠΕΡΙΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΟΙ ΤΟΥ ΛÓΓΟΥ ἈΓΑΠΑΝ, ΚΑΙ ΌΥ ΦΑΣΚΟΝΤΕΣ ἈΓΩΝΙΣΤΑΙ ἈΛΛΑ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΙ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΛΑΝ-

ΘΕΑΙ. ΘΑΝΟΜΕΝ ΤΑΥΤΑ ἘΚΕΙΝΟΙΣ ΤΟΙΣ ΔΕΙΝΟΙΣ ΑΝΘΡΑΣΙΝ ΠΟΙΟΥΝΤΕΣ.

ΘΕΑΙ. ΟΥΠΟΝ ΜΑΝΘΑΝΩ ὅΠΩΣ ΛΕΓΕΙΣ.

ΣΩ. ἈΛΛ' ἜΓΩ ΠΕΙΡΑΣΟΜΑΙ ΔΗΛΩΣΑΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΑΥΤΩΝ Ὡ ΓΕ ΔΗ ΝΟΩ. ἩΡΟΜΕΘΑ ΓΑΡ ΔΗ, ΕΙ ΜΑΘΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΜΗ-

ΜΕΝΟΣ ΤΙΣ ΤΙ ΜΗ ἘΠΙΣΤΑΣΑΙ, ΚΑΙ ΤΟΝ ΙΔΟΝΤΑ ΚΑΙ ΜÚΣΑΝΤΑ ΜΕΜΗΜΕΝΟΝ ΟΡΩΝΤΑ ΔΕ ΟΥ ἈΠΟΔΕΙΞΑΝΤΕΣ,

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it, he does not know it, since he does not see it; but we said that would be a monstrous conclusion.

THEAET. Very true.

soc. So, evidently, we reach an impossible result if we say that knowledge and perception are the same.

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. Then we must say they are different.

THEAET. I suppose so.

soc. Then what can knowledge be? We must, apparently, begin our discussion all over again. And yet, Theaetetus, what are we on the point of doing?

THEAET. About what?

soc. It seems to me that we are behaving like a worthless game-cock; before winning the victory we have leapt away from our argument and begun to crow.

THEAET. How so?

soc. We seem to be acting like professional debaters; we have based our agreements on the mere similarity of words and are satisfied to have got the better of the argument in such a way, and we do not see that we, who claim to be, not contestants for a prize, but lovers of wisdom, are doing just what those ingenious persons do.

THEAET. I do not yet understand what you mean.

soc. Well, I will try to make my thought clear. We asked, you recollect, whether a man who has learned something and remembers it does not know it. We showed first that the one who has seen and then shuts his eyes remembers, although he does not see, and then we showed that he does not know, although at the same time he remembers; but this, we said, was impossible. And so the Protagorean tale was brought to naught, and yours also about the identity of knowledge and perception.
Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ζην. Οὔ τι ἀν, οἶμαι, ὦ φίλε, εἴπερ γε ὁ πατήρ τοῦ ἐτέρου μύθου ἔξη, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἂν ἡμινε
νύν δὲ ὁρφανὸν αὐτὸν ἡμεῖς προπηλακίζομεν. καὶ
γὰρ οὐδ’ οἱ ἐπίτροποι, οὗς Πρωταγόρας κατέλιπεν,
βοηθεῖν ἐθέλουσιν, ὡν Θεόδωρος εἰς ὁδε. ἀλλὰ
δὴ αὐτοί κινδυνεύσῳμεν τοῦ δικαίου ἕνεκ’ αὐτῶ
βοηθεῖν.

ΘΕΟ. Οὔ γὰρ ἐγὼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον

165 Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίκου τῶν ἐκείνου ἐπίτροπος.
ἡμεῖς δὲ πως θάττων ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων πρὸς
τὴν γεωμετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν. χάριν γε μέντοι
σοί 3 ἔξομεν, εάν αὐτῷ βοηθῆσ.

ζην. Καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Θεόδωρε. σκέψαι οὖν
τὴν γ’ ἐμὴν βοήθειαν. τῶν γὰρ ἀρτι δευνότερα
ἀν τις ὁμολογήσειν μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι
τὸν νοῦν, ἣ τὸ πολὺ εἰδίσσομεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἀπ-
αρνεῖσθαι. σοὶ λέγω ὑπη, ἢ Θεαίτητω;

ΘΕΟ. Εἰς τὸ κοινὸν μὲν οὖν, ἀποκρινέσθω δὲ ὁ
Β νεῶτερος· σφαλεῖς γὰρ ἤττουν ἀσχημονήσει.

19. ζην. Λέγω δὴ τὸ δευνότατον ἐρώτημα·
ἐστι δὲ, οἶμαι, τοιὸντει τι· ἀρα οἶνον τε τὸν αὐτὸν
εἰδότα τι τοῦτο ὃ ὅδεν μή εἰδέναι;

ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν ἀποκρινοῦμεθα, ὥ Θεαίτητε;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον οὖν, οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

ζην. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ ὄραν γε ἐπίστασθαι θήσεις. τί

1 πολλὰ om. T. 2 εἰς om. T. 3 σοὶ om. B.

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THEAETETUS

THEAET. Evidently.

soc. It would not be so, I fancy, my friend, if the father of the first of the two tales were alive; he would have had a good deal to say in its defence. But he is dead, and we are abusing the orphan. Why, even the guardians whom Protagoras left—one of whom is Theodorus here—are unwilling to come to the child's assistance. So it seems that we shall have to do it ourselves, assisting him in the name of justice.

THEO. Do so, for it is not I, Socrates, but rather Callias the son of Hipponicus, who is the guardian of his children. As for me, I turned rather too soon from abstract speculations to geometry. However, I shall be grateful to you if you come to his assistance.

soc. Good, Theodorus! Now see how I shall help him; for a man might find himself involved in still worse inconsistencies than those in which we found ourselves just now, if he did not pay attention to the terms which we generally use in assent and denial. Shall I explain this to you, or only to Theaetetus?

THEO. To both of us, but let the younger answer; for he will be less disgraced if he is discomfited.

soc. Very well; now I am going to ask the most frightfully difficult question of all. It runs, I believe, something like this: Is it possible for a person, if he knows a thing, at the same time not to know that which he knows?

THEO. Now, then, what shall we answer, Theaetetus?

THEAET. It is impossible, I should think.

soc. Not if you make seeing and knowing identical.
γὰρ χρήσει ἀφύκτω ἐρωτήματι, τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν
φρέατι συνεχόμενος, οὗτοι ἐρωτᾶ ἀνέκπληκτος
ἀνήρ, καταλαβὼν τῇ χειρὶ σοῦ τὸν ἔτερον ὅφθαλμον,
C εἰ ὅρας τὸ ἰμάτιον τῷ κατειλημμένῳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φήσω, οἶμαι, τούτῳ γε, τῷ μέντοι
ἐτέρῳ.

ΣΝ. Οὐκοῦν ὅρας τε καὶ οὐχ ὅρας ἄμα ταύτων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω γε πως.

ΣΝ. Οὐδὲν ἐγώ, φήσει, τοῦτο οὔτε τάττω οὔτε
ήρόμην τὸ ὅπως, ἀλλ’ εἰ οὖ ἐπίστασαι, τοῦτο καὶ
οὐκ ἐπίστασαι. νῦν δ’ οὔχ ὅρας ὅραν φαίνει,
ὅμολογηκὼς δὲ τυγχάνεις τὸ ὅραν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ
τὸ μή ὅραν μή ἐπίστασθαι. ἐξ οὖν τούτων λογίζομαι,
tί σοι συμβαίνει.

D ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ λογίζομαι ὅτι τάναντια οῖς ὑπε-
θέμην.

ΣΝ. Ἰσως δέ γ’, ὁ θαυμάσιε, πλεῖον ἄν τοιαύτ’
ἐπαθής, εἰ τίς σε προσηρώτα, εἰ ἐπίστασθαι ἔστι
μὲν ὃς, ἐστι δὲ ἀμβλύ, καὶ ἑγγύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασθαι,
πόρρωθεν δὲ μῆ, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἡρέμα τὸ αὐτό,
καὶ ἀλλα μυρία, ὁ ἔλλοχών 2 ἀν πελταστικὸς ἄνηρ
μυσθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις ἐρόμενος, ἦν κ’ ἐπιστήμην καὶ
αἰσθηθὼν ταύτων ἔθους, ἐμβαλὼν ἄν εἰς τὸ ἄκουεν
καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας αἰσθήσεις,
Ε ἠλεγχεν ἄν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνείς πρὶν θαυμάσας
τὴν πολυάρατον σοφίαν συνεποδίσθης ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ,
on δὴ σε χειρωσάμενος τε καὶ συνδήσας ἦδη ἂν

1 συνεχόμενος B; συσχόμενος ΒΤ.
2 ἔλλοχών bt; ἐνλοχών ΒΤ.
For what will you do with a question from which there is no escape, by which you are, as the saying is, caught in a pit, when your adversary, unabashed, puts his hand over one of your eyes and asks if you see his cloak with the eye that is covered?

THEAET. I shall say, I think, "Not with that eye, but with the other."

soc. Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time?

THEAET. After a fashion.

soc. "That," he will reply, "is not at all what I want, and I did not ask about the fashion, but whether you both know and do not know the same thing. Now manifestly you see that which you do not see. But you have agreed that seeing is knowing and not seeing is not knowing. Very well; from all this, reckon out what the result is."

THEAET. Well, I reckon out that the result is the contrary of my hypothesis.

soc. And perhaps, my fine fellow, more troubles of the same sort might have come upon you, if anyone asked you further questions—whether it is possible to know the same thing both sharply and dully, to know close at hand but not at a distance, to know both violently and gently, and countless other questions, such as a nimble fighter, fighting for pay in the war of words, might have lain in wait and asked you, when you said that knowledge and perception were the same thing; he would have charged down upon hearing and smelling and such senses, and would have argued persistently and unceasingly until you were filled with admiration of his greatly desired wisdom and were taken in his toils, and then, after subduing and binding you he would
τότε ἐλύτρον χρημάτων ὀσων σοί γε κάκεινω ἐδόκει. τίν’ οὖν δὴ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, φαίης ἂν ὦσως, λόγον ἐπίκουρον τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἔρει; ἀλλο τι πειρώμεθα λέγειν;

THEAI. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

20. ΞΝ. Ταῦτα τε δὴ πάντα ὄσα ἴμείς ἐπα-166 μύνοντες αὐτῷ λέγομεν, καὶ ὁμόσε, οἴμαι, χωρή-σεται καταφρονῶν ἡμῶν καὶ λέγων· "όντος δὴ ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ χρηστός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παιδίον τι ἐρωτηθέν ἔδεισεν εἰ οἶον τε τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸ μεμνήσθαι ἃμα καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖσαι ἀπέφησεν διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι προορᾶν, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξεν. τὸ δὲ, ὃ ραθυμότατε Σώκρατες, τῇδ’ ἔχει· ὅταν τι τῶν ἐμῶν δὴ ἐρωτή-σεως σκοπῆς, ἔὰν μὲν δ’ ἐρωτηθεῖς οἶὰπερ ἃν εὖ ἀποκριναίμην ἀποκρινάμενος σφάλληται, ἐγὼ ἐλέγ-Β χομαί, εἰ δὲ ἄλλοια, αὐτὸς δ’ ἐρωτηθεῖς. αὐτίκα γάρ δοκεῖς τινά σοι συγχωρήσεσθαι μνήμην παρεῖναι τῷ ὧν ἔπαθε, τοιοῦτον τι οὐδαν πάθος οἰον ὅτε ἔπασχε, μηκέτι πάσχοντι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἡ αὖ ἀποκνήσεωι ὁμολογεῖν οἶον τ’ εἶναι εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτό; ἡ εάνπερ τοῦτο δείσῃ, δώσειν ποτὲ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν ἀνομοιούμενον τῷ πρὶν ἀνομοιοῦσθαι ὀντι; μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν εἶναι τινα, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τοὺς, καὶ τούτους γιγνομένους ἀπείρους, εάνπερ ἀνομοίωσις γίγνεται, C εἰ δὴ ὁνομάτων γε δεήσει θηρεύσεις διευλαβεῖσθαι.
at once proceed to bargain with you for such ransom as might be agreed upon between you. What argument, then, you might ask, will Protagoras produce to strengthen his forces? Shall we try to carry on the discussion?

THEAET. By all means.

soc. He will, I fancy, say all that we have said in his defence and then will close with us, saying contemptuously, "Our estimable Socrates here frightened a little boy by asking if it was possible for one and the same person to remember and at the same time not to know one and the same thing, and when the child in his fright said 'no,' because he could not foresee what would result, Socrates made poor me a laughing-stock in his talk. But, you slovenly Socrates, the facts stand thus: when you examine any doctrine of mine by the method of questioning, if the person who is questioned makes such replies as I should make and comes to grief, then I am refuted, but if his replies are quite different, then the person questioned is refuted, not I. Take this example. Do you suppose you could get anybody to admit that the memory a man has of a past feeling he no longer feels is anything like the feeling at the time when he was feeling it? Far from it. Or that he would refuse to admit that it is possible for one and the same person to know and not to know one and the same thing? Or if he were afraid to admit this, would he ever admit that a person who has become unlike is the same as before he became unlike? In fact, if we are to be on our guard against such verbal entanglements, would he admit that a person is one at all, and not many, who become infinite in number, if the process of becoming
PLATO

"ἀλλήλων; ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε," φήσει, "γενναοτέρως ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἐλθὼν ὁ λέγω, εἰ δύνασαι, ἐξελεγξόν ὡς οὐχὶ ἰδιαί αἰσθήσεις εκάστῳ ἡμῶν γίγνονται, ἢ ὡς ἰδίων γεγομένων οὐδὲν τι ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ φαινόμενον μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ γίγνοντο, ἢ εἰ εἶναι δεὶ ὀνομάζειν, εὗρ ὀπερ φαίνεται· ὃς δὲ δὴ καὶ κυνοκεφάλους λέγων οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ύπηνεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας τοῦτο δράν εἰς τὰ συγγράμματά μου ἀναπείθεις, οὐ καλῶς ποιῶν. ἐγὼ γάρ φημι μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ὡς γέγραφα· μέτρον γὰρ ἐκαστὸν ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὅντων καὶ μὴ· μυρίων μὲντοι διαφέρειν ἐτέρον ἐτέρον αὐτῷ τοῦτῳ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἄλλα ἐστὶ τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα. καὶ σοφίαν καὶ σοφὸν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δὲω τὸ μὴ φάναι εἶναι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ λέγω σοφὸν, ὅς ἂν τιν ἡμῶν, ὃ φαίνεται καὶ ἐστὶ κακά, μεταβάλλων ποιήσῃ ἀγαθὰ φαίνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι.

Ἐτὸν δὲ λόγον αὐτὴ μὴ τῷ ρήματι μου διώκε, ἀλλ' ὦδε ἔτι σαφέστερον μάθε τί λέγω. οἶνον γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνήσθητι, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἀσθενοῦντι πικρά φαίνεται ὃ ἐσθίει καὶ ἐστι, τῷ δὲ υγιαίνοντι τάναντια ἐστι καὶ φαίνεται. σοφώτερον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐδέτερον δεὶ ποιῆσαι—ουδὲ 167 γὰρ δυνατόν—οὐδὲ κατηγορητέον ὡς ὃ μὲν κάμνων ἀμαθῆς ὅτι τοιαῦτα δοξάζει, ὃ δὲ υγιαίνων σοφὸς ὅτι ἄλλοια· μεταβλητέον δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα· ἀμείωνων

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different continues? But, my dear fellow," he will say, "attack my real doctrines in a more generous manner, and prove, if you can, that perceptions, when they come, or become, to each of us, are not individual, or that, if they are individual, what appears to each one would not, for all that, become to that one alone—or, if you prefer to say 'be,' would not be—to whom it appears. But when you talk of pigs and dog-faced baboons, you not only act like a pig yourself, but you persuade your hearers to act so toward my writings, and that is not right. (For I maintain that the truth is as I have written; each one of us is the measure of the things that are and those that are not; but each person differs immeasurably from every other in just this, that to one person some things appear and are, and to another person other things. And I do not by any means say that wisdom and the wise man do not exist; on the contrary, I say that if bad things appear and are to any one of us, precisely that man is wise who causes a change and makes good things appear and be to him. And, moreover, do not lay too much stress upon the words of my argument, but get a clearer understanding of my meaning from what I am going to say. Recall to your mind what was said before, that his food appears and is bitter to the sick man, but appears and is the opposite of bitter to the man in health. Now neither of these two is to be made wiser than he is—that is not possible—nor should the claim be made that the sick man is ignorant because his opinions are ignorant, or the healthy man wise because his are different; but a change must be made from the one condition to
γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα ἐξίς. οὗτώ δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ ἑτέρας ἐξίως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείνων μεταβλητέον· ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς φαρμάκων μεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς λόγους. ἐπεὶ οὐ τί γε ψευδὴ δοξάζοντα τίς τῶν ὑστερον ἀληθῆ ἐποίησε δοξάζειν. οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ’ ἀν πάσχῃ ταύτα δὲ ἂεὶ ἀληθῆ. ἀλλ’ οἶμαι, πονηρᾷ.

Β γυνῆς ἐξεὶ δοξάζοντα γυνῆ ἐποίησε δοξάζειν ὑπὸ ἀτερίας ἀληθῆς, εἰγὼ δὲ βελτίω μὲν τὰ ἑτέρα τῶν ἑτέρων, ἀληθεστέρα δὲ οὐδέν. καὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς, ὃ φίλε Σώκρατες, πολλοὶ δὲ χαράξοντες λέγειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν σώματα ἰατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φύτα γεωργοὺς. φημὶ γὰρ καὶ τούτους τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὅταν τι αὐτῶν ἀσθενῆ, ἠρωτάς καὶ ζυγεῖας αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἐμποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γε σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς δήτορας ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἴναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ οἶδα γ’ ἃν ἐκαστῇ πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταύτα καὶ εἰναι αὐτῆς, ἔως ἃν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ· ἀλλ’ ὁ σοφὸς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἐκαστῶν χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἴναι καὶ δοκεῖν, κατὰ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς τοὺς παιδευμενοὺς οὗτω δυνάμενος παιδαγωγεῖν σοφός τε καὶ

D ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευθεῖσιν καὶ οὕτω σοφωτεροὶ τε εἰσὶν ἑτεροὶ ἑτέρων καὶ οὐδεὶς

1 πονηρὰ Aldina; πονηρᾶς BT.
2 δοξάζοντα Tb; δοξάζοντας B.
3 ἐαυτῆς BT; αὐτῆς some mss. and editors.
4 ἀληθεῖς BT; ἀληθείας Schleiermacher.
the other, for the other is better. So, too, in education a change has to be made from a worse to a better condition; but the physician causes the change by means of drugs, and the teacher of wisdom by means of words. And yet, in fact, no one ever made anyone think truly who previously thought falsely, since it is impossible to think that which is not or to think any other things than those which one feels; and these are always true. But I believe that a man who, on account of a bad condition of soul, thinks thoughts akin to that condition, is made by a good condition of soul to think correspondingly good thoughts; and some men, through inexperience, call these appearances true, whereas I call them better than the others, but in no wise truer. And the wise, my dear Socrates, I do not by any means call tadpoles; when they have to do with the human body, I call them physicians, and when they have to do with plants, husbandmen; for I assert that these latter, when plants are sickly, instil into them good and healthy sensations, and true ones instead of bad sensations, and that the wise and good orators make the good, instead of the evil, seem to be right to their states. For I claim that whatever seems right and honourable to a state is really right and honourable to it, so long as it believes it to be so; but the wise man causes the good, instead of that which is evil to them in each instance, to be and seem right and honourable. And on the same principle the teacher who is able to train his pupils in this manner is not only wise but is also entitled to receive high pay from them when their education is finished. And in this sense it is true that some men are wiser than others, and that
ψευδὴ δοξάζει, καὶ οὐ, ἐὰν τε βούλη ἐὰν τε μή, ἀνεκτέον ὅντι μέτρῳ· σώζεται γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ λόγος οὕτως. ὦ σὺ εἰ μὲν ἐχεις ἐξ ἃρχῆς ἀμφισ-βητεῖν, ἀμφισβήτηε λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθών· εἰ δὲ δὲ ἐρωτήσεων βούλει, δι’ ἐρωτήσεων οὖδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο φευκτέοι, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα διωκτέον τῷ νοῦν ἔχοντι· ποιεῖ μέντοι οὕτως· μὴ ἀδίκει.

Ε ἐν τῷ ἐρωτῶν· καὶ γὰρ πολλὴ ἀλογία ἀρετῆς φάσκοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθα μηδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ ἀδικοῦντα ἐν λόγοις διατελεῖν. ἀδυκεῖν δ’ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅταν τις μὴ χωρίς μὲν ὡς ἀγωνιζόμενος τὰς διατριβὰς ποῦται, χωρίς δὲ διαλέγομενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ παιζῇ τε καὶ σφάλλῃ καθ’ ὅσον ἂν δῦνηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι σπουδάζῃ τε καὶ ἑπανορθοῖ τὸν προσδιαλέγομενον, ἐκεῖνα μόνα αὐτῷ ἐνδεικνύ- μενος τὰ σφάλματα, ἀ αὐτὸς ὑπ’ ἕαυτον· καὶ

168 τῶν προτέρων συνουσίων παρεκέρκουστο· ἂν μὲν γὰρ οὕτω ποιῆς, ἔαυτον αἰτιᾶσονται οἱ προσδια-τρίβοντές σοι τῆς αὐτῶν ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπορίας, ἀλλ’ οὐ σε, καὶ σε μὲν διώξονται καὶ φιλήσουσιν, αὐτοὺς δὲ μισῆσου καὶ φεύξονται ἄφ’ ἔαυτῶν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, ἵν’ ἄλλοι γενόμενοι ἀπαλλαγωσί τῶν οἱ πρότερον ἦσαν· ἐὰν δὲ τάναντι τούτων ὅσον ὃσπερ οἱ πολλοῖ, τάναντι ἔμμεθεσταί σοι καὶ τοὺς συνόντας ἀντὶ φιλοσόφων μισοῦντας τοῦτο

Β τὸ πράγμα ἀποφανεῖς, ἐπειδὰν πρεσβύτεροι γένον-tau. ἐὰν οὖν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, δ’ καὶ πρότερον ἔρρηθη, οὐ δυσμενώς οὓδ’ μαχητικῶς, ἀλλ’ ἦλεω τῇ διανοίᾳ συγκαθεῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς σκέψει τί ποτε λέγομεν,
no one thinks falsely, and that you, whether you
will or no, must endure to be a measure. Upon these
positions my doctrine stands firm; and if you can
dispute it in principle, dispute it by bringing an
opposing doctrine against it; or if you prefer the
method of questions, ask questions; for an intelligent
person ought not to reject this method, on the con-
trary, he should choose it before all others. How-
ever, let me make a suggestion: do not be unfair
in your questioning; it is very inconsistent for a
man who asserts that he cares for virtue to be con-
stantly unfair in discussion; and it is unfair in
discussion when a man makes no distinction between
merely trying to make points and carrying on a real
argument. In the former he may jest and try to
trip up his opponent as much as he can, but in
real argument he must be in earnest and must set
his interlocutor on his feet, pointing out to him
those slips only which are due to himself and his
previous associations. For if you act in this way,
those who debate with you will cast the blame for
their confusion and perplexity upon themselves, not
upon you: they will run after you and love you, and
they will hate themselves and run away from them-
selves, taking refuge in philosophy, that they may
escape from their former selves by becoming different.
But if you act in the opposite way, as most teachers
do, you will produce the opposite result, and instead
of making your young associates philosophers, you
will make them hate philosophy when they grow
older. If, therefore, you will accept the suggestion
which I made before, you will avoid a hostile and
combative attitude and in a gracious spirit will enter
the lists with me and inquire what we really mean
κινεῖσθαί τε ἀποφαίνομενοι τὰ πάντα, τὸ τε δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ εἶναι ἰδιώτη τε καὶ πόλει. καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψει, εἰπτε ταύτων εἰπτε καὶ ἄλλο ἐπιστήμη καὶ αἰσθήσεως ἀλλ' οὐχ, ὡσπερ ἄρτι, ἐκ οὗ πολλῶν ὅπῃ ἀν τύχωσιν ἔλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παντο-δαπᾶς παρέχουσιν. "ταῦτα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τῷ ἑταίρῳ σου εἰς βοήθειαν προσηρξάμην κατ' ἐμὴν δύναμιν, σμικρὰ ἀπὸ σμικρῶν· εἰ δ' αὐτῶς ἔζη, μεγαλειώ-τερον ἂν τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἐβοήθησεν.

21. Θεό. Παίζεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. πάνυ γὰρ νεανίκως τῷ ἄνδρὶ βεβοήθηκας.

ι. Εἴθε λέγεις, ὦ ἑταίρε. καὶ μοι εἰπέ· ἐνενόησας ποὺ λέγοντος ἄρτι τοῦ Πρωταγόρου καὶ ὁνειδί-καὶ τοῦ ἡμῖν ὅτι πρὸς παιδίον τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦ-μενοι τῷ τοῦ παιδὸς φόβῳ ἀγωνίζόμεθα εἰς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ χαριεντισμὸν τινα ἀποκαλῶν, ἀποσεμ- νύνων δὲ τὸ πάντων μέτρου, σπουδάσας ἡμᾶς διεκελεύσατο περὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγου;

Θεο. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐνενόησα, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ι. Τί οὖν; κελεύεις πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ;

Θεο. Σφόδρα γε.

ι. Ὁρᾶς οὖν ὅτι τάδε πάντα πλην σοῦ παιδία ἐστίν. εἰ οὖν πεισόμεθα τῷ ἄνδρί, ἐμὲ καί σὲ ἀγωνίζόμεθα B; ἀγωνιζόμεθα T.
THEAETETUS

when we declare that all things are in motion and that whatever seems is to each individual, whether man or state. And on the basis of that you will consider the question whether knowledge and perception are the same or different, instead of doing as you did a while ago, using as your basis the ordinary meaning of names and words, which most people pervert in haphazard ways and thereby cause all sorts of perplexity in one another.” Such, Theodorus, is the help I have furnished your friend to the best of my ability—not much, for my resources are small; but if he were living himself he would have helped his offspring in a fashion more magnificent.

Theo. You are joking, Socrates, for you have come to the man’s assistance with all the valour of youth.

soc. Thank you, my friend. Tell me, did you observe just now that Protagoras reproached us for addressing our words to a boy, and said that we made the boy’s timidity aid us in our argument against his doctrine, and that he called our procedure a mere display of wit, solemnly insisting upon the importance of “the measure of all things,” and urging us to treat his doctrine seriously?

Theo. Of course I observed it, Socrates.

soc. Well then, shall we do as he says?

Theo. By all means.

soc. Now you see that all those present, except you and myself, are boys. So if we are to do as
Ε δει ἐρωτῶντάς τε καὶ ἀποκρινομένους ἄλληλους σπουδάσαι αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸν λόγον, ἢν μή τοι τούτῳ γε ἔχῃ ἐγκαλεῖν, ὡς παῖζοντες πρὸς μειράκια διεσκεψάμεθα αὐτοῦ τὸν λόγον.

θεό. Τί δ’; οὗ πολλῶν τοῦ Θεοδώρου μεγάλους πόγιων καθˈ ἀνέμουν ἀν ἐπακολούθησείς λόγῳ διερευνωμένῳ;

ση. Ἀλλ’ οὗ τι σοῦ γε, ὃ Θεοδώρε, ἀμεινον. μὴ οὖν οἶου ἔμε μὲν τῷ σῷ ἑταίρῳ τετελευτηκότι 169 δειν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπαμύνεις, σὲ δὲ μὴν, ἄλλ’ ἢθι, ὃ ἀριστε, ὅλγον ἐπίστον, μέχρι τούτου αὐτοῦ ἔως ἃν εἰδωμεν εἰτε ἀρα σὲ δεὶ διαγραμμάτων πέρι μέτρον εἶναι, εἰτε πάντες ὁμοίως σοὶ ἢκανοὶ ἐαυτοῖς εἰς τε ἀστρονομίαν καὶ τάλλα ὅν δὴ σὺ πέρι αἰτίαν ἔχεις διαφέρεις.

θεό. Οὐ βάδιν, ὃ Σώκρατες, σοὶ παρακάθημενον μὴ διδόναι λόγον, ἄλλ’ ἔγω ἁρτὶ παρελήρητα φάσκον σε ἐπιτρέψων μοι μὴ ἀποδύσθαι, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀναγκάσοι καθάπερ Λακεδαμίνοι. οὐ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκίρωνα μᾶλλον τείνεις. Λακε-

Β δαμίνοι μὲν γὰρ ἀπίεναι ἡ ἀποδύσθαι κελεύουσι, σὺ δὲ κατ’ Ἀνταίτον τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δράμα δράν: τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίης πρὶν ἂν ἀναγκάσῃ ἀποδύσας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις προσπαλάισαι. ση. Ἀριστά γε, ὃ Θεοδώρε, τὴν νόσον μον ἀπῃ-

κασανοὶ ἵσχυροκόπτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκεῖνω. μυρίοι

1 τοι τοῦτῳ γε B; τοι τόγε T; τοῦτῳ γε W.
2 αὐτοῦ τῶν ἀπογρ. Coislinianum 155; αὐ τοῦ τῶν B; αὐ τοῦτον τῶν T.
3 πρὶν ἄν Heindorf; πρὶν BT.

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the man asks, you and I must question each other and make reply in order to show our serious attitude towards his doctrine; then he cannot, at any rate, find fault with us on the ground that we examined his doctrine in a spirit of levity with mere boys.

THEO. Why is this? Would not Theaetetus follow an investigation better than many a man with a long beard?

soc. Yes, but not better than you, Theodorus. So you must not imagine that I have to defend your deceased friend by any and every means, while you do nothing at all; but come, my good man, follow the discussion a little way, just until we can see whether, after all, you must be a measure in respect to diagrams, or whether all men are as sufficient unto themselves as you are in astronomy and the other sciences in which you are alleged to be superior.

THEO. It is not easy, Socrates, for anyone to sit beside you and not be forced to give an account of himself and it was foolish of me just now to say you would excuse me and would not oblige me, as the Lacedaemonians do, to strip; you seem to me to take rather after Sciron. For the Lacedaemonians tell people to go away or else strip, but you seem to me to play rather the rôle of Antaeus; for you do not let anyone go who approaches you until you have forced him to strip and wrestle with you in argument.

soc. Your comparison with Sciron and Antaeus pictures my complaint admirably; only I am a more

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1 Sciron was a mighty man who attacked all who came near him and threw them from a cliff. He was overcome by Theseus. Antaeus, a terrible giant, forced all passers-by to wrestle with him. He was invincible until Heracles crushed him in his arms.
γὰρ ἦδη μοι Ἦρακλεές τε καὶ Ὀθισέες ἐντυχόντες ἐντυχόντες ¹ καρτεροὶ ² πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μάλ' εὑ̂ ς ἔγγυκεκόφασιν, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀφίσταμαι· οὕτω τις θέως ὀπισθεῖν ἐνδέδυκε τῆς περὶ ταύτα γυμνασίας. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ σὺ φθονήσῃς προσανατριφάμενος σαυτόν τε ἁμα καὶ ἐμὲ ὤνησαι.

Θεό. Οὐδὲν ἐτι ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ' ἀγε ὅπη θέλεις· πάντως τὴν περὶ ταύτα εἰμαρμένην ἢν ἃν ³ σὺ ἐπικλώσῃς δεὶ ἀνατλήναι ἔλεγχόμενον. οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω γε ὧν προτίθεσαι οἴδος τ' ἐσομαι παρασχεῖν ἐμαυτόν σοι.

xiv. 'Αλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ μέχρι τούτων. καὶ μοι πάνω τήρει τὸ τοιόῦδε, μὴ ποὺ παιδικὸν τι λάθωμεν D εἰδός τῶν λόγων ποιοῦμεν, καὶ τις πάλιν ἡμῶν αὐτὸ ὀνειδίση.

Θεό. 'Αλλὰ δὴ πειράσομαι γε καθ' ὦσον ἀν δύνομαι.

22. xiv. Τούδε τοίνυν πρώτον πάλιν ἀντιλαβῶμεθα οὕπερ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ὑδομέν ὀρθῶς ἢ οὔκ ὀρθῶς ἐδυσχεραίνομεν ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ λόγῳ ὅτι αὐτάρκη ἔκαστον εἰς φρόνησιν ἐποίει· καὶ ἡμῖν συνεχώρησαν ὁ Πρωταγόρας περὶ τέ τοῦ ἀμείνονος καὶ χειρονος διαφέρειν τινάς, οὔς δὴ καὶ εἶναι σοφοῦς. οὔχι;

Θεό. Ναι.

xiv. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτὸς παρὸν ὡμολογεῖ, ἀλλὰ Ε ἡμῖν βοηθοῦντες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ συνεχώρήσαμεν, οὔτεν ἃν πάλιν ἐδει ἐπαναλαβόντας βεβαιούσθαι· νῦν δὲ τάχ' ἃν τις ἡμᾶς ἀκύρους τίθει τῆς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ὑμολογίας. διὸ καλλίνως ἔχει σαφὲ-

¹ ἐντυχόντες T; ἐντυχόχανοντες B.
² καρτεροὶ B; καρτεροὶ T.
³ ἂν W; ἢν BT.
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stubborn combatant than they; for many a Heracles and many a Theseus, strong men of words, have fallen in with me and belaboured me mightily, but still I do not desist, such a terrible love of this kind of exercise has taken hold on me. So, now that it is your turn, do not refuse to try a bout with me; it will be good for both of us.

THEO. I say no more. Lead on as you like. Most assuredly I must endure whatsoever fate you spin for me, and submit to interrogation. However, I shall not be able to leave myself in your hands beyond the point you propose.

soc. Even that is enough. And please be especially careful that we do not inadvertently give a playful turn to our argument and somebody reproach us again for it.

THEO. Rest assured that I will try so far as in me lies.

soc. Let us, therefore, first take up the same question as before, and let us see whether we were right or wrong in being displeased and finding fault with the doctrine because it made each individual self-sufficient in wisdom. Protagoras granted that some persons excelled others in respect to the better and the worse, and these he said were wise, did he not?

THEO. Yes.

soc. Now if he himself were present and could agree to this, instead of our making the concession for him in our effort to help him, there would be no need of taking up the question again or of reinforcing his argument. But, as it is, perhaps it might be said that we have no authority to make the agreement for him; therefore it is better to make the
PLATO

στερον περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ διομολογήσασθαι· οὐ γάρ τι σμικρὸν παραλλάττει οὕτως ἔχον ἡ ἄλλως.

ἐπα. Αὐξεῖς ἀληθῆ.

σὺ. Μὴ τοῖνυν δὲ ἄλλων ἄλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγου ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων λάβωμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν.

ἐπα. Πῶς;

σὺ. Οὔτωσι· τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ εἶναι φησί ποι ὁ δοκεῖ;

ἐπα. Φησὶ γὰρ οὖν.

σὺ. Οὐκοῦν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώ-

πον, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν, 

καὶ φαμέν οὔδένα ὄντια οὐ τὰ μὲν αὐτὸν ἥγεϊσθαι 

τῶν ἄλλων σοφῶτερον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλους έαυτοῦ, καὶ

ἐν γε τοῖς μεγίστοις κυνόνοις, ὅταν ἐν στρατείαις

ἡ νόσοις ἡ ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμάζωνται, ὥσπερ πρὸς 

θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐν ἐκάστοις ἀρχοντας, σωτῆρας

Β σφῶν προσδοκῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τῷ διαφέροντας

ἡ τῷ εἰδέναι· καὶ πάντα ποι μεστὰ τὰνθρώπινα

χητοῦντων διδασκάλους τε καὶ ἀρχοντας ἐαυτῶν

τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἦμῶν τῶν τε ἐργασίων, οἰομένων

τε αὑ ἰκανῶν μὲν διδάσκειν, ἰκανῶν δὲ ἀρχεῖν εἶναι.

καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἀπασί τί ἄλλο φήσομεν ἡ αὐτοῦ.

τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἥγεϊσθαι σοφίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν

εἶναι παρὰ σφίσιν;

ἐπα. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

σὺ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν ἀληθῆ διάνοιαν

ἥγονται, τὴν δὲ ἀμαθίαν ψευδῆ δόξαν;

σὺ. Τί μήν;

σὺ. Τί οὖν, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, χρησόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ;
agreement still clearer on this particular point; for it makes a good deal of difference whether it is so or not.

theo. That is true.

soc. Let us then get the agreement in as concise a form as possible, not through others, but from his own statement.

c. How?

soc. In this way: He says, does he not? "that which appears to each person really is to him to whom it appears."

theo. Yes, that is what he says.

soc. Well then, Protagoras, we also utter the opinions of a man, or rather, of all men, and we say that there is no one who does not think himself wiser than others in some respects and others wiser than himself in other respects: for instance, in times of greatest danger, when people are distressed in war or by diseases or at sea, they regard their commanders as gods and expect them to be their saviours, though they excel them in nothing except knowledge. And all the world of men is, I dare say, full of people seeking teachers and rulers for themselves and the animals and for human activities, and, on the other hand, of people who consider themselves qualified to teach and qualified to rule. And in all these instances we must say that men themselves believe that wisdom and ignorance exist in the world of men, must we not?

theo. Yes, we must.

soc. And therefore they think that wisdom is true thinking and ignorance false opinion, do they not?

theo. Of course.

soc. Well then, Protagoras, what shall we do
πότερον ἀληθῆ φώμεν ἀει τούς ἀνθρώπους δοξάζειν, ἢ ποτὲ μὲν ἀληθῆ, ποτὲ δὲ ἰσευδῆ; ἐξ ἀμφότερων γάρ που συμβαίνει μή ἀει ἀληθῆ ἂλλ' ἀμφότερα αὐτοὺς δοξάζειν. σκόπει γάρ, ὥ Θεόδωρε, εἰ ἐθελοί ἄν ταῖς ἄμφι Πρωταγόραν ἢ σὺ αὐτὸς διαμάχεσθαι ὡς οὔδεις ἴγειταί ἔτερος ἔτερον ἀμαθῆ τε εἶναι καὶ ἰσευδῆ δοξάζειν.

ὦ Θεό. Ὀλλ' ἀπιστον, ὥ Σῶκρατες.

δ ἡμ. Καὶ μήν εἰς τούτῳ γε ἀνάγκης ὁ λόγος ἴκει ὁ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρων ἀνθρώπων λέγων.

ὦ Θεό. Πῶς δή;

ἑμ. "Ὅταν σὺ кρίνας τι παρὰ σαυτῷ πρὸς μὲ αποφαίνῃ περὶ τινος δοξαν, σοι μὲν δῇ τούτῳ κατὰ τον ἐκείνου λόγου ἀληθὲς ἔστω, ἡμῖν δὲ δῇ τοῖς ἄλλοις περὶ τῆς σῆς κρίσεως πότερον οὐκ ἔστων κριταίς γενέσθαι, ἢ ἀει σὲ κρίνομεν ἀληθῆ δοξάζειν; ἡ μυρίοι ἐκάστοτέ σοι μάχονται ἀντιδοξάζοντες, ἴγοιμενοι ἰσευδῆ κρίνειν τε καὶ οἴσεσθαι;

ὦ Θεό. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὥ Σῶκρατες, μάλα μυρίοι δῆτα, φησὶν ὁ Ομηρος, οὐ γε μοι τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πράγματα παρέχουσιν.

ἑμ. Τί οὖν; βούλει λέγωμεν ὡς σὺ τότε σαυτῷ μὲν ἀληθῆ δοξάζεις, τοῖς δὲ μυρίοις ἰσευδῆ;

ὦ Θεό. Ὁσικεν ἐκ γε τοῦ λόγου ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

ἑμ. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρα; ἀρ' οὖχι ἀνάγκη, εἰ μὲν μὴν δὲ αὐτὸς ψετο μέτρον εἶναι ἀνθρώπων μηδὲ οἱ πολλοὶ, ὡςπερ οὐδὲ οἴσταται, μηδενὶ δὴ εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὡς ἐκείνος ἐγραψεν; εἰ 108
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about the doctrine? Shall we say that the opinions which men have are always true, or sometimes true and sometimes false? For the result of either statement is that their opinions are not always true, but may be either true or false. Just think, Theodorus; would any follower of Protagoras, or you yourself, care to contend that no person thinks that another is ignorant and has false opinions?

THEO. No, that is incredible, Socrates.

soc. And yet this is the predicament to which the doctrine that man is the measure of all things inevitably leads.

THEO. How so?

soc. When you have come to a decision in your own mind about something, and declare your opinion to me, this opinion is, according to his doctrine, true to you; let us grant that; but may not the rest of us sit in judgement on your decision, or do we always judge that your opinion is true? Do not myriads of men on each occasion oppose their opinions to yours, believing that your judgement and belief are false?

THEO. Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, countless myriads in truth, as Homer¹ says, and they give me all the trouble in the world.

soc. Well then, shall we say that in such a case your opinion is true to you but false to the myriads?

THEO. That seems to be the inevitable deduction.

soc. And what of Protagoras himself? If neither he himself thought, nor people in general think, as indeed they do not, that man is the measure of all things, is it not inevitable that the "truth" which he wrote is true to no one? But if he himself thought

¹ Homer, Odyssey, xvi. 121, xvii. 432, xix. 78.
δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν ἦτο, τὸ δὲ πληθος μὴ συνοίηται, οἴσθ' ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὅσι πλείους ὅς μὴ δοκεὶ ἥ
οῖς δοκεῖ, τοσοῦτω μᾶλλον οὐκ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐστὶν.

θεο. Ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ γε καθ' ἐκάστην δόξαν
ἐστιν καὶ οὐκ ἐστιν.

σω. "Επειτά γα τοῦτ' ἔχει κομψότατον' ἐκεῖνος
μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ οἴησεως τήν τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων
ὁήσιν, ἡ ἐκεῖνον ἡγοῦνται ψεύδεσθαι, εὐγχωρεῖ
ποὺ ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὀμολογῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν
ἀπαντᾷς.

θεο. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

Β σω. Οὐκοῦν τήν αὐτοῦ ἡν ψεύδη συγχωροῖ, εἰ
τήν τῶν ἠγούμενων αὐτοῦ ψεύδεσθαι ὀμολογεῖ
ἀληθὴ εἶναι;

θεο. Ἀνάγκη.

σω. Οἱ δὲ γ' ἄλλοι οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς ψεύ-
δεσθαι;

θεο. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

σω. 'Ο δὲ γ' αὐ δὸμολογεῖ καὶ ταύτην ἀληθῆ τήν
dόξαν ἐξ ὡν γέγραφε.

θεο. Φαινεται.

σω. 'Εξ ἀπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ Πρωταγόρου ἀρκα-
μένων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπὸ γε ἐκεῖνον
ὀμολογήσεται, ὅταν τῷ ταναντία λέγοντι συγχωρῇ
ἀληθῆ αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ο Πρωταγόρας
C αὐτὸς συγχωρήσεται μήτε κύνα μήτε τὸν ἐπι-
tυχόντα ἀνθρώπων μέτρον εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἐνὸς
οὐ ἂν μὴ μάθην. οὖχ οὖτως;

θεο. Οὗτως.

σω. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων,
οὔδεν ἂν εἰθ' ἢ Πρωταγόρου "ἀλήθεια" ἀληθῆς,
οὔτε τωὶ ἄλλω οὐτ' αὐτῷ ἐκεῖνῳ.
it was true, and people in general do not agree with him, in the first place you know that it is just so much more false than true as the number of those who do not believe it is greater than the number of those who do.

THEO. Necessarily, if it is to be true or false according to each individual opinion.

SOC. Secondly, it involves this, which is a very pretty result; he concedes about his own opinion the truth of the opinion of those who disagree with him and think that his opinion is false, since he grants that the opinions of all men are true.

THEO. Certainly.

SOC. Then would he not be conceding that his own opinion is false, if he grants that the opinion of those who think he is in error is true?

THEO. Necessarily.

SOC. But the others do not concede that they are in error, do they?

THEO. No, they do not.

SOC. And he, in turn, according to his writings, grants that this opinion also is true.

THEO. Evidently.

SOC. Then all men, beginning with Protagoras, will dispute—or rather, he will grant, after he once concedes that the opinion of the man who holds the opposite view is true—even Protagoras himself, I say, will concede that neither a dog nor any casual man is a measure of anything whatsoever that he has not learned. Is not that the case?

THEO. Yes.

SOC. Then since the "truth" of Protagoras is disputed by all, it would be true to nobody, neither to anyone else nor to him.
ΘΕΟ. Ἅγαν, οὖ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἐταίρόν μου καταθέομεν.

ΣΝ. Ἄλλα τοι, ὡς φίλε, ἀδηλον εἰ καὶ παραθέομεν τὸ ὀρθόν. εἰκός γε ἄρα ἐκεῖνων πρεσβύτερον

Δὸντα σοφώτερον ἡμῶν εἶναι· καὶ εἴ αὐτίκα ἐντεῦθεν ἀνακύψειε μέχρι τοῦ αὐχένος, πολλὰ ἂν ἐμὲ τε ἐλέγξας ληροῦντα, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, καὶ σὲ ὅμολογοῦντα, καταθῶς ἂν οἶχοιτο ἀποτρέχων. ἀλλ’ ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη, οἶμαι, χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, ὅποίοι τινὲς ἐσμεν, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἂεὶ ταῦτα λέγεων. καὶ δῆτα καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι φῶμεν ὅμολογεῖν ἂν τούτῳ γε ὄντινον, τὸ εἶναι σοφώτερον ἐτερὸν ἐτέρου, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀμαθέστερον;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

23. ΣΝ. Ἡ καὶ ταῦτη ἂν μάλιστα ἵστασθαι τὸν λόγον, ἢ ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες

ΕΠΡΩΤΑΓΟΡΑ, ὡς τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἢ δοκεῖ, ταῦτη καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάστως, θερμά, ἔπρα, γλυκέα, πάντα οὐσα τού τύπου τούτου· εἰ δὲ ποι έν τισι συγχωρησται διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλου, περὶ τὰ ύγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη ἐθελῆσαι ἂν φάναι μὴ πᾶν γύναιον καὶ παιδίον, καὶ θηρίον δὲ, ἰκανὸν εἶναι ἵσσαθαι αὐτὸ γυγώσκον ἐαυτῷ τὸ ύγιεινόν, ἀλλὰ ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄλλον ἄλλου διαφέρειν, εἰπέρ ποι;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

172 ΣΝ. Ὠνκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα καὶ οὐσία καὶ μῆ, οἷα ἂν ἐκάστῃ πόλις οἰηθεῖσα θῇται νόμιμα αὐτῆ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τῇ ἁλῆθείᾳ ἐκάστῃ, καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν σοφώτερον οὐτε ἴδιωτην ἴδιωτου οὕτε πόλιν πόλεως εἶναι· ἐν δὲ τῷ συμφέροντα ἐαυτῇ
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THEO. I think, Socrates, we are running my friend too hard.

SOC. But, my dear man, I do not see that we are running beyond what is right. Most likely, though, he, being older, is wiser than we, and if, for example, he should emerge from the ground, here at our feet, if only as far as the neck, he would prove abundantly that I was making a fool of myself by my talk, in all probability, and you by agreeing with me; then he would sink down and be off at a run. But we, I suppose, must depend on ourselves, such as we are, and must say just what we think. And so now must we not say that everybody would agree that some men are wiser and some more ignorant than others?

THEO. Yes, I think at least we must.

SOC. And do you think his doctrine might stand most firmly in the form in which we sketched it when defending Protagoras, that most things—hot, dry, sweet, and everything of that sort—are to each person as they appear to him, and if Protagoras is to concede that there are cases in which one person excels another, he might be willing to say that in matters of health and disease not every woman or child—or beast, for that matter—knows what is wholesome for it and is able to cure itself, but in this point, if in any, one person excels another?

THEO. Yes, I think that is correct.

SOC. And likewise in affairs of state, the honourable and disgraceful, the just and unjust, the pious and its opposite, are in truth to each state such as it thinks they are and as it enacts into law for itself, and in these matters no citizen and no state is wiser than another; but in making laws that are advan-
ἡ μὴ συμφέροντα τιθεσθαί, ἐνταῦθ', εἴπερ ποι, αὐτὸ ομολογήσει σύμβουλὸν τε συμβουλὸν διαφέρειν καὶ πόλεως δόξαν ἑτέραν ἑτέρας πρὸς ἁλῆθειαν, Β καὶ οὖκ ἂν πάνυ τολμήσεις φήσαι, ἃ ἂν θῆται πόλεις συμφέροντα οἰηθείσα αὐτῇ, παντὸς μᾶλλον ταῦτα καὶ συνόψεων· ἀλλ' ἐκεί οὐ λέγω, ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἄδικοις¹ καὶ σώιοις καὶ ἄνοιοις, ἔθελουσιν ἵσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς οὖν ἐστὶ φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὕσιν ἕαυτον ἤχον ἀλλὰ τὸ κουμηνῇ δόξαν τούτο γίγνεται ἄλλης τότε ὅταν δόξῃ καὶ ὅσοι ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον· καὶ ὅσοι γε δὴ² μὴ παντάπασι τὸν Πρωταγόρον λόγον λέγουσιν,³ ὃδε πως τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι. λόγος δὲ ἢμᾶς, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ἐκ C λόγου μεῖζων ἐξ ἐλάττωνος καταλαμβάνει.

ὃς. Όυκοῦν σχολὴν ἄγομεν, ὃ Σώκρατες;

ὡς. Φανόμεθα. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν γε δὴ, ὃ δαμόνε, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατενόησα, ἄταρ καὶ νῦν, ὡς εἰκότως οὐ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολύν χρόνον διατρίψαντες εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια ἴντες γελοῖοι φαίνουνται ρήτορες.

ὃς. Πῶς δὴ οὖν λέγεις;

ὡς. Κινδυνεύουσιν οὐ ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν D φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ τοιάδε διατριβῇ τεθραμμένους ὡς οἰκέται πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι.⁴

ὃς. Πῇ δὴ;

ὡς. Ἡ τοῖς μὲν τούτο ὅ σὺ εἴπεις ἀεὶ πάρεστι, σχολή, καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται· ἐστὶν ἢμεῖς νυὲ τρῖτον ἢδη λόγον

¹ καὶ ἄδικοις W; om. BT. ² δὴ BT; ἂν Schanz. ³ λέγουσιν Naber, with inferior mss.; λέγωσιν BT. ⁴ τεθράφθαι W; τεθράφθαι BT.
tageous to the state, or the reverse, Protagoras again will agree that one counsellor is better than another, and the opinion of one state better than that of another as regards the truth, and he would by no means dare to affirm that whatsoever laws a state makes in the belief that they will be advantageous to itself are perfectly sure to prove advantageous. But in the other class of things—I mean just and unjust, pious and impious—they are willing to say with confidence that no one of them possesses by nature an existence of its own; on the contrary, that the common opinion becomes true at the time when it is adopted and remains true as long as it is held; this is substantially the theory of those who do not altogether affirm the doctrine of Protagoras. But, Theodorus, argument after argument, a greater one after a lesser, is overtakeing us.

THEO. Well, Socrates, we have plenty of leisure, have we not?

SOC. Apparently we have. And that makes me think, my friend, as I have often done before, how natural it is that those who have spent a long time in the study of philosophy appear ridiculous when they enter the courts of law as speakers.

THEO. What do you mean?

SOC. Those who have knocked about in courts and the like from their youth up seem to me, when compared with those who have been brought up in philosophy and similar pursuits, to be as slaves in breeding compared with freemen.

THEO. In what way is this the case?

SOC. In this way: the latter always have that which you just spoke of, leisure, and they talk at their leisure in peace; just as we are now taking up
ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὖτω κάκεινοι, ἐὰν αὐτοὺς ὁ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον καθάπερ ἡμᾶς ἀρέση· καὶ διὰ μακρῶν ἢ βραχέων μέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἂν μόνον τὰ ἄρσοι τοῦ ὄντος· οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ τε ἀεὶ λέγουσι—κατεπείγει γὰρ ὑδωρ ἰένιον Ἐ—καὶ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ περὶ οὗ ὁ ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖται, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκην ἔχων ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκεν καὶ ὑπογραφὴν παραναγγείλειςκομένην, ὡς ἐκτὸς οὐ βρήκον. ἦν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν· 1 οἱ δὲ λόγοι άεὶ περὶ ὁμοδούλου πρὸς δεσπότην καθήμενον, ἐν χειρὶ των δίκην ἔχοντα, καὶ οἱ άγώνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλην ἀλλ' άεὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ· πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος.

173 ὡστ' ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων ἐντονοι καὶ δρώμεις γίγνονται, ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν δεσπότην λόγῳ τε θωπεύσαι καὶ ἔργῳ χαρίσασθαι, 2 σμικρὸι δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχὰς. τὴν γὰρ αὔξην καὶ τὸ εὐθύ τε καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον 3 ἢ ἐκ νέων δουλεία ἀφήρηται, ἀναγκάζουσα πράττειν σκολιά, μεγάλους κυνύ- νους καὶ φόβους ἐτί ἀπαλαίτις ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλλουσα, οὕς οὐ δυνάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀληθοῦς ὑποφέρειν, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ ψευδὸς τε καὶ τὸ ἀλλήλους ἀνταδικεῖν τρεπόμενοι πολλά κάμπτονται καὶ

1 ἦν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν mss.; om. Abresch et al.
2 χαρίσασθαι BT; ὑπελθεῖν Cobet from Themistius.
3 τὸ ἐλεύθερον BT; τὸ ἐλευθέριον Themistius.
argument after argument, already beginning a third, so can they, if, as in our case, the new one pleases them better than that in which they are engaged; and they do not care at all whether their talk is long or short, if only they attain the truth. But the men of the other sort are always in a hurry—for the water flowing through the water-clock urges them on—and the other party in the suit does not permit them to talk about anything they please, but stands over them exercising the law's compulsion by reading the brief, from which no deviation is allowed (this is called the affidavit); and their discourse is always about a fellow slave and is addressed to a master who sits there holding some case or other in his hands; and the contests never run an indefinite course, but are always directed to the point at issue, and often the race is for the defendant's life. As a result of all this, the speakers become tense and shrewd; they know how to wheedle their master with words and gain his favour by acts; but in their souls they become small and warped. For they have been deprived of growth and straightforwardness and independence by the slavery they have endured from their youth up, for this forces them to do crooked acts by putting a great burden of fears and dangers upon their souls while these are still tender; and since they cannot bear this burden with uprightness and truth, they turn forthwith to deceit and to requiting wrong with wrong, so that they become

1 In Athenian legal procedure each party to a suit presented a written statement—the charge and the reply—at a preliminary hearing. These statements were subsequently confirmed by oath, and the sworn statement was called ἰδιωμοσία or ἀντιμοσία, which is rendered above by "affidavit" as the nearest English equivalent.
Πλάτων, ὁ Ξενάχθων, ὁ Θεόδωρος, τοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἡμέτερου χοροῦ πότερον βούλει διελθόντες ἦ ἐάσαντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπώμεθα, ἦν τὴν μὴ καὶ, δὲν δὲ ἐλέγομεν. λίαν πολὺ τῇ ἔλευσηρίᾳ καὶ μεταλήψει τῶν λόγων καταχρώμεθα;

θεό. Μηδαμώς, ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες.

C πάνω γὰρ εὖ τοῦτο εἴρηκας, ὅτι οὐχ ἦμείς οἱ εἰς τῷ τοιῷδε χορεύοντες τῶν λόγων ὑπηρέται, ἀλλ' οἱ λόγοι ἡμέτεροι 1 ὡσπερ οἰκέται, καὶ ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν περιμένει ἀποτελεσθῆναι ὅταν ἦμῖν δοκή. οὔτε γὰρ δικαστής οὔτε θεατὴς ὡσπερ ποιητάς ἐπιτιμήσων τε καὶ ἄρξων ἐπιστατεῖ παρ' ἦμῖν.

24. ο. Λέγωμεν δὴ, ὡς ἔσκει, ἐπεὶ σοὶ γε δοκεῖ, περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων τί γὰρ ἄν τις τοὺς γε φαύλως διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγω; οὕτω δὲ που ἐκ νέων πρῶτον μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἦσει τὴν Ὁδὸν, οὐδὲ ὅπου δικαστήριον ἢ βουλευτήριον ἢ τῷ κουμῶν ἀλλο τῆς πόλεως συνεδρίων νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα ἢ γεγραμμένα οὔτε ὅρῳσιν οὔτε ἀκούονσιν σπουδαί δὲ ἑταρίῳ ἐπὶ ἀρχας καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίᾳ κατὰ οὔτε ἄναρτες προσίσταται αὐτοῖς. εὖ δὲ ἡ κακῶς τίς 2 γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, ἢ τί τῶν κακῶν ἐστιν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονός ἢ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν, μᾶλλον αὐτῶν λέγηθεν ἢ οἱ τῆς θαλάττης Εἰ λεγόμενοι χόρε. καὶ ταῦτα πάντ' οὐδ' ὅτι οὔκ

1 ἡμέτεροι W; οἱ ἡμέτεροι BT.
2 τίς W, Iambli., Clem.; τι BT.
greatly bent and stunted. Consequently they pass from youth to manhood with no soundness of mind in them, but they think they have become clever and wise. So much for them, Theodorus. Shall we describe those who belong to our band, or shall we let that go and return to the argument, in order to avoid abuse of that freedom and variety of discourse, of which we were speaking just now?

Theo. By all means, Socrates, describe them; for I like your saying that we who belong to this band are not the servants of our arguments, but the arguments are, as it were, our servants, and each of them must await our pleasure to be finished; for we have neither judge, nor, as the poets have, any spectator set over us to censure and rule us.

Soc. Very well, that is quite appropriate, since it is your wish; and let us speak of the leaders; for why should anyone talk about the inferior philosophers? The leaders, in the first place, from their youth up, remain ignorant of the way to the agora, do not even know where the court-room is, or the senate-house, or any other public place of assembly; as for laws and decrees, they neither hear the debates upon them nor see them when they are published; and the strivings of political clubs after public offices, and meetings, and banquets, and revellings with chorus girls—it never occurs to them even in their dreams to indulge in such things. And whether anyone in the city is of high or low birth, or what evil has been inherited by anyone from his ancestors, male or female, are matters to which they pay no more attention than to the number of pints in the sea, as the saying is. And all these things the philosopher does not even know that he does not
οἶδεν, οἶδεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδο-
κιμεῖν χάριν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ
πόλει κεῖται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἢ δὲ διάνοια,
tαῦτα πάντα ἡγησαμένη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδὲν, ἀτιμά-
σασα πανταχῆ φέρεται ¹ κατὰ Πίνδαρον, "τὰς ²
τε γὰς ὑπένερθε" καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα,
"οὐρανοῦ τε ὑπὲρ" ἀστρονομοῦσα, καὶ πᾶσαν
174 πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνωμένη τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου
ὄλου, εἰς τῶν ἔγγυς οὐδὲν αὐτὴν συγκαθιεῖσα.

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς τούτῳ λέγεις, ὥ Σώκρατες;

σπ. "Ωσπερ καὶ Θαλῆν ἀστρονομοῦντα, ὥ Θεό-
dωρε, καὶ ἀνώ βλέποντα, πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ, Ὄραττά
τις ἐμμελῆς καὶ χαρίεσσα θεραπανίς ἀποσκώθαι
λέγεται, ὡς τὰ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι,
tὰ δὲ ἐμπροσθεὶν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ πόδας λαβόνοι
αὐτὸν. ταύτων δὲ ἄρκει σκώμμα ἐπὶ πάντας ὅσοι
Β ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγονοι. τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τὸν τοιοῦτον
ὁ μὲν πλησίον καὶ ὁ γείτων λέληθεν, οὐ μόνον ὥ τι
πράττει, ἀλλ’ ὀλίγου καὶ εἰ ἀνθρωπός ἔστιν ἢ τι
ἀλλὸ θρέμμα· τῖ δὲ ποτ’ ἐστὶν ἀνθρωπός καὶ τι
τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει προσήκει διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων
ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν ζητεῖ τε καὶ πράγματ’ ἔχει
dιερευνώμενον. μανθάνεις γὰρ πού, ὥ Θεόδωρε.
ἡ οὐ;

ΘΕΟ. "Εγώγε· καὶ ἄληθῆ λέγεις.

σπ. Τοιγάρτω, ὥ φίλε, ἰδία τε συγγιγνόμενος ὁ

¹ φέρεται BΤ; πέτεται B²W, Iambl., Clem., Euseb.
² τὰς Campbell from Clément; τὰ C; τὰ T.

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know; for he does not keep aloof from them for the sake of gaining reputation, but really it is only his body that has its place and home in the city; his mind, considering all these things petty and of no account, disdains them and is borne in all directions, as Pindar\(^1\) says, "both below the earth," and measuring the surface of the earth, and "above the sky," studying the stars, and investigating the universal nature of every thing that is, each in its entirety, never lowering itself to anything close at hand.

**Theo.** What do you mean by this, Socrates?

**Soc.** Why, take the case of Thales, Theodorus. While he was studying the stars and looking upwards, he fell into a pit, and a neat, witty Thracian servant girl jeered at him, they say, because he was so eager to know the things in the sky that he could not see what was there before him at his very feet. The same jest applies to all who pass their lives in philosophy. For really such a man pays no attention to his next door neighbour; he is not only ignorant of what he is doing, but he hardly knows whether he is a human being or some other kind of a creature; but what a human being is and what is proper for such a nature to do or bear different from any other, this he inquires and exerts himself to find out. Do you understand, Theodorus, or not?

**Theo.** Yes, I do; you are right.

**Soc.** Hence it is, my friend, such a man, both in

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\(^1\) This may refer to *Nem. x.* 87 f.—

\[\text{\textit{θμιαν \ μέν κε πνεοις γάλαις ἵππεν τετεθεν ἐως,}}\]
\[\text{\textit{θμιαν δ’ οὐρανοῖ ἐν χρυσέοις ἔμοισιν,}}\]

"Thou (Polydeuces) shalt live being half the time under the earth and half the time in the golden dwellings of heaven," but it may be a quotation from one of the lost poems of Pindar.
PLATO

toioûtos èkástw kai ðemmosía, òper ãrkhómenos

C èlegon, òtan èn dikasthîriw ð pou ìllolhì anagka-
sðhì peri tòn parà pódas kai tòn èn ð phálmoiù

dialégëståi, gêlwta parëhei ou ì mônô Þrâttaiù

âllâ kai tî ìllh ðìlw, eìs ðreåtâ te kai pàsan

âporiàì èmpîptwv ðpò âpeiriâ, kai ð ãschhmosùnì

deuñì, dòxan ãbëleririàs parëchômëni. èn te gàr

taìs lòdorìaiù ìdion èxei ouðèn ouðëna lòdorëin,

àt' ouk èidhìs kàkòn ouðèn ouðënìs èk tòù ìhù

mëmelëtiknì. àporòw ouñ gëloìoìs fàivetai. èn

D te toìs èpàïnos kai taìs tòn ìllwv megàlaxhìain,

ou proespòntwos, âllâ tà dh ònti gëloìn ènðhlòs

gigwnòmenos lìrëwðhì dòkeì èiñai. tûrânìw te

gàr ðe basiliêa ègkwwmaìzômenon èna tòn nòmèñw,

òion svbûtìn ð poumëna ð tìa boukòlon, ðgeîtaì

àkòuèn ènðdamonìzômenon polù ððàllluntà: ðús-

còlòteron dè èkeîwnw ðìwv kai èpìboûlòteron

poumaînèn te kai ððàllleùv nòmìçêì autòùs, àgroomìkò

dè kai àpàïdëwntì ðpò ìsçholìas ouðèn ëttoun tòn

Èvnomèwv tôñ toioûtów anagkàìon gînwnèthai, sêkòw

èn órêi tò teîchos peribëblhmenon. ãhì dè òtan

mûria plêòra ð ëti plëiîw ãkòûaì õs tìs ãrâ

dekhtìmenos ðauhmastà plëðheì këktìtaì, pànsmikra

dòkeì àkòuèn eìs àpàsan ìwòhìs tìn ãhì ðlëpèwn.

tà dè ðì ãeînì ùmnótnwv, õs ãenwaìos tìs èpò

pàppouì plousoììs ëxwv àpòfìhìaì, àntàpàsow

àìblì kai èpì smìkron ðòwntwv ãgeîtaì tòn

175 èpàïnìw, ðpò àpàïdeusìaì ou ðvunàmènìw eìs tò
THEAETETUS

private, when he meets with individuals, and in public, as I said in the beginning, when he is obliged to speak in court or elsewhere about the things at his feet and before his eyes, is a laughing-stock not only to Thracian girls but to the multitude in general, for he falls into pits and all sorts of perplexities through inexperience, and his awkwardness is terrible, making him seem a fool; for when it comes to abusing people he has no personal abuse to offer against anyone, because he knows no evil of any man, never having cared for such things; so his perplexity makes him appear ridiculous; and as to laudatory speeches and the boastings of others, it becomes manifest that he is laughing at them—not pretending to laugh, but really laughing—and so he is thought to be a fool. When he hears a panegyric of a despot or a king he fancies he is listening to the praises of some herdsman—a swineherd, a shepherd, or a neatherd, for instance—who gets much milk from his beasts; but he thinks that the ruler tends and milks a more perverse and treacherous creature than the herdsmen, and that he must grow coarse and uncivilized, no less than they, for he has no leisure and lives surrounded by a wall, as the herdsmen live in their mountain pens. And when he hears that someone is amazingly rich, because he owns ten thousand acres of land or more, to him, accustomed as he is to think of the whole earth, this seems very little. And when people sing the praises of lineage and say someone is of noble birth, because he can show seven wealthy ancestors, he thinks that such praises betray an altogether dull and narrow vision on the part of those who utter them; because of lack of education they cannot keep their eyes fixed
πάν ἀεὶ βλέπειν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι ὅτι πάππων καὶ προγόνων μυριάδες ἐκάστῳ γεγονασιν ἀναρίθμητοι, ἐν αἰσ πλοῦσιοι καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ βασιλεῖς καὶ δούλου βάρβαροι τε καὶ "Ελλήνες πολλάκις μυρίοι γεγονασιν ὅτωσιν ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι καταλόγῳ προγόνων σεμνυνομένων καὶ ἄναφερόντων εἰς 'Ἡρακλέα τὸν Ἀμφιτρύωνος ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, ὅτι Β δὲ ὁ ἀπ’ Ἀμφιτρύωνος εἰς τὸ ἄνω πεντεκαΙΙνουσα πότε τιούτος ἦν οἰα συνεβαίνειν αὐτῷ τῇχ, καὶ ὁ πεντηκοστὸς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, γελᾷ οὐ δυναμένων λογίζεσθαι τε καὶ χαυνότητα ἀνωτίου ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττειν. ἐν ἀπασι δὴ τούτου ο τοιούτος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελάται, τὰ μὲν ὑπερηφάνως ἔχον, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ δ’ ἐν ποσίν ἄγνοιον τε καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις ἄπορων.

ΤΕΟ. Παντάπασι τὰ γιγνομένα λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες.

25. Ν. Ὅταν δὲ γέ τινα αὐτὸς, ὃ φίλε, Ελκύσῃ ἄνω, καὶ ἐθελήσῃ τις αὐτῷ ἔκβηναι ἐκ τοῦ "τί ἐγὼ σὲ ἀδικῶ ἢ σὺ ἐμέ;" εἰς σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας, τί τε ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖς καὶ τί τῶν πάντων ἢ ἀλλήλων διαφερέτων, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ "ἐι βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων," "κεκτημένος τ’ ἀθ πολύ χρυσόν," βασιλείας πέρι καὶ ἀνθρωπίνης ὅλως εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ἐπὶ σκέψιν, ποιῶ τὲ τινὲ ἐστόν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἀνθρώπου φύσει προσήκει τὸ μὲν κτήσασθαι ἐκτὸς αὐτοῖς, τὸ δὲ ἀποφυγεῖν—περὶ τούτων ἁπάντων

D ὅταν αὖ δέῃ λόγον διδόναι τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκεῖνον τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ δρμῶν καὶ δικαίων, πάλιν αὖ τὰ

1 πολὺ Euseb., Iamb.; om. BT.

2 κτήσασθαι B², Iamb., Euseb.; κτήσασθαι BT.

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upon the whole and are unable to calculate that every man has had countless thousands of ancestors and progenitors, among whom have been in any instance rich and poor, kings and slaves, barbarians and Greeks. And when people pride themselves on a list of twenty-five ancestors and trace their pedigree back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, the pettiness of their ideas seems absurd to him; he laughs at them because they cannot free their silly minds of vanity by calculating that Amphitryon's twenty-fifth ancestor was such as fortune happened to make him, and the fiftieth for that matter. In all these cases the philosopher is derided by the common herd, partly because he seems to be contemptuous, partly because he is ignorant of common things and is always in perplexity.

THEO. That all happens just as you say, Socrates.

SOC. But when, my friend, he draws a man upwards and the other is willing to rise with him above the level of "What wrong have I done you or you me?" to the investigation of abstract right and wrong, to inquire what each of them is and wherein they differ from each other and from all other things, or above the level of "Is a king happy?" or, on the other hand, "Has he great wealth?" to the investigation of royalty and of human happiness and wretchedness in general, to see what the nature of each is and in what way man is naturally fitted to gain the one and escape the other—when that man of small and sharp and pettifogging mind is compelled in his turn to give an account of all these
PLATO

ἀντιστροφα ἀποδίδωσιν. ἶλιγγυῖν τε ἀπὸ ύψηλοῦ κρεμασθεὶς καὶ βλέπων μετέωρος ἄνωθεν ύπὸ ἀγθείας ἀδημονών τε καὶ ἄπορῶν καὶ βαττάριζων

γέλωτα Θράτταις μὲν οὐ παρέχει οὐδ’ ἄλλω ἀπαι- δέυτῳ οὐδενὶ, οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνονται, τοῖς δ’ ἐναντίως ἦ ὡς ἀνδραπόδοιοι τραφείσιν ἀπασίν. οὕτως δὴ ἐκατέρου τρόπος, ὡ Θεόδωρε, ὃ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν

Ε ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένου, ὃν δὴ φιλόσοφον καλεῖς, ὃ ἀνεμέσητον εὐήθει δοκεῖν καὶ οὔτεν εἶναι ὅταν εἰς δουλικὰ ἐμπέσῃ διακονήματα, οἰον στρωματόδεσμον μὴ ἐπισταμένου συσκευά-

σασθαι μηδὲ οὐκ εἰς ἀθώπας λόγους. ὃ δ’

αὖ τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα πάντα δυναμένου τορῶς τε καὶ ὀξέως διακονεῖν, ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐπισταμένου ἐπιδέξια ἐλευθέρως οὐδὲ γ’ ἀρμονίαν λόγων

176 λαβόντος ὀρθῶς ὑμνήσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν ἐυδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ.

θεο. Ἐἰ πάντας, ὃ Σώκρατες, πείθους ἅ λέγεις ὅσπερ ἐμὲ, πλείων ἄν εἰρήνη καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττω κατ’ ἀνθρώπους εἰῇ.

σω. Ἀλλ’ οὔτ’ ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ὑπεναντίον γὰρ τῷ τῷ ἀγάθῳ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη, οὔτ’ ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρύσθαι, τὴν δὲ θυντὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ εὖ

1 βατταρίζων Themistius; βαρβαρίζων BT.
2 τραφείσιν ἀπασίν B; τραφείσιν πᾶσιν T, Iamb., Euseb.
3 ὃ δ’ t, Iamb.; οὗ δ’ BT.
4 ἐλευθέρως BT; ἐλευθερίως Athenaeus.
5 ἀληθῆ om. Athenaeus.

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things, then the tables are turned; dizzied by the new experience of hanging at such a height, he gazes downward from the air in dismay and perplexity; he stammers and becomes ridiculous, not in the eyes of Thracian girls or other uneducated persons, for they have no perception of it, but in those of all men who have been brought up as free men, not as slaves. Such is the character of each of the two classes, Theodorus, of the man who has truly been brought up in freedom and leisure, whom you call a philosopher—who may without censure appear foolish and good for nothing when he is involved in menial services, if, for instance, he does not know how to pack up his bedding, much less to put the proper sweetening into a sauce or a fawning speech—and of the other, who can perform all such services smartly and quickly, but does not know how to wear his cloak as a freeman should, properly draped,\(^1\) still less to acquire the true harmony of speech and hymn aright the praises of the true life of gods and blessed men.

THEO. If, Socrates, you could persuade all men of the truth of what you say as you do me, there would be more peace and fewer evils among mankind.

soc. But it is impossible that evils should be done away with, Theodorus, for there must always be something opposed to the good; and they cannot have their place among the gods, but must inevitably hover about mortal nature and this earth. Therefore

\(^1\) The Athenians regarded the proper draping of the cloak as a sign of good breeding. The well-bred Athenian first threw his cloak over the left shoulder, then passed it round the back to the right side, then either above or below the right arm, and finally over the left arm or shoulder. See Aristophanes, *Birds*, 1567 f., with Blaydes’s notes.
Δανάγκης. διὸ καὶ πειράσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε
Β φεύγειν ὡς τάχιστα. φυγῇ δὲ ὀμοίωσις θεῦ
κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν· ὀμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον
μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὃ ἀριστε,
οὐ πάνυ 1 ράδιον πεῖσαι ὡς ἄρα οὐχ ὄν ἔνεκα οἱ
πολλοί φασι δεῖν πονηρίαν μὲν φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ
διώκειν, τοῦτον χάριν τὸ μὲν ἐπιτηδευτέον, τὸ δ' οὐ,
ίνα μὴ 2 κακὸς καὶ ἵνα ἀγαθὸς δοκῇ εἶναι. ταῦτα
γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕθλος, ὡς ἐμοὶ
C φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ ἄληθὲς ὥδε λέγωμεν. θεὸς
οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ' ὡς οἶον τε δικαιο-
tatos, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὀμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὅς
ἀν ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς γένηται ὅτι δικαιότατος. περὶ τοῦτο 3
καὶ ἡ ὃς ἄληθῶς διειστῆς ἀνδρὸς καὶ οὐδενία τε
καὶ ἀνανδρία. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτου γνώσις σοφία καὶ
ἀρετὴ ἄληθινή, ἡ δὲ ἀγνοια ἀμαθία καὶ κακία
ἐναργηθείς· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι διειστήκατε τε δοκοῦσαι καὶ
σοφία ἢν μὲν πολιτικάς δυναστείας γιγνόμεναι
φορτικά, ἐν δὲ τέχναις βάναυσος. τῷ οὖν ἀδι-
D κοῦντι καὶ ἀνόσια λέγοντι ἢ πράττοντι μακρῷ
ἀριστή· ἔχει τὸ μὴ συγχωρεῖν δεινῷ ὕπο πανουργίας
εἶναι· ἀγάλλονται γὰρ τῶν ὅνειδε καὶ οἴονται
ἀκούειν ὅτι οὐ λήροι εἰσὶν, γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη, ἄλλ' ἀνδρὲς οἶους
dεὶ ἐν πόλει τοὺς σωθησομένους.
λκτέον οὖν τάληθες, ὅτι τοσοῦτο μᾶλλον εἰσιν
οἶοι οὐκ οἴονται, ὅτι οὐχὶ οἴονται· ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ
ζημίαν ἀδίκιας, δ' ἡκιστὰ ἁγνοεῖν. οὐ γὰρ

1 πάνυ B; πάνυ τι T.
2 ίνα μὴ B; ίνα δὴ μὴ T.
3 τοῦτο Euseb., Iamb., Stob.; τούτου BT.
we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise. But, indeed, my good friend, it is not at all easy to persuade people that the reason generally advanced for the pursuit of virtue and the avoidance of vice—namely, in order that a man may not seem bad and may seem good—is not the reason why the one should be practised and the other not; that, I think, is merely old wives' chatter, as the saying is. Let us give the true reason. God is in no wise and in no manner unrighteous, but utterly and perfectly righteous, and there is nothing so like him as that one of us who in turn becomes most nearly perfect in righteousness. It is herein that the true cleverness of a man is found and also his worthlessness and cowardice; for the knowledge of this is wisdom or true virtue, and ignorance of it is folly or manifest wickedness; and all the other kinds of seeming cleverness and wisdom are paltry when they appear in public affairs and vulgar in the arts. Therefore by far the best thing for the unrighteous man and the man whose words or deeds are impious is not to grant that he is clever through knavery; for such men glory in that reproach, and think it means that they are not triflers, "useless burdens upon the earth," 1 but such as men should be who are to live safely in a state. So we must tell them the truth—that just because they do not think they are such as they are, they are so all the more truly; for they do not know the penalty of unrighteousness, which is the thing they most ought to know. For

1 Homer, Iliad, xviii. 104; Odyssey, xx. 379.
PLATO

ἐστιν ἦν δοκοῦσι, πληγαί τε καὶ θάνατοι, ὅπε ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν οὐδέν αὐτοῖς πάντα, ἀλλὰ ἦν ἄδινατον Ε ἐκφυγεῖν.

πο. Τίνα δὴ λέγεις;

πο. Παραδειγμάτων, ὁ φίλε, ἐν τῷ ὃντι ἐστώ-
tων, τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀδικωτάτου, οὐχ ὄρωντες ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὑπὸ

ηλικιωτήτος τε καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι

177 τῷ μὲν ὄμοιούμενοι διὰ τὰς ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἄνομοιούμενοι. οὐ δὴ τίνος δίκην ζώντες τὸν
eἰκότα βίον ὃ ὑμώνται. ἐὰν δ' εἶπομεν ὅτι, ἄν μὴ ἀπαλλαγῷ τῆς δεινότητος, καὶ τελευτήσαντας

αὐτοὺς ἐκείνοις μὲν ὅ τῶν κακῶν καθαρός τόπος οὐ

δεξεται, ἐνθάδε δὲ τὴν αὐτοῖς ὄμοιότητα τῆς
diagwγῆς αἰε ἔχουσι, κακοὶ κακοὶς συνόντες,

ταῦτα δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοὶ καὶ πανούργοι

ἀνοήτων τινῶν ἀκόουσονται.

πο. Καὶ μάλα δὴ, ὧν Σώκρατες.

Β σῷ. Οἴδας τοι, ὃ ἔταίρε. ἐν μέντοι τι αὐτοῖς συμβεβηκεν. ὅταν 1 ἰδία λόγον δὲν δοῦναί τε καὶ
dεξασθαι περὶ ὃν ψέγουσι, καὶ ἑθελήσωσιν ἄν-
dρικῶς πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομεῖναι καὶ μὴ ἀνάδρως

φυγεῖν, 2 τότε ἀτόπως, ὃ δαμόνιε, τελευτῶντες οὐκ

ἀρέσκουσιν αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς περὶ ὃν λέγουσι, καὶ ἡ

ῥητορική ἐκείνη πως ἀπομαραίνεται, ὦστε παιδῶν

μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν, ἐπεὶ

καὶ πάρεργα τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, ἀποστῶμεν—εἰ δὲ

C μή, πλείω ἂν ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἥμων τὸν

1 οτ' ἄν W, Iamb.; οτι ἄν BT.

2 φυγεῖν W; φεύγειν BT, Iamb.
it is not what they think it is—scourgings and death, which they sometimes escape entirely when they have done wrong—but a penalty which it is impossible to escape.

THEO. What penalty do you mean?

SOC. Two patterns, my friend, are set up in the world, the divine, which is most blessed, and the godless, which is most wretched. But these men do not see that this is the case, and their silliness and extreme foolishness blind them to the fact that through their unrighteous acts they are made like the one and unlike the other. They therefore pay the penalty for this by living a life that conforms to the pattern they resemble; and if we tell them that, unless they depart from their "cleverness," the blessed place that is pure of all things evil will not receive them after death, and here on earth they will always live the life like themselves—evil men associating with evil—when they hear this, they will be so confident in their unscrupulous cleverness that they will think our words the talk of fools.

THEO. Very true, Socrates.

SOC. Yes, my friend, I know. However, there is one thing that has happened to them: whenever they have to carry on a personal argument about the doctrines to which they object, if they are willing to stand their ground for a while like men and do not run away like cowards, then, my friend, they at last become strangely dissatisfied with themselves and their arguments; their brilliant rhetoric withers away, so that they seem no better than children. But this is a digression. Let us turn away from these matters—if we do not, they will come on like
εξ ἀρχῆς λόγον—ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ἐμπροσθεν ἱώμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ ὁκεῖ.

θεό. Ἐμοὶ μὲν τὰ τουαῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατε, οὐκ ἀγδέστερα ἄκοινει. ρὰ ψέρ γὰρ τηλικῷ δε ὄντι ἐπακολουθεῖν εἰ μέντοι ὁκεῖ, πάλιν ἐπανίωμεν.

26. συ. Οὐκοῦν ἔνταῦθα που ἤμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἐν ὦ ἐφαμεν τοὺς τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν λεγοντας, καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τοῦτῳ ὦ δοκεῖ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔθελεν δυσχυρεῖν.

D ξεσθαί, καὶ οὐχ ἢκιστα περὶ τὰ δίκαια, ὡς παντὸς μάλλον ἃ ἀν θηταί πόλις δοξαντα αὐτῆ; ταῦτα καὶ ἐστι δίκαια τῇ θεμένη, ἐωσπερ ἂν κέηται· περὶ δὲ τάγαθοφ 1 οὐδένα ἀνδρείου ἔθ' οὕτως εἶναι, ὡστε τολμᾶν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι καὶ ἃ ἂν ὠφέλιμα οὐθείσα πόλις ἐαυτῆθη ἢθηται, καὶ ἐστι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἂν κέηται ὠφέλιμα, πλὴν εἰ τις τὸ ὄνομα λέγων· τοῦτο δὲ που σκὼμ' ἂν εἰη πρὸς ὁ λέγομεν. οὐχὶ;

θεό. Πάνυ γε.

Ε. συ. Μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα, ἄλλα τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὄνομαξόμενον θεωρεῖτω. 2

θεό. Μὴ γὰρ.

συ. 'Αλλ' ὁ ἂν τοῦτο ὄνομαξη, τοῦτον δὴ τοῦν στοχάζεται νομοθετομένη, καὶ πάντας τοὺς νόμους, καθ' ὅσον οἴσται τε καὶ δύναται, ὡς ὠφελιμωτάτοις ἐαυτῇ τίθεται. ἡ πρὸς ἄλλ' τι βλέπουσα νομοθετεῖται;

1 τάγαθοφ BW2; τάγαθα TW.
2 τὸ ὄνομαξόμενον θεωρεῖτο W; ὁ ὄνομαξόμενον θεωρεῖται B; λεγέτω ... μὴ γὰρ om. T.

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an ever-rising flood and bury in silt our original argument—and let us, if you please, proceed.

theo. To me, Socrates, such digressions are quite as agreeable as the argument; for they are easier for a man of my age to follow. However, if you prefer, let us return to our argument.

soc. Very well. We were at about the point in our argument where we said that those who declare that only motion is reality, and that whatever seems to each man really is to him to whom it seems, are willing to maintain their position in regard to other matters and to maintain especially in regard to justice that whatever laws a state makes, because they seem to it just, are just to the state that made them, as long as they remain in force; but as regards the good, that nobody has the courage to go on and contend that whatever laws a state passes thinking them advantageous to it are really advantageous as long as they remain in force, unless what he means is merely the name “advantageous”; and that would be making a joke of our argument. Am I right?

theo. Certainly.

soc. Yes; for he must not mean merely the name, but the thing named must be the object of his attention.

theo. True.

soc. But the state, in making laws, aims, of course, at advantage, whatever the name it gives it, and makes all its laws as advantageous as possible to itself, to the extent of its belief and ability; or has it in making laws anything else in view?

1 The legislator may call his laws advantageous, and that name, if it is given them when they are enacted, will belong to them, whatever their character may be.
PLATO

178 ΘΕΟ. Οὐδαμῶς.

σημ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ τυγχάνει ἂεὶ, ἡ πολλὰ καὶ διαμαρτάνει ἐκάστη¹;

ΘΕΟ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ ἀμαρτάνειν.

σημ. Ἔτι τούνν ἐνθένδε ἂν μᾶλλον πᾶς τις ὁμολογήσειν ταύτα ταύτα, εἰ περὶ παντός τις τοῦ εἴδους ἑρωτώῃ, ἐν ὦ καὶ τὸ ὕφελμον τυγχάνει ὃν· ἐστὶ δὲ ποι καὶ περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνων. ὅταν γὰρ νομοθετήμεθα, ὡς ἐσωμένους ὕφελμοις τοὺς νόμους τιθέμεθα εἰς τὸν ἐπειτα χρόνον· τοῦτο δὲ μέλλον² ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγουμεν.

Β ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ γε.

σημ. Ἡθι δή, οὕτωσι ἐρωτῶμεν Πρωταγόραν ἃ ἄλλον τών ἐκείνῳ τὰ αὐτὰ λεγόντων· πάντων μέτρου ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὡς φατε, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, λευκῶν, βαρέων, κούφων, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ τῶν τοιούτων· ἔχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐ πάσχει τοιαύτα οἱμένοις, ἀληθῆ τε οἴεται αὐτῷ καὶ ὄντα. οὐχ οὕτω;

ΘΕΟ. Οὕτω.

σημ. Ἡ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεθαί, φήσομεν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἔχει τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ οἶα C ἂν οἰηθῇ ἔσεθαι, ταῦτα καὶ γίγνεται ἐκείνῳ τῷ οἰηθέντι; οἴον θερμά, ἄρ’ ὅταν τις οἰηθῇ ἰδιώτης αὐτὸν πυρετὸν λήψεθαι καὶ ἔσεθαι ταύτην τὴν θερμότητα, καὶ ἑτερος, ἰατρός δὲ, ἀντωθῇ, κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δοξαν φῶμεν τὸ μέλλον ἀποβήσεθαι; ἥ κατὰ τὴν ἀμφοτέρων, καὶ τῶ μὲν ἰατρῷ οὐ

¹ ἐκάστη W; ἐκάστῃ BT.
² μέλλον W; μᾶλλον BT.
THEAETETUS

Theo. Certainly not.
Soc. And does it always hit the mark, or does every state often miss it?
Theo. I should say they do often miss it!
Soc. Continuing, then, and proceeding from this point, every one would more readily agree to this assertion, if the question were asked concerning the whole class to which the advantageous belongs; and that whole class, it would seem, pertains to the future. For when we make laws, we make them with the idea that they will be advantageous in after time; and this is rightly called the future.

Theo. Certainly.
Soc. Come then, on this assumption, let us question Protagoras or someone of those who agree with him. Man is the measure of all things, as your school says, Protagoras, of the white, the heavy, the light, everything of that sort without exception; for he possesses within himself the standard by which to judge them, and when his thoughts about them coincide with his sensations, he thinks what to him is true and really is. Is not that what they say?

Theo. Yes.
Soc. Does he, then, also, Protagoras, we shall say, possess within himself the standard by which to judge of the things which are yet to be, and do those things which he thinks will be actually come to pass for him who thought them? Take, for instance, heat; if some ordinary man thinks he is going to take a fever, that is to say, that this particular heat will be, and some other man, who is a physician, thinks the contrary, whose opinion shall we expect the future to prove right? Or perhaps the opinion
θερμὸς οὐδὲ πυρέττων γενήσεται, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφό-
tερα;

ὁ. Γελοῖον μέντ' ἂν εἴη.

σπ. Ἀλλ', οἶμαι, περὶ οἶνου γλυκύτητος καὶ

παίδητρότητος μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι ἢ τοῦ γεωργοῦ
dόξα, ἄλλ' οὐχ ἢ τοῦ κυθαριστοῦ κυρία.

ὁ. Τί μὴν;

σπ. Οὐδ' ἂν αὖ περὶ ἀναρμόστου τε καὶ εὐαρ-

μόστου ἐσομένου παιδοτρίβης ἀν βέλτιον δοξάσειεν

μουσικοῦ, ὁ καὶ ἐπειτὰ αὐτῷ παιδοτρίβη δόξει
eυάμορστον εἶναι.

ὁ. Οὐδαμῶς.

σπ. Οὔκοιν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐστιάσεσθαι μὴ

μαγειρικοῦ ὄντος, σκευαζομένης θοῖνης, ἀκυρότερα

ἡ κρίσις τῆς τοῦ ὑποτοιοῦ περὶ τῆς ἐσομένης

Ε ἡδονῆς. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἡδῆ ὄντος ἐκάστῳ

ἡδέας ἡ γεγονότος μηδὲν ποι ὁ λόγῳ διαμαχώ-

μεθα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐκάστῳ καὶ δόξεων

καὶ ἔσεσθαι πότερον αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀριστος κριτῆς,

ἡ σὺ, ὁ Πρωταγόρα, τὸ γε 2 περὶ λόγους πιθανῶν

ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον βέλτιον

ἀν προδοξάσας ἡ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὀστισοῦν;

ὁ. Καὶ μάλα, ὃ Σῶκρατες, τοῦτο γε

σφόδρα ὑπισχεῖτο πάντων διαφέρειν αὐτῶς.

σπ. Νὴ Δία, ὃ μέλε. ἡ οὐδεὶς γ' ἂν αὐτῷ διε-

179 λέγετο διδοῦς πολὺ ἄργυριον, εἰ μὴ τοὺς συνόντας

ἐπειθὲν ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐσεσθαί τε καὶ δόξειν

1 ὁμ. Τ. 2 τὸ γε W; τότε BT.
THEAETETUS

of both, and the man will become, not hot or feverish to the physician, but to himself both?

THEO. No, that would be ridiculous.

SOC. But, I imagine, in regard to the sweetness or dryness which will be in a wine, the opinion of the husbandman, not that of the lyre-player, will be valid.

THEO. Of course.

SOC. And again, in a matter of discord or tunefulness in music that has never been played, a gymnastic teacher could not judge better than a musician what will, when performed, seem tuneful even to a gymnastic teacher himself.

THEO. Certainly not.

SOC. Then, too, when a banquet is in preparation the opinion of him who is to be a guest, unless he has training in cookery, is of less value concerning the pleasure that will be derived from the viands than that of the cook. For we need not yet argue about that which already is or has been pleasant to each one; but concerning that which will in the future seem and be pleasant to each one, is he himself the best judge for himself, or would you, Protagoras—at least as regards the arguments which will be persuasive in court to each of us—be able to give an opinion beforehand better than anyone whatsoever who has no especial training?

THEO. Certainly, Socrates, in this, at any rate, he used to declare emphatically that he himself excelled everyone.

SOC. Yes, my friend, he certainly did; otherwise nobody would have paid him a high fee for his conversations, if he had not made his pupils believe that neither a prophet nor anyone else could judge
οὔτε μάντις οὔτε τις ἄλλος ἰμεινῳ κρίνειν ἂν ἢ αὐτῶς. ¹

θεό. Ἀληθέστατα.

ση. Ὅντοι δὲ καὶ αἱ νομοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ ὑφέλιμον ἐπὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐστὶ, καὶ πᾶς ἢν ὁμολογοῖ νομοθετομένην πολλάκις ἀνάγκην εἶναι τοῦ ὑφελιμωτάτου ἀποτυγχάνειν;

θεό. Μάλα γε.

ση. Μετρίως ἄρα ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλόν ὑμᾶς εἰρήσεται, ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῶ ὁμολογεῖν σοφῶτερον τε ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνεπιστήμῳ μηδὲ ὀπωσδήποτε ἀνάγκην εἶναι μέτρῳ γίγνεσθαι, ὡς ἄρτι με ἡνάγκαζεν ἢ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου λόγοις, εἰτ' ἐβουλόμην εἰτε μή, τοιοῦτον εἶναι.

θεό. Ἐκείνη μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς Σώκρατες, μάλιστα ἀλίσκεσθαι ὁ λόγος, ἀλισκόμενος καὶ ταύτη, ἢ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὕτη δὲ ἐφάνησαν τοὺς ἐκείνου λόγους οὐδαμῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἥγομέναι.

C ση. Πολλαχῇ, ὡς Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄλλη ἂν τὸ γε τοιοῦτον ἀλοίπῃ μὴ πάσαν παντὸς ἀλήθη δόξαν εἶναι: περὶ δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἐκάστῳ πάθος, ἐξ ὦν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξας γίγνονται, χαλεπώτερον ἔλειν ὡς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς. ἵνως δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω· ἀνάλωτοι γάρ, εἰ ἑτυχοῦν, εἰσίν, καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες αὕτας ἑναργεῖς τε εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμης τάχα ἂν ὄντα λέγουεν, καὶ Θεαίτητος οὐδ' οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ εἰρήκεν αἰσθησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταύτων τὴν θέμενος. προσιτέον οὖν ἐγγυτέρω, ὡς ὁ ὑπὲρ

¹ αὐτῶς αὐτῷ ms.; αὐτῷ om. Schleiermacher.

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better than himself what was in the future to be and seem.

**Theo.** Very true.

**Soc.** Both lawmaking, then, and the advantageous are concerned with the future, and everyone would agree that a state in making laws must often fail to attain the greatest advantage?

**Theo.** Assuredly.

**Soc.** Then it will be a fair answer if we say to your master that he is obliged to agree that one man is wiser than another, and that such a wise man is a measure, but that I, who am without knowledge, am not in the least obliged to become a measure, as the argument in his behalf just now tried to oblige me to be, whether I would or no.

**Theo.** In that respect, Socrates, I think that the argument is most clearly proved to be wrong, and it is proved wrong in this also, in that it declares the opinions of others to be valid, whereas it was shown that they do not consider his arguments true at all.

**Soc.** In many other respects, Theodorus, it could be proved that not every opinion of every person is true, at any rate in matters of that kind; but it is more difficult to prove that opinions are not true in regard to the momentary states of feeling of each person, from which our perceptions and the opinions concerning them arise. But perhaps I am quite wrong; for it may be impossible to prove that they are not true, and those who say that they are manifest and are forms of knowledge may perhaps be right, and Theaetetus here was not far from the mark in saying that perception and knowledge are identical. So we must, as the argument in behalf of
Πρωταγόρος λόγος ἐπέταττε, καὶ σκεπτέον τὴν 
φερομένην ταύτην οὐσίαν διακρόνοντα, ἕτερος ὑγιής 
εἶτε σαθρὸν φθέγγεται: μάχη δ᾽ οὖν περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ 
φαύλη οὐδ᾽ ὁλίγοις γέγονεν.

27. Θεό. Πολλοὶ καὶ δεῖ φαύλη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ 
περὶ μὲν τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ ἐπιδίδωσιν πάμπολυ. οἱ 
γὰρ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου ἑταῖροι χορηγοῦσι τοῦτον 
τοῦ λόγου μάλα ἐρρωμένως.

ἐπὶ. Τῷ τοι, ὥ φίλε Θεόδωρε, μᾶλλον σκεπτέον 
Ε καὶ ἐξ ἄρχῆς, ὥσπερ ἀυτοὶ ὑποτείνουνται.

Θεό. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. καὶ γὰρ, ὥ Σώκρατες, 
περὶ τούτων τῶν Ἡρακλείτεων ἥ, ὥσπερ οὐ 
λέγεις, Ὀμηρίων καὶ ἐτὶ παλαιοτέρων, αὐτοῖς 
μὲν τοῖς περὶ τὴν Ἔφεσον, ὥσοι προσποιοῦνται 
ἐμπειροὶ εἶναι,2 οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἴδον τε διαλέχθηναι 
ἡ τοῖς οἰστρῶσιν. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμ-
ματα φέρονται, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπιμείναι ἐπὶ λόγῳ καὶ 
ἐρωτήματι καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ ἐν μέρει ἀποκρίνονται 
180 καὶ ἐρείσθαι ἤπταιν αὐτοῖς ἔνν ἡ τοῦ μηδὲν. μᾶλλον 
δὲ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ᾽ οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ σμικρὸν 
ἔνειν τοῖς ἀνδρᾶσιν ήσυχίας. ἀλλ᾽ ἂν τινὰ τι 
ἐρή, ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ῥήματικαί αἰνηματώδη 
ἀνασπῶντες ἀποτοξεύοντοι, καὶ τοῦτον ζητῆς λόγων 
λαβεῖν τί εἴρηκεν, ἐτέρω πεπλήξες καὶνῶς μετ-
ωνομασμένως. περανεὶς δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν πρὸς 
οὕδενα αὐτῶν. οὐδὲ γε ἐκεῖνοι αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλῆ-

B λους, ἀλλ᾽ εὗ πάνω φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδὲν βέβαιον

1 διακρόνοντα TW; ἀκούοντα B.
2 ἐμπειροὶ εἶναι Vindob. 21; ἐμπειροὶ BT, Euseb.
THEAETETUS

Protagoras \(^1\) enjoined upon us, come up closer and examine this doctrine of motion as the fundamental essence, rapping on it to see whether it rings sound or unsound. As you know, a strife has arisen about it, no mean one, either, and waged by not a few combatants.

theo. Yes, far from mean, and it is spreading far and wide all over Ionia; for the disciples of Heraclitus are supporting this doctrine very vigorously.

soc. Therefore, my dear Theodorus, we must all the more examine it from the beginning as they themselves present it.

theo. Certainly we must. For it is no more possible, Socrates, to discuss these doctrines of Heraclitus (or, as you say, of Homer or even earlier sages) with the Ephesians themselves—those, at least, who profess to be familiar with them—than with madmen. For they are, quite in accordance with their text-books, in perpetual motion; but as for keeping to an argument or a question and quietly answering and asking in turn, their power of doing that is less than nothing; or rather the words "nothing at all" fail to express the absence from these fellows of even the slightest particle of rest. But if you ask one of them a question, he pulls out puzzling little phrases, like arrows from a quiver, and shoots them off; and if you try to get hold of an explanation of what he has said, you will be struck with another phrase of novel and distorted wording, and you never make any progress whatsoever with any of them, nor do they themselves with one another, for that matter, but they take very good care to allow nothing to be settled either

\(^1\) See 168 \(\text{b.}\)
εάν εἶναι μητ’ ἐν λόγῳ μητ’ ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς, ἥγούμενοι, ὃς ἔμοι δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ στάσιμον εἶναι τούτῳ δὲ πάνυ πολεμοῦσιν, καὶ καθ’ ὅσον δύνανται πανταχόθεν ἐκβάλλουσιν.

ζη. Ἱσως, ὁ Θεόδωρε, τοὺς ἄνδρας μαχομένους ἑώρακας, εἰρήνευον δὲ οὐ συγγέγονας: οὐ γὰρ σοὶ ἑταῖροι εἰσώ· ἄλλ’, οἶμαι, τὰ τοιαύτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπὶ σχολῆς φράζουσιν, οὐ δὲν βούλωνται ὁμοίους αὐτοὺς ποιῆσαι.

Θεο. Ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὁ δαμόνιε; οὐδὲ γί- 

C γνεται τῶν τοιούτων ἔτερον ἔτερον μαθητής, ἄλλ’ αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται, ὁπόθεν ἄν τοῦχῃ ἔκαστος αὐτῶν ἐνθουσιάσας, καὶ τὸν ἔτερον ὁ ἔτερος οὐδὲν ἔγειται εἰδέναι. παρὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὁπέρ ἣ ἔρων, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ λάβοις λόγον οὔτε ἐκόντων οὔτ’ ἀκόντων’ αὐτοὺς δὲ δεὶ παραλαβόντας ὦσπερ πρόβλημα ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι.

ζη. Καὶ μετρίως γε λέγεις. τὸ γε δὴ πρόβλημα ἀλλο τι παρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων μετὰ D ποιῆσεως ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς πολλοὺς, ὡς ἡ γένεσις τῶν ἄλλων πάντων Ἡκεανός τε καὶ Τήθος βεύματα τυγχάνει καὶ οὐδὲν ἐστήκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ὅστερων ἀτε σοφωτέρων ἀναφανδὸν ἀποδεικνυμέ- 

νων, ἴνα καὶ οἱ σκυτοτόμοι αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν 

μάθωσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ παύσωνται ἥλιθις οἴο- 

μενοι τὰ μὲν ἐστάναι, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶν οντων, 

μαθόντες δὲ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται τιμῶσιν αὐτοὺς; 

ὁλίγον δὲ ἐπελαθόμην, ὁ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι αὐτά 

ταναντία τούτους ἀπεφήναντο,
in an argument or in their own minds, thinking, I suppose, that this is being stationary; but they wage bitter war against the stationary, and, so far as they can, they banish it altogether.

soc. Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen the men when they are fighting, but have not been with them when they are at peace; for they are no friends of yours; but I fancy they utter such peaceful doctrines at leisure to those pupils whom they wish to make like themselves.

THEO. What pupils, my good man? Such people do not become pupils of one another, but they grow up of themselves, each one getting his inspiration from any chance source, and each thinks the other knows: nothing. From these people, then, as I was going to say, you would never get an argument either with their will or against it; but we must ourselves take over the question and investigate it as if it were a problem of mathematics.

soc. Yes, what you say is reasonable. Now as for the problem, have we not heard from the ancients, who concealed their meaning from the multitude by their poetry, that the origin of all things is Oceanus and Tethys, flowing streams, and that nothing is at rest; and likewise from the moderns, who, since they are wiser, declare their meaning openly, in order that even cobblers may hear and know their wisdom and may cease from the silly belief that some things are at rest and others in motion, and, after learning that everything is in motion, may honour their teachers? But, Theodorus, I almost forgot that others teach the opposite of this,
πελάθηκον τελεθεῖν ὁ πάντ' οὖν· εἶναι,
καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα Μέλισσοι τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναν-
τιοῦμενοι πᾶσι τούτοις διασχυρίζονται, ὡς ἐν τῇ
πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἑστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔχον
χώραν ἐν ἥ κινεῖται. τούτοις οὖν, ὦ ἔταιρε, πᾶσι
τί χρησόμεθα; κατὰ σμικρὸν γὰρ προϊόντες λελη-
θαμέν ἄμφοτέρων εἰς τὸ μέσον πεπτωκότες, καὶ

καὶ ἂν μὴ πῇ ἀμυνόμενοι διαφύγομεν, δίκην δῶσομεν
ἀντερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς παλαιότροις διὰ γραμμὴς
παῖζοντες, όταν ὑπ’ ἄμφοτέρων ληθέντες ἑλκουντας
εἰς τάναντια. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι τοὺς ἑτέρους πρότερον
σκεπτέον, ἐφ’ οὕτωρ ὁμιλήσαμεν, τοὺς ῥέοντας;
καὶ ἐὰν μὲν τι φαίνωμεν λέγοντες, συνελέσομεν μετ’
αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, τοὺς ἑτέρους ἐκφυγεῖν πειρώ-
μενοι· ἐὰν δὲ οἱ τῷ ὀλὸ πασιώταται ἀληθεστερα
λέγειν δοκῶσι, φευξόμεθα παρ’ αὐτοὺς ἀπ’ αὖ τῶν

Β οὐκ ἄκινητα κυνούντων. ἄμφοτεροι δ’ ἂν φανῶσι
μηδὲν μέτριον λέγοντες, γελοῖοι ἐσομεθα ἡγούμενοι
ἡμᾶς μὲν τι λέγειν φαύλους οἴντας, παμπαλαίους δὲ
καὶ πασσόφους ἁνδρας ἀποδεδοκιμακότες. ὁρὰ οὖν,
ὡ Θεόδωρε, εἰ λυσιτέλει ἐἰς τοσοῦτον προϊέναι
κίνδυνον.

θεο. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτόν, ὡ Σώκρατες, μὴ
οὐ διασκέψασθαί τι λέγουσιν ἐκάτεροι τῶν ἄνδρῶν.

1 τελεθεῖν Stallbaum; τελεθεῖν BT.
2 παρ’ αὐτοὺς ἀπ’ αὐ τῶν Schleiermacher; παρ’ αὐτοὺς ἀπ’ ἀυτῶν τῶν W; ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν παρ’ αὐτοὺς B; τῶν παρ’ αὐτοὺς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν Τ.

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So that it is motionless, the name of which is the All, and all the other doctrines maintained by Melissus and Parmenides and the rest, in opposition to all these; they maintain that everything is one and is stationary within itself, having no place in which to move. What shall we do with all these people, my friend? For, advancing little by little, we have unwittingly fallen between the two parties, and, unless we protect ourselves and escape somehow, we shall pay the penalty, like those in the palaestra, who in playing on the line are caught by both sides and dragged in opposite directions. I think, then, we had better examine first the one party, those whom we originally set out to join, the flowing ones, and if we find their arguments sound, we will help them to pull us over, trying thus to escape the others; but if we find that the partisans of "the whole" seem to have truer doctrines, we will take refuge with them from those who would move what is motionless. But if we find that neither party has anything reasonable to say, we shall be ridiculous if we think that we, who are of no account, can say anything worth while after having rejected the doctrines of very ancient and very wise men. Therefore, Theodorus, see whether it is desirable to go forward into so great a danger.

THEO. Oh, it would be unendurable, Socrates, not to examine thoroughly the doctrines of both parties.

1 Parmenides, line 98 (ed. Mullach). In its context the infinitive is necessary; but Plato may have quoted carelessly and may have used the indicative.

2 In the game referred to (called διελκυστίνδα by Pollux, ix. 112) the players were divided into two parties, each of which tried to drag its opponents over a line drawn across the palaestra.
28. ἡμ. Σκεπτέον ἃν εἴη σοῦ γε οὐτω προδιμομένου. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ἄρχῃ εἶναι τῆς σκέψεως. Καὶ τὰ πάντα κινεῖσθαι. βουλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιὸν ἀρχαὶ ἄρα λέγοντές φασὶ τὰ πάντα κινεῖσθαι. βουλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιὸν· πότερον ἐν τι εἰδὸς αὐτῆς λέγουσιν ἢ, ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, δύο; μὴ μέντοι μόνον ἐμοὶ δοκεῖτω, ἀλλὰ συμμέτεχε καὶ σὺ, ἵνα κοινὴ πάσχωμεν, ἂν τι καὶ δέη. καὶ μοι λέγε· ἄρα κινεῖσθαι καλεῖσ, ὅταν τι χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφηται;

ὁμ. Ἐγώγω.

ὁμ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοῖνν ἐν ἔστω εἰδος. ὅταν δὲ

ὅμ. ἢ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, γνώρισκη δὲ, ἢ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ ἢ σκληρῶν ἐκ μαλακοῦ γίγνεται, ἢ τινα ἀλλήν ἄλλοιωσον ἄλλοιώτατι, ἄρα οὐκ ἄξιον ἐτερον εἰδος φάναι κινήσεως;

ὁμ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεί. 1

ὁμ. Ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν. 2 δύο δὴ λέγω τοῦτω εἰδὴ κινήσεως, ἄλλοιωσον, τὴν δὲ φοράν. 3

ὁμ. Ὀρθῶς γε λέγων.

ὁμ. Τοῦτο τοῖνν οὕτω διελόμενοι διαλεγόμεθα ἡδὴ τοῖς τὰ πάντα φάσκοντον κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐρωτῶμεν· πότερον πάν φατε ἀμφοτέρως κινεῖσθαι, ἔφερομενόν τε καὶ ἄλλοιομενον, ἢ τὸ μὲν τί ἀμφοτέρως, τὸ δ' ἐτερόπ.;

ὁμ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' ἐγώγε οὐκ ἑχω εἰπεῖν· οἴμαι δ' ἀν φάναι ἀμφοτέρως.

ὁμ. Εἴ δὲ γε μή, ὦ ἐταῖρε, κινοῦμενα τε αὐτοῖς. 4

1 Ἐμοιγε δοκεί om. Stobaeus.
2 Ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν given to Theodorus by B.
3 φοράν W; περιφοράν BT, Stobaeus.
4 αὐτοῖς W; ἐαυτοῖς BT.
soc. Then they must be examined, since you are so urgent. Now I think the starting-point of our examination of the doctrine of motion is this: Exactly what do they mean, after all, when they say that all things are in motion? What I wish to ask is this: Do they mean to say that there is only one kind of motion or, as I believe, two? But it must not be my belief alone; you must share it also, that if anything happens to us we may suffer it in common. Tell me, do you call it motion when a thing changes its place or turns round in the same place?

theo. Yes.

soc. Let this, then, be one kind of motion. Now when a thing remains in the same place, but grows old, or becomes black instead of white, or hard instead of soft, or undergoes any other kind of alteration, is it not proper to say that this is another kind of motion?

theo. I think so.

soc. Nay, it must be true. So I say that there are these two kinds of motion: "alteration," and "motion in space."

theo. And you are right.

soc. Now that we have made this distinction, let us at once converse with those who say that all things are in motion, and let us ask them, "Do you mean that everything moves in both ways, moving in space and undergoing alteration, or one thing in both ways and another in one of the two ways only?"

theo. By Zeus, I cannot tell! But I think they would say that everything moves in both ways.

soc. Yes; otherwise, my friend, they will find that things in motion are also things at rest, and it will
καὶ ἐστῶτα φανεῖται, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ἔξει εἰπεῖν ὧτι κινεῖται τὰ πάντα ἣ ὁτι ἐστηκεν.

ὁε. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ζ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὰ δεῖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἔνειναι 1 μηδενὶ, πάντα δὴ πᾶσαι 182 κίνησιν ἀδεὶ κινεῖται.

ὁε. Ἀνάγκη.

ζ. Σκόπηι δὴ μοι τόδε αὐτῶν· τῆς θερμότητος ἢ λευκότητος ἢ ὄτου οὐν γένεσιν οὐχ οὖτω πωσ ἐλέγομεν φάναι αὐτοὺς, φέρεσθαι ἐκαστον τούτων ἀμα αἰσθήσει μεταξύ τοῦ ποιούντος τε καὶ πάσχοντος, καὶ τὸ μὲν πάσχον αἰσθητικὸν 2 ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰσθησιν 3 γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ποιόν τι ἀλλ' οὐ ποιότητα; ἵσως οὖν ἢ ποιότης ἀμα ἀλλόκοτον τε φαινεται ὀνομα καὶ οὐ μανθάνεις ἄθροον λεγόμενον· κατὰ Β μέρη οὖν ἄκοιν. τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν οὔτε θερμότης οὔτε λευκότης, θερμὸν δὲ καὶ λευκὸν γίγνεται, καὶ τάλλα οὐτω· μέμνησαι γὰρ που καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὃτι ἀούτως ἐλέγομεν, ἐν μηδεν· αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, μηδ' αὖ τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἀλληλα συγγιγνομένων τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτίκτοντα τὰ μὲν ποιὰ 4 ἀττα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα.

ὁε. Μέμνησαι· πῶς δ' οὖ; 

ζ. Τὰ μὲν τοῖνυν ἀλλα χαίρειν ἐάσωμεν, εἰτε C ἀλλως εἰτε οὔτως λέγουσιν· οὖ δ' ἕνεκα λέγομεν, τοῦτο μόνον φυλάττωμεν, ἐρωτώντες· κινεῖται καὶ βεί, ὡς φατε, τὰ πάντα; ἢ γάρ; 

1 ἐνεῖναι W; ἐν εἶναι BT. 
2 αἰσθητικὸν Burnet; αἰσθητοῦ BT; αἰσθητὴν Buttmann; αἰσθανόμενον Heindorf. 
3 αἰσθησιν W; αἰσθησιν ἐτι BT. 4 ποιὰ bt; ποι BT.
be no more correct to say that all things are in motion than that all things are at rest.

THEO. What you say is very true.

SOC. Then since they must be in motion, and since absence of motion must be impossible for anything, all things are always in all kinds of motion.

THEO. Necessarily.

SOC. Then just examine this point of their doctrine. Did we not find that they say that heat or whiteness or anything you please arises in some such way as this, namely that each of these moves simultaneously with perception between the active and the passive element, and the passive becomes percipient, but not perception, and the active becomes, not a quality, but endowed with a quality? Now perhaps quality seems an extraordinary word, and you do not understand it when used with general application, so let me give particular examples. For the active element becomes neither heat nor whiteness, but hot or white, and other things in the same way; you probably remember that this was what we said earlier in our discourse, that nothing is in itself un-varyingly one, neither the active nor the passive, but from the union of the two with one another the perceptions and the perceived give birth and the latter become things endowed with some quality while the former become percipient.

THEO. I remember, of course.

SOC. Let us then pay no attention to other matters, whether they teach one thing or another; but let us attend strictly to this only, which is the object of our discussion. Let us ask them, "Are all things, according to your doctrine, in motion and flux?" Is that so?
PLATO

θεο. Ναί.

σπ. Οὐκοῦν ἀμφοτέρας ὡς διειλόμεθα κινήσεις, φερόμενα τε καὶ ἄλλου ὁμοίωνα;

θεο. Πῶς δ' οὐ; εἴπερ γε δὴ τελέως κινή-

σεται.

σπ. Εἰ μὲν τοῖς ἐφέρετο μόνον, ἡλλοιοῦτο δὲ 

μή, εἴχομεν ἄν που εἶπεῖν οἷα άττα Ῥεῖ τὰ φερό-

μενα: η̄ πῶς λέγωμεν 1;

θεο. Οὕτως.

σπ. Ἐπειδή δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο μένει, τὸ λευκὸν 

ῥεῖν τὸ Ῥέον, ἄλλα μεταβάλλει, ὡστε καὶ αὐτοῦ 

toῦτου εἶναι βοήν, τῆς λευκότητος, καὶ μεταβολὴν 

eἰς ἄλλην χρόαν, ἣν μὴ ἀλὸ ταύτῃ μένον, ἀρά 

ποτε οἶν τε τῇ προσεπείν χρώμα, ὡστε καὶ 

ὦρθῶς προσαγορεύειν;

θεο. Καὶ τίς μηχανῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἦ ἄλλο γε 

tο τῶν τοιούτων, εἴπερ ἄει λέγοντος ὑπεξέρχεται, 

ἄτε δὴ Ῥέον;

σπ. Τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἔρομεν ὡποιασοῦν, 

οἶν τῆς τοῦ ῥόαν ἦ ἁκούειν; μένειν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῷ 

Ε τῷ ῥόαν ἦ ἁκούειν;

θεο. Οὐκοῦν δει γε, εἴπερ πάντα κινεῖται.

σπ. Οὔτε ἁρὰ ῥόαν προσρητέον τι μᾶλλον ἦ μὴ 

ῥόαν, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλην αἰσθησιν μᾶλλον ἦ μή, πάντων 

γε πάντως κινούμενων.

θεο. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

σπ. Καὶ μὴν αἰσθησίς γε ἐπιστήμη, ὡς ἐφαμὲν 

ἐγὼ τε καὶ Θεαίτητος.

θεο. Ἡν ταύτα.

1 λέγωμεν Β; λέγομεν Τ.
THEAETETUS

THEO. Yes.

SOC. Have they then both kinds of motion which we distinguished? Are they moving in space and also undergoing alteration?

THEO. Of course; that is, if they are to be in perfect motion.

SOC. Then if they moved only in space, but did not undergo alteration, we could perhaps say what qualities belong to those moving things which are in flux, could we not?

THEO. That is right.

SOC. But since not even this remains fixed—that the thing in flux flows white, but changes, so that there is a flux of the very whiteness, and a change of colour, that it may not in that way be convicted of remaining fixed, is it possible to give any name to a colour, and yet to speak accurately?

THEO. How can it be possible, Socrates, or to give a name to anything else of this sort, if while we are speaking it always evades us, being, as it is, in flux?

SOC. But what shall we say of any of the perceptions, such as seeing or hearing? Does it perhaps remain fixed in the condition of seeing or hearing?

THEO. It must be impossible, if all things are in motion.

SOC. Then we must not speak of seeing more than not-seeing, or of any other perception more than of non-perception, if all things are in all kinds of motion.

THEO. No, we must not.

SOC. And yet perception is knowledge, as Theaetetus and I said.

THEO. Yes, you did say that.
PLATO

ση. Οὐδὲν ἁρὰ ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρινάμεθα ἐρωτώμενοι ὁ τι ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμην.
183 θεο. Ἐοίκατε.

ση. Καλὸν ἄν ἦμιν συμβαίνοι τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, προθυμηθεῖσαν ἀποδείξαι ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται, ἵνα δὴ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀπόκρισις ὀρθὴ φανῇ. τὸ δ', ὡς έσοικεν, ἐφανῇ, εἰ πάντα κινεῖται, πάσα ἀπόκρισις, περὶ ὅτου ἄν τις ἀποκρύπτηται, ὁμοίως ὀρθή εἶναι, οὕτω τ' ἔχειν φάναι καὶ μὴ οὕτω, εἰ δὲ βούλει, γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ.

θεο. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ση. Πλὴν γε, ὡ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι "οὕτω" τε εἴπον καὶ "οὕχ οὕτω." δεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ τούτῳ "οὕτω" Β λέγειν: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἐτι κινώτο "οὕτω"· οὐδ' αὖ "μή οὕτω"· οὐδὲ γὰρ "τούτῳ" κινήσει· ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀλλῷ φωνῇ θετέον τοῖς τὸν λόγον τοῦτον λέγουσιν, ὡς νῦν γε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσι ρήματα, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ "οὐδ' ὁπως. 1" μάλιστα δ' οὕτως 2 ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀρμόττοι, ἀπειρον λεγόμενον.

θεο. Ὀικειοτάτη γοῦν διάλεκτος αὐτή αὐτοῖς.

ση. Οὐκοῦν, ὡ Θεόδωρε, τοῦ τε σοῦ ἐταίρου ἀπηλλάγμεθα, καὶ οὕτως συγχυροῦμεν αὐτῷ πάντ' ἄνδρα πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι, ἂν μὴ C φρόνημός τις ἦ· ἐπιστήμην τε αἴσθησιν οὐ συγχυρησόμεθα κατὰ γε τὴν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι μέθοδον, εἰ μὴ 3 τί πως ἄλλως Θεαίτητος ὀδε λέγει.

θεο. "Ἀριστ' εἴρηκας, ὡ Σώκρατες: τούτων γὰρ περαινθέντων καὶ ἐμὲ δεὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι σοι

1 ὁπως ΒΤ; οὕτως W.

2 δ' οὕτως om. W. 3 ei μή W; ἢ ei μή ΒΤ.

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soc. Then when we were asked "what is knowledge?" we answered no more what knowledge is than what not-knowledge is.

theo. So it seems.

soc. This would be a fine result of the correction of our answer, when we were so eager to show that all things are in motion, just for the purpose of making that answer prove to be correct. But this, I think, did prove to be true, that if all things are in motion, every answer to any question whatsoever is equally correct, and we may say it is thus or not thus—or, if you prefer, "becomes thus," to avoid giving them fixity by using the word "is."

theo. You are right.

soc. Except, Theodorus, that I said "thus," and "not thus"; but we ought not even to say "thus"; for "thus" would no longer be in motion; nor, again, "not thus." For there is no motion in "this" either; but some other expression must be supplied for those who maintain this doctrine, since now they have, according to their own hypothesis, no words, unless it be perhaps the word "nohow." That might be most fitting for them, since it is indefinite.

theo. At any rate that is the most appropriate form of speech for them.

soc. So, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend, and we do not yet concede to him that every man is a measure of all things, unless he be a sensible man; and we are not going to concede that knowledge is perception, at least not by the theory of universal motion, unless Theaetetus here has something different to say.

theo. An excellent idea, Socrates; for now that this matter is settled, I too should be rid of the duty
PLATO

ἀποκρινόμενον κατὰ τὸς συνθήκας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ περὶ
tοῦ Πρωταγόρου λόγου τέλος σχούη.

29. Εἴη, πρὶν γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, Σω-

δή κράτης τε καὶ ὑπὸ τοὺς φάσκοντας αὐτὸ τὸ πᾶν ἐστά-

ναι διέλθητε, ὥσπερ ἄρτι προώθεσθε.

Ἐνέως οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους
ἀδικεῖν διδάσκεις ὁμολογίας παραβαίνοντας; ἀλλὰ
παρασκευάζον ὅπως τῶν ἐπιλοίπων Σωκράτει
δώσεις λόγον.

Εἴη, Ἐάνπερ γε βούληται. ηδιστα μέντ' ἂν
ἡκουσα περὶ ἄν λέγω.

Ἐνέως Ἰππέας εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖ Σωκράτη εἰς
λόγους προκαλούμενος· ἐρώτα οὖν καὶ ἄκοψει.

Ἐν. Ἀλλά μοι δοκῶ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, περὶ γε ὅν
Εκελεύει Θεαίτητος οὐ πείσεσθαι αὐτῷ.

Ἐνέως. Τί δὴ οὖν οὐ πείσεσθαι;

Ἐν. Μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἱ ἐν ἐστὸς
λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φορτικῶς σκο-
πῶμεν, ἥττον αἰσχύνομαι ἢ ἔνα ὅντα Παρμενίδην.
Παρμενίδης δὲ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ 'Ομήρου,
"αἰδοίός τέ μοι" εἶναι ἃμα "δεινός τε." συμπροσ-
ἔμιξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτη,
καὶ μοι ἑφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναίον.

184 φοβοῦμαι οὖν μὴ οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα ξυνώμεν, τί
tε διανοούμενος εἰπε τολὺ πλέον λειπώμεθα, καὶ
tὸ μέγιστον, οὐ ἑνεκα δ λόγος ὀρμηταί, ἐπιστήμης
πέρι, τί ποτ' ἔστιν, ἀσκεπτον γένηται ὑπὸ τῶν

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THEAETETUS

of answering your questions according to our agreement, since the argument about Protagoras is ended.

THEAET. No, Theodorus, not until you and Socrates have discussed those who say all things are at rest, as you proposed just now.

THEO. A young man like you, Theaetetus, teaching your elders to do wrong by breaking their agreements! No; prepare to answer Socrates yourself for the rest of the argument.

THEAET. I will if he wishes it. But I should have liked best to hear about the doctrine I mentioned.

THEO. Calling Socrates to an argument is calling cavalry into an open plain. Just ask him a question and you shall hear.

SOC. Still I think, Theodorus, I shall not comply with the request of Theaetetus.

THEO. Why will you not comply with it?

SOC. Because I have a reverential fear of examining in a flippant manner Melissus and the others who teach that the universe is one and motionless, and because I reverence still more one man, Parmenides. Parmenides seems to me to be, in Homer's words, "one to be venerated" and also "awful." For I met him when I was very young and he was very old, and he appeared to me to possess an absolutely noble depth of mind. So I am afraid we may not understand his words and may be still farther from understanding what he meant by them; but my chief fear is that the question with which we started, about the nature of knowledge, may fail to be investigated, because of the disorderly crowd of

1 A proverbial expression. An open plain is just what cavalry desires.

2 Iliad, iii. 172; Odyssey, viii. 22; xiv. 234.
επειςκωμαζόντων λόγων, εἰ τις αὐτοὶς πεῦσεται· ἄλλως τε καὶ οὖν νῦν ἐγείρομεν πλήθει ἀμήχανον, εἰτε τις ἐν παρέργῳ σκέφσεται, ἀνάξι ἂν πάθοι, εἰτε ἱκανὸς, μηκυκόμενος τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀφανεί· δει δὲ οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον ὁυν Β κυεὶ περὶ ἐπιστήμης πειράζθαι ἤμᾶς τῇ μαίευτικῇ τέχνῃ ἀπολύσαι.

Θεό. Ἀλλὰ χρῆ, εἰ δοκεῖ, οὕτω ποιεῖν.

σο. "Ετι τοίνυν, ὡ Θεαίτητε, τοσόνδε περὶ τῶν εὑρημένων ἐπίσκεψαι. αἴσθησιν γὰρ δὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρίνω· ἢ γάρ;

Θεαὶ. Ναί.

σο. Εἰ οὖν τις σε ὡδ' ἑρωτώῃ· "τῷ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ μέλαν ὀρᾶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῷ τὰ ὄξεα καὶ βαρέα ἀκούει;" εἶποις ἂν, οἴμαι, "ὁμμασί τε καὶ ὡσίν."

Θεαὶ. "Εγωγε.

C σο. Τὸ δὲ εὐχερὲς τῶν ὄνομάτων τε καὶ ῥήματων καὶ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ ἀγεννὲς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τούτου ἑνάντιον ἀνελυθέρων, ἐστὶ δὲ οτὲ ἀναγκαῖον, οἶον καὶ νῦν ἀνάγκη ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἢν ἀποκρίνει, ἢ οὐκ ὀρθή. σκόπει γάρ, ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα ὀρθότερα, ὡ ὀρῶμεν, τούτω εἶναι ὀφθαλμοῦς, ἢ δι' οὐ ὀρῶμεν, καὶ ὥ ἄκοομεν, ὥτα, ἢ δι' οὐ ἄκοομεν;

Θεαὶ. Δι' ὃν ἕκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ, ὡ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἢ σῖς.

D σο. Δεινὸν γάρ ποι, ὡ παῖ, εἰ πολλαὶ τινες ἐν ἣμῖν, ὡσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ὕποιος, αἰσθήσεις 156
arguments which will burst in upon us if we let them in; especially as the argument we are now proposing is of vast extent, and would not receive its deserts if we treated it as a side issue, and if we treat it as it deserves, it will take so long as to do away with the discussion about knowledge. Neither of these things ought to happen, but we ought to try by the science of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of the thoughts about knowledge with which he is pregnant.

THeo. Yes, if that is your opinion, we ought to do so.

soc. Consider, then, Theaetetus, this further point about what has been said. Now you answered that perception is knowledge, did you not?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. If, then, anyone should ask you, "By what does a man see white and black colours and by what does he hear high and low tones?" you would, I fancy, say, "By his eyes and ears."

THEAET. Yes, I should.

soc. The easy use of words and phrases and the avoidance of strict precision is in general a sign of good breeding; indeed, the opposite is hardly worthy of a gentleman, but sometimes it is necessary, as now it is necessary to object to your answer, in so far as it is incorrect. Just consider; which answer is more correct, that our eyes are that by which we see or that through which we see, and our ears that by which or that through which we hear?

THEAET. I think, Socrates, we perceive through, rather than by them, in each case.

soc. Yes, for it would be strange indeed, my boy, if there are many senses ensconced within us, as if
'Εγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἱδέαν, εἴτε ψυχήν εἴτε ὁ τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ξυντείνει, ἢ διὰ τούτων οἶον ὅργανον αἰσθανόμεθα ὡσα αἰσθητά.

校注。' Αλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ οὖτω μᾶλλον ἡ ἔκεινωσ.

Ση. Τοῦδε τοι ἕνεκα αὐτά σοι διακρίβομαι, εἰ τινὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐφικνούμεθα λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων, διὰ δὲ τῶν Ε ἄλλων ἐτέρων αὐτὶ τινῶν, καὶ ἐξεῖς ἐρωτώμενος πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀναφέρειν. ἵσως δὲ βέλτιον σὲ λέγειν αὐτὰ ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἡ ἐμε ὑπὲρ σοῦ πολυπραγμονεῖν. καὶ μοι λέγε· θερμὰ καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ γλυκέα δι' ὀδὸν αἰσθάνει, ἃρα οὐ τοῦ σώματος ἕκαστα τίθης; ἡ ἄλλον τινός;

校注。Οὐδενὸς ἄλλου.

Ση. 'Η καὶ ἐθελήσεις ὀμολογεῖν, αὶ δὲ ἐτέρας 185 δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δὲ ἄλλης ταῦτ' αἰσθήσαται, οἶον ἃ δὲ ἀκοῆς, δὲ ὀφεως, ἡ ἃ δὲ ὀφεως, δὲ ἀκοῆς;

校注。Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐθελήσω;

Ση. Εἰ τι ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, οὖκ ἀν διὰ γε τοῦ ἐτέρου ὅργανον, οὐδ' ἂν διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου περὶ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοι' ἃν.

校注。Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Ση. Περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χρόας πρῶτον μὲν

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THEAETETUS

we were so many wooden horses of Troy, and they do not all unite in one power, whether we should call it soul or something else, by which we perceive through these as instruments the objects of perception.

THEAET. I think what you suggest is more likely than the other way.

soc. Now the reason why I am so precise about the matter is this: I want to know whether there is some one and the same power within ourselves by which we perceive black and white through the eyes, and again other qualities through the other organs, and whether you will be able, if asked, to refer all such activities to the body. But perhaps it is better that you make the statement in answer to a question than that I should take all the trouble for you. So tell me: do you not think that all the organs through which you perceive hot and hard and light and sweet are parts of the body? Or are they parts of something else?

THEAET. Of nothing else.

soc. And will you also be ready to agree that it is impossible to perceive through one sense what you perceive through another; for instance, to perceive through sight what you perceive through hearing, or through hearing what you perceive through sight?

THEAET. Of course I shall.

soc. Then if you have any thought about both of these together, you would not have perception about both together either through one organ or through the other.

THEAET. No.

soc. Now in regard to sound and colour, you have,
αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἡ διανοεῖ, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω ἔστών;

θεαῖ. "Εγώγε.

ἔπ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἐκάτερον ἐκατέρον μὲν ἐτερον, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ταύτῳ;

Β θεαῖ. Τί μὴν;

ἔπ. Καὶ ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω δύο, ἐκάτερον δὲ ἐν;

θεαῖ. Καὶ τοῦτο.

ἔπ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴτε ἀνομοίω εἴτε ὁμοίω ἄλλη-λον, δυνατός εἰ ἐπισκέφασθαι;

θεαῖ. "Ἰσώς.

ἔπ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτοῖν δια-


νοεῖ; οὔτε γὰρ δὶ ἀκοῆς οὔτε δὶ ὅψεως ὅν το κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ

tὸν ἑκατέρων περὶ ὧν λέγομεν· εἰ γὰρ δυνατὸν εἰη ἀμφοτέρω σκέψασθαι, ἢ ἐστὸν ἀλμυρῶ ἡ


οἷς ὦτε ἀκοῆς φαῖνεται, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο.

θεαῖ. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει; ἢ γε διὰ τῆς γλώστῆς
dύναμις.

ἔπ. Καλῶς λέγεις. ἢ δὲ δὴ διὰ τίνος δύναμις
tὸ τὲ ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινῶν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἔδηλοί σοι,


ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ "οὐκ ἐστί," καὶ ἂν δὴ ἥρωτῶμεν περὶ αὐτῶν; τούτοις πᾶσι ποῖα ἀποδώσεις ὄργανα δι' ὃν αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἑκαστα;

θεαῖ. Οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὁμοίο-
in the first place, this thought about both of them, that they both exist?

THEAET. Certainly.
soc. And that each is different from the other and the same as itself?

THEAET. Of course.
soc. And that both together are two and each separately is one?

THEAET. Yes, that also.
soc. And are you able also to observe whether they are like or unlike each other?

THEAET. May be.
soc. Now through what organ do you think all this about them? For it is impossible to grasp that which is common to them both either through hearing or through sight. Here is further evidence for the point I am trying to make: if it were possible to investigate the question whether the two, sound and colour, are bitter or not, you know that you will be able to tell by what faculty you will investigate it, and that is clearly neither hearing nor sight, but something else.

THEAET. Of course it is,—the faculty exerted through the tongue.
soc. Very good. But through what organ is the faculty exerted which makes known to you that which is common to all things, as well as to these of which we are speaking—that which you call being and not-being, and the other attributes of things, about which we were asking just now? What organs will you assign for all these, through which that part of us which perceives gains perception of each and all of them?

THEAET. You mean being and not-being, and like-


τητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταύτὸν τε καὶ τὸ
D έτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἐν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ
αὐτῶν. ὁδήλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἀρτιόν τε καὶ περὶ τὸν
ἐρωτᾶς, καὶ τὰλλα ὁσα τούτους ἔπεται, διὰ τῶν
ποτὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος τῇ ψυχῇ αἰώθανόμεθα.

Ἐν. Ὡτέρω, ὁ Θεαίτητε, ἀκολούθεις, καὶ ἐστιν
ἀ ἐρωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλα μᾶ Δία, ὧν Σώκратες, ἐγὼν εὐκ
ἀν ἐξομιμειεῖ, πλὴν γ' ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τῆν ἀρχὴν
οὐδ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν τούτους ὀργανον ἴδιον
ἀὑστερ ἐκεῖνοι, ἂν' αὐτῇ δι' αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχή ἡ
Ε κοινὰ μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκόπεῖν.

Ἐν. Καλὸς γὰρ εἶ, ὁ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὗχ, ὡς
ἐλεγε Θεόδωρος, αἰσχρός· ὁ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων
καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθός. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὖ ἐποιήσας
με μάλα συνυοῦ λόγου ἀπαλλάξας, εἰ φαίνεται σοι
τὰ μὲν αὐτῇ δι' αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχή ἐπισκόπειν, τὰ δὲ
diὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων. τοῦτο γὰρ ἢν
δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἐδόκει, ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοι
δὸξα.

186 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλα μὴν φαίνεται γε.

30. Ἐν. Ποτέρων οὖν τίθης τῆν οὐσίαν; τοῦτο
γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν αὐτῇ ἡ ψυχή καθ' αὐτῆς
ἐπορέγεται.

Ἐν. Ἡ καὶ τὸ ὄμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον καὶ τὸ
ταύτων καὶ ἔτερων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

Ἐν. Τί δὲ; καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ
κακὸν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα
πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι τῆν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογι-
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ness and unlikeness, and identity and difference, and also unity and plurality as applied to them. And you are evidently asking also through what bodily organs we perceive by our soul the odd and the even and everything else that is in the same category.

soc. Bravo, Theaetetus! you follow me exactly; that is just what I mean by my question.

THEAET. By Zeus, Socrates, I cannot answer, except that I think there is no special organ at all for these notions, as there are for those others; but it appears to me that the soul views by itself directly what all things have in common.

soc. Why, you are beautiful, Theaetetus, and not, as Theodorus said, ugly; for he who speaks beautifully is beautiful and good. But besides being beautiful, you have done me a favour by relieving me from a long discussion, if you think that the soul views some things by itself directly and others through the bodily faculties; for that was my own opinion, and I wanted you to agree.

THEAET. Well, I do think so,

soc. To which class, then, do you assign being; for this, more than anything else, belongs to all things?

THEAET. I assign them to the class of notions which the soul grasps by itself directly.

soc. And also likeness and unlikeness and identity and difference?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And how about beautiful and ugly, and good and bad?

THEAET. I think that these also are among the things the essence of which the soul most certainly

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κομένη ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα
Β πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα.

ἐν. "Εχε δή, ἄλλο τι τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν
σκληρότητα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ τοῦ
μαλακοῦ τὴν μαλακότητα ὤσαύτως;

Ἀθανάτιος. Ναί.

ἐν. Τήν δέ γε οὐσίαν καὶ ὁ τι ἐστὸν καὶ τὴν
ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἄλληλω καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὖ τῆς
ἐναντιότητος αὐτῇ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπανοῦσα καὶ συμβάλ-
λουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνειν πειράται ἢ μὲν.

Ἀθανάτιος. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ἐν. Οὐκ εἰς τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένους πάρεστι

φύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι ἄνθρωπος τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὄσα
διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνειν,
τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρὸς τε οὐσίαιν
καὶ ωφέλειαι μόγις καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγ-
μάτων καὶ παίδειας παραγίγνεται ὦς ἂν, καὶ

Ἀθανάτιος. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ἐν. Οἶνον τε οὖν ἄληθείας τυχέιν, ὡ μηδὲ οὐσίας;

Ἀθανάτιος. Ἀδύνατον.

ἐν. Οὐ δὲ ἄληθείας τις ἀναχάσει, ποτὲ τούτου
ἐπιστήμων ἔσται;

Ἀθανάτιος. Καὶ πῶς ἂν, ὅ Σωκράτες;

ἐν. Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἐνι ἐπι-
στήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ
οὐσίας γάρ καὶ ἄληθείας ἐνταθά μὲν, ὡς ἐοικε,

δυνατὸν ἄμφοθεν, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἄδύνατον.

Ἀθανάτιος. Φαίνεται.

ἐν. Ὡς οὖν ταῦταν ἐκείνο τε καὶ τούτο 1 καλεῖς,
tosaoútas diáforas ἔχοντες;

1 τούτο] ταύτο T; ταύτῳ Ὁ.
views in their relations to one another, reflecting within itself upon the past and present in relation to the future.

soc. Stop there. Does it not perceive the hardness of the hard through touch, and likewise the softness of the soft?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. But their essential nature and the fact that they exist, and their opposition to one another, and, in turn, the essential nature of this opposition, the soul itself tries to determine for us by reverting to them and comparing them with one another.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Is it not true, then, that all sensations which reach the soul through the body, can be perceived by human beings, and also by animals, from the moment of birth; whereas reflections about these, with reference to their being and usefulness, are acquired, if at all, with difficulty and slowly, through many troubles, in other words, through education?

THEAET. Assuredly.

soc. Is it, then, possible for one to attain "truth" who cannot even get as far as "being"?

THEAET. No.

soc. And will a man ever have knowledge of anything the truth of which he fails to attain?

THEAET. How can he, Socrates?

soc. Then knowledge is not in the sensations, but in the process of reasoning about them; for it is possible, apparently, to apprehend being and truth by reasoning, but not by sensation.

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. Then will you call the two by the same name, when there are so great differences between them?
ΤΗΕΑΙ. Οὔκ οὖν δὴ δίκαιον γε.

Σιλ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἔκεινοι ἀποδίδως ὠνόμα, τῷ ὀρᾷν, ἀκούειν, ὀφραίνεσθαι, ψυχεῖσθαι, θερμαίνεσθαι;

Ε ΤΗΕΑΙ. Αἰσθάνεσθαι ἕγωγε· τί γὰρ ἄλλο;

Σιλ. Ξύμπαν ἀρ' αὐτὸ καλεῖς αἴσθησιν;

ΤΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

Σιλ. Ὅμω γε, φαμέν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἁμαρθαίναι· οὔτε γὰρ οὐσίας.

ΤΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Σιλ. Οὔδ' ἀρ' ἐπιστήμης.

ΤΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ.

Σιλ. Οὐκ ἀρ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ, ὅ Θεαίτητε, αἰσθησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταύτων.

ΤΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται, ὡς Σώκρατες. καὶ μᾶλλον γε νῦν καταφανεύστατον γέγονεν ἄλλο οὖν αἰσθήσεως ἐπιστήμη.

187 Σιλ. Ἀλλ' οὐ τι μὲν δὴ τοῦτο γε ἐνεκα ἡρχόμενοι, ὥστε εὑρομεν τί ποτ' οὐκ ἔστ' ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ τὶ ἔστιν. ὃμως δὲ τοσοῦτον γε προβεβήκαμεν, ᾧστε μὴ ἔρτειν αὐτὴν ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἔκεινω τῷ ὄνοματι, ὃ τί ποτ' ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα.

ΤΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε καλεῖται, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγκύμαι, δοξάζειν.

Σιλ. Ὅρθως γὰρ οὖν, ὧ φίλε. καὶ ὅρα δὴ νῦν Β πάλιν ἐξ ἄρχης, πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλείψας, εἰ τι μᾶλλον καθορᾶς, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα προεληλυθας. καὶ λέγει αὐθις τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη.

31. ΤΕΑΙ. Δόξαν μὲν πᾶσαν εἰπεῖν, ὃ Σώ-
THEAETETUS

THEAET. No, that would certainly not be right.

soc. What name will you give, then, to the one which includes seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold, and being hot?

THEAET. Perceiving. What other name can I give it?

soc. Collectively you call it, then, perception?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. By which, we say, we are quite unable to apprehend truth, since we cannot apprehend being, either.

THEAET. No; certainly not.

soc. Nor knowledge either, then.

THEAET. No.

soc. Then, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge could never be the same.

THEAET. Evidently not, Socrates; and indeed now at last it has been made perfectly clear that knowledge is something different from perception.

soc. But surely we did not begin our conversation in order to find out what knowledge is not, but what it is. However, we have progressed so far, at least, as not to seek for knowledge in perception at all, but in some function of the soul, whatever name is given to it when it alone and by itself is engaged directly with realities.

THEAET. That, Socrates, is, I suppose, called having opinion.

soc. You suppose rightly, my friend. Now begin again at the beginning. Wipe out all we said before, and see if you have any clearer vision, now that you have advanced to this point. Say once more what knowledge is.

THEAET. To say that all opinion is knowledge is
κρατεῖς, ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδή καὶ ψευδῆς ἐστὶ δόξα·
κινδυνεύει δὲ ἡ ἀληθής δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, καὶ
μου τούτο ἀποκεκρίσθω. εἰάν γὰρ μὴ φανῆ προ-
ιόυσιν, ὦσπερ τὸ νῦν, ἀλλο τι πειρασόμεθα λέγειν.

σ. Οὔτω μὲντοι χρή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγειν προθύ-
μως μᾶλλον, ἡ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἄκνεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι.
εἰάν γὰρ οὔτω δρῶμεν, δυοῖν θάτερα, ἡ εὐρήσομεν
C ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἐρχόμεθα, ἡ ἤπτον οἰησόμεθα εἰδέναι ὁ μηδαμῇ
ἴσμεν· καίτοι οὐκ ἄν εἰη μεμπτός μισθὸς ὁ τοιοῦ-
τος. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τί φής; δυοῖν οὔτων εἰδέον
δόξης, τοῦ μὲν ἀληθινοῦ, ψευδοῦς δὲ τοῦ ἐτέρου,
τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην ὑρίζει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ θυγώγε. τοῦτο γὰρ αὐ νῦν μοι φαίνεται.

σ. Ἡ Ἀρ' οὔν ἐτ' ἀξίων περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν
πάλιν—;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον δὴ λέγεις;

σ. Θράττει μὲ πως νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ πολ-

D λάκις, ὥστ' ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ
πρὸς ἄλλον γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχοντα εἰπεῖν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τούτο τὸ πάθος παρ' ἥμιν καὶ τίνα τρόπον
ἐγγυνόμενου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον δή;

σ. Τὸ δοξάζειν τινὰ ψευδῆ. σκοτῶ δὴ καὶ
νῦν ἐτι διστάξων, πότερον ἐάσωμεν αὐτὸ ἡ ἐπισκε-
ψώμεθα ἄλλον τρόπον ἡ ολίγον πρότερον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τι μην, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε καὶ ὀπῃ-
τιοῦν ἑφ' ἑνταίνειν δείν; ἀρτί γὰρ οὐ κακῶς γε σὺν

1 ὀπητιοῦν Burnet; ὀπηγοῦν B; ὀπη γοῦ W; ὀπηδοῦν T.
impossible, Socrates, for there is also false opinion; but true opinion probably is knowledge. Let that be my answer. For if it is proved to be wrong as we proceed, I will try to give another, just as I have given this.

soc. That is the right way, Theaetetus. It is better to speak up boldly than to hesitate about answering, as you did at first. For if we act in this way, one of two things will happen: either we shall find what we are after, or we shall be less inclined to think we know what we do not know at all; and surely even that would be a recompense not to be despised. Well, then, what do you say now? Assuming that there are two kinds of opinion, one true and the other false, do you define knowledge as the true opinion?

THEAET. Yes. That now seems to me to be correct.

soc. Is it, then, still worth while, in regard to opinion, to take up again—?

THEAET. What point do you refer to?

soc. Somehow I am troubled now and have often been troubled before, so that I have been much perplexed in my own reflections and in talking with others, because I cannot tell what this experience is which we human beings have, and how it comes about.

THEAET. What experience?

soc. That anyone has false opinions. And so I am considering and am still in doubt whether we had better let it go or examine it by another method than the one we followed a while ago.

THEAET. Why not, Socrates, if there seems to be the least need of it? For just now, in talking about
καὶ Θεόδωρος ἐλέγετε σχολῆς πέρι, ὃς οὐδέν ἐν τοῖς τουούσδε κατεπέγει.

Ε Ἐλ. Ὁρθῶς ὑπέμνησας. ἵσως γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ καιροῦ πάλιν ὤσπερ ἵχνος μετελθεῖν. κρεῖττον γὰρ ποι ὁμικρὸν εὖ ἡ πολυ ὡμ ἰκανώς περάναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

Ἐλ. Πῶς οὖν; τί δὴ καὶ λέγομεν; ψευδῆ φαμεν ἐκαστοτε εἶναι δόξαι, καὶ τινα ἡμῶν δοξάζειν ψευδῆ, τὸν δ' αὖ ἄληθῆ, ὃς φύσει οὕτως ἐχόντων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμὲν γὰρ δή.

188 Ἐλ. Οὐκοῦν τόδε γ' ἔσθ' ἡμῖν περὶ πάντα καὶ καθ' ἐκαστον, ήτοι εἰδέναι ἡ μῆ εἰδέναι; μανθάνειν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὡς οὕτα χαίρειν λέγω ἐν τῷ παρόντι: νῦν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον ἑστὶν οὐδέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο γ' οὐδὲν λειπεται περὶ ἐκαστον πλὴν εἰδέναι ἡ μῆ εἰδέναι.

Ἐλ. Οὐκοῦν ἡδη ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν ἡ ὡν τι οἶδεν ἡ μη οἴδεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

Ἐλ. Καὶ μήν εἰδότα γε μῆ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡ μῆ

Β εἰδότα εἰδέναι ἀδύνατον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;

Ἐλ. Ἄρ' οὖν ὁ τὰ ψευδὴ δοξάζων, ἡ οἴδε, ταῦτα οἴηται οὗ ταῦτα εἶναι ἄλλα ἔτερα ἄττα ὡν οἴδε, καὶ ἀμφότερα εἰδως ἀγνοεῖ ἀμφότερα;
THEAETETUS

leisure, you and Theodorus said very truly that there is no hurry in discussions of this sort.

soc. You are right in reminding me. For perhaps this is a good time to retrace our steps. For it is better to finish a little task well than a great deal imperfectly.

THEAET. Of course.

soc. How, then, shall we set about it? What is it that we do say? Do we say that in every case of opinion there is a false opinion, and one of us has a false, and another a true opinion, because, as we believe, it is in the nature of things that this should be so?

THEAET. Yes, we do.

soc. Then this, at any rate, is possible for us, is it not, regarding all things collectively and each thing separately, either to know or not to know them? For learning and forgetting, as intermediate stages, I leave out of account for the present, for just now they have no bearing upon our argument.

THEAET. Certainly, Socrates, nothing is left in any particular case except knowing or not knowing it.

soc. Then he who forms opinion must form opinion either about what he knows or about what he does not know?

THEAET. Necessarily.

soc. And it is surely impossible that one who knows a thing does not know it, or that one who does not know it knows it.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Then does he who forms false opinions think that the things which he knows are not these things, but some others of the things he knows, and so, knowing both, is he ignorant of both?
PLATO

ὅεαι. Ἄλλον ἄδυνατον, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΠ. Ἅλλα ἀρα, ἂ μὴ οἶδεν, ἢγείται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἑτέρα ἄττα ἢν μὴ οἶδε, καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐστι τῷ μήτε Θεαίτητον μήτε Σωκράτη εἰδότι εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν λαβεῖν ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης Θεαίτητος ἢ ὁ Θεαίτητος Σωκράτης;

C ΌΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἂν;

ΣΠ. Ἅλλον, οὐ μὴν, ἂ γέ τις οἶδεν, οἶτει ποῦ ἂ μὴ οἶδεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὔτ’ αὐ ἂ μὴ οἶδεν, ἂ οἶδεν.

ΟΕΑΙ. Τέρας γὰρ ἔσται.

ΣΠ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν ἐτί ψευδή δοξάσειν; ἐκτὸς γὰρ τούτων ἄδυνατον που δοξάζειν, ἐπείπερ πάντ’ ἡ ἱσμεν ἡ οὐκ ἱσμεν, ἐν δὲ τούτως οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται δυνατὸν ψευδὴ δοξάσαι.

ΟΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΠ. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐ ταῦτη σκεπτέον ὁ ξητοῦμεν, κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι ἱόντας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ

D τὸ εἶναι καὶ μῆς;

ΟΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΠ. Μὴ ἀπλοῦν ἢ οτι ὁ τὰ μὴ ὄντα περὶ ὀτου- ὄν δοξάζων οὐκ ἔσθ’ ὡς οὐ ψευδή δοξάσει, κἂν ὀπωσοῦν ἄλλως τὰ τῆς διανοίας ἔχῃ.

ΟΕΑΙ. Εἰκὸς γ’ αὖ, ὁ Σώκρατες.

ΣΠ. Πῶς οὖν; τὶ ἔρωμεν, ὁ Θεαίτητε, εάν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνακρίνῃ: “δυνατὸν δὲ ὀτρὼν ὁ λέγεται, καὶ τις ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ ὄν δοξάσει, εἰτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων τοὺς εἰτε αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ’; καὶ ἡμεῖς

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THEAETETUS

THEAET. That is impossible, Socrates.
soc. Well then, does he think that the things he does not know are other things which he does not know—which is as if a man who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates should conceive the idea that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaetetus Socrates?

THEAET. That is impossible.
soc. But surely a man does not think that the things he knows are the things he does not know, or again that the things he does not know are the things he knows.

THEAET. That would be a monstrous absurdity.
soc. Then how could he still form false opinions? For inasmuch as all things are either known or unknown to us, it is impossible, I imagine, to form opinions outside of these alternatives, and within them it is clear that there is no place for false opinion.

THEAET. Very true.
soc. Had we, then, better look for what we are seeking, not by this method of knowing and not knowing, but by that of being and not being?

THEAET. What do you mean?
soc. We may simply assert that he who on any subject holds opinions which are not, will certainly think falsely, no matter what the condition of his mind may be in other respects.

THEAET. That, again, is likely, Socrates.
soc. Well then, what shall we say, Theaetetus, if anyone asks us, "Is that which is assumed in common speech possible at all, and can any human being hold an opinion which is not, whether it be concerned with any of the things which are, or be entirely independent of them?" We, I fancy, shall
Ε δή, ὡς ἐσικεῖν, πρὸς ταῦτα φήσομεν· "ὅταν γε μὴ ἀληθῆ οὐτί ταίο ὀἴμενος·" ἡ πῶς ἔροῦμεν;

 óēai. Οúdeos.

 ἔ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ ἀλλοθί που τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν;

 óēai. Τὸ ποίον;

 ἔ. Εἰ τὶς ὀρᾶ μὲν τι, ὀρᾶ δὲ οὐδέν.

 óēai. Καὶ πῶς;

 ἔ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἔν γε τὶ ὀρᾶ, τῶν οὖν τι ὀρᾶ. ἡ σὺ οὐεὶ ποτὲ τὸ ἔν ἔν τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν εἴναι;

 óēai. Οὖκ ἔγωγε.

 ἔ. Ὁ ἄρα ἔν γε τὶ ὀρῶν οὐν τι ὀρᾶ.

 óēai. Φαίνεται.

 189 ἔ. Καὶ ὁ ἄρα τι ἄκουων ἔν γε τι ἄκουει καὶ οὖν ἄκουει.

 óēai. Ναί.

 ἔ. Καὶ ὁ ἀπτόμενος δή του, ἐνὸς γε του ἀπτε- ται καὶ οὐτος, εἴπερ ἐνὸς;

 óēai. Καὶ τοῦτο.

 ἔ. Ὁ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων οὐχ ἔν τι ἕνος δοξάζει;

 óēai. Ἀνάγκη.

 ἔ. Ὁ δ' ἔν τι δοξάζων οὐκ ὄν τι;

 óēai. Συγχωρῶ.

 ἔ. Ὁ ἄρα μὴ ὄν δοξάζων οὐδεν δοξάζει.

 óēai. Οὐ φαίνεται.

 ἔ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ γε μηδὲν δοξάζων τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει.

 óēai. Δῆλον, ὡς ἐσικεῖν.

 189. 1 ἐν τι ΜΤ; ἐν γε τι W.
THEAETETUS

reply, "Yes, when, in thinking, he thinks what is not true," shall we not?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And is the same sort of thing possible in any other field?

THEAET. What sort of thing?

soc. For instance, that a man sees something, but sees nothing.

THEAET. How can he?

soc. Yet surely if a man sees any one thing, he sees something that is. Or do you, perhaps, think "one" is among the things that are not?

THEAET. No, I do not.

soc. Then he who sees any one thing, sees something that is.

THEAET. That is clear.

soc. And therefore he who hears anything, hears some one thing and therefore hears what is.

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And he who touches anything, touches some one thing, which is, since it is one?

THEAET. That also is true.

soc. So, then, does not he who holds an opinion hold an opinion of some one thing?

THEAET. He must do so.

soc. And does not he who holds an opinion of some one thing hold an opinion of something that is?

THEAET. I agree.

soc. Then he who holds an opinion of what is not holds an opinion of nothing.

THEAET. Evidently.

soc. Well then, he who holds an opinion of nothing, holds no opinion at all.

THEAET. That is plain, apparently.
PLATO

Β ΣΩ. Όνικ ἁρα οἶόν τε τὸ μὴ ὁν δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται.
ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι ἁρ' ἐστὶ τὸ ψευδὴ δοξάζειν τοῦ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλο ἔσκεν.
ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν οὔτε οὔτε ὃς διοίγον πρότερον ἐσκοποῦμεν, ψευδῆς ἐστὶ δόξα ἐν ἡμῖν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ.
32. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἁρα ὡδε γιγνόμενον τοῦτο προσαγορεύομεν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;
ΣΩ. Ἀλλοδοξίαν τυλὰ οὖσαν ψευδὴ φαμεν εἶναι C δόξαν, ὅταν τις τι 1 τῶν ὄντων ἄλλο αὖ τῶν ὄντων ἀνταλλαξάμενος τῇ διανοίᾳ φή εἶναι. οὔτω γὰρ ὃν μὲν αἰ δοξάζει, ἔτερον δὲ ἀνθ' ἔτερον, καὶ ἀμαρτάνων οὔ ἐσκόπει δικαιῶς ἀν καλοῖτο ψευδὴ δοξάζων.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁρθότατά μοι νῦν δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι. ὅταν γὰρ τις ἀντὶ καλὸν ἀἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀντὶ ἀἰσχροῦ καλὸν δοξάζῃ, τότε ὃς ἀληθῶς δοξάζει ψευδή.
ΣΩ. Δῆλος εἴ, ὥ Θεαίτητε, καταφρονῶν μου καὶ οὐ δεδιώς.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μάλιστα;
ΣΩ. Όνικ ἂν, οἶμαι, σοὶ δοκῶ τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψευ-
D δους ἀντιλαβέσθαι, ἐρόμενος εἰ οἶόν τε ταχὺ βραδέως ἢ κούφον βαρέως ἢ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐναντίου 1 τι om. ΒΤ.

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soc. Then it is impossible to hold an opinion of that which is not, either in relation to things that are, or independently of them.

THEAET. Evidently.

soc. Then holding false opinion is something different from holding an opinion of that which is not.

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. Then false opinion is not found to exist in us either by this method or by that which we followed a little while ago.

THEAET. No, it certainly is not.

soc. But does not that which we call by that name arise after the following manner?

THEAET. After what manner?

soc. We say that false opinion is a kind of interchanged opinion, when a person makes an exchange in his mind and says that one thing which exists is another thing which exists. For in this way he always holds an opinion of what exists, but of one thing instead of another; so he misses the object he was aiming at in his thought and might fairly be said to hold a false opinion.

THEAET. Now you seem to me to have said what is perfectly right. For when a man, in forming an opinion, puts ugly instead of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly, he does truly hold a false opinion.

soc. Evidently, Theaetetus, you feel contempt of me, and not fear.

THEAET. Why in the world do you say that?

soc. You think, I fancy, that I would not attack your "truly false" by asking whether it is possible for a thing to become slowly quick or heavily light, or any other opposite, by a process opposite to itself, in accordance, not with its own nature, but with that
γίγνεσθαι έαυτῷ ἑναντίως. τούτο μὲν οὖν, ὡς μὴ μάτην θαρρήσης, ἀφίημι. ἀρέσκει δέ, ὡς φής, τὸ τὰ ψευδὴ δοξάζειν ἀλλοδοξεῖν εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοίγε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ ἐστὶν ἀρα κατὰ τὴν σήν δόξαν ἐτερὼν τι ὡς ἐτερων καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐκεῖνο τῇ διανοίᾳ τίθεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ ἐστὶ μέντοι.

ΣΩ. Ἡ ὅταν οὖν τοῦθ' ἡ διανοία του δρᾶ, οὐ καὶ Ἐ ἀνάγκη αὐτῆν ἦτοι ἀμφότερα ἢ τὸ ἐτερὸν διανοεῖσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν ἦτοι ἀμα γε ἡ ἐν μέρει.

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα. τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἄρ' ὅπερ ἐγὼ καλεῖς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί καλῶν;

ΣΩ. Λόγον δὴν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτῆν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ δὲν ἅν σκοπῆ. ὡς γε μὴ εἴδως σοι ἀποφαίνομαι. τοῦτο γὰρ μοι ἐνδαίλλεται διανοομένη οὔκ ἂλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν ἑρωτῶσα καὶ ἀποκρυνομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα. ὅταν δὲ ὁρίσασα, ἐῖτε βραδύτερον ἔτει καὶ δύστερον ἑπάξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὴ φή καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, δόξαν ταύτῃν τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. ὥστε ἔγωγε τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῶ καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, οὐ μέντοι πρὸς ἅλλου οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἅλλα σιγῇ πρὸς αὐτόν· οὐ δὲ τί;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κάγω.

ΣΩ. Ἡ ὅταν ἀρα τίς τὸ ἐτερὸν ἐτερων δοξάζῃ, καὶ φησίν, ὡς ἐοικε, τὸ ἐτερὸν ἐτερων εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτῶν.

Β ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

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of its opposite. But I let this pass, that your courage may not fail. You are satisfied, you say, that false opinion is interchanged opinion?

THEAET. I am.

soc. It is, then, in your opinion, possible for the mind to regard one thing as another and not as what it is.

THEAET. Yes, it is.

soc. Now when one's mind does this, does it not necessarily have a thought either of both things together or of one or the other of them?

THEAET. Yes, it must; either of both at the same time or in succession.

soc. Excellent. And do you define thought as I do?

THEAET. How do you define it?

soc. As the talk which the soul has with itself about any subjects which it considers. You must not suppose that I know this that I am declaring to you. But the soul, as the image presents itself to me, when it thinks, is merely conversing with itself, asking itself questions and answering, affirming and denying. When it has arrived at a decision, whether slowly or with a sudden bound, and is at last agreed, and is not in doubt, we call that its opinion; and so I define forming opinion as talking and opinion as talk which has been held, not with someone else, nor yet aloud, but in silence with oneself. How do you define it?

THEAET. In the same way.

soc. Then whenever a man has an opinion that one thing is another, he says to himself, we believe, that the one thing is the other.

THEAET. Certainly.
'Αναμμηνήσκων δὴ εἰ πώποτ' εἶπες πρὸς σεαυτὸν ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦ καλὸν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ ἀδικὸν δίκαιον, ἢ καί, τὸ πάντων κεφαλαίων, σκόπει εἰ ποτ' ἐπεχείρησας σεαυτὸν πείθειν ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἑτερον ἑτερόν ἐστιν, ἢ πᾶν τοῦνατιν οὐδ' ἐν ὑπνω πῶποτε ἐτόλμησας εἶπεἰν πρὸς σεαυτὸν ὡς παντάπασιν ἀρα τὰ περιττὰ ἀρτιὰ ἐστιν ἢ τὶ ἀλλο τοιοῦτον.

ἜΕΑΙ. 'Αληθῆ λέγεις.

Σ. Ἀλλον δὲ τινα οἷει ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μανωμενον τολμήσαι σπουδὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἶπεῖν ἀναπεθοντα αὐτὸν, ὡς ἀνάγκη τὸν βοῦν ἔππον εἶναι ἢ τὰ δύο ἐν;

ἜΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δὶ οὐκ ἐγώγη.

Σ. Ὁμοῦν εἰ τὸ λέγειν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοξάζειν ἐστίν, οὐδεὶς ἀμφότερα γε λέγων καὶ δοξάζων καὶ ἐφαπτόμενος ἀμφοῖν τῇ ψυχῇ εἶποι ἢν καὶ δοξάσεις ὡς τὸ ἑτερόν ἑτερόν ἐστιν. ἐστέον δὲ καὶ σοι τὸ ῥήμα 2 περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου. λέγω γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇδε, μηδένα δοξάζειν ὡς τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλὸν ἢ

D ἀλλο τὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων.

ἜΕΑΙ. 'Αλλ', ὡ Σώκρατες, ἔω τε καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις.

Σ. Ἀμφω μὲν ἀρα δοξάζοντα ἀδύνατον τὸ γε 3 ἑτερον ἑτερον δοξάζειν.

ἜΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

Σ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ ἑτέρον γε μόνον δοξάζων, τὸ

1 καὶ ομ. Τ.

2 After ῥήμα B adds ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥήμα ἑτερόν τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ ῥήμα ταύτων ἐστιν, applied to things in succession, since the word "one" is, as a word, the same as "other" (i.e. the Greek uses ἑτερον for "one" and "other").

3 τὸ γε Ἡεινδόρφ; τότε B; τὸ ** Τ.

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soc. Now call to mind whether you have ever said to yourself that the beautiful is most assuredly ugly, or the wrong right, or—and this is the sum of the whole matter—consider whether you have ever tried to persuade yourself that one thing is most assuredly another, or whether quite the contrary is the case, and you have never ventured, even in sleep, to say to yourself that the odd is, after all, certainly even, or anything of that sort.

theaet. You are right.

soc. Do you imagine that anyone else, sane or insane, ever ventured to say to himself seriously and try to persuade himself that the ox must necessarily be a horse, or two one?

theaet. No, by Zeus, I do not.

soc. Then if forming opinion is talking to oneself, no one who talks and forms opinion of two objects and apprehends them both with his soul, could say and have the opinion that one is the other. But you will also have to give up the expression "one and other." This is what I mean, that nobody holds the opinion that the ugly is beautiful, or anything of that sort.

theaet. Well, Socrates, I do give it up; and I agree with you in what you say.

soc. You agree, therefore, that he who holds an opinion of both things cannot hold the opinion that one is the other.

theaet. So it seems.

soc. But surely he who holds an opinion of one
δὲ ἐτερον μηδαμῆ, οὐδέποτε δοξάσει τὸ ἐτερον εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀναγκάζοιτο γὰρ ἂν ἐφάπττεσθαι καὶ οὐ μὴ δοξάζει.

σ. Οὔτ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἀμφότερα οὔτε τὸ ἐτερον δοξάζοντι ἑγχωρεῖ ἄλλοδοξεῖν. ὡστ' εἰ τις ὀριεῖται δοξαν εἶναι θευδῆ τὸ ἐτεροδοξεῖν, οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι· οὔτ᾽ ἀρα ταύτῃ οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαινεται θευδῆς ἐν ἦμῖν οὕσα δόξα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

33. σ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Θεάτητε, εἰ τοῦτο μὴ φανῆσεται ὡς, πολλὰ ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὀμολογεῖν καὶ ἀτοπα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ποία δῆ; 

σ. Οὐκ ἔρωσιν πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ πειραθῶ σκοπῶν. αἰσχυνοῦμην γὰρ ἂν ὑπὲρ ἦμῶν, ἐν ὡς ἀποροῦμεν, ἀναγκαζομένων ὀμολογεῖν οἶα λέγω. ἀλλ' ἐάν εὐρωμεν καὶ ἐλεύθεροι γενώμεθα, τότ' ἡδὴ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐροῦμεν ὡς πασχόντων αὐτὰ ἔκτος τοῦ γελοίου ἐστῶτες· ἐάν δὲ πάντῃ ἀπορήσωμεν, ταπεινωθέντες, οἷμαι, τῷ λόγῳ παρέξουμεν ὡς ναυτιῶντες πατεῖν τε καὶ χρῆσθαι ὁ τι ἂν βούληται. ἢ οὖν ἐτὶ πόρον τινά εὐρίσκω τοῦ ζητήματος ἦμῶν, ἄκουε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε μόνον.

σ. Οὐ φήσω ἦμᾶς ὀρθῶς ὀμολογήσαι, ἥνικα ὀμολογήσαμεν ἃ τις οἴδεν, ἀδύνατον δοξάσαι ἡ μὴ Βοίδεν εἶναι αὐτὰ καὶ ψευδήναι· ἀλλὰ τῇ δυνατοῦ.

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only, and not of the other at all, will never hold the opinion that one is the other.

THEAET. You are right; for he would be forced to apprehend also that of which he holds no opinion.

soc. Then neither he who holds opinion of both nor he who holds it of one can hold the opinion that a thing is something else. And so anyone who sets out to define false opinion as interchanged opinion would be talking nonsense. Then neither by this method nor by our previous methods is false opinion found to exist in us.

THEAET. Apparently not.

soc. But yet, Theaetetus, if this is found not to exist, we shall be forced to admit many absurdities.

THEAET. What absurdities?

soc. I will not tell you until I have tried to consider the matter in every way. For I should be ashamed of us, if, in our perplexity, we were forced to make such admissions as those to which I refer. But if we find the object of our quest, and are set free from perplexity, then, and not before, we will speak of others as involved in those absurdities, and we ourselves shall stand free from ridicule. But if we find no escape from our perplexity, we shall, I fancy, become low-spirited, like seasick people, and shall allow the argument to trample on us and do to us anything it pleases. Hear, then, by what means I still see a prospect of success for our quest.

THEAET. Do speak.

soc. I shall deny that we were right when we agreed that it is impossible for a man to have opinion that the things he does not know are the things which he knows, and thus to be deceived. But there is a way in which it is possible.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα λέγεις ὃ καὶ ἐγὼ τότε ὑπώπτευσα, ἢνίκ’ αὐτὸ ἐφαμεν τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ὅτι ἐνίοτ’ ἐγὼ γιγνώσκων Σωκράτη, πόρρωθεν δὲ ὀρῶν ἄλλον ὅν οὐ γιγνώσκω, ψήθην εἶναι Σωκράτη ὅν οἶδα; γίγνεται γὰρ ὑ’ ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ οἷον λέγεις.

ΣΝ. Οὐκοῦν ἀπέστημεν αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ὃ ἁμεν ἐποίει ἡμᾶς εἰδότας μὴ εἶδέναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΝ. Μὴ γὰρ οὕτω τιθώμεν, ἀλλ’ ὥδε: ὑσως Σ κτ η ἡμῖν συγχωρήσεται, ὑσως δὲ ἀντιτενεῖ ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν τοιοῦτῳ ἐχόμεθα, ἐν ὃ ἀνάγκη πάντα μεταστρέφοντα λόγον βασανίζειν. σκοπεῖ οὖν εἰ τι λέγω. ἀρα ἔστω μὴ εἰδότα τι πρῶτον ὑστερον μαθεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Εστι μέντοι.

ΣΝ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὖθις ἐτερον καὶ ἐτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ’ οὖ;

ΣΝ. Θές δὴ μοι λόγου ἕνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐνὸν κήριν ομαγείον, τῷ μὲν μείζον, τῷ δ’ ἐλαττών, καὶ τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρου, καὶ σκληροτέρου, εὐνοις δὲ 

D υγροτέρου, ἔστι δ’ οἷς μετρίως ἔχοντος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίθημι.

ΣΝ. Δῶρον τοῖνυν αὐτὸ φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης, καὶ ἐς τοῦτο, ὅ τι ἀν βουληθῶμεν μνημονεύειν ὅν ἂν ἰδώμεν ἡ ἁκοὐσωμεν ἡ ἀυτοὶ ἐννοῆσωμεν, ὑπέχοντας αὐτὸ ταῖς αἰσθήσει καὶ ἐννοίαις, ἀποτυπούσθαι, ὡσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖᾳ ἐνσημαινομένους· καὶ ὃ μὲν

1 εἰδώμεν B.

2 ἁκοὐσωμεν BT.
THEAETETUS

theaet. Do you mean what I myself suspected when we made the statement to which you refer, that sometimes I, though I know Socrates, saw at a distance someone whom I did not know, and thought it was Socrates whom I do know? In such a case false opinion does arise.

soc. But did not we reject that, because it resulted in our knowing and not knowing the things which we know?

theaet. Certainly we did.

soc. Let us, then, not make that assumption, but another; perhaps it will turn out well for us, perhaps the opposite. But we are in such straits that we must turn every argument round and test it from all sides. Now see if this is sensible: Can a man who did not know a thing at one time learn it later?

theaet. To be sure he can.

soc. Please assume, then, for the sake of argument, that there is in our souls a block of wax, in one case larger, in another smaller, in one case the wax is purer, in another more impure and harder, in some cases softer, and in some of proper quality.

theaet. I assume all that.

soc. Let us, then, say that this is the gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses, and that whenever we wish to remember anything we see or hear or think of in our own minds, we hold this wax under the perceptions and thoughts and imprint them upon it, just as we make impressions from seal rings;
ἀν ἐκμαγή, μνημονεύειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἐώς ἄν ἔνη τὸ εἰδῶλον αὐτοῦ· ὄ δὲ ἄν ἔξαλειφθῇ ἡ Ἐ μὴ οἷόν τε γένηται ἐκμαγήναι, ἐπιλελησθαί τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι.

ὁει. 'Εστω οὕτως.

σο. Ὁ τοίνυν ἐπιστάμενος μὲν αὐτά, σκοπῶν δὲ τι ὄν ὧν ὄρᾳ ἡ ἀκούει, άθρει εἰ ἄρα τοὐδε τρόπῳ πευδή ἄν δοξάσαι.

ὁει. Ποίῳ δὴ τινι;

σο. 'Α οἶδεν, οἰηθεὶς εἶναι τοτὲ μὲν ὁ οἶδε, τοτὲ δὲ ὁ μῆ. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐ καλῶς ἀμολογήσαμεν ἀμολογοῦντες ἀδύνατα.

ὁει. Νῦν δὲ πῶς λέγεις;

192 σο. Δεὶ οἴδε λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς διοριζόμενος, ὅτι ὁ μὲν τις οἶδεν σχὼν ἄν οἶδεν μνημεῖον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, αἰσθάνεται δὲ αὐτὸς μῆ, τοῦτο ὁ οἰηθῆναι ἐτερὸν τι ὄν οἶδεν, ἔχοντα καὶ ἐκεῖνον τύπον, αἰσθανόμενον δὲ μῆ, ἀδύνατον. καὶ ὁ γε οἶδεν αὖ, οἰηθῆναι εἶναι ὁ μὴ οἶδε μῆδ' ἔχει αὐτοῦ σφραγίδα. καὶ ὁ μῆ οἶδεν, ὁ μὴ οἶδεν αὖ. καὶ ὁ μῆ οἶδεν, ὁ οἶδε. καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται γε, ἐτερὸν τι ὄν αἰσθάνεται οἰηθῆναι εἶναι· καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται, ὃν τι μῆ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μῆ αἰσθάνεται, ὃν μῆ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μῆ B αἰσθάνεται, ὃν αἰσθάνεται. καὶ εἶτι γε αὖ ὃν οἴδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν

1 ὁ δ' ἄν B2W; ὃταν B; ὃταν δὲ T.
2 σχὼν BT; ἔχων W. 3 τοῦτο B; om. al.
4 καὶ . . ὃν αἰσθάνεται om. B.
THEAETETUS

and whatever is imprinted we remember and know as long as its image lasts, but whatever is rubbed out or cannot be imprinted we forget and do not know.

THEAET. Let us assume that.

soc. Now take a man who knows the things which he sees and hears, and is considering some one of them; observe whether he may not gain a false opinion in the following manner.

THEAET. In what manner?

soc. By thinking that the things which he knows are sometimes things which he knows and sometimes things which he does not know. For we were wrong before in agreeing that this is impossible.

THEAET. What do you say about it now?

soc. We must begin our discussion of the matter by making the following distinctions: It is impossible for anyone to think that one thing which he knows and of which he has received a memorial imprint in his soul, but which he does not perceive, is another thing which he knows and of which also he has an imprint, and which he does not perceive. And, again, he cannot think that what he knows is that which he does not know and of which he has no seal; nor that what he does not know is another thing which he does not know; nor that what he does not know is what he knows; nor can he think that what he perceives is something else which he perceives; nor that what he perceives is something which he does not perceive; nor that what he does not perceive is something else which he does not perceive; nor that what he does not perceive is something which he perceives. And, again, it is still more impossible, if that can be, to think that a thing which he knows and perceives and of which he has an imprint which accords
αἰσθησιν, οἴηθήναι αὖ ἑτερόν τι ὄν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει αὖ καὶ ἑκείνου τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησίν, ἄδυνατώτερον ἔτι ἑκείνων, εἰ οἶον τε. καὶ ὁ οἶδε καὶ ἀισθάνεται ἔχων τὸ μνημεῖον ὀρθῶς, ὁ οἶδεν οἴηθήναι ἄδυνατον· καὶ ὁ οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων κατὰ ταύτα, ὁ C αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ αὖ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὁ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὁ μὴ οἶδε· καὶ ὁ μὴ οἴδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μὴ αἰσθάνεται 3. πάντα ταύτα ὑπερβάλλει ἄδυναμια τοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὕπεν τινα δοξάσαι. λεί-ντεαι ἡ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσιν, εἴπερ ποιὸν ἄλλοθι, τὸ τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐν τίσι δή; ἐὰν ἄρα ἔξις αὐτῶν τι μάλλον μᾶθω· νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἔπομαι.

ΣΝ. Ἐν οἷς οἴδεν, οἴηθήναι αὐτὰ ἑτερ' ἄτα εἶναι ὄν οἴδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται· ἢ ὃν μὴ οἴδεν, αἰσθάνεται δὲ· ἢ ὃν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται, ὃν D οἴδεν αὖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν πολὺ πλέον ἀπελείφθην ἡ τότε.

34. ΣΝ. Ὡδε δὴ ἀνάπαλων ἀκούε. ἐγὼ εἰδὼς Θεόδωρον καὶ ἐν ἑμαυτῷ μεμνημένος οἶος ἐστι, καὶ Θεαίητον κατὰ ταύτα, ἄλλο τι ἐνίοτε μὲν ὅρῳ αὐτούς, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐ, καὶ ἀποταῖον ποτ' αὐτῶν,

1 After καὶ the mss. read ὅ, expunged by Bonitz.
2 τὸ μνημεῖον . . . ἔχων om. ΒΤ; add. ΒΤ in marg.
3 ὁ μὴ οἴδε . . . μὴ αἰσθάνεται om. B.
THEAETETUS

with the perception is another thing which he knows and perceives and of which he has an imprint which accords with the perception. And he cannot think that what he knows and perceives and of which he has a correct memorial imprint is another thing which he knows; nor that a thing which he knows and perceives and of which he has such an imprint is another thing which he perceives; nor again that a thing which he neither knows nor perceives is another thing which he neither knows nor perceives; nor that a thing which he neither knows nor perceives is another thing which he does not know; nor that a thing which he neither knows nor perceives is another thing which he does not perceive. In all these cases it is impossible beyond everything for false opinion to arise in the mind of anyone. The possibility that it may arise remains, if anywhere, in the following cases.

THEAET. What cases are they? I hope they may help me to understand better; for now I cannot follow you.

soc. The cases in which he may think that things which he knows are some other things which he knows and perceives; or which he does not know, but perceives; or that things which he knows and perceives are other things which he knows and perceives.

THEAET. Now I am even more out of the running than before.

soc. Then let me repeat it in a different way. I know Theodorus and remember within myself what sort of a person he is, and just so I know Theaetetus, but sometimes I see them, and sometimes I do not,
τοτε δ' ου, και άκουω η ηυν άλλην αϊσθησιν αϊσθάνομαι, τοτε δ' αισθησιν μεν ουδεμιαν έχω περι υμών, μεμνημαι δε υμάς ουδέν ήττον και επισταμαι αυτως εν εμαυτω;

Ε θεαι. Πάνυ μεν ουν.

Ση. Τοιτο τοινυν πρότων μάθε δν βοϋλομαι δηλώσαι, ως έστι μην α οιδε μη αισθάνεσθαι, έστι 1 δε αισθάνεσθαι.

θεαι. 'Αληθή.

Ση. Ουκον και α μη οιδε, πολλάκις μεν έστι μηδε αισθάνεσθαι, πολλάκις δε αισθάνεσθαι μόνον;

θεαι. 'Έστι και τοιτο.

Ση. 'Ιδε δη έαν τι μάλλον νυν έπίσπη. Σωκρά-
193 της ει γυγνώσκει 2 Θεόδωρον καλ Θεαίτητον, ορα δε μηδέτερον, μηδε άλλην αϊσθησιν αυτω πάρεστι περι αυτών, ουκ άν ποτε εν εαυτώ δοξάσειν άσ ν ο Θεαιττός έστι Θεόδωρος. λέγω τι η οιδεν;

θεαι. Ναι, αληθη γε.

Ση. Τοιτο μεν τοινυν έκεινων πρώτων ήν νυ
έλεγον.

θεαι. 'Ην γαρ.

Ση. Δευτερον τοινυν, οτι τον μεν γυγνώσκων υμών, τον δε μη γυγνώσκων, αϊσθανόμενος δε μηδέτερον, ουκ άν ποτε αυ οιθει εν οιδα ειναι δα μη οιδα.

θεαι. 'Ορθώς.

Ση. Τρίτον δε, μηδετερον γυγνωσκων μηδε
β αϊσθανομενος ουκ άν οιθει εν μη οιδα έτερον τω ειναι ων μη οιδα. και ταλλα τα προτερα πανθ' εξης νομουε παλιν ακηκοει, εν οις ουδεποτ' 1 έστι . . . μηδε αισθανεσθαι below om. B.

2 ει γυγνωσκει W ; επιγυγνωσκει BT.
THEAETETUS

sometimes I touch them, sometimes not, sometimes I hear them or perceive them through some other sense, and sometimes I have no perception of you at all, but I remember you none the less and know you in my own mind. Is it not so?

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. This, then, is the first of the points which I wish to make clear. Note that one may perceive or not perceive that which one knows.

THEAET. That is true.

SOC. So, too, with that which he does not know—he may often not even perceive it, and often he may merely perceive it?

THEAET. That too is possible.

SOC. See if you follow me better now. If Socrates knows Theodorus and Theaetetus, but sees neither of them and has no other perception of them, he never could have the opinion within himself that Theaetetus is Theodorus. Am I right or wrong?

THEAET. You are right.

SOC. Now that was the first of the cases of which I spoke.

THEAET. Yes, it was.

SOC. The second is this: knowing one of you and not knowing the other, and not perceiving either of you, I never could think that the one whom I know is the one whom I do not know.

THEAET. Right.

SOC. And this is the third case: not knowing and not perceiving either of you, I could not think that he whom I do not know is someone else whom I do not know. And imagine that you have heard all the other cases again in succession, in which
PLATO

ἐγὼ περὶ σοῦ καὶ Θεόδωρον τὰ ψευδὴ δοξάσω, οὔτε γιγνώσκων οὔτε ἀγνοῶν ἄμφω, οὔτε τὸν μὲν, τὸν δὲ οὐ γιγνώσκων· καὶ περὶ αἰσθήσεων κατὰ ταύτα, εἰ ἄρα ἔπει.

θεαί. Ἐπομαι.

σὺ. Δεῖπτε τοίνυν τὰ ψευδὴ δοξάσαι ἐν τῷ δε, ὅταν γιγνώσκων σὲ καὶ Θεόδωρον, καὶ ἔχων ἐν ζ ἑκεῖνοι τῷ κηρίῳ ὡσπερ δακτυλίων σφῶν ἄμφω τὰ σημεῖα, διὰ μακροῦ καὶ μὴ ἰκανῶς ὂρῶν ἄμφω προθυμηθῶ, τὸ οἰκεῖον ἐκατέρου σημεῖον ἀποδοῦσ τῇ οἰκεῖᾳ ὁψει, ἐμβιβάσας προσαρμόσαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἰχνος, ὅνα γένηται ἀναγνώρισις, εἰτα τοῦτων ἀποτυχῶν καὶ ὡσπερ οἱ ἐμπαλιν ὑποδούμενοι παραλλάξας προσβάλω τὴν ἐκατέρου ὤψιν πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον σημεῖον, ἢ καὶ οἷα τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις τῆς ὁψεως πάθη, δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερὰ μεταρρεούσης,

D ταῦταν παθῶν διαμάρτως· τὸτε δὴ συμβαίνει ἡ ἑτέροδοξία καὶ τὸ ψευδὴ δοξάζειν.

θεαί. Ἐοικε γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες· θαυμασίως ὡς λέγεις τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος.

σὺ. Ἐτι τοίνυν καὶ ὅταν ἀμφότεροις γιγνώσκων τὸν μὲν πρὸς τῷ γιγνώσκειν αἰσθάνωμαι, τὸν δὲ μὴ, τῆν δὲ γνώσιν τοῦ ἐτέρου μὴ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσεων ἔχω, δὲ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὕτως ἔλεγον καὶ μου τότε οὖκ ἐμάνθανε.
could never form false opinions about you and Theodorus, either when I know or do not know both of you, or when I know one and not the other; and the same is true if we say "perceive" instead of "know." Do you follow me?

THEAET. I follow you.

soc. Then the possibility of forming false opinion remains in the following case: when, for example, knowing you and Theodorus, and having on that block of wax the imprint of both of you, as if you were signet-rings, but seeing you both at a distance and indistinctly, I hasten to assign the proper imprint of each of you to the proper vision, and to make it fit, as it were, its own footprint, with the purpose of causing recognition;¹ but I may fail in this by interchanging them, and put the vision of one upon the imprint of the other, as people put a shoe on the wrong foot; or, again, I may be affected as the sight is affected when we use a mirror and the sight as it flows makes a change from right to left, and thus make a mistake; it is in such cases, then, that interchanged opinion occurs and the forming of false opinion arises.

THEAET. I think it does, Socrates. You describe what happens to opinion marvellously well.

soc. There is still the further case, when, knowing both of you, I perceive one in addition to knowing him, but do not perceive the other, and the knowledge which I have of that other is not in accord with my perception. This is the case I described in this way before, and at that time you did not understand me.

¹ Aeschylus, Choepb. 197 ff., makes Electra recognize the presence of her brother Orestes by the likeness of his footprints to her own.
THEAI. Όδ γαρ οὖν.

ΣΝ. Τοῦτο μῆν ἐλεγον, ὅτι γυγνώσκων τὸν Ἐ ἑτερον καὶ αἰσθανόμενον, καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν αὐτοῦ ἔχον, ουδέποτε οὐήσεται εἰναι αὐτὸν ἑτερον τινα δι' γυγνώσκει τε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν αὐ καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἔχει κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν. Ὕν γαρ τοῦτο;

THEAI. Ναί.

ΣΝ. Παρελείπετο δὲ γέ που τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ἐν ὧ δὴ φαμεν τὴν ψευδή δόξαν γίγνεσθαι τὸ ἁμφω γυγνώσκοντα καὶ ἁμφω ὄρ_QMARKντα ἡ τινα ἄλλην 194 αἰσθησιν ἔχοντα ἁμφοῖν τω σημείῳ μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ αἰσθησιν ἐκάτερον ἔχειν, ἀλλ' οἶνον τοξότην φαύλον οἴντα παραλλάξαι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ ἁμαρτεῖν, δὴ καὶ ψεύδοις ἀρὰ ὄνομασται.

THEAI. Εἰκότως γε.

ΣΝ. Καί ὅταν τοῖνυν τῷ μὲν παρῆ αἰσθησις τῶν σημείων, τῷ δὲ μή, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπουσίας αἰσθησίσεως τῇ παρουσίᾳ προσαρμόσῃ, πάντῃ ταυτῇ ψευδεῖαι ἡ διάνοια. καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὅν μὲν μὴ οἴδε τις Β μηδὲ ἡσθετο 2 πώποτε, οὐκ ἔστω, ὡς ἐοικεν, οὐτε ψευδεσθαι οὐτε ψευδής δόξα, εἰ τι νῦν ἡμεῖς ὤνεσ λέγομεν. περὶ δὲ ὅν ἴσμεν τε καὶ αἰσθανόμενα, ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις στρέφεται καὶ ἐλίττεται ἡ δόξα ψευδής καὶ ἀληθῆς γυγνομένη, καταντίκρυ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθὺ τὰ οἰκεία συνάγουσα ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους ἄληθῆς, εἰς πλάγια δὲ καὶ σκολιά ψευδῆς.

THEAI. Ὄνικοιν καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατε, λέγεται;

1 τῷ σημείῳ al. Heusde; τῷ σημείῳ TW2; τὸ σημεῖον BW.
2 μηδὲ ἡσθετο TW; μηδὲ ἐπείθετο ἐπῆσθετο B; μηδ' ἐπῆσθετο B2.
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THEAET. No, I did not.

soc. This is what I meant, that if anyone knows and perceives one of you, and has knowledge of him which accords with the perception, he will never think that he is someone else whom he knows and perceives and his knowledge of whom accords with the perception. That was the case, was it not?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. But we omitted, I believe, the case of which I am speaking now—the case in which we say the false opinion arises: when a man knows both and sees both (or has some other perception of them), but fails to hold the two imprints each under its proper perception; like a bad archer he shoots beside the mark and misses it; and it is just this which is called error or deception.

THEAET. And properly so.

soc. Now when perception is present to one of the imprints but not to the other, and the mind applies the imprint of the absent perception to the perception which is present, the mind is deceived in every such instance. In a word, if our present view is sound, false opinion or deception seems to be impossible in relation to things which one does not know and has never perceived; but it is precisely in relation to things which we know and perceive that opinion turns and twists, becoming false and true—true when it puts the proper imprints and seals fairly and squarely upon one another, and false when it applies them sideways and aslant.

THEAET. Well, then, Socrates, is that view not a good one?
C Ἐπὶ τοῖνυν καὶ τάδε ἀκούσας μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἔρεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τάληθες δοξάζειν καλὸν, τὸ δὲ ψευδεσθαι αἰσχρόν.

τοῦτο. Ἡῶς δ’ οὖ; 

ἐπὶ. Ταῦτα τοῖνυν φασίν ἐνθένδε γίγνεσθαι. ὅταν μὲν ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βαθὺς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ λεῖος καὶ μετρίως ὄργασμένος ἡ, τὰ ἴόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἐνσημαινόμενα εἰς τούτῳ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, ὁ ἐφη "Ομηρος αὐιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοιότητα, τότε μὲν καὶ τούτοις

D καθαρά τὰ σημεῖα ἐγγυγνόμενα καὶ ἰκανῶς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρόνια τε γίγνεται καὶ εἰσίν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν εὐμαθεῖς, ἐπειτα μνήμονες, εἴτα οὐ παραλλάττουσι τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὰ σημεῖα ἄλλα δοξάζουσιν ἀληθῆ. σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν ἐυρυ-

χωρίᾳ ὄντα ταχὺ διανέμουσιν ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκαστα ἐκμαγεῖα, ἡ δ’ ὄντα καλεῖται, καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ οὔτοι καλοῦνται. ἡ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

τοῦτο. Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.

Ε Ἐπὶ. Ὅταν τοῖνυν λάσιον τοῦ τὸ κέαρ ἡ, δὴ ἐπήνεσαι τὸ πάντα σοφὸς ποιητής, ἡ ὅταν κοπρῶδες καὶ μὴ καθαροῦ τοῦ κηροῦ, ἦ ὢγρὸν σφόδρα ἢ σκληρόν, ὃν μὲν ὢγρὸν, εὐμαθεῖς μὲν, ἐπιλήψιμον δὲ γίγνονται, ὃν δὲ σκληρόν, τάναντια. οἱ δὲ δὴ λάσιον καὶ τραχὺ λυθώδες τι ἡ γῆς ἡ κόπρου συμ-

1 ὄργασμένος Suidas, Timaeus; εἰργασμένος ΒΤ.

2 του τὸν τὸν τὸν Β.
soc. After you have heard the rest, you will be still more inclined to say so. For to hold a true opinion is a good thing, but to be deceived is a disgrace.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. They say the cause of these variations is as follows: When the wax in the soul of a man is deep and abundant and smooth and properly kneaded, the images that come through the perceptions are imprinted upon this heart of the soul—as Homer calls it in allusion to its similarity to wax—; when this is the case, and in such men, the imprints, being clear and of sufficient depth, are also lasting. And men of this kind are in the first place quick to learn, and secondly they have retentive memories, and moreover they do not interchange the imprints of their perceptions, but they have true opinions. For the imprints are clear and have plenty of room, so that such men quickly assign them to their several moulds, which are called realities; and these men, then, are called wise. Or do you not agree?

THEAET. Most emphatically.

soc. Now when the heart of anyone is shaggy (a condition which the all-wise poet commends), or when it is unclean or of impure wax, or very soft or hard, those whose wax is soft are quick to learn, but forgetful, and those in whom it is hard are the reverse. But those in whom it is shaggy and rough and stony, infected with earth or dung which is mixed

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1 The similarity is in the Greek words κέφων or κῆφ, heart, and κηρός, wax. The shaggy heart is mentioned in the Iliad, ii. 851; xvi. 554. The citation of Homer, here and below, is probably sarcastic—in reference to the practice of some of the sophists who used and perverted his words in support of their doctrines.
μιγείσης ἐμπλεων ἔχοντες ἀσαφῆ τὰ ἐκμαγεῖα ἱσχουσιν. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σκληρὰ· βάθος γὰρ οὐκ ἐνι. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ δυγρά· ὑπὸ γὰρ
195 τοῦ συγχείσθαι ταχὺ γίγνεται ἀμυνρά. εάν δὲ πρὸς πᾶσι τούτοις ἐπ' ἀλλήλων συμπεπτωκότα ἢ ὑπὸ στενοχωρίας, εάν τοῦ σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ψυχάριον, ἐτὶ ἀσαφέστερα ἐκεῖνων. πάντες οὖν οὗτοι γίγνον-
tαι οἱ οὖς δοξάζειν ψευδῆ. ὡστιν γὰρ τι ὀρθῶς η ἀκούσων ἢ ἐπινοῶσι, ἑκαστὰ ἀπονέμεων ταχὺ ἐκάστους οὐ δυνάμενοι βραδεὶς τέ εἰς καὶ ἀλλο-
τριονομοῦντες παρορώσι τε καὶ παρακούοντες καὶ παρανοοῦσι πλείοντα, καὶ καλοῦνται αὐ ὀὐτοὶ ἐφευσμένοι τε δὴ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀμαθεῖς.

B ὙΕΙ. 'Ὁρθότατα ἀνθρώπων λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρα-
tες.

ἐν. Φῶμεν ἀρα ἐν ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς δόξας εἶναι;

ὩΕΙ. Σφόδρα γε.

ἐν. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς δή;

ὩΕΙ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς.

ἐν. Ἡδὴ οὖν οἰόμεθα ἱκανῶς ἀμολογήσθαι οτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐστὸν ἀμφοτέρα τούτω τῶν δόξα;

ὩΕΙ. Ὡπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.

5. Ἐν. Δεινὸν τε, ὁ Θεάτητε, ὡς ἀληθῶς κινδυνεύει καὶ ἀγήδες εἶναι ἀνῷ ἀδολεσχῆς.

ὩΕΙ. Τὶ δέ; πρὸς τὶ τοῦτ' εἶπες;

C Ἐν. Τὴν ἐμαντοῦ δυσμαθίαν δυσχεράνας καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀδολεσχίαν. τὴ γὰρ ἂν τις ἄλλο θείτο ὄνομα, ὡστε ἂν κάτω τοὺς λόγους ἐλκῇ τὶς ὑπὸ νωθεῖας οὐ δυνάμενος πεισθῆναι, καὶ ἡ δυσαπάλ-

ὡκτὸς ἀφ' ἑκάστου λόγου;

ὩΕΙ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ τὶ δυσχεραίνεις;

1 ἑκαστα] ἑκαστοὶ ΒΤ.
in it, receive indistinct imprints from the moulds. So also do those whose wax is hard; for the imprints lack depth. And imprints in soft wax are also indistinct, because they melt together and quickly become blurred; but if besides all this they are crowded upon one another through lack of room, in some mean little soul, they are still more indistinct. So all these men are likely to have false opinions. For when they see or hear or think of anything, they cannot quickly assign things to the right imprints, but are slow about it, and because they assign them wrongly they usually see and hear and think amiss. These men, in turn, are accordingly said to be deceived about realities and ignorant.

THEAET. You are right as right could be, Socrates.

soc. Shall we, then, say that false opinions exist in us?

THEAET. Assuredly.

soc. And true opinions, no doubt?

THEAET. And true ones also.

soc. Then now at last we think we have reached a valid agreement, that these two kinds of opinion incontestably exist?

THEAET. Most emphatically.

soc. Truly, Theatetus, a garrulous man is a strange and unpleasant creature!

THEAET. Eh? What makes you say that?

soc. Vexation at my own stupidity and genuine garrulity. For what else could you call it when a man drags his arguments up and down because he is so stupid that he cannot be convinced, and is hardly to be induced to give up any one of them?

THEAET. But you, why are you vexed?
PLATO

ξη. Ὑ δυσαχεράνω μόνον, ἄλλα καὶ δέδοικα, ὁ τι ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἄν τις ἔρηται με· "ὁ Σωκρατες, ἡ ψευδὴ δόξαν, ὅτι οὐτε ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐστὶ πρὸς ἄλληλας οὔτε ἐν ταῖς διανοιαῖς, ἔτι ἐν τῇ συνάψει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαν;" φήσω δὲ ἐγώ, οὐμαι, καλλωπιζόμενοι ὡς τι ηὐρηκότων ἡμῶν καλῶν;

Θεαί. ἀμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὡς Σωκρατες, οὐκ ἀισχρὸν εἶναι τὸ νῦν ἀποδεδειγμένον.

ξη. "Οὐκοῦν," φήσει, "λέγεις ὅτι αὐ τὸν ἀνθρώπον, ὅν διανοούμεθα μόνον, ὅρᾶμεν δ' οὐ, ἢππον οὐκ ἄν ποτε οἰηθείμεν εἶναι, ὅ αὐ οὐτε ὅρᾶμεν οὐτε ἀπτόμεθα, διανοούμεθα δὲ μόνον καὶ ἄλλ' οὐδὲν αἰσθανόμεθα περὶ αὐτοῦ;" ταῦτα, οὕμαι, φήσω λέγειν.

Θεαί. Καὶ ὅρθως γε.

Ε. ξη. "Τί οὖν," φήσει,1 "τὰ ἑνδεκα, ἀ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἡ διανοεῖται τις, ἄλλο τί ἐκ τούτου τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἄν ποτε οἰηθεὶ ἄνδεκα εἶναι, ἀ μόνον αὐ διανοεῖται;" ἢθι οὖν δή, σὺ ἀποκρίνου.

Θεαί. Ἀλλ' ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ὅτι ὅρῶν μὲν ἄν τις ἡ ἐφαπτόμενος οἰηθεὶ τὰ ἑνδεκά δώδεκα εἶναι, ἀ μέντοι ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔχει, οὐκ ἄν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα δοξάσεις οὕτως.

ξη. Τί οὖν; οἱ οἱ πώποτε αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ 196 πέντε καὶ ἐπτά, λέγω δὲ μὴ ἀνθρώπους ἐπτά καὶ πέντε προθεμένον σκοπεῖν μηδ' ἄλλο τουτοῦν, ἄλλ' αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἐπτά, ἀ φαμεν ἐκεῖ μνημεῖα ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείω εἶναι καὶ ψευδὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ εἶναι δοξάσαι, ταῦτα αὐτὰ εἰ τις ἀνθρώπων ἥδη

1 φήσει Stephanus; φής B; φησὶ Burnet.

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soc. I am not merely vexed, I am actually afraid; for I do not know what answer to make if anyone asks me: "Socrates, have you found out, I wonder, that false opinion exists neither in the relations of the perceptions to one another nor in the thoughts, but in the combination of perception with thought?" I shall say "yes," I suppose, and put on airs, as if we had made a fine discovery.

THEAET. It seems to me, Socrates, that the result we have now brought out is not half bad.

soc. "Do you go on and assert, then," he will say, "that we never could imagine that the man whom we merely think of, but do not see, is a horse which also we do not see or touch or perceive by any other sense, but merely think of?" I suppose I shall say that I do make that assertion.

THEAET. Yes, and you will be right.

soc. "Then," he will say, "according to that, could we ever imagine that the number eleven which is merely thought of, is the number twelve which also is merely thought of?" Come now, it is for you to answer.

THEAET. Well, my answer will be that a man might imagine the eleven that he sees or touches to be twelve, but that he could never have that opinion concerning the eleven that he has in his mind.

soc. Well, then, do you think that anyone ever considered in his own mind five and seven,—I do not mean by setting before his eyes seven men and five men and considering them, or anything of that sort, but seven and five in the abstract, which we say are imprints in the block of wax, and in regard to which we deny the possibility of forming false opinions—taking these by themselves, do you imagine
πώποτε ἐσκέψατο λέγων πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ἑρωτῶν πόσα ποτ’ ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ μὲν τις εἶπεν οὐποθεὶς ἐνδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ δῶδεκα, η̣ πάντες λέγουσι τε καὶ οἶονται δῶδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι;

θεαί. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν-
Β δεκα· ἐὰν δὲ γε ἐν πλείον ἀριθμῷ τις σκοπήται, μᾶλλον σφάλλεται. οἶμαι γὰρ σὲ περὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον 1 ἀριθμοῦ λέγειν.

ζη. Ὁρθῶς γὰρ οἶει· καὶ ἐνθυμοῦ μὴ τι τότε 2 γίγνεται ἀλλο η ἀυτὰ τὰ δῶδεκα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγεῖω ἐνδεκα οὐποθῆναι.

θεαί. Ἐοικε γε.

ζη. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρῶτους πάλιν ἀνήκει λόγους; ὁ γὰρ τούτο παθὼν, ὁ οἶδεν, ἔτερον αὐτὸ οἴεται εἶναι δὲν αὐ οἶδεν· ὁ ἐφαμεν ἀδύνατον, καὶ
C τούτω αὐτῷ ἠγακάζομεν μὴ εἶναι ψευδῆ δόξαν, ἢν μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀναγκάζοιτο εἰδὼς μὴ εἰδέναι ἁμα.

θεαί. Ἀληθέστατα.

ζη. Οὐκοῦν ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὖν δεῖ ἀποφαίνειν τὸ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν ἤ διανοίας πρὸς αὐθησίων παραλλα
gγήν. εἰ γὰρ τούτ’ ἢν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς διανοημασίαις ἐψευδόμεθα. νῦν δὲ ἦτοι οὐκ ἔστι ψευδῆς δόξα, ἢ α τις οἶδεν, οἴον τε μὴ εἰδέναι. καὶ τούτων πότερα 3 αἴρει;

θεαί. Ἀπορον αἴρεσιν προτίθης, φ Σώκρατες.

δ ζη. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότερά γε κινδυνεύει ο λόγος οὐκ ἔάσειν. ὅμως δὲ, πάντα γάρ τολμητέον, τί εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαμεν ἀναισχυντεῖν;

θεαί. Πῶς;

1 μᾶλλον om. W. 2 τότε W; ποτε BT. 3 πότερα W; ποτέραν BT.
that anybody in the world has ever considered them, talking to himself and asking himself what their sum is, and that one person has said and thought eleven, and another twelve, or do all say and think that it is twelve?

THEAET. No, by Zeus; many say eleven, and if you take a larger number for consideration, there is greater likelihood of error. For I suppose you are speaking of any number rather than of these only.

soc. You are right in supposing so; and consider whether in that instance the abstract twelve in the block of wax is not itself imagined to be eleven.

THEAET. It seems so.

soc. Have we not, then, come back again to the beginning of our talk? For the man who is affected in this way imagines that one thing which he knows is another thing which he knows. This we said was impossible, and by this very argument we were forcing false opinion out of existence, that the same man might not be forced to know and not know the same things at the same time.

THEAET. Very true.

soc. Then we must show that forming false opinion is something or other different from the interchange of thought and perception. For if it were that, we should never be deceived in abstract thoughts. But as the case now stands, either there is no false opinion or it is possible for a man not to know that which he knows. Which alternative will you choose?

THEAET. There is no possible choice, Socrates.

soc. And yet the argument is not likely to admit both. But still, since we must not shrink from any risk, what if we should try to do a shameless deed?

THEAET. What is it?
PLATO

των. Ἐθελήσαντες εἶπεῖν ποιῶν τι ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι.

Θεαί. Καὶ τί τούτο ἀναίσχυντον;

των. Ἕνωκας οὐκ ἐννοεῖν ὅτι πᾶς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος ξήτησις γέγονεν ἐπιστήμης, ὥς οὐκ εἰδόσι τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

Θεαί. Ἐννοῶ μὲν οὖν.

των. Ἐπεὶ τούτων ἀναίδες δοκεῖ, μὴ εἰδότας ἐπιστήμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἶον ἐστὶν; Ε ἅλλα γὰρ, οὐκ Θεαίτητε, πάλαι ἐσμὲν ἀνάπλεω τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι. μυριάκις γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ "γυγνώσκομεν" καὶ "οὐ γυγνώσκομεν", καὶ "ἐπιστάμεθα" καὶ "οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα," ὡς τι συνεντεῦσα ἀλλήλων ἐν ὅ ἐτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν· εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κεχρήμεθ' ἀδ ὅ τῷ "ἀγνοεῖν" τε καὶ "συνεῖναι," ὡς προσήκον αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, εἰπέρ στερόμεθα ἐπιστήμης.

Θεαί. ἅλλα τίνα τρόπων διαλέξει, ὡ Σώκρατες, τούτων ἀπεχμόενος;

197 των. Οὐδένα ὃν γε ὃς εἰμὶ· εἰ μέντοι ἢν ἀντιλογικός, οἷος ἄνήρ εἰ καὶ νῦν παρήν, τούτων τ' ἂν ἔφη ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν σφόδρ' ἂν ἅ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐπέπληττεν. ἐπείδη οὖν ἐσμὲν φαύλοι, βούλει τολμήσω εἰπεῖν οἶον ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; φαίνεται γάρ μοι προὕργον τι ἂν γενέσθαι.

Θεαί. Τόλμα τοῖνυν ἢ Ἀδε. τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπεχομένω σοι ἐσται πολλὴ συγγνώμη.

36. των. Ἀκήκοας οὖν ὃ νῦν λέγουσιν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι;

Θεαί. Ἰσως· οὐ μέντοι ἐν γε τῷ παρόντι μνημονεύσω.

Β των. Ἐπιστήμης ποι ἐξίν φασιν αὐτὸ εἶναι.

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soc. To undertake to tell what it really is to know.
THEAET. And why is that shameless?
soc. You seem not to remember that our whole talk from the beginning has been a search for knowledge, because we did not know what it is.
THEAET. Oh yes, I remember.
soc. Then is it not shameless to proclaim what it is to know, when we are ignorant of knowledge? But really, Theaetetus, our talk has been badly tainted with uncleanness all along; for we have said over and over again "we know" and "we do not know" and "we have knowledge" and "we have no knowledge," as if we could understand each other, while we were still ignorant of knowledge; and at this very moment, if you please, we have again used the terms "be ignorant" and "understand," as though we had any right to use them if we are deprived of knowledge.
THEAET. But how will you converse, Socrates, if you refrain from these words?
soc. Not at all, being the man I am; but I might if I were a real reasoner; if such a man were present at this moment he would tell us to refrain from these terms, and would criticize my talk scathingly. But since we are poor creatures, shall I venture to say what the nature of knowing is? For it seems to me that would be of some advantage.
THEAET. Venture it then, by Zeus. You shall have full pardon for not refraining from those terms.
soc. Have you heard what they say nowadays that knowing is?
THEAET. Perhaps; however, I don't remember just at this moment.
soc. They say it is having knowledge.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.
ΣΩ. Ἡμεῖς τοίνυν σμικρὸν μεταθώμεθα καὶ εἴπωμεν ἐπιστήμης κτῆσιν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί οὖν δή φῆσεις τοῦτο ἐκεῖνον διαφέρειν;
ΣΩ. Ἰσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὁ δ' οὖν δοκεῖ, ἄκοινσας συνδοκίμαζε.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐάντερ γε οἶδός τ' ὃ.
ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν μοι ταύτων φαίνεται τῶ κεκτησθαί τὸ ἔχειν. οἶδον εἰ' ἰμάτιον πριαμενὸς τις καὶ ἐγκρατής ὄν μὴ φοροί; ἐς ἔχειν μὲν οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ, κεκτήσθαι γε μὴν 3 φαίμεν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρθῶς γε.

C ΣΩ. Ὁρα δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰ δυνατὸν οὔτω κεκτησθένον μὴ ἔχειν, ἄλλ' ὅσπερ εἰ τις ὀρνιθὰς ἀγρίας, περιστερᾶς ἢ τι ἄλλο, θηρεύσας οὐκ οἷοι κατασκευαζόμενος περιστερέων τρέφοι. τρόπον μὲν γὰρ ἂν ποῦ τινα φαίμεν αὐτὸν αὐτὰς ἀεί ἔχειν, ὅτι δὴ κέκτηται. ἡ γὰρ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΩ. Τρόπον δὲ γ' ἄλλον οὐδεμίαν ἔχειν, ἄλλα δύναμιν μὲν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτάς παραγεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐν οἰκείῳ περιβόλῳ ὑποχειρίου ἐποιήτω. Δόσασε, λαβέω καὶ σχείν, ἐπειδὰν βουλῆται, θηρευσάμενος ἢν ἂν ἂεί ἑθέλῃ, καὶ πάλιν ἄφιεναι καὶ τούτο ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν, ὀποσάκις ἃν δοκῇ αὐτῷ.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.
ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὴ, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν κήρυκοι τι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατεσκευάζομεν οὐκ οἶδ' ὁ τι πλάσμα, νῦν αὖ ἐν ἑκάστῃ ψυχῇ ποιήσωμεν

1 εἰ vulg. ex emend. apogr. P; om. BTW.
2 φοροὶ vulg.; φορῶν b; φορῶ B; φορῷ TW.
3 γε μὴν W; γε δὴ B; γε T; δέ γε vulg.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. True.

soc. Let us make a slight change and say possessing knowledge.

THEAET. Why, how will you claim that the one differs from the other?

soc. Perhaps it doesn't; but first hear how it seems to me to differ, and then help me to test my view.

THEAET. I will if I can.

soc. Well, then, having does not seem to me the same as possessing. For instance, if a man bought a cloak and had it under his control, but did not wear it, we should certainly say, not that he had it, but that he possessed it.

THEAET. And rightly.

soc. Now see whether it is possible in the same way for one who possesses knowledge not to have it, as, for instance, if a man should catch wild birds—pigeons or the like—and should arrange an aviary at home and keep them in it, we might in a way assert that he always has them because he possesses them, might we not?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And yet in another way that he has none of them, but that he has acquired power over them, since he has brought them under his control in his own enclosure, to take them and hold them whenever he likes, by catching whichever bird he pleases, and to let them go again; and he can do this as often as he sees fit.

THEAET. That is true.

soc. Once more, then, just as a while ago we contrived some sort of a waxen figment in the soul, so now let us make in each soul an aviary stocked
περιστερεώνα τινα παντοδαπῶν ὅρνιθων, τὰς μὲν κατ' ἀγέλας οὕσας χωρίς τῶν ἄλλων, τὰς δὲ κατ' ὀλίγας, ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν ὅπη ἂν τύχωσι πετομένας.

Ε ὙΕΑΙ. Πεποιήθω δή. ἅλλα τί τοῦντεθείνες;

ΣΠ. Παιδίων μὲν ὀντὼν φάναι χρὴ εἶναι τούτῳ τὸ ἀγγεῖον κενὸν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν ὅρνιθων ἑπιστήμας νοῆσαι· ἢν δ᾿ ἂν ἑπιστήμην κτησάμενος καθείρξῃ εἰς τῶν περίβολον, φάναι αὐτὸν μεμαθηκέναι ἡ ἥφακέναι τὸ πράγμα οὔ ἢν αὐτὴ ἡ ἑπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἑπίστασθαι τοῦτ᾿ εἶναι.

ὙΕΑΙ. ἩΕστω.

198 ΣΠ. Τὸ τοῖνυν πάλιν ἢν ἂν βουληταί τῶν ἑπι-

στημῶν θηρεύει καὶ λαβόντα ἵσχευν καὶ αὐθες

ἀφιέναι, σκόπει τίνων δεῖται ὀνομάτων, εἰτε τῶν

αὐτῶν ἢν τὸ πρῶτον ὑπὲκτάτο εἴτε ἑτέρων.

μαθήσει δ᾿ ἐνθενδε.¹ σαφέστερον τί λέγω. ἀριθμη-

τικὴν μὲν γὰρ λέγεις τέχνην;

ὙΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΠ. Ταύτῃ δὴ ὑπόλαβε θήραν ἑπιστήμων ἀρ-

τίου τε καὶ περιττοῦ παντὸς.

ὙΕΑΙ. Ὕπολαμβάνω.

ΣΠ. Ταύτῃ δὴ, οἶμαι, τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτὸς τε ὑπο-

Β χειρίους τὰς ἑπιστήμας τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἔχει καὶ

ἄλλω παραδίδωσιν ὁ παραδιδοὺς.

ὙΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΠ. Καὶ καλοῦμεν γε παραδίδοντα μὲν διδά-

σκειν, παραλαμβάνοντα δὲ μανθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ

dὴ τῷ κεκτήσθαι ἐν τῷ περιστερεῶνι ἐκεῖνῳ ἑπίστασθαι.

¹ ἐνθενδε] ἐντεθει B.
with all sorts of birds, some in flocks apart from the
rest, others in small groups, and some solitary, flying
hither and thither among them all.

Theaet. Consider it done. What next?
	soc. We must assume that while we are children
this receptacle is empty, and we must understand
that the birds represent the varieties of knowledge.
And whatsoever kind of knowledge a person acquires
and shuts up in the enclosure, we must say that he
has learned or discovered the thing of which this is
the knowledge, and that just this is knowing.

Theaet. So be it.
	soc. Consider then what expressions are needed
for the process of recapturing and taking and holding
and letting go again whichever he please of the
kinds of knowledge, whether they are the same
expressions as those needed for the original acquisi-
tion, or others. But you will understand better by
an illustration. You admit that there is an art of
arithmetic?

Theaet. Yes.
	soc. Now suppose this to be a hunt after the
kinds of knowledge, or sciences, of all odd and
even numbers.

Theaet. I do so.
	soc. Now it is by this art, I imagine, that a man
has the sciences of numbers under his own control
and also that any man who transmits them to
another does this.

Theaet. Yes.
	soc. And we say that when anyone transmits
them he teaches, and when anyone receives them
he learns, and when anyone, by having acquired them,
has them in that aviary of ours, he knows them.
PLATO

θεαί. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

σπ. Τῶ δὲ δὴ ἐνετείθεν ἡδὴ πρόσοχες τὸν νοῦν.

ἀριθμητικὸς γὰρ ὄν τελέως ἄλλο τι πάντας ἀριθμοὺς

ἐπίσταται; πάντων γὰρ ἀριθμῶν εἰσὶν αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ

φυσῆ ἐπιστήμη.

θεαί. Τί μὴν;

C σπ. Ὡν δὲ τοιούτου ἀριθμοὶ οὖν ποτὲ τι ἢ

αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὰ ἡ ἄλλο τὶ τῶν ἔξω ὅσα ἔχει

ἀριθμὸν;

θεαί. Πῶς γὰρ οὖν;

σπ. Τὸ δὲ ἀριθμεῖν γε οὖν ἄλλο τι θέσομεν

τοῦ σκοπεῖσθαι πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει οὖν.

θεαί. Οὔτως.

σπ. Ὁ ἄρα ἐπίσταται, σκοποῦμεν φαίνεται

ὡς οὖσι εἰδῶς, ὅν ἁμολογήκαμεν ἀπαντα ἀριθμὸν

εἰδέναι. ἀκούεις γὰρ ποι τοιαύτας ἀμφιβολη-

tήσεις.

θεαί. Ἑγώγε

37. σπ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἀπεικάζοντες τῇ τῶν

D περιστερῶν κτῆσει τε καὶ θήρα ἐροῦμεν ὅτι διττῇ

ἡν ἡ θήρα, ἢ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτήσθαι τοῦ κεκτήσθαι

ἐνεκα· ἢ δὲ κεκτημένω τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν ἐν

ταῖς χερσὶν ἄ πάλαι ἐκέκτητο. οὔτως δὲ καὶ ὄν

πάλαι ἐπιστήμη ἴσαιν αὐτῷ μαθόντι καὶ 1 ἡπὶ-

στατο αὐτά, πάλιν ἐστὶ καταμανθάνειν ταῦτα

ταῦτα ἀναλαμβάνοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστου

καὶ ἰσχύσιν, ἢν ἐκέκτητο μὲν πάλαι, πρόχειρον

δ' οὖν εἶπε τῇ διανοίᾳ;

θεαί. Ἀληθῆ.

Ε σπ. Τούτο δὴ ἄρτι ἥρωτων, ὅπως χρῆ τοῖς

1 μαθόντι καὶ W; μαθόντι ΒΤ.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Now pay attention to what follows from this. Does not the perfect arithmetician understand all numbers; for he has the sciences of all numbers in his mind?

THEAET. To be sure.

soc. Then would such a man ever count anything —either any abstract numbers in his head, or any such external objects as possess number?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. But we shall affirm that counting is the same thing as considering how great any number in question is.

THEAET. We shall.

soc. Then he who by our previous admission knows all number is found to be considering that which he knows as if he did not know it. You have doubtless heard of such ambiguities.

THEAET. Yes, I have.

soc. Continuing, then, our comparison with the acquisition and hunting of the pigeons, we shall say that the hunting is of two kinds, one before the acquisition for the sake of possessing, the other carried on by the possessor for the sake of taking and holding in his hands what he had acquired long before. And just so when a man long since by learning came to possess knowledge of certain things, and knew them, he may have these very things afresh by taking up again the knowledge of each of them separately and holding it—the knowledge which he had acquired long before, but had not at hand in his mind?

THEAET. That is true.

soc. This, then, was my question just now: How
δνόμασι χρώμενον λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅταν ἀριθμητικῶς ἢ τι ἀναγνωσμένος ὁ γραμματικός, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάλιν ἔρχεται μαθησόμενος παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ ᾗ ἐπίστασαι;

ἡ θεὰ. Ἀλλ’ ἀτόμον, ὥς Σωκράτεις.

σο. Ἀλλ’ ἄ οὐκ ἐπίσταται φάμεν αὐτὸν ἀναγνώσεσθαι καὶ ἀριθμήσειν, δεδωκότες αὐτῷ πάντα μὲν γράμματα, πάντα δὲ ἀριθμὸν ἐπίστασθαι;

199 θεὰ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτ’ ἄλογον.

σο. Βούλει οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὅνομάτων οὐδὲν ἢμῖν μέλει, ὅπη τις καίρει ἐλκὼν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μανθάνειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὡρισάμεθα ἐτερον μὲν τι τὸ κεκτήσαθα τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἐτερον δὲ τὸ ἐχεὶν, ὅ μὲν τις ἔκτηται μὴ κεκτήσαθαι ἀδύνατον φάμεν εἶναι, ὡστε οὐδέποτε συμβαίνει ὅ τις οἶδεν μὴ εἰδέναι, ψευδῆ μὲντοι δόξαν οἶον τ’ εἶναι περὶ Β αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν; μὴ γὰρ ἐχεὶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τούτοις οἶον τε, ἄλλ’ ἔτεραν ἀντ’ ἐκείνης, ὅταν θηρεύων τινὰ ποῦ ποτ’ ἡ ἐπιστήμην διαπετομένων ἀνθ’ ἐτέρας ἐτέραν ἀμαρτῶν λάβη, τότε ἄρα τὰ ἐνδέκα δώδεκα οὐκ ηῇ εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἐνδεκα ἐπιστήμην ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβῶν τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἶον φάτταν ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς.

ἡ θεὰ. Ἐχει γὰρ οὖν λόγον.

σο. Ὅταν δὲ γε ἦν ἐπιγειρεῖ λαβεῖν λάβη, ἀφευδεῖν τε καὶ τὰ οὖν δοξάζειν τότε, καὶ οὐτως δὴ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τε καὶ ψευδῆ δόξαν, καὶ ὅν ἐν τοῖς Σ πρόσθεν ἐδυσχεραίνομεν οὐδέν ἐμποδῶν γίγνεσθαι; ὅσως οὖν μοι συμφήσεις. ἡ πῶς ποιήσεις;

1 ποῦ ποτ’ W; ἀν’ αὐτοῦ BT.
2 τότε W; ὑτε BT.

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THEAETETUS

should we express ourselves in speaking about them when an arithmetician undertakes to count or a man of letters to read something? In such a case shall we say that although he knows he sets himself to learn again from himself that which he knows?

THEAET. But that is extraordinary, Socrates.

soc. But shall we say that he is going to read or count that which he does not know, when we have granted that he knows all letters and all numbers?

THEAET. But that too is absurd.

soc. Shall we then say that words are nothing to us, if it amuses anyone to drag the expressions "know" and "learn" one way and another, but since we set up the distinction that it is one thing to possess knowledge and another thing to have it, we affirm that it is impossible not to possess what one possesses, so that it never happens that a man does not know that which he knows, but that it is possible to conceive a false opinion about it? For it is possible to have not the knowledge of this thing, but some other knowledge instead, when in hunting for some one kind of knowledge, as the various kinds fly about, he makes a mistake and catches one instead of another; so in one example he thought eleven was twelve, because he caught the knowledge of twelve, which was within him, instead of that of eleven, caught a ringdove, as it were, instead of a pigeon.

THEAET. Yes, that is reasonable.

soc. But when he catches the knowledge he intends to catch, he is not deceived and has true opinion, and so true and false opinion exist and none of the things which formerly annoyed us interferes? Perhaps you will agree to this; or what will you do?
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔτως.

ςν. Καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἃ ἐπίστανται μὴ ἐπὶ-

στασθαι ἀπηλλάγμεθα· ἃ γὰρ κεκτήμεθα μὴ

κεκτήσθαι οὐδαμοῦ ἐτί συμβαίνει, οὔτε ψευσθεὶσι

τινὸς οὔτε μή. δεινότερον μὲντοι πάθος ἄλλο

παραφαίνεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποιον;

ςν. Εἰ ἡ τῶν ἐπιστήμων μεταλλαγῆ ψευδῆς

γενήσεται ποτε δόξα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δή;

ὅς. Πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τινὸς ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην

τοῦτο αὐτῷ ἀγνοεῖν, μὴ ἀγνωσμοσύνη ἄλλα τῇ

ἔαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμης· ἔπειτα ἔτερον αὐτὸ ὁδό-

ζειν, τὸ δ' ἔτερον τοῦτο, πῶς οὐ πολλῆ ἄλογία,

ἐπιστήμης παραγενομένης γνῶναι μὲν τὴν ψυχήν

μηδέν, ἀγνοῆσαι δὲ πάντα; ἐκ γὰρ τούτου τοῦ

λόγου κωλύει οὐδὲν καὶ ἀγνοιαν παραγενομένην

γνῶναι τι ποιῆσαι καὶ τυφλότητα ἱδεῖν, εἴπερ

καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοῆσαι ποτὲ τινα ποιήσει.

Ε. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡσυς γὰρ, ὁ Σωκράτης, οὐ καλῶς τὰς

ὀρνιθὰς ἐτίθηκεν ἐπιστήμας μόνον τιθέντες, ἔδει

dὲ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνας τιθέναι ὁμοὶ συνδιαπε-

τομένας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὸν θηρεύοντα τοτὲ μὲν

ἐπιστήμην λαμβάνοντα, τοτὲ δ' ἀνεπιστημοσύνην

tοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι ψευδῆ μὲν δοξάζειν τῇ ἀνεπιστημο-

σύνη, ἀληθῆ δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.

ςν. Οὗ ῥαδίον γε, ὁ Θεαίτητε, μὴ ἐπαινεῖν σε·

δ' μέντοι εἴπες πάλιν ἐπίσκεψαι. ἔστω μὲν γὰρ

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THEAETETUS

THEAET. I will agree.

soc. Yes, for we have got rid of our difficulty about men not knowing that which they know; for we no longer find ourselves not possessing that which we possess, whether we are deceived about anything or not. However, another more dreadful disaster seems to be coming in sight.

THEAET. What disaster?

soc. If the interchange of kinds of knowledge should ever turn out to be false opinion.

THEAET. How so?

soc. Is it not the height of absurdity, in the first place for one who has knowledge of something to be ignorant of this very thing, not through ignorance but through his knowledge; secondly, for him to be of opinion that this thing is something else and something else is this thing — for the soul, when knowledge has come to it, to know nothing and be ignorant of all things? For by this argument there is nothing to prevent ignorance from coming to us and making us know something and blindness from making us see, if knowledge is ever to make us ignorant.

THEAET. Perhaps, Socrates, we were not right in making the birds represent kinds of knowledge only, but we ought to have imagined kinds of ignorance also flying about in the soul with the others; then the hunter would catch sometimes knowledge and sometimes ignorance of the same thing, and through the ignorance he would have false, but through the knowledge true opinion.

soc. It is not easy, Theaetetus, to refrain from praising you. However, examine your suggestion once more. Let it be as you say: the man who
200 ὡς λέγεις· ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην λαβὼν
ψευδὴ μὲν, φής, δοξάσει. ἢ γάρ;
θεαί. Ναι.
συ. Οὐ δὴ ποιοῦ καὶ ἡγησεται γε ψευδη δοξάζειν.
θεαί. Πῶς γάρ;
συ. 'Αλλ' ἄληθὴ γε, καὶ ὡς εἰδὼς διακείσεται
περὶ δὲν ἐξευσταί.
θεαί. Τί μὴν;
συ. 'Επιστήμην ἥρα οὐσεται τεθηρευκὼς ἔχειν,
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην.
θεαί. Δήλον.
συ. Οὐκοῦν μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ
tὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν. ὁ γάρ ἐλεγκτικὸς
Β ἐκεῖνος γελάσας φῆσει· "πότερον, ὁ βέλτιστοι,
ἀμφοτέρας τις εἰδῶς, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ἀνεπιστη-
μοσύνην, ἢν οἶδεν, ἐτέραν αὐτὴν οἴσετα τινα ἐίναι
ὦν οἶδεν; ἢ οὐδετέραν αὐτῶν ἕνεκεν, ἢν μὴ οἶδε,
δοξάζει ἐτέραν ὃν οὐκ οἶδεν; ἢ τὴν μὲν εἰδῶς,
tὴν δ' οὗ, ἢν οἶδεν, ἢν μὴ οἶδεν; ἢ ἢν μὴ οἶδεν,
ἢν οἶδεν ἡγεῖται; ἢ πάλιν αὐτοὶ μοι ἐρείτε ὅτι τῶν
ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνων εἰδὸν αὐ ἐπιστήμαι,
ἂν ὁ κεκτημένος ἐν ἐτέροις τυμποιοις περιστε-
C ῥεῶσιν ἡ κηρύνους πλάσμασι καθείρζας, ἐωσπερ
ἂν κεκτηται ἐπίσταται, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ προχείρους
ἐχῆ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; καὶ οὔτω δὴ ἀναγκασθῇ-
σεσθε εἰς ταύτων περιτρέχειν μυριάκος οὐδὲν πλέον
ποιοῦντες;" τί πρὸς ταῦτα, ὡ Θεαίτητε, ἀπο-
κρινούμεθα;

1 αὐτῶν] αὐτὴν BT; om. W.
catches the ignorance will, you say, have false opinion. Is that it?

THEAETUS

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. But surely he will not also think that he has false opinion.

THEAETUS

THEAET. Certainly not.

SOC. No, but true opinion, and will have the attitude of knowing that about which he is deceived.

THEAETUS

THEAET. Of course.

SOC. Hence he will fancy that he has caught, and has, knowledge, not ignorance.

THEAETUS

THEAET. Evidently.

SOC. Then, after our long wanderings, we have come round again to our first difficulty. For the real reasoner will laugh and say, "Most excellent Sirs, does a man who knows both knowledge and ignorance think that one of them, which he knows, is another thing which he knows; or, knowing neither of them, is he of opinion that one, which he does not know, is another thing which he does not know; or, knowing one and not the other, does he think that the one he does not know is the one he knows; or that the one he knows is the one he does not know? Or will you go on and tell me that there are kinds of knowledge of the kinds of knowledge and of ignorance, and that he who possesses these kinds of knowledge and has enclosed them in some sort of other ridiculous aviaries or waxen figments, knows them, so long as he possesses them, even if he has them not at hand in his soul? And in this fashion are you going to be compelled to trot about endlessly in the same circle without making any progress?" What shall we reply to this, Theaetetus?
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί', ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἔχω τί χρὴ λέγειν.

ΣΠ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἦμῖν, ὁ παῖ, καλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐπιπλήττει, καὶ ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψευδὴ δόξαν προτέραν ζητοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης, ἐκείνην ἄφεν·

Δ ἑντες; τὸ δ' ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον γνῶναι, πρὶν ἂν τις ἐπιστήμην ἰκανῶς λάβῃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη, ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὡς λέγεις οἴεσθαι.

38. ΣΠ. Τί οὖν τις ἔρει πάλιν εξ άρχῆς ἐπιστήμης; οὐ γάρ ποι ἀπεροῦμεν γέ πω;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡκίστα, ἐάνπερ μὴ σὺ γε ἀπαγορεύῃς.

ΣΠ. Λέγε δή, τί ἂν αὐτὸ μάλιστα εἰπόντες ἡκίστῃ ἂν ἦμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιωθείμεν;

ΕΠΕΧΕΙΡΟΔΕΥΣ. ὁ Σῶκρατες, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε ἀλλο οὐδέν.

ΣΠ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὴν ἀληθὴν δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. ἀναμάρτητον γέ ποι ἐστὶν τὸ δοξάζειν ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὰ υπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ γίγνεται.

ΣΠ. Ὅ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος, ὁ Θεαῖτης, ἐφ' ἄρα δείξεων αὐτῷ· καὶ τοῦτο ἔαν ἵνας ἐρευνῶμεν, τὰχ' ἂν ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὐτὸ 201 φήμειν τὸ ζητοῦμεν, μένουσι δὲ δῆλον οὐδέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁρθῶς λέγεις· ἀλλ' ἰσομέν γε καὶ σκοπῶμεν.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. By Zeus, Socrates, I don’t know what to say.
soc. Then, my boy, is the argument right in rebuking us and in pointing out that we were wrong to abandon knowledge and seek first for false opinion? It is impossible to know the latter until we have adequately comprehended the nature of knowledge.

THEAET. As the case now stands, Socrates, we cannot help thinking as you say.
soc. To begin, then, at the beginning once more, what shall we say knowledge is? For surely we are not going to give it up yet, are we?

THEAET. Not by any means, unless, that is, you give it up.
soc. Tell us, then, what definition will make us contradict ourselves least.

THEAET. The one we tried before, Socrates; at any rate, I have nothing else to offer.
soc. What one?

THEAET. That knowledge is true opinion; for true opinion is surely free from error and all its results are fine and good.
soc. The man who was leading the way through the river,¹ Theaetetus, said: “The result itself will show;” and so in this matter, if we go on with our search, perhaps the thing will turn up in our path and of itself reveal the object of our search; but if we stay still, we shall discover nothing.

THEAET. You are right; let us go on with our investigation.

¹ A man who was leading the way through a river was asked if the water was deep. He replied αὐτὸ δεῖξῃ, “the event itself will show” (i.e. you can find out by trying). The expression became proverbial.
PLATO

ση. Οὐκοῦν τούτο γε βραχείας σκέψεως· τέχνη γάρ σοι ὀλη σημαίνει μή εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ.

Θεαί. Πώς δή; καὶ τίς αὕτη;

ση. Ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν, οὕς δὴ καλοῦσιν ῥήτοράς τε καὶ δικαικούσιν. οὗτοι γάρ ποι τῇ ἐαυτῶν τέχνη πείθουσιν οὐ διδάσκοντες, ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποιοῦντες ἃ ἂν βούλωνται. ἢ σὺ οἶει δεινοῖς τινας οὕτω διδασκάλους εἶναι, ὡστε οἷς Β μὴ παρεγένοντό τινες ἀποστερομένους χρήματα ἢ τι ἄλλο βιαζομένους, τούτοις ¹ δύνασθαι πρὸς ὑδωρ σμικρὸν διδάξαι ἰκανῶς τῶν γενομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν;

Θεαί. Οὐδαμῶς ἐγὼγε οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πεῖςα μέν.

ση. Τὸ πεῖσαι δ' οὐχὶ δοξάσαι λέγεις ποιῆσαι;

Θεαί. Τί μήν;

ση. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαῖως πεισθῶσιν δικασταί περὶ δὲν ἰδόντι ² μόνον ἑστὶν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μή, ταύτα τότε εξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθὴν δόξαν Σ λαβόντες, ἀνευ ἐπιστήμης ἐκριναν, ὀρθὰ πεισθέντες, εἰπέρ εὖ ἐδίκασαν;

Θεαί. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ση. Οὐκ ἂν, ὦ φίλε, εἰ γε ταύτων ἢν δόξα τε ἀληθῆς κατὰ ³ δικαστήρια ⁴ καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὀρθὰ ποτ' ἂν δικαστῆς ἄκρος ἐδοξάζεν ἀνευ ἐπιστήμης· νῦν δὲ ἐοικεν ἄλλο τι ἐκάτερον εἶναι.


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soc. Well, then, this at least calls for slight investigation; for you have a whole profession which declares that true opinion is not knowledge.

theaet. How so? What profession is it?

soc. The profession of those who are greatest in wisdom, who are called orators and lawyers; for they persuade men by the art which they possess, not teaching them, but making them have whatever opinion they like. Or do you think there are any teachers so clever as to be able, in the short time allowed by the water-clock,\(^1\) satisfactorily to teach the judges the truth about what happened to people who have been robbed of their money or have suffered other acts of violence, when there were no eyewitneses?

theaet. I certainly do not think so; but I think they can persuade them.

soc. And persuading them is making them have an opinion, is it not?

theaet. Of course.

soc. Then when judges are justly persuaded about matters which one can know only by having seen them and in no other way, in such a case, judging of them from hearsay, having acquired a true opinion of them, they have judged without knowledge, though they are rightly persuaded, if the judgement they have passed is correct, have they not?

theaet. Certainly.

soc. But, my friend, if true opinion and knowledge were the same thing in law courts, the best of judges could never have true opinion without knowledge; in fact, however, it appears that the two are different.

\(^1\) The length of speeches in the Athenian law courts was limited by a water-clock.
Οι εν ευώ, ὁ Σωκρατες, ἐπόντος τού ἀκούσας ἐπελεληφήσημην, νῦν δ' ἐννοῶ· ἔφη δὲ τῆς μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι,

Ωι ἀλογὸν ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ ὃν μὲν μὴ ἐστὶ λόγος, οὐκ ἐπιστήμη αἰνεῖ, οὕτως καὶ ὄνομά-ζων, ἀ δ' ἔχει, ἐπιστήμη.

ὁν. Ὡς καλῶς λέγεις. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστήμη ταὐτὰ καὶ μὴ πὴ διῆρει, λέγε, εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ σὺ τε κάγω ἄκηκόαμεν.

ὁει. Ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδα εἰ ἔξευρήσω· λέγοντος μὲν' ἂν ἑτέρου, ὡς ἐγώμαι, ἀκολοθήσαιμ' ἂν. ¹

39. ὁν. Ἀκονε δὴ ὁναρ ἀντὶ ὁνείρατος. ἐγὼ Ἐ γὰρ αὐ ἐδόκουν ἀκούσων τινῶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρώτα οἰονύπερι στοιχεῖα, εἷς δὲν ἦμεῖς τέ συγκείμεθα καὶ τάλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι. αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐκα-στον ὀνομάσαι μόνον εἰς, προσεπείν δὲ οὐδὲν ἀλλο δυνατὸν, οὐθ' ὡς ἐστὶν, οὐθ' ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶν.

202 ἡδῆ γὰρ ἂν οὐσίαν ἡ μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῇ προστίθεσθαι, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν προσφέρειν, έτερπ αὐτὸ ἐκείνω μόνων τις ἑρεί. ἐπει οὐδὲ τὸ "αὐτὸ" οὐδὲ τὸ "ἐκείνω" οὐδὲ τὸ "ἐκαστὸν" οὐδὲ τὸ "μόνων" οὐδὲ "τοῦτο" προσοιστεόν οὐδ' ἄλλα πολλα τοιαύτα·

ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι, ἐτέρα ὑντα ἐκείνων οἶς προστίθεται, δεῖν δὲ, έτερπ ἵπ δυνατὸν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ έις οἰκείον αὐτοῦ λόγον, ἄνευ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀπάντων λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὅτι οὐθὸν τῶν πρώτων ῥηθήναι

¹ ἀκολοθήσαιμ' ἂν Schanz; ἀκολοθήσαιμ' ΒΤ; ἀκολοθήσαιμ' al.

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THEAETETUS

THEAET. Oh yes, I remember now, Socrates, having heard someone make the distinction, but I had forgotten it. He said that knowledge was true opinion accompanied by reason, but that unreasoning true opinion was outside of the sphere of knowledge; and matters of which there is not a rational explanation are unknowable—yes, that is what he called them—and those of which there is are knowable.

soc. I am glad you mentioned that. But tell us how he distinguished between the knowable and the unknowable, that we may see whether the accounts that you and I have heard agree.

THEAET. But I do not know whether I can think it out; but if someone else were to make the statement of it, I think I could follow.

soc. Listen then, while I relate it to you—"a dream for a dream." I in turn used to imagine that I heard certain persons say that the primary elements of which we and all else are composed admit of no rational explanation; for each alone by itself can only be named, and no qualification can be added, neither that it is nor that it is not, for that would at once be adding to it existence or non-existence, whereas we must add nothing to it, if we are to speak of that itself alone. Indeed, not even "itself" or "that" or "each" or "alone" or "this" or anything else of the sort, of which there are many, must be added; for these are prevalent terms which are added to all things indiscriminately and are different from the things to which they are added; but if it were possible to explain an element, and it admitted of a rational explanation of its own, it would have to be explained apart from everything else. But in fact none of the primal elements can be ex-
Βλόγως· ου γαρ είναι αυτώ ἄλλ' ἢ ὄνομάξεσθαι μόνον· ονόμα γαρ μόνον ἔχειν· τά δέ ἐκ τούτων ἡδη συγκείμενα, ἀσπερ αυτά πεπλεκται, οὕτω καὶ τά ὄνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλακέντα λόγον γεγονέναι· ὄνομάτων γάρ συμπλοκήν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν. οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα καὶ ἀγνώστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δὲ· τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνωστὰς τε καὶ ῥητὰς καὶ ἀληθεῖ δόξη δοξαστάς· ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἀνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν τινὸς

C τις λάβῃ, ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ αυτὸ, γιγνώσκειν δ' οὐ· τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον δοῦναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τούτον· προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατὸν τε ταῦτα πάντα γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν. οὕτως οὐ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἢ ἄλλως ἀκήκοας;

ὅει. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν παντάπασιν.

ἴ. Ἀρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταῦτη, δόξαν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι;

ὅει. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

D οὐ. Ἀρ' ὥστε ἢ καὶ ὑπέριτητος, νῦν οὕτω τῆι ημέρα εἰλήφαμεν δ' πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ξητοῦντες πρὶν εὑρεῖν κατεγράσαν;

ὅει. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὥς Σωκράτες, καλῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν.

ἴ. Καὶ εἰκόσις γε αὐτὸ τούτο οὕτως ἔχειν· τίς γάρ ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰῆ χωρίς τοῦ λόγου τε καὶ ὀρθῆς δόξης· ἐν μέντοι τί με τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀπαρέσκει.

ὅει. Τὸ ποίον δή;
pressed by reason; they can only be named, for they have only a name; but the things composed of these are themselves complex, and so their names are complex and form a rational explanation; for the combination of names is the essence of reasoning. Thus the elements are not objects of reason or of knowledge, but only of perception, whereas the combinations of them are objects of knowledge and expression and true opinion. When therefore a man acquires without reasoning the true opinion about anything, his mind has the truth about it, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give and receive a rational explanation of a thing is without knowledge of it; but when he has acquired also a rational explanation he may possibly have become all that I have said and may now be perfect in knowledge. Is that the version of the dream you have heard, or is it different?

THEAET. That was it exactly.

soc. Are you satisfied, then, and do you state it in this way, that true opinion accompanied by reason is knowledge?

THEAET. Precisely.

soc. Can it be, Theaetetus, that we now, in this casual manner, have found out on this day what many wise men have long been seeking and have grown grey in the search?

THEAET. I, at any rate, Socrates, think our present statement is good.

soc. Probably this particular statement is so; for what knowledge could there still be apart from reason and right opinion? One point, however, in what has been said is unsatisfactory to me.

THEAET. What point?
πω. "Ο καὶ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι κομψότατα, ὡς τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἀγνωστα, τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος Εὐγνωστόν.

ΤΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν ὑβῆς;

πω. Ἰστέον δή: ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁμήρους ἔχομεν τοῦ λόγου τὰ παραδείγματα, οἷς χρώμενος εἶπε πάντα ταῦτα.

ΤΕΑΙ. Ποίᾳ δή;

πω. Τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖά τε καὶ συλλαβάς. ἢ οἷς ἀλλοσε ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα εἰπέων τὸν εἰπόντα ἄ λέγομεν;

ΤΕΑΙ. Οὐκ, ἄλλο εἰς ταῦτα.

203 40. πω. Βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, οὕτως ἢ οὐχ οὕτως γράμματα ἐμάθομεν. φέρε πρῶτον ἀρ' αἱ μὲν συλλαβαῖς λόγου ἔχουσι, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄλογα;

ΤΕΑΙ. Ἰσως.

πω. Πάνω μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. Σωκράτους γοῦν εἰ τις ἔροιτο τὴν πρῶτην συλλαβήν οὕτωσι: "ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγε τί ἐστι σω;" τί ἀποκρινεῖ;

ΤΕΑΙ. Ὄτι σίγμα καὶ ὁ.

πω. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτον ἔχεις λόγον τῆς συλλαβῆς;

ΤΕΑΙ. Ἐγώγε.

Β πω. Ἰθι δή, οὕτως εἰπὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ σίγμα λόγον.

ΤΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς τοῦ στοιχείου τις ἐρεῖ στοιχεῖα; καὶ γὰρ δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ τε σίγμα τῶν ἀφώνων
soc. Just that which seems to be the cleverest; the assertion that the elements are unknowable and the class of combinations is knowable.

THEAET. Is that not right?

soc. We are sure to find out, for we have as hostages the examples which he who said all this used in his argument.

THEAET. What examples?

soc. The elements in writing, the letters of the alphabet, and their combinations, the syllables; or do you think the author of the statements we are discussing had something else in view?

THEAET. No; those are what he had in view.

soc. Let us, then, take them up and examine them, or rather, let us examine ourselves and see whether it was in accordance with this theory, or not, that we learned letters. First then, the syllables have a rational explanation, but the letters have not?

THEAET. I suppose so.

soc. I think so, too, decidedly. Now if anyone should ask about the first syllable of Socrates; “Theaetetus, tell me, what is SO?” What would you reply?

THEAET. I should say “S and O.”

soc. This, then, is your explanation of the syllable?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Come now, in the same manner give me the explanation of the S.

THEAET. How can one give any elements of an element? For really, Socrates, the S is a voiceless

1 Στοιχείον and συλλαβή, originally general terms for element and combination, became the common words for letter and syllable.
PLATO

ἐστὶ, ψόφος τις μόνον, οἷον συμπτούσης τῆς γλώττης· τού δ' αὖ βῆτα οὔτε φωνή οὔτε ψόφος, οὔτε τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων· ἂστε πάνω εὖ ἔχει τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὰ ἄλογα, ὥν γε τὰ ἐναργεῖστατα αὐτὰ τὰ ἑπτά φωνῆς μόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὐδ’ ὄντινοιν.

ςν. Τοιτὶ μὲν ἀρα, δὲ ἐταῖρε, κατωρθώκαμεν περὶ ἐπιστήμης.

 theano. Φαινόμεθα.

ςν. Τί δὲ; τὸ μὴ γνωστὸν εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον, ἀλλὰ τὴν συλλαβὴν ἄρ’ ὀρθῶς ἀποδεδείγμεθα;

 theano. Εἰκός γε.

ςν. Φέρε δὴ, τὴν συλλαβὴν πότερον λέγωμεν 1 τὰ ἀμφότερα στοιχεία, καὶ ἐὰν πλεῖον ἢ ἢ δύο, τὰ πάντα, ἢ μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν γεγονοῦναν συντεθέντων αὐτῶν;

 theano. Τὰ ἀπαντα ἐμοίγε δοκοῦμεν.

ςν. Ὅρα δὴ ἐπὶ δυοῦν, σύγμα καὶ ὁ ἀμφότερά ἐστιν ἢ πρώτη συλλαβὴ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὅνοματος. ἄλλο τὸ γιγνώσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει;

 theano. Τί μὴν;

ςν. Τὸ σύγμα καὶ τὸ ὃ ἁρα γιγνώσκει.

 theano. Ναι.

ςν. Τί δ’; ἐκάτερον ἄρ’ ἄγνωει, καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰδῶς ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει;

 theano. Ἀλλὰ δεινὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ὁ Σωκράτης.

ςν. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἰ γε ἀνάγκῃ ἐκάτερον γιγνώσκειν, εἴπερ ἀμφότερά τις γνώσεται, προγιγνώσκειν

1 λέγωμεν B; λέγομεν T et al.
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letter, a mere noise, as of the tongue hissing; B again has neither voice nor noise, nor have most of the other letters; and so it is quite right to say that they have no explanation, seeing that the most distinct of them, the seven vowels, have only voice, but no explanation whatsoever.

soc. In this point, then, my friend, it would seem that we have reached a right conclusion about knowledge.

THEAET. I think we have.

soc. But have we been right in laying down the principle that whereas the letter is unknowable, yet the syllable is knowable?

THEAET. Probably.

soc. Well then, shall we say that the syllable is the two letters, or, if there be more than two, all of them, or is it a single concept that has arisen from their combination?

THEAET. I think we mean all the letters it contains.

soc. Now take the case of two, S and O. The two together are the first syllable of my name. He who knows it knows the two letters, does he not?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. He knows, that is, the S and the O.

THEAET. Yes.

soc. How is that? He is ignorant of each, and knowing neither of them he knows them both?

THEAET. That is monstrous and absurd, Socrates.

soc. And yet if a knowledge of each letter is necessary before one can know both, he who is

1 The distinction here made is that which we make between vowels and consonants. The seven Greek vowels are α, ε, η, ι, ο, ο, ω, called φωνητα.
tà stoicheía apasa anagkē tō melloventi pote gnwseothai sullabhēn, kai ouτwς ἢμιν ὁ kalos lógos apostedraκwς oixhsetai.

Ε θεαί. Kai malα ge e̱ξαιφνης.

ση. Οὔ γὰρ καλῶς αὐτὸν φυλάττομεν. χρην γὰρ ἵνως τὴν sullabhēn tithetōn μὴ τὰ stoicheia, ἀλλ' εἰς ἐκείνων ἐν τι γεγονός εἴδος, ἵδεαν μιάν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἕχον, ἑτερον δὲ τῶν stoicheiōn.

θεαί. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ τάχα γ' ἄν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἥ' κείνως ἔχοι.

ση. Σκεπτέον καὶ οὗ προδοτέον οὕτως ἀν-ἀνάφρως μέγαν τε καὶ σεμύνον λόγον.

θεαί. Οὔ γὰρ οὖν.

204 ση. Ἐχέτω δὴ ὡς νῦν φαμεν, μία ἴδεα ε疱 ἐκάστων τῶν συναρμοττόντων stoicheiōn γιγνο-μένη ἡ sullabhē, ὀμοίως ἐν τῇ γράμμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις ἀπασι.

θεαί. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ση. Οὐκοδον μέρη αὐτῆς οὗ δεῖ εἶναι.

θεαί. Τί δή;

ση. Ὑπτι οὗ ἂν ἡ μέρη, τὸ οὖν ἀνάγκη ὁτα πάντα μέρη εἶναι. ἡ καὶ τὸ οὖν ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονός ἐν τῇ εἰδος ἑτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν;

θεαί. Ἕγγυε.

ση. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πᾶν καὶ τὸ οὖν πότερον ταυτὸν
Β καλεῖς ἢ ἑτερον ἐκάτερον;

θεαί. Ἕχω μὲν οὐδὲν σαφές, ὡτὶ δὲ κελεύεις prothumous apokrīnασθαι, parakinveinoun lēgον ὅτι ἑτερον.

ση. Ἡ μὲν prothumia, ὡθεάτητε, ὁρθή· εἰ
dė kai ἥ ἀπόκρισις, sketpeteon.

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ever to know a syllable must certainly know the letters first, and so our fine theory will have run away and vanished!

THEAET. And very suddenly, too.

SOC. Yes, for we are not watching it carefully. Perhaps we ought to have said that the syllable is not the letters, but a single concept that has arisen from them, having a single form of its own, different from the letters.

THEAET. Certainly; and perhaps that will be better than the other way.

SOC. Let us look into that; we must not give up in such unmanly fashion a great and impressive theory.

THEAET. No, we must not.

SOC. Let it be, then, as we say now, that the syllable or combination is a single form arising out of the several conjoined elements, and that it is the same in words and in all other things.

THEAET. Certainly.

SOC. Therefore there must be no parts of it.

THEAET. How so?

SOC. Because if there are parts of anything, the whole must inevitably be all the parts; or do you assert also that the whole that has arisen out of the parts is a single concept different from all the parts?

THEAET. Yes, I do.

SOC. Do you then say that all and the whole are the same, or that each of the two is different from the other?

THEAET. I am not sure; but you tell me to answer boldly, so I take the risk and say that they are different.

SOC. Your boldness, Theaetetus, is right; but whether your answer is so remains to be seen.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Δεῖ δὲ γε δή. 1

41. ΞΝ. Οὐκοῦν διαφέρει αὖ τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντὸς, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΝ. Τί δὲ δῆ; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐσθ' ὁ τι διαφέρει; οἶον ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν ἐν, δύο, τρία, έτέσσαρα, πέντε, ἕξ, καὶ ἔαν δῖς τρία ἢ τρίς δύο ἢ τέσσαρά τε καὶ δύο ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἕν, πότερον ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἑτερον λέγομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ αὐτὸ.

ΞΝ. Ἀρ' ἄλλο τι ἢ ἑξ; 

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΞΝ. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἐκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ 2 ἐξ εἰρήκαμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΝ. Πάλιν δ' οὐχ ἐν 3 λέγομεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΞΝ. Ἡ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὰ ἑξ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΔΞΝ. Ταῦτον ἄρα ἐν γε τοῖς ὑσα ἐξ ἄριθμοῦ ἐστὶ, τὸ τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἀπαντα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΞΝ. Ὡδε δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγομεν. δ' τοῦ πλέθρον ἄριθμός καὶ τὸ πλέθρον ταῦτόν. ἡ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΝ. Καὶ ὁ τοῦ σταδίου δὴ ὡσαύτως.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΝ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ τοῦ στρατοπέδου γε καὶ τὸ

1 δὲ γε δὴ BT; γε δὴ W.
2 πάντα τὰ BT; πάντα W.
3 πάλιν δ' οὐχ ἐν Hermann; πάλινδ' οὐδὲν BT; πάν δ' οὐδὲν Burnet, after Campbell.

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THEAET. Yes, certainly, we must see about that.

soc. The whole, then, according to our present view, would differ from all?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. How about this? Is there any difference between all in the plural and all in the singular? For instance, if we say one, two, three, four, five, six, or twice three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we in all these forms speaking of the same or of different numbers?

THEAET. Of the same.

soc. That is, of six?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Then in each form of speech we have spoken of all the six?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And again do we not speak of one thing when we speak of them all?

THEAET. Assuredly.

soc. That is, of six?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Then in all things that are made up of number, we apply the same term to all in the plural and all in the singular?

THEAET. Apparently.

soc. Here is another way of approaching the matter. The number of the fathom and the fathom are the same, are they not?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And of the furlong likewise.

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And the number of the army is the same
στρατόπεδου, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμοίως; ὁ γὰρ ἄριθμὸς πᾶς τὸ ὁν πᾶν ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν ἐστὶν.

τὰ δὲ ἐκαστῶν ἄριθμὸς μᾶν ἀλλο τῇ Ἔ μέρῃ ἐστὶν;

τὰ δὲ γε πάντα μέρη τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὁμολόγηται, εἰπέρ καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἄριθμὸς τὸ πᾶν ἐσται.

τὸ ὅλον ἀρ’ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν γὰρ ἂν εἶπ τὰ πάντα ὁν μέρη.

Μέρος δ’ ἐσθ’ ὁτού ἀλλο ἐστὶν ὀπερ ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ὅλου;

Τοῦ παντός γε.

Ανδρικῶς γε, ὑ Θεαίτητε, μάχει. τὸ πᾶν δὲ οὐχ ὅταν μηδὲν ἀπῆ, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστὶν;

Ἀνάγκη.

Ὀλον δὲ οὐ ταυτὸν τοῦτο ἐσται, ὥ τ ἂν ἡ-

Δαμὴ μηδὲν ἀποστατῆ, οὐ δ’ ἂν ἀποστάτη, οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε πᾶν, ἀμι γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτό;

Δοκεὶ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλον.

Ὀλοῦν ἐλέγομεν ὅτι οὐ ἂν μέρη ἡ, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἐσται;

Πάνυ γε.

1 ὁμολόγηται Τ; ὁμολογεῖται Β.
as the army, and all such cases are alike? In each of them all the number is all the thing.

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And is the number of each anything but the parts of each?

THEAET. No.

soc. Everything that has parts, accordingly, consists of parts, does it not?

THEAET. Evidently.

soc. But we are agreed that the all must be all the parts if all the number is to be the all.²

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Then the whole does not consist of parts, for if it consisted of all the parts it would be the all.

THEAET. That seems to be true.

soc. But is a part a part of anything in the world but the whole?

THEAET. Yes, of the all.

soc. You are putting up a brave fight, Theaetetus. But is not the all precisely that of which nothing is wanting?

THEAET. Necessarily.

soc. And is not just this same thing, from which nothing whatsoever is lacking, a whole? For that from which anything is lacking is neither a whole nor all, which have become identical simultaneously and for the same reason.

THEAET. I think now that there is no difference between all and whole.

soc. We were saying, were we not, that if there are parts of anything, the whole and all of it will be all the parts?

THEAET. Certainly.

¹ Cf. 204 B.
PLATO

ςω. Πάλων δή, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν, οὐκ, εἰπερ ἡ συλλαβὴ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐστὶν, ἀνάγκη αὐτήν.

Β μή ὡς μέρη ἔχειν ἐαυτῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἡ ταῦταν οὕσαν αὐτοὶς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι;

ὥς. Οὕτως.

ςω. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἔνα μὴ γένηται, ἔτερον αὐτῶν αὐτὴν ἐθέμεθα;

ὥς. Ναῖ.

ςω. Τί δὲ; εἰ μή τὰ στοιχεῖα συλλαβῆς μέρη ἐστίν, ἔχεις ἄλλ' ἀττα εἰπεῖν ἃ μέρη μὲν ἐστὶ συλλαβῆς, οὐ μέντοι στοιχεῖά γ' ἐκείνης;

ὥς. Οὐδαμῶς. εἰ γάρ, ὃ Σώκρατες, μόρι' ἀττα αὐτῆς συγχωροῖν, γελοίον ποι ἑκεῖνα στοιχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπ' ἄλλα ἴέναι.

ἑ. Παντάπασι δή, ὁ Θεαίτητε, κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον μία τις ἱδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβὴ ἄν εἰη.

ὥς. ἩΕοικεν.

ςω. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὃ φίλε, ὅτι ὄλιγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἤγομενοι εὐ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τῶν πρῶτων οὖκ εἰη λόγος εξ ὧν τάλλα σύγκειται, διότι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν εὐη ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ "εἰναι," περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ἔχοι προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ "τοῦτο," ὃς ἐτερα καὶ ἀλλότρια λεγόμενα, καὶ αὐτὴ δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἀλογον τε καὶ ἀγνωστὸν αὐτὸ ποιοὶ;

ὥς. Μέμνησαι.

Ἱ. Οὖν ἄλλη τις ἡ αὐτὴ ἡ αἰτία τοῦ μονο- εἰδές τε καὶ ἀμέριστον αὐτὸ εἶναι; ἐγώ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶ ἄλλην.

1 μόρι' ἀττα αὐτῆς W; μόρια ταύτης BT.

2 τε W in ras. B; τι.Τ.
soc. Once more, then, as I was trying to say just now, if the syllable is not the letters, does it not follow necessarily that it contains the letters, not as parts of it, or else that being the same as the letters, it is equally knowable with them?

THEAET. It does.

soc. And it was in order to avoid this that we assumed that it was different from them?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Well then, if the letters are not parts of the syllable, can you mention any other things which are parts of it, but are not the letters\(^1\) of it?

THEAET. Certainly not. For if I grant that there are parts of the syllable, it would be ridiculous to give up the letters and look for other things as parts.

soc. Without question, then, Theaetetus, the syllable would be, according to our present view, some indivisible concept.

THEAET. I agree.

soc. Do you remember, then, my friend, that we admitted a little while ago, on what we considered good grounds, that there can be no rational explanation of the primary elements of which other things are composed, because each of them, when taken by itself, is not composite, and we could not properly apply to such an element even the expression "be" or "this," because these terms are different and alien, and for this reason it is irrational and unknowable?

THEAET. I remember.

soc. And is not this the sole reason why it is single in form and indivisible? I can see no other.

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\(^1\) The reader is reminded that the words στοιχεῖον and συλλαβή have the meanings "element" and "combination" as well as "letter" and "syllable."
PLATO

θεαί. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται.

ση. Οὐκοῦν εἰς ταύτων ἐμπέπτυκεν ἡ συλλαβὴ ἐἶδος ἐκεῖνῳ, εἴπερ μέρη τε μὴ ἔχει καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἴδεια;

θεαί. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ση. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἡ συλλαβὴ ἐστὶν καὶ ὅλου τι, μέρη δ' αὐτῆς ταύτα, ὁμοίως αἱ τε συλλαβαί γνωσται καὶ βηταί καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπείπερ τὰ πάντα μέρη τῷ ὅλῳ ταύτῳ ἐφάνη.

Ε ṿθεαί. Καὶ μάλα.

ση. Εἰ δὲ γε ἐν τε καὶ ἀμερές, ὁμοίως μὲν συλλαβὴ, ὡσαυτῶς δὲ στοιχεῖον ἀλογὸν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον ἡ γὰρ αὐτῇ αἰτία ποιήσει αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα.

θεαί. Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως εἰπεῖν.

ση. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα μὴ ἀποδεχώμεθα, δεῖ ὅν λέγῃ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστὸν ¹ καὶ βητόν, στοιχεῖον δὲ τούναντίον.

θεαί. Μὴ γάρ, εἴπερ τῷ λόγῳ πειθόμεθα.

206 ση. Τὸ δ' αὖ; τοῦναντίον λέγοντος ἄρ' οὐ μάλλον ἄν ἀποδέξαι εἴ δ' ὁ πάντων σύνῳσθα σαυτῷ ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει;

θεαί. Τὸ ποίον;

ση. Ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνων διετέλεσας ἡ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τε ² τῇ ὅβει διαγιγνώσκειν πειρώμενος καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀκοῆ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν, ἣν μὴ ἡ θέσις σε ταράττων λεγομένων τε καὶ γραφομένων.

θεαί. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ση. Ἐν δὲ κιθαριστοῦ τελέως μεμαθηκέναι μῶν Ἁλλο τι ἢν ἡ τὸ τῷ φθόγγῳ ἐκάστῳ δύνασθαι

¹ γνωστῶν W; ἄγνωστων pr. BT.
² τε W; om. BT.

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THEAET. There is no other to be seen.
   soc. Then the syllable falls into the same class with the letter, if it has no parts and is a single form?
   THEAET. Yes, unquestionably.
   soc. If, then, the syllable is a plurality of letters and is a whole of which the letters are parts, the syllables and the letters are equally knowable and expressible, if all the parts were found to be the same as the whole.
   THEAET. Certainly.
   soc. But if one and indivisible, then syllable and likewise letter are equally irrational and unknowable; for the same cause will make them so.
   THEAET. I cannot dispute it.
   soc. Then we must not accept the statement of any one who says that the syllable is knowable and expressible, but the letter is not.
   THEAET. No, not if we are convinced by our argument.
   soc. But would you not rather accept the opposite belief, judging by your own experience when you were learning to read?
   THEAET. What experience?
   soc. In learning, you were merely constantly trying to distinguish between the letters both by sight and by hearing, keeping each of them distinct from the rest, that you might not be disturbed by their sequence when they were spoken or written.
   THEAET. That is very true.
   soc. And in the music school was not perfect attainment the ability to follow each note and tell
ἐπακολουθεῖν, ποιας χορδῆς εἶναι δή στοιχεῖα πᾶς ἂν ὅμοιογνησεῖη μουσικὴς λέγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

SPELL. Ὡν μὲν ἄρ' αὐτοί ἐμπειροὶ ἐσμεν στοιχείων καὶ συλλαβῶν, εἰ δει ἀπὸ τοῦτων τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένος ἐναργεστέραν τῇ γνώσῃ ἔχειν φήσομεν καὶ κυριωτέραν τῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν τελέως ἐκαστὸν μάθημα, καὶ εάν τις φῆσι συλλαβῆν μὲν γνωστὸν, ἀγνωστὸν δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχεῖον, ἐκόντα ἢ ἀκόντα παίζειν ἡγησόμεθ' αὐτὸν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομμῆ μὲν οὖν.

C 42. ΣΠ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο μὲν ἐτὶ κἂν ἄλλα φανεῖν ἀποδείξεις, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ· τὸ δὲ προκείμενον μὴ ἐπιλαβώμεθα δι' αὐτὰ ἰδεῖν, ὃ τι δὴ ποτε καὶ λέγεται τὸ μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσγενόμενον τὴν τελεωτᾶτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ ὅραν.

ΣΠ. Φέρε δὴ, τί ποτὲ βουλεῖται τὸν λόγον ἢ μὴν σημαίνειν; τριῶν γὰρ εὖ τί μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνων δή;

D ΣΠ. Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰη ἃν τὸ τὴν αὐτοῦ διάνοιαν ἐμφανῆ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ὥσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον ἢ ὕδωρ τὴν δόξαν ἐκτυπούμενον εἰς τὴν διὰ τοῦ στομάτος ροήν. ἢ οὔ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ τοιοῦτον λόγος εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε. τὸν γοὺν 1 αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν φαμέν.

ΣΠ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε πᾶς ποιεῖν δυνατὸς θάττον ἢ σχολαιτερον, τὸ ἐνδείξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἐκάστου

1 γοὺν W; οὖν BT.
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which string produced it; and everyone would agree that the notes are the elements of music?

THEAET. Yes, that is all true.

soc. Then if we are to argue from the elements and combinations in which we ourselves have experience to other things in general, we shall say that the elements as a class admit of a much clearer knowledge than the compounds and of a knowledge that is much more important for the complete attainment of each branch of learning, and if anyone says that the compound is by its nature knowable and the element unknowable, we shall consider that he is, intentionally or unintentionally, joking.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Still other proofs of this might be brought out, I think; but let us not on that account lose sight of the question before us, which is: What is meant by the doctrine that the most perfect knowledge arises from the addition of rational explanation to true opinion?

THEAET. No, we must not.

soc. Now what are we intended to understand by "rational explanation"? I think it means one of three things.

THEAET. What are they?

soc. The first would be making one's own thought clear through speech by means of verbs and nouns, imaging the opinion in the stream that flows through the lips, as in a mirror or water. Do you not think the rational explanation is something of that sort?

THEAET. Yes, I do. At any rate, we say that he who does that speaks or explains.

soc. Well, that is a thing that anyone can do sooner or later; he can show what he thinks about
αὐτῷ, ὁ μὴ ἔνεδς ἡ κωφὸς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς. καὶ οὕτως ἐδόθην δοξάζουσι, πάντες αὐτὸ μετὰ λόγου φανοῦνται ἔχοντες, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ὁ ῥῆ ὁ δόξα χωρὶς ἐπιστήμης γενῆσεται.

They. Ἀληθῆς.

σο. Μὴ τοίνυν ῥαδίως καταγιγνώσκωμεν τὸ μὴδὲν εἰρηκέναι τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστήμην ὁ νῦν σκοποῦμεν. ἰσως γὰρ ὁ λέγων οὗ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἐκαστὸν δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν 207 ἀπόκρισιν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἑρωμένῳ.

They. Οἶον τὶ λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες;

σο. Οἶον καὶ Ἡσίοδος περὶ ἀμάξης λέγει τὸ “ἐκατὸν δὲ τε δούραθ’ ἀμάξης.” ὁ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἄν δυναῖμην εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σὺ. ἀλλ’ ἀγαπῶμεν ἄν ἐρωτηθέντες τὶ τέστιν ἀμάξα, εἰ ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν τροχοῖ, ἄξων, ὑπερτερία,1 ἄντυγες, ξυγόν.

They. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

σο. Ὁ δὲ γε ἰσος οἶστρ’ ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὡσπερ ἂν τὸ σὸν ὄνομα ἐρωτηθέντας καὶ ἀποκρισμένους κατὰ Β συλλαβῆν, γελοίους εἶναι, ὁρθῶς μὲν δοξάζοντας καὶ λέγοντας ἃ λέγομεν, οἰκομένους δὲ γραμματικοὺς εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν τε καὶ λέγειν γραμματικῶς τὸν τοῦ Θεατήτου ὄνοματος λόγον. τὸ δ’ οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιστήμονως οὖν ἀν λέγειν, πρὶν ἂν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων μετὰ τῆς ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἐκαστον περαινη τις, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθε ποὺ ἐρρήθη.

1 ὑπερτερία Kuhn; ὑπερτερία Β; ὑπερτήρια Τ.
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anything, unless he is deaf or dumb from the first; and so all who have any right opinion will be found to have it with the addition of rational explanation, and there will henceforth be no possibility of right opinion apart from knowledge.

THEAET. True.

soc. Let us not, therefore, carelessly accuse him of talking nonsense who gave the definition of knowledge which we are now considering; for perhaps that is not what he meant. He may have meant that each person if asked about anything must be able in reply to give his questioner an account of it in terms of its elements.

THEAET. As for example, Socrates?

soc. As, for example, Hesiod, speaking of a wagon, says, "a hundred pieces of wood in a wagon." Now I could not name the pieces, nor, I fancy, could you; but if we were asked what a wagon is, we should be satisfied if we could say "wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke."

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. But he, perhaps, would think we were ridiculous, just as he would if, on being asked about your name, we should reply by telling the syllables, holding a right opinion and expressing correctly what we have to say, but should think we were grammarians and as such both possessed and were expressing as grammarians would the rational explanation of the name Theaetetus. He would say that it is impossible for anyone to give a rational explanation of anything with knowledge, until he gives a complete enumeration of the elements, combined with true opinion. That, I believe, is what was said before.

1 Works and Days, 456 (454).
PLATO

ÒEAI. Ἑρρήθη γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὕτω τοῖνυν καὶ περὶ ἀμάξης ἡμᾶς μὲν ὀρθὴν ἐχεῖν δόξαν, τὸν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἐκατόν ἐκείνων ὁ δυνάμενον διελθείν αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν, προσλαβόντα τούτο, λόγον τε προσεληφθέναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δόξῃ καὶ ἀντὶ δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικοῦ τε καὶ ἑπιστήμονα περὶ ἀμάξης οὐσίας γεγονέναι, διὰ στοιχείων τὸ ὅλον περάναντα.

ÒEAI. Οὐκοῦν εὖ δοκεῖ σοι, ὡ Σῶκρατε;ς;

ΣΩ. Εἰ σοὶ, ὡ ἔταιρε, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδέχει τὴν διὰ στοιχείων διεξόδον περὶ ἐκάστου λόγου εἶναι, τὴν δὲ κατὰ συλλαβᾶς ἢ καὶ κατὰ μείζον ἔτι ἀλογίαν, τούτο μοι λέγε, ἵν' αὐτὸ ἑπισκοπῶμεν.

ÒEAI. Ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἀποδέχομαι.

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἡγούμενος ἑπιστήμονα εἶναι δυντινοῖν ὅτουν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ 1 μὲν τοῦ αὐτοῦ δοκῇ αὐτῷ εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ ἐτέρου, ἢ καὶ ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν ἐτέρου, τοτὲ δὲ ἐτέρου δοξάζῃ;

ÒEAI. Μᾶ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Εἶτα ἀμυνημονεῖσ ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει κατ' ἄρχας σαυτὸν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δρῶντας αὐτά;

ÒEAI. Ἀρα λέγεις τῆς αὐτῆς συλλαβῆς τοτὲ μὲν Ἐ ἐτέρου, τοτὲ δὲ ἐτέρου ἡγούμενους γράμμα, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν, τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ἄλλην τιθέντας συλλαβῆν;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα λέγω.

ÒEAI. Μᾶ Δί' οὖ τοῖνυν ἀμυνημονῶ, οὔδὲ γε πω ἡγούμαι ἑπιστασθαι τοὺς οὕτως ἑχοντας.

1 τοτὲ] τότε W; ὅτε BT.

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THEAET. Yes, it was.

soc. So, too, he would say that we have right opinion about a wagon, but that he who can give an account of its essential nature in terms of those one hundred parts has by this addition added rational explanation to true opinion and has acquired technical knowledge of the essential nature of a wagon, in place of mere opinion, by describing the whole in terms of its elements.

THEAET. Do you agree to that, Socrates?

soc. If you, my friend, agree to it and accept the view that orderly description in terms of its elements is a rational account of anything, but that description in terms of syllables or still larger units is irrational, tell me so, that we may examine the question.

THEAET. Certainly I accept it.

soc. Do you accept it in the belief that anyone has knowledge of anything when he thinks that the same element is a part sometimes of one thing and sometimes of another or when he is of opinion that the same thing has as a part of it sometimes one thing and sometimes another?

THEAET. Not at all, by Zeus.

soc. Then do you forget that when you began to learn to read you and the others did just that?

THEAET. Do you mean when we thought that sometimes one letter and sometimes another belonged to the same syllable, and when we put the same letter sometimes into the proper syllable and sometimes into another?

soc. That is what I mean.

THEAET. By Zeus, I do not forget, nor do I think that those have knowledge who are in that condition.
Ξω. Τι οὖν; ὅταν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καίρῳ "Θεαίτητον" γράφων τις θῆτα καὶ εἶ οἶηται 1 τε δεῖν 208 γράφει καί γράφη, καὶ αὐτὸν "Θεόδωρον" ἐπι- χειρῶν γράφειν ταῦτα καὶ εἶ οἶηται 1 τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράφη, ἀρ' ἐπιστασθαι φήσομεν αὐτόν τὴν πρώτην τῶν ὑμετέρων ὁνομάτων συλλαβῆν; 

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἁλλ' ἄρτι ωμολογήσαμεν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα μήτω εἰδέναι.

Ξω. Καλύπτει οὖν τι καὶ περὶ τὴν δευτέραν συλ- λαβῆν καὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην οὕτως ἔχειν τὸν αὐτόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν γε.

Ξω. Ἀρ' οὖν τότε τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον ἔχων γράψει "Θεαίτητον" μετὰ ὁρθῆς δόξης, ὅταν ἔξης γράφη; 

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον δῆ.

Β Ξω. Ὀύκοιν ἔτι ἀνεπιστήμων ὡν, ὅρθα δὲ δοξάζων, ὡς φαμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

Ξω. Λόγον γε ἔχων μετὰ ὁρθῆς δόξης τὴν γάρ διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου ὁδὸν ἔχων ἐγραφεν, ἥν δῆ λόγον ωμολογήσαμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἁληθῇ.

Ξω. Ὅστιν ἄρα, ὡ ἑταίρε, μετὰ λόγου ὁρθῆ δόξα, ἥν οὕτως δεῖ ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει.

43. Ξω. Ὅναρ δῆ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπλουτήσαμεν οὐριθέντες ἔχειν τὸν ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον. 

ἡ μήτω κατηγορῶμεν; ἔσως γὰρ οὐ τούτῳ τις 

1 οἶηται] οἶεται ΒΤ.
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soc. Take an example: When at such a stage in his progress a person in writing "Theaetetus" thinks he ought to write, and actually does write, TH and E, and again in trying to write "Theodorus" thinks he ought to write, and does write, T and E, shall we say that he knows the first syllable of your names?

THEAET. No, we just now agreed that a person in such a condition has not yet gained knowledge.

soc. Then there is nothing to prevent the same person from being in that condition with respect to the second and third and fourth syllables?

THEAET. No, nothing.

soc. Then, in that case, he has in mind the orderly description in terms of letters, and will write "Theaetetus" with right opinion, when he writes the letters in order?

THEAET. Evidently.

soc. But he is still, as we say, without knowledge, though he has right opinion?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Yes, but with his opinion he has rational explanation; for he wrote with the method in terms of letters in his mind, and we agreed that that was rational explanation.

THEAET. True.

soc. There is, then, my friend, a combination of right opinion with rational explanation, which cannot as yet properly be called knowledge?

THEAET. There is not much doubt about it.

soc. So it seems that the perfectly true definition of knowledge, which we thought we had, was but a golden dream. Or shall we wait a bit before we condemn it? Perhaps the definition to be adopted
PLATO

C αυτὸν ὁριεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶδος τῶν τριῶν, ὅν ἐν γε τὶ ἐφαμεν λόγον θήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπιστήμην ὁριζόμενον δόξαν εἶναι ὅρθὴν μετὰ λόγου.

ὠεί. Ὄρθως ὑπέμνησας· ἐτι γὰρ ἐν λοιπόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἢν διανοίας ἐν φωνῇ ὡσπερ εἰδωλον, τὸ δ' ἀρτι λεχθὲν διὰ στοιχείου ὅδος ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον· τὸ δὲ δὴ τρίτον τί λέγεις;

ς. Ὁσερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ εἰποίεν, τὸ ἔχειν τι σημείον εἶπεῖν ὡ τῶν ἀπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν.

ὠεί. Ὑιον τίνα τίνος ἔχεις μοι λόγον εἰπεῖν;

Dς. Ὑιον, εἰ βουλεί, ἥλιον πέρι ἴκανον οἶμαι σοι εἶναι ἀποδέξασθαι, ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατον ἐστὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἱότων περὶ γῆν.

ὠεί. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ς. Λαβὲ δὴ οὐ χάρων εἰρηταί. ἐστὶ δὲ ὅπερ ἀρτι ἐλέγομεν, ὡσ ἄρα τὴν διαφορὰν ἐκάστου ἂν λαμβάνῃς ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόγον, ὡς φασί τινες, λήψει· ἐως δ' ἂν κοινών τινος ἐφάπτῃ, ἐκείνους πέρι σοι ἔσται δ' ὅλος ὅν ἂν ἡ κοινότης ἢ.

Ε ὤεί. Μανθάνω· καὶ μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν λόγον τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖν.

ς. Ὅσ δ' ἂν μετ' ὅρθης δόξης περὶ ὅτου οὐν τῶν ὄντων τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβη,
is not this, but the remaining one of the three possibilities one of which we said must be affirmed by anyone who asserts that knowledge is right opinion combined with rational explanation.

THEAET. I am glad you called that to mind. For there is still one left. The first was a kind of vocal image of the thought, the second the orderly approach to the whole through the elements, which we have just been discussing, and what is the third?

soc. It is just the definition which most people would give, that knowledge is the ability to tell some characteristic by which the object in question differs from all others.

THEAET. As an example of the method, what explanation can you give me, and of what thing?

soc. As an example, if you like, take the sun: I think it is enough for you to be told that it is the brightest of the heavenly bodies that revolve about the earth.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Understand why I say this. It is because, as we were just saying, if you get hold of the distinguishing characteristic by which a given thing differs from the rest, you will, as some say, get hold of the definition or explanation of it; but so long as you cling to some common quality, your explanation will pertain to all those objects to which the common quality belongs.

THEAET. I understand; and it seems to me that it is quite right to call that kind a rational explanation or definition.

soc. Then he who possesses right opinion about anything and adds thereto a comprehension of the difference which distinguishes it from other things
αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμων γεγονός ἔσται, οὗ πρότερον ἦν
dοξασθήσ.

_Θεαί._ Φαμέν γε μὴν οὔτω.

_Συ._ Νῦν δῆτα, ὡς Θεαίτητε, παντάπασιν ἐγώγε,₁ ἐπειδὴ ἐγγύς ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ
λεγομένου, ἔννιημι οὐδὲ σμικρὸν· ἐως δὲ ἀφεστήκη
πόρρωθεν, ἐφαίνετο τί μοι λέγεσθαι.

_Θεαί._ Πῶς τί τοῦτο;

209 _Συ._ Φράσω, ἐὰν οἶδας τε γένομαι. ὅρθὴν
ἐγώγε ² ἔχων δόξαν περὶ σοῦ, ἐὰν μὲν προσλάβω
τὸν σὸν λόγον, γιγνώσκω δὴ σε, εἰ δὲ μὴ, δοξάζω
μόνων.

_Θεαί._ Ναι.

_Συ._ Λόγος δὲ γε ἡν ἡ τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος
ἐρμηνεία.

_Θεαί._ Οὔτως.

_Συ._ Ἡνίκ' οὖν ἐδόξαζον μόνον, ἀλλο τι ὧ τῶν
ἀλλών διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενὸς ἡπτόμην τῇ
diavnoiā;

_Θεαί._ Οὐκ ἐοικεν.

_Συ._ Τῶν κοινῶν τι ἄρα διεννοοῦμην, ὥς οὐδὲν
σὺ μᾶλλον ἡ τις ἄλλος ἐχει.

Β _Θεαί._ Ἀνάγκη.

_Συ._ Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διόσ. πῶς ποτε ἐν τῷ
toiouthe se mállos edóxaζον h ἄλλον ὄντων;
θεῖ γάρ με διανοούμενον ὡς ἐστιν ὦτος Θεαίτητος,
δε ἂν ἡ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἐχει ῥίνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς
καὶ στόμα καὶ οὔτω δὴ ἐν ἐκαστον τῶν μελῶν.
aυτὴ οὖν ἡ διάνοια ἐσθ' ὁ τί μᾶλλον ποιήσει με

₁ παντάπασιν ἐγώγε W; παντάπασι γε ἐγώ T.

² ἐγώγε W; ἐγώ T.

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will have acquired knowledge of that thing of which he previously had only opinion.

THEAET. That is what we affirm.

soc. Theaetetus, now that I have come closer to our statement, I do not understand it at all. It is like coming close to a scene-painting. While I stood off at a distance, I thought there was something in it.

THEAET. What do you mean?

soc. I will tell you if I can. Assume that I have right opinion about you; if I add the explanation or definition of you, then I have knowledge of you, otherwise I have merely opinion.

THEAET. Yes.

soc. But explanation was, we agreed, the interpretation of your difference.

THEAET. It was.

soc. Then so long as I had merely opinion, I did not grasp in my thought any of the points in which you differ from others?

THEAET. Apparently not.

soc. Therefore I was thinking of some one of the common traits which you possess no more than other men.

THEAET. You must have been.

soc. For heaven's sake! How in the world could I in that case have any opinion about you more than about anyone else? Suppose that I thought "That is Theaetetus which is a man and has nose and eyes and mouth" and so forth, mentioning all the parts. Can this thought make me think of Theaetetus any

1 In which perspective is the main thing.
PLATO

Θεαίτητον ἡ Θεόδωρον διανοεῖσθαι, ἡ τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν τὸν ἔσχατον;

ὁεai. Τί γάρ;

ςν. 'Αλλ' εἶν δὴ μὴ μόνον τὸν ἔχοντα δίνα καὶ ὁφθαλμοὺς διανοηθῶ, ἄλλα καὶ τὸν σημόν τε καὶ ἐξοφθαλμον, μὴ τι σὲ αὐ μᾶλλον δοξάσω ἡ ἐμαυτὸν ἡ ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι;

ὁεai. Ὅυδέν.

ςν. 'Αλλ' οὐ πρότερον γε, οἴμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἄν ἡ σιμότης αὐτὴ τῶν ἀλλων σιμοτήτων ὃν ἐγὼ ἐώρακα διάφορον τι μημείον παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐνσημηναμένη κατάθηται, καὶ τάλλα οὔτω εξί δὲν εἰ σύ· ἡ ἐμὲ,¹ καὶ εἰάν αὐριον ἄπαντησω, ἀναμνήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν περὶ σοῦ.

ὁεai. Ἀληθέστατα.

δςν. Περὶ τὴν διαφορότητα ἄρα καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα ἀν εἰη ἐκάστον πέρι.

ὁεai. Φαίνεται γε.

ςν. Τὸ οὖν προσλαβεῖν λόγον τῇ ὀρθῇ δόξῃ τί ἄν ἐτὶ εἰη; εἰ μὲν γὰρ προσδοξάσαι λέγει ἡ διαφέρει τι τῶν ἀλλων, πάνυ γελοία γίγνεται ἡ ἐπίταξις.

ὁεai. Πῶς;

ςν. Ὡμν ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἐχομεν ἢ τῶν ἀλλων διαφέρει, τούτων προσλαβεῖν κελεύει ἡμᾶς ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἢ τῶν ἀλλων διαφέρει, καὶ οὕτως ἡ μὲν

¹ ei sú· ἡ ἐμὲ Wohlrab; ei sú· ἡ μὲ W (but ἡ added later);
ei sú ἐμὲ B; εἰσεὶ ἐμὲ T.
more than of Theodorus or of the meanest of the Mysians,¹ as the saying is?

THEAET. Of course not.

soc. But if I think not only of a man with nose and eyes, but of one with snub nose and protruding eyes, shall I then have an opinion of you any more than of myself and all others like me?

THEAET. Not at all.

soc. No; I fancy Theaetetus will not be the object of opinion in me until this snubnosedness of yours has stamped and deposited in my mind a memorial different from those of the other examples of snubnosedness that I have seen, and the other traits that make up your personality have done the like. Then that memorial, if I meet you again tomorrow, will awaken my memory and make me have right opinion about you.

THEAET. Very true.

soc. Then right opinion also would have to do with differences in any given instance?

THEAET. At any rate, it seems so.

soc. Then what becomes of the addition of reason or explanation to right opinion? For if it is defined as the addition of an opinion of the way in which a given thing differs from the rest, it is an utterly absurd injunction.

THEAET. How so?

soc. When we have a right opinion of the way in which certain things differ from other things, we are told to acquire a right opinion of the way in which those same things differ from other things! On this

¹ The Mysians were despised as especially effeminate and worthless.
σκυτάλης ἢ ὑπέροι ἢ ὅτων δὴ λέγεται περιτροπὴ
Ε πρὸς ταύτῃ τήν ἐπίταξιν οὐδὲν ἂν λέγου, τυφλοὶ
de παρακέλευσιν ἃν καλοῖτο δικαίοτερον· τὸ
γάρ, δ' ἔχομεν, ταῦτα προσλαβεῖν κελεύειν, ἵνα
μάθωμεν δ' ἄδοξάζομεν, πάνυ γενναίως ἔοικεν ἐσκο-
tωμένως.

THEAI. Εἰπὲ δὴ 1 τί νῦν δὴ ώς ἐρῶν ἐπύθου;

ΣΩ. Εἰ τὸ λόγον, ὡς οὖν προσλαβεῖν γνώναι
κελεύει, ἀλλὰ μὴ δοξάσαι τῆν διαφορότητα, ἢδο
χρῆμα ἂν εἶν τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν περὶ ἐπιστήμης
λόγου. τὸ γάρ γνώναι ἐπιστήμην ποτα λαβεῖν
210 ἐστὶν· ἢ γάρ;

THEAI. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐρωτηθείς, ὡς ἔοικε, τί ἐστιν ἐπι-
στήμην, ἀποκρινεῖται ὅτι δόξα ὅρθη μετὰ ἐπιστήμης
diaforóttatos. λόγου γάρ πρόσληψις τοῦτ' ἂν
εἰν κατ' ἐκείνων.

THEAI. Ἐοικέν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ παντάπασι γε εὐθῆς, ξητούντων ἡμῶν
ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὅρθη εἶναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης
εἰτε διαφορότητος εἰτε ὅτουον. οὔτε ἄρα αἰσθη-
σις, ὡ Θεαίτητε, οὔτε δόξα ἄληθης οὔτε μετ'
Β ἄληθοῦς δόξης λόγος προσγιγνόμενος ἐπιστήμη
ἂν εἰν.

THEAI. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

1 eἰπὲ δὴ T (and W in marg.); εἰ γε δὴ Β; εἰ γε δὴ Β²W.
plan the twirling of a scytale \(^1\) or a pestle or anything of the sort would be as nothing compared with this injunction. It might more justly be called a blind man’s giving directions; for to command us to acquire that which we already have, in order to learn that of which we already have opinion, is very like a man whose sight is mightily darkened.

Theaet. Tell me now, what did you intend to say when you asked the question a while ago?

Soc. If, my boy, the command to add reason or explanation means learning to know and not merely getting an opinion about the difference, our splendid definition of knowledge would be a fine affair! For learning to know is acquiring knowledge, is it not?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. Then, it seems, if asked, “What is knowledge?” our leader will reply that it is right opinion with the addition of a knowledge of difference; for that would, according to him, be the addition of reason or explanation.

Theaet. So it seems.

Soc. And it is utterly silly, when we are looking for a definition of knowledge, to say that it is right opinion with knowledge, whether of difference or of anything else whatsoever. So neither perception, Theaetetus, nor true opinion, nor reason or explanation combined with true opinion could be knowledge.

Theaet. Apparently not.

\(^1\) A σκυτάλη was a staff, especially a staff about which a strip of leather was rolled, on which dispatches were so written that when unrolled they were illegible until rolled again upon another staff of the same size and shape.
ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ἐτί κυοῦμεν τι καὶ ὁδίνομεν, ὦ φίλε, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἡ πάντα ἐκτετάκαμεν;

ΘΕΙ. Καὶ ναί μὰ Δί' ἔγγυε πλείω ἡ ὅσα εἶχον ἐν ἐμαυτῷ διὰ σὲ εὑρήκα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἡ μαίευτικὴ ἡμῶν τέχνη ἀνεμισά φησι γεγενήθαι καὶ οὐκ ἄξια τροφῆς;

ΘΕΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

44. ΣΩ. Ἐὰν τοῖνυ ἀλλων μετὰ ταύτα ἐγκύμων ἐπιχειρήσῃ γίγνεσθαι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐάντε C γίγνη, βελτιώνων ἔσει πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἔξετασιν, ἐάντε κενὸς ἂς, ἦττον ἔσει βαρὺς τοῖς συνοῦσι καὶ ἡμερώτερος, σωφρόνως οὐκ οἰόμενοι εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ οἴσθα. τοσοῦτον γὰρ μόνον ἢ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλέον δὲ οὐδέν, οὐδὲ τι οίδα ὁμ οἱ ἄλλοι, ὦσοι μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι ἄνδρες εἰσὶ τε καὶ γεγόνασι. τὴν δὲ μαίειαν ταύτην ἐγώ τε καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐλάχομεν, ἢ μὲν τῶν γυναικῶν, ἐγώ δὲ τῶν νέων τε καὶ γενναίων καὶ ὦσοι καλοί.

D Νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀπαντησέων μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοὰν ἔπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, ἡν με γέγραπται· ἐωθὲν δὲ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, δεῦρο πάλιν ἀπαντῶμεν.
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soc. Are we then, my friend, still pregnant and in travail with knowledge, or have we brought forth everything?

THEAET. Yes, we have, and, by Zeus, Socrates, with your help I have already said more than there was in me.

soc. Then does our art of midwifery declare to us that all the offspring that have been born are mere wind-eggs and not worth rearing?

THEAET. It does, decidedly.

soc. If after this you ever undertake to conceive other thoughts, Theaetetus, and do conceive, you will be pregnant with better thoughts than these by reason of the present search, and if you remain barren, you will be less harsh and gentler to your associates, for you will have the wisdom not to think you know that which you do not know. So much and no more my art can accomplish; nor do I know aught of the things that are known by others, the great and wonderful men who are to-day and have been in the past. This art, however, both my mother and I received from God, she for women and I for young and noble men and for all who are fair.

And now I must go to the Porch of the King, to answer to the suit which Meletus\(^1\) has brought against me. But in the morning, Theodorus, let us meet here again.

\(^1\) Meletus was one of those who brought the suit which led to the condemnation and death of Socrates.
INTRODUCTION TO THE SOPHIST

In *The Sophist* Theodorus and Theaetetus meet Socrates in accordance with the agreement made in the final paragraph of the *Theaetetus*. They bring with them an Eleatic Stranger, who presently agrees to undertake, with the aid of Theaetetus, the definition of the Philosopher, the Statesman, and the Sophist. Thereupon, after selecting the Sophist as the first of the three to be defined, he proceeds to illustrate his method by defining the angler, on the ground that the Sophist is a difficult subject and that practice on an easier and slighter matter is desirable. The method employed in defining first the angler and then the Sophist is that of comparison and division successively into two parts. This method was probably, at the time when this dialogue was written, something of a novelty, and is employed also in *The Statesman*, which is closely connected with *The Sophist* both in form and substance. It must be admitted that the process of dichotomy becomes very tedious, which may possibly be one of Plato's reasons for making the Stranger, not Socrates, the chief speaker in these two dialogues. The definition of the Sophist—the avowed purpose of the dialogue—is
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carried on in a satirical and polemic spirit which is abundantly evident even when it is no longer possible to name the particular persons against whom the attack is directed.

But all this occupies only the opening and concluding passages. It is interrupted by what is in form a long digression, but is really the most serious and important part of the whole. In this (236 ν—264 ν) the method of dichotomy is given up and abstract questions are treated in a quite different manner. The Sophist has been found to be a juggler and deceiver, and the question arises whether deception or falsehood does not involve the assumption of Not-Being, which was persistently opposed by Parmenides and the Eleatic philosophers in general. Plato refutes the doctrine that Not-Being cannot exist by showing that it has a relative existence—that in each particular instance it denotes a difference or condition of being other than that in connexion with which it is said to exist. It is not mere negation—the opposite of Being—but becomes the positive notion of Difference. This is the most important doctrine promulgated in this dialogue.

Hereupon follows the discussion of the nature of Being, and the conclusion is reached that everything which possesses any power, either to produce a change or to be affected by a cause, has existence (247 ν), i.e., that power—whether active or passive—is Being.

The problem of predication—of the possibility of assertion—is solved by making the distinction between verbs and nouns and defining the sentence as a combination of those two. If that combination corresponds to reality, the assertion is true, if not, it
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is false. How far this is original with Plato is difficult to determine. Other subjects discussed in this dialogue are the theory of knowledge, the relation between reality and appearance, and that between the one and the many. The introduction of the five "forms" or categories—Being, Motion, Rest, Same and Other—is an interesting feature which may be interpreted as marking a stage in the development of the theory of ideas. This dialogue is important in content, though not especially attractive in form.

The date of The Sophist cannot be earlier, and may be considerably later, than that of the Theaetetus.

There is an edition of The Sophist and Politicus, with English notes, by Lewis Campbell (Oxford, 1864).
ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ

[Ἡ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ· ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ]

TA TOY DIALOGOU PROSOPIA

THEODOROS, ZΩKRATES, ZENOS ELEATHS, THEAITHTOS

I. ΘΕΟ. Κατὰ τὴν χθές ὀμολογίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤκομεν αὐτοὶ τε κοσμῆσας καὶ τὸνδε τινὰ ἡγομεν, τὸ μὲν γένος ἐξ Ἑλέας, ἐταίρων δὲ τῶν ἄμφι Παρμενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα,1 μάλα δὲ ἀνδρὰ φιλόσοφον.

Ἐν. Ἄρι οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, οὐ ξένων ἀλλὰ τινὰ θεὸν ἁγνῶ κατὰ τὸν Ὀμήρον λόγον λέληθας; ὡς Β' φησιν ἄλλους τε θεοὺς τοῖς ἄνθρώποις ὡπόσοι μετέχουσιν αἰδοὺς δικαίας, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ξένων οὐχ ήκιστα θεὸν συνοπαδόν γιγνόμενον ὑβρεῖς τε καὶ εὐνομίας τῶν ἄνθρωπων καθορᾶν. τάχ' οὖν ἂν καὶ σοί τις οὕτως τῶν κρειττόνων συνέποιτο, φαύλους ἡμᾶς ὠντας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐποιήμενός τε καὶ ἐλέγξων, θεὸς ὦν τις ἐλεγκτικός.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐχ οὕτως ὁ τρόπος, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ

1 Ζήνωνα ἐταλρων mss.; ἐταλρων om. Upton.
THE SOPHIST
[or ON BEING: LOGICAL]

CHARACTERS

Theodorus, Socrates, an Elean Stranger, Theaetetus

theo. According to our yesterday's agreement, Socrates, we have come ourselves, as we were bound to do, and we bring also this man with us; he is a stranger from Elea, one of the followers of Parmenides and Zeno, and a real philosopher.

soc. Are you not unwittingly bringing, as Homer says, some god, and no mere stranger, Theodorus? He says that the gods, and especially the god of strangers, enter into companionship with men who have a share of due reverence¹ and that they behold the deeds, both violent and righteous,¹ of mankind. So perhaps this companion of yours may be one of the higher powers, who comes to watch over and refute us because we are worthless in argument—a kind of god of refutation.

theo. No, Socrates, that is not the stranger's

¹ A modified quotation from Odyssey, ix. 271; xvii. 485-7.
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ξένου, ἄλλα μετριώτερος τῶν περὶ τὰς ἐρίδας ἐσπουδακότων. καὶ μοι δοκεῖθεος μὲν ἄνηρ
C οὐδαμῶς εἶναι, θεῖος μῆν' πάντας γὰρ ἐγὼ τοὺς φιλοσόφους τοιούτους προσαγορεύω.

Σω. Καλῶς γε, ὁ φίλε. τούτο μέντοι κινδυνεύει τὸ γένος οὐ πολὺ τι βάον, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, εἶναι
dιακρίνειν ἥ το τοῦ θεοῦ. πάνω γὰρ ἄνδρες οὕτω παντοίοι φανταζόμενοι διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀλλῶν ἄγνοιαν
ἐπιστρωφόσι πόλης, οἱ μὴ πλαστῶς ἀλ' ὄντως φιλόσοφοι, καθορώντες υἱόθεν τὸν τῶν κατώ βίον,
καὶ τοῖς μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τοῦ μηδενὸς τίμιοι, τοῖς δ' ἄξιοι τοῦ παντός' καὶ τοτε μὲν πολιτικοὶ
D φανταζόμεναι, τοτε δὲ σοφισταί, τοτε δ' ἐστιν
οῖς δόξαιν παράσχοιντο ἀν ὡς παντάπασιν ἔχουσι
μανικῶς. τοῦ μέντοι ξένου ἡμῖν ἡδέως ἀν πυνθα-
νούμην, εἰ φίλοις αὐτῷ, τὶ ταῦθ' οἱ περὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ
217 τόπον ἡγοῦντο καὶ ὑνόμαζον.

ΘΕΟ. Τὰ ποία δή;

Σω. Σοφιστήν, πολιτικόν, φιλόσοφον.

ΘΕΟ. Τὶ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ τὸ ποῖον τι περὶ αὐτῶν
dιαπορθεὶς ἐρέσθαι διενοθήσις;

Σω. Τόδε: πότερον ἐν πάντα ταῦτα ἐνοίμαζον

ἡ δύο, ἡ καθάπερ τὰ ὀνόματα τρία, τρία καὶ γένη
dιαιροῦμενοι καθ' ἐν ὑμοία γένους ἐκάστῳ προσ-

ήπττον;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλ' οὔδεις, ὡς ἐγώμαι, φθόνος αὐτῷ
dιελθεῖν αὐτά: ἡ πῶς, ὃ ξένε, λέγωμεν;

Β. Οὔτως, ὃ Θεόδωρε. φθόνος μὲν γὰρ

οὔδεις οὔδε χαλεπῶν εἰπεῖν ὅτι γε τρὶ' ἡγοῦντο.

1 ἄνηρ Bekker; ἄνηρ BT.
2 ἄνδρες Bekker; ἄνδρες BT.

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character; he is more reasonable than those who devote themselves to disputation. And though I do not think he is a god at all, I certainly do think he is divine, for I give that epithet to all philosophers.

soc. And rightly, my friend. However, I fancy it is not much easier, if I may say so, to recognize this class, than that of the gods. For these men—I mean those who are not feignedly but really philosophers—appear disguised in all sorts of shapes, thanks to the ignorance of the rest of mankind, and visit the cities, beholding from above the life of those below, and they seem to some to be of no worth and to others to be worth everything. And sometimes they appear disguised as statesmen and sometimes as sophists, and sometimes they may give some people the impression that they are altogether mad. But I should like to ask our stranger here, if agreeable to him, what people in his country thought about these matters, and what names they used.

THEO. What matters do you mean?

soc. Sophist, statesman, philosopher.

THEO. What particular difficulty and what kind of difficulty in regard to them is it about which you had in mind to ask?

soc. It is this: Did they consider all these one, or two, or, as there are three names, did they divide them into three classes and ascribe to each a class, corresponding to a single name?

THEO. I think he has no objection to talking about them. What do you say, stranger?

STR. Just what you did, Theodorus; for I have no objection, and it is not difficult to say that they

καθ' ἐκαστον μὴν διορίσασθαι σαφῶς τί ποτ' ἔστιν, οὐ σμικρὸν οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον ἔργον.

ὁ θεό. Καί μὲν δὴ κατὰ τύχην γε, ὡς Σώκρατες, λόγων ἐπελάβου παραπλησίων ὧν καὶ πρὶν ἡμᾶς δεῦρ' ἐλθεῖν διερωτώντες αὐτὸν ἐτυγχάνομεν· ὃ δὲ ταῦτα ἄπερ πρὸς σὲ νῦν, καὶ τότε ἐσκήπτετο πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ἐπεὶ διακηκοέναι γε φησίν ἰκανῶς καὶ οὐκ ἀμνησμονείν.

C 2. συ. Μὴ τοινυν, ὡς Σώκρατες, ἀλυπως τε καὶ D εὐχήνως προσδιαλεγομένω ρᾷν οὕτω, τὸ πρὸς ἄλλον· εἰ δέ μὴ, τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν.

συ. "Εἴηστι τοινυν τῶν παρόντων ὅν ἄν βουληθῆς ἐκλέξασθαι· πάντες γὰρ ὑπακούσονται σοι πράως· συμβούλω μὴν ἐμοὶ χρώμενος τῶν νέων τών αἱρήσει, Θεαίητην τόνδε, ἦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰ τίς σοι κατὰ νοῦν.

συ. "Ω Σώκρατες, αἰδώς τίς μ᾽ ἔχει τὸ νῦν πρῶτον συγγενόμενον υμῖν μὴ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἔπος πρὸς ἔπος ποιεῖσθαι τὴν συνουσίαν, ἀλλ' ἐκτειναντα ἀπομικύνειν λόγον συγκὸν κατ' ἐμαυτόν,

Ε εἴτε καὶ πρὸς ἐτερον, οἷον ¹ ἐπίδειξιν ποιούμενον· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν οἷς ὤσον ὡδὲ ἐρωτηθέν ἐλπίσειεν ἃν αὐτὸ εἶναι τις, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνει λόγου

¹ οἷον Ast.; ὅτον BT.
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considered them three. But it is no small or easy task to define clearly the nature of each.

Theo. The fact is, Socrates, that by chance you have hit upon a question very like what we happened to be asking him before we came here; and he made excuses to us then, as he does now to you; though he admits that he has heard it thoroughly discussed and remembers what he heard.

Soc. In that case, stranger, do not refuse us the first favour we have asked; but just tell us this: Do you generally prefer to expound in a long uninterrupted speech of your own whatever you wish to explain to anyone, or do you prefer the method of questions? I was present once when Parmenides employed the latter method and carried on a splendid discussion. I was a young man then, and he was very old.

Str. The method of dialogue, Socrates, is easier with an interlocutor who is tractable and gives no trouble; but otherwise I prefer the continuous speech by one person.

Soc. Well, you may choose whomever you please of those present; they will all respond pleasantly to you; but if you take my advice you will choose one of the young fellows, Theaetetus here, or any of the others who suits you.

Str. Socrates, this is the first time I have come among you, and I am somewhat ashamed, instead of carrying on the discussion by merely giving brief replies to your questions, to deliver an extended, long drawn out speech, either as an address of my own or in reply to another, as if I were giving an exhibition; but I must, for really the present subject is not what one might expect from the form of the question, but is a matter for very long speech. On
παμμήκους ὄν. τὸ δὲ αὖ σοὶ μὴ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ
toίσδε, ἄλλως τε καὶ σοῦ λέξαντος ὡς εἶπες,
ἀξενὸν τι καταφαίνεται μοι καὶ ἀγριον. ἔπει
218 Θεαίτητών γε τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον εἶναι δέχομαι
παντάπασιν ἢ μὲν αὐτὸς τε πρότερον διείλεγμαι
καὶ σὺ τὰ νῦν μοι διακελεύει.

θεαί. Ἀρα τοίνυν, ὃ ξένε, οὖτω καὶ καθάπερ
eἰπὲ Σωκράτης πάσι κεχαρισμένοις ἔσει;

εὐ. Κινδυνεύει πρὸς μὲν ταύτα οὐδὲν ἔτι λεκτέον
εἶναι, Θεαίτητε: πρὸς δὲ σὲ ἦδη τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο,
ὡς ἐοικε, γίγνοιτο ἄν ὁ λόγος. ἂν δ' ἀρα τι τῷ
μήκει ποιῶν ἄχθη, μή ἐμὲ αἰτιάσθαι τούτων, ἀλλὰ
tούσδε τοὺς σοὺς ἑταίρους.

Β θεαι. Ἀλλ' οἶμαι μὲν δὴ νῦν οὖτως οὐκ ἀπ-
ερεῖν: ἂν δ' ἁρα τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται, καὶ τὸν
cαθαραὶνομέθα Σωκράτη, τὸν Σωκράτους 
μὲν ὁμώνυμον, ἐμὸν δὲ ήλικιώτην καὶ συνγυμναστὴν,
ὡς κυνιδιαπονεῖν μετ' ἑμοῖ τὰ πολλὰ οὐκ ἄρθες.

3. εὐ. Ἐν λέγεις, καὶ ταύτα μὲν ἵδια βουλεύσῃ
προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου· κοινῇ δὲ μετ' ἑμοὺ 
συνκεπτέον ἀρχομένη πρῶτον, ὡς ἐμὸι διάλεγον,
νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ, ἥτοινυ τι ἐμφανίζοντι
σ λόγῳ τί ποτ' ἔστι. νῦν γὰρ δὴ σὺ καγὼ τοῦτον
πέρι τούνομα μόνον ἔχομεν κοινῇ τὸ δὲ ἔργον
ἐφ' ὃ καλοῦμεν ἑκάτεροι τάχ', ἄν ἴδια παρ' ἦμιν
αὐτοῖς ἔχομεν· δεῖ δὲ ἄεὶ παντὸς πέρι τὸ πράγμα
αὐτὸ μᾶλλον διὰ λόγων ἡ τούνομα μόνον συνομο-
λογῆσασθαι χωρὶς λόγου, τὸ δὲ φύλον ὃ νῦν ἐπι-
νουοῦμεν ἡτεῖν οὐ πάντων ῥᾴδιον συλλαβεῖν τί
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the other hand it seems unfriendly and discourteous to refuse a favour to you and these gentlemen, especially when you have spoken as you did. As for Theaetetus I accept him most willingly as interlocutor in view of my previous conversation with him and of your present recommendation.

Theaet. But, stranger, by taking this course and following Socrates's suggestion will you please the others too?

Str. I am afraid there is nothing more to be said about that, Theaetetus; but from now on, my talk will, I fancy, be addressed to you. And if you get tired and are bored by the length of the talk, do not blame me, but these friends of yours.

Theaet. Oh, no, I do not think I shall get tired of it so easily, but if such a thing does happen, we will call in this Socrates, the namesake of the other Socrates; he is of my own age and my companion in the gymnasium, and is in the habit of working with me in almost everything.

Str. Very well; you will follow your own devices about that as the discussion proceeds; but now you and I must investigate in common, beginning first, as it seems to me, with the sophist, and must search out and make plain by argument what he is. For as yet you and I have nothing in common about him but the name; but as to the thing to which we give the name, we may perhaps each have a conception of it in our own minds; however, we ought always in every instance to come to agreement about the thing itself by argument rather than about the mere name without argument. But the tribe which we now intend to search for, the sophist, is not the easiest thing in the world to catch and define, and
καὶ ράσων αὐτὰ δεῖν μελετᾶν, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς μεγίστοις. νῦν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐγώνε καὶ νῦν οὕτω συμβουλεύω, χαλεπόν καὶ δυσθῆρευτον ἡγησαμένοις εἶναι τὸ σοφιστοῦ γένος πρότερον ἐν ἀλλῳ ράοις τὴν μέθοδον αὐτοῦ προμελετῶν, εἰ μή σοι ποθεν εὐπεπτεστέραν ἔχεις εἰπεῖν ἄλλην ὀδὸν.

ἐαί. Ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔχω.

ἐ. Βούλει δῆτα περὶ τινὸς τῶν φαύλων μετιόντες πειραθώμεν παράδειγμα αὐτὸ θέσθαι τοῦ μείζονος;

ἐ. Ναι.

ἐ. Τί δῆτα προταξάιμεθ’ ἄν εὐγνωστον μὲν καὶ σμικρόν, λόγον δὲ μηδένος ἑλάττων ἔχου τῶν μειζόνων; οἶνον ἀσπαλιεύτῆς’ ἀρ’ οὐ πᾶσι τε γνώριμον καὶ σπουδῆς οὐ πάνυ τι πολλῆς τινος ἐπάξιον;

ἐαί. Οὕτως.

219 ἐ. Μέθοδον μὴν αὐτοῦ ἐλπίζω καὶ λόγον οὐκ ἀνεπιτήδευον ἡμῖν ἔχειν πρὸς δ’ Βουλόμεθα.

ἐαί. Καλῶς ἄν ἔχοι.

4. ἐ. Φέρε δῆ, τῆδε ἀρχώμεθα αὐτῷ. καὶ μοι λέγει· πότερον ὡς τεχνίτην αὐτόν ἡ τινα ἀτεχνών, ἄλλην δὲ δύναμιν ἔχοντα θήσομεν;

ἐαί. Ἡκιστά γε ἀτεχνοῦν.

ἐ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν γε τεχνῶν πασῶν σχεδὸν εἴδη δύο.

ἐαί. Πῶς;

ἐ. Γεωργία μὲν καὶ ὧσῃ περὶ τὸ θυτὸν πᾶν σῶμα θεραπεία, τὸ τε αὐτό περὶ τὸ σύνθετον καὶ Β πλαστῶν, δ’ ἰε σκεῦος ὦνομάκαμεν, ἦ τε μμητικήν,
everyone has agreed long ago that if investigations of great matters are to be properly worked out we ought to practise them on small and easier matters before attacking the very greatest. So now, Theaetetus, this is my advice to ourselves, since we think the family of sophists is troublesome and hard to catch, that we first practise the method of hunting in something easier, unless you perhaps have some simpler way to suggest.

Theaet. I have not.

Str. Then shall we take some lesser thing and try to use it as a pattern for the greater?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Well, then, what example can we set before us which is well known and small, but no less capable of definition than any of the greater things? Say an angler; is he not known to all and unworthy of any great interest?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. But I hope he offers us a method and is capable of a definition not unsuitable to our purpose.

Theaet. That would be good.

Str. Come now; let us begin with him in this way: Tell me, shall we say that he is a man with an art, or one without an art, but having some other power?

Theaet. Certainly not one without an art.

Str. But of all arts there are, speaking generally, two kinds?

Theaet. How so?

Str. Agriculture and all kinds of care of any living beings, and that which has to do with things which are put together or moulded (utensils we call
ξύμπαντα ταύτα δικαιότατ' ἂν ἐνὶ προσαγο- 

ρεύσιτ' ἂν ὅνοματι.

ὁ. Πῶς καὶ τίνι;

ἐ. Πάν ὁπερ ἄν μη' πρότερον τις ὁν ὑστερον 
eis οὐσίαν ἅγη, τὸν μὲν ἁγοντα ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ ἁγό- 

μενον ποιεῖσθαι πού φαμεν.

ὁ. Ὅρθως.

ἐ. Τὰ δὲ γε νῦν δὴ ἂ δυὴλθωμεν ἁπαντα εἰχεν 
eis τοῦτο τὴν αὐτῶν δύναμιν.

ὁ. Εἰχὲ γὰρ οὖν.

ἐ. Ποιητικὴν τοῖνυν αὐτὰ συγκεφαλαιωσάμενοι 

προσείπωμεν.

C ὁ. Ἑστω.

ἐ. Τὸ δὲ μαθηματικὸν αὐ̣ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰδος 

ὁλον καὶ τὸ τῆς γνωρίσεως τὸ τε χρηματιστικὸν 

καὶ ἁγωνιστικὸν καὶ θηρευτικὸν, ἐπειδὴ δημιουργεῖ 

μὲν οὐδὲν τούτων, τὰ δὲ ὄντα καὶ γεγονότα, τὰ 

μὲν χειροῦται λόγοι καὶ πράξεις, τὰ δὲ τοὺς 

χειρουμένους οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει, μάλιστ' ἂν που διὰ 

tαύτα ξυνάπαντα τὰ μέρη τέχνη τις κτητικὴ 

λεκθείσα ἄν διαπρέψειεν.

ὁ. Ναί. πρέποι γὰρ ἂν.

5. ὁ. Κτητικῆς δὴ καὶ ποιητικῆς ξυμπασῶν 

ὅς ὁποδὲ τῶν τεχνῶν ἐν ποτέρα τὴν ἀσπαλιευτικὴν, 

ὅ ὶ Θεαίτητε, τιθῶμεν;

ὁ. Ἑν κτητικῆ σαν δὴλον.

ἐ. Κτητικῆς δὲ ἄρ' οὗ δῦο εἰδη; τὸ μὲν ἐκόν- 

tων πρὸς ἐκόντας μεταβλητικὸν ὁν διὰ τε δώρεων 

καὶ μισθώσεων καὶ ἁγοράσεων, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἡ
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them), and the art of imitation—all these might properly be called by one name.

THEAET. How so, and what is the name?

STR. When anyone brings into being something which did not previously exist, we say that he who brings it into being produces it and that which is brought into being is produced.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Now all the arts which we have just mentioned direct their energy to production.

THEAET. Yes, they do.

STR. Let us, then, call these collectively the productive art.

THEAET. Agreed.

STR. And after this comes the whole class of learning and that of acquiring knowledge, and money making, and fighting, and hunting. None of these is creative, but they are all engaged in coercing, by deeds or words, things which already exist and have been produced, or in preventing others from coercing them; therefore all these divisions together might very properly be called acquisitive art.

THEAET. Yes, that would be proper.

STR. Then since acquisitive and productive art comprise all the arts, in which, Theaetetus, shall we place the art of angling?

THEAET. In acquisitive art, clearly.

STR. And are there not two classes of acquisitive art—one the class of exchange between voluntary agents by means of gifts and wages and purchases, and the other, which comprises all the rest of
κατ' ἐργα ἢ κατὰ λόγους χειροῦμενον ἐξίμπαν χειρωτικῶν ἂν εἰη; 

ἡθ. Φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. 

ἐς. Τί δὲ; τὴν χειρωτικὴν ἂρ’ οὔ διχῇ τμητέον; 

ἡθ. Πῇ; 

ἐς. Τὸ μὲν ἀναφανδὸν οἶλον ἀγωνιστικὸν θέντας, ἢθ. δὲ κρυφαίον αὐτῆς πᾶν θηρευτικὸν. 

ἡθ. Ναί. 

ἐς. Τὴν δὲ γε μὴν θηρευτικὴν ἀλογον τὸ μὴ οὐ τέμνειν διχῇ. 

ἡθ. Λέγε οὔτη. 

ἐς. Τὸ μὲν ἀμφύχου γένους διελομένους, τὸ δ’ ἐμψύχου. 

ἡθ. Τί μήν; εἴπερ ἐστον γε ἀμφω. 

ἐς. Πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἐστον; καὶ δεὶ γε ἡμᾶς τὸ μὲν τῶν ἀμφύχων, ἀνώνυμον ὅν 2 πλὴν κατ’ ἐνα τῆς κολυμβητικῆς ἀττα μέρη καὶ τοιαῦτ’ ἄλλα βραχέα, χάριν εἶπαί, τὸ δὲ, τῶν ἐμψύχων ζῷων οὐδαν θήραν, προσεπείν ζωοθηρικῆς. 

ἡθ. Ἔστω. 

ἐς. Ζωοθηρικὴς δὲ ἂρ’ οὔ διπλοῦν εἴδος ἄν λέγοιτο ἐν δίκη, τὸ μὲν πεζοῦ γένους, πολλοῖς εἴδεσι καὶ οὐνόμαι διηρημένον, πεζοθηρικὸν, τὸ δ’ ἐτερον νευστικοῦ ζῷου πᾶν ἐνυγροθηρικὸν; 

ἡθ. Πάνυ γε. 

Β ἐς. Νευστικοῦ μήν τὸ μὲν πτηνοῦ φύλον ὀρώμεν, τὸ δὲ ἐνυδρον; 

ἡθ. Πῶς δ’ οὔ; 

ἐς. Καὶ τοῦ πτηνοῦ μὴν γένους πᾶσα ἡμῖν ἡ θήρα λέγεται πού τις ὀρνιθευτικὴ. 

1 θέντας Stobaeus; θέντες BT. 

2 ὅν Heindorf; ἐάν BTW.
acquisitive art, and, since it coerces either by word or deed, might be called coercive?

Theaet. It appears so, at any rate, from what you have said.

Str. Well then, shall we not divide coercive art into two parts?

Theaet. In what way?

Str. By calling all the open part of it fighting and all the secret part hunting.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. But it would be unreasonable not to divide hunting into two parts.

Theaet. Say how it can be done.

Str. By dividing it into the hunting of the lifeless and of the living.

Theaet. Certainly, if both exist.

Str. Of course they exist. And we must pass over the hunting of lifeless things, which has no name, with the exception of some kinds of diving and the like, which are of little importance; but the hunting of living things we will call animal-hunting.

Theaet. Very well.

Str. And two classes of animal-hunting might properly be made, one (and this is divided under many classes and names) the hunting of creatures that go on their feet, land-animal hunting, and the other that of swimming creatures, to be called, as a whole, water-animal hunting?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And of swimming creatures we see that one tribe is winged and the other is in the water?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. And the hunting of winged creatures is called, as a whole, fowling.
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ΘΕΑΙ. Δέγεται γάρ οὖν.
ΞΕ. Τοῦ δὲ ἐνύδρου σχεδὸν τὸ σύνολον ἀλευτικῆ.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.
ΞΕ. Τι δὲ; ταύτην αὕτην θήραν ἄρ’ οὐκ ἂν κατὰ μέγιστα μέρη δύο διελοίμην;
ΘΕΑΙ. Κατὰ ποιὰ;
ΞΕ. Καθ’ ὁ τὸ μὲν ἐρκεσιν αὐτόθεν 1 ποιεῖται τὴν θήραν, τὸ δὲ πληγῇ.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις, καὶ πῆ διαιρούμενος ἐκάτερον;
ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν, ὅτι πᾶν οὐσιν ἂν ἕνεκα κωλύσεως
C εἴρηγι τι περιέχον, ἐρκος εἰκὸς ὀνομάξειν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ΞΕ. Κύρτους δὴ καὶ δίκτυα καὶ βρόχους καὶ
πόρκους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μῶν ἀλλο τι πλὴν ἐρκῆ
χρῆ προσαγορεῦειν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲν.
ΞΕ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα ἐρκοθηρικὸν τῆς ἄγρας τὸ
μέρος φήσομεν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.
ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ ἀγκίστρος καὶ τριόδουσι πληγῇ
γυνόμενον ἐσερον μὲν ἐκεῖνον, πληκτικῆν δὲ τινα
D θῆραν ἡμᾶς προσεπτέιν ἐν λόγῳ νῦν χρεῶν. ἢ τι
tis ἁν, Θεαίτητε, εἴποι κάλλιον;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀμελέωμεν τοῦ ὀνόματος. ἀρκεῖ γὰρ καὶ
tούτοτε.
ΞΕ. Τῆς τοῖνυν πληκτικῆς τὸ μὲν νυκτερινῶν,
οἶμαι, πρὸς πυρὸς φῶς γυνόμενον ὑπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν
περὶ τὴν θήραν πυρευτικὴν ῥηθῆναι συμβέβηκεν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.
ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ γε μεθημεριῶν, ὡς ἔχοντων ἐν ἄκροις
ἀγκιστρα καὶ τῶν τρισδόντων, πάν ἀγκιστρευτικῶν.

1 αὐτόθεν al.; αὐτόθι BT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. It is.

STR. And the hunting of water creatures goes by the general name of fishing.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And might I not divide this kind of hunting into two principal divisions?

THEAET. What divisions?

STR. The one carries on the hunt by means of enclosures merely, the other by a blow.

THEAET. What do you mean, and how do you distinguish the two?

STR. As regards the first, because whatever surrounds anything and encloses it so as to constrain it is properly called an enclosure.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. May not, then, wicker baskets and seines and snares and nets and the like be called enclosures?

THEAET. Assuredly.

STR. Then we will call this division hunting by enclosures, or something of that sort.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And the other, which is done with a blow, by means of hooks and three pronged spears, we must now—to name it with a single word—call striking; or could a better name be found, Theaetetus?

THEAET. Never mind the name; that will do well enough.

STR. Then the kind of striking which takes place at night by the light of a fire is, I suppose, called by the hunters themselves fire-hunting.

THEAET. To be sure.

STR. And that which belongs to the daytime is, as a whole, barb-hunting, since the spears, as well as the hooks, are tipped with barbs.
6. ΕΕ. Τού τοίνυν ἀγκιστρευτικοῦ τῆς πληκτικῆς τὸ μὲν ἀνωθεν εἰς τὸ κάτω γιγνόμενον διὰ τὸ τοῖς τριόδουσιν οὔτω μάλιστα χρῆσθαι τριεδοντία τις, οίμαι, κέκληται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φασί γοῦν τινές.
ΕΕ. Τὸ δὲ γε λοιπὸν ἐστιν ἐν ἐτὶ μόνον ως εἰπεῖν εἴδοσ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον;
ΕΕ. Τὸ τῆς ἐναντίας ταύτης πληγῆς, ἀγκιστρῳ τε γιγνόμενον καὶ τῶν ἵχθουν οὐχ ἢ τις ἢν τύχῃ τοῦ σώματος, ὥσπερ τοῖς τριόδουσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα τοῦ θηρευθέντος ἐκάστοτε, καὶ κάτωθεν εἰς τοῦναντίον ἄνω βαρβάδοι καὶ καλάμως ἀνασπώμενον οὐ τί φέσομεν, ὥ Θεαίτητε, δεῖν τοῦνομα λέγοσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκῶ μὲν, ὅπερ ἀρτί προνθέμεθα δεῖν ἐξευρεῖν, τοῦτο αὐτὸ νῦν ἀποτετελέσθαι.

7. ΕΕ. Νῦν ἀρα τῆς ἀσπαλειτικῆς περὶ συ ἰσαρχον συνωμολογήκαμεν ὦ μόνω τοῦνομα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λόγον περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦργον εἰλήφαμεν ἢκανὼς. ἔμπασης γάρ τέχνης τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ μέρος κτητικῶν ἢ, κτητικοῦ δὲ χειρωτικῶν, χειρωτικοῦ δὲ θηρευτικῶν, τοῦ δὲ θηρευτικοῦ ζωοθηρικῶν, ζωοθηρικοῦ δὲ ἐνυγροθηρικῶν, ἐνυγροθηρικοῦ δὲ τὸ κάτωθεν τμῆμα ὅλων ἀλιευτικῶν, ἀλιευτικῆς δὲ πληκτικῶν, πληκτικῆς δὲ ἀγκιστρευτικῶν· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ περὶ τῆν κάτωθεν ἄνω πληγῆν ἀνασπωμένην,
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THEAET. Yes, it is so called.

STR. Then of striking which belongs to barb-hunting, that part which proceeds downward from above, is called, because tridents are chiefly used in it, tridentry, I suppose.

THEAET. Yes, some people, at any rate, call it so.

STR. Then there still remains, I may say, only one further kind.

THEAET. What is that?

STR. The kind that is characterized by the opposite sort of blow, which is practised with a hook and strikes, not any chance part of the body of the fishes, as tridents do, but only the head and mouth of the fish caught, and proceeds from below upwards, being pulled up by twigs and rods. By what name, Theaetetus, shall we say this ought to be called?

THEAET. I think our search is now ended and we have found the very thing we set before us a while ago as necessary to find.

STR. Now, then, you and I are not only agreed about the name of angling, but we have acquired also a satisfactory definition of the thing itself. For of art as a whole, half was acquisitive, and of the acquisitive, half was coercive, and of the coercive, half was hunting, and of hunting, half was animal hunting, and of animal hunting, half was water hunting, and, taken as a whole, of water hunting the lower part was fishing, and of fishing, half was striking, and of striking, half was barb-hunting, and of this the part in which the blow is pulled from below upwards at an angle has a name in the very

The words at an angle are inserted merely to give a reason in English for the words which follow them.
PLATO

C ἀπ' αὐτῆς τῆς πράξεως ἄφομοιωθέν τούνομα, ἢ νῦν ἀσπαλιευτικὴ ζητηθείσα ἐπίκλην γέγονεν.

ὁεαί. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τοῦτο γε ἰκανῶς δεδήλωται.

8. ἕ. Φέρε δὴ, κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ παράδειγμα καὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐπιχειρῶμεν εὔρειν, ὦ τί ποτ' ἐστιν.

ὁεαί. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ὁ. Καὶ μὴν ἐκείνῳ γ' ἢν τὸ ζήτημα πρῶτον, πότερον ἰδιώτην ἢ τίνα τέχνην ἔχοντα θετέον εἶναι τὸν ἀσπαλιευτήν.

ὁεαί. Ναί.

ὁ. Καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτον ἰδιώτην θήσομεν, ὥς ὁ Θεαίτητε, ἢ παντάπασιν ὡς ἀληθῶς σοφιστήν;

ὁεαί. Οὐδαμῶς ἰδιώτην· μανθάνω γάρ ὁ λέγεις, ὡς παντὸς δεὶ τοιοῦτος ἕνεκ' τὸ γε ὄνομα τοῦτο ἔχων.

ὁ. 'Αλλὰ τίνα τέχνην αὐτὸν ἢμῖν ἔχοντα, ὡς ἐοικε, θετέον.

ὁεαί. Τίνα ποτ' οὖν δὴ ταύτην;

ὁ. Ἥ' ἀρ' ὡς πρὸς θεω τὴν ἡγονοῆκαμεν τάνδρος τὸν ἀνδρα ἄντα ξυγγενή;

ὁεαί. Τίνα τοῦ;

ὁ. Τῶν ἀσπαλιευτήν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ.

ὁεαί. Πῇ;

ὁ. Ἐπερευτὰ τινες καταφαίνεσθον ἄμφω μοι.

Ε ὁεαί. Τίνος θήρας ἀτέρως; τὸν μὲν γάρ ἑτερον εἴπομεν.

ὁ. Διόχα τοὺς νῦν δὴ διείλομεν τὴν ἄγγαν πᾶσαν, νευστικοῦ μέρους, τὸ δὲ πεζοῦ τέμνοντες.

1 παντὸς δεὶ τοιοῦτος Winckelmann; πάντως δεὶ τοιοῦτος B; πάντως δεὶ τοιοῦτον T.

2 νῦν δὴ T; νῦ ν B.

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likeness of the act and is called angling, which was the object of our present search.

THEAET. That at all events has been made perfectly clear.

STR. Come, then, let us use this as a pattern and try to find out what a sophist is.

THEAET. By all means.

STR. Well, then, the first question we asked was whether we must assume that the angler was just a man or was a man with an art.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Now take this man of ours, Theaetetus. Shall we assume that he is just a man, or by all means really a man of wisdom?

THEAET. Certainly not just a man; for I catch your meaning that he is very far from being wise, although his name implies wisdom.

STR. But we must, it seems, assume that he has an art of some kind.

THEAET. Well, then, what in the world is this art that he has?

STR. Good gracious! Have we failed to notice that the man is akin to the other man?

THEAET. Who is akin to whom?

STR. The angler to the sophist.

THEAET. How so?

STR. They both seem clearly to me to be a sort of hunters.

THEAET. What is the hunting of the second? We have spoken about the first.

STR. We just now divided hunting as a whole into two classes, and made one division that of swimming creatures and the other that of land-hunting.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΞΕ. Καὶ τὸ μὲν διήλθομεν, ὡσον περὶ τὰ νευ-
στικὰ τῶν ἐνύδρων. τὸ δὲ πεζὸν εἰάσαμεν ἀσχιστον,
eἰπόντες ὅτι πολυεἰδὲς εἶη.

222 ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. Μέχρι μὲν τοῖνυν ἐνταῦθα ὁ σοφιστὴς τε
καὶ ὁ ἀσταλλευτὴς ἀμα ἀπὸ τῆς κτητικῆς τέχνης
πορεύεσθον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἑοίκατον γοῦν.

ΞΕ. Ἐκτρέπεσθον δὲ γε ἀπὸ τῆς ζωοθηρικῆς,
ὁ μὲν ἐπὶ θάλασσαν που καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ λίμνας,
tὰν τούτοις ζώα θηρευσόμενοι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΞΕ. Ὅ δὲ γε ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ ποταμοὺς ἔτερους
ἀὖ τινας, πλοῦτον καὶ νεότητος οἴον λειμῶνας
ἀφθόνους, τὰν τούτοις θρέμματα χειρωσόμενοι.

Β ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΞΕ. Τῆς πεζῆς θήρας γίγνεσθον δύο μεγίστω
των μέρη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίον ἐκάτερον;

ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν τῶν ἡμέρων, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀγρίων.

9. ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰτ' ἐστὶ τις θήρα τῶν ἡμέρων;

ΞΕ. Εἰπέρ γε ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος ἡμερον ζώον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐπ' ἄπῃ χαίρεις, εἴτε μηδὲν τιθεὶς ἡμερον, εἴτε
ἀλλο μὲν ἡμερον τι, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἁγρίον, εἴτε
ἡμερον μὲν λέγεις αὖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἄνθρωπον
δὲ μηδεμίαν ἥγει θήραν· τούτων ὁπότερ' ἄν ἡγη
φίλον εἰρήσθαι σοι, τοῦτο ἡμῖν διώρισον.

C ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς τε ἡμερον, ὃ ἔγεν, ἡγούμαι
ζώον, θήραν τε ἄνθρωπων εἶναι λέγω.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And the one we discussed, so far as the swimming creatures that live in the water are concerned; but we left the land-hunting undivided, merely remarking that it has many forms.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Now up to that point the sophist and the angler proceed together from the starting-point of acquisitive art.

THEAET. I think they do.

STR. But they separate at the point of animal-hunting, where the one turns to the sea and rivers and lakes to hunt the animals in those.

THEAET. To be sure.

STR. But the other turns toward the land and to rivers of a different kind—rivers of wealth and youth, bounteous meadows, as it were—and he intends to coerce the creatures in them.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. Of land-hunting there are two chief divisions.

THEAET. What are they?

STR. One is the hunting of tame, the other of wild creatures.

THEAET. Is there, then, a hunting of tame creatures?

STR. Yes, if man is a tame animal; but make any assumption you like, that there is no tame animal, or that some other tame animal exists but man is a wild one or that man is tame but there is no hunting of man. For the purpose of our definition choose whichever of these statements you think is satisfactory to you.

THEAET. Why, Stranger, I think we are a tame animal, and I agree that there is a hunting of man.
ΕΕ. Διττὴν τοίνυν καὶ τὴν ἥμεροθηρικὴν εἶπομεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κατὰ τί λέγοντες;

ΕΕ. Τὴν μὲν ληστικὴν καὶ ἀνδραποδιστικὴν καὶ τυραννικὴν καὶ ἄμωματα τὴν πολεμικὴν, ἐν πάντα βίαιον θῆραν ὁρισάμενοι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς.

ΕΕ. Τὴν δὲ γε δικανικὴν καὶ δημηγορικὴν καὶ προσομιλητικὴν, ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ ξύνολον, πιθανουργικήν

Δ τινα μίαν τέχνην προσεπόντες.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρθως.

ΕΕ. Ζῆσσι πιθανουργικῆς διττὰ λέγωμεν γένη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποία;

ΕΕ. Τὸ μὲν ἄλλον ἰδία, τὸ δὲ δημοσία γιγνόμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Γίγνεσθον γὰρ οὖν εἶδος ἐκάτερον.

ΕΕ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτῇ τῆς ἰδιοθηρευτικῆς τὸ μὲν μισθαρνητικὸν ἕστι, τὸ δὲ δωροφορικὸν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μανθάνω.

ΕΕ. Ζῆ τῶν ἐρωτῶν θῆρα τῶν νοῦν, ὡς ἐοικας, οὕτω προσέσχες.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦ πέρι;

ΕΕ. "Οτι τοῖς θηρευθείς δῶρα προσεπιδιδόασιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθεστατα λέγεις.

ΕΕ. Τουτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐρωτικῆς τέχνης ἐστω εἴδος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΕΕ. Τοῦ δὲ γε μισθαρνητικοῦ τὸ μὲν προσομιλικὸν ἔμη καὶ παντάπασι δι' ἡδονῆς τὸ δέλεαρ πεποιημένον καὶ τὸν μισθὸν πραττόμενον τροφὴν ἐαυτῷ μόνον κολακικὴν, ὡς έγώμαι,

1 μισθαρνητικὸν Heindorf; μισθαρνητικὸν BTW (so also below).

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str. Let us, then, say that the hunting of tame animals is also of two kinds.

THEAET. How do we justify that assertion?
str. By defining piracy, man-stealing, tyranny, and the whole art of war all collectively as hunting by force.

THEAET. Excellent.
str. And by giving the art of the law courts, of the public platform, and of conversation also a single name and calling them all collectively an art of persuasion.

THEAET. Correct.
str. Now let us say that there are two kinds of persuasion.

THEAET. What kinds?
str. The one has to do with private persons, the other with the community.

THEAET. Granted; each of them does form a class.
str. Then again of the hunting of private persons one kind receives pay, and the other brings gifts, does it not?

THEAET. I do not understand.
str. Apparently you have never yet paid attention to the lovers' method of hunting.

THEAET. In what respect?
str. That in addition to their other efforts they give presents to those whom they hunt.

THEAET. You are quite right.
str. Let us, then, call this the amatory art.

THEAET. Agreed.
str. But that part of the paid kind which converses to furnish gratification and makes pleasure exclusively its bait and demands as its pay only maintenance, we might all agree, if I am not mis-
223 πάντες φαίμεν ἃν ἡ ἡδυντικήν τινα τέχνην εἶναι.

Θεαὶ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;

ζή. Τὸ δὲ ἐπαγγελλόμενον μὲν ὡς ἄρετῆς ἐνεκα τὰς ὁμιλίας ποιοῦμενον, μυσθὸν δὲ νόμισμα πραττόμενον, ἄρα οὗ τοῦτο τὸ γένος ἐτέρω προσεπεῖν ἄξιον ὅνοματι;

Θεαὶ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;

ζή. Τίνι δὴ τοῦτῳ; πειρῶ λέγειν.

Θεαὶ. Δήλον δή. τὸν γὰρ σοφιστὴν μοι δοκοῦμεν ἀνηρηκέναι. τοῦτ’ οὖν ἔγωγε εἰπὼν τὸ προσήκον ὅνομ’ ἂν ἡγοῦμαι καλεῖν αὐτὸν.

Β 10. ζή. Κατὰ δὴ τὸν γών, ὁ Ἐθεαίτης, λόγον, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἡ τέχνης οἰκειωτικής, χειρωτικῆς, ἡθευτικῆς, ἣσθηριας, χερσαίας, ἰμεροθηρικῆς, ἀνθρωποθηρίας, ἰδιοθηρίας, μισθαρικῆς, νομοσα-τοπωλικῆς, δοξοπαιδευτικῆς, νέων πλούσιων καὶ ἐνδόξων γενομένη θῆρα προσρητέου, ὡς ὁ νῦν λόγος ἡμῖν συμβαίνει, σοφιστικῆ.

Θεαὶ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ζή. "Ετι δὲ καὶ τῇδε ἵδωμεν4. οὔ γὰρ τι φαίλης

ζή. Τὸ τῆς κτητικῆς τέχνης διπλοῦν ἢν εἶδὸς που, τὸ μὲν θηρευτικὸν μέρος ἔχου, τὸ δὲ ἀλλακτικόν.

1 ἡ Heindorf; ἡ om. mss.
2 χειρωτικῆς add. Aldina; κτητικῆς mss.; secl. Schleiermacher.
3 ἣσθηριας πεξοθηρίας mss.; πεξοθηρίας secl. Schleiermacher.
4 ἵδωμεν W; εἰδῶμεν BT.

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taken, to call the art of flattery or of making things pleasant.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. But the class which proposes to carry on its conversations for the sake of virtue and demands its pay in cash—does not this deserve to be called by another name?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And what is that name? Try to tell.

THEAET. It is obvious; for I think we have discovered the sophist. And therefore by uttering that word I think I should give him the right name.

STR. Then, as it seems, according to our present reasoning, Theaetetus, the part of appropriative, coercive, hunting art which hunts animals, land animals, tame animals, man, privately, for pay, is paid in cash, claims to give education, and is a hunt after rich and promising youths, must—so our present argument concludes—be called sophistry.

THEAET. Most assuredly.

STR. But let us look at it in still another way; for the class we are now examining partakes of no mean art, but of a very many-sided one. And we must indeed do so, for in our previous talk it presents an appearance of being, not what we now say it is, but another class.

THEAET. How so?

STR. The acquisitive art was of two sorts, the one the division of hunting, the other that of exchange.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡν γὰρ οὖν.

ΕΕ. Τῆς τοίνυν ἀλλακτικῆς δύο εἴδη λέγωμεν, τὸ μὲν δωρητικόν, τὸ δὲ ἑτερον ἀγοραστικόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰρήσθω.

ΕΕ. Καὶ μὴν αὖ φήσομεν ἀγοραστικὴν δικῇ τέμνεσθαι.

ΔΘΕΑΙ. Πή;

ΕΕ. Τὴν μὲν τῶν αὐτουργῶν αὐτοπωλικὴν διαρρούμενοι, τὴν δὲ τὰ ἄλλοτρα ἔργα μεταβαλλομένην μεταβλητικὴν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΕΕ. Τί δέ; τῆς μεταβλητικῆς οὐχ ἢ μὲν κατὰ πόλιν ἄλλαγὴν, σχεδὸν αὐτῆς ήμου μέρος ὅν, καπηλικῆ ¹ προσαγορεύεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΕΕ. Τὸ δὲ γε ἑξ ἄλλης εἰς ἄλλην πόλιν διαλαττόμενον ² ὅνη καὶ πράσει ἐμπορικὴ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ’ οὖ;

ΕΕ. Τῆς δ’ ἐμπορικῆς ἄρ’ οὐκ ἥσθημεθα ὅτι τὸ Ἐ μὲν ὁσσος τὸ σώμα τρέφεται καὶ χρηται, ³ τὸ δὲ ὁσσος ἡ ψυχὴ πωλοῦν διὰ νομίσματος ἀλλάττεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς τούτο λέγεις;

ΕΕ. Τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἵσως ἀγνοοῦμεν, ἐπεὶ τὸ γε ἑτερον που ἔπνευμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΕΕ. Μουσικήν τε τοίνυν ξυνάπασαν λέγωμεν,

¹ καπηλικῆ bt; καὶ πηλικῆ BT.
² διαλαττόμενον| διαλαττομένων BT; διαλάττουν W.
³ καὶ χρήται Heindorf; κέχρηται BT.

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THEAET. Yes, it was.
STR. Now shall we say that there are two sorts of exchange, the one by gift, the other by sale?
THEAET. So be it.
STR. And we shall say further that exchange by sale is divided into two parts.
THEAET. How so?
STR. We make this distinction—calling the part which sells a man's own productions the selling of one's own, and the other, which exchanges the works of others, exchange.
THEAET. Certainly.
STR. Well, then, that part of exchange which is carried on in the city, amounting to about half of it, is called retailing, is it not?
THEAET. Yes.
STR. And that which exchanges goods from city to city by purchase and sale is called merchandising?
THEAET. Certainly.
STR. And have we not observed that one part of merchandising sells and exchanges for cash whatever serves the body for its support and needs, and the other whatever serves the soul?
THEAET. What do you mean by that?
STR. Perhaps we do not know about the part that has to do with the soul; though I fancy we do understand the other division.
THEAET. Yes.
STR. Take, therefore, the liberal arts¹ in general

¹ The word μουσική, here rendered "liberal arts," is much more inclusive than the English word "music," designating, as it does, nearly all education and culture except the purely physical. In the Athens of Socrates' day many, possibly most, of the teachers of music in this larger sense were foreigners, Greeks, of course, but not Athenians.
ἐκ πόλεως ἐκάστοτε εἰς πόλιν ἐνθευ μὲν ὠνηθεῖσαν, ἐτέρῳς δὲ ἄγομένην καὶ τυπρασκομένην, καὶ γραφικήν καὶ θαυματοποικήν καὶ πολλὰ ἐτέρα τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰ μὲν παραμυθίας, τὰ δὲ καὶ σπουδῆς χάριν ἀχθέντα καὶ πωλούμενα, τὸν ἄγοντα καὶ πωλοῦντα μηδὲν ἦττον τῆς τῶν συτίων καὶ ποτῶν πράσεως ἐμπορον ὡρθῶς ἄν λεγόμενον παρασχεῖν.

ترنت. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

Β ζε. Οὔκοιν καὶ τὸν μαθήματα ἐυνωνούμενον πόλιν τε ἐκ πόλεως νομίσματος ἀμείβοντα ταύτον προσερεῖς ὄνομα;

ворот. Σφόδρα γε.

II. ζε. Τῆς δὴ ψυχεμπορικῆς ταύτης ἅρ' οὗ τὸ μὲν ἐπιδεικτικὴ δικαίωτα λέγοντ' ἂν, τὸ δὲ γελοῖον μὲν οὐχ ἤττον τοῦ πρόσθεν, ὃμως δὲ μαθημάτων οὕσαν πρᾶσιν αὐτὴν ἀδελφῷ τινι τῆς πράξεως ὄνοματι προσειπεῖν ἀνάγκη;

ворот. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ζε. Ταύτης τούντι τῆς μαθηματοπωλικῆς τὸ C μὲν περὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν μαθήματα ἐτέρῳ, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄλλω προσρητέον.

ворот. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ζε. Τεχνοπωλικῶν μὴν τὸ γε περὶ τᾶλλα ἄν ἀρμόττοι· τὸ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα σὺ προσεμήθητι λέγειν ὄνομα.

ворот. Καὶ τὶς ᾑν ἄλλο ὄνομα εἰπὼν οὐκ ᾑν πλημμελοῖν πλὴν τὸ νῦν ξητούμενον αὐτὸ ἐἶναι τὸ σοφιστικὸν γένος;

ζε. Οὔδὲν ἄλλο. ἦθι δὴ νῦν 1 συναγάγωμεν αὐτὸ λέγοντες ὅσ τὸ κτητικῆς, μεταβλητικῆς; 2

1 ήθι νῦν ΒΤ (ἂν above the line Τ); ήθι δὴ W.

2 μεταβλητικῆς] μεταβλητικῶν ΒΤ.

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that constantly go about from city to city, bought in one place and carried to another and sold—painting, and conjuring, and the many other things that affect the soul, which are imported and sold partly for its entertainment and partly for its serious needs; we cannot deny that he who carries these about and sells them constitutes a merchant properly so called, no less than he whose business is the sale of food and drink.

Theaet. Very true.

Str. Then will you give the same name to him who buys up knowledge and goes about from city to city exchanging his wares for money?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. One part of this soul-merchandising might very properly be called the art of display, might it not? But since the other part, though no less ridiculous than the first, is nevertheless a traffic in knowledge, must we not call it by some name akin to its business?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Now of this merchandising in knowledge the part which has to do with the knowledge of the other arts should be called by one name, and that which has to do with virtue by another.

Theaet. Of course.

Str. The name of art-merchant would fit the one who trades in the other arts, and now do you be so good as to tell the name of him who trades in virtue.

Theaet. And what other name could one give, without making a mistake, than that which is the object of our present investigation—the sophist?

Str. No other. Come then, let us now summarize the matter by saying that sophistry has appeared a
D' ágorastikής, ἐμπορικῆς, ἡ ψυχεμπορικῆς περὶ λόγους καὶ μαθήματα, ἀρετῆς πωλητικῶν δεύτερον ἀνεφάνη σοφιστικῆ.

Thēai. Μάλα γε.

Σε. Τρίτον δὲ γ' οἴμαι σε, κἂν εἰ τις αὐτοῦ καθιδρυμένος ἐν πόλει, τὰ μὲν ωνούμενος, τὰ δὲ καὶ τεκταίνομενος αὐτὸς μαθηματα περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πωλῶν ἐκ τούτου τὸ ζῆν προούταξατο, καλεῖν οὔδεν ἄλλο πλῆν ὀπερ νῦν δή.

Thēai. Τί δ' οὖ μέλλων;

Σε. Καὶ τὸ κτητικῆς ἀρα μεταβλητικῶν, ἀγορα-Εστικῶν, κατηλικῶν εἴτε αὐτοπωλικῶν, ἀμφοτέρως, ὡς ἔνε κἂν περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα μαθηματοπωλικῶν γένος, ἄει σὺ προσερεῖς, ως φαίνει, σοφιστικῶν.

Thēai. Ἀνάγκη· τῷ γὰρ λόγῳ δεὶ συνακολουθεῖν.

I2. Σε. Ἔτι δὴ σκοπῶμεν, εἴ τινι τοιῶδε προσέοικεν ἄρα τὸ νῦν μεταδιωκόμενον γένος.

225 Thēai. Ποίῳ δή;

Σε. Τῆς κτητικῆς ἀγωνιστικῆ τι μέρος ἢμῖν ἢν.

Thēai. Ὡν γὰρ οὖν.

Σε. Οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπον τοίνυν ἐστὶ διαφεῖν αὐτὴν δίχα.

Thēai. Καθ' ὅτοια λέγε.

Σε. Τὸ μὲν ἀμιλλητικὸν αὐτῆς τιθέντας, τὸ δὲ μαχητικὸν.

Thēai. Ἐστὼν.

Σε. Τῆς το ὀνυν μαχητικῆς τῷ μὲν σώματι

1 ἐμπορικῆς] ἐμπορικοῦ ΒΤ.
second time as that part of acquisitive art, art of exchange, of trafficking, of merchandising, of soul-merchandising which deals in words and knowledge, and trades in virtue.

THEAET. Very well.

STR. But there is a third case: If a man settled down here in town and proposed to make his living by selling these same wares of knowledge, buying some of them and making others himself, you would, I fancy, not call him by any other name than that which you used a moment ago.

THEAET. Certainly not.

STR. Then also that part of acquisitive art which proceeds by exchange, and by sale, whether as mere retail trade or the sale of one's own productions, no matter which, so long as it is of the class of merchandising in knowledge, you will always, apparently, call sophistry.

THEAET. I must do so, for I have to follow where the argument leads.

STR. Let us examine further and see if the class we are now pursuing has still another aspect, of similar nature.

THEAET. Of what nature?

STR. We agreed that fighting was a division of acquisitive art.

THEAET. Yes, we did.

STR. Then it is quite fitting to divide it into two parts.

THEAET. Tell what the parts are.

STR. Let us call one part of it the competitive and the other the pugnacious.

THEAET. Agreed.

STR. Then it is reasonable and fitting to give to
PLATO

πρὸς σώματα γυγνομένω σχεδὸν εἰκὸς καὶ πρέπον ὄνομα λέγειν τι τοιοῦτον τιθεμένους οἶνον βιαστικὸν. 

οει. Ναί.

ἐσ. Τῶ δὲ λόγοι πρὸς λόγους τί τις, ὡ Θεαί - 

Β τητε, ἀλλὸ εἴπῃ πλὴν ἀμφισβητητικὸν 1; 

οει. Οὐδὲν.

ἐσ. Τὸ δὲ γε περὶ τὰς ἀμφισβητήσεις θετέον 

dιττόν.

οει. Πῇ; 

ἐσ. Καθὸ ὦσον μὲν γὰρ γίγνεται μῆκεσι τε πρὸς 

ἔναντία μῆκη λόγων καὶ περὶ τὰ 2 δίκαια καὶ 

ἀδικα δημοσία, δικανικῶν. 

οει. Ναί.

ἐσ. Τὸ δὲ ἐν ἰδίοις αὐ καὶ κατακεκερματισμένον 

ἐρωτήσει πρὸς ἀποκρίσεις μὲν εἰθίσμεθα καλεῖν 

ἀλλὸ πλὴν ἀντιλογικῶν; 

οει. Οὐδὲν.

ἐσ. Τοῦ δὲ ἀντιλογικοῦ τὸ μὲν ὦσον περὶ τὰ 

C εὐμβόλαια ἀμφισβητεῖται μὲν, εἰκῆ δὲ καὶ ἀτέ- 

χως περὶ αὐτὸ πράττειν, ταῦτα 3 θετέον μὲν 

εἴδος, ἐπείπερ αὐτὸ διεγνωκέν ὡς ἔτερον ὅν ὁ λόγος, 

ἀτὰρ ἐπωνυμίας οὐθ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν ἐτύχεν 

οὔτε νῦν ύπ' ἡμῶν τυχεῖν ἄξιον.

οει. Ἀληθῆ· κατὰ σμικρὰ γὰρ λίιν καὶ 

παντοδαπὰ διήρηται.

ἐσ. Τὸ δὲ γε ἐντεχνὸν, καὶ περὶ δικαίων αὐτῶν 

καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅλως ἀμφισβητοῦν, 

ἄρ' οὐκ ἐριστικὸν αὐ λέγειν εἰθίσμεθα; 

οει. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

1 ἀμφισβητητικῶν Stephanus; ἀμφισβητητικῶν BTW. 

2 τὰ om. TW. 

3 ταῦτα BT; τοῦτο al.

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that part of the pugnacious which consists of bodily contests some such name as violent.

THEAET. Yes.

str. And what other name than controversy shall we give to the contests of words?

THEAET. No other.

str. But controversy must be divided into two kinds.

THEAET. How?

str. Whenever long speeches are opposed by long speeches on questions of justice and injustice in public, that is forensic controversy.

THEAET. Yes.

str. But that which is carried on among private persons and is cut up into little bits by means of questions and their answers, we are accustomed to call argumentation, are we not?

THEAET. We are.

str. And that part of argumentation which deals with business contracts, in which there is controversy, to be sure, but it is carried on informally and without rules of art—all that must be considered a distinct class, now that our argument has recognized it as different from the rest, but it received no name from our predecessors, nor does it now deserve to receive one from us.

THEAET. True; for the divisions into which it falls are too small and too miscellaneous.

str. But that which possesses rules of art and carries on controversy about abstract justice and injustice and the rest in general terms, we are accustomed to call disputation, are we not?

THEAET. Certainly.
D ΕΕ. Τού μὴν ἑριστικοῦ τὸ μὲν χρηματοφθορικὸν, τὸ δὲ χρηματιστικὸν ὃν τυγχάνει.
ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι γε.
ΕΕ. Τὴν ἐπωνυμιὰν τοῖνυν, ἦν ἐκάτερον δεὶ καλεῖν αὐτῶν, πειραθῶμεν εἰπεῖν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν χρῆ.
ΕΕ. Δοκῶ μὴν τὸ γε ἕδονὴν τῆς περὶ ταῦτα διατριβῆς ἀμελές τῶν οἰκείων γιγνόμενον, περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων οὐ μεθ᾽ ἕδονῆς ἀκουόμενον καλεῖσθαι κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἐμὴν οὖχ ἔτερον ἀδολεσχικοῦ.
ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν οὕτω πως.
ΕΕ. Τουτοῦ τοῖνυν τούναντίον, ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδιωτικῶν ἐρίδων χρηματιζόμενον, ἐν τῷ μέρει οὐ πειρῶ νῦν εἰπεῖν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τί ἄν αὐτ ἐπὶ ἐτερον οὐκ ἐξαιμάρτοι πλὴν γε τὸν θαυμαστὸν πάλιν ἐκεῖνον ἦκειν αὐτὶ νῦν τέταρτον τὸν μεταδιωκόμενον ὑφ᾽ ἕμων σοφιστῆς;
226 ΕΕ. Οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἡ τὸ χρηματιστικὸν γένος, ὡς ἐουκεν, ἑριστικῆς ὃν τέχνης, τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς, τῆς ἀμφισβητητικῆς, τῆς μαχητικῆς, τῆς ἀγωνιστικῆς, τῆς κτητικῆς ἔστιν, ὡς ὁ λόγος αὐτὶ μεμήνυκε νῦν, ὁ σοφιστῆς.
ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν.
13. ΕΕ. Ὁρᾶσι οὖν ὡς ἄληθῆ λέγεται τὸ ποικίλον εἶναι τούτῳ τὸ θηρίον καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον ἵνα τῇ ἐτέρᾳ ληπτόν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν ἀμφοῖν χρῆ.

1 τὸ γε vulg.; τόδε BT; τὸ δὲ W. 2 τί add. Heindorf. 3 ἀμφισβητητικῆς ἀμφισβητητικῆς BTW. 4 ληπτῶν W; ληπτέον BT.

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str. Well, of disputation, one sort wastes money, the other makes money.

THEAET. Certainly.

str. Then let us try to tell the name by which we must call each of these.

THEAET. Yes, we must do so.

str. Presumably the kind which causes a man to neglect his own affairs for the pleasure of engaging in it, but the style of which causes no pleasure to most of his hearers, is, in my opinion, called by no other name than garrulity.

THEAET. Yes, that is about what it is called.

str. Then the opposite of this, the kind which makes money from private disputes—try now, for it is your turn, to give its name.

THEAET. What other answer could one give without making a mistake, than that now again for the fourth time that wonderful being whom we have so long been pursuing has turned up—the sophist!

str. Yes, and the sophist is nothing else, apparently, than the money-making class of the disputatious, argumentative, controversial, pugnacious, combative, acquisitive art, as our argument has now again stated.

THEAET. Certainly.

str. Do you see the truth of the statement that this creature is many-sided and, as the saying is, not to be caught with one hand?

THEAET. Then we must catch him with both.
Xρή γὰρ οὖν, καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν γε οὕτω
Β ποιητέον, τοιόνδε τι μεταθέοντας ἵχνος αὐτοῦ.
καὶ μοι λέγε· τῶν οἰκετικῶν οὐρομάτων καλοῦμεν
άττα ποι;

Τι μήν;

Καὶ πρὸς γε τούτους ἔτι ξαίνειν, κατάγειν,
κερκίζειν, καὶ μυρία ἐν ταῖς τέχναις ἄλλα τοιαῦτα
ἐνόντα ἑπιστάμεθα. ἦ γὰρ;

Τὸ ποιὸν αὐτῶν πέρι βουληθεὶς δηλώσαι

Διαρειγματα προθείς ταῦτα κατὰ πάντων ἦροι;

Διαρετικά ποι ἐλεθέντα εἴρηται ξύμπαντα.

Ναὶ.

Κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν τοίνυν λόγον ὡς περὶ ταῦτα
μίαν οὕσαν ἐν ἀπασι τέχνην ἐνὸς οὐρομάτος ἀξιώ-

σομεν αὐτήν.

Τίνα προσεπόντες;

Διακριτικὴν.

’Εστώ.

Σκόπει δὴ ταῦτα αὖ δύο ἣν πη δυνώμεθα
κατιδεὼς εἴδη.

Ταχείαν ὡς ἐμοὶ σκέψῃ ἐπιτάττεις.

Καὶ μὴν ἐν γε ταῖς εἰρημέναις διακρίσεις
τὸ μὲν χεῖρον ἀπὸ βελτίων ἀποχωρίζειν ἦν, τὸ
δ’ ὁμοιον ἀφ’ ὁμοίου.

1 διακρίνειν] many emendations have been suggested, none
entirely satisfactory, and all probably unnecessary.
THE SOPHIST

str. Yes, we must, and must go at it with all our might, by following another track of his—in this way. Tell me; of the expressions connected with menial occupations some are in common use, are they not?

theaet. Yes, many. But to which of the many does your question refer?

str. To such as these: we say "sift" and "strain" and "winnow" and "separate."\(^1\)

theaet. Certainly.

str. And besides these there are "card" and "comb" and "beat the web" and countless other technical terms which we know. Is it not so?

theaet. Why do you use these as examples and ask about them all? What do you wish to show in regard to them?

str. All those that I have mentioned imply a notion of division.

theaet. Yes.

str. Then since there is, according to my reckoning, one art involved in all of these operations, let us give it one name.

theaet. What shall we call it?

str. The art of discrimination.

theaet. Very well.

str. Now see if we can discover two divisions of this.

theaet. You demand quick thinking, for a boy like me.

str. And yet, in the instance of discrimination just mentioned there was, first, the separation of worse from better, and, secondly, of like from like.

\(^1\) Apparently a term descriptive of some part of the process of weaving; cf. Cratylus, 338 b.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδὸν οὕτω νῦν λειθέν φαίνεται.
ΕΕ. Τῆς μὲν τοῖνυν οὖνμα οὐκ ἔχω λεγόμενον·
tῆς δὲ καταλειπούσης μὲν τὸ βέλτιον διακρίσεως,
tὸ δὲ χείρον ἀποθαλλοῦσης ἔχω.
ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε τι.
ΕΕ. Πάσα ἡ τοιαύτη διάκρισις, ὡς ἔγω ξυννοῦ,
λέγεται παρὰ πάντων καθαρμός τις.
ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν.
ΕΕ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ γε καθαρτικὸν εἶδος αὕ διπλοῦν
ὅν πᾶς ἂν ἵδοι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι, κατὰ σχολὴν γε ἕσως· οὐ μὴν ἔγωγε
καθορῶ νῦν.
14. ΕΕ. Καὶ μὴν τὰ περὶ τὰ σώματα πολλὰ
εἶδη καθάρσεων ἐνὶ περιλαβέων ὅνοματι προσήκει.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ποία καὶ τίνι;
ΕΕ. Τὰ τε τῶν ζῷων, ὅσα ἐντὸς σωμάτων ὑπὸ
γυμναστικῆς ιατρικῆς τε ὁρθῶς διακρινόμενα
καθαίρεται καὶ περὶ τάκτος,1 εἰπεῖν μὲν φαῦλα,
ὅσα βαλανευτικὴ παρέχεται· καὶ τῶν ἀψάνων
σωμάτων, ὃν γναφευτικὴ καὶ ξύμπασα κοσμητικὴ
tὴν ἐπιμέλειαν παρεχομένη κατὰ σμικρὰ πολλὰ
καὶ γελοῖα δοκοῦντα ὅνοματα ἔσχεν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Μάλα γε.
ΕΕ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὡς Θεαίτητε. ἀλλὰ γὰρ
τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθὸδῳ σπογγιοστικῆς ἡ
fαρμακο-
ποσίας οὐδὲν ἦττον οὐδὲ τι μάλλον τυχάνει μέλον,
eἰ τὸ μὲν σμικρά, τὸ δὲ μεγάλα ἡμᾶς ὥφελει καθαϊ-

1 περὶ τάκτος] περιτάκτος Β; τὰ περὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἃ Τ.

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THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Yes, as you now express it, that is pretty clear.

STR. Now I know no common name for the second kind of discrimination; but I do know the name of the kind which retains the better and throws away the worse.

THEAET. What is it?

STR. Every such discrimination, as I think, is universally called a sort of purification.

THEAET. Yes, so it is.

STR. And could not anyone see that purification is of two kinds?

THEAET. Yes, perhaps, in time; but still I do not see it now.

STR. Still there are many kinds of purifications of bodies, and they may all properly be included under one name.

THEAET. What are they and what is the name?

STR. The purification of living creatures, having to do with impurities within the body, such as are successfully discriminated by gymnastics and medicine, and with those outside of the body, not nice to speak of, such as are attended to by the bath-keeper's art; and the purification of inanimate bodies, which is the special care of the fuller's art and in general of the art of exterior decoration; this, with its petty subdivisions, has taken on many names which seem ridiculous.

THEAET. Very.

STR. Certainly they do, Theaetetus. However, the method of argument is neither more nor less concerned with the art of medicine than with that of sponging, but is indifferent if the one benefits us little, the other greatly by its purifying. It en-
PLATO

Βρον. τοῦ κτήσασθαι γὰρ ἑνεκα νοῦν πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ ξυγγενὲς κατανοεῖν πειρωμένη τιμᾶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἓξ ἵσου πάσας, καὶ θάτερα τῶν ἐτέρων κατὰ τὴν ὁμοίότητα οὐδὲν ἥγεται γελοιότερα, σεμνότερον δὲ τί τὸν διὰ στρατηγικῆς ἡ φθειριστικῆς δηλοῦντα θηρευτικὴν οὐδὲν νενόμικεν, ἀλλ’ ὡς τὸ πολὺ χαυνότερον. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὅπερ ἦροι, τί προσερούμεν ὅνομα ξυμπάσας δυνάμεις, ὅσαι σῶμα εἴτε ἐμφυχον εἴτε ἀψυχον εἰλήχασι ¹ καθαίρειν, οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διοίσει, ποῖον τι

Ο. λεχθὲν εὐπρεπέστατον εἶναι δόξει: μόνον ἑχέων χωρίς τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς καθάρσεων πάντα ἤχυδόσαν, ὅσα ἄλλα τί καθαίρει. τὸν γὰρ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν καθαρμὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἑπικεχειρηθέκεν ἀφορίσασθαι τὰ νῦν, εἰ γε ὅπερ βούλεται μανθάνομεν.

Θεαί. Ἀλλὰ μεμάθηκα, καὶ συγχωρῶ δύο μὲν εἰδὴ καθάρσεως, ἐν δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἴδος εἶναι, τοῦ περὶ τὸ σῶμα χωρίς ὑμῖν.

Ἐ. Πάντων κάλλιστα. καὶ μοι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο

Δ ἐπάκουε πειρώμενος αὕτι τὸ λεχθὲν διχῇ τέμνειν.

Θεαί. Καθ’ ὅποι’ ἀν ὕφηγῇ πειράσομαι σοι συντέμνειν.

Ι. 5. Ε. Πονηρίαν ἐτερον ἀρετῆς ἐν ψυχῇ λέγομέν τι;

Θεαί. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Ε. Καὶ μὴν καθαρμὸς ἣν τὸ λείπειν ² μὲν θάτερον, ἐκβάλλειν δὲ ὅσον ἄν ἡ ποῦ τι φλαύρον.

Θεαί. Ἡν γὰρ οὖν.

Ε. Καὶ ψυχῆς ἀρα, καθ’ ὅσον ἀν εὐρίσκωμεν

¹ εἰλήχασι W; εἰλήφασι BT.
² λείπειν Heindorf; λεῖπειν BT.

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deavours to understand what is related and what is not related in all arts, for the purpose of acquiring intelligence; and therefore it honours them all equally and does not in making comparisons think one more ridiculous than another, and does not consider him who employs, as his example of hunting, the art of generalship, any more dignified than him who employs the art of louse-catching, but only, for the most part, as more pretentious. And now as to your question, what name we shall give to all the activities whose function it is to purify the body, whether animate or inanimate, it will not matter at all to our method what name sounds finest; it cares only to unite under one name all purifications of everything else and to keep them separate from the purification of the soul. For it has in our present discussion been trying to separate this purification definitely from the rest, if we understand its desire.

Theaet. But I do understand and I agree that there are two kinds of purification and that one kind is the purification of the soul, which is separate from that of the body.

Str. Most excellent. Now pay attention to the next point and try again to divide the term.

Theaet. In whatever way you suggest, I will try to help you in making the division.

Str. Do we say that wickedness is distinct from virtue in the soul?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. And purification was retaining the one and throwing out whatever is bad anywhere?

Theaet. Yes, it was.

Str. Hence whenever we find any removal of evil
κακίας ἀφαίρεσιν τινα, καθαρμὸν αὐτοῦ λέγοντες ἐν μέλει φθεγγόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα γε.

ΕΕ. Δύο μὲν εἴδη κακίας περὶ ψυχῆς ῥητέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποία;

228 ΕΕ. Τὸ μὲν οἶον νόσον ἐν σώματι, τὸ δ' οἶον αἰσχὸς ἐγγυνόμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔκ ἔμαθον.

ΕΕ. Νόσον ἰσως καὶ στάσιν οὐ ταύτων νενόμικας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδ' αὐτὸς τούτο ἐχω τί χρή με ἀποκρίνασθαι.

ΕΕ. Πότερον ἀλλο τι στάσιν ἡγούμενος ἢ τὴν τοῦ φύσει ἐγγυνοῦς ἐκ τινος διαφθορᾶς διαφοράν

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΕΕ. 'Ἀλλ' αἰσχὸς ἀλλο τι πλὴν τὸ τῆς ἀμετρίας πανταχοῦ δυσεἰδές ἐνὸν γένος;

Β ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ἀλλο.

ΕΕ. Τι δέ; ἐν ψυχῇ δόξας ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ θυμὸν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λόγον λύπαις καὶ πάντα ἀλλήλοις ταῦτα τῶν φλαῦρως ἐχόντων οὐκ ἦσθημεθα διαφερόμενα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ σφόδρα γε.

ΕΕ. Εὐγγενή γε μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ξύμπαντα γέγονεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ΕΕ. Στάσιν ἄρα καὶ νόσον τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρίαν λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἐρούμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

ΕΕ. Τί δ'; δο' ἄν κινήσεως μετασχόντα καὶ σκοπὸν τυια θέμενα πειρώμενα ἀντίκλατεν

1 διαφθορᾶς διαφοράν Galen; διαφορᾶς διαφθοράν BT, Stobaeus.
2 ἐνὸν Schleiermacher; ἐν ὃν Stobaeus; ἐν ὃν t; ὃν BT.
3 ὁδ' ἀν Cobet; ὁδ'ΑΑα BT.
from the soul, we shall be speaking properly if we call that a purification.

THEAET. Very properly.

STR. We must say that there are two kinds of evil in the soul.

THEAET. What kinds?

STR. The one is comparable to a disease in the body, the other to a deformity.

THEAET. I do not understand.

STR. Perhaps you have not considered that disease and discord are the same thing?

THEAET. I do not know what reply I ought to make to this, either.

STR. Is that because you think discord is anything else than the disagreement of the naturally related, brought about by some corruption?

THEAET. No; I think it is nothing else.

STR. But is deformity anything else than the presence of the quality of disproportion, which is always ugly?

THEAET. Nothing else at all.

STR. Well then; do we not see that in the souls of worthless men opinions are opposed to desires, anger to pleasures, reason to pain, and all such things to one another?

THEAET. Yes, they are, decidedly.

STR. Yet they must all be naturally related.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Then we shall be right if we say that wickedness is a discord and disease of the soul.

THEAET. Yes, quite right.

STR. But if things which partake of motion and aim at some particular mark pass beside the mark

\[ \text{\footnote{$\pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omega\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha\ T,\ Galen,\ Stobaeus:\ \pi\epsilon\iota\rho\omega\mu\epsilon\theta\alpha\ W;\ om.\ B.}} \]
καθ’ ἐκάστην ὀρμὴν παράφορα αὐτοῦ γίγνεται ¹ καὶ ἀποτυγχάνη, ² πότερον αὕτη φήσομεν ὑπὸ συμμετρίας τῆς πρὸς ἀλληλα ἡ τούναυτίον ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας αὕτα πᾶσχεν;

ὁ Θεά. Δὴ λοι ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας.

ἐς. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν ψυχῆν γε ἵσμεν ἄκουσαν πᾶσαν πάν ἀγνοοῦσαν.

ὁ Θεά. Σφόδρα γε.

ἐς. Τό γε μὴν ἄγνοεῖν ἐστιν ἐπ’ ἀλῆθειαν ὀρμω-μένης ψυχῆς, παραφόρου συνέσεως γυγνομένης, οὐδὲν ἀλλο πλὴν παραφροσύνη.

ὁ Θεά. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ἐς. Ψυχὴν ἄρα ἀνόητον αἰσχρὰν καὶ ἀμετρον θετέον.

ὁ Θεά. ἨΕοικεν.

ἐς. Ἡστι δὴ δύο ταῦτα, ὡς φαίνεται, κακῶν ἐν αὐτῆ γένη, τό μὲν πονηρία καλοὺμενον ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, νόσος αὐτῆς σαφέστατα ὄν.

ὁ Θεά. Ναί.

ἐς. Τὸ δὲ γε ἄγνοιαν μὲν καλοῦσι, κακίαν δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ψυχῆ μόνον γυγνόμενον οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ὑμολογεῖν.

Ε ὁ Θεά. Κομίδη συγχωρητέον, ὅ νῦν δὴ λέξαντος ἠμφεγνόησά σου, τό δύο εἶναι γένη κακίας ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ δειλίαν μὲν καὶ ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν ξύμπαντα ἡγητέον νόσου ἐν ἡμῖν, τὸ δὲ τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παντο-δαπῆ ἄγνοιας πάθος αἰσχος θετέον.

¹ γίγνεται BT; γίγνεται al.
² ἀποτυγχάνη T; ἀποτυγχάνει B et al.
and miss it on every occasion when they try to hit it, shall we say that this happens to them through right proportion to one another or, on the contrary, through disproportion? ¹

Theaet. Evidently through disproportion.

Str. But yet we know that every soul, if ignorant of anything, is ignorant against its will.

Theaet. Very much so.

Str. Now being ignorant is nothing else than the aberration of a soul that aims at truth, when the understanding passes beside the mark.

Theaet. Very true.

Str. Then we must regard a foolish soul as deformed and ill-proportioned.

Theaet. So it seems.

Str. Then there are, it appears, these two kinds of evils in the soul, one, which people call wickedness, which is very clearly a disease.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And the other they call ignorance, but they are not willing to acknowledge that it is vice, when it arises only in the soul.

Theaet. It must certainly be admitted, though I disputed it when you said it just now, that there are two kinds of vice in the soul, and that cowardice, intemperance, and injustice must all alike be considered a disease in us, and the widespread and various condition of ignorance must be regarded as a deformity.

¹ The connexion between disproportion and missing the mark is not obvious. The explanation that a missile (e.g. an arrow) which is not evenly balanced will not fly straight, fails to take account of the words προς αληθεία. The idea seems rather to be that moving objects of various sizes, shapes, and rates of speed must interfere with each other.
16. ἢ Ἔ. Οὕκοιν ἐν σώματι γε περὶ δύο παθήματε
tοῦτω δύο τέχνα τινὲ ἐγενέσθην;
θεαὶ. Τίνε τούτω;

229 ἢ Ἔ. Περὶ μὲν αἴσχος γυμναστικῆ, περὶ δὲ νόσον
ιατρικῆ.

θεαὶ. Φαίνεσθον.

ἔ. Οῦκοιν καὶ περὶ μὲν ὑβριν καὶ ἀδικίαν καὶ
dειλίαν ἡ κολαστικῆ πέφυκε τεχνῶν μάλιστα δὴ
πασῶν προσήκουσα Δίκη 1;

θεαὶ. Τὸ γοῦν εἰκός, ὡς εἶπεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρω-
pίνην δόξαν.

ἔ. Τί δὲ; περὶ ξύμπασαν ἄνγοιαν μῶν ἄλλην
tινὰ ἡ διδασκαλικὴν ὀρθότερον εἶποι τις ἄν;

θεαὶ. Οὔδεμιαν.

ἔ. Φέρε δὴ. διδασκαλικῆς δὲ ἀρα ἐν μόνον
Β γένος φατέων εἶναι ἡ πλείω, δύο δὲ τινὲ αὐτῆς
eῖναι μεγίστω, σκόπει.
θεαὶ. Σκοπῶ.

ἔ. Καὶ μοι δοκοῦμεν τῆς ἐν πῃ τάχιστα εὑρεῖν.
θεαὶ. Πῇ;

ἔ. Τὴν ἄνγοιαν ίδόντες εἰ πῃ κατὰ μέσον αὐτῆς 2
tομὴν ἔχει τινὰ. διπλῆ γὰρ αὐτὴ γιγνομένη δὴλον
ὅτι καὶ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν δύο ἀναγκάζει μόρια ἔχειν,
ἐν ἐφ’ ἐνι γένει τῶν αὐτῆς ἐκατέρω.

θεαὶ. Τὶ ών; καταφαίεις πῇ σοι τὸν Ὑ ἐκτούμενον;

缒. Ἀγνοίας γοῦν 3 μέγα τὶ μοι δοκῶ καὶ
χαλεπῶν ἀφορισμένων ῥαῦν εἶδος, πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις
αὐτῆς ἀντίσταθιμον μέρεσιν.

θεαὶ. Ποιον δῇ;

ἔ. Τὸ μὴ κατειδοτά τι δοκεῖν εἶδέναι. δι’ ὦ

1 Δίκη Cobet; δίκη BT, Stobaeus.
2 αὐτῆς W; αὐτῆς BT.
3 γοῦν W; δ’ ων BT.
str. In the case of the body there are two arts which have to do with these two evil conditions, are there not?

THEAET. What are they?

str. For deformity there is gymnastics, and for disease medicine.

THEAET. That is clear.

str. Hence for insolence and injustice and cowardice is not the corrective art the one of all arts most closely related to Justice?

THEAET. Probably it is, at least according to the judgement of mankind.

str. And for all sorts of ignorance is there any art it would be more correct to suggest than that of instruction?

THEAET. No, none.

str. Come now, think. Shall we say that there is only one kind of instruction, or that there are more and that two are the most important?

THEAET. I am thinking.

str. I think we can find out most quickly in this way.

THEAET. In what way?

str. By seeing whether ignorance admits of being cut in two in the middle; for if ignorance turns out to be twofold, it is clear that instruction must also consist of two parts, one for each part of ignorance.

THEAET. Well, can you see what you are now looking for?

str. I at any rate think I do see one large and grievous kind of ignorance, separate from the rest, and as weighty as all the other parts put together.

THEAET. What is it?

str. Thinking that one knows a thing when one
κινδυνεύει πάντα ὁσα διανοία σφαλλόμεθα γίνεσθαι πᾶσιν.

\[ \text{ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αληθη.} \]

\[ \text{ζ. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο γε οἶμαι μόνω τῆς ἀγνοίας ἀμαθίαν τούνομα προσρηθήναι.} \]

\[ \text{ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.} \]

\[ \text{ζ. Τι δὲ δὴ τῷ τῆς διδασκαλίας ἁρα μέρει τῷ τούτῳ ἀπαλλάττοντι λεκτέον;} \]

\[ \text{D ΘΕΑΙ. Οἶμαι μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἔγεν, τὸ μὲν ἄλλο δημιουργικὸς διδασκαλίας, τούτο δὲ ἐνθάδε γε παιδείαν δι' ἡμῶν κεκλήσθαι.} \]

\[ \text{ζ. Καὶ γὰρ σχεδὸν, ὡς Θεαίτητε, ἐν πᾶσιν Ἑλλησπ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡμῶν ἔτι καὶ τούτῳ σκεπτέον, εἰ ἄτομον ἢδη ἐστὶ πᾶν ἢ τινὰ ἔχον διαίρεσιν ἄξιαν ἐπωνυμίαις.} \]

\[ \text{ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ σκοπεῖν.} \]

\[ \text{I7. ζ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καὶ τούτο ἐτί, τῇ σχιζέσθαι.} \]

\[ \text{ΘΕΑΙ. Κατὰ τί;} \]

\[ \text{ζ. Τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διδασκαλίκης ἢ μὲν Ἐ τραγυτέρα τις ἐοικεὶ ὁδὸς εἶναι, τὸ δ' ἐτερον αὐτῆς μόριον λειότερον.} \]

\[ \text{ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ τοῦτον δὴ τούτων ἐκάτερον λέγωμεν;} \]

\[ \text{ζ. Τὸ μὲν ἀρχαιοπρεπές τι πάτριον, ὡς πρὸς τοὺς νῦεις μάλιστ' ἐχρωντό τε καὶ ἐτι πολλοὶ χρώνται τὰ νῦν, ὅταν αὐτοῖς ἐξαμαρτάνωσι τι, τα μὲν 230 χαλεπαίνοντες, τὰ δὲ μαλθακτέρως παραμυθοῦμενοι. τὸ δ' οὖν ξύμπαν αὐτὸ ὀρθότατα εὕποι τις ἄν νουθετητικὴν.} \]

\[ \text{ΘΕΑΙ. 'Εστιν οὖτως.} \]

\[ \text{ζ. Τὸ δὲ γε, εἶπασι ἕτες αὖ λόγον ἑαυτοῖς} \]

\[ \text{1 εἶπασι BT, Stobaeus; ὡς εἶπασι vulg.} \]

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does not know it. Through this, I believe, all the mistakes of the mind are caused in all of us.

THEAET. True.

STR. And furthermore to this kind of ignorance alone the name of stupidity is given.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Now what name is to be given to that part of instruction which gets rid of this?

THEAET. I think, Stranger, that the other part is called instruction in handicraft, and that this part is here at Athens through our influence called education.

STR. And so it is, Theaetetus, among nearly all the Hellenes. But we must examine further and see whether it is one and indivisible or still admits of division important enough to have a name.

THEAET. Yes, we must see about that.

STR. I think there is still a way in which this also may be divided.

THEAET. On what principle?

STR. Of instruction in arguments one method seems to be rougher, and the other section smoother.

THEAET. What shall we call each of these?

STR. The venerable method of our fathers, which they generally employed towards their sons, and which many still employ, of sometimes showing anger at their errors and sometimes more gently exhorting them—that would most properly be called as a whole admonition.

THEAET. That is true.

STR. On the other hand, some appear to have con-
Δόντες ἡγήσασθαι πᾶσαν ἀκουσθείν ἀμαθίαν εἶναι, καὶ μαθεῖν οὐδὲν ποτέ ἄν ἔθελεν τὸν οἰόμενον εἶναι σοφὸν τούτων ὃν οὐκοτο πέρι δεινὸς εἶναι, μετὰ δὲ πολλοῦ πόνου τὸ νουθετητικὸν εἶδος τῆς παιδείας σμικρὸν ἀνύτευν.

ΤΕΑΙ. Ὁρθῶς γε νομίζοντες.

Β ΞΕ. Τὰ τοι ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἐπὶ ἐκβολὴν ἄλλω τρόπῳ στέλλονται.

ΤΕΑΙ. Τίν δή;

ΞΕ. Διερωτῶσιν ὃν ἂν οὐχαίτε τῖς τι πέρι λέγειν λέγων μηδέν. εἰδ′ ἀτε πλανωμένων τὰς δόξας ῥαδίως ἐξετάζουσι, καὶ συνάγοντες δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰς ταύτὸν τιθέασι παρ᾽ ἄλληλας, τιθέντες δὲ ἐπιδεικνύουσιν αὐτὰς αὐταῖς 1 ἁμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταύτα ἑναντίας. οἱ δ′ ὀρώντες ἑαυτοῖς μὲν χαλεπαίνουσιν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἤμερούνται, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ τῷ τρόπῳ τῶν περὶ

C αὐτοὺς μεγάλων καὶ σκληρῶν δοξῶν ἀπαλλάττονται πασῶν 2 ἀπαλλαγὼν ἀκοῦειν τε ἡδίστην καὶ τῷ πάσχοντι βεβαιῶσαι γιγνομένην. νομίζοντες γάρ, ὁ παῖ, φίλε, οἱ καθαίροντες αὐτοὺς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἰατροὶ νευμόικαι μὴ πρότερον ἂν τῆς προσφερομένης τροφῆς ἀπολαύειν δύνασθαι σώμα, πρὶν ἂν τὰ ἐμποδίζοντα ἐν αὐτῷ τις ἐκβάλῃ, ταῦταν καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς διενοθήσασιν ἑκεῖνοι, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὴν ἔξειν τῶν προσφερομένων μαθημάτων ὄνησιν,

D πρὶν ἂν ἐλέγχων τις τῶν ἐλεγχόμενον εἰς αἰσχύνην καταστήσας, τὰς τοῖς μαθήμασι εμποδίους δόξας ἐξελών, καθαρὸν ἀποφήγη καὶ ταύτα ἡγούμενον, ἀπερ οἶδεν, εἰδέναι μόνα, πλεῖον δὲ μή.

1 αὐταῖς] αὐταῖς BT.
2 πασῶν Stobaeus; πασῶν τε BT.
vinced themselves that all ignorance is involuntary, and that he who thinks himself wise would never be willing to learn any of those things in which he believes he is clever, and that the admonitory kind of education takes a deal of trouble and accomplishes little.

**THEAET.** They are quite right.

**STR.** So they set themselves to cast out the conceit of cleverness in another way.

**THEAET.** In what way?

**STR.** They question a man about the things about which he thinks he is talking sense when he is talking nonsense; then they easily discover that his opinions are like those of men who wander, and in their discussions they collect those opinions and compare them with one another, and by the comparison they show that they contradict one another about the same things, in relation to the same things and in respect to the same things. But those who see this grow angry with themselves and gentle towards others, and this is the way in which they are freed from their high and obstinate opinions about themselves. The process of freeing them, moreover, affords the greatest pleasure to the listeners and the most lasting benefit to him who is subjected to it. For just as physicians who care for the body believe that the body cannot get benefit from any food offered to it until all obstructions are removed, so, my boy, those who purge the soul believe that the soul can receive no benefit from any teachings offered to it until someone by cross-questioning reduces him who is cross-questioned to an attitude of modesty, by removing the opinions that obstruct the teachings, and thus purges him and makes him think that he knows only what he knows, and no more.

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θεά. Βελτίστη γούν καὶ σωφρονεστάτη τῶν ἐξεων αὐτή.

ἐε. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα ἢμῖν, ὡς θεαίτητε, καὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον λεκτέων ὡς ἀρα μεγίστῃ καὶ κυριωτάτῃ τῶν καθάρσεων ἔστι, καὶ τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον αὐτοὺς μνημεῖον, ἃν καὶ τυγχάνῃ βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας ὄς ἔστι. Εὐθὺς μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὄντα, ἀπαίδευτον τε καὶ αἰσχρῶν γεγονέναι ταῦτα, ὧν καθαρωτάτον καὶ κάλλιστον ἑπρεπε τὸν ὄντως ἐσόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι.

θεά. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

18. ἐε. Τί δέ; τοὺς ταύτης χρωμένους τῇ τέχνῃ 231 τίνας φήσομεν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ φοβοῦμαι σοφιστᾶς φάναι.

θεά. Τί δὴ;

ἐε. Μὴ μείζον αὐτοῖς προσάπτωμεν γέρας.

θεά. Ἀλλὰ μὴν προσέοικε τοιούτῳ τινὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα.

ἐε. Καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγριώτατον ἡμερωτάτῳ.

τὸν δὲ ἀσφαλὴ δεὶ πάντως μᾶλιστα περὶ τὰς ὁμοίωτας ἁπλή ποιεῖσθαι τὴν φυλακὴν ὁλισθηρότατον γὰρ τὸ γένος. ὄμως δὲ ἔστωσαν οὐ γὰρ περὶ συμκρῶν ὀρῶν τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν οἴομαι γενήσεσθαι τὸτε ὀπόταν ἰκανῶς φυλάττωσιν.

θεά. Όὐκος τὸ γε εἰκός.

ἐε. Ἐστω δὴ διακριτικὴς τέχνης καθαρτικῆ, καθαρτικῆς δὲ τὸ περὶ ψυχῆς μέρος ἀφωρίσθω, τούτῳ δὲ διδασκαλικῆ, διδασκαλικῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆ τῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς ὁ περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξοσοφίαν γεγονόμενος ἔλεγχος ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ παραφανεύτη ἂν ἀλλ' ἦμῖν εἶναι λεγέσθω πλὴν ἢ γένει γενναία σοφιστικῆ.

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THEAET. That is surely the best and most reasonable state of mind.

STR. For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must assert that cross-questioning is the greatest and most efficacious of all purifications, and that he who is not cross-questioned, even though he be the Great King, has not been purified of the greatest taints, and is therefore uneducated and deformed in those things in which he who is to be truly happy ought to be most pure and beautiful.

THEAET. Perfectly true.

STR. Well then, who are those who practise this art? I am afraid to say the sophists.

THEAET. Why so?

STR. Lest we grant them too high a meed of honour.

THEAET. But the description you have just given is very like someone of that sort.

STR. Yes, and a wolf is very like a dog, the wildest like the tamest of animals. But the cautious man must be especially on his guard in the matter of resemblances, for they are very slippery things. However, let us agree that they are the sophists; for I think the strife will not be about petty discriminations when people are sufficiently on their guard.

THEAET. No, probably not.

STR. Then let it be agreed that part of the discriminating art is purification, and as part of purification let that which is concerned with the soul be separated off, and as part of this, instruction, and as part of instruction, education; and let us agree that the cross-questioning of empty conceit of wisdom, which has come to light in our present discussion, is nothing else than the true-born art of sophistry.
PLATO

ὁ θεάι. Λεγέσθω μὲν ἀπορῶ δὲ ἐγώγε ἦδη διὰ τὸ πολλὰ πεφάνθαι, τί χρή ποτε ὡς ἀληθὴ λέγοντα καὶ διαχυρίζομενον εἰπεῖν οἷτως εἶναι τὸν σοφιστὴν.

ἐξ. Ἐικότως γε σὺ ἀπορῶν. ἀλλὰ τοῦ κάκειον ἠγείροντα χρῆ νῦν ἦδὴ σφόδρα ἀπορεῖν ὡπὶ ποτὲ ἔτι διαδύσεται τὸν λόγον· ὅρθη γὰρ ἡ παρομία, τὸ τάς ἀπάσας μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι διαφεύγειν. νῦν οὖν καὶ μάλιστα ἐπιθετέον αὐτῷ.

ὁ θεάι. Καλῶς λέγεις.

19. ἐξ. Πρῶτον δὴ στάντες οἷον ἤειαναπεύσωμεν, καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλογισμόμεθα ἀμα ἀναι-

D παυόμενοι, φέρε, ὅποσα ἡμῖν ὁ σοφιστὴς πέφανται,

δοκῶ μὲν γὰρ, ἕν τὸ πρῶτον ἦπερθη νέων καὶ

πλουσίων ἐμμυθὸς θηρευτής.

ὁ θεάι. Ναῖ.

ἐξ. Τὸ δὲ γε δεύτερον ἐμπορὸς τις περὶ τὰ τῆς

ψυχῆς μαθήματα.

ὁ θεάι. Πάνυ γε.

ἐξ. Τρίτον δὲ ἀρα οὗ περὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα κάτισθα ἀνεφάνη;

ὁ θεάι. Ναϊ, καὶ τέταρτον γε αὐτοπόληθα περὶ τὰ

μαθήματα ἡμῖν ὑν.

ἐξ. Ὄρθως ἐμμυθόνευσας. πέμπτον δ’ ἐγὼ

πειράσομαι μνημονεύειν· τῆς γὰρ ἀγωνιστικῆς

Ε περὶ λόγους ἦν τις ἀθλητῆς, τῆς ἐρωτικῆς τέχνης

ἀφωρισμένος.

ὁ θεάι. Ἐν γὰρ οὖν.

ἐξ. Τὸ γε μὴν ἐκτὸν ἀμφισβητήσιμον μὲν, ὁμωσ

δ’ ἐδεμεν αὐτῷ συγχωρήσαντες δοξῶν ἐμποδίων

μαθήμασι περὶ ψυχῆν καθαρτὴν αὐτὸν εἶναι.

ὁ θεάι. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

1 γὰρ W; γὰρ ὧν BT. 2 ὑ add. Heindorf.

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THE SOPHIST

Theaet. Let us agree to all that; but the sophist has by this time appeared to be so many things that I am at a loss to know what in the world to say he really is, with any assurance that I am speaking the truth.

Str. No wonder you are at a loss. But it is fair to suppose that by this time he is still more at a loss to know how he can any longer elude our argument; for the proverb is right which says it is not easy to escape all the wrestler's grips. So now we must attack him with redoubled vigour.

Theaet. You are right.

Str. First, then, let us stop to take breath and while we are resting let us count up the number of forms in which the sophist has appeared to us. First, I believe, he was found to be a paid hunter after the young and wealthy.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And secondly a kind of merchant in articles of knowledge for the soul.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And thirdly did he not turn up as a retailer of these same articles of knowledge?

Theaet. Yes, and fourthly we found he was a seller of his own productions of knowledge.

Str. Your memory is good; but I will try to recall the fifth case myself. He was an athlete in contests of words, who had taken for his own the art of disputation.

Theaet. Yes, he was.

Str. The sixth case was doubtful, but nevertheless we agreed to consider him a purger of souls, who removes opinions that obstruct learning.

Theaet. Very true.
232 ΞΕ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐννοεῖς, ὅταν ἑπιστήμων τις πολλῶν φαίνηται, μιᾶς δὲ τέχνης ὄνοματι προσαγορεύηται, τὸ φάντασμα τούτῳ ὡς οὐκ ἔσθ' ὑμεῖς, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὡς ὁ πάσχων αὐτῷ πρὸς τινα τέχνην οὗ δύναται κατιδεῖν ἐκεῖνο αὐτῆς εἰς ὁ πάντα τὰ μαθήματα ταῦτα βλέπει, διὸ καὶ πολλοῖς ὄνομασιν ἄνθ' ἐνὸς τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὰ προσαγορεύει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κυνδυνεύει τούτῳ ταῦτῃ πη μάλιστα πεφυκέναι.

Β 20. ΞΕ. Μή τούνων ἡμεῖς γε αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ ξητῆσει δι' ἄργιαν πάσχωμεν, ἀλλ' ἀναλάβωμεν πρῶτον τι τῶν περὶ τὸν σοφιστήν εἰρημένων. ἐν γάρ τι μοι μάλιστα κατεφάνη αὐτὸν μηνύον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΞΕ. 'Αντιλογικόν αὐτὸν ἐφαμεν εἶναι ποι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Τί δ'; οὐ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοῦ τούτου διδάσκαλον γίγνεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΞΕ. Σκοπῶμεν δὴ, περὶ τῶν ἄρα καὶ φασίν οἱ τουιότυοι ποιεῖν ἀντιλογικοὺς. ἦ δὲ σκέψις ἡμῶν ἐξ Ἀρχής ἐστώ τῇ δε πη. φέρε, περὶ τῶν θέλων, ὅσ' ἀφανῇ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἃρ' ἰκανοὺς ποιοῦσι τοῦτο δράν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δέγεται γοῦν 1 δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα.

ΞΕ. Τί δ' ὅσα φανερὰ γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ ποιαῖτα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί γάρ;

ΞΕ. 'Αλλ' μὴν ἐν γε ταῖς ἰδίαις συνουσίαις, ὅποταν γενέσειως τε καὶ οὐσίας πέρι κατὰ πάντων

1 γοῦν W; οὖν BT.
Then do you see that when a man appears to know many things, but is called by the name of a single art, there is something wrong about this impression, and that, in fact, the person who labours under this impression in connexion with any art is clearly unable to see the common principle of the art, to which all these kinds of knowledge pertain, so that he calls him who possesses them by many names instead of one?

Something like that is very likely to be the case.

We must not let that happen to us in our search through lack of diligence. So let us first take up again one of our statements about the sophist. For there is one of them which seemed to me to designate him most plainly.

Which was it?

I think we said he was a disputer.

Yes.

And did we not also say that he taught this same art of disputing to others?

Certainly.

Now let us examine and see what the subjects are about which such men say they make their pupils able to dispute. Let us begin our examination at the beginning with this question: Is it about divine things which are invisible to others that they make people able to dispute?

That is their reputation, at any rate.

And how about the visible things of earth and heaven and the like?

Those are included, of course.

And furthermore in private conversations, when the talk is about generation and being in
λέγηται τι, ξύνωμεν ὃς αυτοὶ τε ἀντειπεῖν δεινοὶ
tοὺς τε ἄλλους ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἀπερ αὐτοῦ δυνατοὺς;

Τὸν παντάπασι γε.

Δ ζε. Τί δ᾽ αὖ περὶ νόμων καὶ ἐκμπάντων τῶν
πολιτικῶν, ἃρ' οὐχ ὑπισχὺνται ποιεῖν ἁμφισβη-
tητικοὺς 1;

Τὸν οὐδὲις γὰρ ἃν αὐτοῖς, ὃς ἔπος εἰπεῖν,
dιελέγετο μὴ τούτο ὑπισχυομένους.

ζε. Τὰ γε μὴν περὶ πασῶν τε καὶ κατὰ μίαν
ἐκάστην τέχνην, ἀ δεὶ πρὸς ἐκαστὸν αὐτὸν τὸν
δημουργὸν ἀντειπεῖν, δεδημιουμένα ποι καταβε-
βληται γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν.

Τὸν οὐδὲις. Τὰ Πρωταγόρεια μοι φαίνει περὶ τε πάλης
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν εἰρηκέναι.

ζε. Καὶ πολλῶν γε, ὃ μακάρις, ἔτερων. ἀτάρ
dὴ τὸ τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης ἃρ' οὐκ ἐν κεφαλαῖο
περὶ πάντων πρὸς ἁμφισβητησίν ἰκανῆ τις δύναμις
ἐοικ' εἶναι;

Τὸν οὐδὲις. Φαίνεται γοῦν σχεδὸν οὐδὲν ὑπολιπεῖν.

ζε. Σὺ δὴ πρὸς θεῶν, ὃ παὶ, δυνατὸν ἢγεῖ τούτο;
tάχα γὰρ ἃν ὡμεῖς μὲν ὃξυτερον οἱ νέοι πρὸς αὐτὸ
βλέποιτε, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἁμβλύτερον.

233 Τὸ ποιοῦν, καὶ πρὸς τι μάλιστα λέγεις; οὐ
gάρ πω κατανοῶ τὸ νῦν ἔρωτόμενον.

ζε. Εἴ πάντα ἐπιστασθαί τινα ἄνθρώπων ἐστὶ
δυνατόν.

Τὸν μακάριον μέντ' ἃν ἡμῶν, ὃ ἔξε, ἣν τὸ
γένος.

ζε. Πῶς οὖν ἃν ποτὲ τις πρὸς γε τὸν ἐπιστά-
μενον αὐτὸς ἀνεπιστήμων ἃν δύνατ' ἃν ὑγιές τι
λέγων ἀντειπεῖν;

1 ἁμφισβητητικὸς] ἁμφισβητικὸς Τ.
THE SOPHIST

general, we know (do we not?) that they are clever disputants themselves and impart equal ability to others.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. And how about laws and public affairs in general? Do they not promise to make men able to argue about those?

THEAET. Yes, for nobody, to speak broadly, would attend their classes if they did not make that promise.

STR. However in all arts jointly and severally what the professional ought to answer to every opponent is written down somewhere and published that he who will may learn.

THEAET. You seem to refer to the text-books of Protagoras on wrestling and the other arts.

STR. Yes, my friend, and to those of many other authors. But is not the art of disputation, in a word, a trained ability for arguing about all things?

THEAET. Well, at any rate, it does not seem to leave much out.

STR. For heaven's sake, my boy, do you think that is possible? For perhaps you young people may look at the matter with sharper vision than our duller sight.

THEAET. What do you mean and just what do you refer to? I do not yet understand your question.

STR. I ask whether it is possible for a man to know all things.

THEAET. If that were possible, Stranger, ours would indeed be a blessed race.

STR. How, then, can one who is himself ignorant say anything worth while in arguing with one who knows?
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΞΕ. Τί ποτ’ οὖν ἂν εἶχῃ τὸ τῆς σοφιστικῆς δυνάμεως θαύμα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦ δ’ πέρι;

Β ΞΕ. Καθ’ ὅν τινα τρόπον ποτὲ δυνατοὶ τοῖς νέοις δόξαν παρασκευάζειν, ὃς εἰσὶ πάντα πάντων αὐτοῦ σοφώτατοι. δῆλον γὰρ ὃς εἰ μήτε ἀντέλεγον ὅρθως μήτε ἐκείνοις ἐφαίνοντο, φαινόμενοι τε εἰ μηδὲν αὐτῷ μᾶλλον ἐδόκουν διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἶναι φρόνιμοι, τὸ σοῦ ἃν τούτο, σχολὴ ποτ’ ἂν αὐτοῖς τις χρήματα δίδοσθαι ἢθελεν ἂν τούτων αὐτῶν μαθητῆς γίγνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σχολὴ μεντ’ ἂν.

ΞΕ. Νῦν δὲ γ’ ἐθέλουσιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

C ΞΕ. Δοκοῦσι γὰρ, οἶμαι, πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπιστημονώς ἔχειν αὐτοῖς πρὸς ἀπερ ἀντιλέγουσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΞΕ. Δρῶσοι δὲ γε τὸ τοῦτο πρὸς ἀπαντᾷ, φαμέν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ΞΕ. Πάντα ἄρα σοφοὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς φαίνονται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΞΕ. Οὐκ ὄντες γε’ ἀδύνατον γὰρ τούτο γε ἐφάνη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀδύνατον;

21. ΞΕ. Δοξαστικῆν ἄρα τινὰ περὶ πάντων ἐπιστήμην ὁ σοφιστὴς ἡμῖν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀλήθειαν ἔχων ἀναπέφανται.

1 τὸ σὸν] τὸσον ΒΤΩ.

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THEAET. He cannot at all.

STR. Then what in the world can the magical power of the sophistical art be?

THEAET. Magical power in what respect?

STR. In the way in which they are able to make young men think that they themselves are in all matters the wisest of men. For it is clear that if they neither disputed correctly nor seemed to the young men to do so, or again if they did seem to dispute rightly but were not considered wiser on that account, nobody, to quote from you,\(^1\) would care to pay them money to become their pupil in these subjects.

THEAET. Certainly not.

STR. But now people do care to do so?

THEAET. Very much.

STR. Yes, for they are supposed, I fancy, to have knowledge themselves of the things about which they dispute.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And they do that about all things, do they not?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Then they appear to their pupils to be wise in all things.

THEAET. To be sure.

STR. Though they are not; for that was shown to be impossible.

THEAET. Of course it is impossible.

STR. Then it is a sort of knowledge based upon mere opinion that the sophist has been shown to possess about all things, not true knowledge.

\(^1\) Cf. 232 d.
D θεαί. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, καὶ κινδυνεύει γε τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον ὀρθότατα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρήσθαι.

Ε. Λάβωμεν τοίνυν σαφέστερον τι παράδειγμα περὶ τούτων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον δὴ;

Ε. Τόδε. καὶ μοι πειρῶ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν εὖ μάλα ἀποκρίνασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον;

Ε. Εἰ τις φαίη μὴ λέγειν μηδὲ ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν καὶ δρᾶν μὴ τέχνη ξυνάπαντα ἐπίστασθαι πράγματα.

ΕΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς πάντα εἶπες;

Ε. Τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ῥηθέντος σὺ γ' ἕμων εὖθυς ἁγνοεῖς: τὰ γὰρ ξύμπαντα, ὡς ἔοικας, οὐ μανθάνεις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Ε. Λέγω τοίνυν σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν πάντων καὶ πρὸς ἕμων τᾶλλα ζῶα καὶ δενδρα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

Ε. Εἰ τις ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τᾶλλα φυτὰ πάντα ποιήσειν ἑνὶ φαίη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνα δὴ λέγων τὴν ποιήσων; οὐ γὰρ δὴ 234 γεωργὸν γε ἑρεῖς τινα: καὶ γὰρ ζῷων αὐτῶν εἰπτες ποιητήν.

Ε. Φημὶ, καὶ πρὸς γε θαλάττης καὶ γῆς καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔντοπότων καὶ τοίνυν καὶ ταχὺ ποιήσας αὐτῶν ἐκαστα πάνυ σμικροῦ νομίσματος ἀποδίδοται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παιδιὰν λέγεις τινὰ.

Ε. Τί δὲ; τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι πάντα οἴδε καὶ

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1 ποιήσεων W; ποιησών BT. 2 καὶ γῆς W; om. BT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Certainly; and I shouldn't be surprised if that were the most accurate statement we have made about him so far.

STR. Let us then take a clearer example to explain this.

THEAET. What sort of an example?

STR. This one; and try to pay attention and to give a very careful answer to my question.

THEAET. What is the question?

STR. If anyone should say that by virtue of a single art he knew how, not to assert or dispute, but to do and make all things—

THEAET. What do you mean by all things?

STR. You fail to grasp the very beginning of what I said; for apparently you do not understand the word "all."

THEAET. No, I do not.

STR. I mean you and me among the "all," and the other animals besides, and the trees.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. If one should say that he would make you and me and all other created beings.

THEAET. What would he mean by "making"? Evidently you will not say that he means a husbandman; for you said he was a maker of animals also.

STR. Yes, and of sea and earth and heaven and gods and everything else besides; and, moreover, he makes them all quickly and sells them for very little.

THEAET. This is some joke of yours.

STR. Yes? And when a man says that he knows all things and can teach them to another for a small
ταῦτα ἔτερον ἀν διδάξειν οἰλίγου καὶ ἐν οἰλίγῳ χρόνῳ, μόνον οὐ παιδιὰν νομιστέον;

θεαί. Πάντως ποι.

Β ἔς. Παιδίας δὲ ἔχεις ἢ τὶ τεχνικῶτερον ἢ καὶ χαριέστερον εἶδος ἢ τὸ μυμητικὸν;

θεαί. Οὐδαμῶς· πάμπολυ γὰρ εἰρήκας εἶδος εἰς ἐν πάντα ξυλλαβῶν καὶ σχεδον ποικιλώτατον.

22. ἔς. Οὐκοῦν τὸν γ' ὑπισχυσμένον δυνατὸν εἶναι μᾶ τέχνη πάντα ποιεῖν γιγνώσκομεν ποι τοῦτο, ὅτι μυμήματα καὶ ὑμώνυμα τῶν ὄντων ἀπεργαζόμενος τῇ γραφικῇ τέχνῃ δυνατός ἔσται τοὺς ἀνοίγους τῶν νέων παιδῶν, πόρρωθεν τὰ γεγραμμένα ἐπιδεικνύω, λανθάνειν ὡς ὅτι περ ἄν ἑυληθῇ δρᾶν, τοῦτο ἰκανώτατος ὁ ἅπατελεῖν ἑργῷ.

C θεαί. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ἔς. Τί δέ δή; περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἄρ' οὐ προσδοκῶμεν εἶναι τινα ἀλλὴν τέχνην, ἢ ἂν δυνατὸν ὑν τυγχάνει 1 τοὺς νέους καὶ ἐτί πόρρω τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφεστῶτας διὰ τῶν ὄντων τοὺς λόγους γοητεύειν, δεικνύτας εἰδωλα λεγόμενα περὶ πάντων, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἁληθῆ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸν λέγοντα δή σοφώτατον πάντων ἀπαντ' εἶναι;

D θεαί. Τί γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀλλὴ τις τοιαύτη τέχνη;

ἔς. Τοὺς πολλοὺς οὖν, ὥθεαίτητε, τῶν τότε ἀκούόντων ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη χρόνον τε ἐπελθόντος αὐτοῖς ἰκανοῦ καὶ προϊόντος ἠλικίας τοῖς τε οὕσι προσπίπτοντας ἐγγύθεν καὶ διὰ παθημάτων ἀναγκα-ζομένους ἑναργῶς ἑφάπτεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μετα-

1 ἢ αὐ δυνατὸν ὑν τυγχάνει Burnet; ἢ (ἢ Τ) οὐ δυνατὸν αὐ τυγχάνει BT; ὡ δὲ δυνατὸν αὐ τυγχάνει Madvig.

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price in a little time, must we not consider that a joke?

THEAET. Surely we must.

STR. And is there any more artistic or charming kind of joke than the imitative kind?

THEAET. Certainly not; for it is of very frequent occurrence and, if I may say so, most diverse. Your expression is very comprehensive.

STR. And so we recognize that he who professes to be able by virtue of a single art to make all things will be able by virtue of the painter's art, to make imitations which have the same names as the real things, and by showing the pictures at a distance will be able to deceive the dullest ones among young children into the belief that he is perfectly able to accomplish in fact whatever he wishes to do.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Well then, may we not expect to find that there is another art which has to do with words, by virtue of which it is possible to bewitch the young through their ears with words while they are still standing at a distance from the realities of truth, by exhibiting to them spoken images of all things, so as to make it seem that they are true and that the speaker is the wisest of all men in all things?

THEAET. Why should there not be such another art?

STR. Now most of the hearers, Theaetetus, when they have lived longer and grown older, will perforce come closer to realities and will be forced by sad experience openly to lay hold on realities; they

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1 Apparently a reference to a proverbial expression. Cf. Hesiod, Works, 216 ξυνω παθών; Herodotus, i. 207 τὰ παθήματα μαθήματα.
βάλλειν τὰς τότε γενομένας δόξας, ώστε σμικρά μὲν φαίνεσθαι τὰ μεγάλα, χαλεπά δὲ τὰ ράδια, καὶ πάντα πάντῃ ἀνατετράφθαι τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις φαντάσματα ύπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἐργων παραγενομένων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑσ γοῦν ἐμοὶ τηλικῶδε ὄντι κρίναι. οἴμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν ἐπὶ πόρρωθεν ἀφεστηκότων εἶναι.

ΣΕ. Τουγαροῦν ἡμεῖς σε οἶδε πάντες πειρασόμεθα καὶ ὑνὶ πειρώμεθα ὡς ἐγγύτατα ἀνευ τῶν παθημάτων προσάγειν. περὶ δὲ ὅν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ τόδε μοι 235 λέγει· πότερον ἦδη τούτο σαφές, ὅτι τῶν γοητῶν ἐστὶ τίς, μμητής ὅν τῶν ὄντων, ἡ διστάζωμεν ἐτι μη περὶ ὀσωνερ ἀντιλέγειν δοκεῖ δυνατὸς εἶναι, περὶ τοσοῦτων καὶ τᾶς ἐπιστήμας ἀληθῶς ἔχων τυγχάνει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἄν, ὃ ξένε; ἀλλα σχεδὸν ἦδη σαφές ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων, ὅτι τῶν τῆς παιδιᾶς μετ-εχόντων ἐστὶ τίς εἰς.1

ΣΕ. Γόητα μὲν δὴ καὶ μμητήν ἁρα θετεόν αὐτὸν τίνα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ θετεόν;

23. ΣΕ. Ἀγε δή, νῦν ἡμέτερον ἐργον ἦδη τὸν Β θῆρα μὴκέτ' ἀνείναι· σχεδὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν περειελήφαμεν ἐν ἀμφιβληστρικῷ τιν τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀργάνων, ὡστε οὐκέτ' ἐκφεύξεται τόδε γε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ 3 ποιον;

1 τίς εἰς Heusde; τίς μερῶν εἰς BT (giving εἰς to the stranger); τίς μερῶν εἰς W.
2 οὐκέτ' W; οὐκ ἐτι B; οὐκ T.
3 τὸ W; om. BT.
THE SOPHIST

will have to change the opinions which they had at first accepted, so that what was great will appear small and what was easy, difficult, and all the apparent truths in arguments will be turned topsy-turvy by the facts that have come upon them in real life. Is not this true?

THEAET. Yes, at least so far as one of my age can judge. But I imagine I am one of those who are still standing at a distance.

STR. Therefore all of us elders here will try, and are now trying, to bring you as near as possible without the sad experience. So answer this question about the sophist: Is this now clear, that he is a kind of a juggler, an imitator of realities, or are we still uncertain whether he may not truly possess the knowledge of all the things about which he seems to be able to argue?

THEAET. How could that be, my dear sir? Surely it is pretty clear by this time from what has been said that he is one of those whose business is entertainment.

STR. That is to say, he must be classed as a juggler and imitator.

THEAET. Of course he must.

STR. Look sharp, then; it is now our business not to let the beast get away again, for we have almost got him into a kind of encircling net of the devices we employ in arguments about such subjects, so that he will not now escape the next thing.

THEAET. What next thing?
Το μή ού τοῦ γένους εἶναι τοῦ τῶν θαυματοποιῶν τις εἰς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κάμοι τούτο γε οὕτω περὶ αυτοῦ ἔγνοικεί. ΕΕ. Δέδοκται 1 τοίνυν ὅτι τάχιστα διαφέρειν τὴν εἰδωλοποιικήν τέχνην, καὶ καταβάντας εἰς αὐτὴν, εὰν μὲν ἡμᾶς εὐθὺς ὁ σοφιστής ὑπομείνῃ, συλλαβεῖν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὰ ἐπεσταλμένα ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ ΘΕΙΟΥ, κάκεινώς παραδόντας ἀποφήναι τὴν ἄγραν, εὰν δ’ ἄρα κατὰ μέρη τῆς μυθητικῆς δύηται πη, ἐξανακολουθεῖν αὐτῷ διαφορώς ἂεῖ τὴν ὑποδεχομένην αὐτὸν μοίραν, ἐωσπερ ἄν ληφθῆ. πάντως οὕτε οὕτως οὕτε ἀλλὸ γένος οὐδὲν μὴ ποτε ἐκφυγὼν ἐπευξηται τὴν τῶν οὕτω δυναμένων μετέναι καθ’ ἐκαστὰ τε καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα μέθοδον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεις εὖ, καὶ ταῦτα ταύτη ποιητέον.

ΕΕ. Κατὰ δὴ τὸν παρελθηλυθότα τρόπον τῆς ΘΕΟΓΩΝ, ἐγὼγε ὁμοιὰς καὶ νῦν φαίνομαι, δύο καθοράν ἐδή τῆς μυθητικῆς· τὴν δὲ ζητομείνην ἰδέαν, ἐν ὁποτέρω ποθ’ ἡμῖν οὐσα τυχάνει, καταμαθεῖν οὐδέπω μοι δοκῶ νῦν δυνατὸς εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σὺ δ’ ἀλλ’ εἰπὲ πρῶτον καὶ διελε ἡμῖν, τίνε τοῦ δύο λέγεις.

ΕΕ. Μιὰν μὲν τὴν εἰκαστικὴν ὁρῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τέχνην. ἐστὶ δ’ αὐτὴ μάλιστα, ὁπόταν κατὰ τὰς τοῦ παραδείγματος συμμετρίας τις ἐν μῆκει καὶ πλάτει καὶ βάθει, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτη χρώματα Ε ἀποδίδοις τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάστοις, 2 τὴν τοῦ μυθημάτος γένεσιν ἀπεργάζεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τι δ’; οὐ πάντες οἱ μμοῦμενοι τι τούτ’ ἐπιχειροῦσι δρᾶν;

1 δέδοκται] δεδείκται BT; δεδείκται W.
2 ἐκάστους Stobaeus, W; ἐκάστους BT.
str. The conclusion that he belongs to the class of conjurers.

THEAET. I agree to that opinion of him, too.

str. It is decided, then, that we will as quickly as possible divide the image-making art and go down into it, and if the sophist stands his ground against us at first, we will seize him by the orders of reason, our king, then deliver him up to the king and display his capture. But if he tries to take cover in any of the various sections of the imitative art, we must follow him, always dividing the section into which he has retreated, until he is caught. For assuredly neither he nor any other creature will ever boast of having escaped from pursuers who are able to follow up the pursuit in detail and everywhere in this methodical way.

THEAET. You are right. That is what we must do.

str. To return, then, to our previous method of division, I think I see this time also two classes of imitation, but I do not yet seem to be able to make out in which of them the form we are seeking is to be found.

THEAET. Please first make the division and tell us what two classes you mean.

str. I see the likeness-making art as one part of imitation. This is met with, as a rule, whenever anyone produces the imitation by following the proportions of the original in length, breadth, and depth, and giving, besides, the appropriate colours to each part.

THEAET. Yes, but do not all imitators try to do this?
PLATO

ΞΕ. Ὅσκουν ὅσοι γε τῶν μεγάλων πού τι πλάττουσιν ἐργων ἦ γράφουσιν. εἰ γὰρ ἀποδοιοῦν τὴν τῶν καλῶν ἀληθινὴν συμμετρίαν, οἶσθ' ὅτι σμικρότερα 236 μὲν τοῦ δέοντος τὰ ἄνω, μεῖξῶ δὲ τὰ κάτω

φαίνοιτ' ἂν διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν πόρρωθεν, τὰ δὲ ἐγγύθεν ὑφ' ἓμών ὀράσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 1

ΞΕ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ δὲ ἕκαστος τὸ ἀληθὲς ἑάσαντες οἱ δημιουργοῖ νῦν οὐ τὰς οὕσας συμμετρίας, ἀλλὰ τὰς δοξούσας εἶναι καλὰς τοῖς εἰδώλοις ἐναπεργάζονται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 2

ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν ἅρα ἐτερον οὐ δίκαιον, εἰκός γε οὖν, εἰκόνα καλεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

Β ΞΕ. Καὶ τῆς γε μυθητικῆς τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος κλητέον, ὅπερ εἰπομεν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, εἰκαστικήν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κλητέον.

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ; τὸ φαινόμενον μὲν διὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐκ καλοῦ θέαν έοικέναι τῷ καλῷ, δύναμιν δὲ εἰ τις λάβοι τὰ τηλικάυτα ἱκανῶς ὀρᾶν, μὴ δ' εἰκὸς ὃς φησιν έοικέναι, τί καλοῦμεν; ἀρ' οὔκ, ἐπεὶ περ

φαίνεται μὲν, ἑοικε δὲ οὖ, φαντάσμα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν πάμμοιλυ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ζωγραφίαν

C τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ ξύμπασαν μυθητικήν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;

ΞΕ. Τὴν δὴ φαντάσμα W 3 ἀλλ' οὔκ εἰκόνα ἀπεργα-

ζομένην τέχνην ἃρ' οὖ φανταστικὴν ὀρθότατ' ἂν προσαγορεύομεν;

1 πάνυ μὲν οὖν Τ, Στοβαέως; om. Β.

2 πάνυ μὲν οὖν ΒΤ; παντάπασι γε Β. W.

3 φαντάσμα W; φαντάσματά ΒΤ.
THE SOPHIST

str. Not those who produce some large work of sculpture or painting. For if they reproduced the true proportions of beautiful forms, the upper parts, you know, would seem smaller and the lower parts larger than they ought, because we see the former from a distance, the latter from near at hand.

THEAET. Certainly.

str. So the artists abandon the truth and give their figures not the actual proportions but those which seem to be beautiful, do they not?

THEAET. Certainly.

str. That, then, which is other, but like, we may fairly call a likeness, may we not?

THEAET. Yes.

str. And the part of imitation which is concerned with such things, is to be called, as we called it before, likeness-making?

THEAET. It is to be so called.

str. Now then, what shall we call that which appears, because it is seen from an unfavourable position, to be like the beautiful, but which would not even be likely to resemble that which it claims to be like, if a person were able to see such large works adequately? Shall we not call it, since it appears, but is not like, an appearance?

THEAET. Certainly.

str. And this is very common in painting and in all imitation?

THEAET. Of course.

str. And to the art which produces appearance, but not likeness, the most correct name we could give would be "fantastic art," would it not?
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Πολύ γε.

ΕΕ. Τούτω τοίνυν τῷ δύο ἔλεγον εἶδη τῆς εἰδωλοποικῆς, εἰκαστικῆν καὶ φανταστικῆν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅροθώς.

ΕΕ. "Ὅ δὲ γε καὶ τότ’ ἡμιφενύον, ἐν¹ ποτέρα² τὸν σοφιστὴν θετέον, οὐδὲ νῦν τω δύναμι θεᾶσαι. ὒ δὲ σαφῶς, ἀλλ’ ὄντως θαυμαστὸς ἀνήρ³ καὶ κατιδεῖν παγχάλεπος, ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν μάλα εὔ καὶ κομψῶς εἰς ἄπορον εἴδος διερευνήσασθαι καταπέφευγεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἕοκεν.

ΕΕ. "Ἄρ’ οὖν αὐτὸ γιγνώσκων ἡμιφής, ἦ σε οἶνον ρύμη τις ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου συνειδησμένον συνεπεστάσατο⁴ πρὸς τὸ ταχῦ ἡμιφήσασθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς καὶ πρὸς τί⁵ τοῦτο ἐφήκας;

24. ΕΕ. "Οὖν, ὡ μακάριε, ἐσμὲν ἐν παντᾷ. Ἐ πασι χαλεπῇ σκέψει. τὸ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι τοῦτο καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν, εἶναι δὲ μή, καὶ τὸ λέγειν μὲν ἄττα, ἀληθῆ δὲ μή, πάντα ταῦτα ἐστὶ μεστὰ ἀπορίας ἂεὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ καὶ νῦν. ὅπως γὰρ εἰπόντα χρὴ ψευδή λέγειν ἡ δοξάζειν ὄντως εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο θεγξάμενον ἑναντιολογία μὴ συνέχεσθαι, παντά-237 πασιν, ὡ Θεαίτητε, χαλεπών.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή;

ΕΕ. Τετόλμηκεν ὁ λόγος οὕτως ὑποθέσαθαι τὸ μὴ ὃν εἶναι. ψεῦδος γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἐγίγνετο ὃν. Παρμενίδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, ὡ παῖ, παισῦν ἡμῖν οὕσων

¹ ἐν add. Bessarionis liber.
² ποτέρα B; πότερα TW.
³ ἀνήρ Bekker; ἀνήρ BT.
⁴ συνεπεστάσατο W; νῦν ἑπεστάσατο BT.
⁵ τί W; ὅτι BT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. By all means.

str. These, then, are the two forms of the image-making art that I meant, the likeness-making and the fantastic.

THEAET. You are right.

str. But I was uncertain before in which of the two the sophist should be placed, and even now I cannot see clearly. The fellow is really wonderful and very difficult to keep in sight, for once more, in the very cleverest manner he has withdrawn into a baffling classification where it is hard to track him.

THEAET. So it seems.

str. Do you assent because you recognize the fact, or did the force of habit hurry you along to a speedy assent?

THEAET. What do you mean, and why did you say that?

str. We are really, my dear friend, engaged in a very difficult investigation; for the matter of appearing and seeming, but not being, and of saying things, but not true ones—all this is now and always has been very perplexing. You see, Theaetetus, it is extremely difficult to understand how a man is to say or think that falsehood really exists and in saying this not be involved in contradiction.

THEAET. Why?

str. This statement involves the bold assumption that not-being exists, for otherwise falsehood could not come into existence. But the great Parmenides, my boy, from the time when we were children to
ἀρχόμενός τε καὶ διὰ τέλους τούτο ἀπεμαρτύρατο, πεζῇ τε ὄδε ἐκάστοτε λέγων καὶ μετὰ μέτρων.

οὐ γὰρ μὴ ποτε τούτο δαμὴ, ἕφορον, εἶναι μὴ ἔσται· ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆς τινα ἀφ’ ὅδου διζήμενον ἐστὶν νόημα.

Β παρ’ ἐκείνου τε οὖν μαρτυρεῖται, καὶ μάλιστα γε δὴ πάντων ὁ λόγος αὐτός ἢν δηλώσεις μέτρια βασανισθεὶς. τούτο οὖν αὐτὸ πρῶτον θεασώμεθα, εἰ μὴ τί σου διαφέρει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν ὅτι βούλει τίθεσο, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἢ βελτιστα διέξεισι σκοπῶν αὐτὸς τε ἢ τι καμὲ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὄδον ἄγε.

25. ΞΕ. Ἀλλὰ χρῆ δραίν ταῦτα. καὶ μοι λέγει τὸ μιθαμῶς ὅν τολμῶμεν ποι φθέγγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ΞΕ. Μὴ τοῖνυν ἔριδος ἐνεκα μηδὲ παιδαῖς, ἀλλ’ ἐὰν σπουδὴν δέοι συννοήσαστά τυν ἀποκρίνασθαι τὰς ἀκροτῶν ποι χρῆ τούνοιμ’ ἐπιφέρειν τοῦτο τὸ μὴ οὖν. τῖ 5 δοκοῦμεν ἄν εἰς τί καὶ ἐπὶ ποῖον αὐτὸν τε καταχρῆσασθαι καὶ τῷ πυρθανομένῳ δεικνύναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Χαλεπον ἦρον καὶ σχεδὸν εἰπεῖν οἷον γε ἐμοὶ παντάπασιν ἀποροῦν.

ΞΕ. Ἀλλ’ οὖν τούτο γε δήλον, ὅτε τῶν ὄντων ἐπὶ τὶ 6 τὸ μὴ οὖν οὐκ οἰστέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν;

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν, οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τὸ τὶ φέρων ὀρθῶς ἄν τις φέροι.

1 τοῦτο δαμὴ Simplicius; τοῦτ’ οὐδαμῇ BT.
2 διζήμενος BTW (διζήσιος 258 δ).
3 αὐτὸ W; οὕτος BT.
4 ἀλλ’ ei σπουδή Bekker; ἀλλῆς πού δὴ B; ἀλλῆ σπουδὴ T.
5 τί] ὅτι TW.
6 τι om. BT.

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the end of his life, always protested against this and constantly repeated both in prose and in verse:

Never let this thought prevail, saith he, that not-being is; But keep your mind from this way of investigation.

So that is his testimony, and a reasonable examination of the statement itself would make it most absolutely clear. Let us then consider this matter first, if it's all the same to you.

Theaet. Assume my consent to anything you wish. Consider only the argument, how it may best be pursued; follow your own course, and take me along with you.

Str. Very well, then. Now tell me; do we venture to use the phrase absolute not-being?

Theaet. Of course.

Str. If, then, not merely for the sake of discussion or as a joke, but seriously, one of his pupils were asked to consider and answer the question "To what is the designation 'not-being' to be applied?" how do we think he would reply to his questioner, and how would he apply the term, for what purpose, and to what object?

Theaet. That is a difficult question; I may say that for a fellow like me it is unanswerable.

Str. But this is clear, anyhow, that the term "not-being" cannot be applied to any being.

Theaet. Of course not.

Str. And if not to being, then it could not properly be applied to something, either.
PLATO

OEOAI. Πῶς δή;

D ΞΕ. Καὶ τοῦτο ἦμῖν που φανερόν, ὡς καὶ τὸ "τὶ" τοῦτο βῆμα ἐπ' οὔτι λέγομεν ἐκάστοτε·
μόνον γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγειν, ὡσπερ γυμνὸν καὶ ἀπηρημω-
μένον ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων, ἀδύνατον ἢ γάρ;
OEOAI. Ἀδύνατον.

ΞΕ. Ἀρα τῇδε σκοποῦν ἐξύμφης ὡς ἀνάγκη τὸν τί
λέγοντα ἐν γε τι λέγειν;
OEOAI. Οὔτως.

ΞΕ. Ἔνος γὰρ δὴ τὸ γε "τὶ" φήσεις σημεῖον
ἐἰναι, τὸ δὲ "τινὲς" δυοῦν, τὸ δὲ "τινὲς" πολλῶν.
OEOAI. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Ε ΞΕ. Τὸν δὲ δὴ μὴ τὶ λέγοντα ἀναγκαίοτατον,
ὡς ἐσικε, παντάπασι μηδὲν λέγειν.
OEOAI. Ἀναγκαίοτατον μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὔδε τοῦτο συγχωρητέον, τὸ τὸν
τουτουτον λέγειν μεν,1 λέγειν μέντοι μηδὲν, ἄλλ’
οὔδε λέγειν φατέον, ὡς γ’ ἂν ἐπιχειρῆ μὴ ὅν φθέγ-
γεσθαι;

OEOAI. Τέλος γοῦν ἂν ἄπορίας ὁ λόγος ἔχοι.

238 26. ΞΕ. Μήπω μέγ’ εἰπης· ἐτι γάρ, ὡ μα-
κάρως, ἐστι, καὶ ταύτα γε τῶν ἄπορίων ἡ μεγίστῃ
καὶ πρώτη. περὶ γὰρ αὐτήν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὖσα
τυγχάνει.

OEOAI. Πῶς φής; λέγε καὶ μηδὲν ἄποκρηφης.

ΞΕ. Τῶ μὲν ὄντι που προσγένοιτ’ ἄν τι τῶν
ὄντων ἐτερον;

OEOAI. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΞΕ. Μὴ ὄντι δὲ τὶ 2 τῶν ὄντων ἄρα προσγίγνεσθαι
φήσομεν δυνατὸν εἰναι;

1 μὲν τὶ BT; τι om. Schleiermacher.
2 ὄντι δὲ τὶ] ὅν δὲ τὶ B; ὅντι δὲ T.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. How could it?

str. And this is plain to us, that we always use the word "something" of some being, for to speak of "something" in the abstract, naked, as it were, and disconnected from all beings is impossible, is it not?

THEAET. Yes, it is.

str. You assent because you recognize that he who says something must say some one thing?

THEAET. Yes.

str. And you will agree that "something" or "some" in the singular is the sign of one, in the dual of two, and in the plural of many.

THEAET. Of course.

str. And he who says not something, must quite necessarily say absolutely nothing.

THEAET. Quite necessarily.

str. Then we cannot even concede that such a person speaks, but says nothing? We must even declare that he who undertakes to say "not-being" does not speak at all?

THEAET. The argument could go no further in perplexity.

str. Boast not too soon! For there still remains, my friend, the first and greatest of perplexities. It affects the very beginning of the matter.

THEAET. What do you mean? Do not hesitate to speak.

str. To that which is may be added or attributed some other thing which is?

THEAET. Of course.

str. But shall we assert that to that which is not anything which is can be attributed?
PLATO

THEA. Καὶ τῶς;

ΕΕ. 'Αριθμὸν δὴ τὸν ξύμπαντα τῶν ὄντων τίθεμεν.

B THEA. Εἶπερ γε καὶ ἄλλο τι θετέον ὡς ὄν.

ΕΕ. Μὴ τοῖνυν μηδ' ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἀριθμοῦ μῆτε

πλῆθος μῆτε τὸ ἐν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὅν προσφέρειν.

THEA. Οὐκοῦν ἂν ὅρθῶς γε, ὡς έουκεν, ἐπιχειροῦμεν, ὡς φησιν ὁ λόγος.

ΕΕ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν ἡ διὰ τοῦ στόματος φθέγξιτο ἀν τις ἡ καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ παράπαν λάβοι τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἡ τὸ μὴ ὅν χωρὶς ἀριθμοῦ;

THEA. Λέγει πῇ; ΕΕ. Μὴ ὄντα μὲν ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν, ἀρα οὐ πλῆθος

C ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἀριθμοῦ προστιθέναι; THEA. Τί μὴν;

ΕΕ. Μὴ ὅν δὲ, ἀρα οὐ τὸ ὑν αὐ;

THEA. Σαφεύστατα γε.

ΕΕ. Καὶ μὴν οὔτε δικαίων γε οὔτε ὅρθων φαμεν ὅν ἐπιχειρεῖν μὴ ὄντι προσαρμόττειν.

THEA. Λέγεις ἀληθέστατα.

ΕΕ. Συννοεῖς οὖν ὡς οὔτε φθέγξασθαι δυνατὸν ὅρθως οὔτ' εἶπειν οὔτε διανοηθήναι τὸ μὴ ὅν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀδιανοητὸν τε καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἀφθεγκτον καὶ ἀλογον;

THEA. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

D ΕΕ. Ἀρ' οὖν ἐψευσάμην ἅρτι λέγων τὴν μεγίστην ἀπορίαν ἑρεῖν αὐτοῦ πέρι;

THEA. Τοῦ δὲ 1 ἐτι μείζω τινὰ λέγειν ἀλλην ἐχομεν;

ΕΕ. Τί δὲ, 2 ὡθαυμάσιε; οὐκ ἐννοεῖς αὐτοῖς τοῖς

1 τοῦ δὲ in marg. T; τὸ δὲ BT; τὸ δὲ W; τί δὲ in marg. al.; τὸ δὲ (τὶ δὲ) . . . ἐχομεν attributed to the Stranger by Winckelmann and others.

2 τὶ δὲ B; τὶ δαὶ T; τίνα δὴ Winckelmann and others.

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THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Certainly not.

STR. Now we assume that all number is among the things which are.

THEAET. Yes, if anything can be assumed to be.

STR. Then let us not even undertake to attribute either the singular or the plural of number to not-being.

THEAET. We should, apparently, not be right in undertaking that, as our argument shows.

STR. How then could a man either utter in speech or even so much as conceive in his mind things which are not, or not-being, apart from number?

THEAET. Tell me how number is involved in such conceptions.

STR. When we say "things which are not," do we not attribute plurality to them?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. And in saying "a thing which is not," do we not equally attribute the singular number?

THEAET. Obviously.

STR. And yet we assert that it is neither right nor fair to undertake to attribute being to not-being.

THEAET. Very true.

STR. Do you see, then, that it is impossible rightly to utter or to say or to think of not-being without any attribute, but it is a thing inconceivable, inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational?

THEAET. Absolutely.

STR. Then was I mistaken just now in saying that the difficulty I was going to speak of was the greatest in our subject?

THEAET. But is there a still greater one that we can mention?

STR. Why, my dear fellow, don't you see, by the
λεχθεῖσιν ὅτι καὶ τὸν ἐλέγχοντα εἰς ἀπορίαν καθιστῆσαι τὸ μὴ ὑπὸ ὦτως, ὡστε, ὅπωτα αὐτὸ ἐπιχειρησάς ἑξ ἐλέγχειν, ἑναντία αὐτοῦ αὐτῷ περὶ ἕκεῖνο ἀναγκάζεσθαι λέγειν;

ὁεαι. Πῶς φήσ; εἰπὲ ἑτὶ σαφέστερον.

ἑ. Οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸ σαφέστερον ἐν ἐμοὶ σκοπεῖν. Ε ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ὑποθέμενος οὔτε ἕνος οὔτε τῶν πολλῶν τὸ μὴ ὑπὸ δεῖν μετέχειν, ἀρτί τε καὶ νῦν ὦτως ἐν αὐτῷ ἑιρήκατο τὸ μὴ ὑπὸ γὰρ φημὶ. ἐξήνησι τοι;

ὁεαι. Ναὶ.

ἑ. Καὶ μὴν ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἀφθεγκτόν τε αὐτό καὶ ἁρρητὸν καὶ ἀλογὸν ἐφήν εἶναι. ἐξενέπει;

ὁεαι. Ἐννέπομαι. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ἑ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ γε εἶναι προσάπτειν πειρώμενος ἑναντία τοῦ πρόσθεν ἐλεγον;

ὁεαι. Φαίνει.

ἑ. Τί δέ; τοῦτο προσάπτων οὐχ ὡς ἐνὶ διελεγόμην;

ὁεαι. Ναϊ.

ἑ. Καὶ μὴν ἀλογὸν τε λέγων καὶ ἁρρητὸν καὶ ἀφθεγκτὸν ὡς γε πρὸς ἐν τὸν λόγον ἐποιούμην.

ὁεαι. Πῶς δ’ οὖ;

ἑ. Φαμέν δέ γε δεῖν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς τις λέξει, μήτε ὡς ἐν μήτε ὡς πολλὰ διορίζειν αὐτό, μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν αὐτὸ καλεῖν. ἕνος γὰρ εἴδει καὶ κατὰ ταύτην ἀν τὴν πρόσρησιν προσαγορεύοιτο.

ὁεαι. Παντάπασί γε.
very arguments we have used, that not-being reduces him who would refute it to such difficulties that when he attempts to refute it he is forced to contradict himself?

THEAET. What do you mean? Speak still more clearly.

STR. You must not look for more clearness in me; for although I maintained that not-being could have nothing to do with either the singular or the plural number, I spoke of it just now, and am still speaking of it, as one; for I say "that which is not." You understand surely?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And again a little while ago I said it was inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational. Do you follow me?

THEAET. Yes, of course.

STR. Then when I undertook to attach the verb "to be" to not-being I was contradicting what I said before.

THEAET. Evidently.

STR. Well, then; when I attached this verb to it, did I not address it in the singular?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And when I called it irrational, inexpressible, and unspeakable, I addressed my speech to it as singular.

THEAET. Of course you did.

STR. But we say that, if one is to speak correctly, one must not define it as either singular or plural, and must not even call it "it" at all; for even by this manner of referring to it one would be giving it the form of the singular.

THEAET. Certainly.
B 27. ΕΕ. Τὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἐμὲ γ' ἔτι τί τις ἀν λέγοι; καὶ γὰρ πάλαι καὶ τὰ νῦν ἤττημένοιν ἂν εὕροι περί τὸν τοῦ μὴ οὖντος ἐλεγχον. ὥστε ἐν ἐμοιγε λέγοντι, καθάπερ εἶπον, μὴ σκοπώμεν τὴν ὁρθολογίαν περὶ τὸ μὴ οὖν, ἀλλ' εἰα ² δὴ νῦν ἐν σοι σκεφώμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς φῆς;

ΕΕ. Ἡθι ἡμῖν εὗ καὶ γενναίως, ὅτε νέος ὤν, ὅτι μάλιστα δύνασαι συντείνας πειράθητι, μήτε οὔσιν μήτε τὸ ἐν μήτε πλήθος ἀριθμοῦ προστίθεις τῷ μὴ οὖντι, κατὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν ³ φθέγξασθαι τι περὶ αὐτοῦ.

C ΘΕΑΙ. Πολλῇ μέντ' ἂν μὲ καὶ ἄτοπος ἔχοι προθυμία τῆς ἐπισχερήσεως, εἰ σὲ τοιαδ' ὅρων πάσχοντα αὐτὸς ἐπισχεροῖν.

ΕΕ. Ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, σὲ μὲν καὶ ἐμὲ χαίρειν ἐώμεν· ἔως δ' ἂν τινὶ δυναμένῳ δρᾶν τοῦτο ἐντυγχάνωμεν, μέχρι τούτου λέγωμεν ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον πανούργος εἰς ἀπορον ὁ σοφιστής τότον καταδέδυκεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα δὴ φαίνεται.

ΕΕ. Τουγαροῦν εἰ τινα φήσομεν αὐτὸν ἔχειν φανταστικὴν τέχνην, ῥαδίως ἐκ ταύτης τῆς χρείας τῶν λόγων ἀντιλαμβανόμενος ἡμῶν εἰς τούναντίων ἀποστρέφει ⁴ τοὺς λόγους, ὅταν εἰδωλοποιοῖν αὐτὸν καλῶμεν, ἀνερωτῶν τί ποτε τὸ παράπαν εἰδωλον λέγομεν. σκοπεῖν οὖν, ὡ Θεαίτητε, χρῆ, τί τις τῷ νεανίᾳ πρὸς τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρινεῖται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δὴλον ὅτι φήσομεν τὰ τε ἐν τοῖς ὅδασι καὶ κατόπτροις εἰδωλα, ἔτι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ τὰ τετυπωμένα καὶ τάλλα ὅσα πον τοιαῦτ' ἐσθ' ἔτερα.

¹ ἐμὲ γ' ἔτι τί τι ² εἰα Bessarion's copy; ἐα BT.

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STR. But poor me, what can anyone say of me any longer? For you would find me now, as always before, defeated in the refutation of not-being. So, as I said before, we must not look to me for correctness of speech about not-being. But come now, let us look to you for it.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. Come, I beg of you, make a sturdy effort, young man as you are, and try with might and main to say something correctly about not-being, without attributing to it either existence or unity or plurality.

THEAET. But I should be possessed of great and absurd eagerness for the attempt, if I were to undertake it with your experience before my eyes.

STR. Well, if you like, let us say no more of you and me; but until we find someone who can accomplish this, let us confess that the sophist has in most rascally fashion hidden himself in a place we cannot explore.

THEAET. That seems to be decidedly the case.

STR. And so, if we say he has an art, as it were, of making appearances, he will easily take advantage of our poverty of terms to make a counter attack, twisting our words to the opposite meaning; when we call him an image-maker, he will ask us what we mean by "image," exactly. So, Theaetetus, we must see what reply is to be made to the young man's question.

THEAET. Obviously we shall reply that we mean the images in water and in mirrors, and those in paintings, too, and sculptures, and all the other things of the same sort.

3 τὸ ὄρθων Β; τὸν ὄρθων λόγον Τ.
4 ἀποστεψεῖ cor. Т; ἀποτεψεῖ BTW.
Ε 28. ἩΦανέρος, ὁ Θεαίτητε, εὰ σοφιστὴν

οὐχ ἑωρακώς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή;

Ἑ. Δόξει σοι μόνειν ἡ παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔχειν

δόμματα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

Ἑ. Τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ὅταν οὕτως αὐτῷ διδᾶς ἐὰν

ἐν κατόπτροις ἡ πλάσμασι λέγης τι, καταγελάσεται

σοι τῶν λόγων, ὅταν ὦς βλέποντι λέγης αὐτῷ,

240 προσποιοῦμενος οὕτε κάτοπτρα οὕτε ὑδατα γιγνώ-

σκευον οὕτε τὸ παράπαν ὄψιν, τὸ δ' ἐκ τῶν λόγων

ἐρωτήσει σε μόνον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποιον;

Ἑ. Τὸ διὰ πάντων τούτων ᾧ πολλὰ εἰσὶν

ἡξίωσας ἐν προσεπείν ὄνοματι φθεγξάμενος εἰδω-

λον ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὦς ἐν ὧν. λέγε ὦν καὶ ἀμύνου μηδὲν

ὑποχωρῶν τὸν ἀνδρά.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δήτα, ὦ ξένε, εἰδωλον ἄν φαίμεν εἰναι

πλήν γε τὸ πρός τάληθινον ἀφωμοιωμένον ἄτερον

τοιούτον;

Ἑ. Ἡ ἑτερον δὲ λέγεις τοιούτον ἀληθινόν, ἦ ἐπὶ

Β τίνι τὸ τοιούτον εἴτε;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἀλλ' ἑοικός μὲν.

Ἑ. ἩἈρα τὸ ἀληθινὸν οὐτὼς ὦν λέγων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐτὼς.

Ἑ. Τί δέ; τὸ μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἄρ' ἑναντίον ἄλθοις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

Ἑ. Οὐκ οὕτωσ 1 ὦν 2 ἑκα λέγεις τὸ ἑοικός, εἶπερ

αὐτό γε μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἑρεῖς.

1 οὕτωs W; οὕτων B; om. T.
2 ὦν T; οὐκον B; οὐκ ὦν W.
It is evident, Theaetetus, that you never saw a sophist.

Why?

He will make you think his eyes are shut or he has none at all.

How so?

When you give this answer, if you speak of something in mirrors or works of art, he will laugh at your words, when you talk to him as if he could see. He will feign ignorance of mirrors and water and of sight altogether, and will question you only about that which is deduced from your words.

What is that?

That which exists throughout all these things which you say are many but which you saw fit to call by one name, when you said "image" of them all, as if they were all one thing. So speak and defend yourself. Do not give way to the man at all.

Why, Stranger, what can we say an image is, except another such thing fashioned in the likeness of the true one?

Do you mean another such true one, or in what sense did you say "such"?

Not a true one by any means, but only one like the true.

And by the true you mean that which really is?

Exactly.

And the not true is the opposite of the true?

Of course.

That which is like, then, you say does not really exist, if you say it is not true.
OEAI. Ἄλλ' ἔστι γε μήν πῶς.1

Ε. Οὐκοῦν ἄληθῶς γε, φήσ.

OEAI. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν πλὴν γ' εἰκὼν ὄντως.

Ε. Οὐκ ὅν 3 ἁρα 4 ὄντως ἐστὶν ὄντως ἣν λέγομεν εἰκόνα;

C OEAI. Κινδυνεύει τοιαύτην τινὰ πεπλέχθαι συμπλοκὴν τὸ μὴ ὑν τῷ ὄντι, καὶ μάλα ἁτοπον.

Ε. Πῶς γὰρ οὖκ ἢτοπον; ὁρᾶς γοῦν οτι καὶ νῦν διὰ τῆς ἑπαλλάξεως ταύτης ὁ πολυκέφαλος σοφιστὴς ἥμαγκακεν ἥμασ τὸ μή ὅν ὦχ ἐκόντας ὁμολογεῖν εἰναὶ πῶς.

OEAI. ὢρῶ καὶ μάλα.

Ε. Τί δὲ δή; τὴν τέχνην αὐτοῦ τίνα ἀφορίσαντες ἥμιν αὐτοῖς συμφωνεῖν οἶοι τε ἐσόμεθα;

OEAI. Πή καὶ τὸ ποίον τι φοβοῦμενοι οὕτω λέγεις;

D Ε. Ὅταν περὶ τὸ φάντασμα αὐτοῦ ἀπατᾶν φώμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην εἰναὶ τινα ἀπατητικὴν αὐτοῦ, τὸτε πότερον ἑυδῆ δοξάζειν τὴν ψυχήν ἥμων φήσομεν ὑπὸ τῆς ἑκείνου τέχνης, ἢ τί ποτ’ ἐροῦμεν;

OEAI. Τοῦτο τί γὰρ ἄν ἀλλο εἰπάμεν;

Ε. Ψευδῆς δ’ αὖ δόξα ἐσται τάναντία τοῖς οὕσι δοξάζουσα, ἢ πῶς;

OEAI. Τάναντια.

Ε. Λέγεις ἁρὰ τὰ μή ὄντα δοξάζειν τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν;

OEAI. Ἀνάγκη.

Ε. Πότερον μὴ εἴναι τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζουσαν, ἢ πῶς εἴναι τὰ μηδαμῶς ὄντα;

1 πῶς Hermann; πῶς; BT (the previous words being given to the stranger).

2 οὐκοῦν W; οὐκοῦν T; οὐκόν B.

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THEAET. But it does exist, in a way.

STR. But not truly, you mean.

THEAET. No, except that it is really a likeness.

STR. Then what we call a likeness, though not really existing, really does exist?

THEAET. Not-being does seem to have got into some such entanglement with being, and it is very absurd.

STR. Of course it is absurd. You see, at any rate, how by this interchange of words the many-headed sophist has once more forced us against our will to admit that not-being exists in a way.

THEAET. Yes, I see that very well.

STR. Well then, how can we define his art without contradicting ourselves?

THEAET. Why do you say that? What are you afraid of?

STR. When, in talking about appearance, we say that he deceives and that his art is an art of deception, shall we say that our mind is misled by his art to hold a false opinion, or what shall we say?

THEAET. We shall say that. What else could we say?

STR. But, again, false opinion will be that which thinks the opposite of reality, will it not?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. You mean, then, that false opinion thinks things which are not?

THEAET. Necessarily.

STR. Does it think that things which are not, are not, or that things which are not at all, in some sense are?

\[^{3} oυ\kappa\ ου\nu^\] ουκον B; oυκ oυν T.\]

\[^{4} α\rhoa\ Badham; \ α\rhoa\ oυκ BT.\]
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἶναι πώς τὰ μὴ ὀντα δεῖ γε, εἰπερ ψεῦ-
σεταί ποτὲ τίς τι καὶ κατὰ βραχύ.

Ε. Τῇ δ'; οὐ καὶ μηδαμῶς εἶναι τὰ πάντως ὀντα
dοξάζεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

Ε. Καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ψεῦδος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτο.

Ε. Καὶ λόγος, οἱμαι, ψευδής οὔτω κατὰ ταῦτα 1

241 νομισθήσεται τὰ τέ ὀντα λέγων μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὰ μὴ
ὸντα εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν ἄλλος 2 τοιοῦτος γένοιτο;

Ε. Σχεδὸν οὐδαμῶς· ἄλλα ταῦτα ὁ σοφιστής

οὐ φήσει. ἡ τίς μηχανῇ συγχωρεῖν τινα τῶν εὕ

φρονοῦντων, ὅταν ἀφθεγκτα καὶ ἄρρητα καὶ ἀλογα

καὶ ἀδιανόητα προδιωμολογημένα 3 ἡ τὰ πρὸ

tούτων ὁμολογθέντα; μανθάνομεν, ὡ Θεαίτητε,

ἀ λέγει 4;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μανθάνομεν ὅτι τάναντια

φήσει λέγειν ἡμᾶς τοῖς νῦν δή, ψευδή τολμῆσαντας

εἰπεῖν ὡς ἔστων ἐν δόξαις τε καὶ κατὰ λόγους; τῷ

Β γὰρ μὴ ὀντι τὸ ὃν προσάπτειν ἡμᾶς πολλάκις

ἀναγκάζεσθαι, διομολογησαμένους νῦν δή ποὺ τοῦτο

εἶναι πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον.

29. Ε. Ἐρθώς ἀπευνημόνευσας. ἄλλα ὥρα 5

dὴ βουλεύσασθαι 6 τὰ χρή δρὰν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ πέρι-

τὰς γὰρ ἀντιλήψεις καὶ ἀπορίας, ἐὰν αὐτὸν διε-

ρευνώμεν ἐν τῇ τῶν ψευδουργῶν καὶ γονίων τέχνης

τιθέντες, ὀρᾶς ὡς εὐποροὶ καὶ πολλαί.

1 ταῦτ᾽ Στοβαῖος; ταῦτα ταῦτα Β; ταῦτα Τ; ταῦτα ταῦτα W.
2 ἄλλως W, Stobaeus; ἄλλος BT.
3 προδιωμολογημένα Τ; προδιωμολογημένα Β; ἀφθεγκτα... ἀδιανόητα om. Madvig, Schanz, Burnet.

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THEAET. It must think that things which are not in some sense are—that is, if anyone is ever to think falsely at all, even in a slight degree.

STR. And does it not also think that things which certainly are, are not at all?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And this too is falsehood?

THEAET. Yes, it is.

STR. And therefore a statement will likewise be considered false, if it declares that things which are, are not, or that things which are not, are.

THEAET. In what other way could a statement be made false?

STR. Virtually in no other way; but the sophist will not assent to this. Or how can any reasonable man assent to it, when the expressions we just agreed upon were previously agreed to be inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational, and inconceivable? Do we understand his meaning, Theaetetus?

THEAET. Of course we understand that he will say we are contradicting our recent statements, since we dare to say that falsehood exists in opinions and words; for he will say that we are thus forced repeatedly to attribute being to not-being, although we agreed a while ago that nothing could be more impossible than that.

STR. You are quite right to remind me. But I think it is high time to consider what ought to be done about the sophist; for you see how easily and repeatedly he can raise objections and difficulties, if we conduct our search by putting him in the guild of false-workers and jugglers.

4 λέγει] λέγεις BT. 6 βουλεύσασθαι τ; βουλεύσασθαι B; om. Burnet.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΞΕ. Μικρὸν μέρος τοῖνυν αὐτῶν διεληλύθαμεν, Οὖσών ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀπεράντων.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αδύνατόν γ' ἄν, ὃς έοικεν, εἰ ὁ τὸν σοφιστὴν ἔλειν, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει.

ΞΕ. Τί οὖν; ἀποστησόμεθα νῦν μαλθακισθέντες;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν ἐγωγέ φημι δεῖν, εἰ καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν οἷοί τ' ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῇ τάνδρῳ ἐσμεν.

ΞΕ. Ἕξεις οὖν συγγνώμην καὶ καθάπερ νῦν εἴπες ἀγαπήσεις εάν τῇ καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ παρασπασώμεθα οὕτως ἴσχυρον λόγου;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐχ ἔξω;

ΔΞΕ. Τόδε τοῖνυν ἑτὶ μᾶλλον παρατοῦμαι σε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΞΕ. Μή με οἶνον πατραλοίαν ὑπολάβης γίγνεσθαι τινα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή;

ΞΕ. Τὸν πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγκαῖον ἦμιν ἀμυνομένοις ἔσται βασανίζεως, καὶ βιάζεσθαι τὸ τε μή ὡς ἔστι κατὰ τι καὶ τὸ ὁν αὐ τάλων ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον διαμαχητέον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

ΞΕ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ φαίνεται καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο τυφλῷ; τοῦτων γὰρ μήτε ἐλεγχθέντων Ε ἔλπη ὁμολογηθέντων σχολῇ ποτὲ τις οἶδ᾽ τις ἔσται περί λόγων ψευδῶν λέγων ἡ δόξης, εἴτε εἰδώλων εἴτε εἰκόνων εἴτε μυθιμάτων εἴτε φαντασμάτων αὐτῶν, ἡ καὶ περί τεχνῶν τῶν ὅσα περὶ ταῦτα εἴσομέν, μή καταγέλαστος εἴναι τὰ ἐναντία ἀναγκαζόμενος αὐτῶν λέγειν.

1 γ' ἄν Burnet; γάρ BT; ἄρ' W; γάρ ἄν al.

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THEAET. Very true.

STR. Yes, we have gone through only a small part of them, and they are, if I may say so, infinite.

THEAET. It would, apparently, be impossible to catch the sophist, if that is the case.

STR. Well, then, shall we weaken and give up the struggle now?

THEAET. No, I say; we must not do that, if we can in any way get the slightest hold of the fellow.

STR. Will you then pardon me, and, as your words imply, be content if I somehow withdraw just for a short distance from this strong argument of his?

THEAET. Of course I will.

STR. I have another still more urgent request to make of you.

THEAET. What is it?

STR. Do not assume that I am becoming a sort of parricide.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. In defending myself I shall have to test the theory of my father Parmenides, and contend forcibly that after a fashion not-being is and on the other hand in a sense being is not.

THEAET. It is plain that some such contention is necessary.

STR. Yes, plain even to a blind man, as they say; for unless these statements are either disproved or accepted, no one who speaks about false words, or false opinion—whether images or likenesses or imitations or appearances—or about the arts which have to do with them, can ever help being forced to contradict himself and make himself ridiculous.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

242 ΞΕ. Διὰ ταῦτα μέντοι τολμητέον ἐπιτίθεσθαι τῷ πατρικῷ λόγῳ νῦν, ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἐατέον, εἰ τούτῳ τις εἴργει δράν ὅκνος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἦµᾶς τούτῳ γε μηδὲν µηδαµῆ εἰρέῃ.

ΞΕ. Τρίτων τοῖνυν ἐτὶ σε σµικρόν τι παρατή-σοµαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε µόνον.

ΞΕ. Εἶπον ποὺ νῦν δὴ λέγων ὡς πρὸς τὸν περὶ
tαῦτ' ἐλεγχον ἂεὶ τε ἀπειρηκῶς ἐγὼ τυγχάνω καὶ
dή καὶ τὰ νῦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἶπες.

ΞΕ. Φοβοῦµαι δὴ τὰ εἰρηµένα, µὴ ποτὲ διὰ ταῦτὰ
σοι µανικὸς εἶναι δόξω παρὰ πόδα µεταβαλὼν
Β ἐµαυτὸν ἀνω καὶ κάτω. σὴν γὰρ δὴ χάριν ἐλέγχειν
τὸν λόγον ἑπιθησόµεθα, εάντερ ἐλέγχωµεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡς τοῖνυν ἐµοιγε µηδαµῆ δόξων µηδὲν
πληµµελεῖν, ἂν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐλεγχον τούτον καὶ τὴν
ἀπόδειξιν ἡς, θαρρῶν ἣτι τούτου γε ἐνεκα.

30. ΞΕ. Φέρε δή, τίνα ἀρχὴν τις ἂν ἀρξαίτο
παρακωνδυνευτικοῦ λόγου; δοκῶ µὲν γὰρ τὴν', ὡ
παλ, τὴν ὁδὸν ἀναγκαιοτάτην ἡµῖν εἶναι τρέπεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πολαν δὴ;

ΞΕ. Τὰ δοκοῦντα νῦν ἑναργῶς ἔχειν ἐπισκέψασθαι
C πρῶτον, µὴ πῇ τεταραγµένον µὲν ὅµεν 1 περὶ
tαῦτα, ῥαδίως δ' ἀλλήλους ὁµολογῶµεν ὡς εὐκρινῶς
ἔχοντες.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε σαφέστερον δ' λέγεις.

ΞΕ. Εὐκόλως µοι δοκεῖ Παρµενίδης ἡµῖν διει
λέχθαι καὶ πᾶς ὁστὶς πώποτε ἐπὶ κρίσιν ὄρµησε

1 µὲν ὅµεν W; µένωµεν BT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Very true.

STR. And so we must take courage and attack our father's theory here and now, or else, if any scruples prevent us from doing this, we must give the whole thing up.

THEAET. But nothing in the world must prevent us.

STR. Then I have a third little request to make of you.

THEAET. You have only to utter it.

STR. I said a while ago that I always have been too faint-hearted for the refutation of this theory, and so I am now.

THEAET. Yes, so you did.

STR. I am afraid that on account of what I have said you will think I am mad because I have at once reversed my position. You see it is for your sake that I am going to undertake the refutation, if I succeed in it.

THEAET. I certainly shall not think you are doing anything improper if you proceed to your refutation and proof; so go ahead boldly, so far as that is concerned.

STR. Well, what would be a good beginning of a perilous argument? Ah, my boy, I believe the way we certainly must take is this.

THEAET. What way?

STR. We must first examine the points which now seem clear, lest we may have fallen into some confusion about them and may therefore carelessly agree with one another, thinking that we are judging correctly.

THEAET. Express your meaning more clearly.

STR. It seems to me that Parmenides and all who ever undertook a critical definition of the number
PLATO

tοῦ τὰ ὄντα διορίσασθαι πόσα τε καὶ ποιὰ ἔστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ;

Εἴ. Μὴν τὸν τῶν ἐκαστὸς φαίνεται μοι διηγεῖσθαι
πιστῶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν, ὅ μὲν ὡς τρία τὰ ὄντα,
πολεμεῖ δὲ ἄλληλοις ἐνίοτε αὐτῶν ἄττα πῇ, τοτὲ δὲ
D καὶ φίλα γιγνόμενα γάμους τε καὶ τόκους καὶ
τροφὰς τῶν ἐγκόνων παρέχεται· δύο δὲ ἐτερος
ἐπών, ὕγρων καὶ ἔτρων ἡ θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν, συν-
οικίζει τε αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκδίδωσι· τὸ δὲ παρ’ ἡμῖν
'Ελεατικὸν ἔθνος, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἐτὶ
πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενων, ὥς ἐνὸς ὄντων τῶν πάντων
καλομένων οὔτω διεξέρχεται τοῖς μύθοις. Ἰάδες
δὲ καὶ Σικελαὶ τινές ὠστερον Μοῦσαι ἔνπνον ἑστὶν

Ε ὅτι συμπλέκειν ἀσφαλέστατον ἀμφότερα καὶ λέγειν
ὡς τὸ ὅν πολλὰ τε καὶ ἐν ἔστιν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ φιλία
συνέχεται. διαφερόμενον γὰρ ἂεὶ ἕμμαθεταί, φασίν
αἱ συντονώτεραι τῶν Μοῦσῶν· αἱ δὲ μαλακώτεραι
tὸ μὲν ἂεὶ ταὐτα οὕτως ἔχειν ἐχάλασαν, ἐν μέρει δὲ
τοτὲ μὲν ἐν εἰναὶ φαιν τὸ πᾶν καὶ φίλον ὑπ’. Ἀφρο-

243 διτῆς, τοτε δὲ πολλὰ καὶ πολέμουν αὐτὸ αὐτῶ διὰ
νεικός τι. ταὐτα δὲ πάντα εἰ μὲν ἀληθῶς τῆς ἡ
μὴ τούτων εἰρήκε, χαλεπών καὶ πλημμελὲς οὕτω
μεγάλα κλεινοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ ἀνδράσιν ἐπιτιμᾶν·
ἔκεινο δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον ἀποφήμασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

Εἴ. Ὅτι λιαν τῶν πολλῶν ἡμῶν ὑπεριδόντες

1 ἡμῖν al. Eusebius; ἡμῶν BTW.
2 ἔνπνον ἑστὶν T, Eusebius, Simplicius; ἔνπνον ἑστὶν B.

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and nature of realities have talked to us rather carelessly.

THEAET. How so?

STR. Every one of them seems to tell us a story, as if we were children. One says there are three principles, that some of them are sometimes waging a sort of war with each other, and sometimes become friends and marry and have children and bring them up; and another says there are two, wet and dry or hot and cold, which he settles together and unites in marriage. And the Eleatic sect in our region, beginning with Xenophanes and even earlier, have their story that all things, as they are called, are really one. Then some Ionian and later some Sicilian Muses reflected that it was safest to combine the two tales and to say that being is many and one, and is (or are) held together by enmity and friendship. For the more strenuous Muses say it is always simultaneously coming together and separating; but the gentler ones relaxed the strictness of the doctrine of perpetual strife; they say that the all is sometimes one and friendly, under the influence of Aphrodite, and sometimes many and at variance with itself by reason of some sort of strife. Now whether any of them spoke the truth in all this, or not, it is harsh and improper to impute to famous men of old such a great wrong as falsehood. But one assertion can be made without offence.

THEAET. What is that?

STR. That they paid too little attention and con-

1 This refers apparently to Pherecydes and the early Ionians.
2 Heracleitus and his followers.
3 Empedocles and his disciples.
PLATO

"ολυγώρησαν· οὔδὲν γὰρ φροντίσαντες εἶτ' ἐπ' ἀκολουθοῦμεν αὐτοῖς λέγουσιν εὔτε ἀπολειπόμεθα,
Β περαινοῦσι τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῶν ἐκαστοι.

ὁ θεά. Πῶς λέγεις;

ἐσ. Ὑπάρχουσιν δὴν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο σαφῶς τὰ τὸν πᾶσαν ἄνθρωπον διαφορὰ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἑπεξεργαζόμεθαν ὁμοσπονδίᾳ τε ῥῆματος ὑπογίζομενα καὶ μαθητῆς ἰδιοτήτοι τούτων. Ὅμως ἐκάστοτε σύ τι πρὸς θεοῦτον ἐκλέξεις ὁ τι λέγουσιν ἐγὼ 

μὲν γὰρ οὔτε μὲν ἢ ἔντεκτο ποιμαντUPPORTED αὐτῶν ἀπορομμένων ὅποτε τις εἴποι, τὸ μὴ ἢν, ἀκριβῶς ὅμως ἐξουσίαν.

νῦν δὲ ὃπας ἢν ἐσμὲν αὐτοῦ πέρι τῆς ἀπορίας.

C θεά. Ὅρω.

ἐσ. Τάχα τοῖνυν ἵσως οὐχ ἢττον κατὰ τὸ ὧν 

ταὐτὸν τούτο πάθος εἰληφότες ἐν τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ περὶ 

μὲν τούτο εὑροεῖν χαμεν καὶ μανθάνειν ὅποταιν τις 

αὐτὸ φθεγγεῖται, περὶ δὲ θάτερον οὐ, πρὸς ἀμφότερα 

ὅμως ἔχοντες.

ὁ θεά. Ἰςως.

ἐσ. Καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τῶν προειρημένων 

ἡμῖν ταὐτὸν τούτο εἰρήσθω.

ὁ θεά. Πάνυ γε.

θ. Ἐσ. Τῶν μὲν τοῖνυν πολλῶν πέρι καὶ

D μετὰ τοῦτο σκεφτόμεθα, ἀν δόξη, περὶ δὲ τοῦ 

μεγίστου τοῦ καὶ ἀρχηγοῦ πρῶτον ὑν σκεπτέον.

ὁ θεά. Τίνος δὴ λέγεις; ἡ δῆλον ὅτι τὸ ὑν φή 

πρῶτον δεῖν διερευνήσασθαι τὶ ποθ' οἰ λέγοντε 

αὐτὸ δηλοῦν ἥγονται;

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consideration to the mass of people like ourselves. For they go on to the end, each in his own way, without caring whether their arguments carry us along with them, or whether we are left behind.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. When one of them says in his talk that many, or one, or two are, or have become, or are becoming, and again speaks of hot mingling with cold, and in some other part of his discourse suggests separations and combinations, for heaven's sake, Theaetetus, do you ever understand what they mean by any of these things? I used to think, when I was younger, that I understood perfectly whenever anyone used this term "not-being," which now perplexes us. But you see what a slough of perplexity we are in about it now.

THEAET. Yes, I see.

STR. And perhaps our minds are in this same condition as regards being also; we may think that it is plain sailing and that we understand when the word is used, though we are in difficulties about not-being, whereas really we understand equally little of both.

THEAET. Perhaps.

STR. And we may say the same of all the subjects about which we have been speaking.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. We will consider most of them later, if you please, but now the greatest and foremost chief of them must be considered.

THEAET. What do you mean? Or, obviously, do you mean that we must first investigate the term "being," and see what those who use it think it signifies?
Κατὰ πόδα 1 γε, ὡς Θεαῖτης, ὑπέλαβες. λέγω γὰρ δὴ ταύτη δεῖν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μέθοδον ἡμᾶς, ὅτι αὐτῶν παρόντων ἀναπτυθανομένους ὥστε φέρε, ὅποιοι θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ἡ τινε δύο τοιοῦτω τὰ πάντ' εἶναι φατε, τί ποτε ἄρα τούτ' ἐπ'

Ε ἀμφοῖν φθέγγεσθε, λέγοντες ἀμφω καὶ ἐκάτερον εἶναι; τί τὸ εἶναι τούτῳ ὑπολάβωμεν ὑμῶν; πότερον τρίτον παρὰ τὰ δύο ἐκείνα, καὶ τρία τὸ πᾶν ἀλλὰ μὴ δύο ἐτὶ καθ' ὑμᾶς τιθώμεν; οὐ γὰρ ποὺ τοῖν γε δυοὶ καλοῦντες θάτερον ὃν ἀμφότερα ὑμῶν εἶναι λέγετε. σχεδόν γὰρ ἂν ἀμφοτέρως ἐν, ἀλλ' οὐ δύο εἶτην. 2

ὁ θεαῖ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ἐ. Ἀλλ' ἄρα τὰ ἀμφω βούλεσθε καλεῖν οὖν;

ὁ θεαῖ. Ἰσώς.

244 ὁ θεαῖ. Ἄλλ', ὃ φίλοι, φήσομεν, κἂν οὕτω τὰ δύο λέγοιτ' 3 ἃν σαφέστατα ἐν.

ὁ θεαῖ. Ὀρθότατα εἰρήκασ.

ἐ. Ἐπειδὴ τοῖς ἡμεῖς ἡπορήκαμεν, ὑμεῖς αὐτὰ ἡμῖν ἐμφανίζετε ἰκανῶς τί ποτε βούλεσθε σημαίνειν ὅπόταν ὃν φθέγγησθε. δῆλον γὰρ ὃς ὑμεῖς μὲν ταῦτα πάλαι γιγνώσκετε, ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ωμεθα, νῦν δ' ἡπορήκαμεν. διδάσκετε οὖν πρῶτον τούτ' αὐτό ἡμᾶς, ἵνα μὴ δοξάζωμεν μανθάνειν μὲν τὰ λεγόμενα παρ' ὑμῶν, τὸ δ' τούτου γίγνηται πᾶν

Β τούναντιον. ταῦτα δὴ λέγοντες τε καὶ ἁξιοῦντες παρὰ τὸ τούτων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι πλεῖον ενὸς λέγοντι τὸ πᾶν εἶναι, μῶν, ὃ παί, τὶ πλημ.μελήσομεν;

1 πόδα T (emend.) W; πολλά B pr. T.
2 εἶτην W; et t' BT.
3 λέγοιτ' λέγοιτo B; λέγετe T; λέγετ' W.
THE SOPHIST

str. You have caught my meaning at once, Theaetetus. For I certainly do mean that this is the best method for us to use, by questioning them directly, as if they were present in person; so here goes: Come now, all you who say that hot and cold or any two such principles are the universe, what is this that you attribute to both of them when you say that both and each are? What are we to understand by this "being" (or "are") of yours? Is this a third principle besides those two others, and shall we suppose that the universe is three, and not two any longer, according to your doctrine? For surely when you call one only of the two "being" you do not mean that both of them equally are; for in both cases they would pretty certainly be one and not two.

THEAET. True.

str. Well, then, do you wish to call both of them together being?

THEAET. Perhaps.

str. But, friends, we will say, even in that way you would very clearly be saying that the two are one.

THEAET. You are perfectly right.

str. Then since we are in perplexity, do you tell us plainly what you wish to designate when you say "being." For it is clear that you have known this all along, whereas we formerly thought we knew, but are now perplexed. So first give us this information, that we may not think we understand what you say, when the exact opposite is the case.—If we speak in this way and make this request of them and of all who say that the universe is more than one, shall we, my boy, be doing anything improper?

1 "In both cases," i.e. whether you say that one only is or that both are, they would both be one, namely being.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡκιστά γε.
32. ΞΕ. Τί δέ; παρὰ τῶν ἐν τὸ πᾶν λεγόν-
tων ἃρ’ οὐ πευστέον εἰς δύναμιν τί ποτε λέγουσι τὸ ὄν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
ΞΕ. Τόδε τοιών ἀποκρινέσθων. ἐν ποῦ φατε
μόνον εἶναι; φαμέν γάρ, φήσομεν. ἥ γάρ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
ΞΕ. Τί δέ; ὅν καλεῖτε τι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Πότερον ὅπερ ἐν, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρώ-
μενοι δυοῖν ὄνομασιν, ἥ πῶς;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τίς οὖν αὐτοῖς ἡ μετὰ τοῦτ', ὃ ἔγεν, ἀπό-
κρίσις;
ΞΕ. Δῆλον, οἳ Θεαίτητε, ὅτι τῷ ταῦτῃ τῇ ὑπό-
θεσιν ὑποθεμένῳ πρὸς τὸ νῦν ἑρωτηθέν καί πρὸς
ἀλλο δὲ ὅτι οὐ πάντων ῥάστον ἀποκρίνασθαι.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;
ΞΕ. Τὸ τε δύο ὄνοματα ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι μηδὲν
θέμενον πλήν ἐν καταγέλαστον οὖν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ’ οὐ;
ΞΕ. Καὶ τὸ παράπαν γε ἀποδέχεσθαι τοῦ 2
D λέγοντος ὃς ἔστιν ὄνομά τι, λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχον.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ;
ΞΕ. Τιθεῖς τε τοῖνομα τοῦ πράγματος ἐτερον δύο
λέγει ποὺ τινε.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἂν ταύτον γε αὐτῷ τιθῇ τοῖνομα,
1 ἀποκρινέσθων Simplicius; ἀποκρινέσθωσαν BTW.
2 τοῦ Hermann; τοῦ BT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Not in the least.

STR. Well then, must we not, so far as we can, try to learn from those who say that the universe is one\(^1\) what they mean when they say "being"?

THEAET. Of course we must.

STR. Then let them answer this question: Do you say that one only is? We do, they will say; will they not?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Well then, do you give the name of being to anything?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Is it what you call "one," using two names for the same thing, or how is this?

THEAET. What is their next answer, Stranger?

STR. It is plain, Theaetetus, that he who maintains their theory will not find it the easiest thing in the world to reply to our present question or to any other.

THEAET. Why not?

STR. It is rather ridiculous to assert that two names exist when you assert that nothing exists but unity.

THEAET. Of course it is.

STR. And in general there would be no sense in accepting the statement that a name has any existence.

THEAET. Why?

STR. Because he who asserts that the name is other than the thing, says that there are two entities.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And further, if he asserts that the name is

\(^1\) The Eleatic Zeno and his school.
PLATO

ἡ μηδενὸς ὄνομα ἀναγκασθῆσεται λέγειν, εἰ δὲ τωσ ἀυτὸ φήσει, συμβῆσεται τὸ ὄνομα ὄνοματος ὄνομα μόνον, ἄλλον δὲ οὐδενὸς ὄν.

θεαί. Οὗτως.

εἴ. Καὶ τὸ ἐν γε, ἐνὸς ὄνομα ὅν ¹ καὶ τοῦ ² ὄνοματος αὐ τὸ ³ ἐν ὄν.

θεαί. Ἀνάγκη.

εἴ. Τί δὲ; τὸ ὅλον ἐτερων τοῦ ὄντος ἐνὸς ἡ ταυτόν φήσουν τούτῳ;

Εθεαί. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ φήσουι τε καὶ φασίν;

εἴ. Εἰ τοῦν ὅλον ἔστιν, ὠσπερ καὶ Παρμενίδης λέγει,

πάντωθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ⁴ ἐναλίγκινον ὄγκων, μεσοῦθεν ἰσοπαλές πάντη. τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῇ ἥ τῇ,

τοιοῦτον γε ὅν τὸ ὅν μέσον τε καὶ ἑσχατά ἔχει, ⁵ ταῦτα δὲ ἔχον πᾶσα ἀνάγκη μέρη ἔχειν. ἥ πῶς;

θεαί. Οὗτως.

245 εἴ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε μεμερισμένον πάθος μὲν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔχειν ἐπὶ τοῖς μέρεσι πᾶσιν οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει, καὶ ταύτη δὴ πάν τε ὅν καὶ ὅλον ἐν εἴναι.

θεαί. Τί δ' οὖ;

εἴ. Τὸ δὲ πεπονθὸς ταῦτα ἅρ' οὐκ ἂδυνατον αὐτὸ γε τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ εἴναι;

θεαί. Πῶς;

¹ ὄνομα ὅν Απελτ; ἐν ὅν μόνον B; ὅν μόνον T.

² τοῦ BW; τοῦ T.

³ αὖ τὸ Schleiermacher; αὐτὸ BTW.

⁴ σφαίρης Simplicius; σφαλφας BT.

⁵ ἔχει] ἔχειν al.
the same as the thing, he will be obliged to say that it is the name of nothing, or if he says it is the name of something, the name will turn out to be the name of a name merely and of nothing else.

Theaet. True.

Str. And the one will turn out to be the name of one and also the one of the name.¹

Theaet. Necessarily.

Str. And will they say that the whole is other than the one which exists or the same with it?

Theaet. Of course they will and do say it is the same.

Str. If then the whole is, as Parmenides says,

On all sides like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equally weighted in every direction from the middle; for neither greater nor less must needs be on this or that,

then being, being such as he describes it, has a centre and extremes, and, having these, must certainly have parts, must it not?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. But yet nothing hinders that which has parts from possessing the attribute of unity in all its parts and being in this way one, since it is all and whole.

Theaet. Very true.

Str. But is it not impossible for that which is in this condition to be itself absolute unity?

Theaet. Why?

¹ In other words, "one," considered as a word, will be the name of unity, but considered as a reality, it will be the unity of which the word "one" is the name. The sentence is made somewhat difficult of comprehension, doubtless for the purpose of indicating the confusion caused by the identification of the name with the thing.
PLATO

εε. Ἀμερές δήπου δεῖ παντελῶς τὸ γε ἄληθῶς ἐν κατὰ τὸν ὅρθον λόγον εἰρήσθαι.

θεαί. Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

β ἐε. Τὸ δὲ γε τοιοῦτον ἐκ πολλῶν μερῶν ὃν οὐ συμφωνήσει τῷ λόγῳ.  
θεαί. Μανθάνω.

εε. Πότερον δὴ πάθος ἔχον τὸ ὅν τοῦ ένὸς οὖτως ἐν τε ἔσται καὶ ὅλων, ὃ παντάπασι μὴ λέγωμεν ὅλων εἶναι τὸ ὅν;

θεαί. Χαλεπὴν προβέβλησας αἴρεσιν.

εε. Ἀληθέστατα μέντοι λέγεις. πεπονθὸς τε γὰρ τὸ ὅν ἐν εἶναι πως, οὐ ταύτων ὅν τῷ ἐνι φανείται καὶ πλέονα δὴ τὰ πάντα ένὸς ἔσται.

θεαί. Ναὶ.

εε. Καὶ μὴν ἐὰν γε τὸ ὅν ἃ μὴ ὅλων διὰ τὸ C πεπονθέναι τὸ ὑπ’ ἐκεῖνον πάθος, ὃ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλων, ἔνδεες τὸ ὅν ἐαυτοῦ ἔμμαθει.

θεαί. Πάνυ γε.

εε. Καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἐαυτοῦ στερομένον οὐκ ὅν ἔσται τὸ ὅν.

θεαί. Οὐτως.

εε. Καὶ ἐνὸς γε αὐτὶ πλεῖω τὰ πάντα γίγνεται, τοῦ τε ὅντος καὶ τοῦ ὅλου χωρίς ἑδιὰν ἐκατέρου φύσιν εἰληφότος.

θεαί. Ναί.

εε. Μὴ ὅντως δὲ γε τὸ παράπαν τοῦ ὅλου, ταύτα τε ταύτα ὑπάρχει τῷ ὅντι καὶ πρὸς τῷ μὴ εἶναι D μὴν ἄν γενέσθαι ποτὲ ὅν.

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1 τῷ λόγῳ Simplicius (codd. EF); τῷ ὅλῳ λόγῳ B; τῷ λόγῳ ὅλῳ T, Simpl. (cod. D).
2 ὃν Schleiermacher; ὅλου BT.
3 φανεῖται Simplicius; φαίνεται BT.

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str. Why surely that which is really one must, according to right reason, be affirmed to be absolutely without parts.
THEAET. Yes, it must.
str. But such a unity consisting of many parts will not harmonize with reason.
THEAET. I understand.
str. Then shall we agree that being is one and a whole because it has the attribute of unity, or shall we deny that being is a whole at all?
THEAET. It is a hard choice that you offer me.
str. That is very true; for being, having in a way had unity imposed upon it, will evidently not be the same as unity, and the all will be more than one.
THEAET. Yes.
str. And further, if being is not a whole through having had the attribute of unity imposed upon it, and the absolute whole exists, then it turns out that being lacks something of being.
THEAET. Certainly.
str. And so, by this reasoning, since being is deprived of being, it will be not-being.
THEAET. So it will.
str. And again the all becomes more than the one, since being and the whole have acquired each its own nature.
THEAET. Yes.
str. But if the whole does not exist at all, being is involved in the same difficulties as before, and besides not existing it could not even have ever come into existence.
PLATO

THEAI. Tί δή;

ΞΕ. Τὸ γενόμενον ἀεὶ γέγονεν ὅλον. ὡστε οὔτε οὐσίαν οὔτε γένεσιν ὡς οὕσαν δεὶ προσαγορεῦεν τὸ ὅλον 1 ἐν τοῖς οὗσι μὴ τιθέντα.

THEAI. Παντάπασιν ἔοικε ταθῇ οὕτως ἔχειν.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν οὐδ’ ὁποσονοῦν τι δεὶ τὸ μὴ ὅλον εἶναι· ποσὸν τι γὰρ ὁν, ὁπόσον ἃν ἢ, τοσοῦτον ὅλον ἀναγκαίον αὐτὸ 2 εἶναι.

THEAI. Κομιδή γε.

ΞΕ. Καὶ τοῖνυν ἄλλα μυρία ἀπεράντους ἀπορίας Ἐ ἐκαστὸν εἰληφὸς φανεῖται τῷ τὸ ὅν εἴτε δύο τυνὲ εἴτε ἐν μόνων εἶναι λέγοντι.

THEAI. Δηλοὶ σχεδόν καὶ τὰ νῦν ὑποφαίνοντα· συνάπτεται γὰρ ἑτερον εξ ἄλλου, μείζων καὶ χαλεπωτέραν φέρον περὶ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν ἀεὶ ῥηθέντων πλάνην.

33. ΞΕ. Τοὺς μὲν τοῖνυν διακριβολογουμένους ὄντος τε πέρι καὶ μὴ πάντας 3 μὲν οὐ διελθόθαμεν, ὡμως δὲ ἰκανῶς ἑχέτω· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους λέγοντας αὖ θεατέον, ἵν’ ἐκ πάντων εἰδώμεν ὧτι τὸ ὅν τοῦ μὴ 246 ὄντος οὐδὲν εὑπορῶτερον εἰπέων ὀ τι ποτ’ ἐστιν.

THEAI. Οὐκοῦν πορεύεσθαι χρῆ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτους.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἔοικε γε ἐν αὐτοῖς οἶον γιγαντομαχία τις εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς ἄλληλους.

THEAI. Πώς;

1 τὸ ὅλον Bekker; τὸ ἢ τὸ ὅλον BT.
2 αὐτὸ W, Simplicius; om. BT.
3 πάντας Eusebius; πάνυ BT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. That which comes into existence always comes into existence as a whole. Therefore no one who does not reckon the whole among things that are can speak of existence or generation as being.

THEAET. That certainly seems to be true.

STR. And moreover, that which is not a whole cannot have any quantity at all; for if it has any quantity, whatever that quantity may be, it must necessarily be of that quantity as a whole.

THEAET. Precisely.

STR. And so countless other problems, each one involving infinite difficulties, will confront him who says that being is, whether it be two or only one.

THEAET. The problems now in sight make that pretty clear; for each leads up to another which brings greater and more grievous wandering in connexion with whatever has previously been said.

STR. Now we have not discussed all those who treat accurately of being and not-being; however, let this suffice. But we must turn our eyes to those whose doctrines are less precise, that we may know from all sources that it is no easier to define the nature of being than that of not-being.

THEAET. Very well, then, we must proceed towards those others also.

STR. And indeed there seems to be a battle like that of the gods and the giants going on among them, because of their disagreement about existence.

THEAET. How so?

1 The Ionic philosophers, the Eleatics, Heracleitus, Empedocles, the Megarians, Gorgias, Protagoras, and Antisthenes all discussed the problem of being and not-being.
Ε. Οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἐλκουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρός περιλαμβάνοντες. τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων διυσχυρίζονται τούτο εἶναι μόνου δὲ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφὴν τινα, ταύτων σώμα B καὶ οὐσίαν ὀριζόμενοι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἰ τίς τίν ¹ φῆσει ² μὴ σώμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν καὶ οὐδὲν ἑθέλοντες ἀλλο ἄκομεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅδη γὰρ καὶ έγὼ τούτων συνχοῦσ προσέτυχον.

Ε. Τοιγαροῦν οἱ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἀνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται, νοητὰ ἀττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι. τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τῆν λεγομένην ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν κατὰ σμικρά C διαθραύνοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν ἀντ’ οὐσίας φερομένην τινὰ προσαγορεύουσιν. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ ταύτα ἀπλετος ἀμφοτέρων μάχη τις, ὡ Θεαίτητε, ἀεὶ ξυνέστηκεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

Ε. Παρ’ ἀμφότερ τοῖν τοῖν γενοῦν κατὰ μέρος λάβωμεν λόγον ὑπὲρ ἧς τίθενται τῆς οὐσίας.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς οὖν δὴ ληψόμεθα;

Ε. Παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἐν εἰδεσιν αὐτὴν τιθεμένων

¹ τι al.; om. BT.
² φῆσει B, Eusebius; φησι T.
str. Some of them drag down everything from heaven and the invisible to earth, actually grasping rocks and trees with their hands; for they lay their hands on all such things and maintain stoutly that that alone exists which can be touched and handled; for they define existence and body, or matter, as identical, and if anyone says that anything else, which has no body, exists, they despise him utterly, and will not listen to any other theory than their own.

THEAET. Terrible men they are of whom you speak. I myself have met with many of them.

str. Therefore those who contend against them defend themselves very cautiously with weapons derived from the invisible world above, maintaining forcibly that real existence consists of certain ideas which are only conceived by the mind and have no body. But the bodies of their opponents, and that which is called by them truth, they break up into small fragments in their arguments, calling them, not existence, but a kind of generation combined with motion. There is always, Theaetetus, a tremendous battle being fought about these questions between the two parties.

THEAET. True.

str. Let us, therefore, get from each party in turn a statement in defence of that which they regard as being.

THEAET. How shall we get it?

str. It is comparatively easy to get it from those

1 The atomists (Leucippus, Democritus, and their followers), who taught that nothing exists except atoms and the void. Possibly there is a covert reference to Aristippus who was, like Plato, a pupil of Socrates.
δῦνον ἡμερώτεροι γάρ παρά δὲ τῶν εἰς σῶμα
D πάντα ἐλκόντων βίᾳ χαλεπώτερον, ἵωσὶ δὲ καὶ
σχεδὸν ἀδύνατον. ἀλλ' ὅδε μοι δεῖν δοκεῖ περὶ
αὐτῶν δρᾶν.

ὁει. Πῶς;

ἐ. Μάλιστα μέν, εἰ πη δυνατὸν ἦν, ἔργῳ βελ-
tίους αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ἐγχωρ-ὶ, λόγῳ ποιῶμεν, ὑποτιθέμενοι νομιμώτερον αὐτοῖς
ἡ νῦν ἑθέλοντας ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι. τὸ γὰρ ὀμολο-
γηθὲν παρὰ βελτίων τῶν κυριώτερον ἡ τὸ παρὰ
χειρόνων· ἥμεις δὲ οὐ τούτων φροντίζομεν, ἀλλὰ
tάληθες ξητοῦμεν.

Ε ὁει. Ὑρθότατα.

34. ἐ. Κέλευε δὴ τοὺς βελτίους γεγονότας
ἀποκρίνασθαι σοι, καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν παρ' αὐτῶν ἀφερ-
μήνευς.

ὁει. Ταῦτ' ἔσται.

ἐ. Λεγόντων δὴ θυητόν ζῷον εἰ φασίν εἶναι τι.

ὁει. Πῶς δ' οὗ;

ἐ. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐ σῶμα ἐμψυχον ὀμολογοῦσιν;

ὁει. Πάνυ γε.

ἐ. Τιθέντες τι τῶν ὑντων ψυχῆν;

247 ὁει. Ναί.

ἐ. Τί δὲ; ψυχῆν οὐ τὴν μὲν δικαιάν, τὴν δὲ
αὐτικὸν φασίν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνιμον, τὴν δὲ
ἀφρόνα;

ὁει. Τί μῆν;

ἐ. Ἀλλ' οὐ δικαιοσύνης ἔξει καὶ παρουσία τοι-
who say that it consists in ideas, for they are peaceful folk; but from those who violently drag down everything into matter, it is more difficult, perhaps even almost impossible, to get it. However, this is the way I think we must deal with them.

THEAET. What way?

STR. Our first duty would be to make them really better, if it were in any way possible; but if this cannot be done, let us pretend that they are better, by assuming that they would be willing to answer more in accordance with the rules of dialectic than they actually are. For the acknowledgement of anything by better men is more valid than if made by worse men. But it is not these men that we care about; we merely seek the truth.

THEAET. Quite right.

STR. Now tell them, assuming that they have become better, to answer you, and do you interpret what they say.

THEAET. I will do so.

STR. Let them tell whether they say there is such a thing as a mortal animal.

THEAET. Of course they do.

STR. And they agree that this is a body with a soul in it, do they not?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Giving to soul a place among things which exist?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Well then, do they not say that one soul is just and another unjust, one wise and another foolish?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And do they not say that each soul becomes just by the possession and presence of justice, and
αὕτην αὐτῶν ἐκάστην γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων
τὴν ἐναντίαν;

Θεά. Ναί, καὶ ταῦτα ξύμφασιν.

ζε. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε δυνατὸν τῷ παραγίγνεσθαι
καὶ ἀπογίγνεσθαι πάντως εἶναι τι φήσονσιν.

Θεά. Φασὶ μὲν οὖν.

Β ζε. Οὕσης οὖν δικαίοσύνης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ
τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ δὴ καὶ
ψυχῆς ἐν ἣ ταῦτα ἐγγίγνεται, πότερον ὅρμτον καὶ
ἀπτὸν εἶναι φασὶ τι αὐτῶν ἢ πάντα ἀόρατα;

Θεά. Σχεδὸν οὐδὲν τούτων γε ὅρατον.

ζε. Τῷ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων; μῶν σῶμα τι λέγουσιν
客栈;

Θεά. Τούτῳ οὐκέτι κατὰ ταῦτα ἀποκρίνονται
πάν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν σφίσι σῶμα
τι κεκτησθαί, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστον
ἐν ἡρώτηκας, αἰσχύνονται τὸ τολμᾶν ἢ μηδὲν τῶν
C ὀντῶν αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν ἢ πάντ' εἶναι σῶματα
διασχυρίζεσθαι.

ζε. Σαφῶς γὰρ ἢμῖν, ὡ Θεαίτητε, βελτίως
γεγόνασιν ἄνδρες. ἐπεὶ τούτων οὐδ' ἄν ἐν
ἐπαισχυνθεῖν οὐ γε αὐτῶν σπαρτοὶ τε καὶ αὐτό-
χθονες, ἀλλὰ διατείνουτ' ἄν πάν ὁ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς
χερσὶ ἐμπιεζεῖν εἰσίν, ως ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παρά-
παν ἐστίν.

Θεά. Σχεδὸν οίᾳ διανοοῦνται λέγεις.

ζε. Πάλιν τούτων ἀνερωτώμεν αὐτοὺς· εἰ γάρ
τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἑθέλουσι τῶν ὀντῶν συγχωρεῖν ἀσώ-

1 τῷ] τῷ BT; τὸ W.
2 ταῦτα] τὰ αὐτὰ W; ταῦτα BT.
3 ἄνδρες Bekker; ἄνδρες BT.
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the opposite by the possession and presence of the opposite?

THEAET. Yes, they agree to this also.

STR. But surely they will say that that which is capable of becoming present or absent exists.

THEAET. Yes, they say that.

STR. Granting, then, that justice and wisdom and virtue in general and their opposites exist, and also, of course, the soul in which they become present, do they say that any of these is visible and tangible, or that they are all invisible?

THEAET. That none of them is visible, or pretty nearly that.

STR. Now here are some other questions. Do they say they possess any body?

THEAET. They no longer answer the whole of that question in the same way. They say they believe the soul itself has a sort of body, but as to wisdom and the other several qualities about which you ask, they have not the face either to confess that they have no existence or to assert that they are all bodies.

STR. It is clear, Theaetetus, that our men have grown better; for the aboriginal sons of the dragon’s teeth¹ among them would not shrink from any such utterance; they would maintain that nothing which they cannot squeeze with their hands has any existence at all.

THEAET. That is pretty nearly what they believe.

STR. Then let us question them further; for if they are willing to admit that any existence, no

¹ This refers to the story of Cadmus, who killed a dragon and then sowed its teeth, from which sprang fierce warriors to be his companions. Born of the dragon’s teeth and of earth, they would naturally be of the earth, earthy.
D ματον, ἑξαρκεῖ. τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ τε τούτους ἁμα καὶ ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνοις ὡς ἔχει σῶμα ἄμφως γεγονός, εἰς ὁ βλέποντες ἀμφότερα εἶναι λέγοντο, τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ῥητέον. τάχ’ οὖν ἰσως ἂν ἀποροίεν· εἰ δὴ τι τοιοῦτον πεπόνθασι, σκόπει, προτεινομένων ᾣμῶν, ἄρ’ ἐθέλουν ἂν δέχεσθαι καὶ ὅμολογεῖν τοιόνδ’ εἶναι τὸ ὁν.

Ἐε. Τὸ ποίον δὴ; λέγε, καὶ τάχα εἰσόμεθα.

Ἑγ. Λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὀποιανόν τινα κεκτημένον δύναμιν εἶτ’ εἰς 1 το ποιεῖν ἔτερον ὅτιον πεφυκός 

Ε εἶτ’ εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυ-λοτάτου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰς ἀπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι· τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον ὁρίζειν τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἐστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλῆν δύναμις.

Ἑε. Ἀλλ’ ἐπείπερ αὐτοὶ γε οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τούτου βέλτιον λέγειν, δέχονται τοῦτο.

Ἑ. Καλῶς· ἰσως γὰρ ἂν εἰς ὑστερον ἤμων τε καὶ τούτοις ἔτερον ἂν φανεῖν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τούτους 218 τοῦτο ἤμων ἐνταῦθα μενετῶ ἐξωμολογηθέν.

Ἑε. Μένει.

35. ἙΕ. Πρὸς δὴ τοὺς ἔτέρους ὑμεν, τοὺς τῶν εἴδουν φίλους· σὺ δ’ ἤμων καὶ τὰ παρὰ τούτων ἀφερμήνευς.

Ἑε. Ταῦτ’ ἐσται.

Ἑ. Γένεσιν, τὴν δὲ οὕσιαν χωρίς ποι διελόμενον λέγετε; ἢ γάρ;

1 εἰτ’ εἰς W; εἰ τις BT.

1 i.e., between the process of coming into existence and existence itself. It is difficult to determine exactly who the idealists are whose doctrines are here discussed. Possibly 378
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matter how small, is incorporeal, that is enough. They will then have to tell what that is which is inherent in the incorporeal and the corporeal alike, and which they have in mind when they say that both exist. Perhaps they would be at a loss for an answer; and if they are in that condition, consider whether they might not accept a suggestion if we offered it, and might not agree that the nature of being is as follows.

THEAET. What is it? Speak, and we shall soon know.

STR. I suggest that everything which possesses any power of any kind, either to produce a change in anything of any nature or to be affected even in the least degree by the slightest cause, though it be only on one occasion, has real existence. For I set up as a definition which defines being, that it is nothing else than power.

THEAET. Well, since they have at the moment nothing better of their own to offer, they accept this.

STR. Good; for perhaps later something else may occur both to them and to us. As between them and us, then, let us assume that this is for the present agreed upon and settled.

THEAET. It is settled.

STR. Then let us go to the others, the friends of ideas; and do you interpret for us their doctrines also.

THEAET. I will.

STR. You distinguish in your speech between generation and being, do you not?¹

Plato is restating or amending some of his own earlier beliefs.
THEAI. Ναί.

ΕΕ. Καὶ σώματι μὲν Ἦμας γενέσει δι’ αἰσθήσεως κοινωνείν, διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῆ πρὸς τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν, ἢν ἂει κατὰ ταῦτα ὡσαύτως ἔχειν φατέ, γένεσιν δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως.

Β ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμέν γὰρ οὖν.

ΕΕ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ κοινωνεῖν, ὡς πάντων ἀριστοί, τί τούθ’ Ἦμας ἐπ’ ἀμφοὶν λέγειν φῶμεν; ἂρ’ οὐ τὸ νῦν δὴ παρ’ Ἦμαν ρηθέν;  

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΕΕ. Πάθημα ἡ ποίημα ἐκ δυνάμεως τυνός ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς ἀλληλα ἔννοιν γυνόμενον. τὰχ’ οὖν, ὡς Θειτήτη, αὐτῶν τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπόκρισιν σὺ μὲν οὐ κατακούεις, ἐγώ δὲ ἔσως διὰ συνήθειαν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίν’ οὖν δὴ λέγουσι λόγον;

ΕΕ. Οὐ συγχωροῦσιν Ἦμιν τὸ νῦν δὴ ρηθὲν πρὸς τοὺς γηγενεῖς οὐσίας πέρι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΕΕ. Ἐκανόν ἔθεμεν ὂρον που τῶν ὄντων, ὡταν τῷ παρῇ ἡ τοῦ πάσχειν ἡ δρᾶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ σμικρότατον δύναμις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΕΕ. Πρὸς δὴ ταῦτα τόδε λέγουσιν, ὡς γενέσει μὲν μέτεστι τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν δυνάμεως, πρὸς δὲ οὐσίαν τοῦτων οὐδετέρον τὴν δύναμιν ἀρμόττειν φασίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν λέγουσι τι;

ΕΕ. Πρὸς ὁ γε λεκτέον Ἦμιν ὃτι δεόμεθα παρ’ 

Δ αὐτῶν ἔτι πυθέσθαι σαφέστερον εἰ προσομολογοῦσι τὴν μὲν ψυχῆν γυνώσκειν, τὴν δ’ οὐσίαν γυνώσκεσθαι.
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THEAET. Yes, we do.

STR. And you say that with the body, by means of perception, we participate in generation, and with the soul, by means of thought, we participate in real being, which last is always unchanged and the same, whereas generation is different at different times.

THEAET. Yes, that is what we say.

STR. But, most excellent men, how shall we define this participation which you attribute to both? Is it not that of which we were just speaking?

THEAET. What is that?

STR. A passive or active condition arising out of some power which is derived from a combination of elements. Possibly, Theaetetus, you do not hear their reply to this, but I hear it, perhaps, because I am used to them.

THEAET. What is it, then, that they say?

STR. They do not concede to us what we said just now to the aboriginal giants about being.

THEAET. What was it?

STR. We set up as a satisfactory sort of definition of being, the presence of the power to act or be acted upon in even the slightest degree.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. It is in reply to this that they say generation participates in the power of acting and of being acted upon, but that neither power is connected with being.

THEAET. And is there not something in that?

STR. Yes, something to which we must reply that we still need to learn more clearly from them whether they agree that the soul knows and that being is known.

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ΘΕΑΙ. Φασὶ μὴν τοῦτο γε.

ἐ. Τὶ δὲ; τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἢ τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι
φατε ποίημα ἢ πάθος ἢ ἀμφότερον; ἢ τὸ μὲν
πάθημα, τὸ δὲ θάτερον; ἢ παντάπασιν οὐδέτερον
οὐδέτερον τούτων μεταλαμβάνει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον ὡς οὐδέτερον οὐδέτερον· τάναντία
γὰρ ἂν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν λέγοιεν.¹

ἐ. Μανθάνω· τόδε γε, ὡς τὸ γιγνώσκειν
Εἰπέρ ἔσται ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον
αὖξυμβαίνει πάσχειν. τὴν οὐσίαν δὴ κατὰ τὸν
λόγον τοῦτον γιγνωσκομένην ὑπὸ τῆς γνώσεως,
καθ’ ὅσον γιγνώσκεται, κατὰ τοσοῦτον κωιδοθαί
διὰ τὸ πάσχειν, δ’ ἤ δὴ φαμεν οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι περὶ
tὸ ἑρμοῦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡρθῶς.

ἐ. Τὶ δὲ πρὸς Διός; ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ
ζωῆν καὶ ψυχῆν καὶ φρόνησιν ἢ ῥαδίως πεισθησόμεθα,
tὸ παντελῶς ὄντι μὴ παρεῖναι, μηδὲ ζῆν αὐτὸ μηδὲ
249 φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ σεμνῶν καὶ ἁγιον, νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον,
ἀκινητὸν ἐστὸς εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δεινὸν μέντ’ ἂν, ὡς ἔγει, λόγον συγχωροῦμεν.

ἐ. Ἀλλὰ νοῦν μὲν ἔχειν, ζωῆν δὲ μὴ φῶμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

ἐ. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀμφότερα ἐνότ’ αὐτῷ
λέγομεν, οὐ μὴν ἐν ψυχῇ γε φήσομεν αὐτὸ ἔχειν
αὐτά;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τίν’ ἂν ἔτερον ἔχοι τρόπον;

ἐ. Ἀλλὰ δῆτα νοῦν μὲν καὶ ζωῆν καὶ ψυχῆν

¹ δῆλον . . . λέγοιεν first attributed to Theaetetus by
Heindorf.
² τόδε γε] τὸ δὲ γε Τ.; τὸ δὲ Β.

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THEAET. They certainly assent to that.

STR. Well then, do you say that knowing or being known is an active or passive condition, or both? Or that one is passive and the other active? Or that neither has any share at all in either of the two?

THEAET. Clearly they would say that neither has any share in either; for otherwise they would be contradicting themselves.

STR. I understand; this at least is true, that if to know is active, to be known must in turn be passive. Now being, since it is, according to this theory, known by the intelligence, in so far as it is known, is moved, since it is acted upon, which we say cannot be the case with that which is in a state of rest.

THEAET. Right.

STR. But for heaven's sake, shall we let ourselves easily be persuaded that motion and life and soul and mind are really not present to absolute being, that it neither lives nor thinks, but awful and holy, devoid of mind, is fixed and immovable?

THEAET. That would be a shocking admission to make, Stranger.

STR. But shall we say that it has mind, but not life?

THEAET. How can we?

STR. But do we say that both of these exist in it, and yet go on to say that it does not possess them in a soul?

THEAET. But how else can it possess them?

STR. Then shall we say that it has mind and
εχειν, ἀκίνητον μέντοι τὸ παράπαν ἐμψυχον ὅν ἐστάναι;

B Θεαί. Πάντα ἐμοογε ἄλογα ταῦτ' εἶναι φαίνεται.
ἐε. Καὶ τὸ κινουμένον δὴ καὶ κίνησιν συγχωρήτεον ὡς ὄντα.
Θεαί. Πώς δ' οὐ;
ἐε. Ξυμβαίνει δ' οὖν, ὥς Θεαίτητε, ἀκίνήτων τε ὄντων νοῦν μηδενὶ περὶ μηδενὸς εἶναι μηδαμοῦ.
Θεαί. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.
ἐε. Καὶ μὴν ἐὰν αὐθ̣ φερόμενα καὶ κινουμένα πάντ' εἶναι συγχωρῶμεν, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ταύτῶν τούτῳ ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ἐξαιρήσομεν.
Θεαί. Πῶς;
ἐε. Τὸ κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὁμαίτως καὶ περὶ τὸ
C αὐτὸ δοκεῖ σοι χωρὶς στάσεως γενέσθαι ποτ' ἂν;
Θεαί. Οὐδαμῶς.
ἐε. Τί δ'; ἀνευ τούτων νοὸν καθορίζες ὄντα ἢ
genoménon ἀν καὶ ὁποιοῦν;
Θεαί. ἩΚιστα.
ἐε. Καὶ μὴν πρὸς γε τούτων παντὶ λόγῳ μαχετέον,
ὅς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἢ φρόνησιν ἢ νοῶν ἀφανίζων
ἰσχυρίζηται περὶ τινος ὅπηον.
Θεαί. Σφόδρα γε.
ἐε. Τῷ δῆ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τιμῶντι
πᾶσα, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἀνάγκη διὰ ταῦτα μήτε τῶν ἐν
ἡ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ εἶδη λεγόντων τὸ πᾶν ἔστηκος
D ἀποδέχεσθαι, τῶν τε ἀδ' πανταχῇ τὸ ὅν κινούντων

1 ἔχειν add. Schleiermacher.
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life and soul, but, although endowed with soul, is absolutely immovable?

THEAET. All those things seem to me absurd.

STR. And it must be conceded that motion and that which is moved exist.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Then the result is, Theaetetus, that if there is no motion, there is no mind in anyone about anything anywhere.

THEAET. Exactly.

STR. And on the other hand, if we admit that all things are in flux and motion, we shall remove mind itself from the number of existing things by this theory also.

THEAET. How so?

STR. Do you think that sameness of quality or nature or relations could ever come into existence without the state of rest?

THEAET. Not at all.

STR. What then? Without these can you see how mind could exist or come into existence anywhere?

THEAET. By no means.

STR. And yet we certainly must contend by every argument against him who does away with knowledge or reason or mind and then makes any dogmatic assertion about anything.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Then the philosopher, who pays the highest honour to these things, must necessarily, as it seems, because of them refuse to accept the theory of those who say the universe is at rest, whether as a unity or in many forms, and must also refuse utterly to listen to those who say that being is universal
μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀκούειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῶν παιδῶν εὐχῆν, ὡσα ἀκίνητα καὶ κεκινημένα, τὸ ὦν τε καὶ τὸ πάν ἐξυναμφότερα λέγειν.

Ἀληθέστατα.

36. Τί οὖν; ἄρ', οὖκ ἐπιεικῶς ἦδη φαινόμεθα περιειληφέναι τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ὦν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Βαβαί μὲντ' ἂν ἄρα, ὡς Θεαίτητε, ὡς μοι δοκοῦμεν νῦν αὐτοῦ γνώσεσθαι πέρι τὴν ἀπορίαν τῆς σκέφεσις.

Πώς αὖ καὶ τί τοῦτ' εἴρηκας;

'Ω μακάριε, οὖκ ἐννοεῖς ὡστὶ νῦν ἐσμέν ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ τῇ πλείοστῃ περὶ αὐτοῦ, φαινόμεθα δὲ τι λέγειν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς;

'Εμοὶ γοῦν. ὅτι δ' αὖ λελήθαμεν οὕτως ἐχοντες, οὐ πάνυ ἐξυνίμι.

Σκόπει δὴ σαφέστερον, εἰ ταῦτα νῦν ἐν 250 ὁμολογοῦντες δικαίως ἂν ἐπερωτηθείμεν ἀπερ αὐτοῦ τότε ἢρωτῶμεν τοὺς λέγοντας εἶναι τὸ πᾶν θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν.

Ποτα; ὑπόμνησόν με.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ πειράσομαι γε δρᾶν τοῦτο, ἔρωτῶν σὲ καθάπερ ἐκεῖνους τότε, ἢν ἄμα τι καὶ προῖμεν.

'Ορθῶς.

Εἰέν δὴ, κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν ἄρ' οὖκ ἐναντιώτατα λέγεις ἀλλῆλοις;

Πώς γὰρ οὖ;
motion; he must quote the children's prayer,\(^1\) "all things immovable and in motion," and must say that being and the universe consist of both.

**Theaet.** Very true.

**Str.** Do we not, then, seem to have attained at last a pretty good definition of being?

**Theaet.** Certainly.

**Str.** But dear me, Theaetetus! I think we are now going to discover the difficulty of the inquiry about being.

**Theaet.** What is this again? What do you mean?

**Str.** My dear fellow, don't you see that we are now densely ignorant about it, but think that we are saying something worth while?

**Theaet.** I think so, at any rate, and I do not at all understand what hidden error we have fallen into.

**Str.** Then watch more closely and see whether, if we make these admissions, we may not justly be asked the same questions we asked a while ago of those who said the universe was hot and cold.\(^2\)

**Theaet.** What questions? Remind me.

**Str.** Certainly; and I will try to do this by questioning you, as we questioned them at the time. I hope we shall at the same time make a little progress.

**Theaet.** That is right.

**Str.** Very well, then; you say that motion and rest are most directly opposed to each other, do you not?

**Theaet.** Of course.

\(^1\) Nothing further seems to be known about this prayer. Stallbaum thought the reference was to a game in which the children said διά δινητα καὶ κεκινημένα είτη, "may all unmoved things be moved."

\(^2\) Cf. 242d above.
Ω. Καὶ μὴν εἶναι γε ὁμοίως φής ἀμφότερα αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκάτερον;

Β. Θ. Φημὶ γὰρ οὖν.

Ε. Ἦλθεν δὲ τῷ τὰ μὲν ἔργα λέγων ἀμφότερα καὶ ἐκάτερον, ὅταν εἶναι συγχωρῆσθι;

Θ. Οὐδαμῶς.

Ε. 'Αλλ' ἐστάναι σημαίνεις λέγων αὐτὰ ἀμφότερα εἶναι;

Θ. Καὶ πῶς;

Ε. Τρίτων άρα τι παρὰ ταύτα τὸ ὅν ἐν τῇ πυκνῇ τιθεῖς, ὡς ὑπ' ἐκείνου τῇ τε στάσιν καὶ τῇ κύνης περιεχομένην, συλλαβῶν καὶ ἀπιδῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν τῆς οὐσίας κοινωνίαν, οὕτως εἶναι προσεῖπος ἀμφότερα;

C. Θ. Κυνδυνεύσωμεν ὡς ἄληθῶς τρίτων ἀπομαντεύεσθαι τι τὸ ὅν, ὅταν κύνησι καὶ στάσιν εἶναι λέγωμεν.

Ε. Οὐκ ἀρα κύνησι καὶ στάσις ἐστὶν ἀμφότερον τὸ ὅν, ἀλλ' ἐτέρον δὴ τι τούτων.

Θ. 'Εσοκεν.

Ε. Κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἀρα τὸ ὅν οὕτε ἐστήκειν οὕτε κυνεῖται.

Θ. Θ. Σχεδόν.

Ε. Ποί δὴ χρῆ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐτι τρέπειν τὸν βουλόμενον ἐναργῆς τι περὶ αὐτοῦ παρ' ἐαυτῷ βεβαιώσασθαι;

Θ. Θ. Ποί γὰρ;

Ε. Ὡμοι μὲν οὖν οὐδαμῶς ἐτι ράδιον. εἰ γὰρ τι D μὴ κυνεῖται, πῶς οὖν ἐστηκεν; ἡ τὸ μηδαμῶς ἐστὸς πῶς οὐκ αὖ κυνεῖται; τὸ δὲ ὅν ἡμῖν νῦν ἐκτὸς τούτων ἀμφότερων ἀναπέφανται. ἡ δυνατὸν οὖν τοῦτο;

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str. And yet you say that both and each of them equally exist?

THEAET. Yes, I do.

str. And in granting that they exist, do you mean to say that both and each are in motion?

THEAET. By no means.

str. But do you mean that they are at rest, when you say that both exist?

THEAET. Of course not.

str. Being, then, you consider to be something else in the soul, a third in addition to these two, inasmuch as you think rest and motion are embraced by it; and since you comprehend and observe that they participate in existence, you therefore said that they are. Eh?

THEAET. We really do seem to have a vague vision of being as some third thing, when we say that motion and rest are.

str. Then being is not motion and rest in combination, but something else, different from them.

THEAET. Apparently.

str. According to its own nature, then, being is neither at rest nor in motion.

THEAET. You are about right.

str. What is there left, then, to which a man can still turn his mind who wishes to establish within himself any clear conception of being?

THEAET. What indeed?

str. There is nothing left, I think, to which he can turn easily. For if a thing is not in motion, it must surely be at rest; and again, what is not at rest, must surely be in motion. But now we find that being has emerged outside of both these classes. Is that possible, then?
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντων μὲν οὖν ἀδυνατῶτατον.

ΕΕ. Τόδε τοίνυν μνησθήναι δίκαιον ἐπὶ τούτοις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΕΕ. Ὀτι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἐρωτηθέντες τοῦνομα ἐφ’ ὃ τί ποτε δεὶ φέρειν, πάσῃ συνεσχόμεθα ἀπορία.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ΕΕ. Μῶν οὖν ἐν ἐλάττονί τινι νῦν ἐσμεν ἀπορίᾳ, ἐπεί τό ὦν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ μέν, ὦ ἔξενε, εἰ δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν, ἐν πλείονι φαινόμεθα.

ΕΕ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐνταῦθα κείσθω διηπορημένον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ έξ ἵσου τὸ τε ὦν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀπορίας μετελήφατον, νῦν ἐλπὶς ἡδι καθ’ ἀπερ ἄν αὐτῶν θάτερον εἴτε ἀμυδρότερον εἴτε σαφέστερον ἀναφαινήται, καὶ θάτερον οὕτως ἀναφαίνεσθαι. καὶ 251 ἐὰν αὐθυδέτερον ἰδείν δυνώμεθα, τὸν γοῦν λόγον ὁππερ ἄν οἰοὶ τε ὦμεν εὐπρεπέστατα διωσόμεθα οὕτως ἀμφοῖν ἅμα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς.

ΕΕ. Λέγωμεν δὴ καθ’ ὄντινα ποτε τρόπον πολλοῖς ὄνομασι ταῦτον τοῦτο ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύομεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οἶον δὴ τί; παράδειγμα εἰπέ.

37. ΕΕ. Λέγομεν ἀνθρωπῶν δὴ πον πόλλ’ ἄττα ἐπανομαζόντες, τά τε χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ σχῆματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἄρετάς, Β ἐν οἷς πάσι καὶ ἐτέροις μυρίοις οὐ μόνον ἀνθρωπῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι φαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἐτερα ἀπειρα, καὶ τάλλα δὴ κατὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγον οὕτως ἐν ἐκαστον ὑποθέμενοι πάλιν αὐτὸ πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς ὄνομασι λέγομεν.

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Theaet. No, nothing could be more impossible.

Str. Then there is this further thing which we ought to remember.

Theaet. What is it?

Str. That when we were asked to what the appellation of not-being should be applied, we were in the greatest perplexity. Do you remember?

Theaet. Of course I do.

Str. Well, then, are we now in any less perplexity about being?

Theaet. It seems to me, stranger, that we are, if possible, in even greater.

Str. This point, then, let us put down definitely as one of complete perplexity. But since being and not-being participate equally in the perplexity, there is now at last some hope that as either of them emerges more dimly or more clearly, so also will the other emerge. If, however, we are able to see neither of them, we will at any rate push our discussion through between both of them at once as creditably as we can.

Theaet. Good.

Str. Let us, then, explain how we come to be constantly calling this same thing by many names.

Theaet. What, for instance? Please give an example.

Str. We speak of man, you know, and give him many additional designations; we attribute to him colours and forms and sizes and vices and virtues, and in all these cases and countless others we say not only that he is man, but we say he is good and numberless other things. So in the same way every single thing which we supposed to be one, we treat as many and call by many names.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄληθῆ λέγεις.

ΕἬ. Ὅθεν γε, οἴμαι, τοῖς τε νέοις καὶ τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὑμιμαθέσι θούνη παρεσκευάκαμεν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἀντιλαβέσθαι παντὶ πρόχειρον ὡς ἀδύνατον τὰ τε πολλὰ ἔν καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ εἶναι, καὶ δὴ ποιν καίρουσιν οὐκ ἕωντες ἀγαθῶν λέγειν ἀνθρωπον, θ ἄλλα τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὸν, τὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρώπων. ἐντυγχάνεις γὰρ, ὡς θεαίτητε, ὡς ἐγέμιαι, πολλάκις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐσπονδακόσων, εἶνοτε προσβυτέρους ἀνθρώπους, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τοιαῦτα τεθαυμακόσι, καὶ δὴ τι καὶ πάσοσοφον οἴομένους τοῦτο αὐτῷ ἀνημηρηκέναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΕἬ. Ἡνα τοῖνυν πρὸς ἀπαντας ἡμῖν δ λόγος ἦ τοὺς πιστεὶ περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὅτιον διαλεξάντας, δ ἐστω καὶ πρὸς τούτους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅσοι ἐμπροσθεὶς διειλέγμεθα, τὰ νῦν ὡς ἐν ἐρωτῆσει λεξηθησόμενα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ποιὰ δή;

ΕἬ. Πῶτερον μὴτε την οὐσίαν κινῆσε καὶ στάσει προσάπτωμεν μὴτε ἀλλὸ ἄλλῳ μηδὲν μηδενὶ, ἄλλῳ ὡς ἄμικτα ὄντα καὶ ἀδύνατον μεταλαμβάνειν ἄλλῃ-λων οὕτως αὐτὰ ἐν τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν λόγοις τιθώμεν; ἦ πάντα εἰς ταύτων ἐννάγωμεν ὡς δυνατὰ ἐπικοινώνοντεῖν ἄλλῃλοις; ἦ τα μέν, τὰ δὲ μῆ; τούτων, ὡς 392
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THEAET. True.

STR. And it is in this way, I fancy, that we have provided a fine feast for youngsters and for old men whose learning has come to them late in life; for example, it is easy enough for anyone to grasp the notion that the many cannot possibly be one, nor the one many, and so, apparently, they take pleasure in saying that we must not call a man good, but must call the good good, and a man man. I fancy, Theaetetus, you often run across people who take such matters seriously; sometimes they are elderly men whose poverty of intellect makes them admire such quibbles, and who think this is a perfect mine of wisdom they have discovered.¹

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Then, to include in our discussion all those who have ever engaged in any talk whatsoever about being, let us address our present arguments to these men as well as to all those with whom we were conversing before, and let us employ the form of questions.

THEAET. What are the arguments?

STR. Shall we attribute neither being to rest and motion, nor any attribute to anything, but shall we in our discussions assume that they do not mingle and cannot participate in one another? Or shall we gather all things together, believing that they are capable of combining with one another? Or are some capable of it and others not? Which of these

¹ Those are here satirized who deny the possibility of all except identical predication. Such were Antisthenes, Euthydemus, and Dionysodorus. The two last are probably those referred to as old men whose learning came late in life.
Ε Θεαίτητε, τί ποτ’ ἂν αὐτοὺς προαιρεῖσθαι φή-σαμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡγὼ μὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχω πρὸς ταῦτα ἀποκρίνασθαι.

Ε. Τί οὖν οὐ καθ’ ἐν ἀποκρινόμενος ἐφ’ ἐκάστου τὰ ἐξυμβαίνοντα ἐσκέψω; ¹

ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς λέγεις.²

Ε. Καὶ τιθῶμεν γε αὐτοὺς λέγεων, εἰ βούλειι, πρῶτον μηδενὶ μηδὲν μηδεμίαν δύναμιν ἔχειν κοινωνίας εἰς μηδὲν. οὐκοῦν κίνησις τε καὶ στάσις οὐδαμῇ μεθέξεσον οὐσίας;

252 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Ε. Τί δὲ; ἐσται πότερον αὐτῶν οὐσίας μὴ προσ-κοινωνοῦν ³;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἐσται.

Ε. Ταχὺ δὴ ταῦτῃ γε τῇ συνομολογίᾳ πάντα ἀνάστατα γέγονεν, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἀμα τε τῶν τὸ πᾶν κινοῦντων καὶ τῶν ὡς ἐν ἱστάντων καὶ ὁσοι κατ’, εἰδὴ τὰ ὅντα κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὀσαύτως ἔχοντα εἰναι φασιν ἀεὶ. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι τὸ γε εἰναι προσ-ἀπτουσιν, οἱ μὲν ὄντως κινεῖσθαι λέγοντες, οἱ δὲ ὄντως ἐστηκότ’ εἰναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

Β Ε. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁσοι τοτὲ μὲν ἔνυντιβέασι τὰ πάντα, τοτε δὲ διαιροῦσιν, εἰτε εἰς ἐν καὶ ἐξ ἐνὸς ἀπειρα εἰτε εἰς πέρας ἔχοντα στοιχεῖα διαιροῦμενοι καὶ ἐκ τούτων συντιθέντες, ὂμοιως μὲν ἐὰν ἐν μέρει τοῦτο τιθῶσι γιγνόμενον, ὂμοιως δὲ καὶ ἐὰν ἀεὶ,

¹ τί οὖν . . . ἐσκέψω; attributed to the Stranger by Badham.
² καλῶς λέγεις attributed to Theaetetus by Badham.
³ προσκοινωνοῦν W; προσκοινωνεῖν VT.

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alternatives, Theaetetus, should we say is their choice?

THEAET. I cannot answer these questions for them.

STR. Then why did you not answer each separately and see what the result was in each case?

THEAET. A good suggestion.

STR. And let us, if you please, assume that they say first that nothing has any power to combine with anything else. Then motion and rest will have no share in being, will they?

THEAET. No.

STR. Well, then, will either of them be, if it has no share in being?

THEAET. It will not.

STR. See how by this admission everything is overturned at once, as it seems—the doctrine of those who advocate universal motion, that of the partisans of unity and rest, and that of the men who teach that all existing things are distributed into invariable and everlasting kinds. For all of these make use of being as an attribute. One party says that the universe "is" in motion, another that it "is" at rest.

THEAET. Exactly.

STR. And further, all who teach that things combine at one time and separate at another, whether infinite elements combine in unity and are derived from unity or finite elements separate and then unite, regardless of whether they say that these changes take place successively or without interrup-
κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα λέγοιεν ἃν οὐδέν, εἰπερ μηδεμία ἐστι ἐξύμμιξις.

ὁ θεαί. Ἄρθρως.

"Επὶ τοῖς ἀν αὐτοὶ πᾶντων καταγελαστῶτατα μετίοιεν 1 τὸν λόγον οἱ μηδὲν ἑώντες κοινωνίᾳ παθήματος ἐτέρου θάτερον προσαγορεύειν.

ὁ θεαί. Πῶς;

"Επὶ τῷ τε "εἶναι" ποι περὶ πάντα ἀναγκάζονται χρῆσθαι καὶ τῷ "χωρίς" καὶ τῷ "τῶν ἄλλων" 2 καὶ τῷ "καθ' αὐτῷ" καὶ μυρίοις ἑτέρους, ὥν ἀκρατεῖς ὄντες εἰργεσθαι καὶ μὴ συνάπτειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐκ ἄλλων δέονται τῶν ἐξελευγόντων, ἄλλα τὸ λεγόμενον οἴκοθεν τῶν πολέμων καὶ ἐναντιωσόμενον ἑχοντες, ἐντὸς ὑποδηγομένον ὡσπερ τὸν ἄτοπον Εὐρυκλέα περιφέροντες ἀεὶ πορεύονται.

ὁ θεαί. Κομιδὴ λέγεις ὁμοῦν τε καὶ ἀληθὲς.

"Επὶ δ', ἃν πάντα ἄλληλοις ἔωμεν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἐπικοινωνίας;

ὁ θεαί. Τοῦτο μὲν οἶδος τε κἀγὼ διαλύειν.

"Επὶ. Πῶς;

"Οτι κίνησις τε 3 αὐτὴ παντάπασιν ἱστατι ἃν καὶ στάσις αὐτή κινοῖτο, εἰπερ ἐπιγνοιώθην ἐπ' ἄλληλοιν.

"Επὶ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο γέ που ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀνάγκαις ἀδύνατον, κίνησιν τε ἱσταθαι καὶ στάσιν κινεῖσθαι;

ὁ θεαί. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

"Επὶ. Τὸ τρίτον δὴ μόνον λυπῶν.

ὁ θεαί. Ναι.

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1 μετίοιεν | μετίοιμεν BTW.
2 τῶν ἄλλων B; ἄλλων T.
3 τε] γε BTW.
tion, would be talking nonsense in all these doctrines, if there is no intermingling.

THEAET. Quite right.

STR. Then, too, the very men who forbid us to call anything by another name because it participates in the effect produced by another, would be made most especially ridiculous by this doctrine.

THEAET. How so?

STR. Because they are obliged in speaking of anything to use the expressions "to be," "apart," "from the rest," "by itself," and countless others; they are powerless to keep away from them or avoid working them into their discourse; and therefore there is no need of others to refute them, but, as the saying goes, their enemy and future opponent is of their own household whom they always carry about with them as they go, giving forth speech from within them, like the wonderful Eurycles.¹

THEAET. That is a remarkably accurate illustration.

STR. But what if we ascribe to all things the power of participation in one another?

THEAET. Even I can dispose of that assumption.

STR. How?

THEAET. Because motion itself would be wholly at rest, and rest in turn would itself be in motion, if these two could be joined with one another.

STR. But surely this at least is most absolutely impossible, that motion be at rest and rest be in motion?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Then only the third possibility is left.

THEAET. Yes.

¹ Eurycles was a ventriloquist and soothsayer of the fifth century, cf. Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 1019.
Ε 38. ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἐν γέ τι τοῦτων ἀναγκαῖον, ἢ πάντα ἢ μηδέν ἢ τὰ μὲν ἑθελεὶν, τὰ δὲ μὴ συμμιγνωσθαί.

Θεαί. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν τὰ γε δύο ἀδύνατον εὑρέθη.

Θεαί. Ναι. ¹

ΞΕ. Πᾶς ἄρα ὁ βουλόμενος ὅρθως ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ λοιπὸν τῶν τριῶν θήσει.

Θεαί. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. "Οτε δὴ τὰ μὲν ἑθελεὶ τοῦτο δρᾶν, τὰ δ’ οὐ, ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ σχέδον οἷον τὰ γράμματα πεποιθοῦτ’ ἂν εἴη. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνων τὰ μὲν ἀναρμοστεὶ ποι πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὰ δὲ ἐναρμόττει.

Θεαί. Πῶς δ’ οὖ; ΞΕ. Τὰ δὲ γε φωνῆσιν ταῖς ἀπερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα γε.

ΞΕ. Πᾶς οὖν οἶδεν ὅταν ὅποιος δυνατὰ κοινω- ΘΕΑΙ. Τέχνης.

ΞΕ. Ποῖας; ΘΕΑΙ. Τῆς γραμματικῆς.

ΞΕ. Τὶ δὲ; περὶ τῶν τῶν οξέων καὶ βαρέων Β ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔτως.

¹ εὑρέθη. ναὶ Heindorf; εὑρέθηναι BT; εὑρεθήναι ναὶ W.

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str. And certainly one of these three must be true; either all things will mingle with one another, or none will do so, or some will and others will not.

THEAET. Of course.

str. And certainly the first two were found to be impossible.

THEAET. Yes.

str. Then everybody who wishes to answer correctly will adopt the remaining one of the three possibilities.

THEAET. Precisely.

str. Now since some things will commingle and others will not, they are in much the same condition as the letters of the alphabet; for some of these do not fit each other, and others do.

THEAET. Of course.

str. And the vowels, to a greater degree than the others, run through them all as a bond, so that without one of the vowels the other letters cannot be joined one to another.

THEAET. Certainly.

str. Now does everybody know which letters can join with which others? Or does he who is to join them properly have need of art?

THEAET. He has need of art.

str. What art?

THEAET. The art of grammar.

str. And is not the same true in connexion with high and low sounds? Is not he who has the art to know the sounds which mingle and those which do not, musical, and he who does not know unmusical?

THEAET. Yes.
ΕΕ. Καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τεχνῶν καὶ ἀτεχνῶν τουαῦτα εὐρήσομεν ἔτερα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὲ οὐ;

ΕΕ. Τί δὲ; ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ γένη πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ ταύτα μίξεως ἔχειν ὁμολογήκαμεν, ἃρ' οὗ μετ' ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τῶν λόγων πορεύεσθαι τὸν ὀρθῶς μέλλοντα δείξειν ποιὰ ποῖοις συμφωνεῖ τῶν γενῶν καὶ ποῖα ἄλληλα οὐ δέχεται;

Καὶ δὴ καὶ διὰ πάντων εἰ συνέχοντ' ἄττ' αὖτ' ἑστων, ὥστε συμμίγνυσθαι δυνατὰ εἶναι, καὶ πάλιν ἐν ταῖς διαιρέσεσιν, εἰ δὲ ὅλων ἔτερα τῆς διαιρέσεως αὕτη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιστήμης δεῖ, καὶ σχεδὸν γε ἑκὼς τῆς μεγίστης;

39. ΕΕ. Τίν' οὖν αὐτὸ προσεροῦμεν, ὃ Θεαίτητε, ταῦτην; ἢ πρὸς Διὸς ἐλάθομεν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐμπεσόντες ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κινδυνεύομεν ἑπτοῦντες τὸν σοφιστὴν πρότερον ἀνηρηκέναι τὸν φιλόσοφον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ΕΕ. Τὸ κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ μήτε ταύτων εἰδὼς ἔτερον ἥγησασθαι μήτε ἔτερον δὲ ταύτων μῶν οὐ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς φύσομεν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί, φύσομεν.

ΕΕ. Οὐκοῦν ὅ γε τοῦτο δυνατὸς δρᾶν μίαν ἴδεαν διὰ πολλῶν, εἶνος ἐκάστου κειμένου χωρίς, πάντη διατεταμένην ἰκανῶς διαμισθᾶται, καὶ πολλὰς ἑτέρας ἄλληλων ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἐξωθεὶ περιεχομένας, καὶ μίαν αὖ δὲ ὅλων πολλῶν ἐν ἑνὶ ἐξωθημένην, καὶ

1 συνέχοντ' ἄττ' αὖτ' Wagner; συνέχοντα ταὐτ' ΒΤΩ.
And we shall find similar conditions, then, in all the other arts and processes which are devoid of art?

**Theaet.** Of course.

**Str.** Now since we have agreed that the classes or genera also commingle with one another, or do not commingle, in the same way, must not he possess some science and proceed by the processes of reason who is to show correctly which of the classes harmonize with which, and which reject one another, and also if he is to show whether there are some elements extending through all and holding them together so that they can mingle, and again, when they separate, whether there are other universal causes of separation?

**Theaet.** Certainly he needs science, and perhaps even the greatest of sciences.

**Str.** Then, Theaetetus, what name shall we give to this science? Or, by Zeus, have we unwittingly stumbled upon the science that belongs to free men and perhaps found the philosopher while we were looking for the sophist?

**Theaet.** What do you mean?

**Str.** Shall we not say that the division of things by classes and the avoidance of the belief that the same class is another, or another the same, belongs to the science of dialectic?

**Theaet.** Yes, we shall.

**Str.** Then he who is able to do this has a clear perception of one form or idea extending entirely through many individuals each of which lies apart, and of many forms differing from one another but included in one greater form, and again of one form evolved by the union of many wholes, and of many
Ε πολλὰς χωρὶς πάντη διωρισμένας· τούτο δ’ ἐστιν, ἢ τε κοινωνεῖν ἔκαστα δύναται καὶ ὅπῃ μὴ, διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος ἐπίστασθαι.

ἐθεί. Παντάπασι μὲν ὁμών.

ἐρ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε διαλεκτικὸν οὐκ ἄλλῳ δώσεις, ὡς ἐγώμει, πλὴν τῷ καθαρῶς τε καὶ δικαίως φιλοσοφοῦντι.

ἐθεί. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν ἄλλῳ δοιή τις;

ἐρ. Τὸν μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφον ἐν τοιούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ καὶ νῦν καὶ ἔπειτα ἀνευρήσωμεν, ἐὰν ἐπτώμεν, ἵνα 254 μὲν χαλεπὸν ἐναργῶς καὶ τούτων, ἔτερον μὴν τρόπον ἣ τε τοῦ σοφιστοῦ χαλεπότης ἢ τε τούτου.

ἐθεί. Πῶς;

ἐρ. Ὁ μὲν ἀποδιδράσκων εἰς τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος σκοτεινότητα, τριβή προσαπτόμενος αὐτῆς, διὰ τὸ σκοτεινὸν τοῦ τόπου κατανοήσαι χαλεπός· ἢ γὰρ;

ἐθεί. Ἕσοικεν.

ἐρ. Ὁ δὲ γε φιλόσοφος, τῇ τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ διὰ λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ἰδέα, διὰ τὸ λαμπρὸν αὐτής χώρας οὐδαμῶς εὐπετῆς ὀφθηγάναι· τὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν Β πολλῶν ψυχῆς ὀμμάτα καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀφορώντα ἀδύνατα.

ἐθεί. Καὶ ταῦτα εἰκὸς οὐχ ἦττον ἐκείνων οὕτως ἔχειν.

ἐρ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ μὲν τούτου καὶ τάχα ἐπισκεψόμεθα σαφέστερον, ἂν ἔτι βουλομένοις ἥμιν ἦ· περὶ δὲ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ που δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἄνετέον, πρὶν ἄν ἰκανῶς αὐτὸν θεασώμεθα.

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forms entirely apart and separate. This is the knowledge and ability to distinguish by classes how individual things can or cannot be associated with one another.

Theaet. Certainly it is.

Str. But you surely, I suppose, will not grant the art of dialectic to any but the man who pursues philosophy in purity and righteousness.

Theaet. How could it be granted to anyone else?

Str. Then it is in some region like this that we shall always, both now and hereafter, discover the philosopher, if we look for him; he also is hard to see clearly, but the difficulty is not the same in his case and that of the sophist.

Theaet. How do they differ?

Str. The sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being, feeling his way in it by practice,\(^1\) and is hard to discern on account of the darkness of the place. Don't you think so?

Theaet. It seems likely.

Str. But the philosopher, always devoting himself through reason to the idea of being, is also very difficult to see on account of the brilliant light of the place; for the eyes of the soul of the multitude are not strong enough to endure the sight of the divine.

Theaet. This also seems no less true than what you said about the sophist.

Str. Now we will make more accurate investigations about the philosopher hereafter, if we still care to do so; but as to the sophist, it is clear that we must not relax our efforts until we have a satisfactory view of him.

\(^1\) By practice, \textit{i.e.}, by empirical knowledge as opposed to reason.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς εἶπες.

40. ΞΕ. "Ότ' οὖν δὴ τὰ μὲν ἦμων τῶν γενῶν ὁμο- λόγηται κοινωνεῖν ἔθελεν ἄλληλους, τὰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπ' ὀλγοῦν, τὰ δ' ἐπὶ πολλά, τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ C πάντων οὐδὲν κωλύειν τοῖς πάσι κεκοινωνηκέναι, τὸ δὴ μετὰ τούτο ξυνεπισπώμεθα τῷ λόγῳ τῇ δὲ σκοποῦντες, μὴ περὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν, ἵνα μὴ ταραττόμεθα ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ προελόμενοι τῶν μεγίστων λεγομένων ἄττα, πρῶτον μὲν ποιά ἐκαστά ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ κοινωνίας ἄλληλων πῶς ἔχει δυνάμεως, ἵνα τὸ τε ὅν καὶ μὴ ὅν εἶ μὴ πάση σαφηνεία δυνάμεθα λαβεῖν, ἀλλ' οὖν λόγον γε ἐνδεέις μηδὲν γιγνώμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, καθ' ὅσον ὁ ἄρτος ἐνδέχεται τῇς νῦν σκέψεως, ἐὰν ἀρα ἦμων πὴ D παρεικάθη ¹ τὸ μὴ ὅν λέγουσιν ὡς ἔστιν ὄντως μὴ ὅν ἄθως ἀπαλλάττετεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν χρή.

ΞΕ. Μέγιστα μὴν τῶν γενῶν, ἃ νῦν δὴ διημεν, τὸ τε ὅν αὐτὸ καὶ στάσις καὶ κίνησις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πολὺ γε.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν τῶ γε δύο φαμέν αὐτοῖν ἀμίκτω πρὸς ἄλληλων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ γε ὅν μικτῶν ἀμφοῖν· ἔστον γὰρ ἀμφῶς παύν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὖ; 

ΞΕ. Τρία δὴ γίγνεται ταῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὶ μὴν;

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτῶν ἐκαστὸν τοῖν μὲν δυοῖν ἔτερόν ἔστω, αὐτὸ δ' ἐαυτῷ ταὐτόν.

¹ παρεικάθη Boeckh; παρεικασθῇ BT.

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THEAET. You are right.

STR. Since, therefore, we are agreed that some of the classes will mingle with one another, and others will not, and some will mingle with few and others with many, and that there is nothing to hinder some from mingling universally with all, let us next proceed with our discussion by investigating, not all the forms or ideas, lest we become confused among so many, but some only, selecting them from those that are considered the most important; let us first consider their several natures, then what their power of mingling with one another is, and so, if we cannot grasp being and not-being with perfect clearness, we shall at any rate not fail to reason fully about them, so far as the method of our present inquiry permits. Let us in this way see whether it is, after all, permitted us to say that not-being really is, although not being, and yet come off unscathed.

THEAET. Yes; that is the proper thing for us to do.

STR. The most important, surely, of the classes or genera are those which we just mentioned; being itself and rest and motion.

THEAET. Yes, by far.

STR. And further, two of them, we say, cannot mingle with each other.

THEAET. Decidedly not.

STR. But being can mingle with both of them, for they both are.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Then these prove to be three.

THEAET. To be sure.

STR. Each of them is, then, other than the remaining two, but the same as itself.
Ε ὙΕΑΙ. ὸευτῶς.

ἙΕ. Τὶ ποτ’ αὖ νῦν ὦτῶς εἰρήκαμεν τὸ τε ταύτον καὶ θάτερον; πότερα δύο γένη τινὲ αὐτῶ,\(^1\) τῶν μὲν τριῶν ἄλλω, ἄμφιμματικῶν μὴν ἔκεινοις ἐξ ἀνάγκης θεὶ, καὶ περὶ πέντε ἄλλ’ οὐ περὶ τριῶν ὡς ὄντων αὐτῶν σκεπτέον, ἣ τὸ τε ταύτον τοῦτο καὶ θάτερον 255 ὡς ἔκεινων τι προσαγορεύοντες λανθάνομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς;

ὙΕΑΙ. Ἰσως.

ἙΕ. Ἀλλ’ οὐ τι μὴν κίνησις γε καὶ στάσις οὐθ’ ἔτερον οὔτε ταύτον ἐστι.

ὙΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ἙΕ. Ὅτιπερ ἀν κοινὴ προσεπώμεν κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν, τοῦτο οὐδέτερον αὐτοῖν οἶνον τε εἶναι.

ὙΕΑΙ. Τ’ δὴ;

ἙΕ. Κίνησις τε στήσεται καὶ στάσις αὐτὶ κινηθῆ- σεται: περὶ γὰρ ἄμφοτερα θάτερον ὑποτερονοῦν γιγνόμενον αὐτοῖν ἀναγκάσει μεταβάλλειν αὐθ’ θά- τερον ἐπὶ τούναντὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως, ἀτε Β μετασχὸν τοῦ ἐναντίου.

ὙΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ γε.

ἙΕ. Μετέχετον μὴν ἄμφω ταύτω καὶ θάτερῳ.

ὙΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ἙΕ. Μὴ τούνων λέγωμεν κίνησιν γ’ εἶναι ταύτον ἡ θάτερον, μὴδ’ αὐθ’ στάσιν.

ὙΕΑΙ. Μὴ γάρ.

ἙΕ. Ἀλλ’ ἀρα τὸ ὅν καὶ τὸ ταύτον ὡς ἐν τι δια- νοητέον ἡμῖν;

ὙΕΑΙ. Ἰσως.

ἙΕ. Ἀλλ’ εἰ τὸ ὅν καὶ τὸ ταύτον μηδὲν διάφορον σημαίνετον, κίνησιν αὐθ’ πάλιν καὶ στάσιν ἄμφοτερα

\(^1\) αὐτῷ ἅ αὐτοῦ B; αὐτοῦ Τ.
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THEAET. Yes.

STR. But what do we mean by these words, "the same" and "other," which we have just used? Are they two new classes, different from the other three, but always of necessity mingled with them, and must we conduct our inquiry on the assumption that there are five classes, not three, or are we unconsciously speaking of one of those three when we say "the same" or "other"?

THEAET. Perhaps.

STR. But certainly motion and rest are neither other nor the same.

THEAET. How so?

STR. Whatever term we apply to rest and motion in common cannot be either of those two.

THEAET. Why not?

STR. Because motion would be at rest and rest would be in motion; in respect of both, for whichever of the two became "other" would force the other to change its nature into that of its opposite, since it would participate in its opposite.

THEAET. Exactly so.

STR. Both certainly partake of the same and the other.¹

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Then we must not say that motion, or rest either, is the same or other.

THEAET. No.

STR. But should we conceive of "being" and "the same" as one?

THEAET. Perhaps.

STR. But if "being" and "the same" have no difference of meaning, then when we go on and say ¹ i.e., sameness and difference can be predicated of both.
εἶναι λέγοντες ἀμφότερα οὖτως αὐτὰ ταὐτὸν ὡς
οὖν τρισχρήσεις.

ὦ ὦ ὀνταῖον πρὸς τοῖς τρισῳν εἴδεσι τὸ

ταὐτὸν τιθώμεν;

ὦ ὀνταῖον. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ὦ τῆς τὸ ἀνεπεί νὰ ἡμῖν λεκτέον πέμπτον;

Ἱ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ὅν ὡς δυ' ἀττα ὁνόματα ἐφ' ἐν' γένει

dιανοεῖσθαι δεῖ;

ὦ ὀνταῖον. Τάχ' ἄν.

ὦ τῆς τὸ δ' ἐπερον ἄεὶ πρὸς ἐπερον. ἡ γαρ;

ὦ ὀνταῖον. Οὐτώς.

ὦ τῆς τὸ ὅν καὶ τὸ ἀνεπεί νὰ μὴ

πάμπολυ δυναφέρετην. ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἀνεπεί νὰ ἀμφοῖν

μετείχε τοῖν εἴδοιν ὡσπερ τὸ ὅν, ἢν ἄν ποτέ τι καὶ
tῶν ἐπερων ἐπερον οὐ πρὸς ἐπερον. νῦν δὲ ἀτεχνῶς

ἡμῖν, ὅτι περ ἄν ἐπερον ἢ, συμβεβηκεν εἴξ ἀνάγκης

ἐπερων τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι.

ὦ ὀνταῖον. Λέγεις καθάπερ ἔχει.

ὦ τῆς πέμπτον δὴ τῆν ἀνεπεί νὰ φύσων λεκτέον ἐν

Ετοῖς εἴδεσιν οὖσαν, ἐν οἷς προαυτρούμεθα.

ὦ ὀνταῖον. Ναί.

ὦ τῆς Καὶ διὰ πάντων γε αὐτὴν αὐτῶν φήσομεν
eἶναι δυνατθήθηκαν. ἐν ἐκαστὸν γὰρ ἐπερον εἶναι

1 εἴδεσι BT; εἴδεσιν εἴδος W.

2 ἄλλα TW; ἄλληλα B.
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that both rest and motion are, we shall be saying that they are both the same, since they are.

THEAET. But surely that is impossible.

STR. Then it is impossible for being and the same to be one.

THEAET. Pretty nearly.

STR. So we shall consider "the same" a fourth class in addition to the other three?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Then shall we call "the other" a fifth class? Or must we conceive of this and "being" as two names for one class?

THEAET. May be.

STR. But I fancy you admit that among the entities some are always conceived as absolute, and some as relative.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And other is always relative to other, is it not?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. It would not be so, if being and the other were not utterly different. If the other, like being, partook of both absolute and relative existence, there would be also among the others that exist another not in relation to any other; but as it is, we find that whatever is other is just what it is through compulsion of some other.

THEAET. The facts are as you say.

STR. Then we must place the nature of "the other" as a fifth among the classes in which we select our examples.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And we shall say that it permeates them all; for each of them is other than the rest, not by reason
τῶν ἄλλων οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ἱδέας τῆς θατέρου.

Θεαί. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.

41. Ἐξ. Ὡδὲ δὴ λέγωμεν ἐπὶ τῶν πέντε καθ' ἐν ἀναλαμβάνοντες.

Θεαί. Πῶς;

Ἐξ. Πρῶτον μὲν κίνησιν, ὡς ἔστι παντάπασιν ἐτερων στάσεως. ἡ πώς λέγωμεν;

Θεαί. Οὔτως.

Ἐξ. Οὐ στάσις ἀρ' ἐστίν.

Θεαί. Οὐδαμῶς.

256 Ἐξ. Ἐστὶ δὲ γε διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τοῦ ὀντος.

Θεαί. Ἐστιν.

Ἐξ. Αὖθις δὴ πάλιν ἡ κίνησις ἐτερον ταύτον ἐστιν.

Θεαί. Σχεδόν.

Ἐξ. Οὐ ταύτων ἄρα ἐστίν.

Θεαί. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Ἐξ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν αὕτη γ' ἣν ταύτων διὰ τὸ μετέχειν αὐτὲν πάντ' αὐτοῦ.

Θεαί. Καὶ μάλα.

Ἐξ. Τὴν κίνησιν δὴ ταύτων τε εἶναι καὶ μὴ ταύτων ὀμολογητέον καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον. οὐ γὰρ ὅταν εἰπωμεν αὕτην ταύτων καὶ μὴ ταύτων, ὀμοίως εἰρήκαμεν, ἀλλ' ὅποταν μὲν ταύτων, διὰ τὴν μέθεξιν Β ταύτων πρὸς ἐαυτὴν οὕτω λέγομεν,1 ὅταν δὲ μὴ ταύτων, διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὐθατέρου, δι' ἥν ἀποχωριζομένη ταύτων γέγονεν οὐκ ἔκεινο ἀλλ' ἐτερον, ὡστε ὀρθῶς αὖ λέγεται πάλιν οὐ ταύτων.

Θεαί. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

Ἐξ. Οὐκοῦν κἂν εἲ πη μετελαμβάνειν αὐτὴ

1 λέγομεν W; λέγωμεν BT.
of its own nature, but because it partakes of the idea of the other.

THEAET. Exactly.

STR. Let us now state our conclusions, taking up the five classes one at a time.

THEAET. How?

STR. Take motion first; we say that it is entirely other than rest, do we not?

THEAET. We do.

STR. Then it is not rest.

THEAET. Not at all.

STR. But it exists, by reason of its participation in being.

THEAET. Yes, it exists.

STR. Now motion again is other than the same.

THEAET. You’re about right.

STR. Therefore it is not the same.

THEAET. No, it is not.

STR. But yet we found it was the same, because all things partake of the same.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Then we must admit that motion is the same and is not the same, and we must not be disturbed thereby; for when we say it is the same and not the same, we do not use the words alike. When we call it the same, we do so because it partakes of the same in relation to itself, and when we call it not the same, we do so on account of its participation in the other, by which it is separated from the same and becomes not that but other, so that it is correctly spoken of in turn as not the same.

THEAET. Yes, certainly.

STR. Then even if absolute motion partook in
κίνησις στάσεως, ούδέν ἄν ἄτοπον ἢν στάσιμον αὐτῆς προσαγορεύειν;

Θεαί. Ὄρθωτατά γε, εἰπέρ τῶν γενῶν συγχωρησόμεθα τὰ μὲν ἄλληλοις ἐθέλειν μίγνυσθαι, τὰ δέ μὴ.

ΣΣ. Καὶ μὴν ἐπὶ γε τὴν τοῦτον πρότερον ἀπόδειξιν ἢ τῶν νῦν ἀφικόμεθα, ἐλέγχοντες ὅσ ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν ταύτη.

Θεαί. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΣ. Δέξωμεν δὴ πάλιν. ἡ κίνησις ἐστὶν ἔτερον τοῦ ἔτερου, καθάπερ ταὐτοῦ τε ἢν ἄλλο καὶ τῆς στάσεως;

Θεαί. Ἀναγκαῖον.

ΣΣ. Οὐχ ἔτερον ἀρ’ ἐστὶ πη καὶ ἔτερον κατὰ τὸν νῦν δὴ λόγον.

Θεαί. Ἀλήθη.

ΣΣ. Τι οὖν δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο; ἄρ’ ἀν πῶν μὲν τριῶν ἔτερον αὐτῆς φήσομεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μὴ φῶμεν, ὁμολογήσαντες αὐτὰ εἶναι πέντε, περὶ δὲν καὶ ἐν οἷς προσβέβημεθα σκοπεῖν;

Θεαί. Καὶ πῶς; ἀδύνατον γὰρ συγχωρεῖν ἐλάττω τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ νῦν δὴ φανέρος.

ΣΣ. Ἀδεώς ἡρ’ τὴν κίνησιν ἔτερον εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος διαμαχόμενοι λέγωμεν;

Θεαί. Ἀδεόστατα μὲν οὖν.

ΣΣ. Οὐκοῦν δὴ σαφῶς ἡ κίνησις ὄντως οὐκ ὁν ἐστὶ καὶ οὖν, ἐπείπερ τοῦ ὄντος μετέχει;

Θεαί. Σαφέστατά γε.

ΣΣ. Ὅστιν ἄρα εἰς ἀνάγκης τὸ μὴ ὃν ἐπὶ τε κινήσεως εἶναι καὶ κατὰ πάντα τὰ γένη. κατὰ πάντα Ἕ γὰρ ἡ θατέρου φύσις ἔτερον ἀπεργαζομένῃ τοῦ

1 ἀν Heindorf;  οὐ BT.
any way of rest, it would not be absurd to say it was at rest?

THEAET. It would be perfectly right, if we are to admit that some of the classes will mingle with one another, and others will not.

STR. And surely we demonstrated that before we took up our present points; we proved that it was according to nature.¹

THEAET. Yes, of course.

STR. Then let us recapitulate: Motion is other than the other, just as we found it to be other than the same and than rest. Is that true?

THEAET. Inevitably.

STR. Then it is in a sense not other and also other, according to our present reasoning.

THEAET. True.

STR. Now how about the next point? Shall we say next that motion is other than the three, but not other than the fourth,—that is, if we have agreed that the classes about which and within which we undertook to carry on our inquiry are five in number?

THEAET. How can we say that? For we cannot admit that the number is less than was shown just now.

STR. Then we may fearlessly persist in contending that motion is other than being?

THEAET. Yes, most fearlessly.

STR. It is clear, then, that motion really is not, and also that it is, since it partakes of being?

THEAET. That is perfectly clear.

STR. In relation to motion, then, not-being is. That is inevitable. And this extends to all the classes; for in all of them the nature of other so operates as to make each one other than being, and

¹ See 251 e ff.
Being is many, for each and every thing in all the classes is; but not-being is infinite, for not only is it true that every thing in each of the classes is not, but not-being extends also to all conceptions which do not and cannot have any reality.
therefore not-being. So we may, from this point of view, rightly say of all of them alike that they are not; and again, since they partake of being, that they are and have being.

THEAET. Yes, I suppose so.

STR. And so, in relation to each of the classes, being is many, and not-being is infinite in number.¹

THEAET. So it seems.

STR. Then being itself must also be said to be other than all other things.

THEAET. Yes, it must.

STR. And we conclude that whatever the number of other things is, just that is the number of the things in relation to which being is not; for not being those things, it is itself one, and again, those other things are not unlimited in number.

THEAET. That is not far from the truth.

STR. Then we must not be disturbed by this either, since by their nature the classes have participation in one another. But if anyone refuses to accept our present results, let him reckon with our previous arguments and then proceed to reckon with the next step.²

THEAET. That is very fair.

STR. Then here is a point to consider.

THEAET. What is it?

STR. When we say not-being, we speak, I think, not of something that is the opposite of being, but only of something different.

THEAET. What do you mean?

² i.e., if he will not accept our proof that being is not, etc., he must disprove our arguments respecting the participation of ideas in one another, and then proceed to draw his inference.
PLATO

ἐγ. Ὅθων ἐπισκόπευ τι μὴ μέγα, τότε μᾶλλον τί σοι φαινόμεθα τὸ σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ἵσον δηλοῦν τῷ ῥήματι;

Ἀ. Καὶ πῶς;

ἐγ. Όὐκ ἄρ, ἐναντίον ὅταν ἀποφασὶς λέγηται σημαίνειν, συγχωρησόμεθα, τοσοῦτον δὲ μόνον, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων τί μηνύει τὸ μὴ καὶ τὸ οὐ προτιθέμενα

C τῶν ἐπιόντων ὄνομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων περὶ ἄττ' ἀν κέντα τὰ ἐπιφθεγγόμενα ὡστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὄνυματα.

Ἀ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

42. Ἐγ. Τόδε δὲ διανοηθῶμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ ἕνωδοκεί.

Ἀ. Τὸ ποίον;

ἐγ. Ηθατέρου μοι φύσις φαίνεται κατακεκεραματισθαὶ καθάπερ ἐπιστήμη.

Ἀ. Πῶς;

ἐγ. Μία μὲν ἑστὶ ποι καὶ ἐκείνη,¹ τὸ δ' ἐπί τῶν γνώμουσαν μέρος αὐτῆς ἐκαστον ἀφορισθέν ἐπω-

D νυμίαν ὄνηκε τινὰ ἑαυτῆς ὅδιαν· διὸ πολλὰ τέχναι τ' εἰσι ² λεγόμεναι καὶ ἐπιστήμαι.

Ἀ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ἐγ. Οὐκοδοὺ καὶ τὰ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως μόρια μίας οὐσίας ταυτὸν πέπονθε τοῦτο.

Ἀ. Τάχθ' ἀν· ἀλλ' ὅπη δὴ ³ λέγωμεν.

ἐγ. Ἐστὶ τῷ καλῷ τι θατέρου μόριον ἀντιτιθήμενον;

Ἀ. Ἐστών.

ἐγ. Τοῦτ' οὖν ἀνώνυμον ἔροῦμεν ἢ τιν' ἔχον ἐπωνυμίαν;

¹ ἐκεῖνη W; ἐκεῖνη BT. ² τέ εἰσι W; τείσι T; τίσιν B. ³ ἀλλ' ὅπη δὴ W; ἀλλὸ πη T; ἀλλο πη B.
THE SOPHIST

str. For instance, when we speak of a thing as not great, do we seem to you to mean by the expression what is small any more than what is of middle size?

THEAET. No, of course not.

str. Then when we are told that the negative signifies the opposite, we shall not admit it; we shall admit only that the particle "not"^1 indicates something different from the words to which it is prefixed, or rather from the things denoted by the words that follow the negative.

THEAET. Certainly.

str. Let us consider another point and see if you agree with me.

THEAET. What is it?

str. It seems to me that the nature of the other is all cut up into little bits, like knowledge.

THEAET. What do you mean?

str. Knowledge, like other, is one, but each separate part of it which applies to some particular subject has a name of its own; hence there are many arts, as they are called, and kinds of knowledge, or sciences.

THEAET. Yes, certainly.

str. And the same is true, by their nature, of the parts of the other, though it also is one concept.

THEAET. Perhaps; but let us discuss the matter and see how it comes about.

str. Is there a part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful?

THEAET. There is.

str. Shall we say that this is nameless or that it has a name?

^1 The two particles οὐ and μὴ in Greek.
PLATO

οἶοι. Ἐξον: ὁ γὰρ μὴ καλὸν ἐκάστοτε φθεγ-γόμεθα, τοῦτο οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἔτερον ἐστιν ἡ τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ φύσεως.

ἐς. Ἡθι νυν τόδε μοι λέγε.

Ε οἶοι. Τὸ ποίον;

ἐς. Ἀλλο τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐνὸς γένους ἀφορισθὲν καὶ πρὸς τὶ τῶν ὄντων αὕτη πάλιν ἀντίτεθὲν οὗτω ἐμβεβηκεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ καλὸν;

οἶοι. Ὀυτὸς.

ἐς. "Οντὸς δὴ πρὸς ὃν ἀντίθεσις, ὡς ἢσικ', εἶναι τὸς συμβαίνει τὸ μὴ καλὸν.

οἶοι. Ὄρθοτάτα.

ἐς. Τῷ οὖν; κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἄρα μᾶλλον μὲν τὸ καλὸν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων, ἠττον δὲ τὸ μὴ καλὸν;

οἶοι. Οὐδέν.

258 ἐς. Ὁμοίως ἀρα τὸ μὴ μέγα καὶ τὸ μέγα αὐτὸ εἶναι λεκτέον;

οἶοι. Ὁμοίως.

ἐς. Ὁυκοῦν καὶ τὸ μὴ δίκαιον τῷ δικαίῳ κατὰ ταυτὰ θετέον πρὸς τὸ μηδέν τι μᾶλλον εἶναι θάτερον θατέρου;

οἶοι. Τῷ μὴν;

ἐς. Καὶ τάλλα δὴ ταύτην λέξομεν, ἐπείπερ ἡ θατέρου φύσις ἐφάνη τῶν ὄντων οὐσα, ἐκείνης δὲ οὐσῆς ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς μηδενὸς ἦττον ὄντα τιθέναι.

οἶοι. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

Β ἐς. Ὁυκοῦν, ὡς ἢσικεν, ἡ τῆς θατέρου μορίου φύσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντι-

1 ἐνὸς γένους Τ; γένους Β.

2 ξυμβεβηκεν εἶναι Stephanus; ξυμβεβηκέναι VT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. That it has one; for that which in each case we call not-beautiful is surely the other of the nature of the beautiful and of nothing else.

STR. Now, then, tell me something more.

THEAET. What?

STR. Does it not result from this that the not-beautiful is a distinct part of some one class of being and also, again, opposed to some class of being?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Then, apparently, it follows that the not-beautiful is a contrast of being with being.

THEAET. Quite right.

STR. Can we, then, in that case, say that the beautiful is more and the not-beautiful less a part of being?

THEAET. Not at all.

STR. Hence the not-great must be said to be no less truly than the great?

THEAET. No less truly.

STR. And so we must recognize the same relation between the just and the not-just, in so far as neither has any more being than the other?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And we shall, then, say the same of other things, since the nature of the other is proved to possess real being; and if it has being, we must necessarily ascribe being in no less degree to its parts also.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Then, as it seems, the opposition of the nature of a part of the other, and of the nature of being, when they are opposed to one another, is no

\[^3\] δν D; δν BT. \[^4\] τις Apelt; τι BT.

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κειμένων ἀντίθεσις οὐδέν ἦττον, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος οὐσία ἐστίν, οὐκ ἐναντίον ἑκείνῳ σημαίνουσα, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ἔτερον ἑκείνου.

ὁε. Σαφέστατά γε.

ἐ. Τίν' οὖν αὐτὴν προσείπωμεν;

ὁε. Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μή ὃν, δ' διὰ τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐξητούμεν, αὐτὸ ἐστὶν τοῦτο.

ἐ. Πότερον οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴπεσ, ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς τῶν ἀλλών οὐσίας ἐλλειπόμενον, καὶ δεὶ θαρροῦντα ήδη λέγειν ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὃν βεβαιώς ἐστὶν τὴν αὐτοῦ

C θύσων ἔχον, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα ἣν μέγα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἢν καλὸν καὶ τὸ μή μέγα μη μέγα καὶ τὸ μή καλὸν μή καλὸν, ὥστω δὲ καὶ τὸ μη ὃν κατὰ ταύτων ἢν τε καὶ ἐστὶν μὴ ὃν, ἐνάριθμον τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων εἰδος ἐν; ή τινα ἐτὶ πρὸς αὐτό, ὃ Θεαίτητε, ἀπιστῶν ἔχομεν;

ὁε. Οὐδεμίαν.

43. ἐ. Οἴσθ' οὖν ὅτι Παρμενίδη μακροτέρως τῆς ἀπορρήσεως ἡπιστήκαμεν;

ὁε. Τι δή;

ἐ. Πλείων ἡ 'κείνος ἀπείπε σκοπεῖν, ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἐτὶ ζητήσαντες ἀπεδείξαμεν αὐτῷ.

ὁε. Πῶς;

D ἐ. Ὄτι δ' μὲν ποὺ φησιν,

οὐ γὰρ μή ποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ, εἰναι μή ἔσται,

ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆς ἀφ' ὅδου διζήσιος ἐβγγε νόμμα.

ὁε. Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.

1 μη μέγα add. Boeckh.
2 μή καλὸν add. Boeckh.
3 τοῦτο δαμῇ Simplicius; τοῦτ' οὐδαμῇ BT.
4 ἔσται Aristot.; ἔσται BT.
5 διζήσιος BT (cf. 237 A).
THE SOPHIST

less truly existence than is being itself, if it is not wrong for me to say so, for it signifies not the opposite of being, but only the other of being, and nothing more.

THEAET. That is perfectly clear.

STR. Then what shall we call this?

THEAET. Evidently this is precisely not-being, which we were looking for because of the sophist.

STR. And is this, as you were saying, as fully endowed with being as anything else, and shall we henceforth say with confidence that not-being has an assured existence and a nature of its own? Just as we found that the great was great and the beautiful was beautiful, the not-great was not-great and the not-beautiful was not-beautiful, shall we in the same way say that not-being was and is not-being, to be counted as one class among the many classes of being? Or have we, Theaetetus, any remaining distrust about the matter?

THEAET. None whatever.

STR. Do you observe, then, that we have gone farther in our distrust of Parmenides than the limit set by his prohibition?

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. We have proceeded farther in our investigation and have shown him more than that which he forbade us to examine.

THEAET. How so?

STR. Because he says somewhere¹:

Never shall this thought prevail, that not-being is; Nay, keep your mind from this path of investigation.

THEAET. Yes, that is what he says.

¹ Parmenides, 52 f., ed. Mullach.
ἘΕ. Ἡμεῖς δὲ γε οὐ μόνον ὡς ἐστὶ τὰ μὴ ὅντα ἀπεδείξησαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἴδος ὁ τυγχάνει ὅν τοῦ μὴ ὅντος ἀπεφηνώμεθα· τὴν γὰρ θατέρου φύσιν ἀποδείξαντες οὐκάν τε καὶ κατακεκερματισμένην Ἐ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ὅντα πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὸ πρὸς τὸ ὅν ἕκαστον 1 μόριον αὐτής ἀντιτιθέμενον ἐτολμήσαμεν εἰπεῖν ὡς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐστὶν ὅντως τὸ μὴ ὅν.

oriously. Καὶ παντάπασι γε, ὃ ἐξεν, ἀληθεστάτα μοι δοκοῦμεν εἰρηκέναι.

ἙΕ. Ἔτι τοῖνυν ἡμᾶς εἴπη τις ὅτι τοῦναντίον τοῦ ὅντος τὸ μὴ ὅν ἀποφαινόμενοι τολμώμεν λέγειν ὡς ἐστὶν. Ἡμεῖς γὰρ περὶ μὲν ἐναντίον τινὸς αὐτῷ χαίρειν πάλαι λέγομεν, εἴτ' ἐστὶν εἴτε μὴ, λόγον 259 ἔχον ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν ἄλογον. ὁ δὲ νῦν εἰρήκαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὅν, ἡ πεισάτω τις ὡς οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν ἐλέγξας, η μέχριτε ἂν ἄδυνατή, λεκτέον καὶ ἐκεῖνω καθόπερ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, ὅτι συμμίγνυται τε ἄλλη- λοις τὰ γένη καὶ τὸ τε ὅν καὶ θατέρου διὰ πάντων καὶ δι' ἄλληλων διεληλυθότα τὸ μὲν ἐτερον μετασχον τοῦ ὅντος ἐστὶ μὲν διὸ ταύτην τὴν μέθεξιν, οὐ μὴν ἐκείνῳ γε οὐ μετέσχεν ἄλλ' ἐτερον, ἐτερον δὲ τοῦ ὅντος ὅν ἐστὶ σαφέστατα εξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι μὴ ὅν.

Β τὸ δὲ ὁν αὐθατέρου μετειληφὸς ἐτερον τῶν ἄλλων ἀν εἴη γενῶν, ἐτερον δ' ἐκείνων ἀπάντων ὅν οὐκ ἐστίν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ξύμπαντα τὰ ἄλλα πλὴν αὐτό, ὥστε τὸ ὅν ἀναμφισβητήτως αὐθαμερὶ ἐπὶ μυρίοις οὐκ ἐστὶ, καὶ τὰλλα δὴ καθ' ἕκαστον οὐτω και ξύμπαντα πολλαχῇ μὲν ἐστὶ, πολλαχῇ δ' οὐκ ἐστίν.

oriously. Ἀληθῆ.

1 ἕκαστον Simplicius; ἕκαστον BT.
THE SOPHIST

str. But we have not only pointed out that things which are not exist, but we have even shown what the form or class of not-being is; for we have pointed out that the nature of the other exists and is distributed in small bits throughout all existing things in their relations to one another, and we have ventured to say that each part of the other which is contrasted with being, really is exactly not-being.

theaet. And certainly, Stranger, I think that what we have said is perfectly true.

str. Then let not anyone assert that we declare that not-being is the opposite of being, and hence are so rash as to say that not-being exists. For we long ago gave up speaking of any opposite of being, whether it exists or not and is capable or totally incapable of definition. But as for our present definition of not-being, a man must either refute us and show that we are wrong, or, so long as he cannot do that, he too must say, as we do, that the classes mingle with one another, and being and the other permeate all things, including each other, and the other, since it participates in being, is, by reason of this participation, yet is not that in which it participates, but other, and since it is other than being, must inevitably be not-being. But being, in turn, participates in the other and is therefore other than the rest of the classes, and since it is other than all of them, it is not each one of them or all the rest, but only itself; there is therefore no doubt that there are thousands and thousands of things which being is not, and just so all other things, both individually and collectively, in many relations are, and in many are not.

theaet. True.

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Καὶ ταῦτας δὴ ταῖς ἐναντιώσεσιν εἶτε ἀπιστεῖ τίς, οὐκεπτέον αὐτῷ καὶ λεκτέον βέλτιον τι τῶν. 

Οὐν εἰρημένων· εἶτε ὡς τὸ χαλεπὸν κατανενοηκὼς χαίρει τοτε μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τοτε δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς λόγους ἐλκων, οὐκ ἄξια πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἐσπούδακεν, ὡς οἱ νῦν λόγοι φασί. τούτῳ μὲν γὰρ οὔτε τι κομψὸν οὔτε χαλεπὸν εὔρειν, ἐκείνῳ δ' ἡδή καὶ χαλεπὸν ἅμα καὶ καλὸν.

Τὸ ποῖον; 

"Ο καὶ πρόσθεν εἰρηται, τὸ ταῦτα ἐάσαντα ὡς δυνατὰ 1 τοῖς λεγομένοις οἴον τ' εἶναι καθ' έκαστον ἐλέγχοντα ἐπακολουθεῖν, ὅταν τε τίς ἐτερον ὅν πη ταυτὸν εἶναι φη καὶ ὅταν ταυτὸν ὄν

D ἐτερον, ἐκείνῃ καὶ κατ' ἐκείνῳ ὁ φησι τοὐτῶν πεπονθέναι πότερον. τὸ δὲ ταυτὸν ἑτερον ἀποφαίνειν ἀμὴ γε πη καὶ τὸ θάτερον ταυτὸν καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρὸν καὶ τὸ ὄμοιον ἀνόμοιον, καὶ χαίρειν. οὕτω τάναντα ἀεὶ προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὔτε τίς ἐλέγχος οὕτος ἀληθίνος ἀρτι τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δῆλος νεογενῆς ὁν.

Κομμῆ μὲν οὖν.

44. Τὸ γὰρ, ὡγαθέ, τὸ γε πᾶν ἀπὸ πάντος ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποχωρίζειν ἄλλως τε οὐκ ἐμμελές. Ε καὶ δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀμούσου τινὸς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφου.

Τὸ δή;

Τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστὶν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλύειν ἐκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων. διὰ γὰρ τὴν

1 δυνατὰ BW; δυνατώτατα Schanz; ἀνήρντα Badham; δυνατὸν μᾶλιστα Campbell; δέν οὐτὰ? Apelt; δυνατὰ is certainly wrong. Possibly οὐκ ὄντα or οὐκ ἄξια (the interpretation adopted in the translation).

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THE SOPHIST

str. And if any man has doubts about these oppositions, he must make investigations and advance better doctrines than these of ours; or if he finds pleasure in dragging words about and applying them to different things at different times, with the notion that he has invented something difficult to explain, our present argument asserts that he has taken up seriously matters which are not worth serious attention; for this process is neither clever nor difficult, whereas here now is something both difficult and beautiful.

THEAET. What is it?

str. What I have spoken of before—the ability to let those quibbles go as of no account and to follow and refute in detail the arguments of a man who says that other is in a sense the same, or that the same is other, and to do this from that point of view and with regard for those relations which he presupposes for either of these conditions. But to show that in some sort of fashion the same is the other, and the other the same, and the great small, and the like unlike, and to take pleasure in thus always bringing forward opposites in the argument,—all that is no true refutation, but is plainly the newborn offspring of some brain that has just begun to lay hold upon the problem of realities.

THEAET. Exactly so.

str. For certainly, my friend, the attempt to separate everything from everything else is not only not in good taste but also shows that a man is utterly uncultivated and unphilosophical.

THEAET. Why so?

str. The complete separation of each thing from all is the utterly final obliteration of all discourse.
αλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἦμιν.

ὁεαί. Ὅληθή.

260 ἔε. Σκόπει τοίον ώς ἐν καίρῳ νῦν δὴ τοῖς τουλίτους διεμαχόμεθα καὶ προσηναγκάζομεν ἕαν ἑτερον ἑτέρῳ μέγυνθαί.

ὁεαί. Πρὸς δὴ τί;

ἔε. Πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἰμιν τῶν ὀντῶν ἐν τί γενῶν εἶναι. τουτοῦ γὰρ στερηθέντες, τὸ μὲν μέγιστον, φιλοσοφίας ἂν στερηθεῖμεν, ἔτι δ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεὶ λόγον ἠμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι τί ποτ' ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ ἀφηρέθημεν αὐτὸ μηδ' εἶναι τὸ παράπαν, οὐδὲν ἄν ἐτι ποιούσιν οἴοι τῷ ἦμεν· ἀφηρέθημεν Βδ' ἄν, εἰ συνεξωρίσαμεν μηδεμίαν εἶναι μίξιν μηδεις πρὸς μηδέν.

ὁεαί. Ὅρθῶς τοῦτο γε· λόγον δὲ δι' ὑ τι νῦν διομολογητέον οὐκ ἐμαθοῦν.

ἔε. Ἀλλ' ἵσως τῇδ' ἐπόμενος ῥαστ' ἀν μάθοισ.

ὁεαί. Πῇ;

ἔε. Τὸ μὲν δὴ μη ὤν ἦμιν ἐν τί τῶν ἄλλων γένος ὃν ἀνεφάνη, κατὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα διεσπαρμένον.

ὁεαί. Οὔτως.

ἔε. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἰ δόξητε καὶ λόγῳ μέγυνται.

ὁεαί. Τί δὴ;

1 τῶν W; om. BT.

1 The denial, that is to say, of all interrelations of ideas leads to purely negative results. Examples of this are the exclusive antithesis of being and not-being and the mutual exclusion of rest and motion. The difficulty is solved at 426
For our power of discourse is derived from the interweaving of the classes or ideas with one another.¹

**Theaet.** True.

**Str.** Observe, then, that we have now been just in time in carrying our point against the supporters of such doctrine, and in forcing them to admit that one thing mingles with another.

**Theaet.** What was our object?

**Str.** Our object was to establish discourse as one of our classes of being. For if we were deprived of this, we should be deprived of philosophy, which would be the greatest calamity; moreover, we must at the present moment come to an agreement about the nature of discourse, and if we were robbed of it by its absolute non-existence, we could no longer discourse; and we should be robbed of it if we agreed that there is no mixture of anything with anything.

**Theaet.** That is true enough; but I do not understand why we must come to an agreement about discourse just now.

**Str.** Perhaps the easiest way for you to understand is by following this line of argument.

**Theaet.** What line?

**Str.** We found that not-being was one of the classes of being, permeating all being.

**Theaet.** Yes.

**Str.** So the next thing is to inquire whether it mingles with opinion and speech.

**Theaet.** Why?

once when we recognize that positive and negative are necessarily interwoven in the nature of things, that the negative has only a relative existence and is not the opposite of the positive, but only different from it.


**PLATO**

ΕΕ. Μή μιγνυμένου μεν αυτοῦ τούτους ἀναγ-καίον ἀλήθη πάντ' εἶναι, μιγνυμένου δὲ δόξα τε ἰευνῆς γίγνεται καὶ λόγος: τὸ γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἢ λέγειν, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ ποῦ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν διανοιᾷ τε καὶ λόγοις γιγνόμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔτως.

ΕΕ. "Οντος δὲ γε ψεῦδος ἐστὶν ἀπάτη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΕΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἀπάτης ὀσοὶς εἰδώλων τε καὶ εἰκόνων ἡδή καὶ φαντασίας πάντα ἀνάγκη μεστά εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΕΕ. Τὸν δὲ γε 1 σοφιστὴν ἐφαμεν ἐν τούτῳ ποι 

scratch

D τῶ τόπῳ καταπεφυγέναι μὲν, ἐξαρνον ὁ γεγονέ-

scratch

ναι τὸ παράπαν μηδ' εἶναι ψεῦδος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὁν ὀὔτε διανοείσθαι τινα ὀὔτε λέγειν· ὀσοὶς γὰρ ὀὐδὲν οὐδαμῆ τὸ μὴ ὁν μετέχειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡν ταῦτα.

ΕΕ. Νῦν δὲ γε τούτῳ μὲν ἐφάνη μετέχον τοῦ ὀντος, ὥστε ταῦτη μὲν ἵσως οὐκ ἂν μάχοιτο ἐτι- 

táχα δ' ἂν φαίη τῶν εἰδών τα μὲν μετέχειν τοῦ μη ὀντος, τὰ δ' οὐ, καὶ λόγον δὴ καὶ δόξαν εἶναι τῶν οὐ μετεχόντων, ὥστε τὴν εἰδωλοποικήν καὶ φαν-

scratch

Εταστικῆν, ἐν ἣ φαμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, διαμάχοιτ' ἂν πάλιν ὡς παντάπασιν οὐκ ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ δόξα καὶ λόγος οὐ κοινωνεῖ τοῦ μη ὀντος· ψεῦδος γὰρ τὸ 

scratch

παράπαν οὐκ εἶναι ταύτης μη συνισταμένης τῆς 

scratch

κοινωνίας. διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν λόγον πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν 

scratch

καὶ φαντασίαν διερευνητέον ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστιν, ὡς 

1 δὲ γε W; δὲ ΒΤ.

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1 The English word "fancy," though etymologically identical with the Greek φαντασία, has lost the close con-
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str. If it does not mingle with them, the necessary result is that all things are true, but if it does, then false opinion and false discourse come into being; for to think or say what is not—that is, I suppose, falsehood arising in mind or in words.

theaet. So it is.

str. But if falsehood exists, deceit exists.

theaet. Yes.

str. And if deceit exists, all things must be henceforth full of images and likenesses and fancies.

theaet. Of course.

str. But we said that the sophist had taken refuge in this region and had absolutely denied the existence of falsehood: for he said that not-being could be neither conceived nor uttered, since not-being did not in any way participate in being.

theaet. Yes, so it was.

str. But now not-being has been found to partake of being, and so, perhaps, he would no longer keep up the fight in this direction; but he might say that some ideas partake of not-being and some do not, and that speech and opinion are among those which do not; and he would therefore again contend that the image-making and fantastic art, in which we placed him, has absolutely no existence, since opinion and speech have no participation in not-being; for falsehood cannot possibly exist unless such participation takes place. For this reason we must first inquire into the nature of speech and opinion and fancy, in order that when they are made clear we may perceive nexion with "seeming" (ἁπειροθαλ) which the Greek retains. The Greek word is therefore more comprehensive than the English, denoting that which appears to be, whether as the result of imagination or of sensation. Cf. 235 d ff.

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PLATO

φανέρωσαν καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὐτῶν τῷ μὴ ὄντι
261 κατίδωμεν, κατιδόντες δὲ τὸ ψεῦδος ὃν ἀποδεί-
ξώμεν, ἀποδείξαντες δὲ τὸν σοφιστήν εἰς αὐτὸν ἕνδήσωμεν, εἴπερ ἐνοχὸς ἐστιν, ἥ καὶ ἀπολύσαντες
ἐν ἀλλῷ γένει ξητῶμεν.

Θεαί. Κομιδὴ γε, ὃ ἔξε, ἔοικεν ἄληθες εἶναι
τὸ περὶ τὸν σοφιστήν κατ᾿ ἀρχὰς λεγθέν, ὅτι δυσθή-
ρευτον εἴη τὸ γένος. φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν προβλημάτων
γέμειν, ὃν ἐπειδὰν τι προβάλη, τοῦτο πρότερον
ἀναγκαῖον διαμάχεσθαι πρὶν ἔτ' αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον
ἀφικέσθαι. νῦν γὰρ μόνιμοι μὲν τὸ μὴ ὃν ὡς οὐκ
Β ἔστι προβληθὲν διεπεράσαμεν, ἔτερον δὲ προβέ-
βληταί, καὶ δεῖ δὴ ψεῦδος ὃς ἔστι καὶ περὶ λόγον
καὶ περὶ δόξαν ἀποδείξαι, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἰσώς
ἔτερον, καὶ ἐτ' ἀλλο μετ' ἐκεῖνο· καὶ πέρας, ὃς
ἔοικεν, οὖνδὲν φανήσεται ποτε.

ζε. Θαρρεῖν, ὃ Θεαίτητε, χρῆ τὸν καὶ σμικρὸν
τι δυνάμενον εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν αἰεὶ προϊέναι. τὸ γὰρ ὃ
γ' ἀθυμῶν ἐν τούτοις δράσειεν ἂν ἐν ἀλλοῖς, ἥ μηδὲν
ἐν ἐκεῖνοις ἀνύτων ἥ καὶ πάλιν εἰς τούπισθεν ἀπ-
ωσθείς; σχολὴ ποι, τὸ κατὰ τὴν παρομιάν λεγό-
C μενον, ὃ γε τοιοῦτος ἂν ποτε ἐλοι πόλιν. νῦν δὲ
ἐπεί, ὡγαθέ, τοῦτο ὃ λέγεις διαπεπέρανται, τὸ τοῦ
μέγιστον ἡμῖν τείχος ἥρμημένον ἂν εἰ, τὰ δ' ἀλλα
ἡδὴ βάμ καὶ σμικρότερα.

Θεαί. Καλῶς εἶπες.

45. ζε. Λόγον δὴ πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν, καθάπερ
ἐρρήθη νῦν δὴ, λάβωμεν, ὡς ἐναργέστερον ἀπο-
λογισῶμεθα πότερον αὐτῶν ἀπτεται τὸ μὴ ὃν ἡ

1 αὐτὸ W; αὐτὸν BT.
2 γε TW; δε γε B.
3 ἀπολογισῶμεθα Heindorf; ἀπολογισῶμεθα BT.
that they participate in not-being, and when we have perceived that, may prove the existence of falsehood, and after proving that, may imprison the sophist therein, if he can be held on that charge, and if not, may set him free and seek him in another class.

**THEAET.** It certainly seems, Stranger, that what you said at first about the sophist—that he was a hard kind of creature to catch—is true; for he seems to have no end of defences,¹ and when he throws one of them up, his opponent has first to fight through it before he can reach the man himself; for now, you see, we have barely passed through the non-existence of being, which was his first prepared line of defence, when we find another line ready; and so we must prove that falsehood exists in relation to opinion and to speech; and after this, perhaps, there will be another line, and still another after that; and it seems no end will ever appear.

**STR.** No one should be discouraged, Theaetetus, who can make constant progress, even though it be slow. For if a man is discouraged under these conditions, what would he do under others—if he did not get ahead at all or were even pressed back? It would be a long time, as the saying is, before such a man would ever take a city. But now, my friend, since we have passed the line you speak of, the main defences would surely be in our hands, and the rest will now be smaller and easier to take.

**THEAET.** Good.

**STR.** First, then, let us take up speech and opinion, as I said just now, in order to come to a clearer understanding whether not-being touches

¹ Perhaps a sort of pun is intended, for πρὸβλημα was already beginning to have the meaning of "problem."
παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀμφότερα ταῦτα ζεύγος δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδέτερον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὄρθως.

D ΞΕ. Φέρε δὴ, καθάπερ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν γραμμάτων ἔλεγομεν, περὶ τῶν ὄνομάτων πάλιν ὀφειλόμεθα ἐπισκεψόμεθα. φαίνεται γὰρ τῇ ταύτῃ τῷ νόμῳ ἐξητούμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον οὖν δὴ περὶ τῶν ὄνομάτων ὑποκουστέον;

ΞΕ. Εἶτε πάντα ἀλλήλοις ἔννομόττει 1 εἶτε μηδέν, εἶτε τὰ μὲν ἑθέλει, τὰ δὲ μὴ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δὴλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἑθέλει, τὰ δ' οὖ.

ΞΕ. Τὸ τοῦτο δὲ λέγεις ἵσως, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἑφεξῆς Ἐ λεγόμενα καὶ δηλοῦντά τι ἔννομόττει, τὰ δὲ τῇ συνεχείᾳ μηδέν σημαίνοντα ἀναμοστέοι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες;

ΞΕ. Ὅπερ ὤνθην ὑπολαβόντα σὲ προσομολογεῖν. ἔστι γὰρ ἕμιν ποὺ τῶν τῇ φωνῇ περὶ τὴν ὀυσίαν δηλωμάτων διὰ τοῦ γένους.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

262 ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν ὄνοματα, τὸ δὲ ρῆματα κληθέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἶτε ἐκάτερον.

ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν ἔπι ταῖς πράξεσιν ὁν δήλωμα ρῆμα ποὺ λέγομεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

1 ἔννομόττει W; ἔννομόττειν BT.

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1 The science of language, in all its branches, was young in the time of Plato. Words of general meaning were necessarily used in a technical sense. So here ὄνομα and ρῆμα are used as parts of grammatical terminology in the
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them, or they are both entirely true, and neither is ever false.

THEAET. Very well.

STR. Then let us now investigate names, just as we spoke a while ago about ideas and letters; for in that direction the object of our present search is coming in sight.

THEAET. What do we need to understand about names?

STR. Whether they all unite with one another, or none of them, or some will and some will not.

THEAET. Evidently the last; some will and some will not.

STR. This, perhaps, is what you mean, that those which are spoken in order and mean something do unite, but those that mean nothing in their sequence do not unite.

THEAET. How so, and what do you mean by that?

STR. What I supposed you had in mind when you assented; for we have two kinds of vocal indications of being.

THEAET. How so?

STR. One called nouns, the other verbs.¹

THEAET. Define each of them.

STR. The indication which relates to action we may call a verb.

THEAET. Yes.

sense of "verb" and "noun," though Plato elsewhere employs them with their ordinary meanings. Similarly the distinction between vowels and consonants (Theaetetus, 203; cf. The Sophist, 233) was at least relatively new, as was that between the active and the passive voice. How important Plato's part was in the development of linguistic study can no longer be accurately determined.
PLATO

ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ γ’ ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἕκαστα διά της φωνῆς ἐπιτεθὲν ὄνομα.
ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν εξ ὁνόματων μὲν μόνων συνεχῶς λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστι ποτὲ λόγος, οὐδ’ αὖ ῥημάτων χωρίς ὁνόματων λεχθέντων.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ταῦτ’ οὖν ἐμαθοῦ.

Β ΞΕ. Δῆλον γὰρ ὡς πρὸς ἔτερον τι βλέπων ἀρτι ξυνωμολόγεις· ἐπει τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ἐβουλόμην εἰπεῖν, ὅτι συνεχῶς ὑδε λεγόμενα ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι λόγος.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;
ΞΕ. Οἶνον “βαδίζει,” “τρέχει,” “καθεύδει,” καὶ τάλλα ὁσα πράζεις σημαίνει ρήματα, καὶ πάντα τις ἐφεξῆς αὐτ’ εἴπῃ, λόγον οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀπεργάζεται.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ;
ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πάλιν ὅταν λέγηται “λέων,” “ἔλαφος,” “ἱππος,” ὁσα τε ὁνόματα τῶν ταῖς πράζεις αὖ πραττόντων ἁνομάζῃ, καὶ κατά ταῦταν δὴ τὴν συνεχειαν ὀυδεῖς πω ἐνεύστη λόγος· οὐδεμίαν γὰρ οὕτε οὕτως οὗτ’ ἐκεῖνως πράζων οὐδ’ ἀπραζίαν οὐδὲ οὐσίαν ὁντος οὐδ’ ὁντος δῆλοι τὰ φωνηθέντα, πρὶν ἄν τις τοῖς ὁνόμαι τὰ ρήματα κεράσῃ. τότε δ’ ἦρμοσέν τε καὶ λόγος ἑγένετο εὐθὺς ἥ πρώτη συμπλοκή, σχεδὸν τῶν λόγων ὁ πρῶτος τε καὶ 2 σμικρότατος.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς ἂρ’ ὡδε λέγεις;
ΞΕ. “Ὅταν εἴπῃ τις· “ἄνθρωπος μανθάνει,” λόγον εἶναι φής τούτων ἐλάχιστον τε καὶ πρῶτων; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἕγωγε.

1 αὐτοῖς τοῖς B, Stobaeus; αὐτοῖς T.
2 τε καὶ W, Stobaeus; ei καὶ T; καὶ B.

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str. And the vocal sign applied to those who perform the actions in question we call a noun.

THEAET. Exactly.

str. Hence discourse is never composed of nouns alone spoken in succession, nor of verbs spoken without nouns.

THEAET. I do not understand that.

str. I see; you evidently had something else in mind when you assented just now; for what I wished to say was just this, that verbs and nouns do not make discourse if spoken successively in this way.

THEAET. In what way?

str. For instance, "walks," "runs," "sleeps" and the other verbs which denote actions, even if you utter all there are of them in succession, do not make discourse for all that.

THEAET. No, of course not.

str. And again, when "lion," "stag," "horse," and all other names of those who perform these actions are uttered, such a succession of words does not yet make discourse; for in neither case do the words uttered indicate action or inaction or existence of anything that exists or does not exist, until the verbs are mingled with the nouns; then the words fit, and their first combination is a sentence, about the first and shortest form of discourse.

THEAET. What do you mean by that?

str. When one says "a man learns," you agree that this is the least and first of sentences, do you not?

THEAET. Yes.
Ε. Δηλοί γὰρ ἡδη ποι τότε περὶ τῶν οὖν ἡ ἑγνωμένων ἡ γεγονότων ἡ μελλόντων, καὶ οὐκ ὁνομάζει μόνον, ἀλλὰ τι περαίνει, συμπλέκων τὰ ῥήματα τοῖς ὁνομασί. διὸ λέγειν τε αὐτὸν ἅλλα οὗ μόνον ὁνομάζειν εἰπομεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῷ πλέγματι τούτῳ τὸ ὁνομα ἐφθεγξάμεθα λόγον.

ΟΕΑΙ. Ἀρθώς.

46. Ε. Οὔτω δὴ καθὰ περὶ τὰ πράγματα τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλοις ἵμοττε, τὰ δὲ οὗ, καὶ περὶ τὰ τῆς φωνῆς αὐθ σημεῖα τὰ μὲν οὕχ ἁρμόττει, τὰ δὲ ἐ ἁρμόττοντα αὐτῶν λόγον ἀπεργάσατο.

ΟΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Ε. 'Ετι δὴ σμικρὸν τόδε.

ΟΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

Ε. Λόγον ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως οἷον, τινὸς εἰναι λόγον, μὴ δὲ τινος ἀδύνατον.

ΟΕΑΙ. Οὔτως.

Ε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ποιόν τινα αὐτὸν εἰναι δεῖ;

ΟΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὲ οὗ;

Ε. Προσέχωμεν δὴ τὸν νοῦν ἥμιν αὐτῶς.

ΟΕΑΙ. Δεῖ γοῦν.

Ε. Λέξω τοίονσοι λόγον συνθεὶς πράγμα πράξει δι' ὁνόματος καὶ ῥήματος· ὅτου δὲ ἃν ὁ λόγος ἡ, σὺ μοι φράζειν.

263 ΟΕΑΙ. Ταὐτ' ἔσται κατὰ δύναμιν.

Ε. Θεαῖττος κάθηται. μῶν μὴ μακρὸς ὁ λόγος;

ΟΕΑΙ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ μέτριος.

Ε. Σων ἔργον δὴ φράζειν περὶ οὗ τ' ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτου.

ΟΕΑΙ. Δῆλον ότι περὶ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ ἐμὸς. 1 εἰπομεν Stobaeus; εἰπομεν ΒΤ.

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str. For when he says that, he makes a statement about that which is or is becoming or has become or is to be; he does not merely give names, but he reaches a conclusion by combining verbs with nouns. That is why we said that he discourses and does not merely give names, and therefore we gave to this combination the name of discourse.

THEAET. That was right.

str. So, then, just as of things some fit each other and some do not, so too some vocal signs do not fit, but some of them do fit and form discourse.

THEAET. Certainly.

str. Now there is another little point.

THEAET. What is it?

str. A sentence, if it is to be a sentence, must have a subject; without a subject it is impossible.

THEAET. True.

str. And it must also be of some quality, must it not?

THEAET. Of course.

str. Now let us pay attention to each other.

THEAET. Yes, at any rate we ought to do so.

str. Now, then, I will speak a sentence to you in which an action and the result of action are combined by means of a noun and a verb, and whatever the subject of the sentence is do you tell me.

THEAET. I will, to the best of my ability.

str. "Theaetetus sits." It isn't a long sentence, is it?

THEAET. No, it is fairly short.

str. Now it is for you to say what it is about and what its subject is.

THEAET. Clearly it is about me, and I am its subject.

2 πράγματα BTW; γράμματα, letters, Bury (cf. 253).
PLATO

ΞΕ. Τί δέ ὃδ' αὖ;
ΟΕΑΙ. Ποῖος;
ΞΕ. Θεαίτητος, ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι, πέτεται. ΟΕΑΙ. Καὶ τούτων οὖδ' ἄν εἰς ἀλλὰς εἶποι πλὴν ἐμὸν τε καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ.
ΞΕ. Ποιὸν δὲ γέ τινα φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον ἐκαστὸν εἶναι τῶν λόγων.

Β ΟΕΑΙ. Ναί.
ΞΕ. Τούτων δὴ ποῖον τινα ἐκάτερον φατέον εἶναι;
ΟΕΑΙ. Τὸν μὲν ψευδὴ ποὺ, τὸν δὲ ἀληθῆ.
ΞΕ. Λέγει δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ μὲν ἀληθῆς τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστι περὶ σοῦ.
ΟΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;
ΞΕ. 'Ο δὲ δὴ ψευδῆς ἔτερα τῶν ὄντων.
ΟΕΑΙ. Ναί.
ΞΕ. Τὰ μὴ ὄντ' ἄρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει.
ΟΕΑΙ. Σχεδὸν.
ΞΕ. Ὕντων ¹ δὲ γε ὄντα ἔτερα περὶ σοῦ. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐφαμεν ὄντα περὶ ἐκαστὸν εἶναι ποὺ, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα.
ΟΕΑΙ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.

C ΞΕ. 'Ον ύστερον δὴ λόγον εἴρηκα περὶ σοῦ, πρῶτον μὲν, ἔξ ὃν ὑρισάμεθα τί ποτ' ἕστι λόγος, ἀναγκαιότατον αὐτὸν ἐνα τῶν βραχυτάτων εἶναι.
ΟΕΑΙ. Νῦν δὴ γοῦν ταύτην ἐξωμολογήσαμεν.
ΞΕ. Ἐπειτὰ δὲ γε τινὸς.
ΟΕΑΙ. Οὔτως.
ΞΕ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἕστι σῶς, οὐκ ἄλλου γε οὐδενὸς.

¹ Ὕντων Cornarius; Ὕντως BT.
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str. And how about this sentence?
theaet. What one?
str. "Theaetetus, with whom I am now talking, flies."
theaet. Every one would agree that this also is about me and I am its subject.
str. But we agree that every sentence must have some quality.
theaet. Yes.
str. Now what quality shall be ascribed to each of these sentences?
theaet. One is false, I suppose, the other true.
str. The true one states facts as they are about you.
theaet. Certainly.
str. And the false one states things that are other than the facts.
theaet. Yes.
str. In other words, it speaks of things that are not as if they were.
theaet. Yes, that is pretty much what it does.
str. And states with reference to you that things are which are other than things which actually are; for we said, you know, that in respect to everything there are many things that are and many that are not.
theaet. To be sure.
str. Now the second of my sentences about you is in the first place by sheer necessity one of the shortest which conform to our definition of sentence.
theaet. At any rate we just now agreed on that point.
str. And secondly it has a subject.
theaet. Yes.
str. And if you are not the subject, there is none.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γάρ;

ΞΕ. Μηδενός δὲ ὁ νῦν οὐδ’ ἂν λόγος εἶη τὸ παρά-

παν. ἀπεφήναμεν γάρ ὅτι τῶν ἀδύνατων ἢν λόγον

ἀντα μηδενός εἶηαι λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρθότατα.

Δ ΞΕ. Περὶ δὴ σοῦ λεγόμενα, λεγόμενα 2 μέντοι

θάτερα ὡς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα, παντά-

πασὶν ἐοικεν 3 ἡ τοιούτη σύνθεσις ἐκ τε βημάτων

γιγνομένη καὶ ὄνοματων ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθώς

γίγνεσθαι λόγος ψευδῆς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.

47. ΞΕ. Τί δὲ δὴ; διάνοια τε καὶ δόξα καὶ

φαντασία, μῶν οὐκ ἢδη δῆλον ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ γένη

ψευδῆ τε καὶ ἀληθῆ πάνθ’ ἡμῶν εν ταῖς ψυχαῖς

εγγίγνεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Ἡδ’ εἴσει βάον, ἢν πρῶτον λάβῃς αὐτά, 4 τί

Ε ποτ’ ἔστι καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν ἕκαστα ἄλληλων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δίδου μόνον.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταύτων. πλὴν

ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἀνευ

φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη, διά

νοία;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ γ’ ἀπ’ ἐκείνης ῥεῦμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος

ιὸν μετὰ φθόγγον κέκληται λόγος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἐν λόγοις αὐτὸ ἵσμεν ὃν—

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΞΕ. Φάσαι τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν.

1 δὲ emend. apogr. Parisinum 1811; γὲ BT; ὑ δὲ or δὲ γὲ

Heindorf.

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THEAET. Certainly not.

STR. And if there is no subject, it would not be a sentence at all; for we showed that a sentence without a subject is impossible.

THEAET. Quite right.

STR. Now when things are said about you, but things other are said as the same and things that are not as things that are, it appears that when such a combination is formed of verbs and nouns we have really and truly false discourse.

THEAET. Yes, very truly.

STR. Is it, then, not already plain that the three classes, thought, opinion, and fancy, all arise in our minds as both false and true?

THEAET. How is it plain?

STR. You will understand more easily if you first grasp their natures and the several differences between them.

THEAET. Give me an opportunity.

STR. Well, then, thought and speech are the same; only the former, which is a silent inner conversation of the soul with itself, has been given the special name of thought. Is not that true?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. But the stream that flows from the soul in vocal utterance through the mouth has the name of speech?

THEAET. True.

STR. And in speech we know there is just—

THEAET. What?

STR. Affirmation and negation.

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2 λεγόμενα add. Badham.
3 ἔοικεν W; ἦς ἔοικεν BT.
4 αὐτά W, Stobaeus; om. BT.
PLATO

ΟΕΑΙ. Ἡσυχία.

264 ΞΕ. "Οταν οὖν τοῦτο ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐγγίγνησει μετὰ σιγῆς, πλῆν δόξης ἔχεις ὁ τι προσεῖπης αὐτῷ;

ΟΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ ὅταν μὴ καθ’ αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ δι’ αἰσθήσεως παρῆ τινὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον αὐ τάθος, ἄρ’ οἶον τε ὄρθως εἰπεῖν ἔτερον τι πλῆν φαντασίαν;

ΟΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΞΕ. Οὐκοὶ εἰς εἰπεῖπερ λόγος ἀληθῆς ἦν καὶ ψευδῆς, τούτων δὲ ἐφάνη διάνοια μὲν αὐτῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ψυχῆς διάλογος, δόξα δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις, Ἐ “φαίνεται” δὲ ὁ λέγομεν σύμμεισις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τούτων τῷ λόγῳ ἔναγγελων ὀντων ψευδῆ τε αὐτῶν ἐνια καὶ ἐνιότε εἶναι.

ΟΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ’ οὖ;

ΞΕ. Κατανοεῖς οὖν ὅτι πρότερον ηὐρέθη ψευδῆς δόξα καὶ λόγος ἦ κατὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν ἦν ἐφοβήθηθημεν ἄρτι, μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνήνυτον ἔργον ἐπιβαλλοίμεθα ἥπτοντες αὐτό;

ΟΕΑΙ. Κατανοῶ.

48. ΞΕ. Μὴ τοῖνοι μηδ’ εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ ἀθυ- Σμοῦμεν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πέφανται ταῦτα, τῶν ἐμπροσθὲν ἀναμνησθῶμεν κατ’ εἶδη διαπρέσεων.

ΟΕΑΙ. Ποίων δὴ;

ΞΕ. Διειλόμεθα τῆς εἰδωλοποιίας εἰδῆ δύο, τὴν μὲν εἰκαστικὴν, τὴν δὲ φανταστικὴν.

ΟΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΞΕ. Καὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἵπομεν ὡς ἀποροῦμεν εἰς ὑποτέραν θήσομεν.

1 αὐτὸ Stobaeus; αὐτὴν BT.
THEAET. Yes, we know that

STR. Now when this arises in the soul silently by way of thought, can you give it any other name than opinion?

THEAET. Certainly not.

STR. And when such a condition is brought about in anyone, not independently, but through sensation, can it properly be called anything but seeming, or fancy?

THEAET. No.

STR. Then since speech, as we found, is true and false, and we saw that thought is conversation of the soul with itself, and opinion is the final result of thought, and what we mean when we say "it seems" is a mixture of sensation and opinion, it is inevitable that, since these are all akin to speech, some of them must sometimes be false.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Do you see, then, that false opinion and false discourse were found sooner than we expected when we feared a few moments ago that in looking for them we were undertaking an endless task?

THEAET. Yes, I see.

STR. Then let us not be discouraged about the rest of our search, either; for now that these points are settled, we have only to revert to our previous divisions into classes.

THEAET. What divisions?

STR. We made two classes of image-making, the likeness-making and the fantastic.¹

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And we said that we did not know to which of the two the sophist should be assigned.

¹ See 235 n ff.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡν ταῦτα.

ΕΕ. Καὶ τοῦθ’ ἡμῶν ἀπορουμένων ἐτὶ μεῖξον κατεχύθη σκοτοδύνια, φανέντος τοῦ λόγου τοῦ πάσιν ἀμφισβητοῦντος, ὡς οὕτε εἰκῶν οὕτε εἴδωλον

D οὕτε φάντασμα εἶν τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲν διὰ τὸ μηδαμὸς μηδέποτε μηδαμοῦ ὤεδος εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεις ἄληθῆ.

ΕΕ. Νῦν δὲ γ’ ἐπειδὴ πέφανται μὲν λόγος, πέφανται δ’ οὕσα δόξα ψευδῆς, ἐγχωρεῖ δὴ μιμήματα τῶν ὄντων εἶναι καὶ τέχνην ἐκ ταύτης γίγνεσθαι τῆς διαθέσεως ἀπατητικήν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγχωρεῖ.

ΕΕ. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γ’ ἦν οἱ σοφιστῆς τούτων πότε- ρον, διωμολογημένοι ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΕΕ. Πάλιν τούναν ἐπιχειρῶμεν, σχίζοντες διχῇ τὸ

Επροτεθὲν γένος, πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τούτι δεξία ἄει μέρος τοῦ τιμηθέντος, ἐχόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σοφιστοῦ κοινωνίας, ἔως ὅν αὐτοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πάντα περιελόντες, τὴν οἰκείαν λυπόντες φύσιν ἐπιδείξωμεν μάλιστα 265 μὲν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς, ἐπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐγγυτάτω γένει τῆς τοιαύτης μεθόδου πεφυκόσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁρθῶς.

ΕΕ. Οὐκοῦν τότε μὲν ἡρχόμεθα ποιητικὴν καὶ

κτητικὴν τέχνην διαιροῦμενοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΕΕ. Καὶ τῆς κτητικῆς ἐν θηρευτικῇ καὶ ἀγωνίᾳ καὶ ἐμπορικῇ καὶ τίσιν ἐν τοιούτοις εἶδεσιν ἐφαντά- ξέθ’ ἡμῖν;

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THEAET. You are right.

STR. And in the midst of our perplexity about that, we were overwhelmed by a still greater dizziness when the doctrine appeared which challenges everybody and asserts that neither likeness nor image nor appearance exists at all, because falsehood never exists anywhere in any way.

THEAET. True.

STR. But now, since the existence of false speech and false opinion has been proved, it is possible for imitations of realities to exist and for an art of deception to arise from this condition of mind.

THEAET. Yes, it is possible.

STR. And we decided some time ago that the sophist was in one of those two divisions of the image-making class.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Then let us try again; let us divide in two the class we have taken up for discussion, and proceed always by way of the right-hand part of the thing divided, clinging close to the company to which the sophist belongs, until, having stripped him of all common properties and left him only his own peculiar nature, we shall show him plainly first to ourselves and secondly to those who are most closely akin to the dialectic method.

THEAET. Right.

STR. We began by making two divisions of art, the productive and the acquisitive, did we not?¹

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And the sophist showed himself to us in the arts of hunting, contests, commerce, and the like, which were subdivisions of acquisitive art?

¹ See 219.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ὁ θεῖος μὲν οὖν.

ζ. Νῦν δὲ γ' ἐπειδὴ μμητικῇ περιείληφεν αὐτὸν τέχνη, δῆλον ὡς αὐτὴν τὴν ποιητικήν δίχα τῇ διαρρετέοι πρώτην. ἦ γάρ ποὺ μίμησις ποιησισ τῖς ἐστιν, εἰδώλων μέντοι, φαμέν, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτῶν ἐκάστων· ἦ γάρ;

ὁ θεῖος μὲν οὖν.

ζ. Ποιητικής δὴ πρῶτον δύο ἐστω μέρη.

ὁ θεῖος οὐσίως μεμάθηκα.

49. ζ. Ποιητικής, εἶτερ μεμνημέθα τὰ κατ' ἀρχὰς λεχθέντα, πάσαν ἔφαμεν εἶναι δύναμιν ἢταν αὐτία γίγνητα τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὑστερον γίγνεσθαι.

ὁ θεῖος ομολογήσαν.

ζ. Ζώα δὴ πάντα θυτὰ καὶ φυτὰ ὅσα π' ἐπὶ γῆς ἐκ σπερμάτων καὶ ρίζῶν φύεται καὶ ὅσα ἄψυχα ἐν γῇ ἐυνύσταται σώματα τηκτὰ καὶ ἀτηκτὰ, μῶν ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φύσομεν ὑστερον γίγνεσθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τῷ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι καὶ ρήματι χρώμενοι—

ὁ θεῖος οἰων.

ζ. Τῷ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ γεννᾶν ἀπὸ τινὸς αὐτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἀνευ διανοίας φυσικῆς, ἢ μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γενομένης;

D ὁ θεῖος. Ἐγὼ μὲν ἵσως διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν πολλάκας ἀμφότερα μεταδοξάζω· νῦν μὴν ἔδεικνυ τοίς σε καὶ ὑπολαμβάνων οἰεσθαι σε κατά γε θεον αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι, ταύτη καὶ αὐτὸς νεώμοικα.

ζ. Καλῶς γε, ὦ θείητηρ· καὶ εἰ μὲν γε σε ἐπὶ μὴν b; μὴ BT.
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THEAET. Certainly.

str. But now, since imitative art has taken him over, it is clear that our first step must be the division of productive art into two parts; for imitative art is a kind of production—of images, however, we say, not of real things in each case. Do you agree?

THEAET. By all means.

str. Then let us first assume two parts of productive art.

THEAET. What are they?

str. The divine and the human.

THEAET. I don’t yet understand.

str. We said, if we remember the beginning of our conversation, that every power is productive which causes things to come into being which did not exist before.

THEAET. Yes, we remember.

str. There are all the animals, and all the plants that grow out of the earth from seeds and roots, and all the lifeless substances, fusible and infusible, that are formed within the earth. Shall we say that they came into being, not having been before, in any other way than through God’s workmanship? Or, accepting the commonly expressed belief—

THEAET. What belief?

str. That nature brings them forth from some self-acting cause, without creative intelligence. Or shall we say that they are created by reason and by divine knowledge that comes from God?

THEAET. I, perhaps because I am young, often change from one opinion to the other; but now, looking at you and considering that you think they are created by God, I also adopt that view.

str. Well said, Theaetetus; and if I thought you
Ηγούμεθα τῶν εἰς τὸν ἐπειτὰ χρόνον ἄλλως πως
dοξαζόντων εἶναι, νῦν ἂν τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθοῦσ
ἀναγκαίας ἐπεχειροῦμεν ποιεῖν ὅμολογεῖν· ἐπειδὴ
dὲ σου καταμανθάνω τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι καὶ ἄνευ τῶν
Επαρ’ ἡμῶν λόγων αὐτὴ 1 πρόσεισιν ἐφ’ ἀπέρ νῦν
ἐλκεσθαί φής, ἐάσω. χρόνος γὰρ ἐκ περιττοῦ
gίγνοιτ’ ἂν· ἀλλὰ θῆσαι τὰ μὲν φύσι πειθοῦσ
ποιεῖσθαι θεία τέχνη, τὰ δ’ ἐκ τούτων ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπων
ξυνιστάμενα ἄνθρωπίνη, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἡ τὸν
λόγον δύο ποιητικῆς γένη, τὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι,
tὸ δὲ θεῖον.

ὁελ. Ὄρθως.

ἐ. Τέμνε δὴ δυοῦν οὐσαίν δίχα ἐκατέραν αὕθις.

ὁελ. Πῶς;

266 ἐ. Οἶον τότε μὲν κατὰ πλάτος τέμνων τὴν
ποιητικῆν πᾶσαν, νῦν δὲ αὐτὰ κατὰ μῆκος.

ὁελ. Τετμησθὼ.

ἐ. Τέτταρα μὴν αὐτῆς οὐτώ τὰ πάντα μέρη
γίγνεται, δύο μὲν τὰ πρὸς ἡμῶν, ἀνθρώπεια, δύο
δ’ αὖ τὰ πρὸς θεῶν, θεία.

ὁελ. Ναὶ.

ἐ. Τὰ δὲ γ’ ὡς ἐτέρωσ αὖ δυρημένα, μέρος μὲν
ἐν ἀφ’ ἐκατέρας τῆς μερίδος αὐτοποιητικῶν, τῷ δ’
ὑπολοίπων σχεδὸν μάλιστ’ ἂν λεγοίςθην εἰδωλο-
ποικῶν καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάλιν ἡ ποιητικὴ
dιχὴ διαιρεῖται.

Β ὍΕΛ. Δέγε ὅπη 2 ἐκατέρα αὕθις.

50. ἐ. ‘Ημεῖς μὲν ποι καὶ τὰλλα ζῶα καὶ ἐξ
ἄν τὰ πεφυκότ’ ἐστὶ, πῦρ καὶ ὑδωρ καὶ τὰ τούτων
ἀδελφά, θεοῦ γεννήματα πάντα ἵσμεν αὐτὰ ἀπειρα-
σμένα ἐκατα’ ἡ πῶς;

1 αὐτή W; αὐτή B; αὐτή T. 2 ὅπη inferior mss.; ὅπη BT.

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were one of those who would think differently by and by, I should try now, by argument and urgent persuasion, to make you agree with my opinion; but since I understand your nature and see that it of itself inclines, without any words of mine, towards that to which you say you are at present attracted, I will let that go; for it would be a waste of time. But I will assume that things which people call natural are made by divine art, and things put together by man out of those as materials are made by human art, and that there are accordingly two kinds of art, the one human and the other divine.

THEAET. Quite right.

STR. Now that there are two, divide each of them again.

THEAET. How?

STR. You divided all productive art widthwise, as it were, before; now divide it lengthwise.

THEAET. Assume that it is done.

STR. In that way we now get four parts in all; two belong to us and are human, and two belong to the gods and are divine.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And again, when the section is made the other way, one part of each half has to do with the making of real things, and the two remaining parts may very well be called image-making; and so productive art is again divided into two parts.

THEAET. Tell me again how each part is distinguished.

STR. We know that we and all the other animals, and fire, water, and their kindred elements, out of which natural objects are formed, are one and all the very offspring and creations of God, do we not?
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔτως.

ΕΕ. Τοῦτων δὲ γε ἐκάστων εἴδωλα, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὰ παρέπεται, δαμονία καὶ ταῦτα μηχανῆ γεγονότα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποία;

ΕΕ. Τά τε ἐν τοῖς ὑπνοι καὶ οὔσα μεθ' ἡμέραν φαντάσματα αὐτοφυή λέγεται, σκιὰ μὲν ὅταν ἐν τῷ πυρὶ σκότος ἐγγίγνηται, διπλοῦν δὲ ἡνίκ' ἂν φῶς οἴκειόν τε καὶ ἀλλότριον περὶ τὰ λαμπρὰ καὶ λεία εἰς ἐν ἕξυνελθὸν τῆς ἐμπροσθεν εἰσωθύεις ὦφεως ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν παρέχον εἴδος ἄπεργαξῆται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δύο γὰρ οὖν ἔστι ταῦτα θείας ἑργα ποιήσεως, αὐτὸ τε καὶ τὸ παρακολουθοῦν εἴδωλον ἐκάστῳ.

ΕΕ. Τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην; ἃρ' οὖκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαιν οἰκοδομικῆ φήσομεν ποιεῖν, γραφικῆ δὲ τῷ ἔτεραν, οἶνον ὄναρ ἀνθρώπινων ἐγρηγορόσω τῷ παραγαγμένῃ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΕΕ. Οὐκότι καὶ τάλλα οὖτω κατὰ δύο διυττὰ ἑργα τῆς ἡμετέρας αὐτοτητικῆς πράξεως, τὸ μὲν αὐτό, φαμέν, αὐτουργικῆ, τὸ δὲ εἴδωλον εἰδωλοτοπικῆ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν μᾶλλον ἔμαθον, καὶ τίθημι δύο διχῆ ποιητικῆς εἰδῆς. θείαν 3 μὲν καὶ ἀνθρωπίνην 4 κατὰ θάτερον τρήμα, κατὰ δὲ θάτερον τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ὦν, τὸ δὲ ὀμοιωμάτων τινῶν γέννημα.

1 αὐτουργικῆ Ηεινστόρφ; αὐτουργικῆ ΒΤ.
2 εἰδωλοτοπικῆ Ηεινστόρφ; εἰδωλοτοπικῆ ΒΤ.
3 θεία Ηεινστόρφ; θεία Β; θεία Τ.
4 ἀνθρωπίνη Ηεινστόρφ; ἀνθρωπίνη Β; ἀνθρωπίνη Τ.

1 This was the current explanation of reflection. Mirrors and smooth objects were supposed to contain a luminous principle which met on the smooth surface with the light.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And corresponding to each and all of these there are images, not the things themselves, which are also made by superhuman skill.

THEAET. What are they?

STR. The appearances in dreams, and those that arise by day and are said to be spontaneous—a shadow when a dark object interrupts the firelight, or when twofold light, from the objects themselves and from outside, meets on smooth and bright surfaces and causes upon our senses an effect the reverse of our ordinary sight, thus producing an image. ¹

THEAET. Yes, these are two works of divine creation, the thing itself and the corresponding image in each case.

STR. And how about our own art? Shall we not say that we make a house by the art of building, and by the art of painting make another house, a sort of man-made dream produced for those who are awake?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. And in the same way, we say, all the other works of our creative activity also are twofold and go in pairs—the thing itself, produced by the art that creates real things, and the image, produced by the image-making art.

THEAET. I understand better now; and I agree that there are two kinds of production, each of them twofold—the divine and the human by one method of bisection, and by the other real things and the product that consists of a sort of likenesses.

coming from the object reflected. So in the act of vision the fire within the eye united with the external fire (Timaeus, 46 a). The words τῆς ἐμπροσθεν... ἐναντίαν ἀλθείου refer to the transposition of right and left in the reflection (cf. Theaetetus, 193 c).
51. ΞΕ. Τῆς τούνν εἰδωλουργικῆς ἀναμνησθῶ·
μεν ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἰκαστικὸν, τὸ δὲ 
fantastikὸν ἐμελ·
Ε λεν εἶναι γένος, εἰ τὸ 
ψεῦδος ὁντως ὑπὸ ψεῦδος καὶ 
tῶν ὁντων ἐν τι φανεῤή 
πεφικός.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡν γὰρ οὖν.
ΞΕ. Ὅποιον ἐφάνη τε καὶ 
dιὰ ταῦτα δὴ κατ· 
αριθμήσωμεν αὐτῶ 1 
νὸν ἀναμφισβητήτως εἰδή 
dύο;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

267 ΞΕ. Τὸ τούνν 
fantastikὸν αὖθις διορίζωμεν 
dίχα.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῆ;
ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν δι' ὄργανων γιγνόμενον, 
τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ 
παρέχοντος ἐαυτὸν ὄργανον 
tοῦ ποιοῦντος τὸ 
φαντασμα.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς φῆς;
ΞΕ. Ὁταν, οἶμαι, τὸ 
σὸν σχῆμα τις 
τῶ ἐαυτοῦ 
χρώμενος 
σώματι προσόμοιον 
ἡ 
φωνὴν 
φωνὴ 
φαίνεσθαι 
ποῦ, 
μίμησις 
tοῦτο 
tῆς 
fantastikῆς 
μάλιστα 
kέκληται 
ποῦ.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
ΞΕ. Μμητικὸν 
δὴ 
tουτο 
αὐτῆς 
προσεπόντες 
ἀπονειμώμεθα 2. 
tὸ 
δὲ 
ἀλλο 
πᾶν 
ἀφώμεν 
μαλακι· 
βοθέντες 
kαὶ 
παρέντες 
ἐτέρῳ 
συναγαγεῖν 
tεἰς 
ἐν 
kαὶ 
πρέπουσαν 
ἐπιωνυμίαν 
ἀποδοῦναι 
tιν' 
αὐτῷ.
ΘΕΑΙ. 
Νευμησθῶ, 
tὸ 
δὲ 
μεθεῖσθω.
ΞΕ. 
Καὶ 
μὴ 
kαὶ 
tουτο 
ἐτὶ 
διπλοῦν, 
ὦ 
Θεαίτητε, 
ἀξιον 
ἡγεῖσθαι. 
δι' 
ἀ 
δὲ, 
σκόπει.
ΘΕΑΙ. 
Λέγε.
ΞΕ. 
Τῶν 
μμουμενῶν 
οὶ 
μὲν 
eἰδότες 
δ 
μμοῦνται

1 αὐτῷ| αὐτῷ BT.
2 ἀπονειμώμεθα W; ἀπονειμώμεθα BT.

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THE SOPHIST

STR. We must remember that there were to be two parts of the image-making class, the likeness-making and the fantastic, if we should find that falsehood really existed and was in the class of real being.

THEAET. Yes, there were.

STR. But we found that falsehood does exist, and therefore we shall now, without any doubts, number the kinds of image-making art as two, shall we not?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Let us, then, again bisect the fantastic art.

THEAET. How?

STR. One kind is that produced by instruments, the other that in which the producer of the appearance offers himself as the instrument.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. When anyone, by employing his own person as his instrument, makes his own figure or voice seem similar to yours, that kind of fantastic art is called mimetic.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Let us, then, classify this part under the name of mimetic art; but as for all the rest, let us be so self-indulgent as to let it go and leave it for someone else to unify and name appropriately.

THEAET. Very well, let us adopt that classification and let the other part go.

STR. But it is surely worth while to consider, Theaetetus, that the mimetic art also has two parts; and I will tell you why.

THEAET. Please do.

STR. Some who imitate do so with knowledge of that which they imitate, and others without such
PLATO

toûto práttousin, oi d' ouk eídotes. kaitoi tîna meîzô diairèsen agwnosias te kai gnôseus theômen;

0eai. Oudemían.

Ze. Oukouv to ge árto lechên eídotwn òn nûmìma; to gár sôn sxîma kal se gygnwskon ãn tis muh-

saito.

C 0eai. Pâs ð' ou;

Ze. Ti dè dikaiosunhìs to sxîma kai òlhsi xullh-

bâthn ãrêtês; àr' ouk agnouontes meû, dozâzontes
dé ù, sfôdhra èpîcheiroûsi polloi to dokouv sfisi
toitò ùs ònôn avtoîs prothmeeîthai fainêthai poiêin,
ôti máliosta èrgous te kai logous muhòymenoi;

0eai. Kai pánu ge polloi.

Ze. Mèn ouv pàntes ãpotugxhânouï toî dokèiw
eîna diîkaioi muhdamôs òntes; ò toûto pân toûnau-
tîon;

0eai. Pân.

Ze. Mîmêtìn dì toûtòn ge èteron èkeînou

D lektéon oumiae, tòn agnouontà toû gygnwskontos.

0eai. Nai.

52. Ze. Pòdeîn ouîn ónomà èkatérw tis avtôn

lîmêtai prêpon; òh dîlon òh xal leptôn òn, diôti tís
tôn genvôn kat' eídê diairèsews palaià tîs, ùs
èoikev, árgia 1 toîs èmproseîv kai àsoûnovos parîh,
ôste meû' èpîcheireîn muhêna diairèshai' káthô
dì tîwv ònomâtôn ãnagki èî sfôdra eîporêîn.
ómws dê, kàv eî tolûmêròteron èirîshai, diagnwsews
ènega tîn meû metà dôxhs muhîsou doxomimêtikhîn

1 árgia Madvig; altría BT.
THE SOPHIST

knowledge. And yet what division can we imagine more complete than that which separates knowledge and ignorance?

THEAET. None.

STR. The example I just gave was of imitation by those who know, was it not? For a man who imitates you would know you and your figure.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. But what of the figure of justice and, in a word, of virtue in general? Are there not many who have no knowledge of it, but only a sort of opinion, and who try with the greatest eagerness to make this which they themselves think is virtue seem to exist within them, by imitating it in acts and words to the best of their ability?

THEAET. Yes, there are very many such people.

STR. Do all of them, then, fail in the attempt to seem to be just when they are not so at all? Or is quite the opposite the case?

THEAET. Quite the opposite.

STR. Then I think we must say that such an imitator is quite distinct from the other, the one who does not know from the one who knows.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Where, then, can the fitting name for each of the two be found? Clearly it is not an easy task, because there was, it seems, among the earlier thinkers a long established and careless indolence in respect to the division of classes or genera into forms or species, so that nobody even tried to make such divisions; therefore there cannot be a great abundance of names. However, even though the innovation in language be a trifle bold, let us, for the sake of making a distinction, call the imitation which is
Ε προσείπωμεν, τὴν δὲ μετ’ ἐπιστήμης ἱστορικῆς τινα μύησαι.

Θεαι. Ἐστώ.

Σε. Θατέρω τοῖνυν χρηστέον· ὁ γὰρ σοφιστής οὐκ ἐν τοῖς εἰδόσιν ἦν, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς μιμομένοις δή.

Θεαι. Καὶ μάλα.

Σε. Τὸν δοξομμητὴν δὴ σκοπῶμεθα ὡσπερ σίδηρον, εἴτε ὑγιὴς εἴτε διπλόην ἔτ’ ἔχων τινὰ ἐστίν ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

Θεαι. Σκοπῶμεν.

268 Σε. Ἔχει τοῖνυν καὶ μάλα συχνῆν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐθήνης αὐτῶν ἐστίν, οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ταῦτα ἃ δοξάζει· τὸ δὲ θατέρου σχῆμα διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κυλίνδησιν ἔχει πολλὴν ὑπομίαν καὶ φόβουν, ὡς ἀγνοεῖ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ὡς εἰδῶς ἐσχημάτισται.

Θεαι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἐστίν ἐκατέρου γένους ὁ δὲ εἰρήκας.

Σε. Οὐκοῦν τὸν μὲν ἀπλοῦν μιμητὴν τινα, τὸν δὲ εἰρωνικὸν μιμητὴν θήσομεν;

Θεαι. Εἰκός γοῦν.

Σε. Τούτου δ’ αὖ τὸ γένος ἐν ἡ δύο φῶμεν;

Θεαι. Ὡρα σὺ.

Β Σε. Σκοπῶ· καὶ μοι διενόμησεν ὁ καταφαίνεσθον τινὲς τὸν μὲν δημοσία τε καὶ μακρῶς λόγοις πρὸς πλῆθος δυνατοῦ εἰρωνεύεσθαι καθορῶ, τὸν δὲ ὢδή τε καὶ βραχέος λόγος ἀναγκάζοντα τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον ἐναντιολογεῖν αὐτῶν αὐτῷ.

Θεαι. Λέγεις ὀρθῶτατα.
based on opinion, opinion-imitation, and that which is founded on knowledge, a sort of scientific imitation.

THEAET. Agreed.

STR. We must therefore apply ourselves to the former, for we found that the sophist was among those who imitate but was not among those who know.

THEAET. Very true.

STR. Then let us examine the opinion-imitator as if he were a piece of iron, and see whether he is sound or there is still some seam in him.

THEAET. Let us do so.

STR. Well, there is a very marked seam. For some of these imitators are simple-minded and think they know that about which they have only opinion, but the other kind because of their experience in the rough and tumble of arguments, strongly suspect and fear that they are ignorant of the things which they pretend before the public to know.

THEAET. Certainly the two classes you mention both exist.

STR. Then shall we call one the simple imitator and the other the dissembling imitator?

THEAET. That is reasonable, at any rate.

STR. And shall we say that the latter forms one class or two again?

THEAET. That is your affair.

STR. I am considering, and I think I can see two classes. I see one who can dissemble in long speeches in public before a multitude, and the other who does it in private in short speeches and forces the person who converses with him to contradict himself.

THEAET. You are quite right.
Τίνα οὖν ἀποφανώμεθα τὸν μακρολογώτερον εἶναι; πότερα πολιτικὸν ἡ δημολογικόν;

ὁεα. Δημολογικόν.

Τί δὲ τὸν ἔτερον ἔρωμεν; σοφὸν ἢ σοφιστικόν;

ὁεα. Τὸ 1 μέν που σοφὸν ἄδυνατον, ἐπείπερ οὐκ εἰδότα αὐτὸν ἐθεμεν. μυμητὴς δ' ἢν τοῦ σοφοῦ δῆλον ὅτι παρωνύμιον αὐτοῦ τί λήψεται, καὶ σχεδὸν ἦδη μεμάθηκα ὅτι τοῦτον δεῖ προσεπεῖν ἀληθῶς αὐτὸν ἔκεινον τὸν παντάπασιν ὄντως σοφιστήν.

οε. Οὐκοῦν συνδήσομεν αὐτοῖς, καθάπερ ἐμπροσθεν, τούνομα συμπλέξαντες ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἐπ' ἀρχήν;

ὁεα. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

οε. Τὸ 2 δὴ τῆς ἐναντιοποιολογικῆς εἰρωνικοῦ μέρους τῆς δοξαστικῆς μυμητικοῦ, τοῦ φανταστικοῦ γένους ἀπὸ τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς οὐ θείον ἀλλ' ἀνθρωπικὸν τῆς ποιήσεως ἀφωρισμένον ἐν λόγοις τὸ θαυματοποιικὸν μόριον, ταύτης τῆς γενεᾶς τε καὶ αἵματος ὃς ἂν φῇ τὸν ὄντως σοφιστήν εἶναι, τάληθέστατα, ως ἔοικεν, ἐρεῖ.

ὁεα. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

1 τὸ Stephanus; τὸν ΒΤ.
2 τὸ Schleiermacher; τὸν ΒΤ.
THE SOPHIST

str. And what name shall we give to him who makes the longer speeches? Statesman or popular orator?

THEAET. Popular orator.

str. And what shall we call the other? Philosopher or sophist?

THEAET. We cannot very well call him philosopher, since by our hypothesis he is ignorant; but since he is an imitator of the philosopher, he will evidently have a name derived from his, and I think I am sure at last that we must truly call him the absolutely real and actual sophist.

str. Shall we then bind up his name as we did before, winding it up from the end to the beginning?

THEAET. By all means.

str. The imitative kind of the dissembling part of the art of opinion which is part of the art of contradiction and belongs to the fantastic class of the image-making art, and is not divine, but human, and has been defined in arguments as the juggling part of productive activity—he who says that the true sophist is of this descent and blood will, in my opinion, speak the exact truth.

THEAET. Yes, he certainly will.
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