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PLATO

II
PREFACE

The Greek text in this volume is based upon the Codex Clarkianus and the Codex Venetus. Deviations from the readings of these manuscripts are noted in the margin at the foot of the page. In most instances disagreement between these two manuscripts, and occasionally readings found in inferior manuscripts or in ancient quotations, as well as emendations offered by modern scholars, are noted, even when they have not affected the text chosen. The following abbreviations are employed:

B = Codex Clarkianus or Bodleianus, written a.d. 895.
T = Codex Venetus, Append. class. 4, cod. 1; twelfth century.
W = Codex Vindobonensis 54, Suppl. graec. 7.
D = Codex Venetus 185.
G = Codex Venetus, Append. class 4, cod. 54.
b t w = later hands of B T W.

The brief introductions aim merely at supplying such information as may aid the reader to appreciate these particular dialogues.

Harold N. Fowler.
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THEAETETUS
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEAETETUS

In the Theaetetus Eucleides the Megarian repeats to his friend Terpsion a conversation between Socrates, the mathematician Theodorus, and the youth Theaetetus, who was himself a mathematician of note. The subject is the nature of knowledge, and the discussion is interrupted and furthered by two digressions, one concerning midwives, in which Socrates likens his method of investigation to the activities of the midwife, the other contrasting the lawyer and the philosopher.

The definition of knowledge is hard to attain, and is, in fact, not attained in this dialogue. The confusion between knowledge and various kinds or applications of knowledge is first cleared up, and then the discussion centres upon three definitions: (1) Knowledge is sensible perception; (2) Knowledge is true opinion; (3) Knowledge is true opinion with reasoned explanation.

The discussion of the first definition contains as one of its most important parts the refutation of the doctrine of Protagoras that "man is the measure of all things"; but it includes also a discussion of the doctrine of Heracleitus, that all things are always in
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEAETETUS

motion. Here Plato distinguishes two kinds of motion—movement in space and change of quality—and asserts that constant motion of the first kind must be accompanied by change, because otherwise the same things would be at the same time both in motion and at rest. This obvious fallacy Plato appears to ascribe to Heracleitus and his school. The result of this discussion is that if nothing is at rest, every answer on whatever subject is equally correct.

The possibility of false opinion is discussed in connexion with the second definition. This part of the dialogue contains many subtle distinctions and interesting comparisons. The errors of memory are illustrated by the wax tablets which, on account of their imperfections, fail to receive and preserve clear impressions from sensible objects, and the confusion of our recollections by the aviary, the possessor of which takes in his hand one bird when he wishes to take another, though all the birds have previously been caught and imprisoned by him.

The third definition is explained in various ways, none of which is found to be satisfactory, and the dialogue closes with its avowed purpose—the complete definition of knowledge—unaccomplished. Nevertheless the rejection of the definitions proposed is a gain in itself, and the dialogue may be said to prepare the way for the acceptance of the theory of ideas. It serves also as an example of the importance of the dialectic method, and shows Plato's interest in combating the theories of other philosophers.

The Theaetetus contains many interesting similes and comparisons, and is, like the Sophist and the
INTRODUCTION TO THE THEAETETUS

*Statesman*, pervaded by a subtle and at the same time ponderous kind of humour which is rather irritating to some, at least, among modern readers. The reasoning is careful and accurate, but the exposition is somewhat too prolix for modern taste.

The date of the *Theaetetus* is uncertain, but it cannot be one of the early dialogues. The mention of the Athenian army at Corinth makes any date much earlier than 390 impossible. At the very end the reader is prepared for a continuation of the conversation, and this takes place in the *Sophist*, but that dialogue and the *Statesman* may very well have been written some years later than the *Theaetetus*, from which they differ considerably in style.

There are separate editions of the *Theaetetus* by Lewis Campbell (Oxford, 1861 and 1883) and B. H. Kennedy (Cambridge, 1881 and 1894), both with translation and notes.
ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ
[Η ΠΕΡΙ ΕΠΙΣΤΗΜΗΣ, ΠΕΙΡΑΣΤΙΚΟΣ]

TA TOT ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΕΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ

A 1. ET. Ἄρτι, ὁ Τερψίων, ἦ πάλαι ἐξ ἁγροῦ;
    ΤΕΡ. Ἐπιευκῶς πάλαι. καὶ σὲ γε ἐξήτουν κατ’ ἀγορὰν καὶ ἑθαύμαζον ὅτι οὐχ οἶδας τ’ ἢ εὑρεῖν.
    ΕΤ. Οὐ γὰρ ἦ κατὰ πόλιν.
    ΤΕΡ. Ποῦ μὴν;
    ΕΤ. Εἰς λυμένα καταβαίνων Θεαίτητῳ ἐνέτυχον φερομένω ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου Ἀθήνας.
    ΤΕΡ. Ζῶντι ἢ τετελευτηκότι;

B 2. ET. Ζῶντι καὶ μάλα μόλις. χαλεπῶς μὲν γὰρ ἔχει καὶ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν, μᾶλλον μὴν αὐτὸν αἱρεῖ τὸ γεγονός νόσημα ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι.
    ΤΕΡ. Μῶν ἢ δυσεντηρία;
    ΕΤ. Ναί.
    ΤΕΡ. Οἶον ἀνδρὰ λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι.
    ΕΤ. Καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν, ὁ Τερψίων, ἐπεὶ τοι
THEAETETUS

[or ON KNOWLEDGE, tentative]

CHARACTERS

Euclides, Terpsion, Socrates, Theodorus, Theaetetus

EU. Just in from the country, Terpsion, or did you come some time ago?

TERP. Quite a while ago; and I was looking for you in the market-place and wondering that I could not find you.

EU. Well, you see, I was not in the city.

TERP. Where then?

EU. As I was going down to the harbour I met Theaetetus being carried to Athens from the camp at Corinth.

TERP. Alive or dead?

EU. Just barely alive; for he is suffering severely from wounds, and, worse than that, he has been taken with the sickness that has broken out in the army.

TERP. You mean the dysentery?

EU. Yes.

TERP. What a man he is who you say is in danger!

EU. A noble man, Terpsion, and indeed just now I
καὶ νῦν ἦκουόν τινων μάλα ἐγκομιαζόντων αὐτοῦν περὶ τὴν μάχην.

τερ. Καὶ οὖνεν γ’ ἀτοπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολὺ θαυ-μαστότερον, εἰ μὴ τοιούτος ἦν. ἀτὰρ πῶς οὖκ
C αὐτοῦ Μεγαροὶ κατέλυεν;

ετ. 'Ἡπείγετο οὐκαδε: ἐπεὶ ἔγνω, ἐδεόμην καὶ
συνεβούλευον, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἦθελεν. καὶ δὴτα προπέμ-
ψας αὐτόν, ἀπών πάλιν ἀνεμνήσθην καὶ ἑθαύμασα
Σωκράτους, ὡς μαντικῶς ἄλλα τε ἐδ’ εἰπε καὶ περὶ
tοῦτου. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι ὁλίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου
ἐνυπέχειν αὐτῷ μειρακίω ὄντι, καὶ συγγενόμενός
τε καὶ διαλεξθεὶς πάνυ ἀγαθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν
φύσιν. καὶ μοι ἐλθόντι 'Ἀθήναζε τοὺς τε λόγους οὐς
D διελέξθη αὐτῷ διηγήσατο, καὶ μᾶλα ἂξιοις ἁκοῆς,
ἐπε’ τε, ὅτι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη εἰ ὑδ’ τοῦτον ἐλλόγμον
γενέσθαι, εἴπερ εἶς ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι.

τερ. Καὶ ἄληθῆ γε, ὡς ἔουσεν, εἰπεν. ἀτὰρ
τίνες ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι; ἔχοις ἂν διηγήσασθαι;

ετ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐκοινον οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στό-
143 ματος· ἀλλ’ ἐγραφάμην τὸτ’ εὐθὺς οὐκαδ’ ἐλθόν
ὑπομνήματα, ὅστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμμη-
σκόμενος ἐγραφον, καὶ ὁσάκις 'Ἀθήναζε ἀφικοῦμην,
ἐπανηρώτων τὸν Σωκράτη δ’ μὴ ἐμεμνήμην, καὶ
δεύρο ἐλθὼν ἐπηνορθούμην· ὥστε μοι σχεδὸν
tι πᾶς ὁ λόγος γέγραπται.

τερ. 'Αληθῆ· ἦκουσα σου καὶ πρότερον, καὶ
μέντοι ἂει μέλλων κελεύσεων ἐπιδείξαι διατέτρφα
δεύρο. ἀλλὰ τὰ κωλύει νῦν ἤμας διελθεῖν; πάντως
ἐγὼγε καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι, ὡς ἐξ ἀγροῦ
ηκῶν.

Β ετ. 'Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς μέχρι 'Ερινὸν

8
heard some people praising him highly for his conduct in the battle.

TERP. That is not at all strange; it would have been much more remarkable if he had not so conducted himself. But why did he not stop here in Megara?

EU. He was in a hurry to get home; for I begged and advised him to stop, but he would not. So I went along with him, and as I was coming back I thought of Socrates and wondered at his prophetic gift, especially in what he said about him. For I think he met him a little before his own death, when Theaetetus was a mere boy, and as a result of acquaintance and conversation with him, he greatly admired his qualities. When I went to Athens he related to me the conversation he had with him, which was well worth hearing, and he said he would surely become a notable man if he lived.

TERP. And he was right, apparently. But what was the talk. Could you relate it?

EU. No, by Zeus, at least not offhand. But I made notes at the time as soon as I reached home, then afterwards at my leisure, as I recalled things, I wrote them down, and whenever I went to Athens I used to ask Socrates about what I could not remember, and then I came here and made corrections; so that I have pretty much the whole talk written down.

TERP. That is true. I heard you say so before; and really I have been waiting about here all along intending to ask you to show it to me. What hinders us from reading it now? Certainly I need to rest, since I have come from the country.

EU. And I myself went with Theaetetus as far as
Θεατήτου προύπεμψα, ὥστε οὐκ ἀν ἀηδῶς ἀναπαυωμένην. ἀλλ' ἱωμεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἁμα ἀναπαυωμένους ὁ παῖς ἀναγνώστει.

τερ. Ὁρθῶς λέγεις.

ετ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ βιβλίον, ὦ Τερψίων, τούτῳ ἐγραψάμην δὲ δὴ οὕτως τὸν λόγον, οὐκ ἐμοὶ Σωκράτη διηγούμενων ὡς διηγεῖτο, ἀλλὰ διαλεγόμενον οἷς ἔφη διαλεχθήναι. ἔφη δὲ τῷ τε γεωμέτρῃ Θεοδώρῳ καὶ τῷ Θεατήτῳ. ἵνα οὖν

C ἐν τῇ γραφῇ μὴ παρέχοιεσ τράγματα αἱ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων διηγήσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ τε ὅποτε λέγοι ὁ Σωκράτης, οὗν, καὶ ἐγὼ ἔφη ἡ καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, ἡ αὖ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου, ὃτι συνέφη ἡ οὖχ ὡμολόγει, τούτων ἕνεκα όσ αὐτὸν αὐτοῖς διαλέγομεν ἑγραφα, ἐξελὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα.

τερ. Καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου, ὦ Εὐκλείδη.

ετ. Ἄλλα, παί, λαβεῖ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε.

D 2. ἔν. Ἐι μὲν τῶν ἐν Κυρήνῃ μάλλον ἐκηδόμην, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὰ ἐκεῖ ἢν σὲ καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἢν ἠρώτων, εἰ τινὲς αὐτόθι περὶ γεωμετρίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν εἰσὶ τῶν νέων ἐπιμέλειαι ποιούμενοι. νῦν δὲ ἤττον γὰρ ἑκείνως ἡ τούσδε φιλῶ, καὶ μάλλον ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι τίνες ἢμῖν τῶν νέων ἐπίδοξοι γενέσθαι ἐπιεικεῖς· ταῦτα δὴ αὐτὸς τε σκοπῶ καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔρωτῳ οἷς ἢν ὑπὸ τοὺς νέους ἐθέλοντας συγγίγνεσθαι. σοὶ δὴ οὐκ ὀλίγωτοι πλησιάζουσι, καὶ δικαίως.

Ε ἄξιος γὰρ τὰ τε ἅλλα καὶ γεωμετρίας ἕνεκα. εἰ
Erineum, so I also should not be sorry to take a rest. Come, let us go, and while we are resting, the boy shall read to us.

TERP. Very well.

EU. Here is the book, Terpsion. Now this is the way I wrote the conversation: I did not represent Socrates relating it to me, as he did, but conversing with those with whom he told me he conversed. And he told me they were the geometrician Theodorus and Theaetetus. Now in order that the explanatory words between the speeches might not be annoying in the written account, such as "and I said" or "and I remarked," whenever Socrates spoke, or "he agreed" or "he did not agree," in the case of the interlocutor, I omitted all that sort of thing and represented Socrates himself as talking with them.

TERP. That is quite fitting, Eucleides.

EU. Come, boy, take the book and read.

SOC. If I cared more for Cyrene and its affairs, Theodorus, I should ask you about things there and about the people, whether any of the young men there are devoting themselves to geometry or any other form of philosophy; but as it is, since I care less for those people than for the people here, I am more eager to know which of our own young men are likely to gain reputation. These are the things I myself investigate, so far as I can, and about which I question those others with whom I see that the young men like to associate. Now a great many of them come to you, and rightly, for you deserve it on account of your geometry, not to speak of other

1 Erineum was between Eleusis and Athens, near the Cephissus. Apparently Eucleides had walked some thirty miles.
δὴ οὖν τιν ἐνετύχεις ἄξιω λόγου, ἢδέως ἃν πυ-θοίμην.

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μήν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐμοὶ τε εἰπεῖν καὶ σοὶ ἀκοῦσαι πάνυ ἄξιον, οἷς ἥμιν τῶν πολιτῶν μειρακίω ἐντετυχήκα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν καλὸς, ἐφοβοῦμην ἃν σφόδρα λέγειν, μὴ καὶ τῷ δόξῳ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ αὐτοῦ εἶναι. νῦν δὲ—καὶ μὴ μοι ἀχθοῦ—οὐκ ἔστι καλὸς, προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τὴν τε συμόητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων. ἢττον δὲ ἢ σὺ ταῦτ’

144 ἔχειν. ἀδεῶς δὴ λέγω. εὖ γὰρ ἰσθι ὅτι ὅν δὴ πόσποτε ἐνετυχοῦν—καὶ πάνυ πολλοῖς πεπλησίακα—οὐδένα πω ἴσθαμην οὔτω θαυμαστῶς εὖ πεφυκότα. τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθῆ ὄντα, ὡς ἄλλῳ χαλεπῶν, πρῶν αὐτὶ εἶναι διαφερότως, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτους ἀνδρείων παρ’ ὀντινοῦν, ἔγω μὲν οὔτ’ ἄν ψόμην γενέσθαι οὔτε ὅρῳ γιγνόμενον. ἂλλ’ οὐ τε ὀξεῖς ὧσπερ οὕτος καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ μνήμονες ὡς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὄργας ὀξύρροποί εἰσι, καὶ ἄττοντες φέρονται Β ὧσπερ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα πλοία, καὶ μανικώτεροι ἢ ἀνδρεώτεροι φύσονται, οὐ τε αὐτὶ ἐμπριθέστεροι νωθροὶ πως ἀπαντῶν πρὸς τὰς μαθῆσεις καὶ λήθης γέμοντες. ο δὲ οὕτω λείῳς τε καὶ ἀπταίστως καὶ ἀνυόιμως ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τὰς μαθῆσεις τε καὶ ζητήσεις μετὰ πολλῆς πραότητος, οἴον ἐλαῖον ἰρεῖμα ἀφοφητὶ βέοντος, ὡστε θαυμάσαι τὸ τῆλικοῦτον ὄντα οὕτως ταῦτα διαπράττεσθαι.

ΣΠ. Εὖ ἀγγέλλεις. τίνος δὲ καὶ ἕστι τῶν πολιτῶν;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀκήκοα μὲν τούνομα, μνημονεύω δὲ σοῦ. C ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἕστι τῶν τῶν προσιόντων ὁ ἐν τῷ

1 γιγνόμενον T ut videtur, Burnet; γιγνομένου B, Berol.
reasons. So if you have met with any young man who is worth mentioning, I should like to hear about him.

Theo. Truly, Socrates, it is well worth while for me to talk and for you to hear about a splendid young fellow, one of your fellow-citizens, whom I have met. Now if he were handsome, I should be very much afraid to speak, lest someone should think I was in love with him. But the fact is—now don’t be angry with me—he is not handsome, but is like you in his snub nose and protruding eyes, only those features are less marked in him than in you. You see I speak fearlessly. But I assure you that among all the young men I have ever met—and I have had to do with a great many—I never yet found one of such marvelously fine qualities. He is quick to learn, beyond almost anyone else, yet exceptionally gentle, and moreover brave beyond any other; I should not have supposed such a combination existed, and I do not see it elsewhere. On the contrary, those who, like him, have quick, sharp minds and good memories, have usually also quick tempers; they dart off and are swept away, like ships without ballast; they are excitable rather than courageous; those, on the other hand, who are steadier are somewhat dull when brought face to face with learning, and are very forgetful. But this boy advances toward learning and investigation smoothly and surely and successfully, with perfect gentleness, like a stream of oil that flows without a sound, so that one marvels how he accomplishes all this at his age.

Soc. That is good news; but which of our citizens is his father?

Theo. I have heard the name, but do not remember it. However, it does not matter, for the youth is
μέσω. ἀρτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἔξω δρόμῳ ἠλείφοντο ἐταῖροί τε τινες οὕτωι αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός, νῦν δὲ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀλευφάμενοι δεύρο ἱέναι. ἀλλὰ σκόπει, εἰ γυγνώσκεισ αὑτῶν.

ὅ. Γυγνώσκω· ὁ τοῦ Σουνιέως Εὐφρονίου ἑστίν, καὶ πάνυ γε, ὅ φίλε, ἀνδρὸς οἶνον καὶ οὐ τοῦτον διηγεῖ, καὶ ἀλλὰς εὐδοκίμουν, καὶ μέντοι καὶ οὐσίαν μάλα πολλήν κατέλιπεν. τὸ δ’ ὅνομα οὐκ οἶδα τοῦ μειρακίου.

Δ ὁ. Ὁσαίτητος, ὁ Σωκράτης, τὸ γε ὅνομα· τὴν μέντοι οὐσίαν δοκοῦσί μοι ἐπίτροποι τινες διεφθαρκέναι· ἀλλ’ ὀμως καὶ πρός τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἐλευθερίατης θαυμαστός, ὁ Σωκράτης.

ὁ. Γενικόν λέγεις τὸν ἀνδρα. καὶ μοι κέλευε αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε παρακαθίζεσθαι.

ὁ. “Ἐσται ταῦτα. Ὁσαίτητε, δεύρο παρά Σωκράτη.”

ὁ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὁ Ὁσαίτητε, ἵνα κἀγὼ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀνασκέψωμαι, ποιόν τι ἔχω τὸ πρόσωπον. Ἐφησίν γὰρ Θεόδωρος ἔχει οὐδὲν με σοι ὀμοιον. ἀτὰρ εἰ νῦν ἐχόντων ἐκατέρω λύραν ἐφῆ αὐτὰς ἡμόσθαν ὅμοιως, τότερον εὐθὺς ἀν ἐπιστεύομεν ἡ ἐπισκεψάμεθ’ ἂν, εἰ μονικὸς ὁ φέ λέγει;

ὁ. Ἐπισκεψάμεθ’ ἂν.

ὁ. Οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτον μὲν εὑρόντες ἐπειθόμεθ’ ἂν, ἀμοισον δὲ, ἡπιστοῦμεν;

ὁ. Ἀληθή.

ὁ. Νῦν δὲ γ’, οἷμαι, εἰ τι μέλει ἢμῖν τῆς τῶν 145 προσώπων ὄμοιότητος, σκεπτέον, εἰ γραφικὸς ὁ φέ λέγει ἡ οὖ.
the middle one of those who are now coming toward us. He and those friends of his were anointing themselves in the outer course, and now they seem to have finished and to be coming here. See if you recognize him.

soc. Yes, I do. He is the son of Euphronius of Sunium, who is a man of just the sort you describe, and of good repute in other respects; moreover he left a very large property. But the youth’s name I do not know.

THEO. Theaetetus is his name, Socrates; but I believe the property was squandered by trustees. Nevertheless, Socrates, he is remarkably liberal with his money, too.

soc. It is a noble man that you describe. Now please tell him to come here and sit by us.

THEO. I will. Theaetetus, come here to Socrates.

soc. Yes, do so, Theaetetus, that I may look at myself and see what sort of a face I have; for Theodorus says it is like yours. Now if we each had a lyre, and he said we had tuned them to the same key, should we take his word for it without more ado, or should we inquire first whether he who said it was a musician?

THEAET. We should inquire.

soc. Then if we found that he was a musician, we should believe him, but if not, we should refuse to take his word?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. But now, if we are concerned about the likeness of our faces, we must consider whether he who speaks is a painter, or not.

The scene is evidently laid in a gymnasium; the young men have been exercising.
PLATO

ΤΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι.
Σ. Ἡ οὖν ζωγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος;
ΤΕΑΙ. Οὐχ, ὅσον γέ με εἰδέναι.
Σ. Ἀρ' οὖδε γεωμετρικός;
ΤΕΑΙ. Πάντως δήπον, ὥ Σώκρατες.
Σ. Ἡ καὶ ἀστρονομικός καὶ λογιστικός τε καὶ
μουσικός καὶ ὁσα παιδείας ἔχεται;
ΤΕΑΙ. "Εμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Σ. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τοῦ σῶματός τι ὁμοίως
φησὶν εἰναι ἐπαινῶν πη ἡ ἴεγὼν, οὔ πάνυ αὐτῷ ἄξιον
τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν.
ΤΕΑΙ. "Ισως οὖ.
Β. Σ. Τί δ', εἰ ποτέρου τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπαινοῖ πρὸς
ἀρετήν τε καὶ σοφίαν; ἄρ' οὖκ ἄξιον τῷ μὲν
ἀκούσαντι προθυμεῖσθαι ἀνασκέφασθαι τὸν ἐπαινε-
θέντα, τῷ δὲ προθύμως ἐαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύαι;
ΤΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὥ Σώκρατες.
3. Σ. Όρα τοῖνυν, ὥ φίλε Θεαίτητε, σοι μὲν
ἐπιδεικνύαι, ἐμοὶ δὲ σκοπεῖσθαι· ὡς εὗ ἵσθι ὅτι
Θεόδωρος πολλοὺς δὴ πρὸς με ἐπαινέσας ξένους
tε καὶ ἀστοὺς οὐδένα πω ἐπήμεσεν ὡς σὲ νῦν δὴ.
ΤΕΑΙ. Ἐδ' ἂν ἔχου, ὥ Σώκρατες· ἁλλ' ὅρα μὴ
C παίξων ἔλεγεν.
Σ. Οὖχ οὔτος ο τρόπος Θεόδώρου· ἁλλὰ μὴ
ἀναδύου τὰ ωμολογημένα σκηπτόμενος παίξοντα
λέγειν τόνδε, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀναγκασθῇ μαρτυρεῖν·
pάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐπισκῆψει αὐτῷ. ἁλλὰ θαρρῶν
ἐμμενε τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ.
ΤΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρῆ ταῦτα ποιεῖν, εἰ σοι δοκεῖ.
Σ. Λέγε δὴ μοι· μανθάνεις ποι παρὰ Θεοδώρου
γεωμετρίας ἅττα;
ΤΕΑΙ. "Εγώγε.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. I think we must.
soc. Well, is Theodorus a painter?
THEAET. Not so far as I know.
soc. Nor a geometrician, either?
THEAET. Oh yes, decidedly, Socrates.
soc. And an astronomer, and an arithmetician, and a musician, and in general an educated man?
THEAET. I think so.
soc. Well then, if he says, either in praise or blame, that we have some physical resemblance, it is not especially worth while to pay attention to him.
THEAET. Perhaps not.
soc. But what if he should praise the soul of one of us for virtue and wisdom? Is it not worth while for the one who hears to examine eagerly the one who is praised, and for that one to exhibit his qualities with eagerness?
THEAET. Certainly, Socrates:
soc. Then, my dear Theaetetus, this is just the time for you to exhibit your qualities and for me to examine them; for I assure you that Theodorus, though he has praised many foreigners and citizens to me, never praised anyone as he praised you just now.
THEAET. A good idea, Socrates; but make sure that he was not speaking in jest.
soc. That is not Theodorus's way. But do not seek to draw back from your agreement on the pretext that he is jesting, or he will be forced to testify under oath; for certainly no one will accuse him of perjury. Come, be courageous and hold to the agreement.
THEAET. I suppose I must, if you say so.
soc. Now tell me; I suppose you learn some geometry from Theodorus?
THEAET. Yes.
PLATO

D σω. Καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἄρμονίας καὶ λογισμοῦς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Προθυμοῦμαι γε δή.

σω. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ, δ' παί, παρά γε τούτων καὶ παρ' ἄλλων, οὐδὲν ὅν ὤμοι τι τούτων ἐπαίειν. ἀλλ' ὁμοιὰς τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρῶς, συμκρόν δὲ τι ἀπορῶ, ὃ μετὰ σοῦ τε καὶ τῶυδε σκεπτέον.
καὶ μοι λέγει: ἀρ' οὖ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐστὶν τὸ σοφώτερον γίγνεσθαι περὶ δὲ μανθάνει τις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; σω. Σοφία δὲ γ', οἴμαι, σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοὶ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

Ε σω. Τοῦτο δὲ μῶν διαφέρει τι ἐπιστήμης;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον;

σω. Ἡ σοφία. ἡ οὖν ἀπερ ἐπιστήμονες, ταῦτα καὶ σοφοί;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

σω. Ταῦτ'ν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

σω. Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τοῖνυν ἐστὶν δ' ἀπορῶ καὶ οὖ

δύναμαι λαβεῖν ἰκανῶς παρ' ἐμαυτῶ, ἐπιστήμη δ' τί

146 ποτε τυγχάνει οὖν. ἄρ' οὖν δή ἔχομεν λέγειν αὐτὸ; τί φατέ; τίς ἂν ἡμῶν πρῶτος εἴποι; δ' 

δὲ ἀμαρτών, καὶ ὃς ἂν ἄει ἀμαρτάνη, καθεδεί
tαι, ὥσπερ φαίνω οἱ παῖδες οἱ σφαίριζοντες, οὖνος;

ὡς δ' ἂν περιγένηται ἀναμάρτητος, βασιλέως ἡ

μῶν καὶ ἐπίταξει δ' τι ἂν βουληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. 

tί συγάτε; οὔ τί ποι, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ἐγὼ ὑπὸ φιλο-

λογίας ἀγροικίζομαι, προθυμούμενος ἡμᾶς ἃ 

ποιήσαι διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε καὶ προσηγόρους ἀλλή-

λους γίγνεσθαι;

1 ἡμᾶς] ὑμᾶς Τ.
soc. And astronomy and harmony and arithmetic?
THEAET. I try hard to do so.

soc. And so do I, my boy, from him and from any others who I think know anything about these things. But nevertheless, although in other respects I get on fairly well in them, yet I am in doubt about one little matter, which should be investigated with your help and that of these others. Tell me, is not learning growing wiser about that which one learns?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. And the wise, I suppose, are wise by wisdom.
THEAET. Yes.

soc. And does this differ at all from knowledge?
THEAET. Does what differ?

soc. Wisdom. Or are not people wise in that of which they have knowledge?
THEAET. Of course.

soc. Then knowledge and wisdom are the same thing?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Well, it is just this that I am in doubt about and cannot fully grasp by my own efforts—what knowledge really is. Can we tell that? What do you say? Who of us will speak first? And he who fails, and whoever fails in turn, shall go and sit down and be donkey, as the children say when they play ball; and whoever gets through without failing shall be our king and shall order us to answer any questions he pleases. Why are you silent? I hope, Theodorus, I am not rude, through my love of discussion and my eagerness to make us converse and show ourselves friends and ready to talk to one another.
B θεό. Ἡκιστὰ μὲν, ὃ Σώκρατες, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀν εἰ ἄγριοκον, ἀλλὰ τῶν μειρακίων τι κέλευε σοι ἀποκρύψεθαι· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἀ保密ς τῆς τοιαύτης διαλέκτου, καὶ οὐδ’ ἀδ συνεβίζεσθαι ἤλυκιαν ἔχω· τούδε δὲ πρέποι τε ἀν τοῦτο καὶ πολὺ πλέον ἐπιδυδοῖεν· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ἡ νεότης εἰς πᾶν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει. ἀλλ’, ὥσπερ ἥρξω, μὴ ἀφίεσο τοῦ Θεατήτου, ἀλ’ ἐρώτα.

σ. Ἀκούεις δή, ὁ Θεατήτης, ἀ λέγει Θεόδωρος,
C ὃ ἀπείθειν, ὡς ἔγω οἶμαι, οἴτε σὺ ἐθελήσεις, 
οὔτε θέμις περὶ τὰ τοιαύτα ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ ἐπιτάττοντι 
νεώτερον ἀπείθειν. ἀλλ’ εὖ καὶ γενναῖως εἰπέ· 
tί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην;

θεαί. Ἀλλὰ χρή, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ ὑμεῖς 
κελεύετε. πάντως γάρ, ἄν τι καὶ ἀμάρτω, ἐπαν- 
ορθώσετε.

4. σ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἂν πέρ γε οἶοί τε ὃμεν.

θεαί. Δοκεῖ τοῖνυν μοι καὶ ἣ παρὰ Θεόδωρου 
ἄν τις μάθοι ἐπιστήμαι εἶναι, γεωμετρία τε καὶ 
αὐτὴ νῦν δὴ συ διήλθες, καὶ αὐτὸκτοτομικὴ τε καὶ 
D αἱ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν τέχναι, πάσαι τε καὶ 
ἐκάστη τούτων, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἡ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι.

σ. Γενναίως γε καὶ φιλοδώρως, ὃ φίλε, ἐν 
αὐτήθεις πολλὰ δίδως καὶ ποικίλα ἀνθ’ ἀπλοῦ.

θεαί. Πώς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες;
σ. Ἰσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὃ μέντοι οἶμαι, φράσω.

E σ. Τί δ’, ὅταν τεκτονικῆ; μὴ τι ἄλλο ἡ 
ἐπιστήμην τῆς τῶν ἕνλχων σκευῶν ἐργασίας;

1 ἀπείθειν W; ἀπιστεῖν BT; ἀπελθεῖν al.
THEAETETUS

theo. That sort of thing would not be at all rude, Socrates; but tell one of the youths to answer your questions; for I am unused to such conversation and, moreover, I am not of an age to accustom myself to it. But that would be fitting for these young men, and they would improve much more than I; for the fact is, youth admits of improvement in every way. Come, question Theaetetus as you began to do, and do not let him off.

soc. Well, Theaetetus, you hear what Theodorus says, and I think you will not wish to disobey him, nor is it right for a young person to disobey a wise man when he gives instructions about such matters. Come, speak up well and nobly. What do you think knowledge is?

THEAET. Well, Socrates, I must, since you bid me. For, if I make a mistake, you are sure to set me right.

soc. Certainly, if we can.

THEAET. Well then, I think the things one might learn from Theodorus are knowledge—geometry and all the things you spoke of just now—and also cobblerly and the other craftsmen’s arts; each and all of these are nothing else but knowledge.

soc. You are noble and generous, my friend, for when you are asked for one thing you give many, and a variety of things instead of a simple answer.

THEAET. What do you mean by that, Socrates?

soc. Nothing, perhaps; but I will tell you what I think I mean. When you say “cobblerly” you speak of nothing else than the art of making shoes, do you?

THEAET. Nothing else.

soc. And when you say “carpentry”? Do you mean anything else than the art of making wooden furnishings?
PLATO

*OEAI. Οὐδὲ τούτο.

σ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ ἐκατέρα ἐπιστήμη, τούτο ὅριζες;

*OEAI. Ναὶ.

σ. Τὸ δὲ γ' ἐρωτηθέν, ὅ Θεαίτητε, οὐ τούτο ἦν, τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὅποσαι τινὲς· οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμῆσαι αὐτὰς βουλόμενοι ἥρῳμεθα, ἀλλὰ γνώναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν. ἦ οὐδὲν λέγω;

*OEAI. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὅρθως.

147 σ. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τόδε. εἰ τις ἡμᾶς τῶν φαύλων τι καὶ προχείρων ἔρουτο, οἶδον περὶ πηλοῦ, ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν, εἰ ἀποκριναίμεθα αὐτῶ πηλὸς ὃ τῶν χυτρέων καὶ πηλὸς ὃ τῶν ἰπποπλαθῶν καὶ πηλὸς ὃ τῶν πλινθουργῶν, οὐκ ἂν γελοῖοι εἰμεν;

*OEAI. Ἡσσως.

σ. Πρῶτον μὲν γε που οἰόμενοι συνιέναι ἐκ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀποκρίσεως τῶν ἐρωτώντα, ὅταν εἰπομεν πηλὸς, εἴτε ὃ τῶν κορυφαλθῶν προσθέντες Β εἴτε ἅλλων ὄντων νωνοῦν δημιουργῶν. ἦ, οἷς, τίς τι συνιήσων τίνος ὄνομα, ὃ μὴ οἶδεν τί ἐστίν;

*OEAI. Οὐδαμῶς.

σ. Οὐδ' ἄρα ἐπιστήμην υποδημάτων συνίησιν ὃ ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδώς.

*OEAI. Οὐ γάρ.

σ. Σκυτυκὴν ἄρα οὐ συνίησιν ὃς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἄγνοι, οὐδὲ τινα ἅλλην τέχνην.

*OEAI. Ἑστίν οὐτώς.

σ. Γελοία ἄρα ἡ ἀπόκρισις τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι ἐπιστήμην τί ἐστίν, ὅταν ἀποκρίνηται τέχνης τινὸς

1 τὸ δὲ γ' ἐρωτηθέν Burnet; τὸ δὲ γ' ἐρωτηθέν W, Berol.; τὸ δ' ἐπερωτηθέν BT.

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THEAETETUS

THEAET. Nothing else by that, either.
soc. Then in both cases you define that to which each form of knowledge belongs?
THEAET. Yes.
soc. But the question, Theaetetus, was not to what knowledge belongs, nor how many the forms of knowledge are; for we did not wish to number them, but to find out what knowledge itself really is. Or is there nothing in what I say?
THEAET. Nay, you are quite right.
soc. Take this example. If anyone should ask us about some common everyday thing, for instance, what clay is, and we should reply that it is the potters' clay and the oven-makers' clay and the brickmakers' clay, should we not be ridiculous?
THEAET. Perhaps.
soc. Yes; in the first place for assuming that the questioner can understand from our answer what clay is, when we say "clay," no matter whether we add "the image-makers'" or any other craftsmen's. Or does anyone, do you think, understand the name of anything when he does not know what the thing is?
THEAET. By no means.
soc. Then he does not understand knowledge of shoes if he does not know knowledge.
THEAET. No.
soc. Then he who is ignorant of knowledge does not understand cobblerly or any other art.
THEAET. That is true.
soc. Then it is a ridiculous answer to the question "what is knowledge?" when we give the name of
C ónoma. tivós γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἀποκρίνεται οὐ τοῦτ’ ἐρωτηθεῖς.

ΘΕΑΙ. "Εσοικεν.

ΣΩ. "Επειτά γέ που ἐξὸν φαύλως καὶ βραχέως ἀποκρίνασθαι περιέρχεται ἀπέραντον ὄδὸν. οἶνον καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει φαύλον που καὶ ἀπλοῦν εἰπεῖν ὅτι γῇ ύγρῇ φυραθείσα πηλὸς ἀν εἴη, τὸ δ’ ὦτον ἐὰν χαίρειν.

5. ΘΕΑΙ. 'Ράδιον, ὥν Σώκρατες, νῦν γε οὕτω φαίνεται: ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύεις ἐρωτάν οἶνον καὶ αὐτὸς ἤμιν ἐναγχός εἰσῆλθε διαλεγομένοις, ἐμοὶ δ’ ἑατέρου τοῦτον Σωκράτει.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ποίον δή, ὥ Θεάτητε;

ΘΕΑΙ. Περὶ δυνάμεων τι ἤμιν Θεόδωρος οἶδε ἔγραφε, τῆς τε τρίποδος πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος ἀποφαίνων ὅτι μήκει οὐ σύμμετρο τῇ ποδιαίᾳ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ μίαν ἑκάστην προαιρούμενος μέχρι τῆς ἐπτακοιδεκάποδος· ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ πως ἐνέσχετο. ἤμιν οὖν εἰσῆλθε τι τοιοῦτον, ἐπειδὴ ἀπειροὶ τὸ πλῆθος αἱ δυνάμεις ἐφαίνοντο, πειράθηναι συλλαβεῖν Εἰς ἐν, ὅτι πάσαι ταύτας προσαγορεύσομεν τὰς δυνάμεις.

1 ἀποφαίνων om. T; Burnet brackets.

1 A simple form of the first statement would be: The square roots of 3, 5, etc., are irrational numbers or surds. The word δύναμις has not the meaning which we give in English to “power,” namely the result of multiplication of a number by itself, but that which we give to “root,” i.e. the number which, when multiplied by itself, produces a given result. Here Theaetetus is speaking of square roots only; and when he speaks of numbers and of equal factors
THEAETETUS

some art; for we give in our answer something that knowledge belongs to, when that was not what we were asked.

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. Secondly, when we might have given a short, everyday answer, we go an interminable distance round; for instance, in the question about clay, the everyday, simple thing would be to say "clay is earth mixed with moisture" without regard to whose clay it is.

THEAET. It seems easy just now, Socrates, as you put it; but you are probably asking the kind of thing that came up among us lately when your namesake, Socrates here, and I were talking together.

soc. What kind of thing was that, Theaetetus?

THEAET. Theodorus here was drawing some figures for us in illustration of roots, showing that squares containing three square feet and five square feet are not commensurable in length with the unit of the foot, and so, selecting each one in its turn up to the square containing seventeen square feet; and at that he stopped. Now it occurred to us, since the number of roots appeared to be infinite, to try to collect them under one name, by which we could henceforth call all the roots.¹

he evidently thinks of rational whole numbers only, not of irrational numbers or fractions. He is not giving an exhaustive presentation of his investigation, but merely a brief sketch of it to illustrate his understanding of the purpose of Socrates. Toward the end of this sketch the word διναμυς is limited to the square roots of "oblong" numbers, i.e. to surds. The modern reader may be somewhat confused because Theaetetus seems to speak of arithmetical facts in geometrical terms. (Cf. Gow, Short History of Greek Mathematics, p. 85.)

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σω. Ἄριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν· τὸν μὲν δυνάμενον ἵσον ἵσακις γίγνεσθαι τῷ τετραγώνῳ τὸ σχήμα ἀπεικάσαντες τετράγωνὸν τε καὶ ἴσο-πλευρον προσεῖπομεν.

σω. Καὶ εὖ γε.

σω. Ἅρη καὶ ηὔρετέ τι τοιοῦτον;  

σω. Ἐμοίγε δοκούμεν· σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ.

σω. Λέγε.

σω. Tὸν ἄριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν· τὸν μὲν δυνάμενον ἵσον ἵσακις γίγνεσθαι τῷ τετραγώνῳ τὸ σχήμα ἀπεικάσαντες τετράγωνὸν τε καὶ ἴσο-πλευρον προσεῖπομεν.

σω. Καὶ εὖ γε.

σω. Τὸν τοῖς μεταξὺ τούτου, ὥν καὶ τὰ τρία καὶ τὰ πέντε καὶ πᾶς ὃς ἄδυνατος ἵσος ἵσακις γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἡ πλείων ἐλαττονάκις ἢ ἐλάττων πλεονάκις γίγνεται, μεῖζων δὲ καὶ ἐλάττων ἀεὶ πλευρὰ αὐτὸν περιλαμβάνει, τῷ προμήκει αὐθεντίματι ἀπεικάσαντες προμήκῃ ἄριθμον ἐκαλέ-σαμεν.

σω. Κάλλιστα. Ἀλλὰ τὶ τὸ μετὰ τούτο;  

σω. Ὅσαι μὲν γραμμαὶ τὸν ἴσοπλευρον καὶ ἐπίπεδον ἄριθμον τετραγωνίζουσι, μήκος ἀριστομεθα, ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἐπερομήκῃ, δυνάμεις, ὃς μήκει B μὲν οὐ ξυμμέτρους ἐκείναις, τοῖς δ' ἐπιπέδοις ὃ δύνανται. καὶ περὶ τὰ στερεὰ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

σω. Ἀριστά γ' ἀνθρώπων, ὃ παῖδες· ὅστε μοι δοκεῖ ὁ Θεόδωρος οὐκ ἐνοχὸς τοῖς ἴσον τυχότος ἔσεσθαι.

σω. Ἀριστά γ' ἀνθρώπων, ὃ παῖδες· ὅστε μοι δοκεῖ ὁ Θεόδωρος οὐκ ἐνοχὸς τοῖς ἴσον τυχότος ἔσεσθαι.

σω. Ἀριστά γ' ἀνθρώπων, ὃ παῖδες· ὅστε μοι δοκεῖ ὁ Θεόδωρος οὐκ ἐνοχὸς τοῖς ἴσον τυχότος ἔσεσθαι.

σω. Ἀριστά γ' ἀνθρώπων, ὃ παῖδες· ὅστε μοι δοκεῖ ὁ Θεόδωρος οὐκ ἐνοχὸς τοῖς ἴσον τυχότος ἔσεσθαι.

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soc. And did you find such a name?
theaet. I think we did. But see if you agree.
soc. Speak on.
theaet. We divided all number into two classes. The one, the numbers which can be formed by multiplying equal factors, we represented by the shape of the square and called square or equilateral numbers.
soc. Well done!
theaet. The numbers between these, such as three and five and all numbers which cannot be formed by multiplying equal factors, but only by multiplying a greater by a less or a less by a greater, and are therefore always contained in unequal sides, we represented by the shape of the oblong rectangle and called oblong numbers.
soc. Very good; and what next?
theaet. All the lines which form the four sides of the equilateral or square numbers we called lengths, and those which form the oblong numbers we called surds, because they are not commensurable with the others in length, but only in the areas of the planes which they have the power to form. And similarly in the case of solids.1
soc. Most excellent, my boys! I think Theodorus will not be found liable to an action for false witness.
theaet. But really, Socrates, I cannot answer that question of yours about knowledge, as we answered the question about length and square roots. And yet you seem to me to want something of that kind. So Theodorus appears to be a false witness after all.

1 That is, cubes and cube roots.
Τί δέ; εἴ σε πρὸς δρόμουν ἐπαινῶν μηδενὶ
οὔτω δρομικῷ ἐφὶ τῶν νέων ἐντευχηκέναι, εἶτα
diαθέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου ἡττήθης,
ηττὸν τι ἄν οἶει ἀληθῆ τόνδ' ἐπαινέσαι;

"Οὐκ ἐγώγε.

Ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ
ἔλεγον, σμικρὸν τι οἶει εἶναι ἐξευρεῖν καὶ οὐ τῶν
πάντη ἀκρων;

"Νη τὸν Δί' ἐγώγε καὶ μάλα γε τῶν ἀκρο-

"Θάρρει τοῖν περὶ σαυτῶ καὶ τι ο'ου

"Ψηφίζων λέγειν, προθυμήθητι δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ
tῶν τε ἅλλων πέρι καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον, τί
ποτε τυγχάνει οὖν.

"Προσβάλλομα μὲν ἄνεκα, ὁ Ὁσκράτης, φα-

"Θάρρει τοῖν περὶ σαυτῶ καὶ τι ο'ου

"Ψηφίζων λέγειν, προθυμήθητι δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ
tῶν τε ἅλλων πέρι καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον, τί
ποτε τυγχάνει οὖν.

"Προσβάλλομα μὲν ἄνεκα, ὁ Ὁσκράτης, φα-

6. Ξυ "Ἰθι δή—καλῶς γὰρ ἄρτι υψηλότερον—
πειρῶ μυθομένοις τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπό-
κρισιν, ὥσπερ ταύτας πολλὰς οὕσας ἐνι εἰθεὶ
περιέλαβες, οὔτω καὶ τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐνὶ
λόγῳ προσεπεῖν.

Ε Ἡ Ἐαί. "Ἄλλῳ εὑ ὦ Ισθὶ, ὁ Ὁσκράτης, πολλὰς δὴ
αὐτὸ ἐπεχείρησα σκέψασθαι, ἀκούσων τὰς παρὰ
σου ἀποφερομένας ἐρωτήσεις. ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὕτ'
αὐτὸς δύναις πεῖσαι ἐμαυτὸν ὡς ἰκανῶς τι λέγω,
οὔτ' ἄλλου ἀκούσαι λέγοντος οὔτως ὡς σὺ διακε-
κελέτευς σου μὲν δὴ αὐ οὔθ' ἀπαλλαγήναι τοῦ μέλεως.¹

Συ. "Βίόνεις γὰρ, ὁ φίλε Ἡθαίτηται, διὰ τὸ μή
κενὸς ἂλλ' ἐγκύμων εἶναι.

"Οὐκ οἶδα, ὁ Ὁσκράτης. δὲ μέντοι πέπονθα
λέγω.

¹ μέλεων B, Berol. et γρ. W (and Burnet); μέλλεων T; εὑρεῖν W.
soc. Nonsense! If he were praising your running and said he had never met any young man who was so good a runner, and then you were beaten in a race by a full grown man who held the record, do you think his praise would be any less truthful?

THEAET. Why, no.

soc. And do you think that the discovery of knowledge, as I was just now saying, is a small matter and not a task for the very ablest men?

THEAET. By Zeus, I think it is a task for the very ablest.

soc. Then you must have confidence in yourself, and believe that Theodorus is right, and try earnestly in every way to gain an understanding of the nature of knowledge as well as of other things.

THEAET. If it is a question of earnestness, Socrates, the truth will come to light.

soc. Well then—for you pointed out the way admirably just now—take your answer about the roots as a model, and just as you embraced them all in one class, though they were many, try to designate the many forms of knowledge by one definition.

THEAET. But I assure you, Socrates, I have often tried to work that out, when I heard reports of the questions that you asked, but I can neither persuade myself that I have any satisfactory answer, nor can I find anyone else who gives the kind of answer you insist upon; and yet, on the other hand, I cannot get rid of a feeling of concern about the matter.

soc. Yes, you are suffering the pangs of labour, Theaetetus, because you are not empty, but pregnant.

THEAET. I do not know, Socrates; I merely tell you what I feel.
PLATO

149 ξν. Είτε, ὁ καταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὥς ἐγώ εἰμι ὑσ μαίας μᾶλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαναρέτης;

Θεαί. Ἡδη τούτό γε ήκουσα.

ξν. Ἀρα καὶ, ὅτι ἐπιτηδεύω τὴν αὐτὴν τέχνην, ἀκήκοας;

Θεαί. Οὐδαμῶς.

ξν. Ἀλλ' εὖ ἵσθ' ὅτι μὴ μέντοι μου κατείπης πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους. λεληθα γάρ, ὁ ἐταίρε, ταύτην ἔχων τὴν τέχνην· οἱ δὲ, ἀτε ὦνκ εἴδότες, τοῦτο μέν οὐ λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν. ἢ καὶ τοῦτο ἀκήκοας;

Β Θεαί. Ἐγώγε.

ξν. Εἶπον οὖν σοι τὸ αἴτιον;

Θεαί. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ξν. Ἐννόησον δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς μαίας ἀπαν ὡς ἔχει, καὶ ράον μαθήσει ὁ βουλόμαι. οἴσθα γάρ ποι ὡς οὐδεμία αὐτῶν ἑτί αὐτὴ κυϊσκομένη τε καὶ τίκτουσα ἄλλας μαιεύεται, ἀλλ' αἰ ἦδη ἀδύνατοι τίκτεων.

Θεαί. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ξν. Αἰτίαν δὲ γε τοῦτο φασίν εἶναι τῇν Ἀρτεμιν, ὅτι ἄλοχος οὖσα τὴν λοχείαν εἶληχε. στερί-

C φαίς μὲν οὖν ἄρα οὐκ ἐδώκε μαιεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἡ λαβεῖν τέχνην ὅν ἦ ἡ ἀπειρος· ταῖς δὲ δι' ἡλικίαν ἀτόκοις προσέταξε τιμῶσα τὴν αὐτῆς ὁμοιότητα.

Θεαί. Εἴκος.

ξν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε εἰκὸς τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον,
THEAETETUS

soc. Have you then not heard, you absurd boy, that I am the son of a noble and burly midwife, Phaenarete?

THEAET. Yes, I have heard that.

soc. And have you also heard that I practise the same art?

THEAET. No, never.

soc. But I assure you it is true; only do not tell on me to the others; for it is not known that I possess this art. But other people, since they do not know it, do not say this of me, but say that I am a most eccentric person and drive men to distraction. Have you heard that also?

THEAET. Yes, I have.

soc. Shall I tell you the reason then?

THEAET. Oh yes, do.

soc. Just take into consideration the whole business of the midwives, and you will understand more easily what I mean. For you know, I suppose, that no one of them attends other women while she is still capable of conceiving and bearing but only those do so who have become too old to bear.

THEAET. Yes, certainly.

soc. They say the cause of this is Artemis, because she, a childless goddess, has had childbirth allotted to her as her special province. Now it would seem she did not allow barren women to be midwives, because human nature is too weak to acquire an art which deals with matters of which it has no experience, but she gave the office to those who on account of age were not bearing children, honouring them for their likeness to herself.

THEAET. Very likely.

soc. Is it not, then, also likely and even necessary,
τὰς κυνούσας καὶ μὴ γυνώσκεσθαι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν μαίῶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων;

τοια. Πάνυ γε.

ς. Καὶ μὴν καὶ διδοῦσαί γε αἱ μαίαι φαρμάκια

δὲ καὶ ἐπάδουσαι δύνανται ἐγείρειν τε τὰς ὁδῆνας καὶ μαλθακωτέρας, ἀν βούλωνται, ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτευν

τε δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἔαν νέον ὄν

δόξην ἀμβλύσκειν, ἀμβλύσκουσιν;

τοια. Ἡστὶ ταῦτα.

ς. Ὁριγι σηντι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἔσθησαι, ὅτι καὶ προμνήστριαι εἰσὶ δεινόταται, ὡς πάσοσοφο

οὖσαι περὶ τοῦ γνῶναι ποιάν χρῆ ποιῶς ἀνδρὶ

συνόδουν ὡς ἀρίστους παῖδας τίκτευν;

τοια. Όὐ πάνυ τοῦτο οἴδα.

ς. Ἁλλὰ ἵσθι δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦτο μείζον φρονοῦσιν

Ε ἣ ἐπὶ τῇ ὁμφαλητομίᾳ. ἐννοεῖ γάρ· τῆς αὐτῆς

ἢ ἄλλης οἰεὶ τέχνης εἰναὶ θεραπείαν τε καὶ συγκο-

μιδὴν τῶν ἐκ γῆς καρπῶν καὶ αὐ τὸ γυνώσκεν εἰς

ποιάν γῆν ποίον φυτὸν τε καὶ σπέρμα καταβλητεόν;

τοια. Ό(',') ἄλλα τῆς αὐτῆς.

ς. Εἰς γυναῖκα δὲ, ὃ φίλε, ἄλλην μὲν οἷεὶ τοῦ

τουτούτου, ἄλλην δὲ συγκομιδῆς;

τοια. Οὐκουν εἰκός γε.

150 ς. Όὐ γάρ. ἄλλα διὰ τὴν ἁδικὸν τε καὶ

ἀτεχνὸν συναγωγὴν ἄνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, ὢ δὴ

προαγωγία ὄνομα, φεύγονται καὶ τὴν προμνηστικὴν

ἀτε σεμναὶ οὖσαι αἱ μαίαι, φοβοῦμεναι μὴ εἰς

ἐκείνην τὴν αἰτίαν διὰ ταύτην ἐμπέσωσιν· ἐπεὶ

1 νέον ὄν of the mss. is impossible; Schanz suggests νόμιμον “lawful,” Adam νηδὼν “the womb.” Possibly Plato wrote νέντεον “permissible.”
that midwives should know better than anyone else who are pregnant and who are not?

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. And furthermore, the midwives, by means of drugs and incantations, are able to arouse the pangs of labour and, if they wish, to make them milder, and to cause those to bear who have difficulty in bearing; and they cause miscarriages if they think them desirable.

THEAET. That is true.

soc. Well, have you noticed this also about them, that they are the most skilful of matchmakers, since they are very wise in knowing what union of man and woman will produce the best possible children?

THEAET. I do not know that at all.

soc. But be assured that they are prouder of this than of their skill in cutting the umbilical cord. Just consider. Do you think the knowledge of what soil is best for each plant or seed belongs to the same art as the tending and harvesting of the fruits of the earth, or to another?

THEAET. To the same art.

soc. And in the case of a woman, do you think, my friend, that there is one art for the sowing and another for the harvesting?

THEAET. It is not likely.

soc. No; but because there is a wrongful and unscientific way of bringing men and women together, which is called pandering, the midwives, since they are women of dignity and worth, avoid match-making, through fear of falling under the charge of pander-
ταῖς γε ὁντως μαίαις μόναις ποι προσήκει καὶ
προμνήσασθαι ὁρθώς.

oriously.  

συ. Τὸ μὲν τοῖνυν τῶν μαίων τοσοῦτον, ἐλαττοῦ
δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος. οὐ γὰρ πρόσεστι γυναῖξιν
Β ἐνίοτε μὲν εἴδωλα τίκτευν, ἐστὶ δὲ  ὅτε ἄληθινα,
τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι διαγνώναι. εἰ γὰρ
προσήη, μέγιστον τε καὶ κάλλιστον ἔργον ἢν ἄν
ταῖς μαίαις τὸ κρίνειν τὸ ἄληθὲς τε καὶ μὴ· ἦ
οὐκ οἶει;

oriously. "Εγώγε.

7. συ. Τῇ δὲ γ΄ ἐμῆ τέχνη τῆς μαιεύσεως
τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὑπάρχει ὡσα ἐκεῖνας, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ
τε ἀνδρὰς ἄλλα μὴ γυναῖκας μαιεύσθαι καὶ τῷ
τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τυκτούσας ἐπισκοπεῖν ἄλλα μὴ
τὰ σώματα. μέγιστον δὲ τούτ᾽ ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ
C τέχνῃ, βασανίζειν δυνατόν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ,
πότερον εἴδωλον καὶ ψεύδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἢ
διάνοια ἡ γόνυμόν τε καὶ ἄληθές. ἐπεὶ τόδε γε
καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει, ὀπέρ ταῖς μαίαις· ἣγονός εἰμι
σοφίας, καὶ ὀπέρ ἢδη πολλοί μοι ὦνειδισαν, ὦς
τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρί
νομαι περὶ οὔδενος διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν,
ἄληθές ὦνειδίζουσιν. τὸ δὲ αὐτίκων τούτου τόδε
μαιεύσθαι μὲ ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκω
λυσεν. εἰμὶ δὴ οὐν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πάνυ τις σοφός,
D οὐδὲ τί μοι ἐστὶν εὐρήμα τοιοῦτον γεγονὸς τῆς
ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἐκγονον· οἱ δὲ ἐμοὶ συγγιγνόμενοι τὸ
μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται ἕνοι μὲν καὶ πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς,
πάντες δὲ προϊόντες τῆς συνοινίας, οἴσπερ ἄν ὁ
θεὸς παρείκη, θαυμαστὸν οὐσον ἐπιδιδόντες, ὦς
ing. And yet the true midwife is the only proper match-maker.

THEAETUS

THEAET. It seems so.

SOC. So great, then, is the importance of midwives; but their function is less important than mine. For women do not, like my patients, bring forth at one time real children and at another mere images which it is difficult to distinguish from the real. For if they did, the greatest and noblest part of the work of the midwives would be in distinguishing between the real and the false. Do you not think so?

THEAET. Yes, I do.

SOC. All that is true of their art of midwifery is true also of mine, but mine differs from theirs in being practised upon men, not women, and in tending their souls in labour, not their bodies. But the greatest thing about my art is this, that it can test in every way whether the mind of the young man is bringing forth a mere image, an imposture, or a real and genuine offspring. For I have this in common with the midwives: I am sterile in point of wisdom, and the reproach which has often been brought against me, that I question others but make no reply myself about anything, because I have no wisdom in me, is a true reproach; and the reason of it is this: the god compels me to act as midwife, but has never allowed me to bring forth. I am, then, not at all a wise person myself, nor have I any wise invention, the offspring born of my own soul; but those who associate with me, although at first some of them seem very ignorant, yet, as our acquaintance advances, all of them to whom the god is gracious make wonderful progress, not only
αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσι· καὶ τούτο ἐναργεῖς ὅτι παρ' ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν πώποτε μαθόντες, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ παρ' αὐτῶν πολλά καὶ καλὰ εὑρόντες τε καὶ τεκόντες.  

1 Τῆς μέντοι μαλείας ὁ θεὸς τε καὶ ἐγώ αἰτιος. ὡδὲ δὲ δῆλον· πολλοὶ ἥδη 

Ε τούτῳ ἀγνοήσαντες καὶ ἑαυτοὺς αὐτισασάμενοι, ἐμοῦ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἡ αὐτοὶ ἡ ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες ἀπῆλθον πρωαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἀπελθόντες δὲ τὰ τε λοιπὰ ἑξήμβλωσαν διὰ πονηρὰν συνουσίαν καὶ τὰ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μαιευθέντα κακῶς τρέφοντες ἀπώλεσαν, πτωχεύσας καὶ εἰδωλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἁλθοῦς, τελευτώντες δ' αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔδοξαν ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι. ὃν εἰς γέγονεν 

151 Ἀριστείδης δ' Ἀναμάχου καὶ ἄλλοι πάνω πολλοὶ· οίς, όταν πάλιν ἐξθωσὶ δεόμενοι τῆς ἐμῆς συνουσίας καὶ θαυμαστὰ δρώντες, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γυγνόμενον μοι δαμόνιον ἀποκολύει συνείναι, ἐνίοις δὲ εἶδο, καὶ πάλιν ὁδὸν ἐπιδιδόσασι. πάσχοι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ συγγνώμόμενοι καὶ τούτῳ ταὐτὸν ταῖς τικτούσαις· ὑδίνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπορίας ἐμπίπτοντα κύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἡ ἔκειναι. ταῦτην δὲ τὴν ὑδίνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀποπούειν ἡ ἔμη τέχνη δύναται. καὶ οὕτωι μὲν Ἐδὴ ὦτως. ἐνίοις  

2 δὲ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὐ δὲν Μοι, ὥθουσι πως ἐγκύμονες εἶναι, γνοὺς ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δέονται, πάνυ εὐμενῶς προμνώμαι καὶ, σὺν 

1 καὶ τεκόντες W, Berol.; κατέχοντες BT.  
2 οὕτωι T; αὐτοὶ B.  
3 ἔκειναι B; κεῖναι T.  
4 ἐνίοι Berol., Burnet; ἐνίοτε BT; ἐνιοὶ W.
in their own opinion, but in that of others as well. And it is clear that they do this, not because they have ever learned anything from me, but because they have found in themselves many fair things and have brought them forth. But the delivery is due to the god and me. And the proof of it is this: many before now, being ignorant of this fact and thinking that they were themselves the cause of their success, but despising me, have gone away from me sooner than they ought, whether of their own accord or because others persuaded them to do so. Then, after they have gone away, they have miscarried thenceforth on account of evil companionship, and the offspring which they had brought forth through my assistance they have reared so badly that they have lost it; they have considered impostures and images of more importance than the truth, and at last it was evident to themselves, as well as to others, that they were ignorant. One of these was Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus, and there are very many more. When such men come back and beg me, as they do, with wonderful eagerness to let them join me again, the spiritual monitor that comes to me forbids me to associate with some of them, but allows me to converse with others, and these again make progress. Now those who associate with me are in this matter also like women in childbirth; they are in pain and are full of trouble night and day, much more than are the women; and my art can arouse this pain and cause it to cease. Well, that is what happens to them. But in some cases, Theaetetus, when they do not seem to me to be exactly pregnant, since I see that they have no need of me, I act with perfect goodwill.
θεῷ εἶπεῖν, πάνυ ἰκανός τοπάζω ὦ ἵνα συγγενόμενοι οὖν αὐτό τὸν πολλοὺς μὲν δὴ ἐξέδωκα Προδίκῳ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλους σοφοὺς τε καὶ θεοπεσίοις ἀνδράσι.

Ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ὥς ἄριστε, ἑνεκα τοῦτε ἐμήκυνα, ὑποτευόντας 1 σε, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς οὔει, ὡδίνειν τι κυοῦντα ένδου. προσφέρου ὦν πρόσ με ἤς πρὸς C μαίας ὦν καὶ αὐτὸν μαυεντικόν, καὶ ὥς ἄν ἐρωτῶ προθυμοῦ ὅπως οἶδο τ' εἴ ὄντως ἀποκρίνασθαι· καὶ ἐὰν ἁρὰ σκοπούμενος τι ἄν ἂν λέγης ἱγήσωμαι εἰδώλον καὶ μὴ ἄληθές, εἶτα ὑπεξαιρόμαι καὶ ἀποβάλλω, 2 μὴ ἀγρίαινε ὦσπερ αἱ πρωτοτόκοι περὶ τὰ παιδία. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἦδη, ὥς θαυμάστε, πρός με οὕτω διετέθησον, ὅστε ἀτεχνὸς δάκνεν ἑτοιμοὶ εἴναι, ἐπειδὰν τῶν λόρων αὐτῶν ἄφαιρόμαι, καὶ οὐκ οὕντα με εὐνοϊα τοῦτο ποιεῖν, D πόρρω ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδεὶς θεὸς δύσων ἄνθρωπος, οὐδ' ἐγὼ δυσνοία τοιοῦτον οὔδὲν δρῶ, ἄλλα μοι ζητῆσε τὸ συγχαρήσαι καὶ ἄληθὲς ἀφανίσαι οὐδαμῶς θέμις. πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥ Θεαίτητε, ὃ τι ποτ' ἐστίν ἐπιστήμη, πειρῶ λέγειν· ὡς δ' οὖν οἶδος τ' εἴ, μηδέποτ' εἰπης. εάν γὰρ θεὸς ἐθέλη καὶ ἄνδρίζῃ, οἶδος τ' ἔσει.

8. ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλὰ μέντοι, ὥς Σώκρατες, σοῦ γε οὕτω παρακελευμένον αἰσχρὸν μὴ οὐ παντὶ Ετρόπω προθυμεῖσθαι ὃ τὶ τις ἔχει λέγειν. Δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὃ ἐπιστάμενος τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἐπιστάται, καὶ ὡς οὐ τοιαύτης, οὖκ ἄλλο τὶ ἐστίν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἰσθήσεις.

1 ὑποτευοῦν B; ὑποτευοῦ al.
2 ἀποβάλλω T; ὑποβάλω B; ἀποβάλω W.
as match-maker and, under God, I guess very successfully with whom they can associate profitably, and I have handed over many of them to Prodicus, and many to other wise and inspired men.

Now I have said all this to you at such length, my dear boy, because I suspect that you, as you yourself believe, are in pain because you are pregnant with something within you. Apply, then, to me, remembering that I am the son of a midwife and have myself a midwife's gifts, and do your best to answer the questions I ask as I ask them. And if, when I have examined any of the things you say, it should prove that I think it is a mere image and not real, and therefore quietly take it from you and throw it away, do not be angry as women are when they are deprived of their first offspring. For many, my dear friend, before this have got into such a state of mind towards me that they are actually ready to bite me, if I take some foolish notion away from them, and they do not believe that I do this in kindness, since they are far from knowing that no god is unkind to mortals, and that I do nothing of this sort from unkindness, either, and that it is quite out of the question for me to allow an imposture or to destroy the true. And so, Theaetetus, begin again and try to tell us what knowledge is. And never say that you are unable to do so; for if God wills it and gives you courage, you will be able.

THEAET. Well then, Socrates, since you are so urgent it would be disgraceful for anyone not to exert himself in every way to say what he can. I think, then, that he who knows anything perceives that which he knows, and, as it appears at present, knowledge is nothing else than perception.
PLATO

Σ. Εὑ γε καὶ γενναῖως, ὡ παῖ: χρῆ γὰρ οὕτως ἀποφαινόμενον λέγειν. ἀλλὰ φέρε δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα, γόνιμον ἢ ἀνεμιαῖον τυγχάνει ὁν. αἰσθήσεις, φήμ, ἐπιστήμη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

Σ. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαύλον εἰρη-
152 κέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ’ ὅν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωτ-
αγόρας. τρόπον δὲ τινα ἄλλον εἰρήκε τὰ αὐτὰ
tαῦτα. φησὶ γὰρ ποὺ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον
ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἐστὶ, τῶν δὲ
μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἐστίν. ἀνέγνωκας γὰρ ποὺ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἰα μὲν ἐκα-
στὰ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαύτα μὲν ἐστὶν ἐμοί, οἰα δὲ
σοὶ, τοιαύτα δὲ αὖ σοὶ. ἄνθρωπος δὲ σὺ τε κἀγὼ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτω.

Β Σ. Εἴκος μέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν· ἐπ-
ακολούθησωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ. ἃρ’ οὐκ ἐνώτε πνεον-
tος ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὃ μὲν ἥμων ρίγοι, ὃ δ’ οὐ;
καὶ ὃ μὲν ἥρέμα, ὃ δὲ σφόδρα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

Σ. Πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸ ἐφ’ ἐαυτοῦ 1 τὸ
πνεύμα ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν; ἡ πεισόμεθα
tῶ Πρωταγόρα ὅτι τῶ μὲν ριγοῦντι ψυχρόν, τῶ
dὲ μὴ οὖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικεῖν.

Σ. Οὔκοιν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτω ἐκατέρω;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

1 ἐαυτοῦ W, Berol.; ἐαυτὸ BT.
soc. Good! Excellent, my boy! That is the way one ought to speak out. But come now, let us examine your utterance together, and see whether it is a real offspring or a mere wind-egg. Perception, you say, is knowledge?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And, indeed, if I may venture to say so, it is not a bad description of knowledge that you have given, but one which Protagoras also used to give. Only, he has said the same thing in a different way. For he says somewhere that man is "the measure of all things, of the existence of the things that are and the non-existence of the things that are not." You have read that, I suppose?

THEAET. Yes, I have read it often.

soc. Well, is not this about what he means, that individual things are for me such as they appear to me, and for you in turn such as they appear to you—you and I being "man"?

THEAET. Yes, that is what he says.

soc. It is likely that a wise man is not talking nonsense; so let us follow after him. Is it not true that sometimes, when the same wind blows, one of us feels cold, and the other does not? or one feels slightly and the other exceedingly cold?

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Then in that case, shall we say that the wind is in itself cold or not cold; or shall we accept Protagoras's saying that it is cold for him who feels cold and not for him who does not?

THEAET. Apparently we shall accept that.

soc. Then it also seems cold, or not, to each of the two?

THEAET. Yes.
Τὸ δὲ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔστιν;  
θεαί. Ὡς ἕστιν γάρ.

ΣΠ. Φαντασία ἀρα καὶ αἰσθησις ταύτων ἐν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πάσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. οἵα γάρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, τοιῶτα ἕκαστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι.  
θεαί. Ἒοικεν.

ΣΠ. Αἰσθησις ἀρα τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἄφενδες ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὖσα.  
θεαί. Φαίνεται.

ΣΠ. Ἄρ', οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσοφός τις ἢν ὁ Πρωταγόρας, καὶ τούτῳ ἦμῖν μὲν ἦν ἱνέκατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἁλήθειαν ἔλεγεν;

D θεαί. Πῶς δῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο λέγεις;  
ΣΠ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ καὶ μάλ' οὐ φαύλων λόγων· ὡς ἀρα ἐν μὲν αὕτῳ καθ' αὐτό ὄδεϊν ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἄν τι προσείποις ὀρθῶς οὐδ' ὅποιονον τι, ἀλλ', ἐὰν ὡς μέγα προσαγορεύῃς, καὶ σμικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ ἕναν βαρύ, κοῦφον, ἐξυπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἐνός μῆτε τινὸς μῆτε ὅποιονον· ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἀλληλα γίγνεται πάντα ἀ δὴ φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ' οὕτως, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται. καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἔξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου συμφερέσθων,  
Ε δὲ γίγνεται. καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἔξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου συμφερέσθων, Ἐμπεδόκλης, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἀκροὶ τῆς ποιήσεως ἐκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὀμηρος, ὅς ἐπὶ τῶν Ἥρεαν τοὺς θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρας Τήθον

1 συμφερέσθων B (ut videtur), Burnet; συμφέρεσθον TW, Berol., Eus.; συμφέροντα Stobaeus.  
2 ὅς add. Heindorf.
sor. But "seems" denotes perceiving?
THEAET. It does.

sor. Then seeming and perception are the same thing in matters of warmth and everything of that sort. For as each person perceives things, such they are to each person.
THEAET. Apparently.

sor. Perception, then, is always of that which exists and, since it is knowledge, cannot be false.
THEAET. So it seems.

sor. By the Graces! I wonder if Protagoras, who was a very wise man, did not utter this dark saying to the common herd like ourselves, and tell the truth in secret to his pupils.
THEAET. Why, Socrates, what do you mean by that?

sor. I will tell you and it is not a bad description, either, that nothing is one and invariable, and you could not rightly ascribe any quality whatsoever to anything, but if you call it large it will also appear to be small, and light if you call it heavy, and everything else in the same way, since nothing whatever is one, either a particular thing or of a particular quality; but it is out of movement and motion and mixture with one another that all those things become which we wrongly say "are"—wrongly, because nothing ever is, but is always becoming. And on this subject all the philosophers, except Parmenides, may be marshalled in one line—Protagoras and Heraclitus and Empedocles—and the chief poets in the two kinds of poetry, Epicharmus, in comedy, and in tragedy, Homer, who, in the line

Oceanus the origin of the gods, and Tethys their mother.

1 An allusion to the title of Protagoras's book, *Truth.*
2 Homer, *Iliad,* xiv. 201, 302.
πάντα εὑρηκεν ἐκγόνα ροής τε καὶ κινήσεως· ἢ
οὐ δοκεῖ τούτο λέγειν;
θεαί. Ἡ ἐμοίγη.
9. σφ. Τίς οὖν ἂν ἔτι πρὸς γε τοσοῦτον
153 στρατόπεδον καὶ στρατηγὸν ὁμηρον δύνατο
ἀμφίσβητήσας μὴ ὦ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι;
θεαί. οὐ ράδιον, φί Σώκρατες.
σφ. Οὐ γάρ, φί θεαίτητε. ἔπει καὶ τάδε τῷ
λόγῳ σημεῖα ἵκανα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ
γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ
ἀπόλλυσθαι ἡσυχία· τὸ γάρ θερμὸν τε καὶ πῦρ,
ὁ δὲ καὶ τάλλα γεννᾶ καὶ ἐπιτροπεύει, αὕτῳ γεννᾶ-
ται ἐκ φοράς καὶ τρίψεως· τούτῳ δὲ κινήσει.
ἡ οὖν ἄντα γενέσεις πυρὸς;
B θεαί. Αὐταὶ μὲν οὖν.
σφ. Καὶ μὴν τὸ γε τῶν ζώων γένος ἐκ τῶν
αὐτῶν τούτων φύεται.
θεαί. Πῶς δ᾿ οὐ;
σφ. Τί δὲ; ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἔξεις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυ-
χίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ
καὶ κινήσεων ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ 3 σῴζεται;
θεαί. Ναί.
σφ. Ἡ δ᾿ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξεις οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως
μὲν καὶ μελέτης, κινήσεων ὄντων, 4 κτάται τε
μαθήματα καὶ σῴζεται καὶ γίγνεται βελτίων, ὑπὸ
δ᾿ ἡσυχίας, ἀμελητησίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας οὐσίας,
ἡ οὔτε τι μανθάνει ἃ τε ἂν μάθῃ ἐπιλαμβάνεται;

1 μὴ οὐ W, Eus., Stobaeus; μὴ BT.
2 τούτω B²W, Berol.; τούτῳ BT, Stobaeus.
3 ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ B, Stobaeus; ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ T (ὡς above the
line); ἐπὶ πολὺ Burnet.
4 κινήσεων οὕσων Stobaeus; κινήσεων ὄντων Buttmann.
THEAETETUS

has said that all things are the offspring of flow and motion; or don't you think he means that?

THEAET. I think he does.

soc. Then who could still contend with such a great host, led by Homer as general, and not make himself ridiculous?

THEAET. It is not easy, Socrates.

soc. No, Theaetetus, it is not. For the doctrine is amply proved by this, namely, that motion is the cause of that which passes for existence, that is, of becoming, whereas rest is the cause of non-existence and destruction; for warmth or fire, which, you know, is the parent and preserver of all other things, is itself the offspring of movement and friction, and these two are forms of motion. Or are not these the source of fire?

THEAET. Yes, they are.

soc. And furthermore, the animal kingdom is sprung from these same sources.

THEAET. Of course.

soc. Well, then, is not the bodily habit destroyed by rest and idleness, and preserved, generally speaking, by gymnastic exercises and motions?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And what of the habit of the soul? Does not the soul acquire information and is it not preserved and made better through learning and practice, which are motions, whereas through rest, which is want of practice and of study, it learns nothing and forgets what it has learned?
PLATO

ἐξει. Καὶ μᾶλα.

σο. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἀγαθὸν κίνησις κατὰ τε ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τοῦναυτίον;

ἐξει. ᾙΕουκεν.

σο. Ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω νυνεῖμασ τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὁσα τοιάντα, ὡς αἱ μὲν ήσυχία σήπουσι καὶ ἀπολλύασι, τὰ δ’ ἐτερα σῷζει; καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφώνα ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων, τὴν χρυσὴν σειράν ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἤλιον ὁμιρος λέγει, D καὶ δηλοὶ ὃτι ἔως μὲν ἢ περιφορά ἢ κινομένη καὶ ὁ ἤλιος, πάντα ἑστὶ καὶ σῷζεται τὰ ἐν θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπως, εἰ δὲ σταῖν τοῦτο ὃσπερ δεθέν, πάντα χρήματ’ ἀν διαφθαρεῖ καὶ γένοιτ’ ἢν τὸ λεγόμενον ἂνω κἀτω πάντα;

ἐξει. Ἀλλ’ ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σωκράτες, τὰῦτα δηλοῦν, ἀπερ λέγεις.

10. σο. Ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὕτωσι· κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον, δ’ ἡ καλεῖς χρώμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἐτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὄμμάτων μηδ’ ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι· μηδέ τιν’ αὐτῷ E χώραν ἀποτάξης· ᾗδη γὰρ ἂν εἰη τε δῆπον ἢν τάξει καὶ μένον ὃ καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν γενέσει γίγνοιτο.

ἐξει. Ἀλλὰ πῶς;

1 ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων TW, Berol.; ἀναγκάζω προβιβάζων B, Stobaeus; προσβιβάζω (omitting ἀναγκάζω) Cobet, followed by Burnet. Possibly ἀναγράφω προσβιβάζων.

2 δῆπον Schanz; ἂν τοῦ BT.

3 καὶ μένον Stobaeus; κείμενοι pr. B (corr. καὶ μένοι); κείμενον T.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Then the good, both for the soul and for the body, is motion, and rest is the opposite?

THEAET. Apparently.

soc. Now shall I go on and mention to you also windless air, calm sea, and all that sort of thing, and say that stillness causes decay and destruction and that the opposite brings preservation? And shall I add to this the all-compelling and crowning argument that Homer by "the golden chain" refers to nothing else than the sun, and means that so long as the heavens and the sun go round everything exists and is preserved, among both gods and men, but if the motion should stop, as if bound fast, everything would be destroyed and would, as the saying is, be turned upside down?

THEAET. Yes, Socrates, I think he means what you say he does.

soc. Then, my friend, you must apply the doctrine in this way: first as concerns vision, the colour that you call white is not to be taken as something separate outside of your eyes, nor yet as something inside of them; and you must not assign any place to it, for then it would at once be in a definite position and stationary and would have no part in the process of becoming.

THEAET. But what do you mean?

1 Homer, Iliad, viii. 18 ff., especially 36. In this passage Zeus declares that all the gods and goddesses together could not, with a golden chain, drag him from on high, but that if he pulled, he would drag them, with earth and sea, would then bind the chain round the summit of Olympus, and all the rest would hang aloft. This "crowning argument" is a reductio ad absurdum of the habit of using texts from Homer in support of all kinds of doctrine.
Ψ. Ἐπώμεθα τῷ ἀρτὶ λόγῳ, μὴ δὲν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἐν ὦν τιθέντες· καὶ ἡμῖν οὕτω μέλαν τε καὶ λευκόν καὶ ὀτιοῦν ἄλλο χρώμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται γεγενημένον, καὶ ὁ δή ἐκαστὸν εἶναι

154 φαμεν χρώμα, οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἐσται, ἀλλὰ μεταξὺ τι ἐκάστῳ ἰδιον γεγονός· ἡ σὺ διασχυρίσαιο ἂν ὡς, οἶον σοὶ φαίνεται ἐκαστὸν χρώμα, τοιοῦτον καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὀτρώον ζῷῳ;

θεαὶ. Μᾶ Δί’ οὐκ ἐγγιγαὶ.

Ψ. Τι δέ; ἀλλις ἀνθρώπῳ ἀρ’ ὀμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὀτιοῦν; ἔχεις τοῦτο ἵσχυρᾶς, ἡ πολὺ μάλλον, ὥστε σοι αὐτῷ ταὐτὸν διὰ τὸ μηδὲποτε ὀμοίως αὐτῶν σεαυτῷ ἔχεις;

θεαὶ. Τούτῳ μᾶλλόν μοι δοκεῖ ἡ ἐκεῖνο.

Ψ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ὁ 1 παραμετρούμεθα ἡ οὐ Β ἐφαπτόμεθα, μέγα ἡ λευκόν ἡ θερμὸν ἡν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἀλλῳ προσπεσόν ἄλλο ἄν ἐγεγόνει, αὐτῷ γε μηδὲν μεταβάλλον· εἰ δὲ αὐ τὸ παραμετρούμενον ἡ ἐφαπτόμενον ἐκαστὸν ἦν τούτων, οὐκ ἄν αὖ ἄλλου προσελθόντος ἡ τι παθόντος αὐτῷ μηδὲν παθῶν ἄλλο ἄν ἐγένετο. ἔτει νῦν γε, ὦ φίλε, θαυμαστά τε καὶ γελοῖα εὐχέρως πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα λέγεις, ὡς φαίη ἂν Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ πᾶς ὁ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκείνῳ ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν.

1 ὁ mss. ; δ Cornarius.
THEAETETUS

soc. Let us stick close to the statement we made a moment ago, and assume that nothing exists by itself as invariably one: then it will be apparent that black or white or any other colour whatsoever is the result of the impact of the eye upon the appropriate motion, and therefore that which we call colour will be in each instance neither that which impinges nor that which is impinged upon, but something between, which has occurred, peculiar to each individual. Or would you maintain that each colour appears to a dog, or any other animal you please, just as it does to you?

THEAET. No, by Zeus, I wouldn't.

soc. Well, does anything whatsoever appear the same to any other man as to you? Are you sure of this? Or are you not much more convinced that nothing appears the same even to you, because you yourself are never exactly the same?

THEAET. Yes, I am much more convinced of the last.

soc. Then, if that with which I compare myself in size, or which I touch, were really large or white or hot, it would never have become different by coming in contact with something different, without itself changing; and if, on the other hand, that which did the comparing or the touching were really large or white or hot, it would not have become different when something different approached it or was affected in some way by it, without being affected in some way itself. For nowadays, my friend, we find ourselves rather easily forced to make extraordinary and absurd statements, as Protagoras and everyone who undertakes to agree with him would say.
THEAI. Πώς δή καὶ ποία λέγεις;

C Σημικρὸν λαβὲ παράδειγμα, καὶ πάντα εἶσει ἀ βούλομαι. ἀστραγάλους γὰρ ποὺ ἔξ, ἂν μὲν τέτταρας αὐτοῖς προσενέγχης, πλεῖονς φαμὲν εἶναι τῶν τεττάρων καὶ ἡμιολίους, ἐὰν δὲ δώδεκα, ἐλάττους καὶ ἡμίσεις· καὶ οὐδὲ ἀνεκτὸν ἄλλως λέγειν· ἢ σὺ ἀνέξει;

THEAI. Οὐκ ἔγγυε.

Σημ. Τί οὖν; ἂν σὲ Πρωταγόρας ἔρηται ἡ τις ἄλλος· Ὁ Θεαίτης, ἔσθ’ ὅπως τι μειζὸν ἡ πλέον γίγνεται ἄλλως ἢ αὐξηθεῖν; τί ἀποκρινεῖ;

THEAI. 'Εὰν μὲν, ὃ Σώκρατες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς

D τῆν νῦν ἔρωτησιν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐστίν. ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἴπω, ὅτι ἐστίν.

Σημ. Ἐδ γε νὴ τὴν Ὅραν, ὃ φίλε, καὶ θεῖως. ἀτάρ, ὥς έοικεν, ἐὰν ἀποκρίνη ὅτι ἐστίν, Εὐριπίδειον τι ἐμμβῆσεται· ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἐσται, ἡ δὲ φρήν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος.

THEAI. Ἀληθῆ.

Σημ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἴμεν, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἐξητακότες, ἢδη ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ περιουσίας ἄλληλων ἀποπειρώμενοι,

Ε συνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην, ἄλληλων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν· νῦν δὲ ἄτε ἰδιώται πρῶτον βουλήσομεθα θεάσασθαι αὕτα πρὸς αὐτὰ, τί ποτ’ ἔστιν ἀ διανοούμεθα, ποτερον ἡμῖν ἄλληλους ἐμμφωνεῖ ἡ οὐδ’ ὀπωστιοῦν.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. What do you mean? What statements?
soc. Take a little example and you will know all I have in mind. Given six dice, for instance, if you compare four with them, we say that they are more than the four, half as many again, but if you compare twelve with them, we say they are less, half as many; and any other statement would be inadmissible; or would you admit any other?

THEAET. Not I.
soc. Well then, if Protagoras, or anyone else, ask you, "Theaetetus, can anything become greater or more in any other way than by being increased?" what reply will you make?

THEAET. If I am to say what I think, Socrates, with reference to the present question, I should say "no," but if I consider the earlier question, I should say "yes," for fear of contradicting myself.
soc. Good, by Hera! Excellent, my friend! But apparently, if you answer "yes" it will be in the Euripidean spirit; for our tongue will be unconvinced, but not our mind.¹

THEAET. True.
soc. Well, if you and I were clever and wise and had found out everything about the mind, we should henceforth spend the rest of our time testing each other out of the fulness of our wisdom, rushing together like sophists in a sophistical combat, battering each other's arguments with counter arguments. But, as it is, since we are ordinary people, we shall wish in the first place to look into the real essence of our thoughts and see whether they harmonize with one another or not at all.

¹ Eurip. Hippol. 612, η γλώσσα δυσμοχ', ἡ δὲ φῆν ἀνόμος, "my tongue has sworn, but my mind is unsworn."
PLATO

συνέ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν ἔγγυτα τούτ' ἂν βουλοῦμην.
Π. συ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγγυ. οτὲ δ' οὔτως ἔχει, ἀλλ' τι η' ἡ ἱέραια, ως πάνυ πολλὴν σχολὴν ἁγοῦτες, 155 πάλιν ἐπανασκεψόμεθα, οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὃντι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζοντες, ἀττα ποτ' ἐστὶν ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα ἐν ἦμιν; ὅν πρῶτον ἐπισκοποῦντες, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἂν μείζον μηδὲ ἐλάττων γενέσθαι μήτε ὁγκὺ μήτε ἀριθμῷ, ἐως ἴσον εἰν' αὐτὸ ἐαυτῷ. οὐχ οὔτως;

συν. Ναι.

συ. Δεύτερον δὲ γε, ὃ μήτε προστιθοῖτο μήτε ἀφαιροῖτο, τοῦτο μήτε αὐξάνεσθαι ποτε μήτε ἄθυνεν, αἰὲ δὲ ἴσον εἶναι.

συν. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

Β συ. 'Αρ', οὖν οὐ καὶ τρίτον, δ' μή πρῶτερον ἢν, ύστερον ἀλλὰ τούτο εἶναι ἄνευ τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἀδύνατον;

συν. Δοκεῖ γε δὴ.

συ. Ταῦτα δὴ, οἶμαι, δυσλογήματα τρία μάχεται αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ, ὅταν τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀστραγάλων λέγωμεν, ἡ ὅταν φώμεν ἐμὲ τηλικώνδε ὄντα, μήτε αὐξηθέντα μήτε τούναντίον παθόντα, ἐν ἐνιαυτῷ σοῦ τοῦ νέου νῦν μὲν μείζῳ εἶναι, ύστερον δὲ ἐλάττω, μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμὸν ὁγκοῦ ἀφαιρεθέντος.

συ γ᾽ ἀλλὰ σοῦ αὐξηθέντος. εἰμὶ γὰρ δὴ ύστερον δ' πρῶτερον οὐκ ἢ, οὐ γενόμενος· ἂνευ γὰρ τοῦ γενέσθαι γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον, μηδὲν δὲ ἀπολλύσ τοῦ ὁγκοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἐγγυνόμην ἐλάττων. καὶ ἀλλὰ δὴ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις οὔτως ἔχει, εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα

1 ύστερον ἀλλὰ. ΒΤ (schol. ὁ Πρόκλος τὸ ἀλλὰ παρέλκειν λέγει, ῥ. ἀλλὰ is transposed to the second place); ἀλλὰ ύστερον Stephanus et al.

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THEAETETUS

THEAET. Certainly that is what I should like.

soc. And so should I. But since this is the case, and we have plenty of time, shall we not quietly, without any impatience, but truly examining ourselves, consider again the nature of these appearances within us? And as we consider them, I shall say, I think, first, that nothing can ever become more or less in size or number, so long as it remains equal to itself. Is it not so?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And secondly, that anything to which nothing is added and from which nothing is subtracted, is neither increased nor diminished, but is always equal.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. And should we not say thirdly, that what was not previously could not afterwards be without becoming and having become?

THEAET. Yes, I agree.

soc. These three assumptions contend with one another in our minds when we talk about the dice, or when we say that I, who do not, at my age, either increase in size or diminish, am in the course of a year first larger than you, who are young, and afterwards smaller, when nothing has been taken from my size, but you have grown. For I am, it seems, afterwards what I was not before, and I have not become so; for it is impossible to have become without becoming, and without losing anything of my size I could not become smaller. And there are countless myriads of such contradictions, if we are to accept these that I have mentioned. You follow
παραδεξόμεθα. ἐπεὶ¹ γάρ ποι, ὦ Θεαίτητε· δοκεῖσ γοῦν μοι οὐκ ἀπειρος τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι.

θεαὶ. Καὶ νῦν τοὺς θεους γε, ὦ Σωκράτες, ὑπερφυῶς ὡς θαυμάζω τί ποτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐνίοτε ὡς ἀληθῶς βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδινῶ.

δ. Θεοδώρως γάρ, ὦ φίλε, φαίνεται οὐ κακῶς τοπάζειν περὶ τῆς φύσεως σου. μάλα γάρ φιλοσόφοι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· ὦ γάρ ἁλλη ἀρχή φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὐτή, καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ τὴν Ἰρμ Θαύμαντος ἐκγονον φήσας οὐ κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν. ἀλλὰ πότερον μανθάνεις ἢδη δι' ὁ ταῦτα τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐξ ὑπ τὸν Πρωταγόραν φαμέν λέγειν, ἢ οὔτω;

θεαὶ. Οὔτω μοι δοκῶ.

σπ. Χάρων οὖν μοι εἰσεῖ, ἐὰν σοι ἀνδρός, μάλις ἔλον δὲ ἀνδρῶν ὅνομαστῶν τῆς διανοίας τῆς ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην συνεξερευνῆσωμαι αὐτῶν;

θεαὶ. Πῶς γάρ οὐκ εἰσομαι, καὶ πάνι γε πολλήν;

12. σπ. Ἀθρεὶ δὴ περισκοπῶν μή τις τῶν ἀμυντῶν ἐπακούῃ. εἰσόν δὲ οὕτοι οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἰναι ἢ οὗ ἀν δύνωνται ἀπρίξ τῶν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι, πράξεις δὲ καὶ γενέσεις καὶ πάν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει.

θεαὶ. Καὶ μὲν δή, ὦ Σωκράτες, σκληροὺς γε 156 λέγεις καὶ ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους.

σπ. Εἰσόν γάρ, ὦ παί, μάλ' εὖ ἀμοισοι· ἄλλοι δὲ πολὺ κομβότεροι, ὃν μέλων σοι τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν. ἀρχή δὲ, ἐξ ἂς ² καὶ ἀ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἡρτηται, ἢδε αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἢν καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τούτο οὐδέν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο

¹ ἐπεὶ Heindorf; εἰπὲ BT.
² ἐξ ἂς W²b; ἐξῆς BTW.
me, I take it, Theaetetus, for I think you are not new at such things.

THEAET. By the gods, Socrates, I am lost in wonder when I think of all these things, and sometimes when I regard them it really makes my head swim.

soc. Theodorus seems to be a pretty good guesser about your nature. For this feeling of wonder shows that you are a philosopher, since wonder is the only beginning of philosophy, and he who said that Iris was the child of Thaumas\(^1\) made a good genealogy. But do you begin to understand why these things are so, according to the doctrine we attribute to Protagoras, or do you not as yet?

THEAET. Not yet, I think.

soc. And will you be grateful to me if I help you to search out the hidden truth of the thought of a famous man or, I should say, of famous men?

THEAET. Of course I shall be grateful, very grateful.

soc. Look round and see that none of the uninitiated is listening. The uninitiated are those who think nothing is except what they can grasp firmly with their hands, and who deny the existence of actions and generation and all that is invisible.

THEAET. Truly, Socrates, those you speak of are very stubborn and perverse mortals.

soc. So they are, my boy, quite without culture. But others are more clever, whose secret doctrines I am going to disclose to you. For them the beginning, upon which all the things we were just now speaking of depend, is the assumption that everything is real motion and that there is nothing besides this,

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\(^1\) Hes. *Theog.* 780. Iris is the messenger of heaven, and Plato interprets the name of her father as "Wonder" (**θαυμα**).
εἰδή, πλήθει μὲν ἀπειρον ἐκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ 
μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχων, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων 
ὀμιλίας τε καὶ τρυφεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται 
ἐκγονα πλήθει μὲν ἀπειρα, δίδυμα δὲ, τὸ μὲν 
Β αἰσθητον, τὸ δὲ αἰσθησις, ἀεὶ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ 
γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθή-
σεις τὰ τοιάδε ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὅνοματα, ὁψεις τε καὶ 
ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὀσφήσεις καὶ ψύξεις τε καὶ καύσεις 
καὶ ἴδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λύται καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι 
κεκλημέναι καὶ ἀλλαῖ, ἀπέραντοι μὲν αἱ ἀνώνυμοι, 
παμπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ὅνομασμέναι: τὸ δ' αὖ αἰσθητὸν 
γένος τούτων ἐκάστας ὅμογονον, ὁψει μὲν χρώ-
ματα παντοδαπαίς παντοδαπά, ἀκοαίς δὲ ὅσαντως 
C φωναί, καὶ ταῖς ἀλλαῖς αἰσθήσεις τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ 
ἔγγενη γιγνόμενα. τὶ δὴ οὖν ἡμῖν βούλεται 
οὕτος ὁ μύθος, ὁ Θεαίτητε, πρὸς τὰ πρότερα; ἀρα 
ἐννοεῖς;

THEAI. Οὐ πάνυ, ὡς Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἄθρει, ἐὰν πως ἀποτελεσθή. βούλεται 
γὰρ δὴ λέγειν ὡς ταῦτα πάντα μὲν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, 
κυνεῖται, τάχος δὲ καὶ βραδυτῆς ἐν τῇ κινήσει 
αὐτῶν. ὅσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς 
τὰ πλησίαζοντα τήν κίνησιν ἵσχει καὶ οὕτω δὴ 
D γεννᾶ, τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὕτω δὴ θάττῳ ἔστων. 
φέρεται γὰρ καὶ ἐν φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν. 
ἐπειδὰν οὖν ὅμμα καὶ ἀλλο τῶν τούτων ἐγμη-
μέτρων πλησιάσαν γεννήσῃ τὴν λευκότητά τε καὶ 
αἰσθησιν αὐτῆς ἐξήμφυτον, ἄ οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐγένετο 
ἐκατέρου ἐκείνων πρὸς ἀλλο ἐλθόντος, τότε δὴ 
μεταξὺ φερομένων τῆς μὲν ὁψεως πρὸς τῶν ὀφθαλ-
but that there are two kinds of motion, each infinite in the number of its manifestations, and of these kinds one has an active, the other a passive force. From the union and friction of these two are born offspring, infinite in number, but always twins, the object of sense and the sense which is always born and brought forth together with the object of sense. Now we give the senses names like these: sight and hearing and smell, and the sense of cold and of heat, and pleasures and pains and desires and fears and so forth. Those that have names are very numerous, and those that are unnamed are innumerable. Now the class of objects of sense is akin to each of these; all sorts of colours are akin to all sorts of acts of vision, and in the same way sounds to acts of hearing, and the other objects of sense spring forth akin to the other senses. What does this tale mean for us, Theaetetus, with reference to what was said before? Do you see?

THEAET. Not quite, Socrates.

soc. Just listen; perhaps we can finish the tale. It means, of course, that all these things are, as we were saying, in motion, and their motion has in it either swiftness or slowness. Now the slow element keeps its motion in the same place and directed towards such things as draw near it, and indeed it is in this way that it begets. But the things begotten in this way are quicker; for they move from one place to another, and their motion is naturally from one place to another. Now when the eye and some appropriate object which approaches beget whiteness and the corresponding perception—which could never have been produced by either of them going to anything else—then, while sight from the eye and white-
Ε μόν, τής δὲ λευκότητος πρὸς τοῦ συναποτίκτοντος τὸ χρώμα, ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὄψεως ἐμπλεος ἐγένετο καὶ ὅρα δὴ τὸτε καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ τι ὄψις ἀλλ' ὀφθαλμὸς ὅτων, τὸ δὲ ἐνεγενήσαν τὸ χρώμα λευκότητος περιπλήσηθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ λευκότης αὐτ' ἀλλὰ λευκόν, εἶτε ξύλον εἶτε λίθος εἶτε ὄστος. 1

ξυνέβη χρώμα 2 χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι. καὶ τάλλα δή οὔτω, σκληρῶν καὶ θερμῶν καὶ πάντα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑποληπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ 157 μηδὲν εἶναι, δ' δὴ καὶ τότε ἐλέγομεν, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὀμιλία πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως, ἐπει καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναι τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ ἐνὸς νοήσαι, ὡς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι παγίως. οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστὶ τι, πρὶν ἄν τῷ πάσχοντι συνέλθῃ, οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἄν τῷ ποιοῦντι. τὸ τέ των συνελθὼν καὶ ποιοῦν ἀλλὰ αὐτὸ προσπεσον πάσχον ἀνεφάνη. ὥστε ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχής ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ των ἄυι ἡγεσθαι, τὸ δ' εἶναι

Β πανταχόθεν ἐξαρτέτεον, οὐχ ὅτι ἴμεις πολλὰ καὶ ἀρτι ἡγαγκάσμεθα ὑπὸ συνηθείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημο- σύνης χρήσθαι αὐτῷ. τὸ δ' οὐ δεῖ, ὡς ὁ τῶν σοφῶν λόγος, οὔτε τι συγχωρεῖν οὔτε τοῦ οὔτ' ἐμοὶ οὔτε τὸ τόδε οὔτ' ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ἄλλο οὔδεν ὄνομα ὅ τι ἂν ἵστη, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι γιγνόμενα καὶ ποιοῦμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα; ὡς εάν τι τοις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὐέλεγκτος ὁ τοῦτο

1 ὄστοιον Schanz; ὄστοι oυν BT; ὄστοιον Campbell; ὄστοι vulg., Burnet.
2 χρώμα BT; χρῆμα Heindorf, Burnet; σχῆμα Schanz.
ness from that which helps to produce the colour are moving from one to the other, the eye becomes full of sight and so begins at that moment to see, and becomes, certainly not sight, but a seeing eye, and the object which joined in begetting the colour is filled with whiteness and becomes in its turn, not whiteness, but white, whether it be a stick or a stone, or whatever it be the hue of which is so coloured. And all the rest—hard and hot and so forth—must be regarded in the same way: we must assume, we said before, that nothing exists in itself, but all things of all sorts arise out of motion by intercourse with each other; for it is, as they say, impossible to form a firm conception of the active or the passive element as being anything separately; for there is no active element until there is a union with the passive element, nor is there a passive element until there is a union with the active; and that which unites with one thing is active and appears again as passive when it comes in contact with something else. And so it results from all this, as we said in the beginning, that nothing exists as invariably one, itself by itself, but everything is always becoming in relation to something, and "being" should be altogether abolished, though we have often—and even just now—been compelled by custom and ignorance to use the word. But we ought not, the wise men say, to permit the use of "something" or "somebody's" or "mine" or "this" or "that" or any other word that implies making things stand still, but in accordance with nature we should speak of things as "becoming" and "being made" and "being destroyed" and "changing"; for anyone who by his mode of speech makes things
ποιών. δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ
περὶ πολλῶν ἄθροισθέντων, ὡς ἡ ἄθροισματι
C ἀνθρωπών τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἐκαστον ζῷόν
τε καὶ εἴδος. ταῦτα δὴ, ὡς Θείτησε, ἃρ' ἤδεα
dokeῖ σοι εἶναι, καὶ γενὸς ἂν αὐτῶν ὡς ἄρεσ-
kόντων;

Θεῖ. ὅπικ οἶδα ἐγώγω, ὡς Σώκρατεο καὶ γὰρ
οὐδὲ περὶ σοὶ δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι, πότερα δοκούντα
σοι λέγεις αὐτᾶ η ἐμοῦ ἀποπειρᾶ.

Σ. Όὐ μνημονεύεις, ὡς φίλε, ὅτι ἐγώ μὲν οὔτ'
οἶδα οὐτε ποιοῦμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμὸν, ἀλλ'
eimι αὐτῶν ἄγονος, σὲ δὲ μαιεύομαι καὶ τούτον ἔνεκα
ἐπάνω τε καὶ παρατίθημι ἐκάστοιν τῶν σοφῶν ἀπο-

Θεῖ. Ἐρώτα δή.

13. Σ. Δέχεσϑαν πάλιν, εἶ σοι ἀρέσκει
τὸ μὴ τι εἶναι ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι ἄει ἄγαθον καὶ
καλὸν ¹ καὶ πάντα ἃ ἄρτι δημην.

Θεῖ. Ἀλλ' ἐμουγε, ἐπειδὴ σοῦ ἀκούω οὕτω
δειγόντος, θαυμασίώς φαίνεται ἃ ἐχειν λόγον
καὶ ὑπολογιέων ἃπερ διελήλυθας.

Ε. Σ. Μὴ τοῖνυν ἀπολίπωμεν ὅσον ἐλλεῖπων
αὐτῶν. λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε πέρι καὶ νόσων,
tῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ μανίας, ὃςα τε παρακούειν
ἡ παρορὰν ἢ τι ἄλλο παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται.

¹ ἄγαθον καὶ καλὸν mss.; seecl. Ast.
THEAETETUS

stand still is easily refuted. And we must use such expressions in relation both to particular objects and collective designations, among which are "mankind" and "stone" and the names of every animal and class. Do these doctrines seem pleasant to you, Theaetetus, and do you find their taste agreeable?

THEAET. I don’t know, Socrates; besides, I can’t tell about you, either, whether you are preaching them because you believe them or to test me.
	soc. You forget, my friend, that I myself know nothing about such things, and claim none of them as mine, but am incapable of bearing them and am merely acting as a midwife to you, and for that reason am uttering incantations and giving you a taste of each of the philosophical theories, until I may help to bring your own opinion to light. And when it is brought to light, I will examine it and see whether it is a mere wind-egg or a real offspring. So be brave and patient, and in good and manly fashion tell what you think in reply to my questions.

THEAET. Very well; ask them.
	soc. Then say once more whether the doctrine pleases you that nothing is, but is always becoming —good or beautiful or any of the other qualities we were just enumerating.

THEAET. Why, when I hear you telling about it as you did, it seems to me that it is wonderfully reasonable and ought to be accepted as you have presented it.
	soc. Let us, then, not neglect a point in which it is defective. The defect is found in connexion with dreams and diseases, including insanity, and everything else that is said to cause illusions of sight and hearing and the other senses. For of course
οἷσθα γάρ πον ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ὀμολογουμένως ἐλέγχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὅτι ἄρτι διήμεν λόγον, ὡς παντὸς 158 μᾶλλον ἥμιν ψευδεῖς αἰσθήσεις ἐν αὐτοῖς γιγνομένας, καὶ πολλοῦ δεὶ¹ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάν τοῦντιον οὐδὲν ὃν φαίνεται εἶναι.

θεαῖ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Σν. Τίς δὴ οὖν, ὦ παῖ, λείπεται λόγος τῷ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐπιστήμην τιθεμένῳ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ὃς φαίνεται;

θεαῖ. Ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅκνῳ εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω, διότι μοι νῦν δὴ ἐπεπληξάς εἰπόντι Β αὐτῷ. ἐπεὶ ὥς ἀληθῶς γε οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀμφισβήτησαι ὡς οἱ μανικοῦν ἢ οἱ ὄνειρόττοντες οὐ ψευδὴ δοξάζουσιν, ὅταν οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν οὕωνται εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πτηνοὶ τε καὶ ὃς πετόμενοι ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ διανοῶνται.

Σν. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐδὲ το τοιώδε ἀμφισβήτημα ἐνοεῖς περὶ αὐτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τοῦ ὄναρ τε καὶ ὑπαρ;

θεαῖ. Τὸ ποίον;

Σν. Ὁ πολλάκις σε οἴμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτώντων, τί ἂν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδείξας, εἴ τις ἔροιτο νῦν οὕτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πότερον καθευδομένοι καὶ πάντα ἀ διανοούμεθα ὄνειρόττομεν, ἡ ἐγχειρογραμένον Σ τε καὶ ὑπαρ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμεθα.

θεαῖ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπορῶν γε ὅτι χρὴ ἡ ἐπιδείξας τεκμήρια· πάντα γὰρ ὡσπερ ἀντίστροφα τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολούθει. ἃ τε γὰρ νῦν διείλεγμεθα, οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τῷ ὑπνῷ δοκεῖν

¹ δεὶ mss.; δεῖν Heindorf, followed by Schanz and Wohlrab.
² χρη TW; χρόνῳ χρη B; χρεῖν Hultsch.

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you know that in all these the doctrine we were just presenting seems admittedly to be refuted, because in them we certainly have false perceptions, and it is by no means true that everything is to each man which appears to him; on the contrary, nothing is which appears.

THEAET. What you say is very true, Socrates.

soc. What argument is left, then, my boy, for the man who says that perception is knowledge and that in each case the things which appear are to the one to whom they appear?

THEAET. I hesitate to say, Socrates, that I have no reply to make, because you scolded me just now when I said that. But really I cannot dispute that those who are insane or dreaming have false opinions, when some of them think they are gods and others fancy in their sleep that they have wings and are flying.

soc. Don't you remember, either, the similar dispute about these errors, especially about sleeping and waking?

THEAET. What dispute?

soc. One which I fancy you have often heard. The question is asked, what proof you could give if anyone should ask us now, at the present moment, whether we are asleep and our thoughts are a dream, or whether we are awake and talking with each other in a waking condition.

THEAET. Really, Socrates, I don't see what proof can be given; for there is an exact correspondence in all particulars, as between the strophe and antistrophe of a choral song. Take, for instance, the conversation we have just had: there is nothing to prevent us from imagining in our sleep also that we
ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι· καὶ ὅταν δὴ ὄναρ ᾠνείρατα
dοκῶμεν διηγεῖσθαι, ἀτοπος ἢ ὦμοιότης τούτων
ἐκεῖνοι.

σω. Ὅρας οὖν ὅτι τὸ γε ᾠμφισβητήσαι οὐ χαλε-
πόν, ὅτε καὶ πότερον ἔστων ὑπάρ ἢ ὄναρ ᾠμφισβη-
τεῖταί, καὶ δὴ ἱσοῦ ὄντος τοῦ χρόνου ὃν καθευδομεν
ὁ ἔγγρηγόραμεν, ἐν ἐκατέρω διαμάχεται ἵμων ἡ
ψυχή τὰ ἄει παρόντα δόγματα παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι
ἀληθῆ, ὥστε ἵσον μὲν χρόνον τάδε φαμὲν ὄντα
εἶναι, ἵσον δὲ ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ὦμοιῶς ἐφ' ἐκατέρως
dισχυριζόμεθα.

théai. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

σω. Ὅνικοῦν καὶ περὶ νόσων τε καὶ μανιῶν ὁ
αὐτὸς λόγος, πλὴν τοῦ χρόνου ὅτι οὐχὶ ἵσος;
théai. Ὅρθως.

σω. Τῷ οὖν; πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὄλγοτητι τὸ
ἀληθὲς ὀρισθήσεται;

ἔ θεαι. Γελοίον μὲν τ' ἀν εἰ ἡ πολλαχῆ.

σω. Ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο ἔχεις σαφές ἐνδείξασθαι,
ὅπως τούτων τῶν δοξασμάτων ἀληθῆ;
théai. Οὕ μοι δοκῶ.

14. σω. Ἐμοὶ τοῖνυν ἀκοῦε οἰα περὶ αὐτῶν
ἀν λέγομεν οἱ τὰ ἄει δοκοῦντα ὀριζόμενοι τῷ δοκοῦντι
eῖναι ἀληθῆ. λέγομεν δὲ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὕτως
ἐρωτώντες: "ὁ Θεαίτητε, ὃ ἄν ἔτερον ἢ παντά-
pασιν, μὴ τῇ τινα δύναμιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔξει τῷ
ἔτερῳ; καὶ μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταύτῃ εἶναι
ὁ ἐρωτώμεν, τῇ δὲ ἔτερον, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἔτερον."

théai. Ἀδύνατον τοῖνυν ταύτῳ τι ἔχειν ἢ ἐν
are carrying on this conversation with each other, and when in a dream we imagine that we are relating dreams, the likeness between the one talk and the other is remarkable.

soc. So you see it is not hard to dispute the point, since it is even open to dispute whether we are awake or in a dream. Now since the time during which we are asleep is equal to that during which we are awake, in each state our spirit contends that the semblances that appear to it at any time are certainly true, so that for half the time we say that this is true, and for half the time the other, and we maintain each with equal confidence.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. And may not, then, the same be said about insanity and the other diseases, except that the time is not equal?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Well, then, shall truth be determined by the length or shortness of time?

THEAET. That would be absurd in many ways.

soc. But can you show clearly in any other way which of the two sets of opinions is true?

THEAET. I do not think I can.

soc. Listen, then, while I tell you what would be said about them by those who maintain that what appears at any time is true for him to whom it appears. They begin, I imagine, by asking this question: "Theaetetus, can that which is wholly other have in any way the same quality as its alternative? And we must not assume that the thing in question is partially the same and partially other, but wholly other."

THEAET. It is impossible for it to be the same in
159 δυνάμει ἡ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὀτρωθὲν, ὅταν ἡ κομιδὴ ἔτερον.

σ. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐ καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τοιοῦτον ὀμολογεῖν;

θεαί. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

σ. Εἰ ἂρα τι συμβαίνει ὁμοίων τῷ γίγνεσθαι ἡ ἀνόμοιον, εἴτε ἐαυτῷ εἴτε ἄλλῳ, ὀμοιούμενον μὲν ταύτον φήσομεν γίγνεσθαι, ἀνομοιούμενον δὲ ἔτερον;

θεαί. Ἀνάγκη.

σ. Οὐκοῦν πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν ὡς πολλὰ μὲν εἰ τὰ ποιοῦντα καὶ ἄπειρα, ὡσαύτως δὲ γε τὰ πάσαντα;

θεαί. Ναί.

σ. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ συμμιμηνύμενον καὶ ἄλλῳ οὖ ταύτα ἄλλ' ἔτερα γεννήσει;

θεαί. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

σ. Δέγωμεν δὴ ἐμὲ τε καὶ σὲ καὶ τὰλλα ἡδή κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, Σωκράτη ύγιαίνοντα καὶ Σωκράτη αὐτ ἀσθενοῦντα. πότερον ὁμοίων τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνῳ ἡ ἀνόμοιον φήσομεν;

θεαί. Ἀρα τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα Σωκράτη, ὅλον τοῦτο λέγεις ὡς ἐκεῖνω, τῷ ύγιαίνοντι Σωκράτει;

σ. Κάλλιστα ὑπέλαβες· αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγω.

θεαί. Ἀνόμοιον δήποτον.

σ. Καὶ ἔτερον ἂρα οὕτως ὦσπερ ἀνόμοιον;

θεαί. Ἀνάγκη.

σ. Καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ὑν ὑν δὴ 1 C διήλθομεν, ὡσαύτως φήσεις;

1 υν δη Heindorf; υν BT.
THEAETETUS

anything, either in quality or in any other respect whatsoever, when it is wholly other.

soc. Must we not, then, necessarily agree that such a thing is also unlike?

THEAET. It seems so to me.

soc. Then if anything happens to become like or unlike anything—either itself or anything else—we shall say that when it becomes like it becomes the same, and when it becomes unlike it becomes other?

THEAET. We must.

soc. Well, we said before, did we not, that the active elements were many—infinite in fact—and likewise the passive elements?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And furthermore, that any given element, by uniting at different times with different partners, will beget, not the same, but other results?

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Well, then, let us take me, or you, or anything else at hand, and apply the same principle—say Socrates in health and Socrates in illness. Shall we say the one is like the other, or unlike?

THEAET. When you say "Socrates in illness" do you mean to compare that Socrates as a whole with Socrates in health as a whole?

soc. You understand perfectly; that is just what I mean.

THEAET. Unlike, I imagine.

soc. And therefore other, inasmuch as unlike?

THEAET. Necessarily.

soc. And you would say the same of Socrates asleep or in any of the other states we enumerated just now?
θεαί. Ἑγώγε.

σημ. Ὁ ἐκαστὸν δὴ τῶν πεφυκότων τι ποιεῖν ἄλλο τι, ὅταν μὲν λάβῃ ὑγιαίνοντα Σωκράτη, ὡς ἐτέρῳ μοι χρήσεται, ὅταν δὲ ἄσθενοῦντα, ὡς ἐτέρῳ;

θεαί. Τί δ᾽ οὐ μέλλει;

σημ. Καὶ ἐτέρα δὴ ἐφ’ ἐκατέρου γεννήσομεν ἐγώ τε ὁ πάσχων καὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν;

θεαί. Τί μὴν;

σημ. Ὁ ὅταν δὴ οἶνον πίνω ὑγιαίνων, Ἦδυς μοι φαίνεται καὶ γλυκύς;

θεαί. Ναι.

σημ. Ἑγέννησε γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογημένων ὁ τὸ τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχων γλυκύτητα τε καὶ αἰσθησιν, ἀμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα, καὶ ὡς μὲν αἰσθησις πρὸς τοῦ πάσχοντος οὔσα αἰσθανομένην τὴν γλώτταν ἀπειργάσατο, ὡς γλυκύτης πρὸς τοῦ οἶνου περὶ αὐτῶν φερομένη γλυκὺς τὸν οἶνον τῇ ὑγιαίνοισα γλώττῃ ἐποίησεν καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι.

θεαί. Πάντα μὲν οὖν τὰ πρότερα ἡμῖν οὕτως ὀμολόγητο.

σημ. Ὁ ὅταν δὲ ἄσθενοῦντα, ἄλλο τι πρῶτον μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν; ἀνομοίῳ γὰρ δὴ προσῆλθεν.

θεαί. Ναι.

Ε σημ. Ἑτερα δὴ αὐτ ἐγεννήσατιν οὐ τε τοιοῦτο Σωκράτης καὶ ὡς τοῦ οἶνου πόσις, περὶ μὲν τὴν γλώτταν αἴσθησιν πικρότητος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἶνον

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THEAET. Yes.

SOC. Then each of those elements which by the law of their nature act upon something else, will, when it gets hold of Socrates in health, find me one object to act upon, and when it gets hold of me in illness, another?

THEAET. How can it help it?

SOC. And so, in the two cases, that active element and I, who am the passive element, shall each produce a different object?

THEAET. Of course.

SOC. So, then, when I am in health and drink wine, it seems pleasant and sweet to me?

THEAET. Yes.

SOC. The reason is, in fact, that according to the principles we accepted a while ago, the active and passive elements produce sweetness and perception, both of which are simultaneously moving from one place to another, and the perception, which comes from the passive element, makes the tongue perceptive, and the sweetness, which comes from the wine and pervades it, passes over and makes the wine both to be and to seem sweet to the tongue that is in health.

THEAET. Certainly, such are the principles we accepted a while ago.

SOC. But when it gets hold of me in illness, in the first place, it really doesn’t get hold of the same man, does it? For he to whom it comes is certainly unlike.

THEAET. True.

SOC. Therefore the union of the Socrates who is ill and the draught of wine produces other results: in the tongue the sensation or perception of bitter-
γιγνομένη καὶ φερομένην πικρότητα, καὶ τὸν μὲν
οὐ πικρότητα ἄλλα πικρόν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐκ αἰσθησιν
ἀλλ’ αἰσθανόμενον;

ὅερ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

σ. Οὐκοῦν ἐγὼ τε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποτὲ γενήσομαι
οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος· τοῦ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλῃ αἰσθησις,
καὶ ἄλλοιον καὶ ἄλλου ποιεῖ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον·
οὔτ’ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμὲ μήποτ’ ἄλλῳ συνελθὼν
ταῦτ’ γενήσαν τοιοῦτον γένηται· ἀπὸ γὰρ
ἄλλου ἄλλο γενήσαν ἄλλοιον γενήσεται.

ὅερ. Ἡστι ταῦτα.

σ. Οὐδὲ μήν ἔγησε ἐμαυτῷ τοιοῦτος, ἐκεῖνο
τε ἐαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γενήσεται.

ὅερ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

σ. Ἀνάγκη δὲ γε ἐμὲ τε τῶν γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν
αἰσθανόμενος γίγνωμαι· αἰσθανόμενον γάρ, μηδε-
νὸς δὲ αἰσθανόμενον ἀδύνατον γίγνεσθαι· ἐκεῖνο
Β τέ των γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν γλυκύ ἢ πικρόν ἢ τι τοιοῦ-
τον γίγνηται· γλυκῦ γάρ, μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ἀδύνα-
τον γενέσθαι.

ὅερ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

σ. Λείπεται δὴ, οἷμαι, ἥμιν ἄλληλοις, εἰτ’
ἔσμεν, εἰναι, εἴτε γιγνόμεθα, γίγνεσθαι, ἐπειπερ
ἡμῶν ἢ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μὲν, συνδεῖ δὲ
οὕτω τῶν ἄλλων, οὗτ’ αὖ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. ἄλληλοις
dὴ λείπεται συνδεδέσθαι· ὡστε εἴτε τις εἰναι τι
ὄνομάζει, τινὶ εἰναι ἡ τινὸς ἢ πρὸς τι ῥητέον αὐτῷ,
ness, and in the wine—a bitterness which is engendered there and passes over into the other; the wine is made, not bitterness, but bitter, and I am made, not perception, but perceptive.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Then I shall never have this perception of any other thing; for a perception of another thing is another perception, and makes the percipient different and other: nor can that which acts on me ever by union with another produce the same result or become the same in kind; for by producing another result from another passive element it will become different in kind.

THEAET. That is true.

soc. And neither shall I, furthermore, ever again become the same as I am, nor will that ever become the same as it is.

THEAET. No.

soc. And yet, when I become percipient, I must necessarily become percipient of something, for it is impossible to become percipient and perceive nothing; and that which is perceived must become so to someone, when it becomes sweet or bitter or the like; for to become sweet, but sweet to no one, is impossible.

THEAET. Perfectly true.

soc. The result, then, I think, is that we (the active and the passive elements) are or become, whichever is the case, in relation to one another, since we are bound to one another by the inevitable law of our being, but to nothing else, not even to ourselves. The result, then, is that we are bound to one another; and so if a man says anything "is," he must say it is to or of or in relation to something,
eîte γίγνεσθαι: αὐτὸ δὲ ἐφ’ αὐτοῦ τι ἢ ὣν ἢ
C γιγνόμενον οὔτε αὐτῷ λεκτέον οὔτ’ ἄλλον λέγοντος
ἀποδεκτέον, ὡς ο λόγος ὅν διεληλύθαμεν σημαίνει.

θεαί. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ζη. Οὐκοῦν ὥστε δὴ το ἐμὲ ποιοῦν ἐμοὶ ἔστιν
καὶ οὔκ ἄλλῳ, ἐγὼ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι αὐτοῦ, ἄλλος
δ’ οὖ; θεαί. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ζη. Ἀληθῆς ἄρα ἐμοὶ ἢ ἐμῆ αἴσθησις: τῆς γὰρ
ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεὶ ἐστὶν· καὶ ἐγὼ κριτὴς κατὰ τὸν
Πρωταγόραν τῶν τε ὄντων ἐμοὶ, ὡς ἔστι, καὶ τῶν
μὴ ὄντων, ὃς οὐκ ἔστιν.

θεαί. ἩΕοικεν.

D 15. ζη. Πῶς ἂν οὖν ἀφευδῆς ἂν καὶ μὴ
πταιῶν τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἢ γιγνόμενα οὐκ
ἐπιστήμων ἂν εἰην ὄντων αἴσθητής;

θεαί. Οὐδαμῶς ὅπως οὖ.

ζη. Παγκάλως ἄρα σοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἐπιστήμη
οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἔστιν ἢ ἀισθήσις, καὶ εἰς ταὐτὸν συμ-
πέπτωκεν, κατὰ μὲν Ὡμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ
πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φύλον οἶον ρεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ
πάντα, κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον
πάντων χρημάτων ἀνθρώπων μέτρου εἶναι, κατὰ
Ε δὲ Θεαίτητον τούτων οὖτως ἑχόντων αἰσθήσιν
ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι. ἢ γὰρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε; φῶμεν
τούτῳ σοὶ μὲν εἶναι σοὶ νεογενὲς παιδίον, ἐμὸν
dὲ μαίευμα; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;

θεαί. Οὐτως ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ζη. Τούτο μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, μόλις ποτὲ ἐγεν-
and similarly if he says it "becomes"; but he must not say it is or becomes absolutely, nor can he accept such a statement from anyone else. That is the meaning of the doctrine we have been describing.

THEAET. Yes, quite so, Socrates.

soc. Then, since that which acts on me is to me and to me only, it is also the case that I perceive it, and I only?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. Then to me my perception is true; for in each case it is always part of my being; and I am, as Protagoras says, the judge of the existence of the things that are to me and of the non-existence of those that are not to me.

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. How, then, if I am an infallible judge and my mind never stumbles in regard to the things that are or that become, can I fail to know that which I perceive?

THEAET. You cannot possibly fail.

soc. Therefore you were quite right in saying that knowledge is nothing else than perception, and there is complete identity between the doctrine of Homer and Heracleitus and all their followers—that all things are in motion, like streams—the doctrine of the great philosopher Protagoras that man is the measure of all things—and the doctrine of Theaetetus that, since these things are true, perception is knowledge. Eh, Theaetetus? Shall we say that this is, so to speak, your new-born child and the result of my midwifery? Or what shall we say?

THEAET. We must say that, Socrates.

soc. Well, we have at last managed to bring this
νήσαμεν, ὦ τι δὴ ποτε τυγχάνει ὁν. μετὰ δὲ τὸν
tόκον τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς εἰν κύκλῳ
περιθρεκτέον τῷ λόγῳ, σκοπουμένου μὴ λάθη
ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἄξιον ὥν τροφῆς τὸ γυνόμενον, ἀλλὰ
161 ἀνεμισαίον τε καὶ ψεύδως. ἦ σου οὐ εἴη πάντως δεῖν
tὸ γε σον τρέφειν καὶ μὴ ἀποτίθεναι, ἦ καὶ ἀνέξει
ἐλεγχόμενον ὅρῶν, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπανείς,
ἐάν τις σοῦ ὡς πρωτοτόκου αὐτὸ ὑφαίρη;
θεό. Ἄνεξεται, ὅ Σώκρατες, Θεαίτητος· οὔδα-
mῶς γὰρ δύσκολος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν εἰπέ, ἦ αὐ
οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει;
σ. Φιλόλογος γ’ εἰ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ χρηστός, ὅ
Θεόδωρε, ὅτι με οἴει λόγων τινὰ εἶναι θύλακον καὶ
βαδίως ἐξελόντα ἐρεῖν ὡς οὐκ οὐ δέ ἔχει οὕτω ταῦτα.}
B τὸ δὲ γυνόμενον οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι οὕδεις τῶν
λόγων ἐξέρχεται παρ’ ἔμοι ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμοὶ
προσδιαλεγομένου, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον
πλὴν βραχέος, ὅσον λόγον παρ’ ἑτέρου σοφοῦ
λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι μετρίως. καὶ νῦν τοῦτο
παρὰ τοῦτο πειράσομαι, οὐ τι αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν.
θεό. Σὺ κάλλιον, ὅ Σώκρατες, λέγεις· καὶ
ποίει οὕτως.
16. σ. Οἶσθ’ οὖν, ὁ Θεόδωρε, ὁ θαυμάζω
τοῦ ἐταίρου σου Πρωταγόρου;
C θεό. Τὸ ποίον;

1 The rite called *amphidromia* took place a few days
after the birth of a child. After some ceremonies of purifica-
tion the nurse, in the presence of the family, carried the
forth, whatever it turns out to be; and now that it is born, we must in very truth perform the rite of running round with it in a circle—the circle of our argument—and see whether it may not turn out to be after all not worth rearing, but only a wind-egg, an imposture. But, perhaps, you think that any offspring of yours ought to be cared for and not put away; or will you bear to see it examined and not get angry if it is taken away from you, though it is your first-born?

Theo. Theaetetus will bear it, Socrates, for he is not at all ill-tempered. But for heaven’s sake, Socrates, tell me, is all this wrong after all?

soc. You are truly fond of argument, Theodorus, and a very good fellow to think that I am a sort of bag full of arguments and can easily pull one out and say that after all the other one was wrong; but you do not understand what is going on: none of the arguments comes from me, but always from him who is talking with me. I myself know nothing, except just a little, enough to extract an argument from another man who is wise and to receive it fairly. And now I will try to extract this thought from Theaetetus, but not to say anything myself.

Theo. That is the better way, Socrates; do as you say.

soc. Do you know, then, Theodorus, what amazes me in your friend Protagoras?

Theo. What is it?

infant rapidly about the family hearth, thereby introducing him, as it were, to the family and the family deities. At this time the father decided whether to bring up the child or to expose it. Sometimes, perhaps, the child was named on this occasion. In the evening relatives assembled for a feast at which shell-fish were eaten.
σω. Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάνυ ἠδὲως εἰρήκεν, ὡς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκαστῶ τούτῳ καὶ ἐστιν· τὴν δ’ ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου τεθαυμακα, ὅτι οὐκ εἰπεν ἄρχόμενος τῆς ἀληθείας ὅτι πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστίν ὃς ἡ κυνοκέφαλος ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀτοπώτερον τῶν ἐχόντων αἰσθήσεων, ἢν μεγαλοπρεπῆς καὶ πάνυ καταφρονητικῶς ἡμᾶς ἢµῖν λέγειν, ἐνδεεικνύµενος ὅτι ἡµεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν ὤσπερ θεὸν ἐθαυμάζοµεν ἐπὶ σοφία, ὦ δ’ ἄρα ἐτύγχανεν ὡν εἰς φρόνησιν οὔδεν

D βελτίων βατράχου γυρίνου, μὴ ὅτι ἄλλου τοῦ ἀνθρώπων. ἡ πῶς λέγωµεν,1 ὅ Θεόδωρε; εἴ γὰρ δὴ ἐκάστω ἀληθεῖς ἐσται ὃ ἀν δὶ’ αἰσθήσεως δοξάζῃ, καὶ μὴτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος βέλτιων διακρίνει;2 μὴτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερον ἐσται ἐπισκέψασθαι ἐτερον τὴν ἐτέρου, ὡρθὴ ἡ ἁευδῆς, ἀλλ’ ὁ πολλάκις εἰρηται, αὐτός τὰ αὐτοῦ ἐκάστος µόνος δοξάσει, ταύτα δὲ πάντα ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀληθῆ, τὶ δὴ ποτε, ὃ ἐταίρε, Πρωταγόρας µὲν σοφὸς, ὡστε καὶ ἄλλων

Ε διδάσκαλος ἀξιούσθαι δικαιώς µετὰ µεγάλων μισθῶν, ἡµεῖς δὲ ἀµαθέστεροι τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἢµῖν ἢµ παρ’ ἐκείνον, µέτρω ὅντι αὐτῷ ἐκάστῳ τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας; ταύτα πῶς µὴ φώµεν δηµούµενον λέγειν τὸν Πρωταγόραν; τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐµὸν τε καὶ τῆς ἐµῆς τέχνης τῆς µανεντικῆς σιγώ, ὥσον γέλωτα ὀφλισκάνοµεν· οἶµαι δὲ καὶ ξύµπασα ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγµατεία. τὸ γὰρ ἐπισκόπεῖν καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν3 ἐλέγχειν τὰς ἄλληλων φαντασίας τε καὶ δόξας, ὀρθὰς ἐκάστον οὕσας, ὡς µακρὰ

1 λέγωµεν BT; λέγοµεν vulg.
2 διακρίνει most editors; διακρίνη B (emendation) T.
3 ἐπιχειρεῖν TW; om. B.
soc. In general I like his doctrine that what appears to each one is to him, but I am amazed by the beginning of his book. I don’t see why he does not say in the beginning of his Truth\(^1\) that a pig or a dog-faced baboon or some still stranger creature of those that have sensations is the measure of all things. Then he might have begun to speak to us very imposingly and condescendingly, showing that while we were honouring him like a god for his wisdom, he was after all no better in intellect than any other man, or, for that matter, than a tadpole. What alternative is there, Theodorus? For if that opinion is true to each person which he acquires through sensation, and no one man can discern another’s condition better than he himself, and one man has no better right to investigate whether another’s opinion is true or false than he himself, but, as we have said several times, each man is to form his own opinions by himself, and these opinions are always right and true, why in the world, my friend, was Protagoras wise, so that he could rightly be thought worthy to be the teacher of other men and to be well paid, and why were we ignorant creatures and obliged to go to school to him, if each person is the measure of his own wisdom? Must we not believe that Protagoras was “playing to the gallery” in saying this? I say nothing of the ridicule that I and my science of midwifery deserve in that case,—and, I should say, the whole practice of dialectics, too. For would not the investigation of one another’s fancies and opinions, and the attempt to refute them, when each man’s must be

\(^1\) Truth was apparently the title, or part of the title, of Protagoras’s book.
162 μὲν καὶ διωλύγιος φλυαρία, εἰ ἀληθῆς ἡ ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλὰ μὴ παίζουσα ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βίβλου ἐφθέγξατο;

 thần. Ἡ Ἀρα κἂν εἰς Δακεδαίμονα ἐλθὼν, ὁ Θεό- Βδωρέ, πρὸς τὰς παλαιόστας ἄξιοῖς ἂν ἄλλους θεόμενος γυμνοῖς, ἐνίον ψαύλους, αὐτὸς μὴ ἀντεπιδεικνύναι τὸ εἰδὸς παραποδώμενος;

 θεο. Ἡ Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν δοκεῖς, εἶπερ μέλλονεν μοι ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ πείσεσθαι; ὡσπερ νῦν οἶμαι ὑμᾶς πείσειν ἐμὲ μὲν ἐὰν θεάσθαι καὶ μὴ ἐλκεῖν πρὸς τὸ γυμνασίον σκληρὸν ἤδη ὄντα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε καὶ ὑγροτέρῳ ὀντὶ προσπαλαίειν.

 I7. θν. Ἡ Ἀλλ᾽ εἰ σύτως, ὃ Θεόδωρε, σοὶ Ὅ τέμων, ὦτος, παύλῳ, ό νῦν ἐπὶ τὸν σοφὸν Θεαίτητον ἵτεον. λέγῃ δὴ, ὁ Θεαίτητε, πρῶτον μὲν ἢ νῦν δὴ διήλθομεν, ἄρα ὦ συνθαυμάζεις ἕκαψ 

 μηδὲν χείρων εἰς σοφίαν ὁτουνὸν ἀνθρώπων ἦ καὶ θεῶν; ἦ ἤττον τι οἶει τὸ Πρωταγόρειον μέτρον εἰς θεοῦ ἢ εἰς ἀνθρώπους λέγεσθαι;

 θεαί. Μὰ Δι᾽ οὐκ ἔγγαγε· καὶ ὀπερ γε ἐρωτᾶς, πάνυ ταυμάζω. ἡνίκα γὰρ διῆλθεν ὄν τρόπον D λέγοιεν τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ εἶναι τῷ δοκούντι, πάνυ μοι εὐφαίνετο λέγεσθαι· νῦν δὲ τούναντίον τάχα μεταπέπτυκεν.

 1 συνθαυμάζεις BT; σὺ ταυμάζεις W.
right, be tedious and blatant folly, if the Truth of Protagoras is true and he was not jesting when he uttered his oracles from the shrine of his book?

THEO. Socrates, the man was my friend, as you just remarked. So I should hate to bring about the refutation of Protagoras by agreeing with you, and I should hate also to oppose you contrary to my real convictions. So take Theaetetus again; especially as he seemed just now to follow your suggestions very carefully.

soc. If you went to Sparta, Theodorus, and visited the wrestling-schools, would you think it fair to look on at other people naked, some of whom were of poor physique, without stripping and showing your own form, too?

THEO. Why not, if I could persuade them to allow me to do so? So now I think I shall persuade you to let me be a spectator, and not to drag me into the ring, since I am old and stiff, but to take the younger and nimbler man as your antagonist.

soc. Well, Theodorus, if that pleases you, it does not displease me, as the saying is. So I must attack the wise Theaetetus again. Tell me, Theaetetus, referring to the doctrine we have just expounded, do you not share my amazement at being suddenly exalted to an equality with the wisest man, or even god? Or do you think Protagoras's "measure" applies any less to gods than to men?

THEAET. By no means; and I am amazed that you ask such a question at all; for when we were discussing the meaning of the doctrine that whatever appears to each one really is to him, I thought it was good; but now it has suddenly changed to the opposite.
π. Νέος γὰρ εἰ, ὦ φίλε παί: τῆς οὖν δῆμηγορίας ὁξέως ὑπακούει καὶ πείθει. πρὸς γὰρ ταῦτα ἐρεῖ Πρωταγόρας ἡ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ· ὁ γενναῖοι παῖδες τε καὶ γέροντες, δῆμηγορεῖτε συγκαθεξόμενοι, θεοὺς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες, οὕς ἐγὼ ἐκ τε τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ Ε αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰσὶν ἡ ὡς οὖν εἰσίν, ἐξαιρῶ, καὶ ὁ οἱ πολλοὶ ἃν ἀποδέχοντο ἀκούοντες, λέγετε ταῦτα, ὡς δεινὸν εἰ μηθὲν διοίσει εἰς σοφίαν ἑκαστὸς τῶν ἀνθρώπων βοσκῆματος ὕποτον: ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὖν ἡ γνώμη λέγετε, ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε, ὃ εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἡ ἄλλοις τίς τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖν, άξιοι οὖν ἐνὸς μόνου1 ἂν εἴη. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σὺ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος, εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογία τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ 163 τηλικούτων2 λεγομένους λόγους.

τείοι. 'Ἀλλ' οὐ δίκαιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτε σὺ οὐτε ἂν ἡμεῖς φαίμεν.

π. Ἀλλὰ δὴ σκέπτεον, ὡς ἐοικεν, ὡς ὁ τε σὸς καὶ ὁ Θεόδωρου λόγος.

τείοι. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἄλλῃ.

π. Τῇδε δὴ σκοπῶμεν εἰ ἀρα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ αἰσθησις ταῦτον ἡ ἑτερον. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτο που πᾶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῶν ἔτεινεν, καὶ τοῦτον χάριν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀτοπα ταῦτα ἐκινήσαμεν. οὐ γὰρ;

τείοι. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

β π. Ἡ οὖν ὄμολογήσομεν, ἃ τῷ ὅραν ἀἰσθα-νόμεθα ἡ τῷ ἄκουεν, πάντα ταῦτα ἄμα καὶ ἐπίστα-σθαι; οἶον τῶν βαρβάρων πρὶν μαθεῖν τὴν φωνὴν πότερον οὐ φήσομεν ἄκουεν, οὔταν φθέγγωνται, ἢ

1 μόνου] Adam, Class. Rev. iv. p. 103, suggests νόμου, "a coin, a copper."

2 τηλικούτων Τ; τοῦτων Β. 80
soc. You are young, my dear boy; so you are quickly moved and swayed by popular oratory. For in reply to what I have said, Protagoras, or someone speaking for him, will say, "Excellent boys and old men, there you sit together declaiming to the people, and you bring in the gods, the question of whose existence or non-existence I exclude from oral and written discussion, and you say the sort of thing that the crowd would readily accept—that it is a terrible thing if every man is to be no better than any beast in point of wisdom; but you do not advance any cogent proof whatsoever; you base your statements on probability. If Theodorus, or any other geometrician, should base his geometry on probability, he would be of no account at all. So you and Theodorus had better consider whether you will accept arguments founded on plausibility and probabilities in such important matters.

THEAET. That would not be right, Socrates; neither you nor we would think so.

soc. Apparently, then, you and Theodorus mean we must look at the matter in a different way.

THEAET. Yes, certainly in a different way.

soc. Well, then, let us look at it in this way, raising the question whether knowledge is after all the same as perception, or different. For that is the object of all our discussion, and it was to answer that question that we stirred up all these strange doctrines, was it not?

THEAET. Most assuredly.

soc. Shall we then agree that all that we perceive by sight or hearing we know? For instance, shall we say that before having learned the language of foreigners we do not hear them when they speak,
ἀκούειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἃ λέγουσι; καὶ αὐτὸ γράμματα μὴ ἑπιστάμενοι, βλέπουσε εἰς αὐτὰ πότερον οὐχ ὅραν ἢ ἐπίστασθαι εἴπερ ὅρωμεν δι-συχυρισμέθα;

θεαί. Ἀυτὸ γε, ὦ Σωκράτει, τοῦτο αὐτῶν, ὅπερ ὅρωμεν τε καὶ ἀκούσας, ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν· τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ χρῶμα ὅραν τε καὶ ζ ἐπίστασθαι, τῶν δὲ τὴν ὁξύτητα καὶ βαρύτητα ἀκούσας τε ᾳμα καὶ εἰδέναι· ὃ δὲ οἳ τε γραμματι-σταὶ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ οἳ ἐρμηνεῖς διδάσκουσιν, οὐτε αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ ὅραν ἢ ἀκούσας οὔτε ἐπίστασθαι.

18. σπ. Ἀριστάς γ', ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐκ ἀξιόν σου πρὸς ταῦτα ἁμφισβητῆσαι, ἣν καὶ αὐξάνῃ. ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ καὶ τόδε ἄλλο προσιόν, καὶ σκόπει πο' αὐτὸ διωσόμεθα.

θεαί. Τὸ ποίον δή;

σπ. Τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις ἔρουσ, "ἄρα δυνατόν, ὅτου τις ἐπιστήμων γένοιτο ποτε, ἐτι ἔχοντα

θεαί. Καὶ πῶς, ὦ Σωκράτει; τέρας γὰρ ἀν εἴη

σπ. Μὴ οὐν ἔγω λῃρῶ; σκόπει δὲ. ἄρα τὸ ὅραν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγεις καὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἴσθησιν;

θεαί. Ἐγώγηε.

σπ. Ὁυκοῦν ὁ ἰδῶν τι ἐπιστήμων ἔκεινον γέγονεν ἔ ὅ εἴδεν κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον;
or that we both hear and know what they say? And again, if we do not know the letters, shall we maintain that we do not see them when we look at them or that if we really see them we know them?

THEAET. We shall say, Socrates, that we know just so much of them as we hear or see: in the case of the letters, we both see and know the form and colour, and in the spoken language we both hear and at the same time know the higher and lower notes of the voice; but we do not perceive through sight or hearing, and we do not know, what the grammarians and interpreters teach about them.

soc. First-rate, Theaetetus! and it is a pity to dispute that, for I want you to grow. But look out for another trouble that is yonder coming towards us, and see how we can repel it.

THEAET. What is it?

soc. It is like this: If anyone should ask, "Is it possible, if a man has ever known a thing and still has and preserves a memory of that thing, that he does not, at the time when he remembers, know that very thing which he remembers?" I seem to be pretty long winded; but I merely want to ask if a man who has learned a thing does not know it when he remembers it.

THEAET. Of course he does, Socrates; for what you suggest would be monstrous.

soc. Am I crazy, then? Look here. Do you not say that seeing is perceiving and that sight is perception?

THEAET. I do.

soc. Then, according to what we have just said, the man who has seen a thing has acquired knowledge of that which he has seen?
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΗ. Τί δέ; μνήμην οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τί;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
ΣΗ. Πότερον οὖδενὸς ἡ τινὸς;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τινὸς δήπου.
ΣΗ. Οὐκοῦν ὃν ἔμαθε καὶ ὃν ἤσθετο, τοιούτων τινῶν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;
ΣΗ. "Ὁ δὴ εἰδέ τις, μέμνηται ποι ἐνίοτε;
ΘΕΑΙ. Μέμνηται.
ΣΗ. Ἡ καὶ μῦσας; ἡ τοῦτο δράσας ἐπελάθητο;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλα δεινόν, ὦ Σῶκρατες, τοῦτο γε φάναι.

164 ΣΗ. Δεῖ γε μέντοι, εἴ σώσομεν ἕν τὸν πρόσθε λόγον· εἴ δὲ μή, οἴχεται.
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἐγὼ, νὴ τὸν Δία, ὑποπτεύω, οὐ μήν ἰκανῶς γε συννοῶ· ἀλλ' εἰπὲ πη.
ΣΗ. Τῇδε· ὁ μὲν ὅρῶν ἐπιστήμων, φαμέν, τοῦτο γέγονεν οὔπερ ὅρῶν· ὅψε γάρ καὶ αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταύτων ὑμολογηται.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω γε.
ΣΗ. Ὅ δέ γε ὅρῶν καὶ ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς οὐ ἐώρα, ἐάν μῦσῃ, μέμνηται μὲν, οὐχ ὅρᾷ δὲ αὑτῷ. ἡ γάρ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

Β ΣΗ. Τὸ δὲ γε οὐχ ὅρᾳ οὐκ ἐπίσταταί ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ὅρᾳ ἐπίσταται.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἁληθῇ.
ΣΗ. Συμβαίνει ἂρα, οὐ τις ἐπιστήμων ἐγένετο,

1 σώσομεν Dissen; σώσομεν ΒΤ.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Well, then, do you not admit that there is such a thing as memory?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Memory of nothing or of something?

THEAET. Of something, surely.

soc. Of things he has learned and perceived—that sort of things?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. A man sometimes remembers what he has seen, does he not?

THEAET. He does.

soc. Even when he shuts his eyes, or does he forget if he does that?

THEAET. It would be absurd to say that, Socrates.

soc. We must, though, if we are to maintain our previous argument; otherwise, it is all up with it.

THEAET. I too, by Zeus, have my suspicions, but I don’t fully understand you. Tell me how it is.

soc. This is how it is: he who sees has acquired knowledge, we say, of that which he has seen; for it is agreed that sight and perception and knowledge are all the same.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. But he who has seen and has acquired knowledge of what he saw, if he shuts his eyes, remembers it, but does not see it. Is that right?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. But "does not see" is the same as "does not know," if it is true that seeing is knowing.

THEAET. True.

soc. Then this is our result. When a man has acquired knowledge of a thing and still remembers
ἐτι μεμνημένον αὐτὸν μή ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπειδή οὐχ ὅραί, ὁ τέρας ἐφαμεν ἃν εἶναι εἰ γέγονοτο.

θεαί. ᾿Αληθέστατα λέγεις.

ζ. Τῶν ἀδυνάτων δή τι συμβαίνειν φαίνεται, ἐάν τις ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἰσθήσων ταύτὸν φη ἐναι.

θεαί. ᾿Εοικεν.

ζ. Ἀλλο ἀρα ἐκάτερον φατέον.

θεαί. Κινδυνεύει.

Σ. Τί οὖν δήτ’ ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη; πάλιν εὖ ἀρχῆς, ὡς ἠοικεν, λεκτέον. καίτοι τί ποτε μέλλομεν, ὦ θεαίτητε, δρᾶν;

θεαί. Τίνος πέρι;

ζ. Φαινόμεθα μοι ἀλεκτρυόνος ἀγενοῦς δίκην πρὶν νενικηκέναι ἀποτηθήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἁδειν.

θεαί. Πῶς δή;

ζ. ᾿Αντιλογικῶς εἶκαμεν πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἀνομάτων ὑμολογίας ἀνομολογησάμενοι καὶ τοιούτῳ των περιγενόμενοι τοῦ λόγου ἁγαπᾶν, καὶ οὐ φάσκοντες ἁγωνισταὶ ἅλλα φιλόσοφοι εἶναι λαν.

D θάνομεν ταύτα ἐκείνοις τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδράσιν ποιοῦντες.

θεαί. Οὐτω μανθάνω ὅπως λέγεις.

ζ. ᾿Αλλ’ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι δηλώσαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ γε δὴ νοώ. ἤρομεθα γὰρ δὴ, εἰ μαθὼν καὶ μεμνημένος τις τι μὴ ἐπίσταται, καὶ τὸν ἱδόντα καὶ μύσατα μεμνημένον ὅρωντα δὲ οὐ ἀποδείξαντες, οὐκ εἰδότα ἀπεδείξαμεν καὶ ἄμα μεμνημένον·

τούτο δ’ εἶναι ἀδύνατον. καὶ οὐτω δὴ μύθος ἀπώλετο ὁ Πρωταγόρειος, καὶ ὁ σος ἄμα ὁ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως, ὁτι ταύτων ἔστιν.
it, he does not know it, since he does not see it; but we said that would be a monstrous conclusion.

THEAET. Very true.

soc. So, evidently, we reach an impossible result if we say that knowledge and perception are the same.

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. Then we must say they are different.

THEAET. I suppose so.

soc. Then what can knowledge be? We must, apparently, begin our discussion all over again. And yet, Theaetetus, what are we on the point of doing?

THEAET. About what?

soc. It seems to me that we are behaving like a worthless game-cock; before winning the victory we have leapt away from our argument and begun to crow.

THEAET. How so?

soc. We seem to be acting like professional debaters; we have based our agreements on the mere similarity of words and are satisfied to have got the better of the argument in such a way, and we do not see that we, who claim to be, not contestants for a prize, but lovers of wisdom, are doing just what those ingenious persons do.

THEAET. I do not yet understand what you mean.

soc. Well, I will try to make my thought clear. We asked, you recollect, whether a man who has learned something and remembers it does not know it. We showed first that the one who has seen and then shuts his eyes remembers, although he does not see, and then we showed that he does not know, although at the same time he remembers; but this, we said, was impossible. And so the Protagorean tale was brought to naught, and yours also about the identity of knowledge and perception.
Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ς. Οὐ τι ἄν, ὁμιᾶς, ὦ φίλε, εἴπερ γε ὁ πατήρ τοῦ ἐτέρου μῦθου ἐξη, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἄν ᾗμινεν τῷ δὲ ὀρφανὸν αὐτὸν ἴμεις προπηλακίζομεν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδ' οἱ ἐπίτροποι, οὐς Πρωταγόρας κατέλιπεν, βοηθεῖν ἔθελουσι, ὅν Θεόδωρος εἴς οдей. ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυνεύσομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἕνεκ' αὐτῶ βοηθεῖν.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον 165 Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίκου τῶν ἐκείνου ἐπίτροπος ἴμεις δὲ πὼς θάττον ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν. χάριν γε μέντοι σοι ἐξομεν, εὰν αὐτῷ βοηθῆσι.

ς. Καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Θεόδωρε. σκέψαι οὖν τὴν γ' ἐμην βοηθειαν. τῶν γὰρ ἄρτη δευτέρα ἀν τις ὀμολογήσεις εἰς προσέχων τοῖς ρήμασι τοῦ νοῦν, ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἴθισμεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἁπαρεσθαί. σοι λέγω ὅπη, ἦ Θεαιτήτω;

ΘΕΟ. Εἰς τὸ κοῦνον μὲν οὖν, ἀποκρινέσθω δὲ ὁ Β νεώτερος ὁ σφαλεῖς γὰρ ἦττον ἀσχημονήσει.

19. ς. Λέγω δῆ τὸ δευνότατον ἐρώτημα· ἐστὶ δὲ, ὁμιᾶς, τούτοις τι· ἀρα οἶδον τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα τι τοῦτο δ ὁ οἶδεν μὴ εἰδέναι;

ΘΕΟ. Τῇ δῇ οὖν ἀποκρινοῦμεθα, ὦ Θεαιτητε;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄδυνατον πον, ὁμιᾶς ἔγνωγε.

ς. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ ὀράν γε ἐπίστασθαι θήσεις. τί

1 πολλὰ om. Τ. 2 εἰς om. Τ. 3 σοι om. Β. 88
THEAETETUS

THEAET. Evidently.

soc. It would not be so, I fancy, my friend, if the father of the first of the two tales were alive; he would have had a good deal to say in its defence. But he is dead, and we are abusing the orphan. Why, even the guardians whom Protagoras left—one of whom is Theodorus here—are unwilling to come to the child’s assistance. So it seems that we shall have to do it ourselves, assisting him in the name of justice.

THEO. Do so, for it is not I, Socrates, but rather Callias the son of Hipponicus, who is the guardian of his children. As for me, I turned rather too soon from abstract speculations to geometry. However, I shall be grateful to you if you come to his assistance.

soc. Good, Theodorus! Now see how I shall help him; for a man might find himself involved in still worse inconsistencies than those in which we found ourselves just now, if he did not pay attention to the terms which we generally use in assent and denial. Shall I explain this to you, or only to Theaetetus?

THEO. To both of us, but let the younger answer; for he will be less disgraced if he is discomfited.

soc. Very well; now I am going to ask the most frightfully difficult question of all. It runs, I believe, something like this: Is it possible for a person, if he knows a thing, at the same time not to know that which he knows?

THEO. Now, then, what shall we answer, Theaetetus?

THEAET. It is impossible, I should think.

soc. Not if you make seeing and knowing identical.
γὰρ χρῆσει ἀφύκτω ἐρωτήματι, τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν
φρέατι συνεχόμενος, ὅταν ἐρωτὰ ἀνέκπληκτος
ἀνὴρ, καταλαβὼν τῇ χειρὶ σοῦ τὸν ἔτερον ὀφθαλμόν,
C εἰ ὁρᾶς τὸ ἰμάτιον τῷ κατελημμένῳ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔ φήσω, οἴμαι, τοῦτῳ γε, τῷ μέντοι
ἐτέρῳ.
ΣΩ. Ὅντοις ὁρᾶς τε καὶ οὐχ ὁρᾶς ἀμα ταύτον;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅντω γέ πως.
ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἐγώ, φήσει, τούτῳ οὔτε τάττῳ οὔτ' ἡρόμην τὸ ὅπως, ἀλλ' εἰ ὁ ἐπίστασαι, τούτῳ καὶ
οὐκ ἐπίστασαι. νῦν δ' ὃ οὐχ ὁρᾶς ὁρὰν φαίνει.
ὸμολογηκὼς δὲ τυγχάνεις τὸ ὁρὰν ἐπίστασαι καὶ
to μὴ ὁρὰν μὴ ἐπίστασαι. ἐξ οὖν τούτων λογίζομαι,
tί σοι συμβαίνει.
D ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλὰ λογίζομαι ὅτι τάναντία οἷς ὑπε-
θέμην.
ΣΩ. 'Ἰσως δὲ γ', ὃ θαυμάσιε, πλείω ἂν τοιαῦτ' ἐπαθεῖς, εἰ τίς σε προσηρώτα, εἰ ἐπίστασαι ἐστί
mὲν ὄξυ, ἐστὶ δὲ ἀμβλύ, καὶ ἐγγύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασαι,
pórrωθεν δὲ μὴ, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἢρέμα τὸ αὐτό,
καὶ ἀλλὰ μυρία, ὃ ἐλλοχών 2 ἃν πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ
μυσθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις ἐρόμενος, ἢνίκ' ἐπιστήμην καὶ
αἰσθησιν ταῦτον ἔθου, ἐμβαλών ἂν εἰς τὸ ἄκοιν
καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας αἰσθήσεις,
Ε ἤλεγχεν ἂν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνείς πρὶν θαυμάσας
τὴν πολυάρατον σοφίαν συνεποδίσθης ὑπ' αὐτοῦ,
οὗ δὴ σε χειρωσάμενός τε καὶ συνδῆσας ἢδη ἂν

1 συνεχόμενος B; συναχόμενος B²Τ.
2 ἐλλοχών bt; ἐνλοχών BT.
For what will you do with a question from which there is no escape, by which you are, as the saying is, caught in a pit, when your adversary, unabashed, puts his hand over one of your eyes and asks if you see his cloak with the eye that is covered?

Theaet. I shall say, I think, "Not with that eye, but with the other."

Soc. Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time?

Theaet. After a fashion.

Soc. "That," he will reply, "is not at all what I want, and I did not ask about the fashion, but whether you both know and do not know the same thing. Now manifestly you see that which you do not see. But you have agreed that seeing is knowing and not seeing is not knowing. Very well; from all this, reckon out what the result is."

Theaet. Well, I reckon out that the result is the contrary of my hypothesis.

Soc. And perhaps, my fine fellow, more troubles of the same sort might have come upon you, if anyone asked you further questions—whether it is possible to know the same thing both sharply and dully, to know close at hand but not at a distance, to know both violently and gently, and countless other questions, such as a nimble fighter, fighting for pay in the war of words, might have lain in wait and asked you, when you said that knowledge and perception were the same thing; he would have charged down upon hearing and smelling and such senses, and would have argued persistently and unceasingly until you were filled with admiration of his greatly desired wisdom and were taken in his toils, and then, after subduing and binding you he would
τότε ἐλύτρον χρημάτων ὅσων σοί γε κάκεινω ἑδόκει. τιν' οὖν δή ὁ Πρωταγόρας, φαίης ἃν ἃσως, λόγον ἐπίκουρον τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἔρει; ἀλλο τι πειρώμεθα λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

20. ΣΩ. Ταῦτα τε δή πάντα οὐσά ἰμεῖς ἐπα. 166 μύνοντες αὐτῶ λέγομεν, καὶ ὁμόσε, οἴμαι, χωρή- σεται καταφρονῶν ἡμῶν καὶ λέγων: "οὗτος δή ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ χρηστός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παϊδίον τι ἐρωτηθέν ἐδείσεν εἰ οἶδον τε τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸ μεμνήσθαι ἂμα καὶ μή εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖσαν ἀπέφησεν διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι προορᾶν, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξεν. τὸ δὲ, ὡ ραθυμότατε Σώκρατε, τῇ δὲ ἔχει· όταν τι τῶν ἐμῶν δὲ ἐρωτή- σεως σκοπῆς, ἐὰν μὲν ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς οἶαπερ ἄν ἐγὼ ἀποκριναίμην ἀποκρινάμενος σφάλληται, ἐγὼ ἐλέγ.- Β χομαι, εἰ δὲ ἄλλοια, αὐτῶς ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς. αὐτίκα γὰρ δοκεῖς τινά σοι συγχωρήσεσθαι μνήμην παρεῖναι τῷ ὑν ἔπαθε, τοιοῦτον τι οὖσαν πάθος οἶον ὥστε ἔπασχε, μηκέτι πάσχοντι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἢ αὖ ἀποκνήσεωι ὤμολογεῖν οἶον τ' εἶναι εἰδέναι καὶ μή εἰδέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτό; ἢ ἐάνπερ τοῦτο δείσῃ, δώσειν ποτὲ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν ἄνομοιούμενον τῷ πρὶν ἄνομοιοῦσθαι ὅτι; μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν εἶναι τινα, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τοὺς, καὶ τούτους γιγνομένους ἀπείρους, ἐάνπερ ἄνομοιοσις γίγνηται, Σ εἰ δὴ ὀνομάτων γε δεήσει θηρεύσεις διευλαβείσθαι

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at once proceed to bargain with you for such ransom as might be agreed upon between you. What argument, then, you might ask, will Protagoras produce to strengthen his forces? Shall we try to carry on the discussion?

THEAET. By all means.

soc. He will, I fancy, say all that we have said in his defence and then will close with us, saying contemptuously, "Our estimable Socrates here frightened a little boy by asking if it was possible for one and the same person to remember and at the same time not to know one and the same thing, and when the child in his fright said 'no,' because he could not foresee what would result, Socrates made poor me a laughing-stock in his talk. But, you slovenly Socrates, the facts stand thus: when you examine any doctrine of mine by the method of questioning, if the person who is questioned makes such replies as I should make and comes to grief, then I am refuted, but if his replies are quite different, then the person questioned is refuted, not I. Take this example. Do you suppose you could get anybody to admit that the memory a man has of a past feeling he no longer feels is anything like the feeling at the time when he was feeling it? Far from it. Or that he would refuse to admit that it is possible for one and the same person to know and not to know one and the same thing? Or if he were afraid to admit this, would he ever admit that a person who has become unlike is the same as before he became unlike? In fact, if we are to be on our guard against such verbal entanglements, would he admit that a person is one at all, and not many, who become infinite in number, if the process of becoming
αλλήλων; ἀλλ', ὃ μακάριε,“ φήσει, “ γενναστέ-
ρως ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἐλθὼν ὁ λέγω, εἰ δύνασαι, ἐξέλεγξον
ὡς οὐχὶ ἰδιαί αἰσθήσεις ἐκάστῳ ἦμῶν γίγνονται,
ἡ ὡς ἰδίων γυγνομένων οὐδέν τι ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ
φαινόμενον μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ γίγνοιτο, ἡ εἰ εἶναι δεὶ
όνομάζειν, εἲ ὑπερ φαίνεται· ὃς δὲ δὴ καὶ κυνο-
κεφάλους λέγων οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ὑπηεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ
τοὺς ἀκούοντας τούτου δρᾶν εἰς τὰ συγγράμματά

D μου ἀναπείθεις, οὐ καλῶς ποιῶν. ἐγὼ γὰρ φημὶ
μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ὡς γέγραφα· μέτρον γὰρ
ἐκαστὸν ἦμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ μή· μυρίον
μέντοι διαφέρειν ἔτερον ἐτέρου αὐτῷ τοῦτῳ, ὅτι
τῷ μὲν ἄλλα ἐστὶ τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα.
καὶ σοφίαν καὶ σοφὸν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δεώ τὸ μὴ
φάναι εἶναι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ λέγω σοφὸν,
ὅς ἂν τινὶ ἦμῶν, ὃ φαίνεται καὶ ἕστι κακά, μετα-
βάλλων ποιήσῃ ἀγαθὰ φαινεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι.

Ε τὸν δὲ λόγον αὐ μὴ τῷ ρήματι μου διώκε, ἀλλ' 
διδε ἐτὶ σαφέστερον μάθε τί λέγω. οἶνον γὰρ ἐν
τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνήσθητι, ὅτι τῷ μὲν
ἀσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαίνεται ὃ ἐσθίει καὶ ἕστι, τῷ
δὲ ὑγιαῖνοντι τάναντια ἐστί καὶ φαίνεται. σοφώτε-
ρον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐδέτερον δεὶ ποιῆσαι—οὐδὲ
167 γὰρ δυνατὸν—οὐδὲ κατηγορητέον ὡς ὃ μὲν κάμινον
ἀμαθῆς ὅτι τοιαῦτα δοξάζει, ὃ δὲ ὑγιαὶνον σοφὸς
ὅτι ἄλλοια· μεταβλητέον δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα· ἀμεῖνον

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different continues? But, my dear fellow,” he will say, “attack my real doctrines in a more generous manner, and prove, if you can, that perceptions, when they come, or become, to each of us, are not individual, or that, if they are individual, what appears to each one would not, for all that, become to that one alone—or, if you prefer to say ‘be,’ would not be—to whom it appears. But when you talk of pigs and dog-faced baboons, you not only act like a pig yourself, but you persuade your hearers to act so toward my writings, and that is not right. (For I maintain that the truth is as I have written; each one of us is the measure of the things that are and those that are not; but each person differs immeasurably from every other in just this, that to one person some things appear and are, and to another person other things. And I do not by any means say that wisdom and the wise man do not exist; on the contrary, I say that if bad things appear and are to any one of us, precisely that man is wise who causes a change and makes good things appear and be to him. And, moreover, do not lay too much stress upon the words of my argument, but get a clearer understanding of my meaning from what I am going to say. Recall to your mind what was said before, that his food appears and is bitter to the sick man, but appears and is the opposite of bitter to the man in health. Now neither of these two is to be made wiser than he is—that is not possible—nor should the claim be made that the sick man is ignorant because his opinions are ignorant, or the healthy man wise because his are different; but a change must be made from the one condition to
γάρ ἡ ἐτέρα ἔξις. οὖτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ ἑτέρας ἔξεως ἔπι τὴν ἀμείων μεταβλητεόν· ἄλλῳ μὲν ἰατρὸς φαρμάκους μεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς λόγους. ἐπεί οὐ τί γε ψευδὴ δοξάζοντα τῖς τυχ ὑστερον ἀληθῆ ἐποίησε δοξάζειν. οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μή ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ᾽ αὐτὸν πάσχῃ ταύτα δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ. ἄλλ᾽ οἶμαι, πονηρᾷ 1

Β ἡ ψυχὴ ἔξει δοξάζοντα 2 συγγενὴ ἐαυτῆς 3 χρηστῇ ἐποίησε δοξάζεσθαι ἑτερα τοιαῦτα, ἀ δὴ τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ βελτίω μὲν τὰ ἑτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, ἀληθεύστερα δὲ οὐδέν. καὶ τοὺς σοφούς, ὃ φίλε Σῶκρατες, πολλοῖς δὲν βατράχους λέγειν, ἄλλα κατὰ μὲν σώματα ἰατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργοὺς. φημὶ γὰρ καὶ τούτους τοὺς φυτοῖς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὅταν τι αὐτῶν ἀσθενῆ, χρηστὸς καὶ

C ὑμεῖνας αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς 4 ἐμποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γε σοφοὺς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἰδιότοπα ταῖς πόλεις τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ οὖν γὰρ ἐκάστη πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῆ, ταύτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῆς, ἦς ἂν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ· ἄλλο σοφός ἀντὶ πονηρῶν ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἐκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς τοὺς παιδευμένους οὖν δυνάμενον παιδαγωγεῖν σοφὸς τε καὶ

D ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοὺς παιδευθεῖσιν καὶ οὕτω σοφώτεροί τε εἶσιν ἑτεροὶ ἑτέρων καὶ οὕδεις

1 πονηρᾷ Aldina; πονηρᾶς BT.
2 δοξάζοντα Tb; δοξάζοντας B.
3 ἐαυτῆς BT; αὐτῆς some mss. and editors.
4 ἀληθεῖς BT; ἀληθείας Schleiermacher.
the other, for the other is better. So, too, in education a change has to be made from a worse to a better condition; but the physician causes the change by means of drugs, and the teacher of wisdom by means of words. And yet, in fact, no one ever made anyone think truly who previously thought falsely, since it is impossible to think that which is not or to think any other things than those which one feels; and these are always true. But I believe that a man who, on account of a bad condition of soul, thinks thoughts akin to that condition, is made by a good condition of soul to think correspondingly good thoughts; and some men, through inexperience, call these appearances true, whereas I call them better than the others, but in no wise truer. And the wise, my dear Socrates, I do not by any means call tadpoles; when they have to do with the human body, I call them physicians, and when they have to do with plants, husbandmen; for I assert that these latter, when plants are sickly, instil into them good and healthy sensations, and true ones instead of bad sensations, and that the wise and good orators make the good, instead of the evil, seem to be right to their states. For I claim that whatever seems right and honourable to a state is really right and honourable to it, so long as it believes it to be so; but the wise man causes the good, instead of that which is evil to them in each instance, to be and seem right and honourable. And on the same principle the teacher who is able to train his pupils in this manner is not only wise but is also entitled to receive high pay from them when their education is finished. And in this sense it is true that some men are wiser than others, and that
ψευδή δοξάζει, καὶ σοί, ἐὰν τε βούλῃ ἐὰν τε μή, ἀνεκτέον ὅντι μέτρῳ· σώζεται γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ λόγος οὕτως. ὦ σὺ εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἁμφοβητεῖν, ἁμφοβητεῖ λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθών· εἰ δὲ δι' ἐρωτήσεων βούλει, δι' ἐρωτήσεων· οὔδὲ γὰρ τούτῳ φευκτέον, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα διωκτέον τῷ νοῦν ἔχοντι. ποίει μέντοι οὕτως· μή ἀδίκει

Ε ἐν τῷ ἐρωτῶν· καὶ γὰρ πολλὴ ἀλογία ἀρετῆς φάσκοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μηδὲν ἀλλ' ἡ ἀδικοῦντα ἐν λόγοις διατελεῖν. ἀδικεῖν δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅταν τις μὴ χωρίς μὲν ὃς ἀγωνιζόμενος τᾶς διατριβὰς ποιήται, χωρὶς δὲ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ παίζῃ τε καὶ σφάλλῃ καθ' ὅσον ἂν δύνηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι σπουδάζῃ τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῖ τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον, ἐκεῖνα μόνα αὐτῷ ἐνδεικνύμενος τὰ σφάλματα, ἀ αὐτὸς ὡς ἠαυτοῦ· καὶ

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Β τὸ πράγμα ἀποφανείς, ἐπειδ' ἂν πρεσβύτεροι γένονται. ἐὰν οὖν ἔμοι πείθῃ, ὦ καὶ πρότερον ἔρρήθη, οὐ δυσμενῶς οὔδὲ μαχητικώς, ἀλλ' ἔλεως τῇ διανοίᾳ συγκαθεῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς σκέψει τί ποτε λέγομεν,
no one thinks falsely, and that you, whether you will or no, must endure to be a measure. Upon these positions my doctrine stands firm; and if you can dispute it in principle, dispute it by bringing an opposing doctrine against it; or if you prefer the method of questions, ask questions; for an intelligent person ought not to reject this method, on the contrary, he should choose it before all others. However, let me make a suggestion: do not be unfair in your questioning; it is very inconsistent for a man who asserts that he cares for virtue to be constantly unfair in discussion; and it is unfair in discussion when a man makes no distinction between merely trying to make points and carrying on a real argument. In the former he may jest and try to trip up his opponent as much as he can, but in real argument he must be in earnest and must set his interlocutor on his feet, pointing out to him those slips only which are due to himself and his previous associations. For if you act in this way, those who debate with you will cast the blame for their confusion and perplexity upon themselves, not upon you; they will run after you and love you, and they will hate themselves and run away from themselves, taking refuge in philosophy, that they may escape from their former selves by becoming different. But if you act in the opposite way, as most teachers do, you will produce the opposite result, and instead of making your young associates philosophers, you will make them hate philosophy when they grow older. If, therefore, you will accept the suggestion which I made before, you will avoid a hostile and combative attitude and in a gracious spirit will enter the lists with me and inquire what we really mean
κινεῖσθαι τε ἀποφαινόμενοι τὰ πάντα, τὸ τε δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ εἶναι ἰδιώτη τε καὶ πόλει. καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψει, εἴτε ταύτῳ εἴτε καὶ ἄλλο ἐπιστήμη καὶ αἴσθησις, ἄλλ' οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι, ἐκ Μ οἰνομάτων τε καὶ ὄνομάτων, δ' οἱ πολλοὶ ὅποι ἀν τύχωσιν ἐλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παντο- δαπᾶς παρέχουσι." ταῦτα, ὁ Θεόδωρος, τῷ ἐταίρῳ σου εἰς βοήθειαν προσηηράμην κατ' ἐμὴν δύναμιν, σμικρὰ ἀπὸ σμικρῶν· εἰ δ' αὐτὸς Ἑξη, μεγαλειώ- τερον ἄν τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἐβοήθησεν.

21. ΘΕΟ. Παίζεις, ὁ Σώκρατες· πάνω γὰρ νεανικῶς τῷ ἀνδρὶ βεβοήθηκας.

. ΞΝ. Εὐ λέγεις, ὁ ἐταίρε. καὶ μοι εἰπέ· ἐνενόη- σάς που λέγοντος ἄρτι τοῦ Πρωταγόρου καὶ ὅνειδι- D ξύντος ἡμῶν ὅτι πρὸς παιδίον τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦ- μενοι τῷ τοῦ παιδὸς φόβῳ ἀγωνιζόμεθα· εἰς τὰ ἐαυτοῦ, καὶ χαριευμένοι των ἀποκαλών, ἀποσεμ- νύνων δὲ τὸ πάντων μέτρων, σπουδάσας ἡμᾶς διεκελεύσατο περὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον;

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐνενόησα, ὁ Σώκρατες;

ΞΝ. Τί οὖν; κελεύεις πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ;

ΘΕΟ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΞΝ. Ὅρας οὖν ὅτι τάδε· πάντα πλῆν σοῦ παιδία ἐστίν. εἰ οὖν πεισόμεθα τῷ ἀνδρὶ, ἐμὲ καὶ σε

1 ἀγωνιζόμεθα B; ἀγωνιζομέθα T.
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when we declare that all things are in motion and
that whatever seems is to each individual, whether
man or state. And on the basis of that you will
consider the question whether knowledge and per-
ception are the same or different, instead of doing as
you did a while ago, using as your basis the ordinary
meaning of names and words, which most people
pervert in haphazard ways and thereby cause all
sorts of perplexity in one another." Such, Theo-
dorus, is the help I have furnished your friend to
the best of my ability—not much, for my resources
are small; but if he were living himself he would
have helped his offspring in a fashion more
magnificent.

THEO. You are joking, Socrates, for you have come
to the man's assistance with all the valour of youth.

SOC. Thank you, my friend. Tell me, did you
observe just now that Protagoras reproached us for
addressing our words to a boy, and said that we
made the boy's timidity aid us in our argument
against his doctrine, and that he called our procedure
a mere display of wit, solemnly insisting upon the
importance of "the measure of all things," and
urging us to treat his doctrine seriously?

THEO. Of course I observed it, Socrates.

SOC. Well then, shall we do as he says?

THEO. By all means.

SOC. Now you see that all those present, except
you and myself, are boys. So if we are to do as
Ε δεί ἐρωτῶντάς τε καὶ ἀποκρινομένους ἄλληλους σπουδάσαι αυτοῦ περὶ τὸν λόγον, ἵνα μὴ τοι τοῦτο γε ἔχῃ ἐγκαλεῖν, ὡς παῖζοντες πρὸς μειράκια διεσκεφάμεθ' αὐτοῦ τὸν λόγον.

καὶ γ. Ο. Τί; οὐ πολλῶν τοῦ Θεαίτητος μεγάλους πῶγωνας ἐχόντων ἄμεινον ἃν ἐπακολουθήσειε λόγῳ διερευνομένως;

σφ. Ἀλλ' οὐ τι σοῦ γε, ὡ Θεόδωρε, ἄμεινον.

μὴ οὖν οἶου ἐμὲ μὲν τῷ σῷ ἐταῖρῳ τετελευτηκότι 169 δεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπαμύνειν, σὲ δὲ μηδενί, ἄλλ' ἵν, ὡς ἄριστε, ὅλιγον ἐπίστου, μέχρι τοῦτον αὐτοῦ ἔως ἢν εἰδώμεν εἴτε ἄρα σὲ δεὶ διαγραμμάτων πέρι μέτρον εἶναι, εἴτε πάντες ὀμοίως σοὶ ἰκανοὶ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς τε ἀστρονομίαν καὶ τάλλα ὃν δὴ σὺ πέρι αἰτίαν ἔχεις διαφέρειν.

καὶ γ. Ο. Οὐ ράδιον, ὡ Σώκρατες, σοὶ παρακαθήμενον μὴ διδόναι λόγον, ἄλλ' ἐγὼ ἄρτι παρελήρητα φάσκων σε ἐπιτρέψειν μοι μὴ ἀποδύσθαι, καὶ οὕχι ἀναγκάσειν καθάπερ Λακεδαμίωνοι· σὺ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκίρωνα μᾶλλον τείνειν. Λακε-

Β δαμόνιοι μὲν γὰρ ἀπιέναι ἡ ἀποδύσθαι κελεύουσι, σὺ δὲ κατ' Ἀνταῖον τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δράμα δράν· τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίης πρὶν ἀν ³ ἀναγκάσει ἀποδύσας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις προσπαθαῖσαι.

σφ. Ἀριστά γε, ὡ Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσον μοι ἀπῆ-

κασας· ἵσχυρικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκέινων. μυρίοι

1 τοι τοῦτο γε Β; τοι τὸ γε Τ; τοῦτο γε Ζ.
2 αὐτοῦ τὸν απογρ. Coislinianum 155; αὐ τοῦ τὸν Β; αὐ τοῦτον τὸν Τ.
3 πρὶν ἀν Heindorf; πρὶν ΒΤ.

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the man asks, you and I must question each other and make reply in order to show our serious attitude towards his doctrine; then he cannot, at any rate, find fault with us on the ground that we examined his doctrine in a spirit of levity with mere boys.

theo. Why is this? Would not Theaetetus follow an investigation better than many a man with a long beard?

soc. Yes, but not better than you, Theodorus. So you must not imagine that I have to defend your deceased friend by any and every means, while you do nothing at all; but come, my good man, follow the discussion a little way, just until we can see whether, after all, you must be a measure in respect to diagrams, or whether all men are as sufficient unto themselves as you are in astronomy and the other sciences in which you are alleged to be superior.

theo. It is not easy, Socrates, for anyone to sit beside you and not be forced to give an account of himself and it was foolish of me just now to say you would excuse me and would not oblige me, as the Lacedaemonians do, to strip; you seem to me to take rather after Sciron.¹ For the Lacedaemonians tell people to go away or else strip, but you seem to me to play rather the rôle of Antaeus; for you do not let anyone go who approaches you until you have forced him to strip and wrestle with you in argument.

soc. Your comparison with Sciron and Antaeus pictures my complaint admirably; only I am a more

¹ Sciron was a mighty man who attacked all who came near him and threw them from a cliff. He was overcome by Theseus. Antaeus, a terrible giant, forced all passers-by to wrestle with him. He was invincible until Heracles crushed him in his arms.
γὰρ ἦδη μοι Ἦρακλέες τε καὶ Θησεύς ἐνυχώντες ¹ καρτεροὶ ² πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μᾶλ’ εὗ ἐνυγκεκόφασιν, ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ οὐδέν τι μάλλον ἀφίσταμαι: οὕτω τὶς Σέρας δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε τῆς περὶ ταῦτα γυμνασίας. μὴ οὖν μηδὲ σὺ φθονήσῃ προσανατριψάμενος σαυτὸν τε ἀμα καὶ ἐμὲ ὑνήσαι.

θεό. Οὔτεν ἐτι ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ’ ἀγε ὅτι θέλεις: πάντως τὴν περὶ ταῦτα εἰμαρμένῃ ἢν ἄν ³ σὺ ἐπικλώσῃς δει ἀνατλῆναι ἐλεγχόμενον. οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω γε ὄν προτίθεσαι οἶδος τ’ ἔσομαι παρα- σχεῖν ἐμαυτὸν σοι.

ς. Ἀλλ’ ἄρκει καὶ μέχρι τοῦτων. καὶ μοι πάνω τήρει τὸ τοιόῦτο, μὴ που παιδικὸν τι λάθωμεν D εἰδος τῶν λόγων ποιούμενοι, καὶ τις πάλιν ἡμῖν αὐτὸ ὑνεδίση.

θεό. Ἀλλὰ δὴ πειράσομαι γε καθ’ ὅσον ἂν δύ- νωμαι.

22. ς. Τοῦτε τοῖνν πρῶτον πάλιν ἀντιλαβόμεθα οὔπερ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἰδὼμεν ὅρθως ἢ οὐκ ὅρθως ἐδυσχεραίνομεν ἐπιτιμώντες τὸ λόγῳ ὅτι αὐτάρκη ἔκαστον εἰς φρόνησιν ἐποίει· καὶ ἡμῖν συνεχώρησεν ὁ Πρωταγόρας περὶ τε τοῦ ἀμείνονος καὶ χείρονος διαφέρειν τινάς, οὐς δὴ καὶ εἶναι σοφοὺς. οὐχί;

θεό. Ναὶ.

ς. Εἰ μὲν τοῖνν αὐτὸς παρῶν ὑμιλογεῖ, ἀλλὰ Ε μὴ ἡμεῖς βοθοῦντες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδὲν ἂν πάλιν ἐδει ἐπαναλαβόντας βεβαιοῦσθαι· νῦν δὲ τάχ’ ἂν τις ἡμᾶς ἀκύρους τιθείη τῆς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ὑμιλογίας. διὸ καλλιώνως ἔχει σαφέ-

1 ἐνυχώντες T; ἐνυγχάοντες B.
2 καρτεροὶ B; κρατεροὶ T.
3 ἄν ἂν W; ἄν BT.
stubborn combatant than they; for many a Heracles and many a Theseus, strong men of words, have fallen in with me and belaboured me mightily, but still I do not desist, such a terrible love of this kind of exercise has taken hold on me. So, now that it is your turn, do not refuse to try a bout with me; it will be good for both of us.

Theo. I say no more. Lead on as you like. Most assuredly I must endure whatsoever fate you spin for me, and submit to interrogation. However, I shall not be able to leave myself in your hands beyond the point you propose.

Soc. Even that is enough. And please be especially careful that we do not inadvertently give a playful turn to our argument and somebody reproach us again for it.

Theo. Rest assured that I will try so far as in me lies.

Soc. Let us, therefore, first take up the same question as before, and let us see whether we were right or wrong in being displeased and finding fault with the doctrine because it made each individual self-sufficient in wisdom. Protagoras granted that some persons excelled others in respect to the better and the worse, and these he said were wise, did he not?

Theo. Yes.

Soc. Now if he himself were present and could agree to this, instead of our making the concession for him in our effort to help him, there would be no need of taking up the question again or of reinforcing his argument. But, as it is, perhaps it might be said that we have no authority to make the agreement for him; therefore it is better to make the
οτερον περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ διομολογήσασθαι· οὐ γάρ τι σμικρόν παραλλάττει οὕτως ἔχον ἢ ἄλλως.

 theano. Λέγεις ἀλήθη.

 σω. Μὴ τούνων δὲ ἄλλων ἄλλα ἕκ τοῦ ἑκεῖνον

170 λόγου ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων λάβωμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν.

 theano. Πῶς;

 σω. Οὕτωσι· τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτῳ καὶ εἰναί φησί ποῦ ὁ δοκεῖ;

 theano. Φησὶ γάρ οὖν.

 σω. Ὅντον, ὃ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ ἤμεις ἀνθρώ-

που, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν, καὶ φαμὲν οὐδένα ὄντων οὐ τὰ μὲν αὐτὸν ἤγείσθαι τῶν ἄλλων σοφώτερον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλους ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἐν γε τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις, ὅταν ἐν στρατείαις ἢ νόσοις ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμάζωνται, ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἐχεῖν τοὺς ἐν ἐκάστοις ἁρχοντας, σωτήρας

β σφῶν προσδοκῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλω τῷ διαφέροντας ἢ τῷ εἰδέναι· καὶ πάντα ποὺ μεστὰ τὰνθρώπων ξητούντων διδασκάλους τε καὶ ἁρχοντας ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τῶν τε ἐργασίων, οἰομένων τε αὐτένικαν, ἐκανὼν δὲ ἀρχεῖν εἰναι. καὶ ἐν τούτωι ἀπασὶ τή ἄλλο φήσομεν ἢ ἀυτοῦς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἠγείσθαι σοφίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν εἰναι παρὰ σφίσον;

 theano. Οὐδέν ἄλλο.

 σω. Ὅντον τὴν μὲν σοφίαν ἀλήθη διάνοιαν ἠγούνται, τὴν δὲ ἀμαθίαν ψευδῆ δόξαν;

 σω. Τί μήν;

 σω. Τί οὖν, ὃ Πρωταγόρα, χρησόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ;
agreement still clearer on this particular point; for it makes a good deal of difference whether it is so or not.

THEO. That is true.

soc. Let us then get the agreement in as concise a form as possible, not through others, but from his own statement.

THEO. How?

soc. In this way: He says, does he not? “that which appears to each person really is to him to whom it appears.”

THEO. Yes, that is what he says.

soc. Well then, Protagoras, we also utter the opinions of a man, or rather, of all men, and we say that there is no one who does not think himself wiser than others in some respects and others wiser than himself in other respects; for instance, in times of greatest danger, when people are distressed in war or by diseases or at sea, they regard their commanders as gods and expect them to be their saviours, though they excel them in nothing except knowledge. And all the world of men is, I dare say, full of people seeking teachers and rulers for themselves and the animals and for human activities, and, on the other hand, of people who consider themselves qualified to teach and qualified to rule. And in all these instances we must say that men themselves believe that wisdom and ignorance exist in the world of men, must we not?

THEO. Yes, we must.

soc. And therefore they think that wisdom is true thinking and ignorance false opinion, do they not?

THEO. Of course.

soc. Well then, Protagoras, what shall we do
πότερον ἄλθηθὶ φῶμεν ἢ ἵπτες ἄνθρωπους δοξάζειν, ἢ ποτὲ μὲν ἄλθηθη, ποτὲ δὲ ψευδῆ; εἴος ἀμφοτέρων γάρ ποινα δοξάζειν. σκόπει γάρ, ὁ Θεόδωρε, εἴ ἐθέλοι ἂν τις τῶν ἄμφι Πρωταγόραν ἢ σὺ αὐτὸς διαμάχεσθαι ὡς οὐδεὶς ἤγεῖται ἐτερὸς ἐτερον ἀμαθῆ τε εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.

Ὀ. Ἄλλῳ ἀπιστον, ὁ Σωκράτης.

ὅ. Καὶ μὴν εἰς τούτο γε ἀνάγκης ὁ λόγος ἢκεί ὁ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρου ἀνθρωπον λέγων.

Ὀ. Πῶς δῆ; ὁ. Ὅταν συν κρίνας τι παρὰ σαυτῷ πρὸς με ἀποφαίνῃ περὶ τινος δόξαν, σοὶ μὲν δὴ τούτο κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον ἄλθηθες ἐστώ, ἦμων δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἀλλοις περὶ τῆς σῆς κρίσεως πότερον οὐκ ἐστὶν κριτάς γενέσθαι, ἦ ἢ ἢ ἢ τὸ κρίνοιμεν ἄλθηθὶ δοξάζειν; ἡ μυρίοι ἐκάστοτε σοὶ μάχονται ἄντιδοξάζοντες, ἤγονευμοι ψευδῆ κρίνειν τε καὶ οἰσθαί; Ὀ. Ὁ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σωκράτης, μάλα μυρίοι ἔτη, φησὶν ὁμήρος, οὐ γέ μοι τὰ ἐς ἀνθρώπων πράγματα παρέχουσιν.

ὁ. Τί οὖν; βούλει λέγωμεν ὡς σὺ τότε σαυτῷ μὲν ἄλθηθὶ δοξάζεις, τοῖς δὲ μυρίοις ψευδῇ; Ὀ. Ἐοίκειν ἐκ γε τοῦ λόγου ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

ὁ. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρα; ἄρ’ οὐχὶ ἀνάγκη, εἰ μὲν μηδὲ αὐτὸς ψετὸ μέτρου εἶναι ἀνθρωπον μηδὲ οἱ πολλοί, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ οἶονται, μηδὲν δὴ εἶναι ταύτῃ τῇ ἄλθειαν ἢν ἐκείνος ἐγραφεῖ; εἰ
about the doctrine? Shall we say that the opinions which men have are always true, or sometimes true and sometimes false? For the result of either statement is that their opinions are not always true, but may be either true or false. Just think, Theodorus; would any follower of Protagoras, or you yourself, care to contend that no person thinks that another is ignorant and has false opinions?

THEO. No, that is incredible, Socrates.

soc. And yet this is the predicament to which the doctrine that man is the measure of all things inevitably leads.

THEO. How so?

soc. When you have come to a decision in your own mind about something, and declare your opinion to me, this opinion is, according to his doctrine, true to you; let us grant that; but may not the rest of us sit in judgement on your decision, or do we always judge that your opinion is true? Do not myriads of men on each occasion oppose their opinions to yours, believing that your judgement and belief are false?

THEO. Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, countless myriads in truth, as Homer\(^1\) says, and they give me all the trouble in the world.

soc. Well then, shall we say that in such a case your opinion is true to you but false to the myriads?

THEO. That seems to be the inevitable deduction.

soc. And what of Protagoras himself? If neither he himself thought, nor people in general think, as indeed they do not, that man is the measure of all things, is it not inevitable that the "truth" which he wrote is true to no one? But if he himself thought

\(^1\) Homer, *Odyssey*, xvi. 121, xvii. 432, xix. 78.
171 δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν ὡς, τὸ δὲ πλὴθος μὴ συνοίηται, οἴοθ᾿ ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὁς πλείους οἰς μὴ δοκεῖ ἢ οἷς δοκεῖ, τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον οὐκ ἐστὶν ἢ ἔστιν.

ὁε. Ἀνάγκη, εἰπέρ γε καθ᾿ ἐκάστην δόξαν ἐσται καὶ οὐκ ἐστι.

ση. Ἔπειτα γε τοῦτ᾿ ἔχει κομψότατον ἐκεῖνος μὲν περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ οὐ̑ςεως τῆς τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων οὐ̑ςιν, ἢ ἐκεῖνον ἠγούνται ψεύδεσθαι, ἐγγυχωρεῖ ποι ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὁμολογῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἀπαντάς.

ὁε. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

Β ση. Οὐκοῦν τῇν αὐτοῦ ἄν ψεύδη συγχυροῖ, εἰ τῆν τῶν ἡγούμενων αὐτοῦ ψεύδεσθαι ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι;

ὁε. Ἀνάγκη.

ση. Οὐ δὲ γ᾿ ἄλλοι οὐ συγχυροῦσιν ἐαυτοῖς ψεύδεσθαι;

ὁε. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ση. Ὡ δὲ γ᾿ αὐ ὁμολογεῖ καὶ ταύτην ἀληθῆ τῆν δόξαν εξ ὃν γέγραφε.

ὁε. Φαίνεται.

ση. Ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμένων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπὸ γε ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, ὅταν τῷ τάναντι λέγοντι συγχυρῇ ἀληθῆ αὐτοῦ δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας

C αὐτὸς συγχωρήσεται μήτε κύνα μήτε τὸν ἐπιτυχόντα ἀνθρωπον μέτρου εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἐνὸς οὗ ἄν μὴ μάθη. οὐχ οὕτως;

ὁε. Οὕτως.

ση. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων, οὐδενὶ ἀν εἰη ἢ Πρωταγόρου ἀλῆθεια ἀληθῆς, οὔτε τώι ἄλλω οὗτι αὐτῷ ἐκεῖνῳ.

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it was true, and people in general do not agree with him, in the first place you know that it is just so much more false than true as the number of those who do not believe it is greater than the number of those who do.

THEO. Necessarily, if it is to be true or false according to each individual opinion.

soc. Secondly, it involves this, which is a very pretty result; he concedes about his own opinion the truth of the opinion of those who disagree with him and think that his opinion is false, since he grants that the opinions of all men are true.

THEO. Certainly.

soc. Then would he not be conceding that his own opinion is false, if he grants that the opinion of those who think he is in error is true?

THEO. Necessarily.

soc. But the others do not concede that they are in error, do they?

THEO. No, they do not.

soc. And he, in turn, according to his writings, grants that this opinion also is true.

THEO. Evidently.

soc. Then all men, beginning with Protagoras, will dispute—or rather, he will grant, after he once concedes that the opinion of the man who holds the opposite view is true—even Protagoras himself, I say, will concede that neither a dog nor any casual man is a measure of anything whatsoever that he has not learned. Is not that the case?

THEO. Yes.

soc. Then since the "truth" of Protagoras is disputed by all, it would be true to nobody, neither to anyone else nor to him.
THEO. "Αγαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν έταίρον μου καταθέομεν.

ΣΝ. 'Αλλά τοι, ὦ φίλε, ἀδηλον εἰ καὶ παρα-θέομεν τὸ ὀρθὸν. εἰκός γε ἃρα ἐκείνων προσβύτερον

D ὁντα σοφώτερον ἡμῶν εἶναι· καὶ εἰ αὐτίκα ἐν-τεῦθεν ἀνακύψειε μέχρι τοῦ αὐχένος, πολλὰ ἂν ἐμὲ τε ἐλέγχας ληροῦντα, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, καὶ σὲ ὁμολο-γοῦντα, κατάδος ἂν οἶχοιο ἀποτρέχων. ἀλλ' ἡμῶν ἀνάγκη, οἴμαι, χρῆσθαι ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς, ὁποῖοι τινὲς ἔσομεν, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀεὶ ταῦτα λέγειν. καὶ δῆτα καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι φῶμεν ὁμολογεῖν ἂν τοῦτο γε ὄντων, τὸ εἶναι σοφώτερον ἐτερον ἐτέρου, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀμαθέστερον;

THEO. 'Εμοί γοῦν δοκεῖ.

23. ΣΝ. 'Η καὶ ταύτη ἂν μάλιστα ἴστασθαι τὸν λόγον, ἃ ημεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες

Ε Πρωταγόρα, ὡς τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἃ δοκεῖ, ταύτη καὶ ἐστιν ἐκάστῳ, θερμά, ἔπρα, γλυκέα, πάντα ὥσα τοῦ τύπου τοῦτου· εἰ δὲ ποι ἐν τισι συγχωρήσεται διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλου, περὶ τὰ ὑγιεῖα καὶ νοσώδη ἔθελήσαι ἂν φάναι μὴ πάν γύναιον καὶ παιδίον, καὶ θηρίων δὲ, ἵκανον εἶναι ἵσθαι αὐτὸ γιγνώσκον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ὑγιεῖν, ἄλλα ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄλλον ἄλλου διαφέρειν, εἰπερ ποι; ΘΕΟ. 'Εμοι γε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

172 ΣΝ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα καὶ ὅσια καὶ μή, οἷα ἂν ἐκάστῃ πόλις ὁιχθείσα θηται νόμιμα αὐτή, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐκάστῃ, καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν σοφώτερον οὕτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου οὕτε πόλων πόλεως εἶναι· ἐν δὲ τῷ συμφέροντα ἑαυτῇ
THEAETETUS

theo. I think, Socrates, we are running my friend too hard.

soc. But, my dear man, I do not see that we are running beyond what is right. Most likely, though, he, being older, is wiser than we, and if, for example, he should emerge from the ground, here at our feet, if only as far as the neck, he would prove abundantly that I was making a fool of myself by my talk, in all probability, and you by agreeing with me; then he would sink down and be off at a run. But we, I suppose, must depend on ourselves, such as we are, and must say just what we think. And so now must we not say that everybody would agree that some men are wiser and some more ignorant than others?

theo. Yes, I think at least we must.

soc. And do you think his doctrine might stand most firmly in the form in which we sketched it when defending Protagoras, that most things—hot, dry, sweet, and everything of that sort—are to each person as they appear to him, and if Protagoras is to concede that there are cases in which one person excels another, he might be willing to say that in matters of health and disease not every woman or child—or beast, for that matter—knows what is wholesome for it and is able to cure itself, but in this point, if in any, one person excels another?

theo. Yes, I think that is correct.

soc. And likewise in affairs of state, the honourable and disgraceful, the just and unjust, the pious and its opposite, are in truth to each state such as it thinks they are and as it enacts into law for itself, and in these matters no citizen and no state is wiser than another; but in making laws that are advan-
ν μη συμφέροντα τίθεσθαι, ενταύθι, είπερ ποι, αυ ὁμολογήσει σύμβουλον τε συμβούλου διαφέρειν καὶ πόλεως δοξαν ἐτέραν ἐτέρας πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, 
Β καὶ οὖν ἂν πάνι τολμήσει φήσαι, ἃ ἂν θέται πόλις συμφέροντα οὐθεδέσα αὐτῇ, παντὸς μᾶλλον ταῦτα καὶ συνοίσειν. ἀλλ' ἐκεὶ οὗ λέγω, ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκοις καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἄνοσίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς οὖν ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἐαυτοῦ ἔχον ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῆ δόξαν τοῦτο γίγνεται ἀληθεῖς τότε ὅταν δοξή καὶ ὁσιον ἄν δοκῇ χρόνον. καὶ ὁσοι γε δή μὴ παντάπασι τοῖς Πρωταγόρῳ λόγον λέγουσιν,3 ὅδε πως τὴν 
σοφίαν ἄγουσι. λόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς, ὁ Θεόδωρε, εκ 
C λόγου μείζων εξ ἐλάττωνος καταλαμβάνει.

Theta. Οὐκοῦν σχολὴν ἀγομεν, ὡ Σώκρατες; 
Σώ. Φανόμεθα καὶ πολλάκις μὲν γε δὴ, ὡ δαιμόνιε, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατενόησα, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν, ὡς εἰκότως οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολὺς χρόνον διατρίψαντες εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια ἱόντες γελοῖοι φαίνονται ῥήτορες.

Theta. Πῶς δὴ οὖν λέγεις; 
Σώ. Κινδυνεύονσι οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς 
τοιοῦτοις ἐκ νέων κυλωδοῦμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν 
D φιλοσοφία καὶ τῇ τούδε διατρίβῃ τεθραμμένοσ 
ὡς οἰκέται πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι.4

Theta. Πῇ δή; 
Σώ. Ἦν τοῖς μὲν τούτῳ δ' οὖ εἴπες ἀεὶ πάρεστι, 
σχολή, καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς 
ποιοῦνται: ὃσπερ ἡμεῖς νυνὶ τρίτον ἦδη λόγον 

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1 καὶ ἀδίκοις W; om. BT. 
2 δὴ BT; ἄν Schanz. 
3 λέγουσιν Naber, with inferior mss.; λέγωσιν BT. 
4 τεθράφθαι W; τετράφθαι BT.
tageous to the state, or the reverse, Protagoras again will agree that one counsellor is better than another, and the opinion of one state better than that of another as regards the truth, and he would by no means dare to affirm that whatsoever laws a state makes in the belief that they will be advantageous to itself are perfectly sure to prove advantageous. But in the other class of things—I mean just and unjust, pious and impious—they are willing to say with confidence that no one of them possesses by nature an existence of its own; on the contrary, that the common opinion becomes true at the time when it is adopted and remains true as long as it is held; this is substantially the theory of those who do not altogether affirm the doctrine of Protagoras. But, Theodorus, argument after argument, a greater one after a lesser, is overtaking us.

THEO. Well, Socrates, we have plenty of leisure, have we not?

Soc. Apparently we have. And that makes me think, my friend, as I have often done before, how natural it is that those who have spent a long time in the study of philosophy appear ridiculous when they enter the courts of law as speakers.

THEO. What do you mean?

Soc. Those who have knocked about in courts and the like from their youth up seem to me, when compared with those who have been brought up in philosophy and similar pursuits, to be as slaves in breeding compared with freemen.

THEO. In what way is this the case?

Soc. In this way: the latter always have that which you just spoke of, leisure, and they talk at their leisure in peace; just as we are now taking up
ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κἀκεῖνοι, ἓν αὐτούς ὁ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον καθάπερ ἡμᾶς ἀρέσῃ. καὶ διὰ μακρῶν ἢ βραχέων μέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἂν μόνον τύχωσι τοῦ ὄντος· οἴ δὲ ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ τε ἂεὶ λέγουσι—κατεπείγει γὰρ ύδωρ ῥέον Ἔ—καὶ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκην ἔχων ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκεν καὶ ὑπογραφήν παραναγιγνωσκομένην, ὦν ἐκτὸς οὐ ρητέον. ἢν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν. 1 οἱ δὲ λόγοι ἂεὶ περὶ ὁμοδούλου πρὸς δεσπότην καθήμενον, ἐν χειρὶ τινα δίκην ἔχοντα, καὶ οἱ ἀγωνεῖς οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλως ἄλλ' ἂεὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῖ. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος.

173 ὡστ' ἐξ ἀπαντῶν τούτων ἐντονοι καὶ δρώμεις γίγνονται, ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν δεσπότην λόγω τε θωπεύσαι καὶ ἔργω χαρίσασθαι, 2 σμικρὸι δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὅρθοι τὰς ψυχὰς. τὴν γὰρ αὐξην καὶ τὸ εὐθύ τε καὶ τὸ ἐλευθερὸν 3 ἢ ἐκ νέων δουλεία αὐθηρηταί, ἀναγκάζουσα πράττειν σκολιὰ, μεγάλους κινδύνους καὶ φόβους ἐτί ἀπαλαίσ ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλλουσα, οὐσ οὐ δυνάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀληθοῦς ὑποφέρειν, εὔθυς ἐπὶ τὸ ψευδός τε καὶ τὸ ἀλλήλους ἀνταδικεῖν τρεπομένοι πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ

1 ἢν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν mss.; om. Abresch et al.
2 χαρίσασθαι BT; ὑπελθείν Cobet from Themistius.
3 τὸ ἐλευθερὸν BT; τὸ ἐλευθέρων Themistius.

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argument after argument, already beginning a third, so can they, if, as in our case, the new one pleases them better than that in which they are engaged; and they do not care at all whether their talk is long or short, if only they attain the truth. But the men of the other sort are always in a hurry—for the water flowing through the water-clock urges them on—and the other party in the suit does not permit them to talk about anything they please, but stands over them exercising the law's compulsion by reading the brief, from which no deviation is allowed (this is called the affidavit); and their discourse is always about a fellow slave and is addressed to a master who sits there holding some case or other in his hands; and the contests never run an indefinite course, but are always directed to the point at issue, and often the race is for the defendant's life. As a result of all this, the speakers become tense and shrewd; they know how to wheedle their master with words and gain his favour by acts; but in their souls they become small and warped. For they have been deprived of growth and straightforwardness and independence by the slavery they have endured from their youth up, for this forces them to do crooked acts by putting a great burden of fears and dangers upon their souls while these are still tender; and since they cannot bear this burden with uprightness and truth, they turn forthwith to deceit and to requiting wrong with wrong, so that they become

1 In Athenian legal procedure each party to a suit presented a written statement—the charge and the reply—at a preliminary hearing. These statements were subsequently confirmed by oath, and the sworn statement was called ἄρτωμοσια or ἀρτωμοσια, which is rendered above by "affidavit" as the nearest English equivalent.
Β συγκλώνται, ὃσθε' ὑγιὲς οὐδὲν ἔχοντες τῆς διανοίας εἰς ἀνδρας ἢκ μειρακίων τελευτῶσι, δεινοὶ τε καὶ 
σοφοὶ γεγονότες, ὡς οἴονται. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ 
τοιοῦτοι, ὃ Θεόδωρος τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χορὸν 
πότερον βούλει διελθόντες ἦ έάσαντες πάλιν ἐπὶ 
τὸν λόγον τρεπώμεθα, ἵνα μὴ καὶ, δ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, 
λίαν πολὺ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ μεταλήψει τῶν λόγων 
καταχρώμεθα;

θεό. Μηδαμίως, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες.

C πάνυ γὰρ εὖ τούτῳ εἰρήκας, ὅτι οὐχ ἥμεις οἱ ἐν 
tῷ τοιώδε χορεύοντες τῶν λόγων υπηρέται, ἀλλ' 
οἱ λόγοι ἡμετέροι 1 ὢσπερ οίκεται, καὶ ἐκαστὸς 
αὐτῶν περιμένει ἀποτελεσθῆναι ὅταν ἥμιν δοκῆ· 
οὔτε γὰρ δικαστὴς οὔτε θεατὴς ὢσπερ ποιηταῖς 
ἐπιτιμήσων τε καὶ ἀρξῶν ἐπιστατεῖ παρ' ἥμιν.

24. ζν. Λέγωμεν δὴ, ὥς ἔουκεν, ἐπεὶ σοὶ γε 
δοκεῖ, περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων· τί γὰρ ἄν τις τοῖς γε 
φαύλωσ διατρίβοντας εὖ φιλοσοφία λέγοι; οὔτοι δὲ 
ποὺ ἐκ νέων πρῶτον μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἵσασι τῇ 

D ὁδὸν, οὔτε ὅπου δικαστήριον ἦ βουλευτήριον ἦ 
tὶ κοινὸν ἀλλὰ τῆς πόλεως συνεδρίου· νῷμοις δὲ 
καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα ἦ γεγραμμένα οὔτε 
ὁρώσων οὔτε ἄκουόν. σπουδαὶ δὲ ἐταυρῖων ἐπ' 
ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δείπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι 
κῶμιοι, οὔτε ὅναρ πράττειν προσώπηται αὐτοῖς. 
εὖ δὲ ἡ κακῶς τὶς 2 γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, ἡ τὶ τῶν κακῶν 
ἐστιν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονὸς ἡ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἡ 
γυναικῶν, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέληθεν ἡ οἱ τῆς 

Ε λεγὸμενοι χόρε. καὶ ταῦτα πάντ' οὔδε ὅτι οὐκ

1 ἡμετέροι W; οἱ ἡμετέροι BT.

2 τὶς W, Iambl., Clem.; τὶ BT.
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greatly bent and stunted. Consequently they pass from youth to manhood with no soundness of mind in them, but they think they have become clever and wise. So much for them, Theodorus. Shall we describe those who belong to our band, or shall we let that go and return to the argument, in order to avoid abuse of that freedom and variety of discourse, of which we were speaking just now?

THEO. By all means, Socrates, describe them; for I like your saying that we who belong to this band are not the servants of our arguments, but the arguments are, as it were, our servants, and each of them must await our pleasure to be finished; for we have neither judge, nor, as the poets have, any spectator set over us to censure and rule us.

SOC. Very well, that is quite appropriate, since it is your wish; and let us speak of the leaders; for why should anyone talk about the inferior philosophers? The leaders, in the first place, from their youth up, remain ignorant of the way to the agora, do not even know where the court-room is, or the senate-house, or any other public place of assembly; as for laws and decrees, they neither hear the debates upon them nor see them when they are published; and the strivings of political clubs after public offices, and meetings, and banquets, and revellings with chorus girls—it never occurs to them even in their dreams to indulge in such things. And whether anyone in the city is of high or low birth, or what evil has been inherited by anyone from his ancestors, male or female, are matters to which they pay no more attention than to the number of pints in the sea, as the saying is. And all these things the philosopher does not even know that he does not
οἶδεν, οἶδεν τὸ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν χάριν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει κεῖται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἢ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα ἡγησαμένη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδὲν, ἀτιμάσασα πανταχῇ φέρεται 1 κατὰ Πίνδαρον, “τὰς 2 τε γὰς ὑπένερθε” καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα, “οὐρανοῦ τε ὑπὲρ” ἀστρονομοῦσα, καὶ πᾶσαν 174 πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνώμενη τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον ὀλού, εἰς τῶν ἐγγὺς οὐδὲν αὐτὴν συγκαθίεισα.

θεὸ. Πῶς τούτο λέγεις, ὦ Σωκράτες;

σπ. Ἡ Ὀσπερ καὶ Θαλῆν ἀστρονομοῦντα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄνω βλέποντα, πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ, Ὠράττα τις ἐμμελῆς καὶ χαρίσσασα θεραπαινίς ἀποσκώψαι λέγεται, ὡς τὰ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι, τὰ δὲ ἐμπρόσθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ πόδας λαυθάνου αὐτοῖν. ταύτων δὲ ἀρκεῖ σκῶμα ἐπὶ πάντας ὅσοι Β ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγοισι. τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τῶν τοιούτων ὁ μὲν πλησίον καὶ ὁ γεῖτων λέληθεν, οὐ μόνον ὁ τι πράττει, ἀλλ’ ὄλιγον καὶ εἰ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ἢ τι ἀλλο θρέμμα· τί δὲ ποτ’ ἐστιν ἀνθρωπος καὶ τί τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει προσήκει διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖν ἢ πᾶσχεν ζητεῖ τε καὶ πράγματ’ ἔχει διερευνώμενος. μανθάνεις γάρ ποι, ὦ Θεόδωρε. ἢ οὖ; 

θεὸ. “Εγώγε· καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

σπ. Τουγάρτοι, ὦ φίλε, ἰδία τε συγγιγνόμενος ὁ 1 φέρεται ΒΤ; πέτεται B3W, Iambl., Clem., Euseb. 2 τὰς Campbell from Clement; τὰ C; τὰ T.
know; for he does not keep aloof from them for the sake of gaining reputation, but really it is only his body that has its place and home in the city; his mind, considering all these things petty and of no account, disdains them and is borne in all directions, as Pindar\(^1\) says, "both below the earth," and measuring the surface of the earth, and "above the sky," studying the stars, and investigating the universal nature of every thing that is, each in its entirety, never lowering itself to anything close at hand.

**THEO.** What do you mean by this, Socrates?

**SOC.** Why, take the case of Thales, Theodorus. While he was studying the stars and looking upwards, he fell into a pit, and a neat, witty Thracian servant girl jeered at him, they say, because he was so eager to know the things in the sky that he could not see what was there before him at his very feet. The same jest applies to all who pass their lives in philosophy. For really such a man pays no attention to his next door neighbour; he is not only ignorant of what he is doing, but he hardly knows whether he is a human being or some other kind of a creature; but what a human being is and what is proper for such a nature to do or bear different from any other, this he inquires and exerts himself to find out. Do you understand, Theodorus, or not?

**THEO.** Yes, I do; you are right.

**SOC.** Hence it is, my friend, such a man, both in

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\(^1\) This may refer to *Nem. x. 87 f.*—

\[\begin{align*}
\text{"Thou (Polydeuces) shalt live being half the time under the earth and half the time in the golden dwellings of heaven," but it may be a quotation from one of the lost poems of Pindar.}
\end{align*}\]
τοιούτος ἐκάστῳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος
C ἔλεγον, ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ᾧ ποὺ ἄλλοθι ἀναγκα-
σθῇ περὶ τῶν παρὰ πόδας καὶ τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς
dιαλέγεσθαι, γέλωτα παρέχει οὐ μόνον Θράτταις
ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ ὀχλῷ, εἰς φρέστα τε καὶ πᾶσαι
ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτων ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καὶ ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη
dεινή, δόξαν ἀβελτερίας παρεχομένη· ἐν τε γὰρ
ταῖς λοιδορίαις ὑδίον ἔχει οὐδὲν οὐδένα λοιδορεῖν,
ἀνύκτωρ καὶ κακὰν οὐδέν οὐδετος ἐκ τοῦ μή
μεμελετηκέναι. ἀπορῶν οὐν γελοῖος φάνεται. ἐν
D τε τοῖς ἐπαίνοις καὶ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων μεγαλαυχίαι,
οὐ προσπονήτως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι γελῶν ἐνδήλος
γιγνόμενος ληρώδης δοκεῖ εἶναι. τύραννον τε
γὰρ ἡ βασιλέα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἕνα τῶν νομέων,
οἶνον συβώτην ἢ ποιμένα ἢ των βουκόλου, ἤγείται
ἀκούειν εὐδαμονιζόμενον πολὺ βδάλλοντα· δυσ-
kολωτερον δὲ ἐκείνων ζῴων καὶ ἐπιβουλότερον
ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλων νομίζει αὐτούς, ἀγροικον
δὲ καὶ ἀπαίδευτον ὑπὸ ἀσχολίας οὐδὲν ἤττον τῶν
Ε νομέων τῶν τοιούτων ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι, σηκὸν
ἐν ὄρει τὸ τεῖχος περιβεβλημένον. γῆς δὲ ὅταν
μυρία πλέθρα ἢ ἔτι πλεῖστ ἀκούσῃ ὡς τις ἀρὰ
κεκτημένος θαυμάστα πλήθει κέκτηται, πάνσημκρα
δοκεῖ ἀκούειν εἰς ἄπασαν εἰσθανοῖς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν.
tὰ δὲ δὴ γένη ὑμνοῦντος, ὡς γενναῖος τις ἐπὶ
πάππους πλουσίους ἔχων ἀποφήναι, παντὰπασιν
ἀμβλύ· καὶ ἐπὶ σμικρὸν ὀρώντων ἠγείται τῶν
175 ἐπαινοῦν, ὑπὸ ἀπαίδευσίας οὐ δυναμένων εἰς τὸ
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private, when he meets with individuals, and in public, as I said in the beginning, when he is obliged to speak in court or elsewhere about the things at his feet and before his eyes, is a laughing-stock not only to Thracian girls but to the multitude in general, for he falls into pits and all sorts of perplexities through inexperience, and his awkwardness is terrible, making him seem a fool; for when it comes to abusing people he has no personal abuse to offer against anyone, because he knows no evil of any man, never having cared for such things; so his perplexity makes him appear ridiculous; and as to laudatory speeches and the boastings of others, it becomes manifest that he is laughing at them—not pretending to laugh, but really laughing—and so he is thought to be a fool. When he hears a panegyric of a despot or a king he fancies he is listening to the praises of some herdsman—a swineherd, a shepherd, or a neatherd, for instance—who gets much milk from his beasts; but he thinks that the ruler tends and milks a more perverse and treacherous creature than the herdsmen, and that he must grow coarse and uncivilized, no less than they, for he has no leisure and lives surrounded by a wall, as the herdsmen live in their mountain pens. And when he hears that someone is amazingly rich, because he owns ten thousand acres of land or more, to him, accustomed as he is to think of the whole earth, this seems very little. And when people sing the praises of lineage and say someone is of noble birth, because he can show seven wealthy ancestors, he thinks that such praises betray an altogether dull and narrow vision on the part of those who utter them; because of lack of education they cannot keep their eyes fixed
πάν ἀεὶ βλέπειν οὐδὲ λογίζονθαι ὅτι πάππων καὶ προγόνων μυριάδες ἐκάστῳ γεγόνασιν ἀναρί-θμητοι, ἐν αἷς πλούσιοι καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ βασιλεῖς καὶ δούλοι βάρβαροι τε καὶ Ἕλληνες πολλάκις μυρίων γεγόνασιν ὅτων. ἂλλ’ ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ εἰκοσὶ κατάλογοι προγόνων σεμνωμένων καὶ ἀναφερόντων εἰς Ἡρακλέα τὸν Ἀμφιτρύωνος ἄτοπα αὐτῶ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, ὅτι Β δὲ ὁ ἄπ’ Ἀμφιτρύωνος εἰς τὸ ἄνω πεντεκαι-εἰκοστὸς τοιούτος ἢν οἷα συνεβαίνειν αὐτῷ τύχη, καὶ ὁ πεντηκοστὸς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, γελᾷ οὐ δυναμένων λογί-ζονθαι τε καὶ χαυνότητα ἀνοίγοντος ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττειν. ἐν ἀπαί δὴ τούτοις ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελάται, τά μὲν ὑπερηψάνως ἔχουν, ὥς δοκεῖ, τά δ’ ἐν ποσὶν ἁγνοῦν τε καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις ἀπορῶν.

ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασι τὰ γιγνόμενα λέγεις, οὐ Σώκρατες.

25. Ἐπι. "Ὅταν δὲ γέ τινα αὐτός, ὅ φίλε, Κ Ἐλκύσῃ ἄνω, καὶ ἐθελήσῃ τις αὐτῷ ἐκβήναι ἐκ τοῦ "τί ἐγὼ σε ἄδικῶν ἢ σοῦ ἐμὲ;" εἰς σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας, τί τε ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν καὶ τί τῶν πάντων ἢ ἄλλης διαφέρετον, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ "εἰ βασιλεῖς εὐδαίμων," "κεκτημένος τ’ αὖ πολὺ¹ χρυσόν,” βασιλείας πέρι καὶ ἄνθρω-πίνης ὀλίσθεν εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ἐπὶ σκέψιν, ποῦ τε τινὲ ἐστόν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἀνθρώπου φύσει προσήκει τὸ μὲν κτήσασθαι² αὐτοῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀποφυγεῖν—περὶ τούτων ἀπάντων

Δ ὅταν αὖ δὲ ἡ λόγου διδόσκει τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκείνου τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ δρμῶν καὶ δικανικῶν, πάλιν αὖ τὰ

¹ πολὺ Euseb., Iamb.; om. BT.
² κτήσασθαι B², Iamb., Euseb.; κτήσασθαι BT.
upon the whole and are unable to calculate that every man has had countless thousands of ancestors and progenitors, among whom have been in any instance rich and poor, kings and slaves, barbarians and Greeks. And when people pride themselves on a list of twenty-five ancestors and trace their pedigree back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, the pettiness of their ideas seems absurd to him; he laughs at them because they cannot free their silly minds of vanity by calculating that Amphitryon's twenty-fifth ancestor was such as fortune happened to make him, and the fiftieth for that matter. In all these cases the philosopher is derided by the common herd, partly because he seems to be contemptuous, partly because he is ignorant of common things and is always in perplexity.

Theo. That all happens just as you say, Socrates.

Soc. But when, my friend, he draws a man upwards and the other is willing to rise with him above the level of "What wrong have I done you or you me?" to the investigation of abstract right and wrong, to inquire what each of them is and wherein they differ from each other and from all other things, or above the level of "Is a king happy?" or, on the other hand, "Has he great wealth?" to the investigation of royalty and of human happiness and wretchedness in general, to see what the nature of each is and in what way man is naturally fitted to gain the one and escape the other—when that man of small and sharp and pettifogging mind is compelled in his turn to give an account of all these
ἀντίστροφα ἀποδίδωσιν· ἵλιγγινῶν τε ἀπὸ υψηλοῦ κρεμασθεὶς καὶ βλέπων μετέωρος ἄνωθεν ὑπὸ ἀνθείας ἄδημονών τε καὶ ἀπόρων καὶ βατταρίζων

γέλωτα Θράττας μὲν οὔ τε παρέχει οὐδ’ ἄλλῳ ἀπα-

dεύτῳ οὔδενί, οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνονται, τοίς δ’ ἐναντίως

ἡ ὡς ἀνδραπόδους τραφεῖσιν ἄπασιν. οὕτως δὴ

ἐκατέρου τρόπος, ὡ Θεόδωρε, ὁ μὲν τῷ οὖν ἐν

Ε ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένων, ὅν δὴ ἰ

λόγοις καλεῖς, ὃ ἀνεμέσθην εὐθεῖα δοκεῖν καὶ

οὔδενι εἶναι ὅταν εἰς δουλικὰ ἐμπέσῃ διακονήματα,

οῖνον στρωματόδεσμον μὴ ἐπισταμένου συσκεφά-

λοσθαι μηδὲ ὑπὸν ἤδυναι ἡ θῶπας λόγους· ὥ δ’

ἀ倒霉 τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα πάντα δυναμένου τορώς τε καὶ

όξεως διακονεῖν, ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐπισταμένου

eπιδέξια ἐλευθέρως οὕτως γ’ ἀρμονίαν λόγων

176 λαβόντος ὁρθῶς ὑμνήσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν

evδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ·

Ἑω. Εἰ πάντας, ὡ Σώκρατε, πείθοις ἅ λέγεις

ὡσπερ ἔμε, πλείων ἄν εἰρήνη καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττω

κατ’ ἀνθρώπους εὖ.

Σω. Ἀλλ’ οὔτ’ ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὡ

Θεόδωρε· ὑπεναντίον γὰρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι

ἀνάγκη· οὔτ’ ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρύσθαι, τὴν δὲ

θυνήτης φύσιν καὶ τῶν ἐν τῶν τόποις περιπολεῖ εὖ

1 βατταρίζων Themistius; βαρβαρίζων BT.

2 τραφεῖσιν ἄπασιν B; τραφεῖσιν πάσιν T, Iamb., Euseb.

3 ὥ δ’ T, Iamb.; οὐ δ’ BT.

4 ἐλευθέρως BT; ἐλευθερίως Athenaeus.

5 ἀληθῆ om. Athenaeus.
things, then the tables are turned; dizzied by the new experience of hanging at such a height, he gazes downward from the air in dismay and perplexity; he stammers and becomes ridiculous, not in the eyes of Thracian girls or other uneducated persons, for they have no perception of it, but in those of all men who have been brought up as free men, not as slaves. Such is the character of each of the two classes, Theodorus, of the man who has truly been brought up in freedom and leisure, whom you call a philosopher—who may without censure appear foolish and good for nothing when he is involved in menial services, if, for instance, he does not know how to pack up his bedding, much less to put the proper sweetening into a sauce or a fawning speech—and of the other, who can perform all such services smartly and quickly, but does not know how to wear his cloak as a freeman should, properly draped,\(^1\) still less to acquire the true harmony of speech and hymn aright the praises of the true life of gods and blessed men.

THEO. If, Socrates, you could persuade all men of the truth of what you say as you do me, there would be more peace and fewer evils among mankind.

soc. But it is impossible that evils should be done away with, Theodorus, for there must always be something opposed to the good; and they cannot have their place among the gods, but must inevitably hover about mortal nature and this earth. Therefore

\(^1\) The Athenians regarded the proper draping of the cloak as a sign of good breeding. The well-bred Athenian first threw his cloak over the left shoulder, then passed it round the back to the right side, then either above or below the right arm, and finally over the left arm or shoulder. See Aristophanes, *Birds*, 1567 f., with Blaydes's notes.
ἀνάγκης. διὸ καὶ πειράσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσθαι ἐν τάχιστα. φυγῇ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῶ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὥς ἄριστε, οὐ πάνυ ¹ ρᾴδιον πεῖσαι ὡς ἄρα οὐχ ὄν ἐνεκα οἱ πολλοὶ φασι δεῖν πονηρὰν μὲν φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν, τοῦτον χάριν τὸ μὲν ἐπιτηδευτέον, τὸ δ' οὖ, ἵνα μὴ ² κακὸς καὶ ἵνα ἀγαθὸς δοκῇ εἶναι· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕθλος, ὡς ἐμοὶ 

C φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ ἄληθὲς ὃδε λέγωμεν. θεὸς οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ' ὡς οἶνον τε δικαιότατος, καὶ οὐκ ἐστιν αὐτῷ ὁμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὃς ἄν ἡμῶν αὐτῷ γένηται ὅτι δικαιότατος. περὶ τούτο ³ καὶ ἢ ὡς ἄληθῶς δεινότης ἀνδρὸς καὶ οὐδενία τε καὶ ἄνανδρία. ἢ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτον γνώσις σοφία καὶ ἀρετὴ ἄληθινή, ἢ δὲ ἄγνοια ἀμαθία καὶ κακία ἕναργῆς· αἳ δ' ἀλλ' δεινότητές τε δοκοῦσαι καὶ σοφίαν ἐν μὲν πολιτικὰς δυναστείας γιγνόμεναι φορτικαί, ἐν δὲ τέχναις βάναυσοι. τῷ οὖν ἄδι-

D κοὗτῳ καὶ ἄνωσια λέγοντι ἢ πράττοντι μακρῷ ἀριστῇ ἐχεῖ τὸ μή συγχωρεῖν δεινῷ ὑπὸ πανουργίας εἶναι· ἀγάλλονται γὰρ τῷ ὑπείδει καὶ οἶνον τὰ ἀκούειν ὡσ ὁ λήρων εἰςι, γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη, ἀλλ' ἄνδρεσ οἴους δεὶ ἐν πόλει τοὺς σωθησομένους. λεκτέον οὖν τάληθες, ὃτι τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον εἰσιν ο JNI οὐκ οἶνον, ὃτι οὐχὶ οἴνονται· ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ ἐξήμαι ἄδικιας, δ' ἔπει ἡκίστα ἁγνοεῖν. οὐ γάρ

1 πάνυ B; πάνυ τι T. ² ἵνα μὴ B; ἵνα δὴ μὴ T. ³ τούτῳ Euseb., Iamb., Stob.; τούτου BT.
we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise. But, indeed, my good friend, it is not at all easy to persuade people that the reason generally advanced for the pursuit of virtue and the avoidance of vice—namely, in order that a man may not seem bad and may seem good—is not the reason why the one should be practised and the other not; that, I think, is merely old wives' chatter, as the saying is. Let us give the true reason. God is in no wise and in no manner unrighteous, but utterly and perfectly righteous, and there is nothing so like him as that one of us who in turn becomes most nearly perfect in righteousness. It is herein that the true cleverness of a man is found and also his worthlessness and cowardice; for the knowledge of this is wisdom or true virtue, and ignorance of it is folly or manifest wickedness; and all the other kinds of seeming cleverness and wisdom are paltry when they appear in public affairs and vulgar in the arts. Therefore by far the best thing for the unrighteous man and the man whose words or deeds are impious is not to grant that he is clever through knavery; for such men glory in that reproach, and think it means that they are not triflers, "useless burdens upon the earth," ¹ but such as men should be who are to live safely in a state. So we must tell them the truth—that just because they do not think they are such as they are, they are so all the more truly; for they do not know the penalty of unrighteousness, which is the thing they most ought to know. For

¹ Homer, Iliad, xviii. 104; Odyssey, xx. 379.
PLATO

ἐστιν ἴν δοκοῦσι, πληγαῖ τε καὶ θάνατοι, ὡς ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλὰ ἴν ἀδύνατον Ε ἐκφυγεῖν.

Θεό. Τίνα δὴ λέγεις;

σ. Παραδειγμάτων, ὥστε, ἐν τῷ ὠντι ἐστώτων, τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαίμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀθλιωτάτου, οὐχ ὀρώντες ὦτι οὔτως ἔχει, ὑπὸ ἠλυθιότητος τε καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι 177 τῷ μὲν ὀμοιούμενοι διὰ τὰς ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιούμενοι. οὐ δὴ τίνοις δίκην ἔδωντες τὸν εἰκότα βίον ὧν ὀμοιοῦνται. εὰν δὲ εἴπομεν ὦτι, ἂν μὴ ἀπαλλαγώσω τῆς δεινότητος, καὶ τελευτήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐκείνος μὲν ὁ τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος οὐ δέξεται, ἐνθάδε δὲ τὴν αὐτοῖς ὀμοιότητα τῆς διαγωγῆς ἀεὶ ἔδωσε, κακοὶ κακοῖς συνόντες, ταύτα δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοὶ καὶ πανούργοι ἀνοήτων τινῶν ἀκούσονται.

Θεό. Καὶ μάλα δή, ὥ Σῶκρατες.

Β σ. Οἶδά τοι, ὥ ἐταίρε. ἐν μέντοι τι αὐτοῖς συμβέβηκεν. ὅταν1 ἴδια λόγον δὲ δοῦναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι περὶ ὄν ψέγουσι, καὶ ἐθελήσωσιν ἄν- δρικῶς πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομείνατε καὶ μὴ ἀνάδρως φυγεῖν,2 τότε ἀτόπως, ὥ δαμόνει, τελευτώντες οὐκ ἀρέσκουσιν αὐτοῖς περὶ ὄν λέγουσι, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκείνη πως ἀπομαραίνεται, ὥστε παίδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, ἀποστώμεν—εἰ δὲ C μή, πλείω ἀεὶ ἐπιρρέοντα καταχωσεῖ ἣμιῶν τὸν

1 ὅτ' ἄν W; Iamb. ; ὅτι ἄν BT.
2 φυγεῖν W; φεύγειν BT, Iamb.
THEAETETUS

it is not what they think it is—scourgings and death, which they sometimes escape entirely when they have done wrong—but a penalty which it is impossible to escape.

THEO. What penalty do you mean?

soc. Two patterns, my friend, are set up in the world, the divine, which is most blessed, and the godless, which is most wretched. But these men do not see that this is the case, and their silliness and extreme foolishness blind them to the fact that through their unrighteous acts they are made like the one and unlike the other. They therefore pay the penalty for this by living a life that conforms to the pattern they resemble; and if we tell them that, unless they depart from their "cleverness," the blessed place that is pure of all things evil will not receive them after death, and here on earth they will always live the life like themselves—evil men associating with evil—when they hear this, they will be so confident in their unscrupulous cleverness that they will think our words the talk of fools.

THEO. Very true, Socrates.

soc. Yes, my friend, I know. However, there is one thing that has happened to them: whenever they have to carry on a personal argument about the doctrines to which they object, if they are willing to stand their ground for a while like men and do not run away like cowards, then, my friend, they at last become strangely dissatisfied with themselves and their arguments; their brilliant rhetoric withers away, so that they seem no better than children. But this is a digression. Let us turn away from these matters—if we do not, they will come on like
εἰς ἀρχὴς λόγον—ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ἐμπροσθεν ἰωμεν, εἰ καὶ σοι· δοκεῖ.

θεο. Ἔμοι μὲν τὰ τουαῦτα, ὥ Σῶκρατες, οὐκ ἀγδέστερα ἀκούειν· βάρω γὰρ τηλικῶδε οὕτω ἐπακολουθεῖν· εἰ μέντοι δοκεῖ, τάλιν ἑπανίμεν.

26. ΣΠ. Οὐκοῦν ἐνταῦθα ποὺ ἦμεν τὸν λόγον, ἐν ὧ ἐφαμεν τοὺς τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν λέγοντας, καὶ τὸ ἀεί δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ὧ δοκεῖ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἑθέλειν διακυρί—

ζεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα περὶ τὰ δίκαια, ὡς παντὸς μάλλον ἃ ἂν θῆται πόλις δόξαντα αὐτῇ, ταύτα καὶ ἐστι δίκαια τῇ θεμένῃ, ἐωσπερ ἂν κέηται· περὶ δὲ τάγαθοῦ ἰούδενα ἀνδρεῖον ἐθ' οὕτως εἶναι, ὡστε τολμᾶν διαμαχεσθαι ότι καὶ ἃ ἂν ὕφελμα οἰηθείσα πόλις ἐαυτῇ θῆται, καὶ ἐστι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἂν κέηται ὕφελμα, πλην εἰ τὸ τὸ ὅνομα λέγων· τοῦτο δὲ ποὺ σκώμμι ἂν εἰη πρὸς ὃ λέγομεν. οὖχι;

θεο. Πάνω γε.

Ε. ΣΠ. Μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὅνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πράγμα τὸ ὅνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖτω.

θεο. Μὴ γὰρ.

ΣΠ. Ἑλλ' ὅ ἂν τὸ τοῦτο ὅνομαζῆ, τοῦτον δὴ τοῦτον στοχάζεται νομοθετουμένη, καὶ πάντας τοὺς νόμους, καθ' ὅσον οὐεται τε καὶ δύναται, ὡς ὕφελμωτάτους ἐαυτῇ τίθεται; ἥ πρὸς ἀλλο τι βλέπουσα νομοθετεῖται;

1 τάγαθοῦ BW; τάγαθα TW.
2 τὸ ὅνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖτω W; δ ὅνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖται B; λεγέτω ... μὴ γὰρ om. T.

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an ever-rising flood and bury in silt our original argument—and let us, if you please, proceed.

theo. To me, Socrates, such digressions are quite as agreeable as the argument; for they are easier for a man of my age to follow. However, if you prefer, let us return to our argument.

soc. Very well. We were at about the point in our argument where we said that those who declare that only motion is reality, and that whatever seems to each man really is to him to whom it seems, are willing to maintain their position in regard to other matters and to maintain especially in regard to justice that whatever laws a state makes, because they seem to it just, are just to the state that made them, as long as they remain in force; but as regards the good, that nobody has the courage to go on and contend that whatever laws a state passes thinking them advantageous to it are really advantageous as long as they remain in force, unless what he means is merely the name "advantageous"; and that would be making a joke of our argument. Am I right?

theo. Certainly.

soc. Yes; for he must not mean merely the name, but the thing named must be the object of his attention.

theo. True.

soc. But the state, in making laws, aims, of course, at advantage, whatever the name it gives it, and makes all its laws as advantageous as possible to itself, to the extent of its belief and ability; or has it in making laws anything else in view?

1 The legislator may call his laws advantageous, and that name, if it is given them when they are enacted, will belong to them, whatever their character may be.
PLATO

178 ΘΕΩ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΝ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ τυγχάνει ἅει, ἡ πολλὰ καὶ διαμαρτάνει ἐκάστη;

ΘΕΩ. Οἶμαι ἐγώγε καὶ ἀμαρτάνειν.

ΣΝ. Ἐτι τοίνυν ἐνθένδε ἃν μᾶλλον πᾶς τις ὁμολογήσειν ταῦτα ταῦτα, εἰ περὶ παντὸς τῶν εἴδους ἐρωτήη, ἐν ὧ καὶ τὸ ὦφέλιμον τυγχάνει ὃν· ἦστι δὲ ποὺ καὶ περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον· ὅταν γὰρ νομοθετόμεθα, ὡς ἐσομένους ὦφελίμους τοὺς νόμους τιθέμεθα εἰς τὸν ἐπείτα χρόνον· τοῦτο δὲ μέλλον ὁρθῶς ἃν λέγομεν.

Β ΘΕΩ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΝ. Ἡθι δή, οὔτως ἐρωτᾶμεν Πρωταγόραν ἡ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν ἐκεῖνω τὰ αὐτὰ λεγόντων· πάντων μέτρων ἀνθρώποι ἔστιν, ὡς φατε, ὧν Πρωταγόρα, λευκῶν, βαρέων, κούφων, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ τῶν τινῶν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, οἷα πάσχει τοιαῦτα οὕμενος, ἀληθῆ τε οἴεται αὐτῷ καὶ ὄντα. οὐχ οὔτω;

ΘΕΩ. Οὔτω.

ΣΝ. Ἡ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι, φήσομεν, ὃς Πρωταγόρα, ἔχει τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ οἶα ὅ ἂν οἰηθῇ ἐσεσθαι, ταῦτα καὶ γίγνεται ἐκεῖνῳ τῷ οἰηθέντι; οἶον θερμά, ἃρ' ὅταν τις οἰηθῇ ἱδιωτὴς αὐτῶν πυρετὸν λήφεσθαι καὶ ἔσεσθαι ταύτην τὴν θερμότητα, καὶ ἔτερος, ἵατρὸς δὲ, ἀντουνθῇ, κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δοξάν φῶμεν τὸ μέλλον ἀποβήσεσθαι; ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἄμφοτέρων, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἵατρῷ οὐ

1 ἐκάστη W; ἐκάστη ΒΤ.
2 μέλλον W; μᾶλλον ΒΤ.
THEAETETUS

THEO. Certainly not.

soc. And does it always hit the mark, or does every state often miss it?

THEO. I should say they do often miss it!

soc. Continuing, then, and proceeding from this point, every one would more readily agree to this assertion, if the question were asked concerning the whole class to which the advantageous belongs; and that whole class, it would seem, pertains to the future. For when we make laws, we make them with the idea that they will be advantageous in after time; and this is rightly called the future.

THEO. Certainly.

soc. Come then, on this assumption, let us question Protagoras or someone of those who agree with him. Man is the measure of all things, as your school says, Protagoras, of the white, the heavy, the light, everything of that sort without exception; for he possesses within himself the standard by which to judge them, and when his thoughts about them coincide with his sensations, he thinks what to him is true and really is. Is not that what they say?

THEO. Yes.

soc. Does he, then, also, Protagoras, we shall say, possess within himself the standard by which to judge of the things which are yet to be, and do those things which he thinks will be actually come to pass for him who thought them? Take, for instance, heat; if some ordinary man thinks he is going to take a fever, that is to say, that this particular heat will be, and some other man, who is a physician, thinks the contrary, whose opinion shall we expect the future to prove right? Or perhaps the opinion
θερμὸς οὐδὲ πυρέττων γενήσεται, ἐαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφότερα;

θεο. Γελοίον μέντ' ἂν εἴη.

σπ. 'Αλλ', οἶμαι, περὶ οἶνου γλυκύττοτος καὶ

Δ αὐστηρόττοτος μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι ἢ τοῦ γεωργοῦ
dόξα, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ κυρία.

θεο. Τί μὴν;

σπ. Οὐδ' ἂν αὖ περὶ ἀναρμόστου τε καὶ εὐαρ-

μόστου ἐσομένου παιδοτρίβης ἂν βέλτιον δοξάσειν

μουσικοῦ, ὁ καὶ ἐπειτὰ αὐτῷ παιδοτρίβη δόξει
eυάρμοστον εἶναι.

θεο. Οὐδαμῶς.

σπ. Οὐκοὖν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐστιάσεσθαι μὴ

μαγειρικοῦ ὕντος, σκευαζομένης θοίνης, ἀκυροτέρα

ἡ κρίσις τῆς τοῦ ὕποποιου περὶ τῆς ἐσομένης

Ε ἡδονῆς. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἡδῆ ὑντος ἐκάστω

ἡδεος ἡ γεγονότος μηδὲν πω τῷ λόγῳ διαμαχώ-

μεθα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐκάστῳ καὶ δόξεων

καὶ ἐσεσθαι πότερον αὐτός αὐτῷ ἀριστος κριτῆς,

ἡ σὺ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τὸ γε 2 περὶ λόγους πιθανὸν

ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον βέλτιον

ἀν προδοξάσαις ἡ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὀστισοῦν;

θεο. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σῶκρατες, τοῦτο γε

σφόδρα ὑπισχενέτο πάντων διαφέρειν αὐτός.

σπ. Νὴ Δία, ὦ μέλε. ἡ οὐδεὶς ἡ ἂν αὐτῷ διε-

179 λέγετο διδοὺς πολὺ ἄργυριον, εἰ μὴ τοὺς συνόντας

ἐπειθεὶν ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐσεσθαί τε καὶ δόξεων

1 δ ὁμ. Τ. 2 τὸ γε W; τότε ΒΤ.
of both, and the man will become, not hot or feverish to the physician, but to himself both?

Theo. No, that would be ridiculous.

Soc. But, I imagine, in regard to the sweetness or dryness which will be in a wine, the opinion of the husbandman, not that of the lyre-player, will be valid.

Theo. Of course.

Soc. And again, in a matter of discord or tunefulness in music that has never been played, a gymnastic teacher could not judge better than a musician what will, when performed, seem tuneful even to a gymnastic teacher himself.

Theo. Certainly not.

Soc. Then, too, when a banquet is in preparation the opinion of him who is to be a guest, unless he has training in cookery, is of less value concerning the pleasure that will be derived from the viands than that of the cook. For we need not yet argue about that which already is or has been pleasant to each one; but concerning that which will in the future seem and be pleasant to each one, is he himself the best judge for himself, or would you, Protagoras—at least as regards the arguments which will be persuasive in court to each of us—be able to give an opinion beforehand better than anyone whatsoever who has no especial training?

Theo. Certainly, Socrates, in this, at any rate, he used to declare emphatically that he himself excelled everyone.

Soc. Yes, my friend, he certainly did; otherwise nobody would have paid him a high fee for his conversations, if he had not made his pupils believe that neither a prophet nor anyone else could judge
οὔτε μάντες οὔτε τις ἄλλος ἁμεινον κρίνειεν ἂν ἦ αὐτός. ¹

 theano. Ἀληθέστατα.

 οὐκοῦν καὶ αἰ νομοθεσία καὶ τὸ ὁφέλιμον περί τὸ μέλλον ἔστι, καὶ πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ νομοθετομένην πόλιν πολλάκις ἀνάγκην εἶναι τοῦ ὁφελιμωτάτου ἀποτυγχάνειν;

 theano. Μάλα γε.

 οὐ. Μετρίως ἄρα ἢμῖν πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλόν 

 Β σου εἰρήσεται, ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖν σοφοτερόν τε ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ τῶν ἀνεπιστήμων μηδὲ ὀπωσδει καὶ ἀνάγκην εἶναι μέτρω γίγνεσθαι, ὡς ἀρτι μὲ ἡνάγκαζεν ὁ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου λόγος, εἴτ' ἐβουλόμην εἴτε μή, τοιοῦτον εἶναι.

 theano. Ἐκείνη μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς Σωκράτης, μάλιστα ἀλίσκεσθαι ὁ λόγος, ἀλισκόμενος καὶ ταύτη, ἢ τάς τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὕτα δὲ ἐφανήσαν τους ἐκείνου λόγους οὐδαμῇ ἀληθεῖς ἤγοιμεναι.

 οὐ. Πολλαχῇ, ὡς Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄλλη ἂν τὸ γε τοιοῦτον ἀλοίπη μὴ πᾶσαν παντὸς ἀληθή δόξαν εἶναι. περὶ δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἐκάστῳ πάθος, ἔνων αἰ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἰ κατὰ ταύτας δόξας γίγνονται, χαλεπώτερον ἐλείν ὡς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς. ἵσως δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω. ἀνάλωτον γάρ, εἰ ἐτυχο, εἰσιν, καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες αὕτας ἐναργεῖς τε εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμας τάχα ἂν ὑπνα λέγουσιν, καὶ. Θεαίητος ἵσως σκοποῦ εἰρήκειν αἰσθήσιν καὶ ἐπιστῆμην ταύτων

θέμενος. προσπείτεν οὖν ἐγγυτέρω, ὡς ὁ ὑπὲρ ¹ αὐτός αὐτῷ mss.; αὐτῷ om. Schleiermacher.
THEAETETUS

better than himself what was in the future to be and seem.

THEO. Very true.

soc. Both lawmaking, then, and the advantageous are concerned with the future, and everyone would agree that a state in making laws must often fail to attain the greatest advantage?

THEO. Assuredly.

soc. Then it will be a fair answer if we say to your master that he is obliged to agree that one man is wiser than another, and that such a wise man is a measure, but that I, who am without knowledge, am not in the least obliged to become a measure, as the argument in his behalf just now tried to oblige me to be, whether I would or no.

THEO. In that respect, Socrates, I think that the argument is most clearly proved to be wrong, and it is proved wrong in this also, in that it declares the opinions of others to be valid, whereas it was shown that they do not consider his arguments true at all.

soc. In many other respects, Theodorus, it could be proved that not every opinion of every person is true, at any rate in matters of that kind; but it is more difficult to prove that opinions are not true in regard to the momentary states of feeling of each person, from which our perceptions and the opinions concerning them arise. But perhaps I am quite wrong; for it may be impossible to prove that they are not true, and those who say that they are manifest and are forms of knowledge may perhaps be right, and Theaetetus here was not far from the mark in saying that perception and knowledge are identical. So we must, as the argument in behalf of
Πρωταγόρου λόγος ἐπέταττε, καὶ σκεπτέον τὴν
φερομένην ταύτην οὐσίαν διακρούοντα,¹ εἰτε ὑγιὲς
εἰτε σαθρὸν φθέγγεται: μάχη δ’ οὖν περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ
φαύλη οὖθ’ ὀλύνοις γέγονεν.

27. θεό. Πολλοῦ καὶ δεὶ φαύλη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ
περὶ μὲν τῇ Ἰωνίᾳ καὶ ἐπιδίδωσι πάμπολυ. οἱ
γὰρ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου ἑταίροι χορηγοῦσι τούτου
τοῦ λόγου μᾶλα ἐρρωμένως.

υπ. Τῷ τοι, ὦ φίλε Θεόδωρε, μᾶλλον σκεπτέον
Ε καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται.

θεό. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. καὶ γὰρ, ὦ Σῶκρατές,
περὶ τούτων τῶν Ἡρακλείτειων ἦ, ὥσπερ οὐ
λέγεις, Ὅμηρειον καὶ ἐτί παλαιότερων, αὐτοῖς
μὲν τοὺς περὶ τὴν Ἑφεσον, ὅσοι προσποιοῦνται
ἐμπειροὶ εἶναι,² οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἶδ’ τε διαλεχθήναι
ἡ τοῖς οἰστρῶσι. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμ-
ματα φέρονται, τὸ δ’ ἐπιμελεῖν ἐπὶ λόγῳ καὶ
ἐρωτήματι καὶ ἤσυχίας ἐν μέρει ἀποκρίνονται
καὶ ἔρεσθαι ἓττον αὐτοῖς ἐν ἐν τὸ μηδὲν’ μᾶλλον
δὲ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὖδ’ οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ σμικρὸν
ἐνεῖναι τοῖς ἁνδράσιν ἤσυχίας. ἀλλ’ ἂν τινὰ τι
ἐρή, ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ῥήματικαί αἰνιγματώδη
ἀναστῶντες ἀποτοξεύοντο, καὶ τούτου ζητῆς λόγον
λαβεῖν τί εὑρηκεν, ἐτέρω πεπλῆξε καὶ ὁμώς μετ-
ωνομασμένως. περανεῖς δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν πρὸς
οὐδένα αὐτῶν’ οὐδὲ γε ἐκεῖνοι αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλή-

Βλους, ἀλλ’ εὖ πάνυ φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδὲν βέβαιον

¹ διακρούοντα TW; ἀκοβοῦντα B.
² ἐμπειροὶ εἶναι Vindob. 21; ἐμπειροὶ BT, Euseb.
THEAETETUS

Protagoras enjoined upon us, come up closer and examine this doctrine of motion as the fundamental essence, rapping on it to see whether it rings sound or unsound. As you know, a strife has arisen about it, no mean one, either, and waged by not a few combatants.

THEO. Yes, far from mean, and it is spreading far and wide all over Ionia; for the disciples of Heraclitus are supporting this doctrine very vigorously.

soc. Therefore, my dear Theodorus, we must all the more examine it from the beginning as they themselves present it.

THEO. Certainly we must. For it is no more possible, Socrates, to discuss these doctrines of Heraclitus (or, as you say, of Homer or even earlier sages) with the Ephesians themselves—those, at least, who profess to be familiar with them—than with madmen. For they are, quite in accordance with their text-books, in perpetual motion; but as for keeping to an argument or a question and quietly answering and asking in turn, their power of doing that is less than nothing; or rather the words "nothing at all" fail to express the absence from these fellows of even the slightest particle of rest. But if you ask one of them a question, he pulls out puzzling little phrases, like arrows from a quiver, and shoots them off; and if you try to get hold of an explanation of what he has said, you will be struck with another phrase of novel and distorted wording, and you never make any progress whatsoever with any of them, nor do they themselves with one another, for that matter, but they take very good care to allow nothing to be settled either

1 See 168 b.
έαν εἶναι μὴτ' ἐν λόγῳ μῆτ' ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς, ἡγούμενοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ στάσιμον εἶναι· τούτω δὲ πάνυ πολεμοῦσιν, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύνανται πανταχόθεν ἐκβάλλουσιν.

ζη. Ἰσως, ὁ Θεόδωρε, τοὺς ἄνδρας μαχομένους ἐώρακας, εἰρηνεύουσιν δὲ οὐ συγγέγονας· οὐ γὰρ σοὶ ἐταῖροι εἰσῶν· ἀλλ', οἴμαι, τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπὶ σχολῆς φράξουσιν, οὐς ἂν βούλωνται ὀμοίους αὐτοῖς ποιῆσαι.

Θεο. Ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὃ δαμόνιε; οὐδὲ γι-

C γνεται τῶν τοιούτων ἔτερος ἔτερον μαθητής, ἀλλ' αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται, ὅποθεν οὐν τύχῃ ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν ἐνθουσιάσας, καὶ τὸν ἔτερον ὁ ἔτερος οὐδὲν ἤγείται εἰδέναι. παρὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὅπερ ἦν ἔρων, οὐκ ἂν ποτε λάβοις λόγον οὐτὲ ἐκόντων οὐτ' ἀκόντων· αὐτοὺς δὲ δεὶ παραλαβόντας ὡσπερ πρόβλημα ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι.

ζη. Καὶ μετρίως γε λέγεις. τὸ γε δὴ πρόβλημα ἀλλο τι παρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἄρχαίων μετὰ D ποιῆσεως ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς πολλοὺς, ὡς ἡ γένεσις τῶν ἅλλων πάντων Ὁκεανὸς τε καὶ Τηθὸς βεῦματα τυγχάνει καὶ οὐδὲν ἑστηκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ὑστέρων ἀτε σοφωτέρων ἀναφανδὸν ἀποδεικνυμέ-νων, ἵνα καὶ οἱ σκυτότομοι αὐτῶν τῆς σοφίας μάθωσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ παύσωνται ἥλιθως οἰό-μενοι τὰ μὲν ἑστάναι, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μαθόντες δὲ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται τιμῶσιν αὐτοὺς; ὁλίγου δὲ ἐπελαθόμην, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι ἂν τάναντία τούτους ἀπεφήναντο,
in an argument or in their own minds, thinking, I suppose, that this is being stationary; but they wage bitter war against the stationary, and, so far as they can, they banish it altogether.

soc. Perhaps, Theodorus, you have seen the men when they are fighting, but have not been with them when they are at peace; for they are no friends of yours; but I fancy they utter such peaceful doctrines at leisure to those pupils whom they wish to make like themselves.

THEO. What pupils, my good man? Such people do not become pupils of one another, but they grow up of themselves, each one getting his inspiration from any chance source, and each thinks the other knows; nothing. From these people, then, as I was going to say, you would never get an argument either with their will or against it; but we must ourselves take over the question and investigate it as if it were a problem of mathematics.

soc. Yes, what you say is reasonable. Now as for the problem, have we not heard from the ancients, who concealed their meaning from the multitude by their poetry, that the origin of all things is Oceanus and Tethys, flowing streams, and that nothing is at rest; and likewise from the moderns, who, since they are wiser, declare their meaning openly, in order that even cobblers may hear and know their wisdom and may cease from the silly belief that some things are at rest and others in motion, and, after learning that everything is in motion, may honour their teachers? But, Theodorus, I almost forgot that others teach the opposite of this,
ο ὁδὸν ἀκίνητον τελέθειν ὑπὸ πάντ' ὄνομ' εἶναι,
καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα Μέλισσοί τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναντιοῦμενοι πᾶσι τούτοις διασχυρίζονται, ὡς ἐν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἔστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν ἤ κινεῖται. τούτοις οὖν, δὲ ἔτατος, πᾶσι τὶ χρησὸμεθα; κατὰ σμικρὸν γὰρ προϊόντες λελήθησαμεν ἀμφότερων εἰς τὸ μέσον πεπτωκότες, καὶ ἄν μὴ πὴ ἀμυνόμενον διαφύγωμεν, δικὴν δώσομεν ὁσπέρ οἱ ἐν ταῖς παλαιόσταται διὰ γραμμῆς παῖζοντες, ὥστε ὑπ' ἀμφότερων ληφθέντες ἐλκυοῦσαν εἰς τὰναντία. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι τοὺς ἔτερους πρότερον σκεπτεόν, ἐφ' οὐσπέρ ὠρμήσαμεν, τοὺς ῥέοντας· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν τὶ φαίνωνται λέγοντες, συνέλξομεν μετ' αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τοὺς ἔτερους ἐκφυγεῖν πειρῶμενοι· ἐὰν δὲ οἱ τὸν ὀλὸν στασίωται ἄληθέστερα λέγειν δοκῶσι, φεύξόμεθα παρ' αὐτούς ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν 1

τὰ ἀκίνητα κινοῦντων. ἀμφότεροι δ' ἂν φανῶσι μηδὲν μέτριον λέγοντες, γελοιοῖς ἔσόμεθα ἡγοῦμενοι ἡμᾶς μὲν τὶ λέγειν φαύλους ὀντας, παμπαλαιόν ὑπ' καὶ πασσόφοις ἄνδρας ἀποδεδοκιμακότες. ὅρα οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ λυσιτελεῖ εἰς τοσοῦτον προϊόντα κίνδυνον.

ο. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτόν, ὦ Ἔοκρατης, μη ὅτι διασκέψασθαι τί λέγονσιν ἐκάτεροι τῶν ἄνδρῶν.

1 τελέθειν Stallbaum; τελέθει BT.
2 παρ' αὐτούς ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν Schleiermacher; παρ' αὐτούς ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν W; ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν παρ' αὐτούς B; τῶν παρ' αὐτούς ἀπ' αὐτῶν T.

144.
So that it is motionless, the name of which is the All, and all the other doctrines maintained by Melissus and Parmenides and the rest, in opposition to all these; they maintain that everything is one and is stationary within itself, having no place in which to move. What shall we do with all these people, my friend? For, advancing little by little, we have unwittingly fallen between the two parties, and, unless we protect ourselves and escape somehow, we shall pay the penalty, like those in the palaestra, who in playing on the line are caught by both sides and dragged in opposite directions. I think, then, we had better examine first the one party, those whom we originally set out to join, the flowing ones, and if we find their arguments sound, we will help them to pull us over, trying thus to escape the others; but if we find that the partisans of "the whole" seem to have truer doctrines, we will take refuge with them from those who would move what is motionless. But if we find that neither party has anything reasonable to say, we shall be ridiculous if we think that we, who are of no account, can say anything worth while after having rejected the doctrines of very ancient and very wise men. Therefore, Theodorus, see whether it is desirable to go forward into so great a danger.

Theo. Oh, it would be unendurable, Socrates, not to examine thoroughly the doctrines of both parties.

1 Parmenides, line 98 (ed. Mullach). In its context the infinitive is necessary; but Plato may have quoted carelessly and may have used the indicative.

2 In the game referred to (called διελκυστίνδα by Pollux, ix. 112) the players were divided into two parties, each of which tried to drag its opponents over a line drawn across the palaestra.
28. Σκεπτέον ἄν εἰη σοῦ γε οὕτω προθυμουμένου. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ἄρχῇ εἶναι τῆς σκέφτεσθαι. Κινήσεως πέρι, ποίον τί ποτε ἄρα λέγοντες φασι τὰ πάντα κινεῖσθαι. βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνυν πότερον ἐν τί εἴδος αὐτῆς λέγουσιν ἡ, ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, δύο; ἡ μέντοι μόνον ἐμοὶ δοκεῖτω, ἀλλὰ συμμέτεχε καὶ σὺ, ἵνα κοινὴ πάσχωμεν, ἂν τι καὶ δέη. καὶ μοι λέγε· ἄρα κινεῖσθαι καλεῖσ, ὅταν τι χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ ἡ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφηται;

θεο. Ἔγωγε.

σα. Τούτω μὲν τοίνυν ἐν ἑστώ εἴδος. ὅταν δὲ 

D ἢ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, γηράσκη δὲ, ἢ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ ἢ σκληρῶν ἐκ μαλακοῦ γίγνηται, ἢ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀλλοίωσιν ἀλλοίωται, ἄρα οὐκ ἄξιον ἔτερον εἴδος φάναι κινήσεως;

θεο. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.1

σα. Ἀναγκαίον μὲν οὖν,2 δύο δὴ λέγω τούτῳ εἴδη κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ φοράν.3

θεο. Ὄρθως γε λέγων.

σα. Τούτῳ τοίνυν οὕτω διελόμενοι διαλεγόμεθα ἢδη τοῖς τὰ πάντα φάσκουσιν κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐρωτῶμεν· πότερον πᾶν φατε ἀμφοτέρως κινεῖσθαι, Ἐ φερόμενον τε καὶ ἀλλοιοῦμενον, ἡ τὸ μὲν τί ἀμφοτέρως, τὸ δ’ ἐτέρως;

θεο. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' ἐγώγε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν· οἴμαι δ’ ἂν φάναι ἀμφοτέρως.

σα. Εἴ δέ γε μῆ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κινοῦμενα τε αὐτοῖς.4

1 Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ om. Stobaeus.

2 Ἀναγκαίον μὲν οὖν οἰν given to Theodorus by B.

3 φοράν W; περιφοράν BT, Stobaeus.

4 αὐτοῖς W; εαυτοῖς BT.
soc. Then they must be examined, since you are so urgent. Now I think the starting-point of our examination of the doctrine of motion is this: Exactly what do they mean, after all, when they say that all things are in motion? What I wish to ask is this: Do they mean to say that there is only one kind of motion or, as I believe, two? But it must not be my belief alone; you must share it also, that if anything happens to us we may suffer it in common. Tell me, do you call it motion when a thing changes its place or turns round in the same place?

THEO. Yes.

soc. Let this, then, be one kind of motion. Now when a thing remains in the same place, but grows old, or becomes black instead of white, or hard instead of soft, or undergoes any other kind of alteration, is it not proper to say that this is another kind of motion?

THEO. I think so.

soc. Nay, it must be true. So I say that there are these two kinds of motion: "alteration," and "motion in space."

THEO. And you are right.

soc. Now that we have made this distinction, let us at once converse with those who say that all things are in motion, and let us ask them, "Do you mean that everything moves in both ways, moving in space and undergoing alteration, or one thing in both ways and another in one of the two ways only?"

THEO. By Zeus, I cannot tell! But I think they would say that everything moves in both ways.

soc. Yes; otherwise, my friend, they will find that things in motion are also things at rest, and it will
καὶ ἐστώτα φανεῖται, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὅρθως ἐξεὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι κινεῖται τὰ πάντα ή ὁτι ἐστηκεν.

ʻΕΕ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ζ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὰ δεῖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἑνείναι 1 μηδενί, πάντα δὴ πᾶσαν 182 κύριου άεὶ κινεῖται.

ʻΕΕ. Ἀνάγκη.

ζ. Σκόπει δὴ μοι τόδε αὐτῶν· τῆς θερμότητος ἢ λευκότητος ἢ ὅτουοιν γένεσιν οὐχ οὕτω πως ἐλέγομεν φάναι αὐτούς, φέρεσθαι ἔκαστον τούτων ἁμα ἀισθήσει μεταξύ τοῦ ποιούντος τε καὶ πάσχοντος, καὶ τὸ μὲν πάσχον αἰσθητικόν 2 ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰσθησίς γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ποῖον τι ἀλλ' οὐ ποιότητα; ἵσως οὖν ἡ ποιότης ἁμα ἀλλόκοτόν τε φαίνεται ὄνομα καὶ οὐ μανθάνεις ἀθρόον λεγόμενον· κατὰ Β μέρῃ οὖν ἄκουε. τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν οὔτε θερμότης οὔτε λευκότης, θερμὸν δὲ καὶ λευκὸν γίγνεται, καὶ τὰλλα οὕτω. μέμνησαι γὰρ που καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὅτι οὕτως ἐλέγομεν, ἐν μηδεν· αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, μηδ' αὐ τὸ ποιοῦν ἡ πάσχον, ἀλλ' εξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἀλληλα συγγενομένων τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητα ἀποτίκτοντα τὰ μὲν ποιὰ 4 ἀττα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα.

ʻΕΕ. Μέμνημαι· πῶς δ' οὖ;

ζ. Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐάσωμεν, εἴτε C ἀλλως εἴτε οὕτως λέγουσιν· οὗ δ' ἐνεκα λέγομεν, τοῦτο μόνον φιλάττωμεν, ἐρωτώντες· κινεῖται καὶ ρεῖ, ὡς φατε, τὰ πάντα; ἢ γάρ;

1 ἑνείναι W; ἑν εἶναι BT.
2 αἰσθητικόν Burnet; αἰσθητον BT; αἰσθητήν Buttmann; αἰσθανόμενον Heindorf.
3 αἰσθησίς W; αἰσθήσιν ἐτι BT. 4 ποιὰ bt; ποι ΒΤ.
be no more correct to say that all things are in motion than that all things are at rest.

THEO. What you say is very true.

SOC. Then since they must be in motion, and since absence of motion must be impossible for anything, all things are always in all kinds of motion.

THEO. Necessarily.

SOC. Then just examine this point of their doctrine. Did we not find that they say that heat or whiteness or anything you please arises in some such way as this, namely that each of these moves simultaneously with perception between the active and the passive element, and the passive becomes percipient, but not perception, and the active becomes, not a quality, but endowed with a quality? Now perhaps quality seems an extraordinary word, and you do not understand it when used with general application, so let me give particular examples. For the active element becomes neither heat nor whiteness, but hot or white, and other things in the same way; you probably remember that this was what we said earlier in our discourse, that nothing is in itself un-varyingly one, neither the active nor the passive, but from the union of the two with one another the perceptions and the perceived give birth and the latter become things endowed with some quality while the former become percipient.

THEO. I remember, of course.

SOC. Let us then pay no attention to other matters, whether they teach one thing or another; but let us attend strictly to this only, which is the object of our discussion. Let us ask them, "Are all things, according to your doctrine, in motion and flux?" Is that so?
θεο. Ναι.

σο. Οὐκοῦν ἄμφοτέρας ἂς διειλόμεθα κινήσεις, 

φερόμενα τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα;

θεο. Πῶς δ’ οὗ; εἴπερ γε δὴ τελέως κινή-

σεται.

σο. Εἰ μὲν τοῖνυν ἐφέρετο μόνον, ἕλλοιοῦτο δὲ 

μή, εἴχομεν ἂν που εἴπεῖν οἶα ἄττα βεῖ τὰ 

φερό-

μενα: η̣ πῶς λέγωμεν 1;

θεο. Οὔτως.

Δ  σο. Ἑπείδη δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο μένει, τὸ λευκὸν 

ρεῖν τὸ βέον, ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει, ὡστε καὶ αὐτοῦ 

τούτου εἶναι βοήν, τῆς λευκότητος, καὶ μεταβολήν 

eis ἀλλην χρόαν, ἵνα μὴ ἀλῳ ταύτῃ μένον, ἀρά 

ποτε οἶον τε τι προσεπείν χρώμα, ὡστε καὶ 

ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύειν;

θεο. Καὶ τίς μηχανή, Ὡ Σωκράτες; ἡ ἄλλο γέ 

tι τῶν τοιοῦτων, εἴπερ ἀεὶ λέγοντος ὑπεξέρχεται, 

ἄτε δὴ βέον;

σο. Τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἐροῦμεν ὀποιασοῦν, 

οἶον τῆς τοῦ ὅραν ἡ ἀκούειν; μένειν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῷ 

Ἐ τῷ ὅραν ἡ ἀκούειν;

θεο. Οὐκοῦν δεῖ γε, εἴπερ πάντα κινεῖται.

σο. Οὔτε ἄρα ὅραν προσρητέον τι μᾶλλον ἡ μὴ 

ὁράν, οὐδὲ τυ’ ἀλλην αἰσθησιν μᾶλλον ἡ μῆ, πάντων 

gε πάντως κινούμενων.

θεο. Οὔ γὰρ οὖν.

σο. Καὶ μὴν αἰσθησίς γε ἐπιστήμη, ὡς ἐφαμεν 

ἔγω τε καὶ Θεαίτητος.

θεο. Ἡν ταῦτα.

1 λέγωμεν Β; λέγομεν Τ.
THEAETETUS

THEO. Yes.

SOC. Have they then both kinds of motion which we distinguished? Are they moving in space and also undergoing alteration?

THEO. Of course; that is, if they are to be in perfect motion.

SOC. Then if they moved only in space, but did not undergo alteration, we could perhaps say what qualities belong to those moving things which are in flux, could we not?

THEO. That is right.

SOC. But since not even this remains fixed—that the thing in flux flows white, but changes, so that there is a flux of the very whiteness, and a change of colour, that it may not in that way be convicted of remaining fixed, is it possible to give any name to a colour, and yet to speak accurately?

THEO. How can it be possible, Socrates, or to give a name to anything else of this sort, if while we are speaking it always evades us, being, as it is, in flux?

SOC. But what shall we say of any of the perceptions, such as seeing or hearing? Does it perhaps remain fixed in the condition of seeing or hearing?

THEO. It must be impossible, if all things are in motion.

SOC. Then we must not speak of seeing more than not-seeing, or of any other perception more than of non-perception, if all things are in all kinds of motion.

THEO. No, we must not.

SOC. And yet perception is knowledge, as Theaetetus and I said.

THEO. Yes, you did say that.
PLATO

ρν. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον ἡ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρινάμεθα ἐρωτώμενοι ὁ τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμην.

183 θεο. Ἠ Εὐκάτε.

ρν. Καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν συμβαίνοι τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, προθυμηθεῖσαν ἀποδείξαι ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται, ὡς δὴ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀπόκρισις ὀρθὴ φανῇ. τὸ δ', ὡς ἔσοικεν, ἐφάνῃ, εἰ πάντα κινεῖται, πάσα ἀπόκρισις, περὶ ὅσον ἂν τις ἀποκρύφηται, ὁμοίως ὀρθὴ εἶναι, οὕτω τ' ἔχειν φάναι καὶ μὴ οὕτω, εἴ δὲ βούλει, γίγνεσθαι, ἡμὲν μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ.

θεο. Ὡρθῶς λέγεις.

ρν. Πλὴν γε, ὁ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι "οὔτω" τε εἶπον καὶ "οὔχ οὔτω." δεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο "οὔτω" Β λέγειν: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι κινοῖτο "οὔτω"· οὐδ' αὐ "μὴ οὔτω"· οὐδὲ γὰρ "τοῦτο" κινήσις· ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀλλῷ φωνῇ θετέον τοὺς τὸν λόγον τοῦτον λέγοντιν, ὡς νῦν γε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσι βῆμα, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ "οὔ" ὀπως. 1" μάλιστα δ' οὔτως 2 ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀρμόττοι, ἀπειρον λεγόμενον.

θεο. Οἰκειοτάτῃ γοῦν διάλεκτος αὐτὴ αὐτοῖς.

ρν. Οὐκοῦν, ὁ Θεόδωρε, τοῦ τε σοῦ ἐταῖρον ἀπηλλάγμεθα, καὶ οὔτω συγχυροῦμεν αὐτῷ πάντ' ἀνδρὰ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι, ἂν μὴ C φρόνιμος τις ἢ· ἐπιστήμην τε αἰσθησιν ὅ που συγχυροῦμεν κατὰ γε τὴν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι μέθοδον, εἰ μὴ 3 τί πως ἄλλως Θεαίτητος ὁδε λέγει.

θεο. "Ἀριστ' εὐρήκασ, ὁ Σώκρατες· τούτων γὰρ περανθέντων καὶ ἐκε ἄλλῃ ἀπηλλάχθαι σοι

1 ὀπως ὉΤ; οὔτως Ὡ.

2 δ' οὔτως ομ. Ὡ.

3 εἰ μὴ Ὡ; ἢ εἰ μὴ ὉΤ.
soc. Then when we were asked "what is knowledge?" we answered no more what knowledge is than what not-knowledge is.

THEO. So it seems.

soc. This would be a fine result of the correction of our answer, when we were so eager to show that all things are in motion, just for the purpose of making that answer prove to be correct. But this, I think, did prove to be true, that if all things are in motion, every answer to any question whatsoever is equally correct, and we may say it is thus or not thus—or, if you prefer, "becomes thus," to avoid giving them fixity by using the word "is."

THEO. You are right.

soc. Except, Theodorus, that I said "thus," and "not thus"; but we ought not even to say "thus"; for "thus" would no longer be in motion; nor, again, "not thus." For there is no motion in "this" either; but some other expression must be supplied for those who maintain this doctrine, since now they have, according to their own hypothesis, no words, unless it be perhaps the word "nohow." That might be most fitting for them, since it is indefinite.

THEO. At any rate that is the most appropriate form of speech for them.

soc. So, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend, and we do not yet concede to him that every man is a measure of all things, unless he be a sensible man; and we are not going to concede that knowledge is perception, at least not by the theory of universal motion, unless Theaetetus here has something different to say.

THEO. An excellent idea, Socrates; for now that this matter is settled, I too should be rid of the duty
Ἀποκρινόμενον κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας, ἐπειδή τὸ περὶ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου λόγου τέλος σχοίη.

29. ΘΕΑI. Μή, πρὶν γ’ ἂν, ὃ Θεόδωρε, Σω-
νος τῆς τε καὶ σὺ τοὺς φάσκοντας ἂδ τὸ πάν ἐστά-
ναι διέλθητε, ὦ σοπερ ἅρτι προῦθεσθε.

ΘΕΟ. Νέος ὦν, ὃ Θεαίτητε, τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους
ἀδικεῖν διδάσκεις ὁμολογίας παραβαίνοντας; ἀλλὰ
παρασκευάζον ὅπως τῶν ἐπιλοίπων Σωκράτει
dώσεις λόγον.

ΘΕΑI. Ἐάνπερ γε βούληται. ἦδιστα μέντ’ ἂν
ηκούσα περὶ ἄν λέγω.

ΘΕΟ. Ἰππέας εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖ Σωκράτη εἰς
λόγους προκαλούμενος· ἔρωτα ὦν καὶ ἄκουσει.

ΣΠ. Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκῶ, ὃ Θεόδωρε, περὶ γε ἄν
Ε κελεύει Θεαίτητος οὐ πείσεσθαι αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΟ. Τι δὴ ὦν οὐ πείσεσθαι;

ΣΠ. Μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὦ ῃ ἐν ἔστὸς
λέγουσι τὸ πάν, αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φορτικῶς σκο-
πῶμεν, ἣττον αἰσχύνομαι ἦ ἐνα ὄντα Πάρμενιδῆν.
Πάρμενιδῆς δὲ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου,
“αἰδοῖός τέ μοι” εἴναι ἀμα “δεινός τε.” συμπροσ-
έμιξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτη,
καὶ μοι ἐφάνη βάθος τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον.

184 φοβοῦμαι οὖν μὴ οὕτε τὰ λεγόμενα ἔξωθενεν, τί
tε διανοούμενος εἶπε πολὺ πλέον λειτύμεθα, καὶ
tὸ μέγιστον, ὦ ἐνεκα ὃ λόγος ὑμηται, ἐπιστήμης
πέρι, τί ποτ’ ἔστιν, ἀσκεπτον γένηται ὑπὸ τῶν

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of answering your questions according to our agreement, since the argument about Protagoras is ended.

THEAET. No, Theodorus, not until you and Socrates have discussed those who say all things are at rest, as you proposed just now.

THEO. A young man like you, Theaetetus, teaching your elders to do wrong by breaking their agreements! No; prepare to answer Socrates yourself for the rest of the argument.

THEAET. I will if he wishes it. But I should have liked best to hear about the doctrine I mentioned.

THEO. Calling Socrates to an argument is calling cavalry into an open plain. Just ask him a question and you shall hear.

SOC. Still I think, Theodorus, I shall not comply with the request of Theaetetus.

THEO. Why will you not comply with it?

SOC. Because I have a reverential fear of examining in a flippant manner Melissus and the others who teach that the universe is one and motionless, and because I reverence still more one man, Parmenides. Parmenides seems to me to be, in Homer's words, "one to be venerated" and also "awful." For I met him when I was very young and he was very old, and he appeared to me to possess an absolutely noble depth of mind. So I am afraid we may not understand his words and may be still farther from understanding what he meant by them; but my chief fear is that the question with which we started, about the nature of knowledge, may fail to be investigated, because of the disorderly crowd of

1 A proverbial expression. An open plain is just what cavalry desires.

2 *Iliad*, iii. 172; *Odyssey*, viii. 22; xiv. 234.
ἔπεισκωμαζόντων λόγων, εἴ τις αὐτοῖς πείσεται· ἀλλὰς τε καὶ διὸν νῦν ἐγείρομεν πλήθει ἀμήχανον, εἴτε τις ἐν παρέργῳ σκέφτεται, ἀνάξι' ἣν πάθοι, εἴτε ἰκανῶς, μηκυνόμενος τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀφανεῖ· δεὶ δὲ οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον ὅν
Β κυνεί περὶ ἐπιστήμης πειράσθαι ἡμᾶς τῇ μαίευτικῇ τέχνῃ ἀπολύσαι.

 theano. Ἀλλὰ χρῆ, εἴ δοκεῖ, οὐτω ποιεῖν.

ση. Ἑτε τοίνυν, ὡθεαίτητε, τοσόνδε περὶ τῶν εἰρήμενῶν ἐπίσκεψαι. αἴσθησιν γὰρ δὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρίνω· ἢ γὰρ;

 theano. Ναῖ.

ση. Εἰ οὖν τίς σε ὡδ' ἐρωτῆῃ. "τῷ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ μέλαν ὀρᾷ ἀνθρώπος καὶ τῷ τὰ ὅξεα καὶ βαρέα ἀκούει;" εἶποις ἄν, οἶμαι, "ὅμως τε καὶ ὡσὶν."

 theano. Ἔγωγε.

C ση. Τὸ δὲ εὐχερές τῶν ὄνομάτων τε καὶ ἰημάτων καὶ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ ἀγέννεσ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τοῦτον ἑναντίον ἀνελεύθερον, έστι δὲ ὅτε ἀναγκαῖον, οἶνον καὶ νῦν ἀνάγκη ἐπιλαμβάνεται τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἢν ἀποκρίνει, ἡ οὐκ ὀρθή. σκόπει γὰρ, ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα ὀρθότερα, ὃ ὀρῶμεν, τοῦτο εἶναι ὀφθαλμοὺς, ἡ δὲ οὔ ὀρῶμεν, καὶ ὃ ἀκούομεν, ὡτα, ἡ δὲ οὔ ἀκούομεν;

 theano. Δι' ὅλν ἐκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὡς Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἡ οἷς.

D ση. Δεινὸν γὰρ ποι, ὡ παῖ, εἰ πολλαὶ τινες ἐν ημῖν, ὦστερ ἐν δουρείοις ὑποισ, αἰσθήσεις 156
THEAETETUS

arguments which will burst in upon us if we let them in; especially as the argument we are now proposing is of vast extent, and would not receive its deserts if we treated it as a side issue, and if we treat it as it deserves, it will take so long as to do away with the discussion about knowledge. Neither of these things ought to happen, but we ought to try by the science of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of the thoughts about knowledge with which he is pregnant.

THEO. Yes, if that is your opinion, we ought to do so.

soc. Consider, then, Theaetetus, this further point about what has been said. Now you answered that perception is knowledge, did you not?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. If, then, anyone should ask you, "By what does a man see white and black colours and by what does he hear high and low tones?" you would, I fancy, say, "By his eyes and ears."

THEAET. Yes, I should.

soc. The easy use of words and phrases and the avoidance of strict precision is in general a sign of good breeding; indeed, the opposite is hardly worthy of a gentleman, but sometimes it is necessary, as now it is necessary to object to your answer, in so far as it is incorrect. Just consider; which answer is more correct, that our eyes are that by which we see or that through which we see, and our ears that by which or that through which we hear?

THEAET. I think, Socrates, we perceive through, rather than by them, in each case.

soc. Yes, for it would be strange indeed, my boy, if there are many senses ensconced within us, as if
εγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἱδέαν, εἴτε ψυχῆν εἴτε ὁ τι ἤθελεν ἰσαρχεῖν, ἢ διὰ τούτων ὑδὸν ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὡσα αἰσθητά.

ὁς. Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ οὕτω μᾶλλον ἡ ἑκεῖνως.

σφ. Τοῦτο τοῖς ἔνεκα αὐτὰ σοι διακριβωμαί, εἰ τινὶ ἡμῖν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐφικνοῦμεθα λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων, διὰ δὲ τῶν Ἐ ἄλλων ἐτέρων αὐτῷ τινῶν, καὶ ἔξεις ἐρωτάμενοι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀναφέρειν. ἴσως δὲ βέλτιον σε λέγειν αὐτὰ ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἡ ἐμὲ ύπέρ σοι πολυπραγμονεῖν. καὶ μοι λέγε· θερμά καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ κούφα καὶ γλυκέα δι᾽ ὁδὸν αἰσθάνει, ἀρα οὗ τοῦ σώματος ἐκαστὰ τίθης; ἡ ἄλλου τινός;

ὁς. Οὐδενὸς ἄλλου.

σφ. Ἡ καὶ ἑθελήσεις ὑμολογεῖν, ἀ δι᾽ ἐτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι᾽ ἄλλης ταῦτ' αἰσθέοσθαι, οἷον ἀ δι᾽ ἀκοῆς, δι᾽ ὁφεως, ἡ δι᾽ ὁφεως, δι᾽ ἀκοῆς;

ὁς. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἑθελήσω;

σφ. Εἰ τι ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, οὐκ ἂν διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου ὀργάνου, οὔτ᾽ ἂν διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου περὶ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοι' ἂν.

ὁς. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

σφ. Περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χρόας πρῶτον μὲν
THEAETETUS

we were so many wooden horses of Troy, and they
do not all unite in one power, whether we should
call it soul or something else, by which we per-
ceive through these as instruments the objects of
perception.

THEAET. I think what you suggest is more likely
than the other way.

soc. Now the reason why I am so precise about
the matter is this: I want to know whether there is
some one and the same power within ourselves by
which we perceive black and white through the eyes,
and again other qualities through the other organs,
and whether you will be able, if asked, to refer all
such activities to the body. But perhaps it is better
that you make the statement in answer to a question
than that I should take all the trouble for you.
So tell me: do you not think that all the organs
through which you perceive hot and hard and light
and sweet are parts of the body? Or are they parts
of something else?

THEAET. Of nothing else.

soc. And will you also be ready to agree that it is
impossible to perceive through one sense what you
perceive through another; for instance, to perceive
through sight what you perceive through hearing,
or through hearing what you perceive through
sight?

THEAET. Of course I shall.

soc. Then if you have any thought about both
of these together, you would not have perception
about both together either through one organ or
through the other.

THEAET. No.

soc. Now in regard to sound and colour, you have,
αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἦ διανοεῖ, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω ἔστών;

ἡ Ἑγωγ. Τι μὴν;

καὶ ὅτι ἐκάτερον ἐκατέρου μὲν ἔτερον, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ταῦτόν;

καὶ τοῦτο.

καὶ εἴτε ἀνομοίως εἴτε ὁμοίω ἀλλήλων, δυνατὸς εἶ ἐπισκέψασθαι;

ἡ Ἑγωγ. Τι δ' οὐ μέλλει; η γε διὰ τῆς γλώττης δύναμις.

καὶ τὸ τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινῶν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις δηλοὶ σοι, ὃ τὸ "ἐστιν" ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ "οὐκ ἔστιν," καὶ δ' νῦν δὴ ἠρωτῶμεν περὶ αὐτῶν; τούτοις πᾶσι ποῖα ἀποδώσεις ὀργάνα δι' ὧν αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἕκαστα;

ὁ θεατής λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὁμοίω-
THEAETETUS

in the first place, this thought about both of them, that they both exist?
THEAET. Certainly.
soc. And that each is different from the other and the same as itself?
THEAET. Of course.
soc. And that both together are two and each separately is one?
THEAET. Yes, that also.
soc. And are you able also to observe whether they are like or unlike each other?
THEAET. May be.
soc. Now through what organ do you think all this about them? For it is impossible to grasp that which is common to them both either through hearing or through sight. Here is further evidence for the point I am trying to make: if it were possible to investigate the question whether the two, sound and colour, are bitter or not, you know that you will be able to tell by what faculty you will investigate it, and that is clearly neither hearing nor sight, but something else.
THEAET. Of course it is,—the faculty exerted through the tongue.
soc. Very good. But through what organ is the faculty exerted which makes known to you that which is common to all things, as well as to these of which we are speaking—that which you call being and not-being, and the other attributes of things, about which we were asking just now? What organs will you assign for all these, through which that part of us which perceives gains perception of each and all of them?
THEAET. You mean being and not-being, and like-
τητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταὐτὸν τε καὶ τὸ

D ἑτέρον, ἐτὶ δὲ ἐν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ

αὐτῶν. δὴ λοις δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἄρτιῶν τε καὶ περιττὸν

ἐρωτᾶς, καὶ τάλλα ὅσα τούτους ἔπεται, διὰ τίνος

ποτὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσθανόμεθα.

σν. Ὕπέρευ, ὁ Θεαίτητε, ἀκολούθεις, καὶ ἔστω

ἄ ἐρωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.

θεαὶ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐγώγει οὐκ

ἀν ἔχομι εἰπεῖν, πλήν γ΄ ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τῇ ἄρχῃ

οὐδ’ εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν τούτους ὄργανον ἓδον

ὡς περ ἐκεῖνος, ἀλ’ αὐτῆ δι’ αὐτῆς ἢ ψυχῇ τὰ

Ε κοινὰ μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἔπισκοπεῖν.

σν. Καλὸς γὰρ εἶ, ὁ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐχ, ὡς

ἐλεγε Θεόδωρος, αἰσχρός· ὁ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων

καλὸς τε καὶ ἄγαθός. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὖ ἐποίησάς

με μάλα συχνὸν λόγου ἀπαλλάξας, εἶ φαίνεται σοι

τὰ μὲν αὐτῇ δι’ αὐτῆς ἢ ψυχῇ ἐπισκόπειν, τὰ δὲ

διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων. τούτῳ γὰρ ἢν

ὁ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἐδόκει, ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοὶ

dόξαι.

186 θεαὶ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνεται γε.

30. σν. Ποτέρων οὖν τίθης τὴν οὐσίαν; τοῦτο

γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται.

θεαὶ. Ἔγω μὲν ὃν αὐτῇ ἢ ψυχῇ καθ’ αὐτῆς

ἐπορέγεται.

σν. Ἡ καὶ τὸ ὄμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον καὶ τὸ

taυτὸν καὶ ἑτερον;

θεαὶ. Ναί.

σν. Τὶ δὲ; καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἄγαθὸν καὶ

κακὸν;

θεαὶ. Καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα

πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογι-
ness and unlikeness, and identity and difference, and also unity and plurality as applied to them. And you are evidently asking also through what bodily organs we perceive by our soul the odd and the even and everything else that is in the same category.

soc. Bravo, Theaetetus! you follow me exactly; that is just what I mean by my question.

theaet. By Zeus, Socrates, I cannot answer, except that I think there is no special organ at all for these notions, as there are for those others; but it appears to me that the soul views by itself directly what all things have in common.

soc. Why, you are beautiful, Theaetetus, and not, as Theodorus said, ugly; for he who speaks beautifully is beautiful and good. But besides being beautiful, you have done me a favour by relieving me from a long discussion, if you think that the soul views some things by itself directly and others through the bodily faculties; for that was my own opinion, and I wanted you to agree.

theaet. Well, I do think so,

soc. To which class, then, do you assign being; for this, more than anything else, belongs to all things?

theaet. I assign them to the class of notions which the soul grasps by itself directly.

soc. And also likeness and unlikeness and identity and difference?

theaet. Yes.

soc. And how about beautiful and ugly, and good and bad?

theaet. I think that these also are among the things the essence of which the soul most certainly
ζομένη ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα
Β πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα.

σω. Ὑπέ δή. ἄλλο τι τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν
σκληρότητα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ τοῦ
μαλακοῦ τὴν μαλακότητα ὑσαύτως;

θεαί. Ναι.

σω. Τὴν δὲ γε οὐσίαν καὶ ὁ τι ἐστὸν καὶ τὴν
ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἄλληλον καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῇ τῆς
ἐναντιότητος ἥπαι ἡ ψυχή ἐπανοίγεται καὶ συμβάλλω
λουσα πρὸς ἄλληλα κρίνεις πειράται ἡμῖν.

θεαί. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

σω. Ὅσκοιν τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένους πάρεστι
C φύσει αἰσθάνονται ἀνθρώπους τε καὶ θηρίους, ὅσα
dιὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει
τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρὸς τε οὐσίαν
cαι ωφέλειαν μόνος καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διά πολλῶν πραγ-
mάτων καὶ παϊδείας παραγίγνεται οἷς ἂν, καὶ
παραγίγνεται;

θεαί. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

σω. Οἶνον τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ὡς μηδὲ οὕσιας;

θεαί. Ἀδύνατον.

σω. Οὗ δὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τούτων
ἐπιστήμων ἐσταί;

D θεαί. Καὶ πῶς ἄν, ὡς Σώκρατες;

σω. Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἐν ἑπι-
stήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ.
οὕσιας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μὲν, ὡς ἐσικε,
dυνατὸν ἄμβασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον.

θεαί. Φαίνεται.

σω. Ἡ οὖν ταύτων ἐκείνω τε καὶ τοῦτο 1 καλεῖς,
tosau̱ta̱ς διαφοράς ἔχοντε;
views in their relations to one another, reflecting within itself upon the past and present in relation to the future.

soc. Stop there. Does it not perceive the hardness of the hard through touch, and likewise the softness of the soft?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. But their essential nature and the fact that they exist, and their opposition to one another, and, in turn, the essential nature of this opposition, the soul itself tries to determine for us by reverting to them and comparing them with one another.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Is it not true, then, that all sensations which reach the soul through the body, can be perceived by human beings, and also by animals, from the moment of birth; whereas reflections about these, with reference to their being and usefulness, are acquired, if at all, with difficulty and slowly, through many troubles, in other words, through education?

THEAET. Assuredly.

soc. Is it, then, possible for one to attain “truth” who cannot even get as far as “being”?

THEAET. No.

soc. And will a man ever have knowledge of anything the truth of which he fails to attain?

THEAET. How can he, Socrates?

soc. Then knowledge is not in the sensations, but in the process of reasoning about them; for it is possible, apparently, to apprehend being and truth by reasoning, but not by sensation.

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. Then will you call the two by the same name, when there are so great differences between them?
θεα. Οὔκοιν δὴ δίκαιον γε.
ζη. Τί οὖν δή ἐκείνου ἀποδίδως ονόμα, τῶ όραν, ἀκούειν, ὑφραίνεσθαι, ψύχεσθαι, θερμαίνεσθαι;  
Ε. θεα. Αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔγωγε· τί γὰρ ἄλλο;  
ζη. Ξύμπαν ἄρ' αὐτὸ καλεῖς αἰσθησίν;  
θεα. Ἀνάγκη.
ζη. Ὁμοιοί, φαμέν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἀφαιρεῖ· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας.
θεα. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
ζη. Οὐδ' ἄρ' ἐπιστήμης.
θεα. Οὐ γὰρ.
ζη. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἶη ποτέ, ὡς θεαίητε, αἰσθησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταῦτόν.
θεα. Οὔ fαινεται, ὡς Σώκρατες. καὶ μάλιστα γε νῦν καταφανέστατον γέγονεν ἄλλο ὡς αἰσθήσεως ἐπιστήμη.

187 ζη. Ἄλλ' οὗ τι μὲν δὴ τοῦτο γε ἑνεκα ἡρχόμεθα διαλέγομενοι, ἣν εὑρωμεν τί ποτ' οὖν ἐστ' ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ τὶ ἐστίν. ὅμως ἐς τοσοῦτον γε προβεβήκαμεν, ὡστε μὴ ἤστεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς τί ποτ' ἔχει ἡ ψυχή, ὅταν αὐτῇ καθ' ἀυτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα.  
θεα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο γε καλεῖται, ὡς Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγώμαι, δοξάζειν.  
ζη. Ὀρθῶς γὰρ οἶει, ὡς φίλε. καὶ ὁρα δὴ νῦν ὁ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλείψας, εἰ τι μάλλον καθορᾶς, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα προεληφθάσας. καὶ λέγει αὖθις τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη.  
31. θεα. Δόξαν μὲν πάσαν εἶπεῖν, ὡς Σώ-
THEAETETUS

THEAET. No, that would certainly not be right.
soc. What name will you give, then, to the one which includes seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold, and being hot?
THEAET. Perceiving. What other name can I give it?
soc. Collectively you call it, then, perception?
THEAET. Of course.
soc. By which, we say, we are quite unable to apprehend truth, since we cannot apprehend being, either.
THEAET. No; certainly not.
soc. Nor knowledge either, then.
THEAET. No.
soc. Then, Theaetetus, perception and knowledge could never be the same.
THEAET. Evidently not, Socrates; and indeed now at last it has been made perfectly clear that knowledge is something different from perception.
soc. But surely we did not begin our conversation in order to find out what knowledge is not, but what it is. However, we have progressed so far, at least, as not to seek for knowledge in perception at all, but in some function of the soul, whatever name is given to it when it alone and by itself is engaged directly with realities.
THEAET. That, Socrates, is, I suppose, called having opinion.
soc. You suppose rightly, my friend. Now begin again at the beginning. Wipe out all we said before, and see if you have any clearer vision, now that you have advanced to this point. Say once more what knowledge is.
THEAET. To say that all opinion is knowledge is
κρατεῖς, ἀδύνατον, ἑπειδή καὶ ψευδής ἐστὶν δόξα·
κινδυνεύει δὲ ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, καὶ
μοι τούτο ἀποκεκρίθω. ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ φανῇ προ-
τοῦσον, ὥσπερ τὸ νῦν, ἄλλο τι πειρασόμεθα λέγειν.

ζν. Οὔτω μέντοι χρή, δὴ Θεαίτητε, λέγειν προθύ-
μως μᾶλλον, ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἀκύεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

εἰν γὰρ οὔτω δρῶμεν, δυοὶ θάτερα, δὴ εὐρήσομεν
C ἐφ' ὁ ἐρχόμεθα, ἢ ἤττον οἰνονόμεθα εἰδέναι ὁ μηδαμῇ
ζμενεν· καὶ τοιοῦτοι οὐκ ἂν εἰῇ μεμπτὸς μισθὸς ὁ τοιοῦ-
τος. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τί φῆς; δυοὶ όντων εἰδέοιν
dόξης, τοῦ μὲν ἀληθινοῦ, ψευδοῦς δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου,
τὴν ἀληθὴ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην ὀρίζει;

 theano. Ἑγὼ γε· τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτὸ νῦν μοι φαίνεται.
ζν. Ἄρ’ οὖν ἔτ’ ἄξιον περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν
πάλιν—;

 theano. Τὸ ποίον δὴ λέγεις;
ζν. Ὁράττει μὲ πως νῦν τε καὶ ἀλλοτε δὴ πολ-

D λάκις, ὥστ’ ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ
πρὸς ἀλλὸν γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχοντα εἰπεῖν τί ποτ’
ἐστὶ τούτῳ τὸ πάθος παρ’ ἥμιν καὶ τίνα τρόπον
ἐγγυνόμενον.

 theano. Τὸ ποίον δὴ;
ζν. Τὸ δοξάζειν τινὰ ψευδῆ. σκοτῶ δὴ καὶ
νῦν ἐτι διστάζων, πότερον έάσωμεν αὐτῷ ἡ ἐπισκε-
ψώμεθα ἀλλο τρόπον ᾗ ὀλίγον πρότερον.

 theano. Τὶ μὴν, ὁ Σώκρατες, εἴπερ γε καὶ ὅπη-
τιοῦν ἕφαινεται δεῖν; ἀρτι γὰρ οὐ κακῶς γε σὺ

1 ὅπητιοῦν Burnet; ὅπηγοῦ B; ὅπη γοῦ W; ὅπηοῦ T.
impossible, Socrates, for there is also false opinion; but true opinion probably is knowledge. Let that be my answer. For if it is proved to be wrong as we proceed, I will try to give another, just as I have given this.

soc. That is the right way, Theaetetus. It is better to speak up boldly than to hesitate about answering, as you did at first. For if we act in this way, one of two things will happen: either we shall find what we are after, or we shall be less inclined to think we know what we do not know at all; and surely even that would be a recompense not to be despised. Well, then, what do you say now? Assuming that there are two kinds of opinion, one true and the other false, do you define knowledge as the true opinion?

THEAET. Yes. That now seems to me to be correct.

soc. Is it, then, still worth while, in regard to opinion, to take up again—?

THEAET. What point do you refer to?

soc. Somehow I am troubled now and have often been troubled before, so that I have been much perplexed in my own reflections and in talking with others, because I cannot tell what this experience is which we human beings have, and how it comes about.

THEAET. What experience?

soc. That anyone has false opinions. And so I am considering and am still in doubt whether we had better let it go or examine it by another method than the one we followed a while ago.

THEAET. Why not, Socrates, if there seems to be the least need of it? For just now, in talking about
καὶ Θεόδωρος ἐλέγετε σχολῆς πέρι, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτῳ διετείχει.

Ε Ἐν. Ὅρθως ὑπέμνησας. ἵσως γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ καιροῦ πάλιν ὡσπερ ἵχνος μετελθεῖν. κρεῖττον γὰρ που σμικρὸν εὑ ἡ πολὺ μὴ ἰκανῶς περάναι.

 theano. Τί μὴν;

ἐν. Πῶς οὖν; τί δὴ καὶ λέγομεν; ψευδὴ φαμεν ἐκάστοτε εἰναι δόξαν, καὶ τίνα ἡμῶν δοξάζειν ψευδὴ, τὸν δ' αὖ ἀληθῆ, ὡς φύσει οὕτως ἔχοντων;

 theano. Φαμεν γὰρ δή.

188 Ἐν. Οὐκοῦν τόδε γ' ἔσθ' ἡμῖν περὶ πάντα καὶ καθ' ἐκαστον, ἦτοι εἰδέναι ἡ μὴ εἰδέναι; μανθάνειν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὡς ὄντα χαίρειν λέγω ἐν τῷ παρόντι. νῦν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον ἐστὶν οὐδέν.

 theano. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλο γ' οὐδὲν λείπεται περὶ ἐκαστον πλὴν εἰδέναι ἡ μὴ εἰδέναι.

ἐν. Οὐκοῦν ἢδη ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν ἡ ἢν τι οἴδεν ἡ μὴ οἴδεν;

 theano. Ἀνάγκη.

ἐν. Καὶ μὴν εἰδότα γε μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὕτω ἡ μὴ

Β εἰδότα εἰδέναι ἀδύνατον.

 theano. Πῶς δ' οὖ;

ἐν. Ἀρ' οὖν ὁ τὰ ψευδὴ δοξάζων, ἄ οἰδε, ταῦτα οἴεται οὐ ταῦτα εἶναι ἀλλὰ ἑτερα ἄττα ὅν οἴδε, καὶ ἄμφοτερα εἰδῶς ἁγνοεῖ ἄμφοτερα;

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leisure, you and Theodorus said very truly that there is no hurry in discussions of this sort.

soc. You are right in reminding me. For perhaps this is a good time to retrace our steps. For it is better to finish a little task well than a great deal imperfectly.

THEAET. Of course.

soc. How, then, shall we set about it? What is it that we do say? Do we say that in every case of opinion there is a false opinion, and one of us has a false, and another a true opinion, because, as we believe, it is in the nature of things that this should be so?

THEAET. Yes, we do.

soc. Then this, at any rate, is possible for us, is it not, regarding all things collectively and each thing separately, either to know or not to know them? For learning and forgetting, as intermediate stages, I leave out of account for the present, for just now they have no bearing upon our argument.

THEAET. Certainly, Socrates, nothing is left in any particular case except knowing or not knowing it.

soc. Then he who forms opinion must form opinion either about what he knows or about what he does not know?

THEAET. Necessarily.

soc. And it is surely impossible that one who knows a thing does not know it, or that one who does not know it knows it.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Then does he who forms false opinions think that the things which he knows are not these things, but some others of the things he knows, and so, knowing both, is he ignorant of both?
Ἀλλ’ ἀδύνατον, ὁ Σώκρατες.

Σο. Ἀλλ’ ἄρα, ἃ μὴ οἶเดν, ἢγεῖται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἕτερα ἄττα ἄν μὴ οἶδε, καὶ τούτ’ ἐστι τῷ μὴ 
Θεαίτητον μήτε Σωκράτη εἰδότι εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν 
λαβεῖν ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης Θεαίτητος ἢ ὁ Θεαίτητος 
Σωκράτης;

C ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἄν;

Σο. Ἀλλ’ οὗ μὴν, ἃ γέ τις οἶδεν, οἴεται ποὺ ἃ 
μὴ οἶδεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐδ’ αὖ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἃ οἶδεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τέρας γὰρ ἔσται.

Σο. Πῶς οὖν ἄν ἐτὶ ψευδὴ δοξάσειν; ἐκτὸς 
γὰρ τούτων ἀδύνατον ποὺ δοξάζων, ἐπείπερ πάντ’ 
ἡ ἵσμεν ὑ’ οὐκ ἵσμεν, ἐν δὲ τούτως οὐδαμοῦ 
φαίνεται 
δυνατόν ψευδὴ δοξάσαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

Σο. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐ ταῦτη σκέπτεων ὁ ζητοῦμεν, 
καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι ἱόντας, ἄλλα καὶ 
D τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

Σο. Μὴ ἄπλουν ἢ ὅτι ὁ τὰ μὴ ὄντα περὶ ὅτου- 
οῦν δοξάζων οὐκ ἔσθ’ ὡς οὐ ψευδὴ δοξάσει, κἂν 
ὁπωσοῦν ἀλλὰς τὰ τῆς διανοίας ἔχῃ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός γ’ αὖ, ὁ Σώκρατες.

Σο. Πῶς οὖν; τί ἔροιμεν, ὁ Θεαίτητε, ἐάν τις 
ἡμᾶς ἀνακρίνῃ. “δυνατὸν δὲ ὅτως ὁ λέγεται, 
καὶ τις ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ ὃν δοξάσει, εἰτε περὶ 
τῶν ὄντων του εἰτε αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ”; καὶ ἡμεῖς

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THEAET. That is impossible, Socrates.

soc. Well then, does he think that the things he does not know are other things which he does not know—which is as if a man who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates should conceive the idea that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaetetus Socrates?

THEAET. That is impossible.

soc. But surely a man does not think that the things he knows are the things he does not know, or again that the things he does not know are the things he knows.

THEAET. That would be a monstrous absurdity.

soc. Then how could he still form false opinions? For inasmuch as all things are either known or unknown to us, it is impossible, I imagine, to form opinions outside of these alternatives, and within them it is clear that there is no place for false opinion.

THEAET. Very true.

soc. Had we, then, better look for what we are seeking, not by this method of knowing and not knowing, but by that of being and not being?

THEAET. What do you mean?

soc. We may simply assert that he who on any subject holds opinions which are not, will certainly think falsely, no matter what the condition of his mind may be in other respects.

THEAET. That, again, is likely, Socrates.

soc. Well then, what shall we say, Theaetetus, if anyone asks us, "Is that which is assumed in common speech possible at all, and can any human being hold an opinion which is not, whether it be concerned with any of the things which are, or be entirely independent of them?" We, I fancy, shall
Ε δή, ώς ἐοικεν, πρὸς ταῦτα φήσομεν· "ὅταν γε μὴ ἀληθῆ οὕτως οἰόμενος·" ἥ πῶς ἐροῦμεν;

τὸ ποῖον;

Εἰ τις ὅρα μὲν τι, ὅρα δὲ οὐδέν.

Καὶ πῶς;

Ἄλλα μὴν εἰ ἐν γέ τι ὅρα, τῶν οὐν τι ὅρα. ἡ σὺ οἴει ποτὲ τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς μὴ οἴων εἶναι;

Οὐκ ἔγγυς.

Ὄ ἀρα ἐν γέ τι ὅραν ὄν τι ὅρα.

Φαίνεται.

Καὶ ὁ ἀρα τι ἀκούων ἐν γέ τι ἀκούει καὶ ὄν ἀκούει.

Ναὶ.

Καὶ ὁ ἀπτόμενος δὴ του, ἐνὸς γε του ἀπτεται καὶ οὗτος, εἴπερ ἐνὸς;

Καὶ τοῦτο.

Ὅ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων οὐχ ἐν τι 1 δοξάζει;

Ἀνάγκη.

Ὅ ὑ ἐν τι δοξάζων οὐκ ὄν τι;

Συγχωρῶ.

Ὅ ἀρα μὴ ὄν δοξάζων οὐδὲν δοξάζει.

Οὐ φαίνεται.

Ἄλλα μὴν ὁ γε μηδὲν δοξάζων τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει.

Δῆλον, ὃς ἐοικεν.

ἐν τὶ ΒΤ; ἐν γέ τι W.
reply, "Yes, when, in thinking, he thinks what is not true," shall we not?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And is the same sort of thing possible in any other field?

THEAET. What sort of thing?

soc. For instance, that a man sees something, but sees nothing.

THEAET. How can he?

soc. Yet surely if a man sees any one thing, he sees something that is. Or do you, perhaps, think "one" is among the things that are not?

THEAET. No, I do not.

soc. Then he who sees any one thing, sees something that is.

THEAET. That is clear.

soc. And therefore he who hears anything, hears some one thing and therefore hears what is.

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And he who touches anything, touches some one thing, which is, since it is one?

THEAET. That also is true.

soc. So, then, does not he who holds an opinion hold an opinion of some one thing?

THEAET. He must do so.

soc. And does not he who holds an opinion of some one thing hold an opinion of something that is?

THEAET. I agree.

soc. Then he who holds an opinion of what is not holds an opinion of nothing.

THEAET. Evidently.

soc. Well then, he who holds an opinion of nothing, holds no opinion at all.

THEAET. That is plain, apparently.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

Β  σω. Όυκ ἄρα οἶν τοῦτο μὴ ὅν δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό.

Θεαί. Οὐ φαίνεται.

σω. ‘ Αλλο τι ἄρ’ ἐστὶ τὸ θευδὴ δοξάζειν τοῦ τα μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν.

Θεαί. ‘Αλλο ἔσοικεν.

σω. Οὐ γὰρ οὕτως οὔτε ὃς ὅλιγον πρότερον ἑσκοπούμεν, θευδὴς ἐστι δόξα ἐν ἡμῖν.

Θεαί. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δή.

32. σω. ’ Αλλ’ ἄρα ὡδὲ γιγνόμενον τοῦτο προσαγορεύομεν;

Θεαί. Πῶς;

σω. ‘Αλλοδοξίαν τινὰ οὕτως θευδὴ φαμεν εἶναι

σω. ὃς τοῦ τι 1 τῶν ὄντων ἀλλο αὖ τῶν ὄντων ἀνταλλαξάμενος τῇ διανοίᾳ φή εἶναι. οὔτω γὰρ ὃν μὲν ἂεὶ δοξάζει, ἔτερον δὲ ἀνθ’ ἔτερον, καὶ ἀμαρτάνων οὐ ἑσκόπει δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο θευδὴ δοξάζων.

Θεαί. Ὅρθότατά μου νῦν δοκεῖσ εἰρηκέναι. ὅταν γὰρ τις ἀντὶ καλοῦ ἀισχρὸν ἦ ἀντὶ ἀισχροῦ καλὸν δοξάζῃ, τότε ὡς ἀληθῶς δοξάζει θευδὴ.

σω. Δῆλος εἶ, ὡ Θεάιτητε, καταφρονῶν μου καὶ οὐ δεδίως.

Θεαί. Τί μάλιστα;

σω. Όυκ ἂν, οἶμαι, σοὶ δοκῶ τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύ-

D δοις ἀντιλαβέσθαι, ἐρόμενος εἰ οἶνον τε ταχὺ βραδέως ἢ κούφον βαρέως ἢ ἀλλο τι ἐναντίον μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἄλλα κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐναντίου

1 τι ομ. ΒΤ.
soc. Then it is impossible to hold an opinion of that which is not, either in relation to things that are, or independently of them.

THEAET. Evidently.

soc. Then holding false opinion is something different from holding an opinion of that which is not.

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. Then false opinion is not found to exist in us either by this method or by that which we followed a little while ago.

THEAET. No, it certainly is not.

soc. But does not that which we call by that name arise after the following manner?

THEAET. After what manner?

soc. We say that false opinion is a kind of interchanged opinion, when a person makes an exchange in his mind and says that one thing which exists is another thing which exists. For in this way he always holds an opinion of what exists, but of one thing instead of another; so he misses the object he was aiming at in his thought and might fairly be said to hold a false opinion.

THEAET. Now you seem to me to have said what is perfectly right. For when a man, in forming an opinion, puts ugly instead of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly, he does truly hold a false opinion.

soc. Evidently, Theaetetus, you feel contempt of me, and not fear.

THEAET. Why in the world do you say that?

soc. You think, I fancy, that I would not attack your "truly false" by asking whether it is possible for a thing to become slowly quick or heavily light, or any other opposite, by a process opposite to itself, in accordance, not with its own nature, but with that
γίγνεσθαι ἕαυτῷ ἐναντίως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, ὡς μὴ μάτην θαρρήσης, ἀφήμι. ἀρέσκει δὲ, ὡς φής, τὸ τὰ ψευδὴ δοξάζειν ἄλλοδοξεῖν εἶναι;

ὁ θεά. "Εμοίγε.

ζ. Ὁστιν ἄρα κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν ἔτερον τι ὡς ἔτερον καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐκεῖνο τῇ διανοίᾳ τίθεσθαι.

ὁ θεά. "Εστι μέντοι.

ζ. Ὅταν οὖν τοῦθ' ἡ διανοίᾳ τοῦ δρᾶ, οὐ καὶ Ἐ ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν ἥτοι ἀμφότερα ἡ τὸ ἔτερον διανοεῖσθαι;

ὁ θεά. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν ἥτοι ἁμα γε ἡ ἐν μέρει.

ζ. Κάλλιστα. τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἀρ' ὅπερ ἐγὼ καλεῖς;

ὁ θεά. Τί καλῶν;

ζ. Δόγον δὲν αὐτῇ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ων ἀν σκοπῆ. ὡς γε μὴ εἰδῶς σοι ἀποφαίνομαι. τοῦτο γάρ μου ἰνδάλλεται διανοουμένη οὐκ ἀλλο τι ἡ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτῇ ἐαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα 190 καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκονσα καὶ οὐ φάσκονσα. ὅταν δὲ ὀρίσασα, εἴτε βραδύτερον εἴτε καὶ δέχτερον ἐπάξασά, τὸ αὐτὸ ἡδὴ φη καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, δόξαν ταύτῃ τίθεμεν αὐτῇς. ἦστ' ἐγὼ γε τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῶ καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, οὐ μέντοι πρὸς ἄλλον οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ πρὸς αὐτῶν οὐ δὲ τί;

ὁ θεά. Κάγω.

ζ. Ὁταν ἄρα τις τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερον δοξάζῃ, καὶ φησίν, ὡς ἐοικε, τὸ ἔτερον ἔτερον εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν.

B ὁ θεά. Τί μήν;

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of its opposite. But I let this pass, that your courage may not fail. You are satisfied, you say, that false opinion is interchanged opinion?

Theaet. I am.

Soc. It is, then, in your opinion, possible for the mind to regard one thing as another and not as what it is.

Theaet. Yes, it is.

Soc. Now when one's mind does this, does it not necessarily have a thought either of both things together or of one or the other of them?

Theaet. Yes, it must; either of both at the same time or in succession.

Soc. Excellent. And do you define thought as I do?

Theaet. How do you define it?

Soc. As the talk which the soul has with itself about any subjects which it considers. You must not suppose that I know this that I am declaring to you. But the soul, as the image presents itself to me, when it thinks, is merely conversing with itself, asking itself questions and answering, affirming and denying. When it has arrived at a decision, whether slowly or with a sudden bound, and is at last agreed, and is not in doubt, we call that its opinion; and so I define forming opinion as talking and opinion as talk which has been held, not with someone else, nor yet aloud, but in silence with oneself. How do you define it?

Theaet. In the same way.

Soc. Then whenever a man has an opinion that one thing is another, he says to himself, we believe, that the one thing is the other.

Theaet. Certainly.
υν. 'Αναμμηνήσκον δή εἰ πώποτ’ εἴπες πρὸς σεαυτόν ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ τοι καλὸν αἰσχρὸν ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἄδικον δίκαιον, ἢ καί, τὸ πάντων κεφαλαῖον, σκόπει εἰ ποτ’ ἑπεχείρησας σεαυτόν πείθειν ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἐτέρον ἐτέρον ἐστὶν, ἢ πῶς τοῦνατίον οὐδ’ ἐν ὑπνῷ πώποτε ἑτόλμησας ἑπεὶν πρὸς σεαυτὸν ὡς παντάπασιν ἄρα τὰ περιττὰ ἀρτιά ἐστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

ὁεαί. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

τὸν ἐν τινα οἶει ἡμιαίνοντα ἢ μανόμενον τολμῆσαι σπουδὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπεὶν ἀναπείθοντα αὐτὸν, ὡς ἀνάγκη τὸν βοῦν ἵππον εἶναι ἢ τὰ δύο ἐν;

ὁεαί. Μὰ Δι’ οὐκ ἔγονε.

υν. Ὅντιον εἰ τὸ λέγεις πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοξᾶζειν ἐστὶν, οὐδεὶς ἀμφότερα γε λέγων καὶ δοξᾶζων καὶ ¹ ἐφαπτόμενος ἀμφοῖν τῇ ψυχῇ εἴποι ἂν καὶ δοξάσειν ὡς τὸ ἐτέρον ἐτέρον ἐστὶν. ἑατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ Ῥῆμα ² περὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου. λέγω γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇδε, μηδένα δοξάζειν ὡς τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλὸν ἢ D ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων.

ὁεαί. Ἀλλ’, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔω τε καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις.

υν. "Ἀμφῶ μὲν ἄρα δοξάζοντα ἀδύνατον τὸ γε ³ ἐτέρον ἐτέρον δοξάζειν.

ὁεαί. Ἐουκεν.

υν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ ἐτέρον γε μόνον δοξάζων, τὸ ¹ καὶ ομ. Τ.

After Ῥῆμα B adds ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει, ἐπειδὴ τὸ Ῥῆμα ἐτέρον τῷ ἐτέρῳ κατὰ Ῥῆμα ταῦταν ἐστὶν, applied to things in succession, since the word “one” is, as a word, the same as “other” (i.e. the Greek uses ἐτέρον for “one,” and “other”).

³ τὸ γε Ηεινδόρφ; τότε Β; τὸ ** Τ.

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soc. Now call to mind whether you have ever said to yourself that the beautiful is most assuredly ugly, or the wrong right, or—and this is the sum of the whole matter—consider whether you have ever tried to persuade yourself that one thing is most assuredly another, or whether quite the contrary is the case, and you have never ventured, even in sleep, to say to yourself that the odd is, after all, certainly even, or anything of that sort.

THEAET. You are right.

soc. Do you imagine that anyone else, sane or insane, ever ventured to say to himself seriously and try to persuade himself that the ox must necessarily be a horse, or two one?

THEAET. No, by Zeus, I do not.

soc. Then if forming opinion is talking to oneself, no one who talks and forms opinion of two objects and apprehends them both with his soul, could say and have the opinion that one is the other. But you will also have to give up the expression "one and other." This is what I mean, that nobody holds the opinion that the ugly is beautiful, or anything of that sort.

THEAET. Well, Socrates, I do give it up; and I agree with you in what you say.

soc. You agree, therefore, that he who holds an opinion of both things cannot hold the opinion that one is the other.

THEAET. So it seems.

soc. But surely he who holds an opinion of one
δὲ ἔτερον μηδαμῆ, οὐδέποτε δοξάσει τὸ ἄτομο ἔτερον εἶναι.

ἡεί. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις: ἀναγκάζοιτο γὰρ ἂν ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ οὐ μὴ δοξάζει.

σν. Οὔτ' ἀρ' ἀμφότερα οὔτε τὸ ἔτερον δοξάζοντι

Ε ἐγχώρει ἄλλοδοξεῖν. Ῥῶτ' εἰ τίς ὀριεῖται δόξαν εἶναι ψευδή τὸ ἐτεροδοξεῖν, οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι. οὔτ' ἀρα ταύτῃ οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται ψευδῆς ἐν ἦμῖν οὔσα δόξα.

ἡεί. Οὐκ ἔσοικεν.

33. σν. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὁ Θεάτητε, εἰ τούτῳ μὴ φανήσεται ὅν, πολλὰ ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὁμολογεῖν καὶ ἀτοπα.

ἡεί. Τὰ ποιὰ δὴ;

σν. Οὐκ ἔρωθοι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῆ πειράθω σκοπῶν. αἰσχυνούμην γὰρ ἂν ὑπὲρ ἦμῶν, ἐν οἷ ἁποροῦμεν, ἀναγκαζομένων ὁμολογεῖν οἷα λέγω. ἀλλ' 191 εἶν εὑρωμεν καὶ ἐλεύθεροι γενώμεθα, τότ' ἡδὴ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑρωῦμεν ὡς πασχόντων αὐτὰ ἐκτὸς τοῦ γελοίου ἑστῶτες. εἶν δὲ πάντῃ ἀπορήσωμεν, ταπεινωθέντες, οἷμαι, τῷ λόγῳ παρέξομεν ὡς ναυτιώντες πατεῖν τε καὶ χρῆσθαι ὁ τι ἂν βούληται. ἦ οὖν ἐτὶ πόρον τινὰ εὐρίσκω τοῦ ζητήματος ἦμῖν, ἀκούει.

ἡεί. Λέγε μόνον.

σν. Οὗ φήσω ἦμᾶς ὁρθῶς ὁμολογήσαι, ἦνίκα ὁμολογήσαμεν ἃ τις οἴδειν, ἀδύνατον δοξάσαι ἃ μὴ Β οἴδειν εἶναι αὐτὰ καὶ ψευδῆναι: ἀλλὰ πη δυνα-τόν.
only, and not of the other at all, will never hold
the opinion that one is the other.

THEAET. You are right; for he would be forced to
apprehend also that of which he holds no opinion.

soc. Then neither he who holds opinion of both
nor he who holds it of one can hold the opinion that
a thing is something else. And so anyone who sets
out to define false opinion as interchanged opinion
would be talking nonsense. Then neither by this
method nor by our previous methods is false opinion
found to exist in us.

THEAET. Apparently not.

soc. But yet, Theaetetus, if this is found not to
exist, we shall be forced to admit many absurdities.

THEAET. What absurdities?

soc. I will not tell you until I have tried to
consider the matter in every way. For I should be
ashamed of us, if, in our perplexity, we were forced
to make such admissions as those to which I refer.
But if we find the object of our quest, and are set
free from perplexity, then, and not before, we will
speak of others as involved in those absurdities, and
we ourselves shall stand free from ridicule. But if
we find no escape from our perplexity, we shall, I
fancy, become low-spirited, like seasick people, and
shall allow the argument to trample on us and do to
us anything it pleases. Hear, then, by what means
I still see a prospect of success for our quest.

THEAET. Do speak.

soc. I shall deny that we were right when we
agreed that it is impossible for a man to have opinion
that the things he does not know are the things
which he knows, and thus to be deceived. But
there is a way in which it is possible.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀρα λέγεις ὦ καὶ ἐγὼ τότε ὑπώπτευσα, ἦνίκ' αὐτὸ ἐφαμεν τοιούτων εἶναι, ὅτι ἐνιότ' ἐγὼ γιγνώσκων Σωκράτη, πόρρωθεν δὲ ὅρον ἄλλον δὲν οὐ γιγνώσκω, φήθην εἶναι Σωκράτη δὲν οἶδα; γίγνεται γὰρ ὅτι ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ οἶνον λέγεις.

ΣΠ. Οὐκοῦν ἀπέστημεν αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ὁ ἵππος ἐποίει ἥμᾶς εἰδότας μὴ εἰδέναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΠ. Μὴ γὰρ οὖτω τιθῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὅρε, ἵσως οὐκ ἦμιν συγχωρήσεται, ὅσως δὲ ἀντιτενεῖ. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν τοιούτῳ ἔχόμεθα, ἐν δὲ ἀνάγκῃ πάντα μεταστρέφοντα λόγον βασανίζειν. σκόπει οὖν εἰ τι λέγω. ἥρα ἐστὶν μὴ εἰδότα τι πρότερον ὑστερον μαθεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. "Εστι μέντοι.

ΣΠ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὖθις ἐτερον καὶ ἐτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὖν;

ΣΠ. Θες δὴ μοι λόγου ἑνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἥμιὼν ἐνὸν κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον, τῷ μὲν μείζον, τῷ δ' ἔλαττον, καὶ τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδέστερου, καὶ σκληροτέρου, ἐνίος δὲ

D ὑγροτέρου, ἐστὶ δ' οἷς μετρίως ἐχοντος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίθημι.

ΣΠ. Δῶρον τοῖνυν αὐτὸ φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης, καὶ ἐς τοῦτο, ὃ τι ἄν βουληθῶμεν μημονεύσαι ὃν ἂν ἱδώμεν ἢ ἀκούσωμεν ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν, ὑπέχοντας αὐτὸ ταῖς αἰσθήσει καὶ ἐννοίας, ἀποτυποῦσθαι, ὡσπερ δακτυλίων σημεία ἐνοημαινομένους. καὶ ὁ μὲν

1 εἰδώμεν B.
2 ἀκούσωμεν VT.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. Do you mean what I myself suspected when we made the statement to which you refer, that sometimes I, though I know Socrates, saw at a distance someone whom I did not know, and thought it was Socrates whom I do know? In such a case false opinion does arise.

SOC. But did not we reject that, because it resulted in our knowing and not knowing the things which we know?

THEAET. Certainly we did.

SOC. Let us, then, not make that assumption, but another; perhaps it will turn out well for us, perhaps the opposite. But we are in such straits that we must turn every argument round and test it from all sides. Now see if this is sensible: Can a man who did not know a thing at one time learn it later?

THEAET. To be sure he can.

SOC. Please assume, then, for the sake of argument, that there is in our souls a block of wax, in one case larger, in another smaller, in one case the wax is purer, in another more impure and harder, in some cases softer, and in some of proper quality.

THEAET. I assume all that.

SOC. Let us, then, say that this is the gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses, and that whenever we wish to remember anything we see or hear or think of in our own minds, we hold this wax under the perceptions and thoughts and imprint them upon it, just as we make impressions from seal rings;
αν ἐκμαγή, μνημονεύειν τε καὶ ἐπιστασθαί ἐως αν ἐν ἡ τὸ εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ. δ, δ' ἃν ἐξαλειφθῇ ἡ Ε μὴ οἶδον τε γένηται ἐκμαγήναι, ἐπιλελήσθαι τε καὶ μὴ ἐπιστασθαί.

ὦΕΑI. Ἑστω οὕτως.

ση. 'Ὁ τούνυν ἐπιστάμενος μὲν αὐτά, σκοπῶν δὲ τι ὄν ὁρᾷ ἡ ἀκούει, ἄθρει εἰ ἁρὰ τουφῶς τρόπῳ ἴεν θεότατου ἂν δοξάσαι.

ὦΕΑI. Ποίω δή τινι;

ση. Ἀ οἰδέν, οἶηθεῖς εἶναι τοτε μὲν ἃ οἴδε, τοτὲ δὲ ἃ μὴ. ταύτα γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐ καλῶς ὀμολογήσαμεν ὀμολογοῦντες ἄδυνατα.

ὦΕΑI. Νῦν δὲ πῶς λέγεις;

192 ση. ἐς ἂνδε λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐς ἀρχῆς διοριζομένους, ὃτι ὃ μὲν τις οἰδέν σχὼν 2 αὐτῶν μνημείον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, αἰσθάνεται δὲ αὐτὸ τῇ μή, τούτο 3 οἴηθηναι ἐτερόν τι ὅν οἰδέν, ἐχοντα καὶ ἐκείνον τύπον, αἰσθανόμενον δὲ μὴ, ἄδυνατον. καὶ ὃ γε οἰδέν αὐτός ἐν ἀλήθηναι εἶναι ὧν μή οἴδε μὴν ἐχει αὐτῷ σφοραγία. καὶ ὧν μή οἰδέν, ὧν μὴ οἴδεν αὐτό. καὶ ὧν μή οἴδεν, ὧν ὧν αἰσθάνεται γε, ἐτερόν τι ὅν αἰσθάνεται οἴηθηναι εἶναι καὶ ὧν αἰσθάνεται, ὃν τῇ μῆ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὧν μὴ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὧν μὴ αἰσθάνεται, ὃν μὴ αἰσθάνεται. καὶ ὧν ἂν αἰσθάνεται 4 καὶ ἠτί γε αὐτό ὃν οἴδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἠτί το σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν

1 ὃ δ' ἃν B\textsuperscript{2}W; ὧταν B; ὧταν δὲ T.
2 σχὼν BT; ἔχων W. 3 τούτο B; om. al.
4 καὶ . . . ὃν αἰσθάνεται om. B.
and whatever is imprinted we remember and know as long as its image lasts, but whatever is rubbed out or cannot be imprinted we forget and do not know.

THEAET. Let us assume that.

soc. Now take a man who knows the things which he sees and hears, and is considering some one of them; observe whether he may not gain a false opinion in the following manner.

THEAET. In what manner?

soc. By thinking that the things which he knows are sometimes things which he knows and sometimes things which he does not know. For we were wrong before in agreeing that this is impossible.

THEAET. What do you say about it now?

soc. We must begin our discussion of the matter by making the following distinctions: It is impossible for anyone to think that one thing which he knows and of which he has received a memorial imprint in his soul, but which he does not perceive, is another thing which he knows and of which also he has an imprint, and which he does not perceive. And, again, he cannot think that what he knows is that which he does not know and of which he has no seal; nor that what he does not know is another thing which he does not know; nor that what he does not know is what he knows; nor can he think that what he perceives is something else which he perceives; nor that what he perceives is something which he does not perceive; nor that what he does not perceive is something else which he does not perceive; nor that what he does not perceive is something which he perceives. And, again, it is still more impossible, if that can be, to think that a thing which he knows and perceives and of which he has an imprint which accords
αἰσθήσεων, οὐκ ἦν αὐτὸν τι ὁ νόμος καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει αὐτὸ καὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσειν, ἀδυνατῶτερον ἔτι ἐκεῖνων, εἰ ὁ νόμος τε. καὶ ὁ νόμος καὶ ¹ αἰσθάνεται ἐξὼν τὸ μνημεῖον ὀρθῶς, ὁ νόμος οὐκ ἦν ἀδύνατον· καὶ ὁ νόμος καὶ αἰσθάνεται ἐξὼν κατὰ ταῦτα, ὁ Σ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ οὐκ ὁ νόμος μνηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὁ μνηδὲ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ὁ οὐκ ὁ νόμος μνηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὁ μνηδὲ αἰσθάνεται ². καὶ ὁ οὐκ ὁ νόμος καὶ αἰσθάνεται, ὁ μνηδὲ αἰσθάνεται ³. πάντα ταῦτα ὑπερβάλλει ἀδυναμία τού ἐν αὐτοῖς ψευδὴ τίνα δοξάσαι. λεί- 
πεται δὴ ἐν τοῖς τουοίσοδε, εἴπερ ποὺ ἄλλοθι, τὸ τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐν τίσι δή; ἐὰν ἄρα ἔξι αὐτῶν τι μᾶλλον μάθω· νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἐπομαῖ.

ΣΠ. Ἐν οἷς οἴδεν, οὐκ ἦν αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνον τι μᾶλλον μάθω· νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἐπομαῖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν πολὺ πλέον ἀπελείφθην ἢ τότε.

34. ΣΠ. Ἡ θυεία ἁνάπαλιν ἀκοῦε. ἐγὼ εἰδὼς Θεόδωρον καὶ ἐν ἑμαυτῷ μεμημένος οἴδα ἐστί, καὶ Θεαῖτην κατὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τι ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁρῶ αὐτοῖς, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὖ, καὶ ἀπτομαί ποτ' αὐτῶν,

¹ After καὶ the ms. read ὁ, expunged by Bonitz.
² τὸ μνημεῖον . . . ἐξὼν om. BT; add. B²Τ in marg.
³ ὁ μνηδὲ . . . μνηδὲ αἰσθάνεται om. B.
THEAETETUS

with the perception is another thing which he knows and perceives and of which he has an imprint which accords with the perception. And he cannot think that what he knows and perceives and of which he has a correct memorial imprint is another thing which he knows; nor that a thing which he knows and perceives and of which he has such an imprint is another thing which he perceives; nor again that a thing which he neither knows nor perceives is another thing which he neither knows nor perceives; nor that a thing which he neither knows nor perceives is another thing which he does not know; nor that a thing which he neither knows nor perceives is another thing which he does not perceive. In all these cases it is impossible beyond everything for false opinion to arise in the mind of anyone. The possibility that it may arise remains, if anywhere, in the following cases.

THEAET. What cases are they? I hope they may help me to understand better; for now I cannot follow you.

soc. The cases in which he may think that things which he knows are some other things which he knows and perceives; or which he does not know, but perceives; or that things which he knows and perceives are other things which he knows and perceives.

THEAET. Now I am even more out of the running than before.

soc. Then let me repeat it in a different way. I know Theodorus and remember within myself what sort of a person he is, and just so I know Theaetetus, but sometimes I see them, and sometimes I do not,
ποτὲ δ' οὖ, καὶ ἀκούω ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἰσθήσην αἰσθάνομαι, ποτὲ δ' αἰσθήσην μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχω περὶ ὕμων, μέμνημαι δὲ ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ἤττον καὶ ἐπίσταμαι αὐτὸς ἐν ἐμαυτῷ;

Ε ὈΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ςν. Τούτο τοίνυν πρῶτον μᾶθε ὅν βούλομαι δηλώσαι, ὥσ ἐστὶ μὲν ἂ οἶδε μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἐστὶ 1 δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι.

ὈΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ςν. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἂ μὴ οἶδε, πολλάκις μὲν ἐστὶ μηδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι μόνον;

ὈΕΑΙ. Ἐστὶ καὶ τούτο.

ςν. 'Ιδὲ δὴ ἐὰν τι μᾶλλον νῦν ἐπίστη. Σωκράτης εἰ γιγνώσκει 2 Θεόδωρον καὶ Θεαίτητον, ὅρα δὲ μηδέτερον, μηδὲ ἄλλην αἰσθήσησις αὐτῷ πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἐν ἐαυτῷ δοξάσειν ὡς ὁ Θεαίτητος ἐστὶ Θεόδωρος. λέγω τι ἡ οὐδέν;

ὈΕΑΙ. Ναι, ἀληθῆ γε.

ςν. Τούτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἦν ὅν ἐλεγον.

ὈΕΑΙ. Ἡν γάρ.

ςν. Δεύτερον τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸν μὲν γιγνώσκων ὕμων, τὸν δὲ μὴ γιγνώσκον, αἰσθανόμενος δὲ μηδέτερον, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ αὖ οἰηθεὶν ὅν οἶδα εἶναι ὅν μὴ οἶδα.

ὈΕΑΙ. Ὀρθῶς.

ςν. Τρίτον δὲ, μηδέτερον γιγνώσκων μηδὲ B αἰσθανόμενος οὐκ ἂν οἰηθεὶν ὅν μὴ οἶδα ἐτερόν τω' εἶναι ὅν μὴ οἶδα. καὶ τὰλα τὰ πρώτα πάνθε' ἔξης νόμιζε πάλιν ἀκηκοέναι, ἐν οἷς οὐδέποτ' 1 ἐστι ... μηδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι below om. B.

2 εἰ γιγνώσκει W; ἐπιγιγνώσκει BT.

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sometimes I touch them, sometimes not, sometimes I hear them or perceive them through some other sense, and sometimes I have no perception of you at all, but I remember you none the less and know you in my own mind. Is it not so?

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. This, then, is the first of the points which I wish to make clear. Note that one may perceive or not perceive that which one knows.

THEAET. That is true.

soc. So, too, with that which he does not know—he may often not even perceive it, and often he may merely perceive it?

THEAET. That too is possible.

soc. See if you follow me better now. If Socrates knows Theodorus and Theaetetus, but sees neither of them and has no other perception of them, he never could have the opinion within himself that Theaetetus is Theodorus. Am I right or wrong?

THEAET. You are right.

soc. Now that was the first of the cases of which I spoke.

THEAET. Yes, it was.

soc. The second is this: knowing one of you and not knowing the other, and not perceiving either of you, I never could think that the one whom I know is the one whom I do not know.

THEAET. Right.

soc. And this is the third case: not knowing and not perceiving either of you, I could not think that he whom I do not know is someone else whom I do not know. And imagine that you have heard all the other cases again in succession, in which I
ἐγὼ περὶ σοῦ καὶ Θεοδώρου τὰ ἕνεκὴ δοξάσω, οὔτε γιγνώσκων οὔτε ἀγνοῶν ἄμφω, οὔτε τὸν μὲν, τὸν δὲ οὐ γιγνώσκων· καὶ περὶ αἰσθήσεων κατὰ ταύτα, εἰ ἄρα ἔπει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἂσπομαί.

ΣΩ. Λέιπεται τοῖνν τὰ ἕνεκὴ δοξάσαι ἐν τῶδε, οἳ τῶν γιγνώσκων σὲ καὶ Θεοδώρου, καὶ ἕχων ἐν τῷ ἐκείνῳ τῷ κηρίῳ ὄσπερ δακτυλίων σφῶν ἄμφοι τὰ σημεῖα, διὰ μακροῦ καὶ μὴ ἵκανῶς ὀρῶν ἄμφω προθυμηθῶ, τὸ οἴκειον ἐκατέρου σημείον ἀποδοῦσ τῇ οἴκειᾳ ὠφει, ἐμβιβάζασας προσαρμόσαι εἰς τὸ ἐαυτῆς ἵχνος, ἵνα γένηται ἀναγνώρισις, εἰτα τούτων ἀποτυχῶν καὶ ὄσπερ οἱ ἐμπαλίν ὑποδούμενοι παραλλάξασας προσβάλῃ τὴν ἐκατέρου ὄψιν πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον σημεῖον, ἡ καὶ ὅλα τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις τῆς ὀψεως πάθῃ, δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερὰ μεταρρεύσῃς, 

Δ ἦταυτὸν παθῶν διαμάρτων· τότε δὴ συμβαίνει ἡ ἐτεροδοξία καὶ τὸ ἕνεκὴ δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἂσικε γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες· θαυμασίως ως λέγεις τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος.

ΣΩ. Ἂτι τοῖνν καὶ ὅταν ἄμφοτέρους γιγνώσκων τὸν μὲν πρὸς τῷ γιγνώσκειν αἰσθάνομαι, τὸν δὲ μὴ, τὴν δὲ γνώσων τοῦ ἐτέρου μὴ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσεων ἔχω, δὲ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐτωσ ἔλεγον καὶ μου τότε οὐκ ἐμάνθανες.
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could never form false opinions about you and Theodorus, either when I know or do not know both of you, or when I know one and not the other; and the same is true if we say "perceive" instead of "know." Do you follow me?

THEAET. I follow you.

soc. Then the possibility of forming false opinion remains in the following case: when, for example, knowing you and Theodorus, and having on that block of wax the imprint of both of you, as if you were signet-rings, but seeing you both at a distance and indistinctly, I hasten to assign the proper imprint of each of you to the proper vision, and to make it fit, as it were, its own footprint, with the purpose of causing recognition;¹ but I may fail in this by interchanging them, and put the vision of one upon the imprint of the other, as people put a shoe on the wrong foot; or, again, I may be affected as the sight is affected when we use a mirror and the sight as it flows makes a change from right to left, and thus make a mistake; it is in such cases, then, that interchanged opinion occurs and the forming of false opinion arises.

THEAET. I think it does, Socrates. You describe what happens to opinion marvellously well.

soc. There is still the further case, when, knowing both of you, I perceive one in addition to knowing him, but do not perceive the other, and the knowledge which I have of that other is not in accord with my perception. This is the case I described in this way before, and at that time you did not understand me.

¹ Aeschylus, Choeph. 197 ff., makes Electra recognize the presence of her brother Orestes by the likeness of his footprints to her own.
θεαί. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

σπ. Τοῦτο μὴν ἔλεγον, ὅτι γυγνώσκων τὸν Ἐ ἔτερον καὶ αἰσθανόμενον, καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν αὐτοῦ ἔχων, οὐδέποτε οὕσεται εἰναὶ αὐτὸν ἔτερον τινα ὃν γυγνώσκει τε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν αὐ καὶ ἐκείνου ἔχει κατὰ τὴν αἰσθήσιν. ἢν γὰρ τοῦτο;

θεαί. Ναί.

σπ. Παρελείπετο δὲ γέ που τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ἐν ὃ δὴ φαμεν τὴν ψευδή δόξαν γίγνεσθαι τὸ ἄμφω γυγνώσκοντα καὶ ἄμφω ὅρωντα ἣ τινα ἄλλην 194 αἰσθήσιν ἔχοντα ἄμφοτὲ τῶν σημείων μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ αἰσθήσιν ἐκάτερον ἔχειν, ἀλλ' οἶνον τοξότην φαίλον ἑντα παραλλάξαι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν, δ δὴ καὶ ψεῦδος ἄρα ὠνόμασται.

θεαί. Εἰκότως γε.

σπ. Καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν τῷ μὲν παρῆ ἀισθήσις τῶν σημείων, τῷ δὲ μῆ, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπούσης αἰσθήσεως τῆς παρούσης προσαρμόση, πάντη ταύτη ψεῦδεται ἡ διάνοια. καὶ ἕνι λόγῳ, περὶ δὲ μὲν μὴ οἴδε τις Β μηδὲ ἤσθετο 2 πώποτε, οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς έοικεν, οὕτε ψεῦδος οὕτε ψευδῆς δόξα, εἰ τί νῦν ἡμεῖς όγιές λέγομεν. περὶ δὲ ὃν ἴσμεν τε καὶ αἰσθανόμενα, ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις στρέφεται καὶ ἔλληται ἡ δόξα ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς γυγνομένη, καταντικρύ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθὺ τὰ οἰκεία συνάγουσα ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους ἀληθῆς, εἰς πλάγια δὲ καὶ σκολία ψευδῆς.

θεαί. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς, ὃ Σώκρατες, λέγεται;

1 τῷ σημείῳ αλ. Heusde; τῷ σημείῳ TW²; τῷ σημείῳ BW.
2 μηδὲ ἤσθετο TW; μηδὲ ἐπείθετο ἐπῆξθετο B; μηθ' ἐπῆξθετο B².

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THEAET. No, I did not.

soc. This is what I meant, that if anyone knows and perceives one of you, and has knowledge of him which accords with the perception, he will never think that he is someone else whom he knows and perceives and his knowledge of whom accords with the perception. That was the case, was it not?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. But we omitted, I believe, the case of which I am speaking now—the case in which we say the false opinion arises: when a man knows both and sees both (or has some other perception of them), but fails to hold the two imprints each under its proper perception; like a bad archer he shoots beside the mark and misses it; and it is just this which is called error or deception.

THEAET. And properly so.

soc. Now when perception is present to one of the imprints but not to the other, and the mind applies the imprint of the absent perception to the perception which is present, the mind is deceived in every such instance. In a word, if our present view is sound, false opinion or deception seems to be impossible in relation to things which one does not know and has never perceived; but it is precisely in relation to things which we know and perceive that opinion turns and twists, becoming false and true—true when it puts the proper imprints and seals fairly and squarely upon one another, and false when it applies them sideways and aslant.

THEAET. Well, then, Socrates, is that view not a good one?
C  Ἐτι τοῖνν καὶ τᾶδε ἀκούσας μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἔρεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τάληθες δοξάζειν καλὸν, τὸ δὲ ψεύδεσθαι αἰσχρόν.

θεαί. Πῶς δ᾿ οὐ;

ἐπ. Ταῦτα τοῖνν φασίν ἐνθένδε γίγνεσθαι. ὅταν μὲν ὁ κηρός του ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βαθὺς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ λεῖος καὶ μετρίως ὄργασμένος ἢ, τὰ ἱόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἐνσημανώμενα εἰς τούτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, ὃ ἐφῆ Ὁμήρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοίότητα, τότε μὲν καὶ τούτοις

D καθαρὰ τὰ σημεῖα ἐγγυνώμενα καὶ ἰκανῶς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρόνια τε γίγνεται καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτοι μὲν εὐμαθεῖς, ἔπειτα μνήμονες, εἰτα οὐ παραλλάττουσι τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὰ σημεῖα ἀλλὰ δοξάζουσιν ἀληθῆ. σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν ἐὕρυχωρίᾳ ὅντα ταχύ διανέμουσιν ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκάστα ἐκμαγεία, ἃ δὴ ὅντα καλεῖται, καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ οὕτω καλοῦνται. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

θεαί. Ἡπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.

Ε  Ἐπ. Ὅταν τοῖνν λάσιον του τὸ ἔκαρ ἢ, δ ὅ ἐπήνεσεν ὁ πάντα σοφὸς ποιητῆς, ἢ ὅταν κοπρῶδες καὶ μὴ καθαρὸς τοῦ κηροῦ, ἢ ὄγρον σφόδρα ἢ σκληρόν, ὃν μὲν ὄγρον, εὐμαθεῖς μὲν, ἐπιλήσιμονες δὲ γίγνονται, ὃν δὲ σκληρόν, τάναντία. οἱ δὲ δὴ λάσιον καὶ τραχὺ λυθώδες τι ἢ γῆς ἢ κόπρου συμ-

1 ὄργασμένος Suidas, Timaeus; εἴργασμένος ΒΤ.

2 του τὸ] τοῦτο τὸ Β.
soc. After you have heard the rest, you will be still more inclined to say so. For to hold a true opinion is a good thing, but to be deceived is a disgrace.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. They say the cause of these variations is as follows: When the wax in the soul of a man is deep and abundant and smooth and properly kneaded, the images that come through the perceptions are imprinted upon this heart of the soul—as Homer calls it in allusion to its similarity to wax¹—; when this is the case, and in such men, the imprints, being clear and of sufficient depth, are also lasting. And men of this kind are in the first place quick to learn, and secondly they have retentive memories, and moreover they do not interchange the imprints of their perceptions, but they have true opinions. For the imprints are clear and have plenty of room, so that such men quickly assign them to their several moulds, which are called realities; and these men, then, are called wise. Or do you not agree?

THEAET. Most emphatically.

soc. Now when the heart of anyone is shaggy (a condition which the all-wise poet commends), or when it is unclean or of impure wax, or very soft or hard, those whose wax is soft are quick to learn, but forgetful, and those in whom it is hard are the reverse. But those in whom it is shaggy and rough and stony, infected with earth or dung which is mixed

¹ The similarity is in the Greek words καρπ or κηρ, heart, and κηρός, wax. The shaggy heart is mentioned in the Ἰλιαδ, ii. 851; xvi. 554. The citation of Homer, here and below, is probably sarcastic—in reference to the practice of some of the sophists who used and perverted his words in support of their doctrines.
μιγείσης ἐμπλευν ἔχοντες ἀσαφῆ τὰ ἐκμαγεῖα ἵσχυον. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σκληρά: βάθος γάρ οὐκ ἐν. ἀσαφῆ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ ὑγρά· ύπὸ γάρ 195 τοῦ συγχείσθαι ταχὺ γίγνεται ἀμυδρά. ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς πᾶσι τούτοις ἐπ’ ἀλλήλων συμπεπτωκότα ἦ ὑπὸ στενοχωρίας, ἐὰν τοῦ σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ψυχάριον, ἢτι ἀσαφέστερα ἐκείνων. πάντες οὖν οὗτοι γίγνονται οἱ δοξάζειν ψευδή. ὅταν γάρ τι ὀρῶσιν ἢ ἀκούσωσιν ἢ ἐπιστῶσιν, ἡκαστα ἁπονέμεν ταχὺ ἑκάστοις οὐ δυνάμενοι βραδεῖς τε εἰσὶ καὶ ἀλλοτριομοιῶτες παρορώσῃ τε καὶ παρακοῦσι τὸν πλείστα, καὶ καλοῦνται οὕτω οὐτοὶ ἐφευσμένοι τε δὴ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀμαθεῖς.

Β ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθότατα ἀνθρώπων λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ἐν. Φῶμεν ἁρά ἐν ἠμίν ψευδεῖς δόξας εἶναι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε.
ἐν. Καὶ ἀλήθεις δή;
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἀλήθεις.
ἐν. Ὡδὴ οὖν οἰόμεθα ἰκανῶς ἁμολογήσθαι ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἑστὸν ἀμφοτέρα τούτω τῷ δόξα;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.
35. Ἔνων τε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς ἀληθῶς κινδυνεύει καὶ ἄθρος εἶναι ἀνήρ ἀδολεσχῆς.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δὲ; πρὸς τί τούτ’ εἶπες;

Κ Ἐν. Τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ δυσμαθίαν δυσχεράνας καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀδολεσχίαν. τί γάρ ἂν τις ἄλλο θεῖο ὁνόμα, ὅταν ἄν κατ’ τοὺς λόγους ἔληκη τις ὑπὸ νωθείας οὐ δυνάμενος πείσθηναι, καὶ ἢ δυσαπάλ- λακτος ἁφ’ ἑκάστου λόγου;
ΘΕΑΙ. Σὺ δὲ δή τί δυσχεραίνεις;

1 ἡκαστα] ἡκαστοι ΒΤ.
in it, receive indistinct imprints from the moulds. So also do those whose wax is hard; for the imprints lack depth. And imprints in soft wax are also indistinct, because they melt together and quickly become blurred; but if besides all this they are crowded upon one another through lack of room, in some mean little soul, they are still more indistinct. So all these men are likely to have false opinions. For when they see or hear or think of anything, they cannot quickly assign things to the right imprints, but are slow about it, and because they assign them wrongly they usually see and hear and think amiss. These men, in turn, are accordingly said to be deceived about realities and ignorant.

THEAET. You are right as right could be, Socrates.
SOC. Shall we, then, say that false opinions exist in us?

THEAET. Assuredly.
SOC. And true opinions, no doubt?
THEAET. And true ones also.
SOC. Then now at last we think we have reached a valid agreement, that these two kinds of opinion incontestably exist?

THEAET. Most emphatically.
SOC. Truly, Theatetus, a garrulous man is a strange and unpleasant creature!

THEAET. Eh? What makes you say that?
SOC. Vexation at my own stupidity and genuine garrulity. For what else could you call it when a man drags his arguments up and down because he is so stupid that he cannot be convinced, and is hardly to be induced to give up any one of them?

THEAET. But you, why are you vexed?
ση. Οὐ δυσχεραίνω μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δέδοικα, ὁ τι ἀποκρινόμαι, ἂν τις ἔρηται με: "ὁ Ὁσκρατεῖς, νύμηκας δὴ ψευδή δόξαν, ὅτι οὔτε ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἔστι πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὔτ' ἐν ταῖς διανοιαῖς, ὃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ συνάψει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαν;" φήσω δὲ ἐγώ, οἶμαι, καλλωπιζόμενος ὡς τι νύμηκότων ἡμῶν καλόν.

Θεαί. "Εμοίγε δοκεῖ, ὁ Ὁσκρατεῖς, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι τὸ νῦν ἀποδεδειγμένου.

ση. "Οὐκοῦν," φήσει, "λέγεις ὅτι αὐ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὃν διανοούμεθα μόνον, ὀρῶμεν δ' οὐ, ἱππόν οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἰκθείμημεν εἶναι, ὅτι αὐ οὔτε ὀρῶμεν οὔτε ἀπτόμεθα, διανοούμεθα δὲ μόνον καὶ ἀλλ' οὐδὲν αἰσθανόμεθα περὶ αὐτοῦ;" ταῦτα, οἶμαι, φήσω λέγεω.

Θεαί. Καὶ ὁρθῶς γε.

Ε. ση. "Τί οὖν," φήσει,1 "τὰ ἐνδέκα, ἃ μηδὲν ἄλλῳ ἢ διανοεῖται τις, ἄλλο τι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἰκθεί δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μόνον αὐ διανοεῖται;" ἵθι οὖν δὴ, σὺ ἀποκρίνου.

Θεαί. 'Ἀλλ' ἀποκρινόμαι, ὅτι ὁρῶν μὲν ἂν τις ἢ ἐφαπτόμενος οἰκθεί τὰ ἐνδέκα δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μέντοι ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα δοξάσεις οὔτως.

ση. Τί οὖν; οὐεὶ τινὰ πώς τοτε αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ 196 πέντε καὶ ἐπτά, λέγω δὲ μὴ ἄνθρωπος ἐπτά καὶ πέντε προθέμενον σκοπεῖν μηδὲ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, ἄλλ' αὕτα πέντε καὶ ἐπτά, ἄ φαμεν ἐκεῖ μνημεία ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ εἶναι δοξάσαι, ταῦτα αὕτα εἰ τίς ἀνθρώπων ἢδη

1 φήσει Stephanus; φής B; φησί Burnet.
soc. I am not merely vexed, I am actually afraid; for I do not know what answer to make if anyone asks me: "Socrates, have you found out, I wonder, that false opinion exists neither in the relations of the perceptions to one another nor in the thoughts, but in the combination of perception with thought?" I shall say "yes," I suppose, and put on airs, as if we had made a fine discovery.

THEAET. It seems to me, Socrates, that the result we have now brought out is not half bad.

soc. "Do you go on and assert, then," he will say, "that we never could imagine that the man whom we merely think of, but do not see, is a horse which also we do not see or touch or perceive by any other sense, but merely think of?" I suppose I shall say that I do make that assertion.

THEAET. Yes, and you will be right.

soc. "Then," he will say, "according to that, could we ever imagine that the number eleven which is merely thought of, is the number twelve which also is merely thought of?" Come now, it is for you to answer.

THEAET. Well, my answer will be that a man might imagine the eleven that he sees or touches to be twelve, but that he could never have that opinion concerning the eleven that he has in his mind.

soc. Well, then, do you think that anyone ever considered in his own mind five and seven,—I do not mean by setting before his eyes seven men and five men and considering them, or anything of that sort, but seven and five in the abstract, which we say are imprints in the block of wax, and in regard to which we deny the possibility of forming false opinions—taking these by themselves, do you imagine
πώποτε ἐσκέψατο λέγων πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ἐρωτῶν πόσα ποτ᾽ ἑστίν, καὶ ὁ μὲν τις εἰπεν οὐθεὶς ἐνδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ δώδεκα, ἡ πάντες λέγουσί τε καὶ οἶνονται δώδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι;

ΤΕΑΙ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν-

Β δέκα· ἐὰν δὲ γε ἐν πλείον ἀριθμῷ τις σκοπήται, μᾶλλον σφάλλεται. οἶμαι γὰρ σὲ περὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀριθμοῦ λέγειν.

Σ. Ὄρθως γὰρ οἷεί· καὶ ἐνθυμοῦν μὴ τι τότε 2 γίγνεται ἀλλο ἡ αὐτὰ τὰ δώδεκα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγεῖον ἐνδεκα οὐθήναι.

ΤΕΑΙ. Ἔοικέ γε.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρώτους πάλιν ἀνήκει λόγους; ὁ γὰρ τούτῳ παθὼν, δὸ οἴδειν, ἔτερον αὐτὸ οἴεται εἶναι δὲν αὑ οἴδειν· ὁ ἐφαμεν ἀδύνατον, καὶ

C τούτῳ αὐτῷ ἡμαγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι ψευδή δόξαν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀναγκάζοιτο εἰδὸς μὴ εἰδέναι ἄμα.

ΤΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

Σ. Οὐκοῦν ἀλλὰ ὅτιοι δεῖ ἀποφαίνειν τὸ τὰ ψευδὴ δοξάζειν ἡ διανοίας πρὸς αὐθησίᾳν παραλλαγήν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἕν, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς διανοήμασιν ἐψευδόμεθα. νῦν δὲ ἦτοι οὐκ ἐστὶ ψευδὴς δόξα, ἥ ἡ τις οἴδεν, οἶον τε μὴ εἰδέναι. καὶ τούτων πότερα 3 αἴρεῖ;

ΤΕΑΙ. Ἀπορον αἴρεσιν προτίθης, ὁ Σώκρατες.

D Σ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότερα γε κυνδυνεύει ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἐάσειν. ὅμως δὲ, πάντα γὰρ τολμητέον, τί εἰ ἐπιχειρήσαμεν ἀναίσχυντεῖν;

ΤΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

1 μᾶλλον om. W. 2 τότε W; ποτε BT. 3 πότερα W; ποτέραν BT.
that anybody in the world has ever considered them, talking to himself and asking himself what their sum is, and that one person has said and thought eleven, and another twelve, or do all say and think that it is twelve?

THEAET. No, by Zeus; many say eleven, and if you take a larger number for consideration, there is greater likelihood of error. For I suppose you are speaking of any number rather than of these only.

soc. You are right in supposing so; and consider whether in that instance the abstract twelve in the block of wax is not itself imagined to be eleven.

THEAET. It seems so.

soc. Have we not, then, come back again to the beginning of our talk? For the man who is affected in this way imagines that one thing which he knows is another thing which he knows. This we said was impossible, and by this very argument we were forcing false opinion out of existence, that the same man might not be forced to know and not know the same things at the same time.

THEAET. Very true.

soc. Then we must show that forming false opinion is something or other different from the interchange of thought and perception. For if it were that, we should never be deceived in abstract thoughts. But as the case now stands, either there is no false opinion or it is possible for a man not to know that which he knows. Which alternative will you choose?

THEAET. There is no possible choice, Socrates.

soc. And yet the argument is not likely to admit both. But still, since we must not shrink from any risk, what if we should try to do a shameless deed?

THEAET. What is it?
"Εθελήσαντες εἶπεῖν ποῖόν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΤΕΑΙ. Καὶ τί τοῦτο ἀναίσχυντον;

ΣΩ. "Εοικας οὐκ ἐννοεῖν ὅτι πᾶς ἡμῖν εἴξ ἀρχής ὁ λόγος ἔπτησις γέγονεν ἐπιστήμης, ὅσ οὐκ εἶδόσι τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

ΤΕΑΙ. 'Εννοῶ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. "Επειτ' οὐκ ἀναιδές δοκεῖ, μή εἰδότας ἐπιστήμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἶνον ἔστιν; Ἐ ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὃ Θεαίτητε, πάλαι ἐσμὲν ἀνάπλευ τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι. μυριάκις γὰρ εἰρή-καμεν τὸ "γυγνώσκομεν" καὶ "οὐ γυγνώσκομεν", καὶ "ἐπιστάμεθα" καὶ "οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα," ὡς τι συνιέντες ἄλληλων ἐν ὧ ἔτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν· εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κεχρημέθ' αὐ τῷ "ἀγνοεῖν" τε καὶ "συνιέναι," ὡς προσήκον αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, εἴπερ στερόμεθα ἐπιστήμης.

ΤΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπων διαλέξει, ὃ Σώκρατες, τούτων ἀπεχμόνεοι;

197 ΣΩ. Οὐδένα ὥν γε ὃς εἰμι· εἰ μέντοι ἢν ἀντι- λογικός, οἶος ἂν ἂν εἰ καὶ νῦν παρῆν, τοῦτων τ' ἂν ἐφθ ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν σφόδρ' ἂν ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐπέπληττεν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐσμὲν φαύλου, βούλει τολμήσω εἶπεῖν οἰόν ἔστι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; φαίνεται γὰρ μοι προῦργον τι ἂν γενέσθαι.

ΤΕΑΙ. Τόλμα τούτων νη Δία. τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπεχμόμενω σοι ἐσται πολλῆ συγγνώμη.

36. ΣΩ. 'Ακήκοας οὖν δ νῦν λέγουσιν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι;

ΤΕΑΙ. Ἰσως· οὐ μέντοι ἐν γε τῷ παρόντι μνημονεύων.

Β ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμης πον ἐξιν φασίν αὐτὸ εἶναι.
THEAETETUS

soc. To undertake to tell what it really is to know.

THEAET. And why is that shameless?

soc. You seem not to remember that our whole talk from the beginning has been a search for knowledge, because we did not know what it is.

THEAET. Oh yes, I remember.

soc. Then is it not shameless to proclaim what it is to know, when we are ignorant of knowledge? But really, Theaetetus, our talk has been badly tainted with uncleanness all along; for we have said over and over again “we know” and “we do not know” and “we have knowledge” and “we have no knowledge,” as if we could understand each other, while we were still ignorant of knowledge; and at this very moment, if you please, we have again used the terms “be ignorant” and “understand,” as though we had any right to use them if we are deprived of knowledge.

THEAET. But how will you converse, Socrates, if you refrain from these words?

soc. Not at all, being the man I am; but I might if I were a real reasoner; if such a man were present at this moment he would tell us to refrain from these terms, and would criticize my talk scathingly. But since we are poor creatures, shall I venture to say what the nature of knowing is? For it seems to me that would be of some advantage.

THEAET. Venture it then, by Zeus. You shall have full pardon for not refraining from those terms.

soc. Have you heard what they say nowadays that knowing is?

THEAET. Perhaps; however, I don’t remember just at this moment.

soc. They say it is having knowledge.
ΤΩΛΩ. Ἀλήθη.

ΣΩ. Ημεῖς τούτων σμικρὸν μεταθώμεθα καὶ εἴπωμεν ἐπιστήμης κτήσων.

ΤΩΛΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ φήσεις τοῦτο ἐκείνου διαφέρειν; ΣΩ. Ἡσώς μὲν οὐδέν· ὦ δὲ οὖν δοκεῖ, ἀκούσας συνδοκίμαζε.

ΤΩΛΩ. Ἐάντερ γε οἶδος τ᾿ ὡ.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τούτων μοι ταῦταν φαίνεται τῷ κεκτήσας τὸ ἔχεων. οἶον εἰ ἰμάτιον πριάμενός τις καὶ ἐγκρατής ὤν μὴ φοροὶ, ἐχεῖν μὲν οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν αὐτό, κεκτήσας ταῦτα γε μὴν φαίμεν.

ΤΩΛΩ. Ὁρθῶς γε.

ΣΩ. Ὄρα δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰ δυνατὸν οὖτω κεκτημένων μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ ὁσπέρ εἰ τις ὀρνιθα πάρα, περιστερὰς ἢ τί ἄλλο, θηρεύσας οὐκοι κατασκευασάμενοι περιστερεύων τρέφοι. τρόπον μὲν γὰρ ἂν ποὺ τινα φαίμεν αὐτὸν αὐτὸς ἢ ἐχειν, ὅτι δὴ κέκτηται. ἢ γάρ;

ΤΩΛΩ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Τρόπον δὲ γ᾿ ἄλλον οὐδεμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ δύναμιν μὲν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτὰς παραγεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐν οἰκείῳ περιβόλῳ ὑποχειρίως ἐπούθισατο, λαβεῖν καὶ σχεῖν, ἐπειδὰν θυμάσθη, θηρευσάμενοι ἦν ἂν ἀεὶ ἐθέλη, καὶ πάλιν ἀφίναι· καὶ τούτῳ ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν, ὀποσάκις ἂν δοκῆ αὐτῷ.

ΤΩΛΩ. Ἐστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὴ, ὁσπέρ ἐν τοῖς πρόοθεν κήρυντι τι ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατεσκευάζομεν οὐκ οἶδ᾿ ὦ τι πλάσμα, νῦν αὐ ἐν ἑκάστῃ ψυχῇ ποιήσωμεν.

1 ei vulg. ex emend. apogr. P; om. BTW.
2 φοροὶ vulg.; φορῶν b; φορῶ B; φορῷ TW.
3 γε μὴν W; γε δὴ B; γε T; δὲ γε vulg.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. True.

soc. Let us make a slight change and say possessing knowledge.

THEAET. Why, how will you claim that the one differs from the other?

soc. Perhaps it doesn’t; but first hear how it seems to me to differ, and then help me to test my view.

THEAET. I will if I can.

soc. Well, then, having does not seem to me the same as possessing. For instance, if a man bought a cloak and had it under his control, but did not wear it, we should certainly say, not that he had it, but that he possessed it.

THEAET. And rightly.

soc. Now see whether it is possible in the same way for one who possesses knowledge not to have it, as, for instance, if a man should catch wild birds—pigeons or the like—and should arrange an aviary at home and keep them in it, we might in a way assert that he always has them because he possesses them, might we not?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And yet in another way that he has none of them, but that he has acquired power over them, since he has brought them under his control in his own enclosure, to take them and hold them whenever he likes, by catching whichever bird he pleases, and to let them go again; and he can do this as often as he sees fit.

THEAET. That is true.

soc. Once more, then, just as a while ago we contrived some sort of a waxen figment in the soul, so now let us make in each soul an aviary stocked
περιστερεώνα τινα παντοδαπῶν ὅρνιθων, τὰς μὲν κατ' ἀγέλας οὕσας χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, τὰς δὲ κατ' ὀλίγας, ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν ὅπῃ ἄν τὺχωσι πετομένας.

Ε θεαί. Πεποιήσοθω δή. ἄλλα τί τούντεθεν;

σφ. Παιδίων μὲν ὅντων φάναι χρῆ εἶναι τούτο τὸ ἀγγείον κενὸν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν ὅρνιθων ἐπιστήμας νοῆσαι. ἦν δ' ἂν ἐπιστήμην κτησάμενος καθείρξῃ εἰς τὸν περίβολον, φάναι αὐτὸν μεμαθηκέναι ἣ νύρηκέναι τὸ πράγμα οὗ ἢν αὐτὴ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι τοῦτ' εἶναι.

θεαί. "Εστώ.

198 σφ. Τὸ τοίνυν πάλιν ἦν ἂν βούληται τῶν ἐπιστημῶν θηρεύειν καὶ λαβόντα ἰσχεῖν καὶ αὕθις ἀφιέναι, σκόπει τίνων δεῖται ὄνομάτων, εἴτε τῶν αὐτῶν ἢν τὸ πρῶτον ὅτε ἐκτάτο εἴτε ἐτέρων. μαθῆσει δ' ἐνθένδε.¹ σαφέστερον τὶ λέγω. ἀριθμητικὴν μὲν γὰρ λέγεις τέχνην;

θεαί. Ναι.

σφ. Ταύτῃ δὴ ὑπόλαβε θήραν ἐπιστημῶν ἄρτιον τε καὶ περιττόν παντὸς.

θεαί. Ὑπολαμβάνω.

σφ. Ταύτῃ δὴ, οἷμαι, τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτὸς τε ὑπο-Β χειρίους τὰς ἐπιστήμας τῶν ἁριθμῶν ἔχει καὶ ἄλλω παραδίδωσιν ὁ παραδίδουσ.

θεαί. Ναι.

σφ. Καὶ καλοῦμέν γε παραδίδοντα μὲν διδάσκειν, παραλαμβάνοντα δὲ μανθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ τῷ κεκτήσαθαι ἐν τῷ περιστερεῶνι ἐκείνῳ ἐπίστασθαι.

¹ ἐνθένδε] ἐντεθέν B.

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THEAETETUS

with all sorts of birds, some in flocks apart from the rest, others in small groups, and some solitary, flying hither and thither among them all.

THEAET. Consider it done. What next?
soc. We must assume that while we are children this receptacle is empty, and we must understand that the birds represent the varieties of knowledge. And whatsoever kind of knowledge a person acquires and shut up in the enclosure, we must say that he has learned or discovered the thing of which this is the knowledge, and that just this is knowing.

THEAET. So be it.

soc. Consider then what expressions are needed for the process of recapturing and taking and holding and letting go again whichever he please of the kinds of knowledge, whether they are the same expressions as those needed for the original acquisition, or others. But you will understand better by an illustration. You admit that there is an art of arithmetic?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Now suppose this to be a hunt after the kinds of knowledge, or sciences, of all odd and even numbers.

THEAET. I do so.

soc. Now it is by this art, I imagine, that a man has the sciences of numbers under his own control and also that any man who transmits them to another does this.

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And we say that when anyone transmits them he teaches, and when anyone receives them he learns, and when anyone, by having acquired them, has them in that aviary of ours, he knows them.
τοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ἔπιστημον ἵππες, τοὺς ἄλλους τὰς ἀριθμοὺς ἐπιστήμηται; πάντων γὰρ ἀριθμῶν εἰσὶν αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.

οἶκος. Τί μήν;

εἰς. Ὅμως γὰρ οὗ;

οἶκος. Τὸ δὲ ἀρίθμεῖν γε ὅποι ἄλλο τι θήσομεν τοῦ σκοπεῖσθαι πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὡν.

οἶκος. Οὕτως.

οἶκος. Ὅ ἄρα ἐπιστήμηται, σκοπούμενος φαίνεται ὥσ ὅποι εἰδώς, ὅν ὠμολογήκαμεν ἀπαντα ἀριθμὸν εἰδέναι. ἀκούεις γὰρ ποῦ τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβήτησεις.

οἶκος. Ἐγώγε.

37. οἶκος. Οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἀπεικάζοντες τῇ τῶν ἰδίων κεκτηθέν τε καὶ θήρᾳ ἔρονσιν ὑπὸ ἴδιτῃ ἡθῇ, ἢ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτήσθαι τοῦ κεκτήθαι ἑνекα. ἡ δὲ κεκτηθένῃ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἂν πάλαι ἐκέκτητο. οὕτως δὲ καὶ ὅποι πάλαι ἐπιστήμηται ἢσαν αὐτῷ μαθόντες καὶ ἡπὶ- στατο αὐτά, πάλιν ἐστὶ καταμανθάνειν ταῦτα ταῦτα ἀναλαμβάνοντα τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐκάστου καὶ ἱσχύοντα, ἢν ἐκέκτητο μὲν πάλαι, πρόχειρον δὲ ὅποι εἰς ἡτὶ διανοίᾳ;

οἶκος. Ἀληθῆ.

Εἰς οἶκος. Τοῦτο δὲ ἀρτι ἡρώτων, ὅπως χρή τοῖς ἡμιπρόθεσιν καὶ ὁμοθεσίας ΒΤ. 1 μαθόντες καὶ ΒΤ; μαθόντες ΒΤ.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Now pay attention to what follows from this. Does not the perfect arithmetician understand all numbers; for he has the sciences of all numbers in his mind?

THEAET. To be sure.

soc. Then would such a man ever count anything—either any abstract numbers in his head, or any such external objects as possess number?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. But we shall affirm that counting is the same thing as considering how great any number in question is.

THEAET. We shall.

soc. Then he who by our previous admission knows all number is found to be considering that which he knows as if he did not know it. You have doubtless heard of such ambiguities.

THEAET. Yes, I have.

soc. Continuing, then, our comparison with the acquisition and hunting of the pigeons, we shall say that the hunting is of two kinds, one before the acquisition for the sake of possessing, the other carried on by the possessor for the sake of taking and holding in his hands what he had acquired long before. And just so when a man long since by learning came to possess knowledge of certain things, and knew them, he may have these very things afresh by taking up again the knowledge of each of them separately and holding it—the knowledge which he had acquired long before, but had not at hand in his mind?

THEAET. That is true.

soc. This, then, was my question just now: How
δνόμασι χρώμενον λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅταν ἄριθμη-σων ἢ ὁ ἄριθμητικός ἢ τι ἀναγνωσόμενος ὁ γραμματικός, ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἀρα ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ πάλιν ἔρχεται μαθησόμενος παρ’ έαυτοῦ ἄ ἐπισταται; 

θεαὶ. 'Αλλ' ἀτοπον, ὥ Σώκρατες. 

σχ. 'Αλλ' ἡ οὐκ ἐπισταται φάμεν αὐτὸν ἀνα- 

γνώσεσθαι καὶ ἄριθμήσειν, δεδωκότες αὐτῷ πάντα ἀ 

μεν γράμματα, πάντα δὲ ἄριθμον ἐπιστασθαι;

199 θεαὶ. 'Αλλα καὶ τοῦτ' ἀλγον. 

σχ. Βουλεί οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὄνομάτων 

οὔδὲν ἢμίν μέλει, ὅτι τὰς καὶρει ἔλκων τὸ ἐπιστα- 

σθαι καὶ μαθάνειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὄρισμεν ἐτερον 

μὲν τι τὸ κεκτήσατι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἐτερον δὲ τὸ 

ἔχειν, ὃ μὲν τις ἐκτηται μὴ κεκτήσατι ἀδύνατον 

φάμεν εἶναι, ὡστε οὐδέποτε συμβαίνει ὃ τις οἶδεν 

μὴ εἰδέναι, ψευδὴ μὲντοι δὸξαν οἶν τ’ εἶναι περὶ 

Β αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν; μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τούτου 

οἶν τε, ἀλλ’ ἔτεραν ἀντ’ ἐκεῖνης, ὅταν θηρεύων 

tuα ποῦ ποτ’ 1 ἐπιστήμην διαπετομένων ἀνθ’ 

ἔτερας ἔτεραν ἀμαρτῶν λάβῃ, τότε 2 ἢρα τὰ ἐνδεκα 

δώδεκα ὧνθ’ εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἐνδεκα ἐπιστήμην ἀντὶ 

τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβῶν τὴν ἐν ἐαυτῷ οἶν 

φάτταν ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς. 

θεαϊ. Ἡ ἔχει γὰρ οὖν λόγον. 

σχ. Ὁταν δὲ γε ἢν ἐπιγειρεὶ λαβεῖν λάβῃ, 

ἀφευδεῖν τε καὶ τὰ ὅντα δοξάζειν τότε, καὶ οὕτω 

δὴ εἶναι ἄλθης τε καὶ ψευδὴ δόξαν, καὶ ὃν ἐν τοῖς 

C πρόσθεν ἐδυσχεραινομεν οὐδὲν ἐμποδών γίγνε- 

σθαι; ἵνας οὖν μοι συμφήσεις η πῶς ποιήσεις;

1 ποῦ ποτ’ W ; ἀν’ αὑτοῦ BT. 

2 τότε W ; στε BT.
THEAETETUS

should we express ourselves in speaking about them when an arithmetician undertakes to count or a man of letters to read something? In such a case shall we say that although he knows he sets himself to learn again from himself that which he knows?

THEAET. But that is extraordinary, Socrates.

soc. But shall we say that he is going to read or count that which he does not know, when we have granted that he knows all letters and all numbers?

THEAET. But that too is absurd.

soc. Shall we then say that words are nothing to us, if it amuses anyone to drag the expressions "know" and "learn" one way and another, but since we set up the distinction that it is one thing to possess knowledge and another thing to have it, we affirm that it is impossible not to possess what one possesses, so that it never happens that a man does not know that which he knows, but that it is possible to conceive a false opinion about it? For it is possible to have not the knowledge of this thing, but some other knowledge instead, when in hunting for some one kind of knowledge, as the various kinds fly about, he makes a mistake and catches one instead of another; so in one example he thought eleven was twelve, because he caught the knowledge of twelve, which was within him, instead of that of eleven, caught a ringdove, as it were, instead of a pigeon.

THEAET. Yes, that is reasonable.

soc. But when he catches the knowledge he intends to catch, he is not deceived and has true opinion, and so true and false opinion exist and none of the things which formerly annoyed us interferes? Perhaps you will agree to this; or what will you do?
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

σ. Καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἡ ἐπίστανται μὴ ἐπί-
στασθαί ἀπηλλάγμεθα· ἀ γὰρ κεκτήμεθα μὴ
κεκτῆσαί οὐδαμοῦ ἐτί συμβαίνει, οὔτε ὑευσθεῖσι
τινος οὔτε μή. δεινότερον μέντοι πάθος ἀλλο
παραφαίνεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

σ. Εἰ ἡ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλαγὴ ψευδῆς
γενήσεται ποτε δόξα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ;

Δ σ. Πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τινὸς ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην
τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖν, μὴ ἀγνωσμοῦν ἄλλα τῇ
ἔαυτοι ἐπιστήμη· ἐπείτα ἔτερον αὐ ὁ τοῦτο δοξά-
ζειν, τὸ δ' ἔτερον τοῦτο; πῶς οὐ πολλῇ ἀλογίᾳ,
ἐπιστήμης παραγενομένης γνώναι μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν
μηδέν, ἀγνοῆσαι δὲ πάντα; ἐκ γὰρ τούτου τοῦ
λόγου κωλύει οὐδὲν καὶ ἀγνοιαν παραγενομένην
γνώναι τί ποιῆσαι καὶ τυφλότητα ἰδεῖν, εἰπερ
καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοῆσαι ποτὲ τινα ποιῆσει.

Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡσώς γάρ, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐ καλῶς τὰς
ὄρνιθας ἔτηθέμεν ἐπιστήμας μόνον τιθέντες, ἔδει
δὲ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης τιθέναι ὁμοὶ συνδιαπε-
τομένας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὸν θηρεύοντα τοτὲ μὲν
ἐπιστήμην λαμβάνοντα, τοτὲ δ' ἀνεπιστημοσύνης
τοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι ψευδὴ μὲν δοξάζειν τῇ ἀνεπιστημο-
σύνης, ἀληθῆ δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμη.

σ. Οὐ διδόν γε, ὁ Θεαίτητε, μὴ ἐπανεῖν σε·
δ' μέντοι εἰπὲς πάλιν ἐπίσκεψαι. ἔστω μὲν γὰρ
THEAET. I will agree.

soc. Yes, for we have got rid of our difficulty about men not knowing that which they know; for we no longer find ourselves not possessing that which we possess, whether we are deceived about anything or not. However, another more dreadful disaster seems to be coming in sight.

THEAET. What disaster?

soc. If the interchange of kinds of knowledge should ever turn out to be false opinion.

THEAET. How so?

soc. Is it not the height of absurdity, in the first place for one who has knowledge of something to be ignorant of this very thing, not through ignorance but through his knowledge; secondly, for him to be of opinion that this thing is something else and something else is this thing—for the soul, when knowledge has come to it, to know nothing and be ignorant of all things? For by this argument there is nothing to prevent ignorance from coming to us and making us know something and blindness from making us see, if knowledge is ever to make us ignorant.

THEAET. Perhaps, Socrates, we were not right in making the birds represent kinds of knowledge only, but we ought to have imagined kinds of ignorance also flying about in the soul with the others; then the hunter would catch sometimes knowledge and sometimes ignorance of the same thing, and through the ignorance he would have false, but through the knowledge true opinion.

soc. It is not easy, Theaetetus, to refrain from praising you. However, examine your suggestion once more. Let it be as you say: the man who
200 ὡς λέγεις· ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην λαβὼν
ψευδῆ μὲν, φής, δοξάσει. ἢ γάρ;

ὁεαι. Ναί.

σν. Οὐ δὴ τούτῳ καὶ ἥγησετάι γε ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.

ὁεαι. Πῶς γάρ;

σν. Ἀλλ' ἀληθῆ γε, καὶ ὡς εἰδὼς διακείσεται
περὶ ὧν ἐξευτελεῖ.

ὁεαι. Τί μήν;

σν. Ἐπιστήμην ἄρα οὐχισταί τεθηρευκὼς ἔχειν,
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην.

ὁεαι. Δήλον.

σν. Οὐκοῦν μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ
tὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν. ὁ γάρ ἐλεγκτικὸς

Β ἐκεῖνος γελάσας φήσει· "πότερον, ὁ βέλτιστοι,
ἀμφοτέρας τις εἰδώς, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ἀνεπιστη-
μοσύνην, ἦν οἶδεν, ἐτέραν αὐτήν οἴεται τινα ἐιναι
ὡν οἶδεν; ἦν οὐδετέραν αὐτοῖν ἰἰδως, ἦν μὴ οἴδε,
δοξάζει ἐτέραν ὡν οὐκ οἶδεν; ἦ τὴν μὲν εἰδώς,
τὴν δ' οὐ, ἦν οἴδεν, ἦν μὴ οἴδεν; ἦ ἦ μὴ οἴδεν,
ἣν οἴδεν ἤγειται; ἦ πάλιν αὐ μοι ἔρειτε ὀτι τῶν
ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνων εἰδών αὐ ἐπιστῆμαι,
ἀς ὁ κεκτημένος ἐν ἐτέροις τισι γελοίοις περιστε-

C ῥέωσιν ἣ κηρίνοις πλάσμαι καθείρξας, ἔωσπερ
ἀν κεκτήται ἐπίσταται, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ προχείρους
ἐχῃ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; καὶ οὔτω δὴ ἀναγκασθή-
σεσθε εἰς ταῦτων περιτρέχειν μυριάκως οὐδὲν πλέον
ποιοῦντες;" τί πρὸς ταῦτα, ὁ Ἐθειττῆς, ἀπο-
κρινούμεθα;

1 αὐτοῖς] αὐτὴν BT; om. W.
THEAETETUS

catches the ignorance will, you say, have false opinion. Is that it?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. But surely he will not also think that he has false opinion.

THEAET. Certainly not.

soc. No, but true opinion, and will have the attitude of knowing that about which he is deceived.

THEAET. Of course.

soc. Hence he will fancy that he has caught, and has, knowledge, not ignorance.

THEAET. Evidently.

soc. Then, after our long wanderings, we have come round again to our first difficulty. For the real reasoner will laugh and say, "Most excellent Sirs, does a man who knows both knowledge and ignorance think that one of them, which he knows, is another thing which he knows; or, knowing neither of them, is he of opinion that one, which he does not know, is another thing which he does not know; or, knowing one and not the other, does he think that the one he does not know is the one he knows; or that the one he knows is the one he does not know? Or will you go on and tell me that there are kinds of knowledge of the kinds of knowledge and of ignorance, and that he who possesses these kinds of knowledge and has enclosed them in some sort of other ridiculous aviaries or waxen figments, knows them, so long as he possesses them, even if he has them not at hand in his soul? And in this fashion are you going to be compelled to trot about endlessly in the same circle without making any progress?" What shall we reply to this, Theaetetus?
PLATO

THEAI. 'Αλλὰ μὰ Δι', ὡ Σώκρατες, ἐγώγε ὦν ἡχω τί χρή λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡμῖν, ὡ παῖ, καλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐπιπλήττει, καὶ ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι οὖν ὦρθῶς ψευδὴ δόξαν προτέραν ἔλημεν ἐπιστήμης, ἐκείνην ἄφ-

D ἐντες; τὸ δ' ἐστιν ἀδύνατον γνώναι, πρὶν ἂν τις ἐπιστήμην ἰκανῶς λάβῃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

THEAI. Ἀνάγκη, ὡ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὑς λέγεις οἰέσθαι.

38. ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τις ἐρεί πάλιν εἰς ἀρχὴς ἐπιστήμην; οὐ γάρ ποι ἀπερομέν γέ πω;

THEAI. Ἡκιστα, εάνπερ μὴ σὺ γε ἀπαγορεύῃς.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δή, τί ἂν αὐτὸ μάλιστα ἐπίστευτη ἦκιστ' ἂν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιωθεῖμεν;

Ε ΤΗΕAI. Ὅπερ ἐπεχειροῦμεν, ὡ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν· οὐ γάρ ἡχω ἐγώγη ἀλλο οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

THEAI. Τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. ἀναμάρτητον γε ποὺ ἐστιν τὸ δοξάζειν ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γινόμενα πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ γίγνεται.

ΣΩ. Ὅ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγοῦμεν, ὡ Θεαῖτητε, ἔφη ἄρα δείξειν αὐτὸ· καὶ τοῦτο ἂν ἱόντες ἔρευνῶμεν, τάχ' ἂν ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὐτὸ 201 φήνειν τὸ ζητοῦμεν, μένουσι δὲ δήλον οὐδέν.

THEAI. Ὅρθῶς λέγεις: ἀλλ' ἵωμεν γε καὶ σκο-

πῶμεν.

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THEAET. By Zeus, Socrates, I don't know what to say.

soc. Then, my boy, is the argument right in rebuking us and in pointing out that we were wrong to abandon knowledge and seek first for false opinion? It is impossible to know the latter until we have adequately comprehended the nature of knowledge.

THEAET. As the case now stands, Socrates, we cannot help thinking as you say.

soc. To begin, then, at the beginning once more, what shall we say knowledge is? For surely we are not going to give it up yet, are we?

THEAET. Not by any means, unless, that is, you give it up.

soc. Tell us, then, what definition will make us contradict ourselves least.

THEAET. The one we tried before, Socrates; at any rate, I have nothing else to offer.

soc. What one?

THEAET. That knowledge is true opinion; for true opinion is surely free from error and all its results are fine and good.

soc. The man who was leading the way through the river, Theaetetus, said: "The result itself will show;" and so in this matter, if we go on with our search, perhaps the thing will turn up in our path and of itself reveal the object of our search; but if we stay still, we shall discover nothing.

THEAET. You are right; let us go on with our investigation.

1 A man who was leading the way through a river was asked if the water was deep. He replied ἀπὸ δεξίως, "the event itself will show" (i.e. you can find out by trying). The expression became proverbial.
τούτοις τούτοις Τ.
2 ιδόντι] εἶδον τί Β; εἰδότι W.
3 κατὰ Jowett; καὶ mss.; om. Heindorf.
4 δικαστήρια] δικαστήριον Τ; om. Heindorf.
soc. Well, then, this at least calls for slight investigation; for you have a whole profession which declares that true opinion is not knowledge.

THEAET. How so? What profession is it?

soc. The profession of those who are greatest in wisdom, who are called orators and lawyers; for they persuade men by the art which they possess, not teaching them, but making them have whatever opinion they like. Or do you think there are any teachers so clever as to be able, in the short time allowed by the water-clock,¹ satisfactorily to teach the judges the truth about what happened to people who have been robbed of their money or have suffered other acts of violence, when there were no eyewitnesses?

THEAET. I certainly do not think so; but I think they can persuade them.

soc. And persuading them is making them have an opinion, is it not?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. Then when judges are justly persuaded about matters which one can know only by having seen them and in no other way, in such a case, judging of them from hearsay, having acquired a true opinion of them, they have judged without knowledge, though they are rightly persuaded, if the judgement they have passed is correct, have they not?

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. But, my friend, if true opinion and knowledge were the same thing in law courts, the best of judges could never have true opinion without knowledge; in fact, however, it appears that the two are different.

¹ The length of speeches in the Athenian law courts was limited by a water-clock.
THEAI. "Ο γε ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπόντος τοι τάκονᾶς ἐπελελήσμην, νῦν δ' ἔννοο. ἐφη δὲ τὴν
μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀλήθη δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι,
δ' τὴν δὲ ἄλογου ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης. καὶ ὃν μὲν μὴ
ἔστι λόγος, οὐκ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, οὕτωσί καὶ ὄνομά-
ζων, ᾧ δ' ἔχει, ἐπιστήμη.

Σο. Ὡ Hier kalwσ λέγεις. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστήμην
tάντα καὶ μὴ πῇ διήρει, λέγε, εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταύτα
σὺ τε κἂν ἀκηκόαμεν.

THEAI. 'Αλλ' οὐκ οἴδα εἰ ἐξευρήσω. λέγωντος
μὲντ' ἂν ἐτέρου, ὡς ἐγώμα, ἀκολουθήσαιμ' ἂν. 1

39. Σο. "Ἀκούει δὴ ὁ ναρ ἀντὶ νοείρατος. ἐγὼ
Ε γὰρ αὐ ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρώτα
οἴνσπερεῖ στοιχεῖα, ἔξ ὃν ἥμεις τε συγκεκμεθα καὶ
τάλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι. αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐκα-
στον ὄνομασαι μόνον εἰη, προσεπείν ἐν ὀὗδε
ἀλλο δυνατον, οὐθ' ὡς ἔστων, οὐθ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστων.

202 ἴδη γὰρ ἂν οὐσίαν ἡ μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστιθεσθαι,
δεῖν δὲ οὖδὲν προσφέρειν, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο μόνον
τὴς ἔρει. ἐπεὶ οὖδὲ τὸ "αὐτὸ" οὖδὲ τὸ "ἐκεῖνο"
οὐδὲ τὸ "ἐκαστον" οὐδὲ τὸ "μόνον" οὖδὲ
"τούτο" προσουστέον οὐδ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τουλάτα:
tάντα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πάσι προσφέρεσθαι,
ἔτερα ὁντα ἐκείνων ὅσ προστιθεται, δεῖν δὲ,
eἴπερ ἤν δυνατὸν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἴρησιν οἰκείον
αυτοῦ λόγον, ἀνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων λέγεσθαι.

νὸν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὅτιον τῶν πρώτων ῥηθήναι

1 ἀκολουθήσαμ' ἂν Schanz; ἀκολουθήσαμ' ΒΤ; ἀκολουθή-
σαιμ al.

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THEAET. Oh yes, I remember now, Socrates, having heard someone make the distinction, but I had forgotten it. He said that knowledge was true opinion accompanied by reason, but that unreasoning true opinion was outside of the sphere of knowledge; and matters of which there is not a rational explanation are unknowable—yes, that is what he called them—and those of which there is are knowable.

soc. I am glad you mentioned that. But tell us how he distinguished between the knowable and the unknowable, that we may see whether the accounts that you and I have heard agree.

THEAET. But I do not know whether I can think it out; but if someone else were to make the statement of it, I think I could follow.

soc. Listen then, while I relate it to you—"a dream for a dream." I in turn used to imagine that I heard certain persons say that the primary elements of which we and all else are composed admit of no rational explanation; for each alone by itself can only be named, and no qualification can be added, neither that it is nor that it is not, for that would at once be adding to it existence or non-existence, whereas we must add nothing to it, if we are to speak of that itself alone. Indeed, not even "itself" or "that" or "each" or "alone" or "this" or anything else of the sort, of which there are many, must be added; for these are prevalent terms which are added to all things indiscriminately and are different from the things to which they are added; but if it were possible to explain an element, and it admitted of a rational explanation of its own, it would have to be explained apart from everything else. But in fact none of the primal elements can be ex-
Βλόγως· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτῷ ἄλλ’ ἢ ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον· ὀνόμα γὰρ μόνον ἔχειν· τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἦδη συγκείμενα, ἀοσπερ αὐτὰ πέπλεκται, οὔτω καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλακέντα λόγου γεγονόναι· ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν. οὔτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεία ἄλογα καὶ ἀγνωστά εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δὲ· τὰς δὲ συλλαβάς γνωστάς τε καὶ ῥήτας καὶ ἀλήθεις δόξῃ δοξαστάς. δόται μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀλήθη δόξαν τινὸς C τις λάβῃ, ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτὸν τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ αὐτό, γιγνώσκειν δ’ οὗ· τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον δούναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμων εἶναι περὶ τούτου· προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατὸν τε ταύτα πάντα γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν. οὔτως οὐ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἢ ἄλλως ἀκήκοας; θεαὶ. Οὔτω μὲν οὖν παντάπασιν.

ς. Ἀρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτη, δόξαν ἀλήθη μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι;

θεαὶ. Κομίδῃ μὲν οὖν.

D σ. Ἀρ’, ὃ Θεαίτητε, νῦν οὔτω τῇδε τῇ ἴμερᾳ εἰλήφαμεν δ’ πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ξητούντες πρὶν εὑρεῖν κατεγράσαν; θεαὶ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὃ Σωκράτες, καλῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν.

ς. Καὶ εἰκὸς γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὔτως ἔχειν· τὸς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐτὶ ἐπιστήμην εἶν χωρὶς τοῦ λόγου τε καὶ ὀρθῆς δόξης; ἐν μέντοι τί με τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀπαρέσκει.

θεαὶ. Τὸ ποίον δὴ;
pressed by reason; they can only be named, for they have only a name; but the things composed of these are themselves complex, and so their names are complex and form a rational explanation; for the combination of names is the essence of reasoning. Thus the elements are not objects of reason or of knowledge, but only of perception, whereas the combinations of them are objects of knowledge and expression and true opinion. When therefore a man acquires without reasoning the true opinion about anything, his mind has the truth about it, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give and receive a rational explanation of a thing is without knowledge of it; but when he has acquired also a rational explanation he may possibly have become all that I have said and may now be perfect in knowledge. Is that the version of the dream you have heard, or is it different?

THEAET. That was it exactly.

soc. Are you satisfied, then, and do you state it in this way, that true opinion accompanied by reason is knowledge?

THEAET. Precisely.

soc. Can it be, Theaetetus, that we now, in this casual manner, have found out on this day what many wise men have long been seeking and have grown grey in the search?

THEAET. I, at any rate, Socrates, think our present statement is good.

soc. Probably this particular statement is so; for what knowledge could there still be apart from reason and right opinion? One point, however, in what has been said is unsatisfactory to me.

THEAET. What point?
PLATO

ς. ε' Ο καὶ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι κομψότατα, ὡς τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἀγνωστά, τό δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος Ε γνωστόν.

Θεαί. Οὔκοιν ὅρθῶς;

ς. Ἰστέων δή. ὡσπερ γὰρ ὦμήρους ἔχομεν τοῦ λόγου τὰ παραδείγματα, οἷς χρώμενος εἶπε πάντα ταῦτα.

Θεαί. Ποία δή;

ς. Τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖα τε καὶ συλλαβάς. ἢ οὐεὶ ἀλλοσέ ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα εἶπείν τὸν εἰπόντα α λέγομεν;

Θεαί. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' εἰς ταῦτα.

203 40. ς. Βασανίζωμεν δή αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, οὕτως ἢ οὔχ οὕτως γράμματα ἐμάθομεν. φέρε πρῶτον' ἃρ' αἱ μὲν συλλαβαί λόγον ἔχουσιν, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἁλογα;

Θεαί. Ἔσως.

ς. Πάνω μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. Σωκράτους γοῦν εἰ τις ἐρωτᾷ τὴν πρώτην συλλαβήν οὕτως: "ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγε τί ἐστι σῶ;" τί ἀποκρινεῖ;

Θεαί. "Ὅτι σήμα καὶ ὥ.

ς. Οὔκοιν τοῦτον ἔχεις λόγον τῆς συλλαβῆς;

Θεαί. Ἐγώγγε.

Β ς. Ἰθι δή, οὕτως εἰπὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ σήμα λόγον.

Θεαί. Καὶ πῶς τοῦ στοιχείου τις ἐρεῖ στοιχεία; καὶ γὰρ δή, ὦ Σωκρατέ, τὸ τε σήμα τῶν ἀφώνων

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soc. Just that which seems to be the cleverest; the assertion that the elements are unknowable and the class of combinations is knowable.

THEAET. Is that not right?

soc. We are sure to find out, for we have as hostages the examples which he who said all this used in his argument.

THEAET. What examples?

soc. The elements in writing, the letters of the alphabet, and their combinations, the syllables; or do you think the author of the statements we are discussing had something else in view?

THEAET. No; those are what he had in view.

soc. Let us, then, take them up and examine them, or rather, let us examine ourselves and see whether it was in accordance with this theory, or not, that we learned letters. First then, the syllables have a rational explanation, but the letters have not?

THEAET. I suppose so.

soc. I think so, too, decidedly. Now if anyone should ask about the first syllable of Socrates; "Theaetetus, tell me, what is SO?" What would you reply?

THEAET. I should say "S and O."

soc. This, then, is your explanation of the syllable?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Come now, in the same manner give me the explanation of the S.

THEAET. How can one give any elements of an element? For really, Socrates, the S is a voiceless

1 Στοιχεῖον and συλλαβή, originally general terms for element and combination, became the common words for letter and syllable.
ἔστι, ψόφος τις μόνον, οἶον συριττοῦσης τῆς γλώττης· τοῦ δ' αὖ βῆτα οὖτε φωνὴ οὖτε ψόφος, οὔδὲ τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων· ὥστε πάντα εὖ ἔχει τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὰ ἁλογα, ὅν γε τὰ ἐναργεῖστατα αὐτὰ τὰ ἐπὶ φωνῆς μόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὖδ' ὄντινον.

ζω. Τοῦτι μὲν ἀρα, ὦ ἔταιρε, κατωρθώκαμεν περὶ ἑπιστήμης.

ὁεαί. Φαινόμεθα.

ζω. Τί δε; τὸ μὴ γνωστὸν εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον, ἄλλα τὴν συλλαβὴν ἄρ' ὅρθως ἀποδεδείγμεθα;

ὁεαί. Εἰκὸς γε.

ζω. Φέρε δὴ, τὴν συλλαβὴν πότερον λέγωμεν ἕν τὰ ἀμφότερα στοιχεῖα, καὶ ἐὰν πλεῖον ἢ ἢ δύο, τὰ πάντα, ἢ μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν γεγονοῦσιν συντεθέντων αὐτῶν;

ὁεαί. Τὰ ἀπαντά ἐμοιγενίκομεν.

ζω. Ὅρα δὴ ἐπὶ δυοῖν, σύγμα καὶ ὦ. ἀμφότερα ἐστιν ἡ πρώτη συλλαβὴ τοῦ ἑμοῦ ὅνοματος. ἄλλα τὸ γιγνόμενον αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφότερα γιγνόμεκει;

θεαί. Τί μὴν;

ζω. Τὸ σύγμα καὶ τὸ ὦ ἀρα γιγνόμεκει.

ὁεαί. Ναι.

ζω. Τί δ; ἐκάτερον ἄρ' ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰδὼς ἀμφότερα γιγνόμεκει;

ὁεαί. Ἄλλα δεινὸν καὶ ἁλογον, ὦ Σωκράτες.

ζω. Ἄλλα μέντοι εἰ γε ἀνάγκη ἐκάτερον γιγνόμεκειν, εἴπερ ἀμφότερά τις γιγνόμεςαι, προγιγνόμεκειν

1 λέγωμεν B; λέγομεν T et al.
letter, a mere noise, as of the tongue hissing; B again has neither voice nor noise, nor have most of the other letters; and so it is quite right to say that they have no explanation, seeing that the most distinct of them, the seven vowels, have only voice, but no explanation whatsoever.

soc. In this point, then, my friend, it would seem that we have reached a right conclusion about knowledge.

THEAET. I think we have.

soc. But have we been right in laying down the principle that whereas the letter is unknowable, yet the syllable is knowable?

THEAET. Probably.

soc. Well then, shall we say that the syllable is the two letters, or, if there be more than two, all of them, or is it a single concept that has arisen from their combination?

THEAET. I think we mean all the letters it contains.

soc. Now take the case of two, S and O. The two together are the first syllable of my name. He who knows it knows the two letters, does he not?

THEAET. Of course.

soc. He knows, that is, the S and the O.

THEAET. Yes.

soc. How is that? He is ignorant of each, and knowing neither of them he knows them both?

THEAET. That is monstrous and absurd, Socrates.

soc. And yet if a knowledge of each letter is necessary before one can know both, he who is

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1 The distinction here made is that which we make between vowels and consonants. The seven Greek vowels are α, ε, η, ι, ο, υ, ω, called φωνήεντα.
τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀπασα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντι ποτε γνώσεσθαι συλλαβήν, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἴχησεται.

Ε ἕθει. Καὶ μᾶλα γε ἐξαίφνης.

ζην. Οὐ γὰρ καλῶς αὐτὸν φυλάττομεν. χρὴν γὰρ ἵνα τὴν συλλαβήν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐκείνων ἐν τῷ γεγονός εἶδος, ἵδεαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον, ἐτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων.

εθει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ τάχα γ' ἂν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἡ 'κείνως ἔχοι.

ζην. Σκεπτέον καὶ οὗ προδοτέον οὕτως ἀν-ἀνδρῶς μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνὸν λόγον.

εθει. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

204 ζην. 'Εχεῖν δὴ ὡς νῦν φαμεν, μία ἰδέα ἐξ ἐκάστων τῶν συναρμοττόντων στοιχεῖων γιγνο-μένη ἡ συλλαβή, ὁμοίως ἐν τῇ γράμμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασι.

εθει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ζην. Οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι.

εθει. Τί δή;

ζην. "Ὅτι οὐ ἂν ἡ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη εἶναι. ἡ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονός ἐν τῷ εἶδος ἐτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν;

εθει. "Ἐγγεγε.

ζην. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πάν καὶ τὸ ὅλον πότερον ταὐτὸν ἐκαλεῖς ἡ ἐτερον ἐκάτερον;

εθει. "Ἐχω μὲν οὐδὲν σαφές, ὅτι δὲ κελεύεις προθήμως ἀποκρίνασθαι, παρακινδυνεύοντων λέγω ὅτι ἐτερον.

ζην. 'Ἡ μὲν προθυμία, ὁ Θεαίτητε, ὧν ἐἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόκρισις, σκεπτέον.

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ever to know a syllable must certainly know the letters first, and so our fine theory will have run away and vanished!

THEAET. And very suddenly, too.

soc. Yes, for we are not watching it carefully. Perhaps we ought to have said that the syllable is not the letters, but a single concept that has arisen from them, having a single form of its own, different from the letters.

THEAET. Certainly; and perhaps that will be better than the other way.

soc. Let us look into that; we must not give up in such unmanly fashion a great and impressive theory.

THEAET. No, we must not.

soc. Let it be, then, as we say now, that the syllable or combination is a single form arising out of the several conjoined elements, and that it is the same in words and in all other things.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Therefore there must be no parts of it.

THEAET. How so?

soc. Because if there are parts of anything, the whole must inevitably be all the parts; or do you assert also that the whole that has arisen out of the parts is a single concept different from all the parts?

THEAET. Yes, I do.

soc. Do you then say that all and the whole are the same, or that each of the two is different from the other?

THEAET. I am not sure; but you tell me to answer boldly, so I take the risk and say that they are different.

soc. Your boldness, Theaetetus, is right; but whether your answer is so remains to be seen.
ΘΕΑΙ. Δεῖ δὲ γε δῆ. 1
41. σφ. Οὐκοῦν διαφέροι ἂν τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντὸς, ως δ νῦν λόγος;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
σφ. Τί δὲ δή; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἔσθ' ὁ τι
diαφέρει; οἴον ἐπευδάν λέγωμεν ἐν, δύο, τρία,
C τέτταρα, πέντε, ἕξ, καὶ ἕαν δις τριὰ ἡ τριὰ δύο
ἡ τέτταρά τε καὶ δύο ἡ τριὰ καὶ δύο καὶ ἐν, πότερον
ἐν πάσι τούτοις τὸ αὐτὸ ἡ ἔτερον λέγομεν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ αὐτὸ.
σφ. Ἀρ' ἄλλο τι ἡ ἕξ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.
σφ. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἐκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ 2 ἕξ
eἰρήκαμεν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
σφ. Πάλω δ' οὐχ ἐν 3 λέγομεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.
σφ. Ἡ ἄλλο τι ἡ τὰ ἕξ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

Δ σφ. Ταυτὸν ἄρα ἐν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ
ἐστι, τὸ τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἀπαντα;
ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.
σφ. Ὡδε δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγωμεν. ὁ τοῦ πλέ-
θρου ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ πλέθρον ταυτὸν. ἡ γάρ;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
σφ. Καὶ ὁ τοῦ σταδίου δὴ ὡσαῦτως.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
σφ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ τοῦ στρατοπέδου γε καὶ τὸ

1 δὲ γε δῆ BT; γε δῆ W.
2 πάντα τὰ BT; πάντα W.
3 πάλω δ' οὐχ ἐν Hermann; πάλῳδ' οὐδέν BT; πᾶν δ' οὐδέν
Burnet, after Campbell.

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THEAET. Yes, certainly, we must see about that.
   soc. The whole, then, according to our present view, would differ from all?
THEAET. Yes.
   soc. How about this? Is there any difference between all in the plural and all in the singular? For instance, if we say one, two, three, four, five, six, or twice three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we in all these forms speaking of the same or of different numbers?
THEAET. Of the same.
   soc. That is, of six?
THEAET. Yes.
   soc. Then in each form of speech we have spoken of all the six?
THEAET. Yes.
   soc. And again do we not speak of one thing when we speak of them all?
THEAET. Assuredly.
   soc. That is, of six?
THEAET. Yes.
   soc. Then in all things that are made up of number, we apply the same term to all in the plural and all in the singular?
THEAET. Apparently.
   soc. Here is another way of approaching the matter. The number of the fathom and the fathom are the same, are they not?
THEAET. Yes.
   soc. And of the furlong likewise.
THEAET. Yes.
   soc. And the number of the army is the same
στρατόπεδον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμοίως; ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς τὸ ὅν πᾶν ἔκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστιν.

Θεαί. Ναί.

Σ. Ὡς δὲ ἔκαστων ἀριθμὸς μᾶν ἄλλο τί ἦ ἔμερη ἐστὶν;

Θεαί. Οὔτεν.

Σ. Ὡσα ἄρα ἔχει μέρη, ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εῦθη;

Θεαί. Φαίνεται.

Σ. Τὰ δὲ γε πάντα μέρη τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὡμολογηται,1 εὔπερ καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τὸ πᾶν ἔσται.

Θεαί. Οὔτως.

Σ. Τὸ ὅλον ἄρ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν γὰρ ἂν εὐθη τὰ πάντα ὅν μέρη.

Θεαί. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

Σ. Μέρος δ' ἐσθ' ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστὶν ὁπερ ἐστὶν ἦ τοῦ ὅλου;

Θεαί. Τοῦ παντός γε.

205 Σ. Ἀνδρικῶς γε, Ὑ Θεαίτητε, μάχει. τὸ πᾶν δὲ οὐχ ὅταν μηδέν ἄτη, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστιν;

Θεαί. Ἀνάγκη.

Σ. Ὁλον δὲ οὐ ταυτόν τοῦτο ἔσται, οὐ ἂν μηδὲν ἀπτη, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστιν;

Θεαί. Δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλον.

Σ. Οὐκοὖν ἐλέγομεν ὅτι οὐ ἂν μέρη ἦ, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἔσται;

Θεαί. Πάνυ γε.

1 ὡμολογηται Τ; ὁμολογεῖται Β.
as the army, and all such cases are alike? In each of them all the number is all the thing.

THEAET. Yes.

soc. And is the number of each anything but the parts of each?

THEAET. No.

soc. Everything that has parts, accordingly, consists of parts, does it not?

THEAET. Evidently.

soc. But we are agreed that the all must be all the parts if all the number is to be the all.¹

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Then the whole does not consist of parts, for if it consisted of all the parts it would be the all.

THEAET. That seems to be true.

soc. But is a part a part of anything in the world but the whole?

THEAET. Yes, of the all.

soc. You are putting up a brave fight, Theaetetus. But is not the all precisely that of which nothing is wanting?

THEAET. Necessarily.

soc. And is not just this same thing, from which nothing whatsoever is lacking, a whole? For that from which anything is lacking is neither a whole nor all, which have become identical simultaneously and for the same reason.

THEAET. I think now that there is no difference between all and whole.

soc. We were saying, were we not, that if there are parts of anything, the whole and all of it will be all the parts?

THEAET. Certainly.

¹ Cf. 204 b.
PLATO

σω. Πάλιν δή, ὅπερ ἀρτι ἐπεχείρουν, οὐκ, εἰπερ ἡ συλλαβὴ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς Β μὴ ὡς μέρη ἔχειν ἐαυτῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἡ ταύτων οὖςαν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι;

Θεα. Οὔτως.

σω. Οὐκοῦν τούτο ἵνα μὴ γένηται, ἔτερον αὐτῶν αὐτὴν ἐδέμεθα;

Θεα. Ναὶ.

σω. Τί δὲ; εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα συλλαβῆς μέρη ἐστὶν, ἔχεις ἀλλ' ἀττα εἰπεῖν ἢ μέρη μὲν ἐστι συλλαβῆς, οὗ μέντοι στοιχεῖα γ' ἐκείνης;

Θεα. Οὐδαμῶς. εἰ γάρ, ὡ Σώκρατες, μόρι ἀττα αὐτῆς 1 συγχωροῖν, γελοῖον ποὺ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπ' ἄλλα ἰέναι.

C σω. Παντάπασι δή, ὡ Θεαίτητε, κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον μία τις ἰδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβὴ ἂν εἶη.

Θεα. ἩΕοικεν.

σω. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὡ φιλε, ὅτι ὁλίγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἡγοῦμενοι εὖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τῶν πρῶτων οὐκ εἶη λόγος εξ ὑν τάλλα σύγκειται, διότι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐκαστὸν εἰη ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ "εἰναι" περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ἐχοι προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ "τοῦτο," ὡς ἐτερα καὶ ἄλλοτρια λεγόμενα, καὶ αὐτῇ δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἁλογόν τε καὶ ἀγνωστὸν αὐτὸ ποιοῖ;

Θεα. Μέμνησαι.

D σω. Ἡ οὖν ἄλλη τις ἡ αὐτή ἡ αἰτία τοῦ μονο-εἰδές τε 2 καὶ ἀμέριστον αὐτὸ εἶναι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὖχ ὀρῶ ἄλλην.

1 μόρι' ἀττα αὐτῆς W; μόρια ταύτης BT.
2 τε W in ras. B; τι.Τ.
soc. Once more, then, as I was trying to say just now, if the syllable is not the letters, does it not follow necessarily that it contains the letters, not as parts of it, or else that being the same as the letters, it is equally knowable with them?

THEAET. It does.

soc. And it was in order to avoid this that we assumed that it was different from them?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Well then, if the letters are not parts of the syllable, can you mention any other things which are parts of it, but are not the letters of it?

THEAET. Certainly not. For if I grant that there are parts of the syllable, it would be ridiculous to give up the letters and look for other things as parts.

soc. Without question, then, Theaetetus, the syllable would be, according to our present view, some indivisible concept.

THEAET. I agree.

soc. Do you remember, then, my friend, that we admitted a little while ago, on what we considered good grounds, that there can be no rational explanation of the primary elements of which other things are composed, because each of them, when taken by itself, is not composite, and we could not properly apply to such an element even the expression "be" or "this," because these terms are different and alien, and for this reason it is irrational and unknowable?

THEAET. I remember.

soc. And is not this the sole reason why it is single in form and indivisible? I can see no other.

1 The reader is reminded that the words στοιχεῖον and συλλαβή have the meanings "element" and "combination" as well as "letter" and "syllable."
ΠΛΑΤΟ

θεαι. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται.

σω. Οὐκοῦν εἰς ταύτων ἐμπέπτωκεν ἢ συλλαβῇ εἴδος ἐκεῖνῳ, εὖπερ μέρη τε μὴ ἔχει καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα;

θεαι. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

σω. Εἰ μὲν ἀρα πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἢ συλλαβῆ ἐστὶν καὶ ὅλον τι, μέρη δὲ αὐτῆς ταύτα, ὡμοίως αἴ τε συλλαβαὶ γνωσταί καὶ ῥηταὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπείπερ τὰ πάντα μέρη τῷ ὀλῷ ταύτων ἑφάνη.

Ε θεαι. Καὶ μάλα.

σω. Εἰ δὲ γε ἐν τε καὶ ἀμερές, ὡμοίως μὲν συλλαβῆ, ὡσαύτως δὲ στοιχείων ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἀγνωστὸν ἢ γὰρ αὐτή αὐτία ποιήσει αὐτὰ τουσάτα.

θεαι. Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως εἴπειν.

σω. Τούτῳ μὲν ἀρα μὴ ἀποδεχώμεθα, δὲ ἀν λέγῃ συλλαβῆ ἢ μὲν γνωστὸν 1 καὶ ῥητόν, στοιχείων δὲ τούναντιον.

θεαι. Μὴ γὰρ, εὖπερ τῷ λόγῳ πειθόμεθα.

206 σω. Τὴ δ' αὖ; τούναντιον λέγοντος ἄρ' οὖ μᾶλλον ἂν ἀποδέξαμοι εἴ δὲν αὐτὸς σύνοισθα σαυτῷ ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθῆσει;

θεαι. Τὸ ποιον;

σω. Ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνων διετέλεσα ἢ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τε 2 τῇ ὁμεὶ διαγιγνώσκειν πειρώμενος καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀκοῇ αὐτό καθ' αὐτὸ ἐκαστον, ἵνα μὴ ἢ θέσις σε ταράττοι λεγομένων τε καὶ γραφομένων.

θεαι. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

σω. Ἐν δὲ κιθαριστοῦ τελέως μεμαθηκέναι μῶν Β ἄλλο τι ἢν ἢ τὸ τῷ φθόγγῳ ἐκάστω δύνασθαι

1 γνωστὸν W; ἀγνωστὸν pr. BT.

2 τε W; om. BT.
there is no other to be seen.

soc. Then the syllable falls into the same class with the letter, if it has no parts and is a single form?

theaet. Yes, unquestionably.

soc. If, then, the syllable is a plurality of letters and is a whole of which the letters are parts, the syllables and the letters are equally knowable and expressible, if all the parts were found to be the same as the whole.

theaet. Certainly.

soc. But if one and indivisible, then syllable and likewise letter are equally irrational and unknowable; for the same cause will make them so.

theaet. I cannot dispute it.

soc. Then we must not accept the statement of any one who says that the syllable is knowable and expressible, but the letter is not.

theaet. No, not if we are convinced by our argument.

soc. But would you not rather accept the opposite belief, judging by your own experience when you were learning to read?

theaet. What experience?

soc. In learning, you were merely constantly trying to distinguish between the letters both by sight and by hearing, keeping each of them distinct from the rest, that you might not be disturbed by their sequence when they were spoken or written.

theaet. That is very true.

soc. And in the music school was not perfect attainment the ability to follow each note and tell
ἐπακολουθεῖν, ποιας χορδῆς εἰη: ἡ δὴ στοιχεία πάς ἂν όμολογήσεις μονοικής λέγεσθαι;

Θεαί. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

ζowitz. Ὄν μὲν ἄρ' αὐτόν ἐμπειροῖ ἐσμὲν στοιχείων καὶ συλλαβῶν, εἰ δεὶ ἀπὸ τοῦτων τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένος ἐναργεστέραν τε τὴν γνώσιν ἔχειν φήσομεν καὶ κυριωτέραν τῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν τελέως ἐκαστον μάθημα, καὶ εάν τις φῇ συλλαβῆς μὲν γνωστὸν, ἀγνωστὸν δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχεῖον, ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα παίζειν ἣγησόμεθ' αὐτόν.

Θεαί. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

C 42. ζowitz. Ἀλλὰ δὴ τούτου μὲν ἔτι κἂν ἄλλαι φανεῖν ἀποδείξεις, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. τὸ δὲ προκεῖ-μενον μὴ ἐπιλαβώμεθα δι' αὐτὰ ἰδεῖν, ὅ τι δὴ ποτὲ καὶ λέγεται τὸ μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσ-γενόμενον τὴν τελευτῶσαν ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι.

Θεαί. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ ὅραν.

ζowitz. Φέρε δὴ, τί ποτὲ βουλεῖται τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν σημαινεῖν; τριῶν γὰρ ἐν τί μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν.

Θεαί. Τίνων δὴ;

D ζowitz. Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰη ἀν τὸ τὴν αὐτοῦ διά-νοιαν ἐμφανῇ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ὥσπερ εἰς κατοπτρον ἡ ὑδωρ τὴν δόξαν ἐκτυπούμενον εἰς τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ροήν. ἡ οὖ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ τοιοῦτον λόγος εἶναι;

Θεαί. Ἔμουγε. τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸ δρόντα λέγειν φαμέν.

ζowitz. Οὐκοῦν τούτο γε πᾶς ποιεῖν δυνατὸς θάττον ἡ σχολαίτερον, τὸ ἐνδείξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἐκάστου

1 γοῦν W; οὖν BT.
THEAETETUS

which string produced it; and everyone would agree that the notes are the elements of music?

THEAET. Yes, that is all true.

soc. Then if we are to argue from the elements and combinations in which we ourselves have experience to other things in general, we shall say that the elements as a class admit of a much clearer knowledge than the compounds and of a knowledge that is much more important for the complete attainment of each branch of learning, and if anyone says that the compound is by its nature knowable and the element unknowable, we shall consider that he is, intentionally or unintentionally, joking.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Still other proofs of this might be brought out, I think; but let us not on that account lose sight of the question before us, which is: What is meant by the doctrine that the most perfect knowledge arises from the addition of rational explanation to true opinion?

THEAET. No, we must not.

soc. Now what are we intended to understand by "rational explanation"? I think it means one of three things.

THEAET. What are they?

soc. The first would be making one's own thought clear through speech by means of verbs and nouns, imaging the opinion in the stream that flows through the lips, as in a mirror or water. Do you not think the rational explanation is something of that sort?

THEAET. Yes, I do. At any rate, we say that he who does that speaks or explains.

soc. Well, that is a thing that anyone can do sooner or later; he can show what he thinks about.
αυτῷ, ὁ μή ἔνεδς ἢ κωφὸς ἀπ’ ἀρχής· καὶ οὕτως ἔσοι τι ὅρθον δοξάζουσι, πάντες αὐτὸ μετὰ λόγου φανοῦνται ἐχοντες, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἐτι ὅρθη δόξα χωρίς ἐπιστήμης γενήσεται.

ὁεαί. Ἀληθῆ.

σπ. Μή τούνων ῥαδίως καταγινώσκωμεν τὸ μηδὲν εἰρηκέναι τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστήμην ὁ νῦν σκοτοῦμεν. ἵσως γὰρ ὁ λέγων ὁυ τούτο ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἐκαστὸν δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν 207 ἀπόκρισιν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἐρο-μένῳ.

ὁεαί. Ὅιον τί λέγεις, ὃ Σώκρατες;

σπ. Ὅιον καὶ Ἡσίοδος περὶ ἀμάξης λέγει τὸ "ἐκατὸν δὲ τε δοῦραθ' ἀμάξης." ἃ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἄν δυναίμην εἰπεῖν, οἴμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σὺ· ἀλλ’ ἀγα-πῶμεν ἃν ἐρωτηθέντες ὁ τί ἐστιν ἀμάξα, εἰ ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν τροχοῖ, ἄξων, ὑπερτερία, ἁντυγγες, ζυγόν.

ὁεαί. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

σπ. Ὁ δὲ γε ἵσως οἶνοτ’ ἁν ἡμᾶς, ὁσπερ ἁν τὸ σὸν ὅνομα ἐρωτηθέντας καὶ ἀποκρινομένους κατὰ Β συλλαβῆν, γελοίους εἶναι, ὅρθως μὲν δοξάζοντας καὶ λέγοντας ὁ λέγομεν, οἰομένους δὲ γραμματικοὺς εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν τε καὶ λέγειν γραμματικῶς τὸν τοῦ θεατήτου ὅνοματος λόγον· τὸ δ’ οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιστημόνως οὐδὲν λέγειν, πρὶν ἂν διὰ τῶν στοι-χείων μετὰ τῆς ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἐκαστὸν περαίνῃ τις, ὁπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθε ποι ἑρρῆθη.

1 ὑπερτερία Kuhn; ὑπερτερία B; ὑπερτήρια T.
anything, unless he is deaf or dumb from the first; and so all who have any right opinion will be found to have it with the addition of rational explanation, and there will henceforth be no possibility of right opinion apart from knowledge.

THEAET. True.

soc. Let us not, therefore, carelessly accuse him of talking nonsense who gave the definition of knowledge which we are now considering; for perhaps that is not what he meant. He may have meant that each person if asked about anything must be able in reply to give his questioner an account of it in terms of its elements.

THEAET. As for example, Socrates?

soc. As, for example, Hesiod, speaking of a wagon, says, "a hundred pieces of wood in a wagon." 

Now I could not name the pieces, nor, I fancy, could you; but if we were asked what a wagon is, we should be satisfied if we could say "wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke."

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. But he, perhaps, would think we were ridiculous, just as he would if, on being asked about your name, we should reply by telling the syllables, holding a right opinion and expressing correctly what we have to say, but should think we were grammarians and as such both possessed and were expressing as grammarians would the rational explanation of the name Theaetetus. He would say that it is impossible for anyone to give a rational explanation of anything with knowledge, until he gives a complete enumeration of the elements, combined with true opinion. That, I believe, is what was said before.

1 Works and Days, 456 (454).
ocrates. 'Ερρήθη γάρ.

Σω. Οὗτω τοῖνυν καὶ περὶ ἀμάξης ἡμᾶς μὲν ὅρθην ἐχειν δόξαν, τὸν δὲ δία τῶν ἐκατὸν ἐκεῖνων Οὐνάμενον διελθεῖν αὐτής τὴν οὐσίαν, προσλαβόντα τούτο, λόγον τε προσεληφθέναι τῇ ἄληθείς δόξῃ καὶ ἄντι δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικοῦ τε καὶ ἐπιστήμονα περὶ ἀμάξης οὐσίας γεγονέναι, διὰ στοιχείων τὸ ὅλον περάναντα.

οικοῦν εἰ δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες;

Σω. Εἴ σοι, ὦ ἑταίρε, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδέχει τὴν διὰ στοιχείων διεξόδον περὶ ἐκάστοτον λόγον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ κατὰ συλλαβᾶς ἢ καὶ κατὰ μείζον ἐτὶ ἀλογίαν, τούτῳ μοι λέγε, ἵνα ἀυτὸ ἐπισκοπῶμεν.

οικ. Ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἀποδεχομαι.

Σω. Πότερον ἡγούμενος ἐπιστήμονα εἶναι ὑπίνοιν ὅτων ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ 1 μὲν τοῦ αὐτοῦ δοκῇ αὐτῷ εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ ἔτερου, ἢ καὶ ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν ἔτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἔτερον δοξάζῃ;

οικ. Μᾶ Δί' οὐκ ἐγώγησ.

Σω. Εἴτε ἄμυχος ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει κατ' ἀρχὰς σαυτὸν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δρώντας αὐτά;

οικ. Ἀρα λέγεις τῆς αὐτής συλλαβῆς τοτὲ μὲν ὕπερ έτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἔτερον ἡγούμενος γράμμα, καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν, τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ἄλλην τιθέντας συλλαβῆν;

Σω. Ταύτα λέγω.

οικ. Μᾶ Δί' οὐ τοῖνυν ἄμυχον, οὐδὲ γε πω ἡγούμαι ἐπίστασθαι τοὺς οὕτως ἐχοντας.

1 τοτὲ] τότε W; οὔτε BT.
THEAETETUS

THEAET. Yes, it was.

soc. So, too, he would say that we have right opinion about a wagon, but that he who can give an account of its essential nature in terms of those one hundred parts has by this addition added rational explanation to true opinion and has acquired technical knowledge of the essential nature of a wagon, in place of mere opinion, by describing the whole in terms of its elements.

THEAET. Do you agree to that, Socrates?

soc. If you, my friend, agree to it and accept the view that orderly description in terms of its elements is a rational account of anything, but that description in terms of syllables or still larger units is irrational, tell me so, that we may examine the question.

THEAET. Certainly I accept it.

soc. Do you accept it in the belief that anyone has knowledge of anything when he thinks that the same element is a part sometimes of one thing and sometimes of another or when he is of opinion that the same thing has as a part of it sometimes one thing and sometimes another?

THEAET. Not at all, by Zeus.

soc. Then do you forget that when you began to learn to read you and the others did just that?

THEAET. Do you mean when we thought that sometimes one letter and sometimes another belonged to the same syllable, and when we put the same letter sometimes into the proper syllable and sometimes into another?

soc. That is what I mean.

THEAET. By Zeus, I do not forget, nor do I think that those have knowledge who are in that condition.
Σω. Τί οὖν; ὅταν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καίρῳ "Θεαίτητον" γράφων τις θήτα καὶ εἶ ὀνήται 1 τε δεῖν 208 γράφειν καὶ γράφη, καὶ αὖ "Θεόδωρον" ἐπιχειρῶν γράφειν ταῦτα καὶ εἶ ὀνήται 1 τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράφη, ἃρ' ἐπιστασθαι φήσομεν αὐτὸν τὴν πρώτην τῶν ὑμετέρων ὑπομάτων συλλαβήν;

ΤΕΙ. Ἡλ' ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα μῆτω εἰδέναι.

Σω. Κωλύει οὖν τι καὶ περὶ τὴν δευτέραν συλλαβήν καὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην οὕτως ἔχειν τὸν αὐτὸν;

ΤΕΙ. Οὐδέν γε.

Σω. Ἄρ' οὖν τότε τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον ἔχων γράφει "Θεαίτητον" μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης, ὅταν ἔξῆς γράφη;

ΤΕΙ. Δῆλον δῆ.

Β ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐτί ἀνεπιστήμων ὡν, ὀρθὰ δὲ δοξάζων, ὡς φαμεν;

ΤΕΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Λόγον γε ἔχων μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης την γὰρ διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου ὁδὸν ἔχων ἐγγραφεν, ἢν δὴ λόγον ὡμολογήσαμεν.

ΤΕΙ. Ἡλῃθῆ.

ΣΩ. ᾍστιν ἄρα, ὃ ἐταίρη, μετὰ λόγου ὀρθῇ δόξᾳ, ἢν οὕτω δει ἐπιστῆμην καλεῖν.

ΤΕΙ. Κινδύνευει.

43. ΣΩ. Ὄναρ δῆ, ὡς έοικεν, ἐπλοντήσαμεν οὐθέντες ἔχειν τὸν ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον. ἡ μῆπω κατηγορῶμεν; ἦσως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο τις

1 οὐν] οἶνται BT.
soc. Take an example: When at such a stage in his progress a person in writing "Theaetetus" thinks he ought to write, and actually does write, TH and E, and again in trying to write "Theodorus" thinks he ought to write, and does write, T and E, shall we say that he knows the first syllable of your names?

THEAET. No, we just now agreed that a person in such a condition has not yet gained knowledge.

soc. Then there is nothing to prevent the same person from being in that condition with respect to the second and third and fourth syllables?

THEAET. No, nothing.

soc. Then, in that case, he has in mind the orderly description in terms of letters, and will write "Theaetetus" with right opinion, when he writes the letters in order?

THEAET. Evidently.

soc. But he is still, as we say, without knowledge, though he has right opinion?

THEAET. Yes.

soc. Yes, but with his opinion he has rational explanation; for he wrote with the method in terms of letters in his mind, and we agreed that that was rational explanation.

THEAET. True.

soc. There is, then, my friend, a combination of right opinion with rational explanation, which cannot as yet properly be called knowledge?

THEAET. There is not much doubt about it.

soc. So it seems that the perfectly true definition of knowledge, which we thought we had, was but a golden dream. Or shall we wait a bit before we condemn it? Perhaps the definition to be adopted
C αυτὸν ὤριεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶδος τῶν τριῶν, ὅν ἐν γέ τι ἔφαμεν λόγον θήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπιστήμην ὀριζόμενον δόξαν εἶναι ὀρθῇ μετὰ λόγου.

ὁει. Ὅρθως ὑπέμνησας. ἐτι γὰρ ἐν λοιπόν.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἦν διανοίας ἐν φωνῇ ὡσπερ εἴδωλον,
τὸ δ᾽ ἄρτι λεχθὲν διὰ στοιχείου ὁδὸς ἐπὶ τὸ ὄλον,
τὸ δὲ δὴ τρίτον τί λέγεις;

ΣΔ. Ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν, τὸ ἐχεῖν τι σημεῖον εἰπεῖν ὃ τῶν ἀπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν.

ὁει. Ὁλον τίνα τίνος ἔχεις μοι λόγον εἰπεῖν;

Δ ΣΔ. Ὁλον, εἴ βούλει, ἥλιον πέρι ἰκανόν οἷμαι
σοι εἶναι ἀποδέξασθαι, ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατον ἐστὶ
tῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἑόντων περὶ γῆς.

ὁει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΔ. Λαβὲ δὴ οὔ χάριν εἰρηται. ἑστὶ δὲ ὧπερ
ἀρτι ἔλεγομεν, ὡς ἃρα τὴν διαφορὰν ἐκάστου ἂν
λαμβάνῃς ὃ τῶν ἀλλῶν διαφέρει, λόγον, ὡς φασί
tines, λήψει ἕως δ᾽ ἂν κωνοῦ τινος ἐφάπτη,
ἐκείνων πέρι σοι ἑσται δ λόγος ἄν ἂν ἡ κοινότης ἢ.

Ε ὁει. Μανθάνω. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν
λόγον τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖν.

ΣΔ. Ὅς δ᾽ ἂν μετ᾿ ὀρθῆς δόξης περὶ ὅτου ὅντων
tῶν ὅντων τῇ διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβῃ,
THEAETETUS

is not this, but the remaining one of the three possibilities one of which we said must be affirmed by anyone who asserts that knowledge is right opinion combined with rational explanation.

THEAET. I am glad you called that to mind. For there is still one left. The first was a kind of vocal image of the thought, the second the orderly approach to the whole through the elements, which we have just been discussing, and what is the third?

soc. It is just the definition which most people would give, that knowledge is the ability to tell some characteristic by which the object in question differs from all others.

THEAET. As an example of the method, what explanation can you give me, and of what thing?

soc. As an example, if you like, take the sun: I think it is enough for you to be told that it is the brightest of the heavenly bodies that revolve about the earth.

THEAET. Certainly.

soc. Understand why I say this. It is because, as we were just saying, if you get hold of the distinguishing characteristic by which a given thing differs from the rest, you will, as some say, get hold of the definition or explanation of it; but so long as you cling to some common quality, your explanation will pertain to all those objects to which the common quality belongs.

THEAET. I understand; and it seems to me that it is quite right to call that kind a rational explanation or definition.

soc. Then he who possesses right opinion about anything and adds thereto a comprehension of the difference which distinguishes it from other things
αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμων γεγονός ἦσται, οὐ πρότερον ἢν
dοξαστῆς.

οὐ. Φαμέν γε μὴν οὔτω.
s. Νῦν δὴτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, παντάπασιν ἐγώνη,1 ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὤσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ
λεγομένου, ἡμίμημον οὔτε σμικρὸν· ἦστε δὲ ἀφεστήκη
πόρρωθεν, ἐφαίνετο τί μοι λέγεσθαι.

οὐ. Πῶς τί τοῦτο;

2 09 σ. Φράσω, εὖν οἶδα τε γένωμαι. ὅρθὴν
ἐγώγε 2 ἔχων δόξαν περὶ σοῦ, εὖν μὲν προσλάβω
τὸν σὸν λόγον, γυγωσκω δὴ σε, εἰ δὲ μὴ, δοξάζω
μόνον.

οὐ. Ναί.
s. Λόγος δὲ γε ἢν ἢ τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος
ἐρμηνεία.

οὐ. Οὔτως.
s. 'Ηνίκ' οὖν ἐδόξαζον μόνον, ἀλλο τι ὧ τῶν
ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενὸς ἡπτόμην τῇ
diανοίᾳ;

οὐ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.
s. Τῶν κοινῶν τι ἄρα διενοούμην, οὐν οὔτε
σὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει.

Β ὅ. Ἀνάγκη.
s. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός· πῶς ποτε ἐν τῷ
tοιούτῳ σὲ μᾶλλον ἐδόξαζον ἢ ἄλλον οὖτως;
θεὶς γὰρ με διανοούμενον ὡς ἐστὶν οὖτος Θεαίτητος,
ὅτα ἢ τε ἀνθρωπός καὶ ἐχθὴ ρίνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς
καὶ στόμα καὶ οὖτω δὴ ἐν ἑκαστὸν τῶν μελῶν.

αὕτη οὖν ἡ διάνοια ἐστὶ 3 τὶ μᾶλλον ποιήσει με

1 παντάπασιν ἐγώγε W; παντάπασι γε ἐγὼ T.
2 ἐγώγε W; ἐγὼ T.

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will have acquired knowledge of that thing of which he previously had only opinion.

THEAET. That is what we affirm.

soc. Theaetetus, now that I have come closer to our statement, I do not understand it at all. It is like coming close to a scene-painting. While I stood off at a distance, I thought there was something in it.

THEAET. What do you mean?

soc. I will tell you if I can. Assume that I have right opinion about you; if I add the explanation or definition of you, then I have knowledge of you, otherwise I have merely opinion.

THEAET. Yes.

soc. But explanation was, we agreed, the interpretation of your difference.

THEAET. It was.

soc. Then so long as I had merely opinion, I did not grasp in my thought any of the points in which you differ from others?

THEAET. Apparently not.

soc. Therefore I was thinking of some one of the common traits which you possess no more than other men.

THEAET. You must have been.

soc. For heaven's sake! How in the world could I in that case have any opinion about you more than about anyone else? Suppose that I thought "That is Theaetetus which is a man and has nose and eyes and mouth" and so forth, mentioning all the parts. Can this thought make me think of Theaetetus any

1 In which perspective is the main thing.
Θεαίτητον ἢ Θεόδωρον διανοεῖσθαι, ἢ τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν τὸν ἐσχατον;

Θεαί. Τί γάρ;

ἢ. 'Αλλ' ἐάν δὴ μὴ μόνον τὸν ἔχοντα ρίνα καὶ ὁφθαλμοὺς διανοηθῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ ἔξοφθαλμον, μὴ τὶ σὲ αὕ μᾶλλον δοξάσω ἢ ἐμαυτὸν ἢ ὅσι τοιοῦτοι;

Θεαί. Οὐδέν.

ἢ. 'Αλλ' οὐ πρότερον γε, οἷμαι, Θεαίτητος εὖ ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἢ σιμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων ἢν ἐγὼ εὕρακα διάφορον τι μημεῖον παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐνσημηναμένη κατάθηται, καὶ τῶλα οὔτω εὔ ὃν εἰ σὺ· ἢ ἐμὲ, ἢ καὶ ἐὰν αὐριον ἀπαντήσω, ἀναμνήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὀρθὰ δοξάζεων περὶ σοῦ.

Θεαί. Ἀληθέστατα.

D ἢ. Περὶ τὴν διαφορότητα ἄρα καὶ ἢ ὀρθὴ δόξα ἢν εἰς ἐκάστου πέρι.

Θεαί. Φανεταί γε.

ἢ. Τὸ οὖν προσλαβεῖν λόγον τῇ ὀρθῇ δόξῃ τί ἃν ἐτι εἴη; εἰ μὲν γὰρ προσδοξάσαι λέγει ἢ διαφέρει τί τῶν ἄλλων, πάνυ γελοια γίγνεται ἢ ἐπίταξις.

Θεαί. Πῶς;

ἢ. Ὡς ὁρθὴν δόξαν ἐχομεν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, τούτων προσλαβεῖν κελεύει ἡμᾶς ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει. καὶ οὔτως ἢ μὲν

1 ei σὺ· ἢ ἐμὲ Wohlrab; ei σὺ· ἢ μὲ W (but ἢ added later); ei σὺ ἐμὲ B; elšei ἐμὲ T.

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more than of Theodorus or of the meanest of the Mysians,¹ as the saying is?

THEAET. Of course not.

soc. But if I think not only of a man with nose and eyes, but of one with snub nose and protruding eyes, shall I then have an opinion of you any more than of myself and all others like me?

THEAET. Not at all.

soc. No; I fancy Theaetetus will not be the object of opinion in me until this snubnosedness of yours has stamped and deposited in my mind a memorial different from those of the other examples of snubnosedness that I have seen, and the other traits that make up your personality have done the like. Then that memorial, if I meet you again tomorrow, will awaken my memory and make me have right opinion about you.

THEAET. Very true.

soc. Then right opinion also would have to do with differences in any given instance?

THEAET. At any rate, it seems so.

soc. Then what becomes of the addition of reason or explanation to right opinion? For if it is defined as the addition of an opinion of the way in which a given thing differs from the rest, it is an utterly absurd injunction.

THEAET. How so?

soc. When we have a right opinion of the way in which certain things differ from other things, we are told to acquire a right opinion of the way in which those same things differ from other things! On this

¹ The Mysians were despised as especially effeminate and worthless.
σκυτάλης ἢ ὑπέρου ἢ ὁτου δὴ λέγεται περιτροπή.
Ε πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ἐπίταξιν οὐδὲν ἂν λέγω, τυφλὸι δὲ παρακέλευσιν ἃν καλοῖτο δικαιότερον: τὸ γὰρ, ἃ ἔχομεν, ταῦτα προσλαβεῖν κελεύειν, ὡς μάθωμεν ἃ δοξάζομεν, πάνυ γενναίως ἔοικεν ἐσκοτωμένως.

 EOAI. Εἰπές δη ἢ τί νῦν δὴ ὡς ἔρων ἐπίθους;
σω. Εἰ τὸ λόγον, ὡς παί, προσλαβεῖν γνῶναι κελευεῖ, ἅλλα μὴ δοξάσαι τὴν διαφορότητα, ἥδυ χρῆμα ἁν εἴη τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν περὶ ἐπιστήμης λόγου. τὸ γὰρ γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην που λαβεῖν
210 ἑστιν· ἢ γὰρ;
EOAI. Ναί.
σω. Οὐκοῦν ἐρωτηθεῖς, ὡς ἔοικε, τί ἑστιν ἐπιστήμην, ἀποκρινεῖται ὅτι δόξα ὀρθὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης διαφορότητος. λόγου γὰρ πρόσληψις τούτη ἃν εἴη κατ' ἐκείνον.
EOAI. Ἐοικέν.
σω. Καὶ παντάπασι γε εὐθῆς, ξητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἴναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης εἴτε διαφορότητος εἴτε ὄτουον. οὔτε ἄρα ἀἰσθησίς, ἢ Θεαίτητε, οὔτε δόξα ἀλήθης οὔτε μετ' Β ἀληθοῦς δόξης λόγος προσγιγνόμενος ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἴη.
EOAI. Ὁνκ ἔοικεν.

1 εἰπέ δη Τ (and W in marg.); εἰ γε δὴ Β; εἰ γε δὴ Β²W.
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plan the twirling of a scytale or a pestle or anything of the sort would be as nothing compared with this injunction. It might more justly be called a blind man's giving directions; for to command us to acquire that which we already have, in order to learn that of which we already have opinion, is very like a man whose sight is mightily darkened.

Theaet. Tell me now, what did you intend to say when you asked the question a while ago?

Soc. If, my boy, the command to add reason or explanation means learning to know and not merely getting an opinion about the difference, our splendid definition of knowledge would be a fine affair! For learning to know is acquiring knowledge, is it not?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. Then, it seems, if asked, "What is knowledge?" our leader will reply that it is right opinion with the addition of a knowledge of difference; for that would, according to him, be the addition of reason or explanation.

Theaet. So it seems.

Soc. And it is utterly silly, when we are looking for a definition of knowledge, to say that it is right opinion with knowledge, whether of difference or of anything else whatsoever. So neither perception, Theaetetus, nor true opinion, nor reason or explanation combined with true opinion could be knowledge.

Theaet. Apparently not.

1 A σκυτάλη was a staff, especially a staff about which a strip of leather was rolled, on which dispatches were so written that when unrolled they were illegible until rolled again upon another staff of the same size and shape.


σω. Ἡ οὖν ἐτὶ κυνοῦμεν τι καὶ ὁδύνομεν, ὦ φίλε, περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἢ πάντα ἐκτετόκαμεν;

θεαί. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί ἐγὼ γεγονεὶ πλεῖον ἢ ὁσα εἶχον ἐν ἐμαυτῷ διὰ σὲ εἰρήκα.

σω. Ὅντον ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἢ μαυεντικὴ ἢ μὲν τέχνη ἀνεμιαῖα φησὶ γεγενήθαι καὶ οὐκ ἄξια τροφῆς;

θεαί. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

44. σω. Ἐὰν τοῖνυν ἄλλων μετὰ ταῦτα ἐγκύμων ἐπιχειρῆς γίγνεσθαι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐὰντε χρήγη, βελτιῶνων ἐσεὶ πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐξέτασιν, ἔαντε κενὸς ἢς, ἢττον ἐσεὶ βαρὺς τοῖς συνούσι καὶ ἡμερώτερος, σωφρόνως οὐκ οἰδίμενος εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ οἶσθα. τοσοῦτον γὰρ μόνον ἢ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλέον δὲ οὐδέν, οὐδὲ τι οἶδα ὅπερ οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι ἄνδρες εἰσὶ τε καὶ γεγόνασι. τὴν δὲ μακελόν ταῦτην ἐγώ τε καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἐκ θεοῦ ἑλάχομεν, ἢ μὲν τῶν γυναικῶν, ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν νέων τε καὶ γενναίων καὶ ὁσοὶ καλοί.

D Νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφὴν, ἢν με γέγραπται· ἐωθεὶν δὲ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, δεύτερο πάλιν ἀπαντῆμεν.
socrates. Are we then, my friend, still pregnant and in travail with knowledge, or have we brought forth everything?

Theaetetus. Yes, we have, and, by Zeus, Socrates, with your help I have already said more than there was in me.

socrates. Then does our art of midwifery declare to us that all the offspring that have been born are mere wind-eggs and not worth rearing?

Theaetetus. It does, decidedly.

socrates. If after this you ever undertake to conceive other thoughts, Theaetetus, and do conceive, you will be pregnant with better thoughts than these by reason of the present search, and if you remain barren, you will be less harsh and gentler to your associates, for you will have the wisdom not to think you know that which you do not know. So much and no more my art can accomplish; nor do I know aught of the things that are known by others, the great and wonderful men who are to-day and have been in the past. This art, however, both my mother and I received from God, she for women and I for young and noble men and for all who are fair.

And now I must go to the Porch of the King, to answer to the suit which Meletus\(^1\) has brought against me. But in the morning, Theodorus, let us meet here again.

\(^1\) Meletus was one of those who brought the suit which led to the condemnation and death of Socrates.
THE SOPHIST
INTRODUCTION TO THE SOPHIST

In *The Sophist* Theodorus and Theaetetus meet Socrates in accordance with the agreement made in the final paragraph of the *Theaetetus*. They bring with them an Eleatic Stranger, who presently agrees to undertake, with the aid of Theaetetus, the definition of the Philosopher, the Statesman, and the Sophist. Thereupon, after selecting the Sophist as the first of the three to be defined, he proceeds to illustrate his method by defining the angler, on the ground that the Sophist is a difficult subject and that practice on an easier and slighter matter is desirable. The method employed in defining first the angler and then the Sophist is that of comparison and division successively into two parts. This method was probably, at the time when this dialogue was written, something of a novelty, and is employed also in *The Statesman*, which is closely connected with *The Sophist* both in form and substance. It must be admitted that the process of dichotomy becomes very tedious, which may possibly be one of Plato's reasons for making the Stranger, not Socrates, the chief speaker in these two dialogues. The definition of the Sophist—the avowed purpose of the dialogue—is
INTRODUCTION TO THE SOPHIST

carried on in a satirical and polemic spirit which is abundantly evident even when it is no longer possible to name the particular persons against whom the attack is directed.

But all this occupies only the opening and concluding passages. It is interrupted by what is in form a long digression, but is really the most serious and important part of the whole. In this (236 d—264 b) the method of dichotomy is given up and abstract questions are treated in a quite different manner. The Sophist has been found to be a juggler and deceiver, and the question arises whether deception or falsehood does not involve the assumption of Not-Being, which was persistently opposed by Parmenides and the Eleatic philosophers in general. Plato refutes the doctrine that Not-Being cannot exist by showing that it has a relative existence—that in each particular instance it denotes a difference or condition of being other than that in connexion with which it is said to exist. It is not mere negation—the opposite of Being—but becomes the positive notion of Difference. This is the most important doctrine promulgated in this dialogue.

Hereupon follows the discussion of the nature of Being, and the conclusion is reached that everything which possesses any power, either to produce a change or to be affected by a cause, has existence (247 d), i.e., that power—whether active or passive—is Being.

The problem of predication—of the possibility of assertion—is solved by making the distinction between verbs and nouns and defining the sentence as a combination of those two. If that combination corresponds to reality, the assertion is true, if not, it
is false. How far this is original with Plato is difficult to determine. Other subjects discussed in this dialogue are the theory of knowledge, the relation between reality and appearance, and that between the one and the many. The introduction of the five “forms” or categories—Being, Motion, Rest, Same and Other—is an interesting feature which may be interpreted as marking a stage in the development of the theory of ideas. This dialogue is important in content, though not especially attractive in form.

The date of The Sophist cannot be earlier, and may be considerably later, than that of the Theaetetus.

There is an edition of The Sophist and Politicus, with English notes, by Lewis Campbell (Oxford, 1864).
ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΞΕΝΟΣ ΕΛΕΑΤΗΣ, ΘΕΑΙΤΗΣ

1. ΘΕΟ. Κατὰ τὴν χθές ὁμολογίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἠκοµοῦν αὐτοὶ τε κοσµίως καὶ τόνδε τινὰ ξένον ἄγοµεν, τὸ μὲν γένος ἕξ 'Ελέας, ἑταίρον δὲ τῶν ἀµφὶ Παρµενίδην καὶ Ζήνωνα,1 μάλα δὲ ἄνδρα φιλόσοφον.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, οὐ ξένον ἀλλὰ τινὰ θεόν ἄγων κατὰ τὸν Ὁµήρου λόγον λέληθας; δὲ Βφησιν ἀλλους τε θεοὺς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὑπόσου μετέχουσιν αἰδοῦς δικαίας, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν ξένιον οὐχ ἠκιστα θεόν συνοπαδὸν γιγνόµενον ὑβρεῖς τε καὶ εὐνοµίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθορᾶν. τάχ' οὖν ἂν καὶ σοὶ τις οὔτος τῶν κρειττόνων συνέποιτο, φαύλους ἡµᾶς ὄντας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἑποιοµένος τε καὶ ελέγξων, θεοὶ οὐν τις ἐλεγκτικός.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐχ οὔτος ὁ τρόπος, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦ

1 Ζήνωνα ἐταλρων mss.; ἐταλρων om. Upton.

ΣΟΦΙΣΤΗΣ
[Ἡ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ· ΛΟΓΙΚΟΣ]
THE SOPHIST
[or ON BEING: LOGICAL]

CHARACTERS

Theodorus, Socrates, an Elean Stranger, Theaetetus

theo. According to our yesterday's agreement, Socrates, we have come ourselves, as we were bound to do, and we bring also this man with us; he is a stranger from Elea, one of the followers of Parmenides and Zeno, and a real philosopher.

soc. Are you not unwittingly bringing, as Homer says, some god, and no mere stranger, Theodorus? He says that the gods, and especially the god of strangers, enter into companionship with men who have a share of due reverence\(^1\) and that they behold the deeds, both violent and righteous,\(^1\) of mankind. So perhaps this companion of yours may be one of the higher powers, who comes to watch over and refute us because we are worthless in argument— a kind of god of refutation.

theo. No, Socrates, that is not the stranger's

\(^1\) A modified quotation from *Odyssey*, ix. 271; xvii. 485-7.

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ξένου, ἄλλα μετριώτερος τῶν περὶ τὰς ἐρίδας ἐσπουδακότων. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ θεὸς μὲν ἄνηρ ¹
C οὐδαμῶς εἶναι, θεῖος μὴν πάντας γὰρ ἐγὼ τοὺς φιλοσόφους τοιούτους προσαγορεύω.

σ. Καλώς γε, ὦ φίλε. τούτῳ μέντοι κινδυνεύει τὸ γένος οὐ πολὺ τι βᾶον, ὡς ἔτος εἰπεῖν, εἶναι διακρίνειν ἢ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ. πάνυ γὰρ ἄνδρες ² οὕτωι παντοῖοι φανταζόμενοι διὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγνοιαν ἐπιστρωφῶσι πόλης, οἱ μὴ πλαστῶς ἄλλ' ὄντως φιλόσοφοι, καθορὼντες υψόθεν τὸν τῶν κάτω βίον, καὶ τοῖς μὲν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι τοῦ μηδενὸς τίμιοι, τοῖς δ' ἄξιοι τοῦ παντοῦ· καὶ τοτε μὲν πολιτικοὶ

D φανταζόμεναι, τοτε δὲ σοφισταὶ, τοτε δ' ἐστιν οῖς δόξαν παράσχουντο ἀν ως παντάπασιν ἔχουσεν μανικῶς. τοῦ μέντοι ξένου ἡμῖν ἡδέως ἀν πυθανούμην, εἰ φιλον αὐτῷ, τί ταῦθ' οἱ περὶ τὸν ἑκεῖ 217 τόπον ἡγοῦντο καὶ ὠνόμαζον.

θεο. Τὰ ποιὰ δή;

σ. Σοφιστήν, πολιτικόν, φιλόσοφον.

θεο. Τι δὲ μάλιστα καὶ τὸ ποῖόν τι περὶ αὐτῶν διαπορήθεις ἐρέσθαι διενοθής;

σ. Τόδε· πότερον ἐν πάντα ταῦτα ἐνόμιζον ἢ δυο, ἢ καθάπερ τὰ ὄνοματα τρία, τρία καὶ γένη διαιρούμενοι καθ' ἐν ὅνομα γένος ἐκάστῳ προσῆπτων;

θεο. 'Αλλ' οὐδείς, ως ἐγὼμαι, φθόνος αὐτῷ διελθεῖν αὐτά· ἢ πῶς, ὦ Ξένε, λέγωμεν;

β. Οὕτως, ὦ Θεόδωρε. φθόνος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ χαλεπῶν εἰπεῖν ὅτι γε τρὶ' ἡγοῦντο·

¹ ἄνηρ Bekker; ἄνηρ BT.
² ἄνδρες Bekker; ἄνδρες BT.
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character; he is more reasonable than those who devote themselves to disputation. And though I do not think he is a god at all, I certainly do think he is divine, for I give that epithet to all philosophers.

soc. And rightly, my friend. However, I fancy it is not much easier, if I may say so, to recognize this class, than that of the gods. For these men—I mean those who are not feignedly but really philosophers—appear disguised in all sorts of shapes, thanks to the ignorance of the rest of mankind, and visit the cities, beholding from above the life of those below, and they seem to some to be of no worth and to others to be worth everything. And sometimes they appear disguised as statesmen and sometimes as sophists, and sometimes they may give some people the impression that they are altogether mad. But I should like to ask our stranger here, if agreeable to him, what people in his country thought about these matters, and what names they used.

THEO. What matters do you mean?

soc. Sophist, statesman, philosopher.

THEO. What particular difficulty and what kind of difficulty in regard to them is it about which you had in mind to ask?

soc. It is this: Did they consider all these one, or two, or, as there are three names, did they divide them into three classes and ascribe to each a class, corresponding to a single name?

THEO. I think he has no objection to talking about them. What do you say, stranger?

STR. Just what you did, Theodorus; for I have no objection, and it is not difficult to say that they

καθ' ἐκαστον μὴν διορίσασθαι σαφῶς τί ποτ' ἔστιν, οὐ σμικρὸν οὐδὲ βέβιον ἔργον.

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ κατὰ τύχην γε, ὁ Σώκρατες, λόγων ἐπελάβον παραπλησίων ὧν καὶ πρὶν ἡμᾶς δεύρῃ ἐλθεὶν διερωτώντες αὐτὸν ἐτυγχάνομεν: ὁ δὲ ταῦτα ἀπερ πρὸς σὲ νῦν, καὶ τότε ἐσκήπτετο πρὸς ἡμᾶς· ἐπεὶ διακηκοέναι γε φησὶν ἰκανῶς καὶ οὐκ ἀμημονεῖν.

C 2. ζ. Μὴ τοῖνυν, ὃντι εἶ δὲ, ἡμῶν τὴν γε πρὸς τὴν αὐτησάντων χάριν ἀπαρνηθεῖσα γένη, τοιούτῳ δὲ ἡμῖν φράζε· τότερον εἰσθαν ἔδωκαν αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σαυτῷ μακρῷ λόγῳ διεξεῖν λέγων τοῦτο δὲ ἐν ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ βουληθῆς, ἢ δὲ ἐρωτῆσθαι, οἷς ποτὲ καὶ Παρμενίδη χρωμένω καὶ δειξόντι λόγους παγκάλους παρεγενόμην ἐγὼ νέος ὡν, ἐκεῖνοι μάλα δὴ τότε ὄντος πρεσβύτου;

ἐ. Τώ μὲν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἀλύπως τε καὶ ἐνήνως προσδιαλεγομένω ἐρῶν οὐτω, τὸ πρὸς ἄλλον· εἰ δὲ μὴ, τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸν.

ζ. "Εξεστὶ τοῖνυν τῶν παρόντων ὅν ἀν βουληθῆς ἐκλέξασθαι· πάντες γὰρ ὑπακούσονται σοι πράως· συμβούλω μὴν ἐμοὶ χρώμενος τῶν νέων τῶν αἰρῆσει, Θεαίτητον τόνδε, ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἶ τίς σοι κατὰ νοῦν.

ἐ. Ὅ Σώκρατες, αἰδῶς τίς μ’ ἔχει τὸ νῦν πρῶτον συγγενόμενον ὑμῖν μὴ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἔπος πρὸς ἔπος ποιεῖσθαι τὴν συνοιων, ἀλλ’ ἐκτείναντα ἀπομηκύνευν λόγον συχνὸν κατ’ ἐμαυτόν,

Εἰ ἐπὶ καὶ πρὸς ἔτερον, οἶον ἐπὶ ἐπίδειξιν ποιοῦμεν· τῷ γὰρ ὅντι τὸ νῦν ῥηθὲν οὕχ ὅσον ὡδὲ ἐρωτηθὲν ἐλπίσειν ἂν αὐτὸ εἶναι τίς, ἀλλὰ τυγχάνει λόγου
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considered them three. But it is no small or easy task to define clearly the nature of each.

THEO. The fact is, Socrates, that by chance you have hit upon a question very like what we happened to be asking him before we came here; and he made excuses to us then, as he does now to you; though he admits that he has heard it thoroughly discussed and remembers what he heard.

soc. In that case, stranger, do not refuse us the first favour we have asked; but just tell us this: Do you generally prefer to expound in a long uninterrupted speech of your own whatever you wish to explain to anyone, or do you prefer the method of questions? I was present once when Parmenides employed the latter method and carried on a splendid discussion. I was a young man then, and he was very old.

STR. The method of dialogue, Socrates, is easier with an interlocutor who is tractable and gives no trouble; but otherwise I prefer the continuous speech by one person.

soc. Well, you may choose whomever you please of those present; they will all respond pleasantly to you; but if you take my advice you will choose one of the young fellows, Theaetetus here, or any of the others who suits you.

STR. Socrates, this is the first time I have come among you, and I am somewhat ashamed, instead of carrying on the discussion by merely giving brief replies to your questions, to deliver an extended, long drawn out speech, either as an address of my own or in reply to another, as if I were giving an exhibition; but I must, for really the present subject is not what one might expect from the form of the question, but is a matter for very long speech. On
παμμήκους ὄν. τὸ δὲ αὖ σοι μὴ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ
tοῦδε, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ σοῦ λέξαντος ὡς εἶπες,
ἀξενὸν τι καταφαίνεται μοι καὶ ἀγριον. ἑπεὶ
218 Θεαίτητον γε τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον εἶναι δέχομαι
παντάπασιν ἐξ ἃν αὐτὸς τε πρότερον διείλεγμα
καὶ σὺ τὰ νῦν μοι διακελεύει.

θεαί. Ἀρα τοῖνυν, ὧ ξένε, οὕτω καὶ καθάπερ
ἐπε Σωκράτης πάσι κεχαρισμένος ἔσει;

ἐς. Κινδυνεύει πρὸς μὲν ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἐτί λεκτέον
eῖναι, Θεαίτητε: πρὸς δὲ σὲ ἢδη τὸ μετὰ τούτο,
ὡς έσικε, γίγνουτο ἃν ὁ λόγος. ἃν δ' ἀρα τί τῷ
μήκει πονῶν ἄχθη, μὴ ἐμὲ αἰτιάσθαι τοῦτών, ἂλλα
τοῦδε τοὺς σοὺς ἐταίρους.

Β θεαί. Ἀλλ' οἶμαι μὲν δὴ νῦν οὕτως οὐκ ἀπ-
ερεῖν: ἃν δ' ἀρα τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται, καὶ τόνδε
παραληψόμεθα Σωκράτη, τὸν Σωκράτους μὲν
όμώνυμον, ἐμὸν δὲ ἡλικιωτὴν καὶ συγχυμναστὴν,
ὡ συνδιαπονεῖν μετ' ἐμοῖ τὰ πολλὰ οὐκ ἄρθρες.

3. ἔς. ἐν λέγεις, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἰδίᾳ βουλεύεσθε
προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου· κοινῇ δὲ μετ' ἐμοὶ σοι
συσκεπτέων ἀρχομένῳ πρώτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται,
νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ, ζητοῦντι καὶ ἐμφανίζοντι

C λόγῳ τί ποτ' ἐστι. νῦν γὰρ δὴ σὺ κἀγὼ τοῦτον
πέρι τοῦνομα μόνον ἔχομεν κοινῇ· τὸ δὲ ἔργον
ἐφ' ὧ καλοῦμεν ἐκάτερος τάχ' ἃν ἰδίᾳ παρ' ἡμῖν
αὐτοῖς ἔχομεν· δεῖ δὲ αἰὲ παντὸς πέρι το πρᾶγμα
αὐτὸ μᾶλλον διὰ λόγων ἥ τοῦνομα μόνον συνομο-
λογήσασθαι χωρίς λόγου. τὸ δὲ φύλον ὃ νῦν ἐπι-
νοοῦμεν ζητεῖν οὐ πάντων βρότον συλλαβεῖν τί
270
the other hand it seems unfriendly and discourteous to refuse a favour to you and these gentlemen, especially when you have spoken as you did. As for Theaetetus I accept him most willingly as interlocutor in view of my previous conversation with him and of your present recommendation.

THEAET. But, stranger, by taking this course and following Socrates's suggestion will you please the others too?

STR. I am afraid there is nothing more to be said about that, Theaetetus; but from now on, my talk will, I fancy, be addressed to you. And if you get tired and are bored by the length of the talk, do not blame me, but these friends of yours.

THEAET. Oh, no, I do not think I shall get tired of it so easily, but if such a thing does happen, we will call in this Socrates, the namesake of the other Socrates; he is of my own age and my companion in the gymnasion, and is in the habit of working with me in almost everything.

STR. Very well; you will follow your own devices about that as the discussion proceeds; but now you and I must investigate in common, beginning first, as it seems to me, with the sophist, and must search out and make plain by argument what he is. For as yet you and I have nothing in common about him but the name; but as to the thing to which we give the name, we may perhaps each have a conception of it in our own minds; however, we ought always in every instance to come to agreement about the thing itself by argument rather than about the mere name without argument. But the tribe which we now intend to search for, the sophist, is not the easiest thing in the world to catch and define, and
ποτέ ἦστιν, ὁ σοφιστής. ὅσα δ' αὖ τῶν μεγάλων δεῖ διαπονεῖσθαι καλῶς, περὶ τῶν τουιότων δέδοκται πᾶσιν καὶ πάλαι τὸ πρότερον ἐν σμικροῖς. 

καὶ έρασιν αὕτα δεἶν μελετᾶν, πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς μεγίστοις. νῦν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἑγώγε καὶ νῦν οὕτω συμβουλεύω, χαλεπῶν καὶ δυσθήρευτων ἔγηςαμένοις εἶναι τὸ σοφιστοῦ γένος πρότερον ἐν ἀλλῷ βάσιν τὴν μέθοδον αὐτοῦ προμελετάν, εἰ μή σὺ ποθεν εὐπεπτεστέραν ἐξεις εἰπεῖν ἄλλην ὁδόν. 

ἐωε. Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχω.

εἰ. Βούλει δήτα περὶ τυως τῶν φαύλων μετιόντες πειραθώμεν παράδειγμα αὐτὸ θέσθαι τοῦ μεῖζονος; ἐωε. Ναί.

εἰ. Τι δήτα προταξαίμεθ' ἂν εὗχνωστοι μὲν καὶ σμικρῶν, λόγον δὲ μηδενὸς ἐλάττωνα ἔχων τῶν μειζόνων; οἷον ἀσπαλιευτής. ἄρ' οὗ πᾶσι τε γνώριμον καὶ σπουδής οὐ πάντως τι πολλῆς τυως ἑπάξιον;

ἐωε. Οὔτως.

219 εἰ. Μέθοδον μήν αὐτὸν ἑλπίζω καὶ λόγον οὐκ ἀνεπιτήδευον ἡμῶν ἐχειν πρὸς δ' ὄνωποι μεθα. 

ἐωε. Καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι.

4. εἰ. Φέρε δή, τήδε ἀρχώμεθα αὐτοῦ. καὶ μοι λέγε· πότερον ὡς τεχνίτην αὐτοῦ ἡ τίνα ἀτεχνον, ἄλλην δὲ δύναμιν ἔχοντα θήσομεν;

ἐωε. "Ηκιστά γε ἀτεχνον.

εἰ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τῶν γε τεχνῶν πασῶν σχεδὸν εἰδή δύο.

ἐωε. Πῶς?

εἰ. Γεωργία μὲν καὶ ὁση περὶ τὸ θυητὸν πᾶν σῶμα θεραπεία, τὸ τε αὖ περὶ τὸ σύνθετον καὶ 

πλαστῶν, δ' δὴ σκεῦος ὑνομάζαμεν, ἡ τε μμητική,
everyone has agreed long ago that if investigations of great matters are to be properly worked out we ought to practise them on small and easier matters before attacking the very greatest. So now, Theaetetus, this is my advice to ourselves, since we think the family of sophists is troublesome and hard to catch, that we first practise the method of hunting in something easier, unless you perhaps have some simpler way to suggest.

Theaet. I have not.
Str. Then shall we take some lesser thing and try to use it as a pattern for the greater?

Theaet. Yes.
Str. Well, then, what example can we set before us which is well known and small, but no less capable of definition than any of the greater things? Say an angler; is he not known to all and unworthy of any great interest?

Theaet. Yes.
Str. But I hope he offers us a method and is capable of a definition not unsuitable to our purpose.

Theaet. That would be good.
Str. Come now; let us begin with him in this way: Tell me, shall we say that he is a man with an art, or one without an art, but having some other power?

Theaet. Certainly not one without an art.
Str. But of all arts there are, speaking generally, two kinds?

Theaet. How so?
Str. Agriculture and all kinds of care of any living beings, and that which has to do with things which are put together or moulded (utensils we call
εύμπαντα ταῦτα δικαίοτατ' ἂν ἔνι προσαγορεύοντ' ἂν ὄνοματι.

oriously. Πῶς καὶ τίνι;

Then. Πάν ὅπερ ἂν μὴ πρότερον τις ὄν ύστερον εἰς οὖσιν ἁγη, τὸν μὲν ἁγοντα ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ ἁγόμενον ποιεῖσθαί πού φαίμεν.

oriously. Ὁρθῶς.

Then. Τὰ δὲ γε νῦν δὴ ἂ διήλθομεν ἀπαντα εἶχεν εἰς τοῦτο τὴν αὐτῶν δύναμιν.

oriously. Ἐξε γὰρ οὖν.

Then. Ποιητικὴν τοῖνυν αὐτὰ συγκεφαλαίωσάμενον προσείπωμεν.

C oly. Ἐστῶ.

Then. Τὸ δὲ μαθηματικὸν αὖ μετὰ τοῦτο εἶδος ὅλον καὶ τὸ τῆς γνωρίσεως τὸ τε χρηματιστικὸν καὶ ἁγωνιστικὸν καὶ θηρευτικὸν, ἐπειδὴ δημιουργεῖ μὲν οὐδέν τούτων, τὰ δὲ οὖντα καὶ γεγονότα, τὰ μὲν χειροῦται λόγους καὶ πράξεις, τὰ δὲ τοὺς χειρομένους οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει, μάλιστ' ἂν που διὰ ταῦτα ἐξισάπαντα τὰ μέρη τέχνη τῆς κτητικῆς λεξθεῖσα ἂν διαπρέψειεν.

oriously. Ναί· πρέποι γὰρ ἂν.

5. Then. Κτητικῆς δὴ καὶ ποιητικῆς εὐμπασῶν D οὐδῶν τῶν τεχνῶν ἐν ποτέρα τὴν ἀσπαλιευτικῆν, ὡς Ὑθείτητε, τιθώμεν;

oriously. Ἐν κτητικῇ ποὺ δῆλον.

Then. Κτητικῆς δὲ ἂρ' οὐ δύο εἴδη; τὸ μὲν ἐκόντων πρὸς ἐκόντας μεταβλητικὸν ὅν διὰ τε δωρεῶν καὶ μιοθώσεων καὶ ἀγοράσεων, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἢ

1 δικαίοτατ' ἂν BT; δικαίοτατα W, Stobaeus.

2 ἂ om. BTW.
them), and the art of imitation—all these might properly be called by one name.

Teaet. How so, and what is the name?

Str. When anyone brings into being something which did not previously exist, we say that he who brings it into being produces it and that which is brought into being is produced.

Teaet. Certainly.

Str. Now all the arts which we have just mentioned direct their energy to production.

Teaet. Yes, they do.

Str. Let us, then, call these collectively the productive art.

Teaet. Agreed.

Str. And after this comes the whole class of learning and that of acquiring knowledge, and money making, and fighting, and hunting. None of these is creative, but they are all engaged in coercing, by deeds or words, things which already exist and have been produced, or in preventing others from coercing them; therefore all these divisions together might very properly be called acquisitive art.

Teaet. Yes, that would be proper.

Str. Then since acquisitive and productive art comprise all the arts, in which, Theaetetus, shall we place the art of angling?

Teaet. In acquisitive art, clearly.

Str. And are there not two classes of acquisitive art—one the class of exchange between voluntary agents by means of gifts and wages and purchases, and the other, which comprises all the rest of
κατ’ ἐργα ἡ κατὰ λόγους χειρούμενον ξύμπαν χειρωτικὸν ἀν εἴη;

ἐ. Τί δὲ; τὴν χειρωτικὴν ἄρ’ οὐ διχῇ τμητέον;

Θεαί. Πή; 

ἐ. Τὸ μὲν ἀναφανδὸν ὄλον ἀγωνιστικὸν θέντας, ¹

Ε ὑδὴ κρυφαίοις αὐτῆς πάν θηρευτικοῖς.

Θεαί. Ναὶ.

ἐ. Τὴν δὲ γε μὴν θηρευτικὴν ἄλογον τὸ μὴ οὐ τέμνειν διχῇ.

Θεαί. Δέγε ὅπη.

ἐ. Τὸ μὲν ἀμφότερο γένους διελομένους, τὸ δ’ ἐμψύχου.

Θεαί. Τί μὴν; εἴπερ ἑστον γε ἅμφω.

ἐ. Πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἑστον; καὶ δεῖ γε ἠμᾶς τὸ μὲν τῶν ἀμφότερων, ἀνώνυμον οὖν ² πλῆρ’ κατ’ ἑνὶ τῆς κολυμβητικῆς ἄττα μέρη καὶ τοιαῦτ’ ἄλλα βραχέα, χαίρειν ἑάσαι, τὸ δὲ, τῶν ἐμψύχων ζώων οὕσαν θῆραν, προσεπείν ζωοθηρικῆς.

Θεαί. Ἑστω.

ἐ. Ζωοθηρικῆς δὲ ἄρ’ οὐ διπλοὺν εἴδος ἀν λέγοιτο ἐν δίκη, τὸ μὲν πεζοῦ γένους, πολλοίς εἰδεῖν καὶ ὄνομαι διηρημένοι, πεζοθηρικοῖς, τὸ δ’ ἐτερον νευστικοῦ ζώου πάν ἐνυγροθηρικοῖς;

Θεαί. Πάνυ γε.

Β ἐ. Νευστικοῦ μὴν τὸ μὲν πτηνὸν φύλον ὅρῳμεν, τὸ δὲ ἐνυδρον;

Θεαί. Πῶς δ’ οὖ; 

ἐ. Καί τοῦ πτηνοῦ μὴν γένους πάσα ἡμῖν ἡ θῆρα λέγεται ποῦ τις ὀρνιθευτικὴ.

¹ θέντας Stobaeus; θέντες BT.
² οὖν Heindorf; ἐὰν BTW.
acquisitive art, and, since it coerces either by word or deed, might be called coercive?

THEAET. It appears so, at any rate, from what you have said.

STR. Well then, shall we not divide coercive art into two parts?

THEAET. In what way?

STR. By calling all the open part of it fighting and all the secret part hunting.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. But it would be unreasonable not to divide hunting into two parts.

THEAET. Say how it can be done.

STR. By dividing it into the hunting of the lifeless and of the living.

THEAET. Certainly, if both exist.

STR. Of course they exist. And we must pass over the hunting of lifeless things, which has no name, with the exception of some kinds of diving and the like, which are of little importance; but the hunting of living things we will call animal-hunting.

THEAET. Very well.

STR. And two classes of animal-hunting might properly be made, one (and this is divided under many classes and names) the hunting of creatures that go on their feet, land-animal hunting, and the other that of swimming creatures, to be called, as a whole, water-animal hunting?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. And of swimming creatures we see that one tribe is winged and the other is in the water?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And the hunting of winged creatures is called, as a whole, fowling.
ΤΟΙ. Δέγεται γάρ οὖν.
Τοῦ δὲ ἐνύδρου σχεδὸν τὸ σύνολον ἀλητικὴν.
Τοῦ. Ναι.
Τι δὲ; ταύτην αὖ τὴν θήραν ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν κατὰ μέγιστα μέρη δύο διελοίμην;
Κατὰ ποῖα;
Καθ' ἂ τὸ μὲν ἔρκεσιν αὐτὸθεν ¹ ποιεῖται τὴν θήραν, τὸ δὲ πληγῇ.
Πῶς λέγεις, καὶ πῇ διαιρούμενος ἐκάτερον;
Τὸ μὲν, ὅτι πᾶν ὅσον ἂν ἕνεκα κωλύσεως C εἰργῇ τι περιέχον, ἐρκὸς εἰκὸς ὀνομάζειν.
Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
Κύρτους δὴ καὶ δίκτυα καὶ βρόχους καὶ πόρκους καὶ τὰ τουαῦτα μῶν ἄλλο τι πλῆν ἔρκῃ χρῇ προσαγορεύειν;
Οὐδέν.
Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα ἔρκοθηρικὸς τῆς ἄγρας τὸ μέρος φῆσομεν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον.
Ναι.
Τὸ δὲ ἀγκίστροις καὶ τριόδουςι πληγῇ γεγυμένου ἔστερον μὲν ἐκείνου, πληκτικὴν δὲ τινα
θήραν ἡμᾶς προσειπεῖν ἐνι λόγῳ νῦν χρεῶν. ἢ τί τις ἂν, Θεαίτητε, εἴποι κάλλιον;
'Αμελῶμεν τοῦ ὀνόματός· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο.
Τῆς τοίνυν πληκτικῆς τὸ μὲν νυκτερινόν, οἴμαι, πρὸς πυρὸς φῶς γεγυμένου ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν περὶ τὴν θήραν πυρευτικὴν ρηθήναι συμβεβηκέν.
Πάνω γε.
Τὸ δὲ γε μεθημερινόν, ὡς ἐχόντων ἐν ἀκροις ἀγκιστρα καὶ τῶν τριόδοντων, πᾶν ἀγκιστρευτικόν.
¹ αὐτὸθεν al.; αὐτῶθι BT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. It is.

STR. And the hunting of water creatures goes by the general name of fishing.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And might I not divide this kind of hunting into two principal divisions?

THEAET. What divisions?

STR. The one carries on the hunt by means of enclosures merely, the other by a blow.

THEAET. What do you mean, and how do you distinguish the two?

STR. As regards the first, because whatever surrounds anything and encloses it so as to constrain it is properly called an enclosure.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. May not, then, wicker baskets and seines and snares and nets and the like be called enclosures?

THEAET. Assuredly.

STR. Then we will call this division hunting by enclosures, or something of that sort.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And the other, which is done with a blow, by means of hooks and three pronged spears, we must now—to name it with a single word—call striking; or could a better name be found, Theaetetus?

THEAET. Never mind the name; that will do well enough.

STR. Then the kind of striking which takes place at night by the light of a fire is, I suppose, called by the hunters themselves fire-hunting.

THEAET. To be sure.

STR. And that which belongs to the daytime is, as a whole, barb-hunting, since the spears, as well as the hooks, are tipped with barbs.
Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Δέχεται γάρ οὖν.
6. ΕΕ. Τοῦ τοῖνυν ἀγκιστρευτικοῦ τῆς πληκτικῆς τὸ μὲν ἀνωθεν εἰς τὸ κάτω γεγομένου διὰ τὸ τοῖς πριόδουσιν οὕτω μάλιστα χρῆσθαι πριοδοντία τις, οἶμαι, κέκληται.
ΘΕΑΙ. Φασί γοῦν τωσὲ.
ΕΕ. Τὸ δὲ γε λοιπὸν ἐστὶν ἐν ἔτι μόνον ὡς εἰπεῖν εἶδος.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον;
ΕΕ. Τὸ τῆς ἑναντίας ταύτης πληγῆς, ἀγκιστρωτε γεγομένου καὶ τῶν ἱχθῶν οὐχ ἢ τις ἢν τύχῃ 221 τοῦ σώματος, ὥσπερ τοῖς πριόδουσιν, ἄλλα περὶ τὴν κεφαλήν καὶ τὸ στόμα τοῦ θηρευθέντος ἐκάστοτε, καὶ κάτωθεν εἰς τοὐναντίον ἄνω ράβδου καὶ καλάμους ἀναστώμενον· οὐ τί φήσομεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, δεῖν τοῦνομα λέγεσθαι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκῶ μὲν, ὃπερ ἄρτι προθέμεθα δεῖν ἐξευρεῖν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ νῦν ἀποτετελέσθαι.
7. ΕΕ. Νῦν ἄρα τῆς ἀσπαλιευτικῆς πέρι σύ ¹
Β τε κάγῳ συνωμολογήκαμεν οὐ μόνον τοῦνομα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λόγον περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦργον εἰλήφαμεν ἐκανὼς. ξυμπάσης γὰρ τέχνης τὸ μὲν ἦμισι μέρος κτητικῶν ἢ, κτητικοῦ δὲ χειρωτικῶν, χειρωτικοῦ δὲ θηρευτικῶν, τοῦ δὲ θηρευτικοῦ χωσθηρικών, χωσθηρικοῦ δὲ ἐνυγροθηρικῶν, ἐνυγροθηρικοῦ δὲ τὸ κάτωθεν τρήμα ὅλον ἀλιευτικῶν, ἀλιευτικῆς δὲ πληκτικῶν, πληκτικῆς δὲ ἀγκιστρευτικῶν· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν κάτωθεν ἄνω πληγῆν ἀνασπωμένην,

¹ σύ Heindorf; οὐ σύ BT.

¹ Plato’s etymology—ἀσπαλιευτική from ἀνασπάσθαι—is hardly less absurd than that suggested in the translation.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Yes, it is so called.

STR. Then of striking which belongs to barb-hunting, that part which proceeds downward from above, is called, because tridents are chiefly used in it, tridentry, I suppose.

THEAET. Yes, some people, at any rate, call it so.

STR. Then there still remains, I may say, only one further kind.

THEAET. What is that?

STR. The kind that is characterized by the opposite sort of blow, which is practised with a hook and strikes, not any chance part of the body of the fishes, as tridents do, but only the head and mouth of the fish caught, and proceeds from below upwards, being pulled up by twigs and rods. By what name, Theaetetus, shall we say this ought to be called?

THEAET. I think our search is now ended and we have found the very thing we set before us a while ago as necessary to find.

STR. Now, then, you and I are not only agreed about the name of angling, but we have acquired also a satisfactory definition of the thing itself. For of art as a whole, half was acquisitive, and of the acquisitive, half was coercive, and of the coercive, half was hunting, and of hunting, half was animal hunting, and of animal hunting, half was water hunting, and, taken as a whole, of water hunting the lower part was fishing, and of fishing, half was striking, and of striking, half was barb-hunting, and of this the part in which the blow is pulled from below upwards at an angle has a name in the very

The words at an angle are inserted merely to give a reason in English for the words which follow them.
C αἵ τε τῆς πράξεως ἀφομοιωθέν τοῦνομα, ή νῦν ἀσπαλιευτικὴ ἕτηθεὶσα ἐπίκλην γέγονεν.

θεαί. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε ἰκανῶς δε-δήλωται.

8. Περε δή, κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ παράδειγμα καὶ τὸν σοφιστήν ἐπιχειρώμεν εὑρεῖν, ὁ τί ποτ' ἔστιν.

θεαί. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

εἴ. Καὶ μὴν ἐκείνῳ γ' ἢν τὸ ζήτημα πρῶτον, πότερον ἱδιώτην ἢ τινα τέχνην ἔχοντα θετέον εἶναι τὸν ἀσπαλιευτήν.

θεαί. Ναί.

εἴ. Καὶ νῦν δὴ τούτον ἱδιώτην θήσομεν, δὲ

D θεαίτητε, ἡ παντάπασιν ὡς ἀληθῶς σοφιστήν;

θεαί. Οὐδαμῶς ἱδιώτην· μανθάνω γὰρ ὁ λέγεις, ὡς παντὸς δεὶ τοιοῦτος 1 εἶναι τὸ γε ὄνομα τοῦτο ἐχων.

εἴ. Ἀλλὰ τινα τέχνην αὐτὸν ἢμῖν ἔχοντα, ὡς ἔσοικε, θετέον.

θεαί. Τίνα ποτ' οὖν δὴ ταύτην;

εἴ. Ἄρ' ὡς πρὸς θεοὺς ἡγνοήκαμεν τὰνδρὸς τὸν ἀνδρὰ ὃντα ξυγγενῆ;

θεαί. Τίνα τοῦ;

εἴ. Τὸν ἀσπαλιευτὴν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ.

θεαί. Πῇ;

εἴ. Θηρευτά τινες καταφαινεσθον ἁμφώ μοι.

Ε θεαί. Τίνος θήρας ἄτερος; τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐτερον εἶπομεν.

εἴ. Δίχα που νῦν δὴ 2 διείλομεν τὴν ἄγραν πᾶσαν, νευστικοῦ μέρους, τὸ δὲ πεζοῦ τέμνοντες.

1 παντῶς δεί τοιοῦτος Winckelmann; πάντως δεί τοιοῦτος B; πάντως δεί τοιοῦτον T. 2 νῦν δὴ Ῥ; νῦν B.

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likeness of the act and is called angling, which was the object of our present search.

**THEAET.** That at all events has been made perfectly clear.

**STR.** Come, then, let us use this as a pattern and try to find out what a sophist is.

**THEAET.** By all means.

**STR.** Well, then, the first question we asked was whether we must assume that the angler was just a man or was a man with an art.

**THEAET.** Yes.

**STR.** Now take this man of ours, Theaetetus. Shall we assume that he is just a man, or by all means really a man of wisdom?

**THEAET.** Certainly not just a man; for I catch your meaning that he is very far from being wise, although his name implies wisdom.

**STR.** But we must, it seems, assume that he has an art of some kind.

**THEAET.** Well, then, what in the world is this art that he has?

**STR.** Good gracious! Have we failed to notice that the man is akin to the other man?

**THEAET.** Who is akin to whom?

**STR.** The angler to the sophist.

**THEAET.** How so?

**STR.** They both seem clearly to me to be a sort of hunters.

**THEAET.** What is the hunting of the second? We have spoken about the first.

**STR.** We just now divided hunting as a whole into two classes, and made one division that of swimming creatures and the other that of land-hunting.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.

ξέ. Καὶ τὸ μὲν διήλθομεν, ὅσον περὶ τὰ νευστικὰ τῶν ἐνύδρων. τὸ δὲ πεζὸν εἰάσαμεν ἁσχιστον, εἰπόντες ὅτι πολυεἰδὲς εἶη.

222 ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ξέ. Μέχρι μὲν τοῖνυν ἐνταῦθα ὁ σοφιστὴς τε καὶ ὁ ἀσταλευτὴς ἀμα ἀπὸ τῆς κτητικῆς τέχνης πορεύεσθον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἑοίκατον γοῦν.

ξέ. Ἐκτρέπεσθον δὲ γε ἀπὸ τῆς ζωοθηρικῆς, ὁ μὲν ἐπὶ θάλασσαν ποῦ καὶ ποταμοὺς καὶ λίμνας, τὰν τούτους ξώα θηρευσόμενος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ξέ. Ὁ δὲ γε ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ ποταμοὺς ἔτερον αὐ τινας, πλοῦτου καὶ νεότητος οἶνον λειμῶνας ἀφθόνους, τὰν τούτους θρέμματα χειρωσόμενος.

B ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ξέ. Τῆς πεζῆς θήρας γίγνεσθον δύο μεγίστω τινὲ μέρη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίον ἐκάτερον;

ξέ. Τὸ μὲν τῶν ήμέρων, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀγρίων.

9. ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰτ' ἐστι τις θήρα τῶν ήμέρων;

ξέ. Εἴπερ γε ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπος ήμερον ζῶον. θές δὲ ὅπη χαῖρεις, εἶτε μηδὲν τιθεὶς ήμερον, εἰτὲ ἀλλο μὲν ήμερον τι, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἀγρίων, εἰτὲ ήμερον μὲν λέγεις αὖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀνθρώπων δὲ μηδεμίαν ἠγεῖ θήραν· τούτων ὅποτερ' ἄν ήγῆ φίλον εἰρήσθαι σοι, τοῦτο ἡμῖν διόρισον.

C ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ήμᾶς τε ήμερον, ὡ δὲνε, ἡγούμαι ζῶον, θήραν τε ἄνθρωπων εἶναι λέγω.
Theaet. Yes.

Str. And the one we discussed, so far as the swimming creatures that live in the water are concerned; but we left the land-hunting undivided, merely remarking that it has many forms.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Now up to that point the sophist and the angler proceed together from the starting-point of acquisitive art.

Theaet. I think they do.

Str. But they separate at the point of animal-hunting, where the one turns to the sea and rivers and lakes to hunt the animals in those.

Theaet. To be sure.

Str. But the other turns toward the land and to rivers of a different kind—rivers of wealth and youth, bounteous meadows, as it were—and he intends to coerce the creatures in them.

Theaet. What do you mean?

Str. Of land-hunting there are two chief divisions.

Theaet. What are they?

Str. One is the hunting of tame, the other of wild creatures.

Theaet. Is there, then, a hunting of tame creatures?

Str. Yes, if man is a tame animal; but make any assumption you like, that there is no tame animal, or that some other tame animal exists but man is a wild one or that man is tame but there is no hunting of man. For the purpose of our definition choose whichever of these statements you think is satisfactory to you.

Theaet. Why, Stranger, I think we are a tame animal, and I agree that there is a hunting of man.
ΞΕ. Διττὴν τοίνυν καὶ τὴν ἡμεροθηρικὴν εἴπωμεν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Κατὰ τί λέγοντες;
ΞΕ. Τὴν μὲν λῃστικὴν καὶ ἀνδραποδιστικὴν καὶ τυραννικὴν καὶ ἕμπασαι τὴν πολεμικὴν, ἐν πάντα βίαιον θήραν ὄρισάμενοι.
ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς.
ΞΕ. Τὴν δὲ γε δικανικὴν καὶ δημογορικὴν καὶ προσομιλητικὴν, ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ ξύνολον, πιθανουργικὴν
Δτινά μίαν τέχνην προσεπόντες.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὸρθῶς.
ΞΕ. Τῆς δὴ πιθανουργικῆς διττὰ λέγωμεν γένη.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ποία;
ΞΕ. Τὸ μὲν ἑτέρον ἴδια, τὸ δὲ δημοσία γιγνόμενον.
ΘΕΑΙ. Γίγνεσθον γὰρ οὖν ἐῖδος ἐκάτερον.
ΞΕ. Οὔκοιν αὐτῇ τῇ ἰδιοθηρευτικῇ τὸ μὲν µισθαρνητικὸν ¹ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ δωροφορικὸν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ µανθάνω.
ΞΕ. Τῇ τῶν ἐρωτών θῆρᾳ τὸν νοῦν, ὡς ἔοικας, οὕτω προσέσχες.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦ πέρι;
ΕΞΕ. Ὁτι τοῖς θηρευθεῖσι δῶρα προσεπιδιδόσων.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλήθεστατα λέγεις.
ΞΕ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐρωτικὴς τέχνης ἔστω εἴδος.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.
ΞΕ. Τοῦ δὲ γε µισθαρνητικοῦ τὸ μὲν προσομιλοῦν διὰ χάριτος καὶ παντάπασι δι’ ἡδονῆς τὸ δέλεαρ πεποιημένον καὶ τὸν µισθοῦν πραττόμενον τροφὴν ἑαυτῷ µόνον κολακικὴν, ὡς ἐγγὺς,
¹ µισθαρνητικὸν Heindorf; µισθαρνητικὸν BTW (so also below).
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str. Let us, then, say that the hunting of tame animals is also of two kinds.

THEAET. How do we justify that assertion?

str. By defining piracy, man-stealing, tyranny, and the whole art of war all collectively as hunting by force.

THEAET. Excellent.

str. And by giving the art of the law courts, of the public platform, and of conversation also a single name and calling them all collectively an art of persuasion.

THEAET. Correct.

str. Now let us say that there are two kinds of persuasion.

THEAET. What kinds?

str. The one has to do with private persons, the other with the community.

THEAET. Granted; each of them does form a class.

str. Then again of the hunting of private persons one kind receives pay, and the other brings gifts, does it not?

THEAET. I do not understand.

str. Apparently you have never yet paid attention to the lovers' method of hunting.

THEAET. In what respect?

str. That in addition to their other efforts they give presents to those whom they hunt.

THEAET. You are quite right.

str. Let us, then, call this the amatory art.

THEAET. Agreed.

str. But that part of the paid kind which converses to furnish gratification and makes pleasure exclusively its bait and demands as its pay only maintenance, we might all agree, if I am not mis-
223 πάντες φαίμεν ἂν ἢ κηδυντικήν τινα τέχνην εἶναι.

ὉΕΑΙ. Πῶς γάρ οὖ; ἢ. Τὸ δὲ ἐπαγγελλόμενον μὲν ὡς ἀρετὴς ἑνεκα τὰς ὁμιλίας ποιοῦμεν, μισθὸν δὲ νόμισμα πραττό-μενον, ἃρα οὐ τούτῳ τὸ γένος ἐτέρῳ προσεπεῖν ἄξιον ὄνοματι;

ὉΕΑΙ. Πῶς γάρ οὖ;

Ἑ. Τίνι δὴ τούτῳ; πειρῶ λέγειν.

ὋΕΑΙ. Δήλον δὴ· τὸν γὰρ σοφιστὴν μοι δοκοῦμεν ἀνηγηρκέναι. τούτ’ οὖν ἐγνωγε εἰπὼν τὸ προσήκον ὄνομ’ ἕν ἡγοῦμαί καλεῖν αὐτόν.

Β 10. Ἑ. Κατὰ δὴ τὸν γών, ὃ Θεαίτητε, λόγον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ τέχνης οἰκειωτικῆς, χειρωτικῆς, θηρευτικῆς, ζωοθηρίας, ξερσαίας, ἡμεροθηρικῆς, ἀνθρωποθηρίας, ἱδιοθηρίας, μισθαρικῆς, νομισμα-τοπωλικῆς, δοξοπαιδευτικῆς, νέων πλούσιων καὶ ένδοξων γυγνομένη θήρα προσρητέον, ὃς ὁ νῦν λόγος ἤμιν συμβαίνει, σοφιστικῆ.

ὩΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Ἑ. Ἐτι δὲ καὶ τῇδε ἴδωμεν· οὐ γάρ τι φαύλης Κ μέτοχον ἐστὶ τέχνης τὸ νῦν ζητοῦμεν, ἀλλ’ εὖ μάλα ποικίλης. καὶ γὰρ οὖν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν εἰρημένοις φάντασμα παρέχεται, μὴ τούτῳ ὁ νῦν αὐτὸ ἴμεῖς φαμεν ἀλλ’ ἐτερον εἶναι τι γένος.

ὩΕΑΙ. Πὴ δὴ;

Ἑ. Τὸ τῆς κτητικῆς τέχνης διπλοῦν ἢν εἰδὸς που, τὸ μὲν θηρευτικὸν μέρος ἔχου, τὸ δὲ ἀλλακτικὸν.

Ἐπὶ Ηενδόρφ; ἢ om. mss.

2 χειρωτικῆς add. Aldina; κτητικῆς mss.; secl. Schleiermacher.

3 ζωοθηρίας πεζοθηρίας mss.; πεζοθηρίας secl. Schleiermacher.

4 ἴδωμεν W; εἰδώμεν BT.

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taken, to call the art of flattery or of making things pleasant.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. But the class which proposes to carry on its conversations for the sake of virtue and demands its pay in cash—does not this deserve to be called by another name?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And what is that name? Try to tell.

THEAET. It is obvious; for I think we have discovered the sophist. And therefore by uttering that word I think I should give him the right name.

STR. Then, as it seems, according to our present reasoning, Theaetetus, the part of appropriative, coercive, hunting art which hunts animals, land animals, tame animals, man, privately, for pay, is paid in cash, claims to give education, and is a hunt after rich and promising youths, must—so our present argument concludes—be called sophistry.

THEAET. Most assuredly.

STR. But let us look at it in still another way; for the class we are now examining partakes of no mean art, but of a very many-sided one. And we must indeed do so, for in our previous talk it presents an appearance of being, not what we now say it is, but another class.

THEAET. How so?

STR. The acquisitive art was of two sorts, the one the division of hunting, the other that of exchange.
\[ \text{PLATO} \]

\[ \text{ΘεΑΙ. Ἡν γὰρ οὐν.} \]

ΞΕ. Τὰς τοῖνυν ἀλλακτικὰς δύο ἐιδὴ λέγωμεν, τὸ μὲν δωρητικὸν, τὸ δὲ ἐτερον ἀγοραστικὸν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰρήσθω.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν αὕ φήσομεν ἀγοραστικὴν διχῇ τέμνεσθαι.

Δ ΘΕΑΙ. Πῇ;

ΞΕ. Τὴν μὲν τῶν αὐτουργῶν αὐτοπωλικῆν διαρρούμενοι, τὴν δὲ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἔργα μεταβαλλομένην μεταβλητικὴν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ; τῆς μεταβλητικῆς οὐχ ἢ μὲν κατὰ πόλιν ἀλλαγῆ, σχεδὸν αὐτῆς ἡμιον μέρος ὑπὲρ, κατηλικὴ ¹ προσαγορεῦται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ γε ἐξ ἀλλῆς εἰς ἀλλὴν πόλιν διαλλαττόμενον ² ὑπὲρ καὶ πράσιν ἐμπορικὴ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ;

ΞΕ. Τῆς δ' ἐμπορικῆς ἃρ' οὐκ ἦσθημεθα ὅτι τὸ Ἐ μὲν ὅσοις τὸ σώμα τρέφεται καὶ χρηται, ³ τὸ δὲ ὅσοις ἡ ψυχὴ πωλοῦν διὰ νομίσματος ἀλλάττεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τούτο λέγεις;

ΞΕ. Τὸ περὶ τῆν ψυχὴν ἵσως ἀγνοοῦμεν, ἔπει τὸ γε ἐτερον που ἔυνιεμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

224 ΞΕ. Μουσικὴν τε τοῖνυν ἐυνάπασαν λέγωμεν,

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¹ κατηλικὴ bt; καὶ πηλικὴ ΒΤ.
² διαλαττόμενον] διαλαττομένων ΒΤ; διαλάττον W.
³ καὶ χρηται Heindorf; κέχρηται ΒΤ.
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Theaet. Yes, it was.

Str. Now shall we say that there are two sorts of exchange, the one by gift, the other by sale?

Theaet. So be it.

Str. And we shall say further that exchange by sale is divided into two parts.

Theaet. How so?

Str. We make this distinction—calling the part which sells a man's own productions the selling of one's own, and the other, which exchanges the works of others, exchange.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Well, then, that part of exchange which is carried on in the city, amounting to about half of it, is called retailing, is it not?

Theaet. Yes.

Str. And that which exchanges goods from city to city by purchase and sale is called merchandising?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And have we not observed that one part of merchandising sells and exchanges for cash whatever serves the body for its support and needs, and the other whatever serves the soul?

Theaet. What do you mean by that?

Str. Perhaps we do not know about the part that has to do with the soul; though I fancy we do understand the other division.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Take, therefore, the liberal arts\(^1\) in general

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\(^1\) The word μουσική, here rendered "liberal arts," is much more inclusive than the English word "music," designating, as it does, nearly all education and culture except the purely physical. In the Athens of Socrates' day many, possibly most, of the teachers of music in this larger sense were foreigners, Greeks, of course, but not Athenians.
πόλεως ἐκάστοτε εἰς πόλιν ἐνθεὶς μὲν ἦνθεὶς ταῦτα, ἐτέρωσε δὲ ἀγομένην καὶ πυπρασκομένην, καὶ γραφικήν καὶ θαυματοποιήκην καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰ μὲν παραμυθίας, τὰ δὲ καὶ σπουδῆς χάριν ἄχθεντα καὶ πωλοῦμενα, τὸν ἄγοντα καὶ πωλοῦντα μυθὴν ἢπτον τῆς τῶν συτίων καὶ ποτῶν πράσεως ἐμπορον ὑρθὼς ἃν λεγόμενον παρασχεῖν.

Τε οὖν καὶ τὸν μαθήματα ἐξυνωνούμενον πόλιν τε ἐκ πόλεως νομίσματος ἀμείβοντα ταὐτὸν προσερεῖς ὄνομα;

Τε οὖν καὶ τὸν μαθήματα ἐξυνωνούμενον πόλιν τε ἐκ πόλεως νομίσματος ἀμείβοντα ταὐτὸν προσερεῖς ὄνομα;

Τε οὖν καὶ τὸν μαθήματα ἐξυνωνούμενον πόλιν τε ἐκ πόλεως νομίσματος ἀμείβοντα ταὐτὸν προσερεῖς ὄνομα;

Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

Ταῦτας τοίνυν τῆς μαθηματοποιήκης τὸ μὲν περὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν μαθήματα ἐτέρω, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄλλω προσρητέον.

Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Τεχνοτεχνικοῦ μὴν τὸ γε περὶ τᾶλα ἄν ἀρμόττοι· τὸ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα σὺ προθυμήθητι λέγειν ὄνομα.

Καὶ τὶς ἃν ἄλλο ὄνομα εἰπὼν οὐκ ἃν πλημμελοῖ τὴν τὸ νῦν ξητούμενον αὐτῷ εἶναι τὸ σοφιστικὸν γένος;

Οὔδέν ἄλλο. Ὡθὶ δὴ νῦν οἷς τὸ κτητικῆς, μεταβλητικῆς;

1 οἶ προσερεῖς τοῦτο ἐν τῷ πάνω μὲν ἦνθεὶς ταῦτα, ἐτέρωσε δὲ ἀγομένην καὶ πυπρασκομένην, καὶ γραφικήν καὶ θαυματοποιήκην καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τῆς ψυχῆς, τὰ μὲν παραμυθίας, τὰ δὲ καὶ σπουδῆς χάριν ἄχθεντα καὶ πωλοῦμενα, τὸν ἄγοντα καὶ πωλοῦντα μυθὴν ἢπτον τῆς τῶν συτίων καὶ ποτῶν πράσεως ἐμπορον ὑρθὼς ἃν λεγόμενον παρασχεῖν.

Τε οὖν καὶ τὸν μαθήματα ἐξυνωνούμενον πόλιν τε ἐκ πόλεως νομίσματος ἀμείβοντα ταὐτὸν προσερεῖς ὄνομα;

Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

Ταῦτας τοίνυν τῆς μαθηματοποιήκης τὸ μὲν περὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν μαθήματα ἐτέρω, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄλλω προσρητέον.

Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Τεχνοτεχνικοῦ μὴν τὸ γε περὶ τᾶλα ἄν ἀρμόττοι· τὸ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα σὺ προθυμήθητι λέγειν ὄνομα.

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Οὔδέν ἄλλο. Ὡθὶ δὴ νῦν οἷς τὸ κτητικῆς, μεταβλητικῆς;
that constantly go about from city to city, bought in one place and carried to another and sold—painting, and conjuring, and the many other things that affect the soul, which are imported and sold partly for its entertainment and partly for its serious needs; we cannot deny that he who carries these about and sells them constitutes a merchant properly so called, no less than he whose business is the sale of food and drink.

Theaet. Very true.

Str. Then will you give the same name to him who buys up knowledge and goes about from city to city exchanging his wares for money?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. One part of this soul-merchandising might very properly be called the art of display, might it not? But since the other part, though no less ridiculous than the first, is nevertheless a traffic in knowledge, must we not call it by some name akin to its business?

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Now of this merchandising in knowledge the part which has to do with the knowledge of the other arts should be called by one name, and that which has to do with virtue by another.

Theaet. Of course.

Str. The name of art-merchant would fit the one who trades in the other arts, and now do you be so good as to tell the name of him who trades in virtue.

Theaet. And what other name could one give, without making a mistake, than that which is the object of our present investigation—the sophist?

Str. No other. Come then, let us now summarize the matter by saying that sophistry has appeared a
ΠΛΑΤΟ

Δ ἀγοραστικῆς, ἐμπορικῆς, ἑκατέρων μετατρέπεται, ἀρετῆς, ἀνεβάλλει τὸν ἄλλον ὑπεράνων καὶ τοῦτον ὑπολητικῶν δεύτερον, ἀνεφάνη σοφιστικῇ.

ἐοἰ. Μάλα γε.

ἐ. Τρίτον δὲ γ᾽ οἷμαι γε, κἂν εἰ τις αὐτοῦ καθισμένος ἐν πόλει, τὰ μὲν ὤνομα, τὰ δὲ καὶ τεκταίων, καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκαθόρως, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἀνεσταλμένος, ἀνεφάνη σοφιστικῇ.

ἐ. Τῇ δὲ οὐ μέλλων;

ἐ. Καὶ τὸ κτητικῆς ἀρα μεταβλητικὸν, ἀγοραστικὸν, κατηγορικὸν, ἐν τοῦτον τοῦτον μετατρέπεται, διαρκῶς τὸν κτητικὸν, τὸν ἀνεσταλμένον, ἀνεφάνη σοφιστικῇ.

ἐ. 'Ανάγκη δὲ γὰρ λόγῳ δεῖ συνακολουθεῖν.

II. εὐ. 'Ετι δὴ σκοπῶμεν, εἰ τίνι τοιῷδε προσέσχεται ἢ σοφιστικῷ γένος.

225 ἐοἰ. Ποίως δή;

ἐ. Τῆς κτητικῆς ἀγωνιστικῆς τῷ μέρος ἐρωτεῖ τάδε.

ἐ. Ἐν γὰρ οὖν.

ἐ. Οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου τοῖνυν ἔστι διαρκεῖν αὐτὴν δίχα.

ἐοἰ. Καθ’ ὅποια λέγε.

ἐ. Τὸ μὲν ἀμυλητικὸν αὐτῆς τιθέντας, τὸ δὲ μαχητικὸν.

ἐ. 'Εστὶν.

ἐ. Τῆς τοῖνυν μαχητικῆς τῷ μὲν σώματι

1 ἐμπορικῆς] ἐμπορικοῦ ΒΤ.
second time as that part of acquisitive art, art of exchange, of trafficking, of merchandising, of soul-merchandising which deals in words and knowledge, and trades in virtue.

THEAET. Very well.

STR. But there is a third case: If a man settled down here in town and proposed to make his living by selling these same wares of knowledge, buying some of them and making others himself, you would, I fancied, not call him by any other name than that which you used a moment ago.

THEAET. Certainly not.

STR. Then also that part of acquisitive art which proceeds by exchange, and by sale, whether as mere retail trade or the sale of one’s own productions, no matter which, so long as it is of the class of merchandising in knowledge, you will always, apparently, call sophistry.

THEAET. I must do so, for I have to follow where the argument leads.

STR. Let us examine further and see if the class we are now pursuing has still another aspect, of similar nature.

THEAET. Of what nature?

STR. We agreed that fighting was a division of acquisitive art.

THEAET. Yes, we did.

STR. Then it is quite fitting to divide it into two parts.

THEAET. Tell what the parts are.

STR. Let us call one part of it the competitive and the other the pugnacious.

THEAET. Agreed.

STR. Then it is reasonable and fitting to give to
πρὸς σώματα γυγνομένοι εἰκώς καὶ πρέποιν ὄνομα λέγειν τι τοιούτον τιθεμένους οἶον βιαστικόν. 

ἐ. Τῷ δὲ λόγους πρὸς λόγους τί τις, ὡς Ἐκα
d tητε, ἀλλὰ εἰπτη πλὴν ἀμφισβητητικόν;

ἴ. Οὐδὲν. 

ἐ. Τὸ δὲ γε περὶ τὰς ἀμφισβητητές τετέον 

ἴ. Πη; 

ἐ. Καθὼς ὁσον μὲν γὰρ γίγνεται μῆκεσί τε πρὸς ἐναντία μήκη λόγων καὶ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἀδικα δημοσία, δικανικάν. 

ἴ. Ναι. 

ἐ. Τὸ δὲ ἐν ιδίοις αὐτὶ καὶ κατακεκερματισμένον ἐρωτήσει πρὸς ἀποκρίσεις μὸν εἰθίσμεθα καλεῖν ἀλλο πλὴν ἀντιλογικόν; 

ἴ. Οὐδέν. 

ἐ. Τοῦ δὲ ἀντιλογικοῦ τὸ μὲν ὅσον περὶ τὰ ὁμβόλαια ἀμφισβητεῖται μὲν, εἰκῇ δὲ καὶ ἀτε-χνως περὶ αὐτὸ πράττεται, ταῦτα θετέον μὲν εἴδος, ἐπείπερ αὐτὸ διέγνωκεν ὡς ἐτερον ὁν ὁ λόγος, ἀτὰρ ἐπωνυμίας οὐθ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν ἐτυχεῖν οὔτε νῦν υφ' ἡμῶν τυχεῖν ἄξιον. 

ἴ. Αἱθῆ' κατὰ σμικρὰ γὰρ λίαν καὶ παντοδαπὰ διήρηται. 

ἐ. Τὸ δὲ γε ἐντεχνον, καὶ περὶ δικαίων αὐτῶν καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀλλων ὅλως ἀμφισβητοῦν, ἄρ' οὐκ ἐριστικόν αὐτ' λέγειν εἰθίσμεθα; 

ἴ. Πώς γὰρ οὔ; 

1 ἀμφισβητητικόν Stephanus; ἀμφισβητητικόν BTW. 

2 τὰ om. TW. 

3 ταῦτα BT; τούτο al.
that part of the pugnacious which consists of bodily contests some such name as violent.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And what other name than controversy shall we give to the contests of words?

THEAET. No other.

STR. But controversy must be divided into two kinds.

THEAET. How?

STR. Whenever long speeches are opposed by long speeches on questions of justice and injustice in public, that is forensic controversy.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. But that which is carried on among private persons and is cut up into little bits by means of questions and their answers, we are accustomed to call argumentation, are we not?

THEAET. We are.

STR. And that part of argumentation which deals with business contracts, in which there is controversy, to be sure, but it is carried on informally and without rules of art—all that must be considered a distinct class, now that our argument has recognized it as different from the rest, but it received no name from our predecessors, nor does it now deserve to receive one from us.

THEAET. True; for the divisions into which it falls are too small and too miscellaneous.

STR. But that which possesses rules of art and carries on controversy about abstract justice and injustice and the rest in general terms, we are accustomed to call disputation, are we not?

THEAET. Certainly.
D ΞΕ. Τοῦ μὴν ἐριστικοῦ τὸ μὲν χρηματοφθορικόν, τὸ δὲ χρηματιστικὸν ὁν τυγχάνει.
ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι γε.
ΞΕ. Τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τοῖνυν, ἂν ἐκάτερον δεὶ καλεῖν αὐτῶν, πειραθῶμεν εἰπεῖν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοίν χρῆ.
ΞΕ. Δοκῶ μὴν τὸ γε ¹ δι’ ἤδονὴν τής περὶ ταῦτα διαστριβῆς ἀμέλεις τῶν οἰκείων γιγνόμενον, περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων οὐ μεθ’ ἤδονῆς· ἀκουόμενον καλεῖσθαι κατὰ γνώμην τὴν ἔμην οὐχ ἐτερον ἀδολεσχικοῦ.
ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν οὕτω πως.
Ε ΞΕ. Τούτου τοῖνυν τούγαντίον, ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδιωτικῶν ἑρίδων χρηματιζόμενον, ἐν τῷ μέρει σὺ πειρῶ νῦν εἰπεῖν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τί ² τις ἂν αὖ εἰπὼν ἐτερον οὐκ ἔξαμάρτοι πλὴν· γε τὸν βαθμαστὸν πάλιν ἐκεῖνον ἦκεν αὖ νῦν τέταρτον τὸν μεταδιωκόμενον ύφ’ ἠμῶν σοφιστήν;
226 ΞΕ. Οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἂ τὸ χρηματιστικὸν γένος, ὡς ἔουκεν, ἐριστικῆς ὅν τέχνης, τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς, τῆς ἀμφισβητητικῆς, τῆς μαχητικῆς, τῆς ἀγωνιστικῆς, τῆς κτητικῆς ἐστιν, ὡς ὁ λόγος αὖ μεμήνυκε νῦν, ὁ σοφιστής.
ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν .
13. ΞΕ. Ὁρᾶς οὖν ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγεται τὸ ποικίλον εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ θηρίον καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον ἀὐ τῇ ἐτέρᾳ ληπτὸν ⁴;
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοίν ἄμφοιν χρῆ.

¹ τὸ γε vulg.; τὸ δὲ BT; τὸ δὲ W. ² τί add. Heindorf. ³ ἀμφισβητητικῆς] ἀμφισβητητικῆς BTW. ⁴ ληπτὸν W; ληπτέον BT.
str. Well, of disputation, one sort wastes money, the other makes money.
theaet. Certainly.
str. Then let us try to tell the name by which we must call each of these.
theaet. Yes, we must do so.
str. Presumably the kind which causes a man to neglect his own affairs for the pleasure of engaging in it, but the style of which causes no pleasure to most of his hearers, is, in my opinion, called by no other name than garrulity.
theaet. Yes, that is about what it is called.
str. Then the opposite of this, the kind which makes money from private disputes—try now, for it is your turn, to give its name.
theaet. What other answer could one give without making a mistake, than that now again for the fourth time that wonderful being whom we have so long been pursuing has turned up—the sophist!
str. Yes, and the sophist is nothing else, apparently, than the money-making class of the disputatious, argumentative, controversial, pugnacious, combative, acquisitive art, as our argument has now again stated.
theaet. Certainly.
str. Do you see the truth of the statement that this creature is many-sided and, as the saying is, not to be caught with one hand?
theaet. Then we must catch him with both.
**PLATO**

ΞΕ. Χρή γὰρ οὖν, καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν γε οὕτω

Β ποιητέον, τοιόνδε τι μεταθέοντας ἵνας αὐτοῦ,

καὶ μοι λέγε· τῶν οἰκετικῶν ὅνομάτων καλοῦμεν

ἀττα που;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πολλά· ἀτὰρ ποία δὴ τῶν πολλῶν

πυνθάνει;

ΞΕ. Τὰ τοιάδε, οἶνον διηθεῖν τε λέγομεν καὶ

διατάν καὶ βράττεων καὶ διακρίνειν. ¹

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΞΕ. Καὶ πρὸς γε τοῦτοι ἔτι ἔανεν, κατάγεν, κερκίζεων, καὶ μυρία ἐν ταῖς τέχναις ἄλλα τουιάντα

ἐνόντα ἐπιστάμεθα. ἢ γὰρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον ἀυτῶν πέρι βουληθεῖς δηλώσαι

C παραδείγματα προθεῖς ταῦτα κατὰ πάντων ἦροι;

ΞΕ. Διαιρετικά πον τὰ λεχθέντα εἰρηται ξύμπαντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΞΕ. Κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν τοῦτον λόγον ὡς περὶ ταῦτα

μίαν οὔςαν ἐν ἀπασι τέχνην ἐνὸς ὅνοματος ἀξιώ-

σομεν αὐτὴν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνα προσεπόντες;

ΞΕ. Διακριτικὴν.

ΘΕΑ. Ὅπως.

ΞΕ. Σκόπει δὴ ταῦτης αὐ δύο ἀν πὴ δυνώμεθα

κατιδεῖν εἰδή.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ταχείαν ὡς ἐμοὶ σκέψιν ἐπιτάττεις.

D ΞΕ. Καὶ μήν ἐν γε ταῖς εἰρημέναις διακρίσεσι

τὸ μὲν χεῖρον ἀπὸ βελτίων ἀποχωρίζεων ἢν, τὸ

δὲ ὅμοιον ἀφ' ὅμοιον.

¹ διακρίνειν] many emendations have been suggested, none entirely satisfactory, and all probably unnecessary.

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THE SOPHIST

str. Yes, we must, and must go at it with all our might, by following another track of his—in this way. Tell me; of the expressions connected with menial occupations some are in common use, are they not?

theaet. Yes, many. But to which of the many does your question refer?

str. To such as these: we say "sift" and "strain" and "winnow" and "separate." ¹

theaet. Certainly.

str. And besides these there are "card" and "comb" and "beat the web" and countless other technical terms which we know. Is it not so?

theaet. Why do you use these as examples and ask about them all? What do you wish to show in regard to them?

str. All those that I have mentioned imply a notion of division.

theaet. Yes.

str. Then since there is, according to my reckoning, one art involved in all of these operations, let us give it one name.

theaet. What shall we call it?

str. The art of discrimination.

theaet. Very well.

str. Now see if we can discover two divisions of this.

theaet. You demand quick thinking, for a boy like me.

str. And yet, in the instance of discrimination just mentioned there was, first, the separation of worse from better, and, secondly, of like from like.

¹ Apparently a term descriptive of some part of the process of weaving; cf. Cratylus, 338 b.
ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδὸν οὕτω νῦν λειχθὲν φαίνεται.

ζΕ. Τῆς μὲν τοῖνυν ὄνομα οὐκ ἔχω λεγόμενον·
τῆς δὲ καταλειποῦσης μὲν τὸ βέλτιον διακρίσεως,
τὸ δὲ χεῖρον ἀποβαλλοῦσης ἔχω.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δέγε τί.

ζΕ. Πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη διάκρισις, ὡς ἔγω ξυννοῦ,
λέγεται παρὰ πάντων καθαρμός τις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δέγεται γὰρ οὖν.

Ε ζΕ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ γε καθαρτικὸν εἰδὼς αὖ διπλοῦν
ὅν πᾶς ἂν ἴδοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι, κατὰ σχολὴν γε ἵσωσ· οὐ μὴν ἔγγυῃ
καθορῶ νῦν.

14. ζΕ. Καὶ μὴν τὰ περὶ τὰ σώματα πολλὰ
εἶδη καθάρσεων ἐνὶ περιλαβείν ὁνόματι προσήκει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποία καὶ τίνι;

ζΕ. Τὰ τε τῶν ζώων, ὁσα ἐντὸς σωμάτων ὑπὸ
γυμναστικῆς ιατρικῆς τε ὀρθῶς διακρινόμενα
καθαίρεται καὶ περὶ τάκτος, εἰπεῖν ἡν ἐνη φαῦλα,
ὅσα βαλανευτικὴ παρέχεται καὶ τῶν ἄμψων
σωμάτων, ὅν γναφευτικὴ καὶ ἐξυμπασα κοσμητικὴ
tὴν ἐπιμέλειαν παρεχομένη κατὰ σμικρὰ πολλὰ
καὶ γελοια δοκοῦντα ὁνόματα ἐσχεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μάλα γε.

ζΕ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὡ Θεαίτητε. ἀλλὰ γὰρ
τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθὸδῳ σπογγιστικῆς ἡ φαρμακο-
ποσίας οὐδὲν ἦττον οὐδὲ τὶ μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλον,
eὶ τὸ μὲν σμικρά, τὸ δὲ μεγάλα ἡμᾶι ὁφελεῖ καθαῖ-

1 περὶ τάκτος] περιτάκτος Β; τὰ περὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀ Τ.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Yes, as you now express it, that is pretty clear.

STR. Now I know no common name for the second kind of discrimination; but I do know the name of the kind which retains the better and throws away the worse.

THEAET. What is it?

STR. Every such discrimination, as I think, is universally called a sort of purification.

THEAET. Yes, so it is.

STR. And could not anyone see that purification is of two kinds?

THEAET. Yes, perhaps, in time; but still I do not see it now.

STR. Still there are many kinds of purifications of bodies, and they may all properly be included under one name.

THEAET. What are they and what is the name?

STR. The purification of living creatures, having to do with impurities within the body, such as are successfully discriminated by gymnastics and medicine, and with those outside of the body, not nice to speak of, such as are attended to by the bath-keeper's art; and the purification of inanimate bodies, which is the special care of the fuller's art and in general of the art of exterior decoration; this, with its petty subdivisions, has taken on many names which seem ridiculous.

THEAET. Very.

STR. Certainly they do, Theaetetus. However, the method of argument is neither more nor less concerned with the art of medicine than with that of sponging, but is indifferent if the one benefits us little, the other greatly by its purifying. It en-
Βρον. τοῦ κτήσασθαι γάρ ἐνεκα νοῦν πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ ξυγγενὲς κατανοεῖν πειρωμένη τιμᾶ πρὸς τούτο ἔσ οὐσον πάσας, καὶ θάτερα τῶν ἐτέρων κατὰ τὴν όμοιότητα οὐδὲν ἦγείται γελοιότερα, σεμνότερον δὲ τι τὸν διὰ στρατηγικῆς ἡ φθειριστικῆς δηλοῦντα θηρευτικὴν οὐδὲν νενόμικεν, ἀλλ' ὦς τὸ πολὺ χαυνότερον. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὃπερ ἦρου, τί προσεροῦμεν ὅνομα ξυμπάσας δυνάμεις, ὥσαι σῶμα εἶτε ἐμψυχον εἶτε ἄψυχον εἰλήχασεν¹ καθαίρειν, οὐδὲν αὐτῷ διώσει, ποῖον τι C λεχθεὶν εὐπρεπέστατον εἶναι δοξεὶ μόνον ἔχετω χωρίς τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς καθάρσεων πάντα ἐξυνόησαι, ὥσα ἄλλο τι καθαίρει. τὸν γὰρ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν καθαρμὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπικεχείρηκεν ἀφορίσασθαι τὰ νῦν, εἰ γε ὅπερ βούλεται μανθάνομεν.

θεαί. Ἀλλὰ μεμάθηκα, καὶ συγχωρὸν δύο μὲν εἰδὴ καθάρσεως, ἐν δὲ τὸ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἴδος εἶναι, τοῦ περὶ τὸ σῶμα χωρὶς ὅν.

ἐ. Πάντων κάλλιστα. καὶ μοι τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο D ἐπάκουε πειράμενος αὐτὸ λεχθέν διχῇ τέμνειν.

θεαί. Καθ' ὁπο' ἀν ύψηλή πειράσομαι σοι συντέμνειν.

15. ἐ. Ποιηρίαν ἐτερον ἀρετῆς ἐν ψυχῇ λέγομεν τι;

θεαί. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; ἐ. Καὶ μὴν καθαρμὸς ἢν τὸ λείπειν² μὲν θάτερον, ἔκβαλλει δὲ ὅσον ἂν ἣ ποὺ τι φλαῦρον.

θεαί. Ἡν γὰρ οὖν.

ἐ. Καὶ ψυχῆς ἁρα, καθ' ὅσον ἂν εὐρύσκωμεν

¹ ειλήχασε W; ειλήφασι BT.
² λείπειν Heindorf; λειπεῖν BT.
deavours to understand what is related and what is not related in all arts, for the purpose of acquiring intelligence; and therefore it honours them all equally and does not in making comparisons think one more ridiculous than another, and does not consider him who employs, as his example of hunting, the art of generalship, any more dignified than him who employs the art of louse-catching, but only, for the most part, as more pretentious. And now as to your question, what name we shall give to all the activities whose function it is to purify the body, whether animate or inanimate, it will not matter at all to our method what name sounds finest; it cares only to unite under one name all purifications of everything else and to keep them separate from the purification of the soul. For it has in our present discussion been trying to separate this purification definitely from the rest, if we understand its desire.

THEAET. But I do understand and I agree that there are two kinds of purification and that one kind is the purification of the soul, which is separate from that of the body.

STR. Most excellent. Now pay attention to the next point and try again to divide the term.

THEAET. In whatever way you suggest, I will try to help you in making the division.

STR. Do we say that wickedness is distinct from virtue in the soul?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And purification was retaining the one and throwing out whatever is bad anywhere?

THEAET. Yes, it was.

STR. Hence whenever we find any removal of evil
κακίας ἀφαίρεσιν τινά, καθαρμὸν αὐτὸν λέγοντες ἐν μέλει φθεγξόμεθα.

*Ειλ. Καὶ μάλα γε.

*Ε. Δύο μὲν εἶδη κακίας περὶ ψυχῆν ῥητέον.

*Ειλ. Ποία;

228 *Ε. Τὸ μὲν οἶνον νόσον ἐν σώματι, τὸ δ' οἶνον αἰσχος ἐγγυγνόμενον.

*Ειλ. Οὐκ ἐμαθον.

*Ε. Νόσον ἵσως καὶ στάσιν οὐ ταύτων νενόμικας;

*Ειλ. Οὔδ' αὖ πρὸς τοῦτο ἔχω τί χρή με ἀποκρίνασθαι.

*Ε. Πότερον ἄλλο τι στάσιν ἡγούμενος ἢ τὴν τοῦ φύσει ἐγγυγνοῦσ ἐκ τίνος διαφθορᾶς διαφοράν 1;

*Ειλ. Οὔδεν.

*Ε. ' Ἀλλ' αἰσχος ἄλλο τι πλὴν τὸ τῆς ἀμετρίας πανταχοῦ δυσειδὲς ἐνὸν 2 γένος;

B *Ειλ. Οὐδαμῶς ἄλλο.

*Ε. Τί δέ; ἐν ψυχῇ δόξας ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ θυμῶν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λόγων λύπαις καὶ πάντα ἀλλήλους ταῦτα τῶν φλαύρως ἐχόμενον οὐκ ἡθήμεθα διαφερόμενα;

*Ειλ. Καὶ σφόδρα γε.

*Ε. Ἐγγυγνῆ γε μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ξύμπαντα γέγονεν.

*Ειλ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

*Ε. Στάσιν ἄρα καὶ νόσου τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρίαν λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἐρούμεν.

*Ειλ. Ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

C *Ε. Τί δ'; δο' ἀν 3 κινήσεως μετασχόντα καὶ σκοπὸν τὶνα θέμενα πειράμενα 4 τούτου τυγχάνειν

1 διαφθορᾶς διαφοράν Galen; διαφορᾶς διαφοράν BT, Stobaeus.

2 ἐνὸν Schleiermacher; ἐν δὲν Stobaeus; ἐν δὲν t; ἐν BT.

3 δο' ἀν Cobet; ὅσα BT.

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from the soul, we shall be speaking properly if we call that a purification.

THEAET. Very properly.

STR. We must say that there are two kinds of evil in the soul.

THEAET. What kinds?

STR. The one is comparable to a disease in the body, the other to a deformity.

THEAET. I do not understand.

STR. Perhaps you have not considered that disease and discord are the same thing?

THEAET. I do not know what reply I ought to make to this, either.

STR. Is that because you think discord is anything else than the disagreement of the naturally related, brought about by some corruption?

THEAET. No; I think it is nothing else.

STR. But is deformity anything else than the presence of the quality of disproportion, which is always ugly?

THEAET. Nothing else at all.

STR. Well then; do we not see that in the souls of worthless men opinions are opposed to desires, anger to pleasures, reason to pain, and all such things to one another?

THEAET. Yes, they are, decidedly.

STR. Yet they must all be naturally related.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Then we shall be right if we say that wickedness is a discord and disease of the soul.

THEAET. Yes, quite right.

STR. But if things which partake of motion and aim at some particular mark pass beside the mark

4 πειρώμενα T, Galen, Stobaeus; πειρώμεθα W; om. B.

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καθ’ ἐκάστην ὀρμήν παράφορα αὐτοῦ γίγνεται 1 καὶ ἀποτυγχάνη; 2 πότερον αὐτὰ φῆσομεν ὑπὸ συμμετρίας τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα ἡ τοὐναντίον ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας αὐτὰ πᾶσχειν;

ὁμαλ. Δῆλον ὡς ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας.

ἐς. Ἄλλα μὴν ψυχήν γε ἵσμεν ἄκουσαν πᾶσαν πάν ἀγνοοῦσαν.

ὁμαλ. Σφόδρα γε.

ἐς. Τὸ γε μὴν ἀγνοεῖν ἑστιν ἔπ’ ἀλήθειαν ὀρμώμενης ψυχῆς, παραφόρου συνέσεως γυγνομένης, οὐδὲν ἄλλο πληθυντῆς παραφροσύνη.

ὁμαλ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

ἐς. Ψυχήν ἄρα ἀνόητον αἰσχρὰν καὶ ἀμετρον θετέον.

ὁμαλ. Ἑοικεν.

ἐς. Ἐστι δὴ δύο ταῦτα, ὡς φαίνεται, κακῶν ἐν αὐτῇ γένη, τὸ μὲν πονηρία καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν, νόσος αὐτῆς σαφέστατά ὑπάρχει.

ὁμαλ. Ναι.

ἐς. Τὸ δὲ γε ἀγνοοὶ μὲν καλοῦσι, κακίαν δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν ψυχῇ μόνον γυγνόμενον οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ὁμολογεῖν.

Ἕ ὁμαλ. Κομιδῇ συγχωρητέον, ὅ νῦν δὴ λέξαντος ἡμφεγνόσα σοι, τὸ δύο εἶναι γένη κακίας ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ δεῖλαι μὲν καὶ ἀκολούθην καὶ ἀδικίαν ἡγεῖται ὄνομα ἐν ἡμῖν, τὸ δὲ τῆς πολλῆς καὶ παντοδαπῆς ἀγνοίας πάθος αἰσχὸς θετέον.

1 γίγνεται BT; γίγνεται al.
2 ἀποτυγχάνῃ T; ἀποτυγχάνει B et al.
and miss it on every occasion when they try to hit it, shall we say that this happens to them through right proportion to one another or, on the contrary, through disproportion?¹

**THEAET.** Evidently through disproportion.

**STR.** But yet we know that every soul, if ignorant of anything, is ignorant against its will.

**THEAET.** Very much so.

**STR.** Now being ignorant is nothing else than the aberration of a soul that aims at truth, when the understanding passes beside the mark.

**THEAET.** Very true.

**STR.** Then we must regard a foolish soul as deformed and ill-proportioned.

**THEAET.** So it seems.

**STR.** Then there are, it appears, these two kinds of evils in the soul, one, which people call wickedness, which is very clearly a disease.

**THEAET.** Yes.

**STR.** And the other they call ignorance, but they are not willing to acknowledge that it is vice, when it arises only in the soul.

**THEAET.** It must certainly be admitted, though I disputed it when you said it just now, that there are two kinds of vice in the soul, and that cowardice, intemperance, and injustice must all alike be considered a disease in us, and the widespread and various condition of ignorance must be regarded as a deformity.

¹ The connexion between disproportion and missing the mark is not obvious. The explanation that a missile (e.g. an arrow) which is not evenly balanced will not fly straight, fails to take account of the words πρὸς ἄληξα. The idea seems rather to be that moving objects of various sizes, shapes, and rates of speed must interfere with each other.
16. **ἐσ.** Οὐκοῦν ἐν σώματί γε περὶ δύο παθήματε τούτῳ δύο τέχνα τινὲς ἐγενέσθην;

**οἰκ.** Τίνε τούτῳ;

229 **ἐσ.** Περὶ μὲν αἵσχος γυμναστικῆ, περὶ δὲ νόσου ἰατρικῆ.

**οἰκ.** Φαίνεσθον.

**ἐσ.** Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ μὲν ὑβρὶς καὶ ἀδίκιαν καὶ δειλίαν ἡ κολαστική πέφυκε τεχνῶν μάλιστα δὴ πασῶν προσήκουσα Δίκη;

**οἰκ.** Τὸ γοῦν εἰκός, ὡς εἴπειν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην δόξαν.

**ἐσ.** Τί δὲ; περὶ ξύμπασαν ἄγνοιαν μῶν ἄλλην τινὰ ἡ διδασκαλικὴ ὀρθότερον εἴποι τις ἂν;

**οἰκ.** Οὐδεμίαν.

**ἐσ.** Φέρε δὴ: διδασκαλικὴς δὲ ἄρα ἐν μόνον Β γένος φατέον εἶναι ἡ πλεῖω, δύο δὲ τινὲς αὐτῆς εἶναι μεγίστω, σκόπει.

**οἰκ.** Ποιῶ.

**ἐσ.** Καὶ μοι δοκοὺμεν τῆς ἀν τη τάχιστα εὑρεῖν.

**οἰκ.** Πή;

**ἐσ.** Τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἰδόντες εἰ την κατὰ μέσον αὐτῆς τομῆν ἔχει τινὰ. διπλὴ γὰρ αὐτὴ γιγνομένη δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν διδασκαλικὴν δύο ἀναγκάζει μόρια ἔχειν, ἐν ἑφ’ ἐνι γένει τῶν αὐτῆς ἑκατέρῳ.

**οἰκ.** Τί οὖν; καταφανές τῇ σοι τὸ νῦν ἤτοιμον;

**ἐσ.** Ἀγνοίας γοῦν μέγα τί μοι δοκῶ καὶ χαλεπον ἀφωρισμένον ὅραν εἴδος, πάσι τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτῆς ἀντισταθμον μέρεσιν.

**οἰκ.** Ποιοῦ δὴ;

**ἐσ.** Τὸ μὴ κατειδότα τι δοκεῖν εἴδέναι. δι’ οὐ

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1 Δίκη Cobet; δίκη BT, Stobaeus.
2 αὐτῆ; W; αὐτῆς BT.
3 γοῦν W; δ’ οὖν BT.
str. In the case of the body there are two arts which have to do with these two evil conditions, are there not?

THEAET. What are they?

str. For deformity there is gymnastics, and for disease medicine.

THEAET. That is clear.

str. Hence for insolence and injustice and cowardice is not the corrective art the one of all arts most closely related to Justice?

THEAET. Probably it is, at least according to the judgement of mankind.

str. And for all sorts of ignorance is there any art it would be more correct to suggest than that of instruction?

THEAET. No, none.

str. Come now, think. Shall we say that there is only one kind of instruction, or that there are more and that two are the most important?

THEAET. I am thinking.

str. I think we can find out most quickly in this way.

THEAET. In what way?

str. By seeing whether ignorance admits of being cut in two in the middle; for if ignorance turns out to be twofold, it is clear that instruction must also consist of two parts, one for each part of ignorance.

THEAET. Well, can you see what you are now looking for?

str. I at any rate think I do see one large and grievous kind of ignorance, separate from the rest, and as weighty as all the other parts put together.

THEAET. What is it?

str. Thinking that one knows a thing when one
κινδυνεύει πάντα ὃσα διανοία σφαλλόμεθα γίγνεσθαι πᾶσιν.

ὁ Ἐ. Ἀληθῆ.

ὁ Θ. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τούτῳ γε οἶμαι μόνῳ τῆς ἀγνοίας ἀμαθίαν τούνομα προσρηθήναι.

ὁ Ἐ. Πάνυ γε.

ὁ Θ. Τί δὲ δὴ τῷ τῆς διδασκαλικῆς ᾗρα μέρει τῷ τούτῳ ἀπαλλάττοντι λεκτέον;

ὁ Θ. Οἶμαι μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἤσε, τὸ μὲν ἄλλο δημιουργικὰς διδασκαλίας, τούτῳ δὲ ἐνθάδε γε παιδείαν δι’ ἡμῶν κεκληθόταί.

ὁ Θ. Καὶ γὰρ σχεδόν, ὡς Ἰαίτητε, ἐν πάσῳ Ἐλλησιν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἔτι καὶ τούτῳ σκέπτεσθαι, εἰ ἄτομον ἢ δὴ ἔστι πᾶν ἢ τίνα ἔχον διαίρεσιν ἀξίαν ἐπωνυμίας. 

ὁ Θ. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ σκοπεῖν. 

17. Ὁ. Δοκεῖ τοῖνυν μοι καὶ τοῦτο ἐτι. τῇ σχίζεσθαι.

ὁ Θ. Κατὰ τί; 

ὁ Θ. Τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διδασκαλικῆς ἢ μὲν Ετραχυτέρα τις ἐοικεν ὄδὸς εἶναι, τὸ δ’ ἐτερον αὐτῆς μόριον λειότερον.

ὁ Θ. Τὸ ποίον δὴ τούτων ἐκάτερον λέγωμεν; 

ὁ Θ. Τὸ μὲν ἄρχαιοπρεπές τι πάτριον, δ’ πρὸς τοὺς νιεῖσι μάλιστ’ ἐχρώντο τε καὶ ἕτι πολλοὶ χρώνησι τα τά νῦν, ὅταν αὐτοῖς ἔξαμαρτάνωσί τι, τὰ μὲν 230 χαλεπαίνοντες, τὰ δὲ μαλθακώτερος παραμυθούμενοι τὸ δ’ οὖν ξύμπαν αὐτὸ ὀρθότατα εἴποι τις ἀν νοουθητικήν.

ὁ Θ. Ἐστιν οὕτως.

ὁ Θ. Τὸ δὲ γε, εἶξασι’ τινες αὐτῷ λόγον ἐαυτοῖς

1 εἶξασι BT, Stobaeus; ὡς εἶξασι vulg.
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does not know it. Through this, I believe, all the mistakes of the mind are caused in all of us.

THEAET. True.

STR. And furthermore to this kind of ignorance alone the name of stupidity is given.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Now what name is to be given to that part of instruction which gets rid of this?

THEAET. I think, Stranger, that the other part is called instruction in handicraft, and that this part is here at Athens through our influence called education.

STR. And so it is, Theaetetus, among nearly all the Hellenes. But we must examine further and see whether it is one and indivisible or still admits of division important enough to have a name.

THEAET. Yes, we must see about that.

STR. I think there is still a way in which this also may be divided.

THEAET. On what principle?

STR. Of instruction in arguments one method seems to be rougher, and the other section smoother.

THEAET. What shall we call each of these?

STR. The venerable method of our fathers, which they generally employed towards their sons, and which many still employ, of sometimes showing anger at their errors and sometimes more gently exhorting them—that would most properly be called as a whole admonition.

THEAET. That is true.

STR. On the other hand, some appear to have con-
δόντες ἡγήσασθαι πᾶσαν ἀκούσιον ἀμαθίαν εἶναι, καὶ μαθεῖν οὐδὲν ποτ' ἀν ἐξελειν τὸν οἴομενον εἶναι σοφὸν τούτων ὑν οίοιτο πέρι δεινὸς εἶναι, μετὰ δὲ πολλοῦ πόνου τὸ νουθετητικὸν εἰδὸς τῆς παιδείας σμικρὸν ἀνύτευν.

ثقة. Ὡρθῶς γε νομίζοντες.

Β ἜΕ. Τῷ τοι ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἐπὶ ἐκβολὴν ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ στέλλονται.

ثقة. Τίνι δή;

ΕΕ. Διερωτῶσιν δὲν ἂν οὐχιταί τίς τι πέρι λέγειν λέγων μηδέν; εἰθ' ἄτε πλανωμένων τᾶς δόξας βαδίσως ἐξετάζουσι, καὶ συνάγοντες δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰς ταύτων τιθέασι παρ' ἀλλήλας, τιθέντες δὲ ἐπιδεικνύουσιν αὐτάς αὕτας ἁυτός 1 ἀμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ κατὰ ταύτα ἐναντίας. οἱ δ' ὀρώντες ἀυτοῖς μὲν χαλεπαίνουσι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἠμεροῦνται, καὶ τούτω δὴ τῷ τρόπῳ τῶν περὶ

C αὐτοὺς μεγάλων καὶ σκληρῶν δοξῶν ἀπαλάττονται πασῶν 2 ἀπαλαγῶν ἀκούειν τε ἡδίστην καὶ τῷ πάσχοντι βεβαιότατα γιγνομένην. νομίζοντες γάρ, ὥς παί φίλε, οἱ καθαίροντες αὐτοὺς, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἰατροὶ νεομίκαισιν ἡ πρὸτερον ἂν τῆς προσφερομένης τροφῆς ἀπολαύειν δύνασθαι σώμα, πρὶν ἂν τὰ ἐμποδίζοντα ἐν αὐτῷ τις ἐκβάλῃ, ταύτων καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς διενοθήσαν ἑκεῖνοι, μὴ πρὸτερον αὕτην ἐξειν τῶν προσφερομένων μαθημάτων ὀνησιν,

D πρὶν ἂν ἐλέγχων τις τῶν ἐλεγχόμενον εἰς αἰσχύνην καταστήσῃ, τὰς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐμποδίζουσι δόξας ἐξελῶν, καθαρὸν ἀποφήνη καὶ ταύτα ἠγούμενον, ἀπερ οἶδεν, εἰδέναι μόνα, πλείω δὲ μή.

1 αὑταῖς] αὑταῖς BT.  
2 πασῶν Stobaeus; πασῶν τε BT.
vinced themselves that all ignorance is involuntary, and that he who thinks himself wise would never be willing to learn any of those things in which he believes he is clever, and that the admonitory kind of education takes a deal of trouble and accomplishes little.

Theaet. They are quite right.

Str. So they set themselves to cast out the conceit of cleverness in another way.

Theaet. In what way?

Str. They question a man about the things about which he thinks he is talking sense when he is talking nonsense; then they easily discover that his opinions are like those of men who wander, and in their discussions they collect those opinions and compare them with one another, and by the comparison they show that they contradict one another about the same things, in relation to the same things and in respect to the same things. But those who see this grow angry with themselves and gentle towards others, and this is the way in which they are freed from their high and obstinate opinions about themselves. The process of freeing them, moreover, affords the greatest pleasure to the listeners and the most lasting benefit to him who is subjected to it. For just as physicians who care for the body believe that the body cannot get benefit from any food offered to it until all obstructions are removed, so, my boy, those who purge the soul believe that the soul can receive no benefit from any teachings offered to it until someone by cross-questioning reduces him who is cross-questioned to an attitude of modesty, by removing the opinions that obstruct the teachings, and thus purges him and makes him think that he knows only what he knows, and no more.
"θεαὶ. Βελτίωτη γοῦν καὶ σωφρονεστάτη τῶν ἑξευν αὐτῆ.

ἐ. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα ἢμῖν, ὡς θεαίτητε, καὶ τὸν ἐλεγχὸν λεκτέον ὡς ἄρα μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεων ἐστι, καὶ τὸν ἀνέλεγκτον αὐτὸν νομιστέον, ἂν καὶ τυγχάνῃ βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας ὁμιλητὴς, ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὄντα, ἀπαίδευτόν τε καὶ αἰσχρὸν γεγονέναι ταῦτα, ὁ καθαρώτατον καὶ καλλίστον ἔπρεπε τὸν ὄντως ἐσόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι.

θεαὶ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

18. ἐ. Τί δὲ; τοὺς ταῦτην χρωμένους τῇ τέχνῃ τῶν φήσωμεν; ἕγώ μὲν γὰρ φοβοῦμαι σοφιστὰς φάναι.

θεαὶ. Τί δή; ἐ. Μὴ μείζον αὐτοῖς προσάπτωμεν γέρας.

θεαὶ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν προσέοικε τοιούτω τινὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα.

ἐ. Καὶ γὰρ κυνὶ λύκος, ἀγριώτατον ἥμερωτάτω. τὸν δὲ ἀσφαλῆ δεῖ πάντων μάλιστα περὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητας ἀεὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν φυλακήν· ὁ λοιπὸν ἀργὸς τὸ γένος. ὃμως δὲ ἐστωσαν· οὗ γὰρ περὶ σμικρῶν ὅρων τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν οἴομαι γενήσεσθαι ἐν τῷ ὀπόταν ἰκανῶς φυλάττωσιν.

θεαὶ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ γε εἰκός.

ἐ. Ἔστω δὴ διακριτικῆς τέχνης καθαρτικῆ, καθαρτικῆς δὲ τὸ περὶ ψυχῆν μέρος ἀφωρίσθω, τοῦτον δὲ διδασκαλίκη, διδασκαλικῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆ· τῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς ὁ περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξοσοφίαν γιγνόμενος ἐλεγχὸς ἐν τῷ νῦν λόγῳ παραφανεῖτι μηδὲν ἀλλ' ἢμῖν εἴναι λεγέσθω πλὴν ἢ γένει γενναία σοφιστικῆ.

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Theaet. That is surely the best and most reasonable state of mind.

Str. For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must assert that cross-questioning is the greatest and most efficacious of all purifications, and that he who is not cross-questioned, even though he be the Great King, has not been purified of the greatest taints, and is therefore uneducated and deformed in those things in which he who is to be truly happy ought to be most pure and beautiful.

Theaet. Perfectly true.

Str. Well then, who are those who practise this art? I am afraid to say the sophists.

Theaet. Why so?

Str. Lest we grant them too high a meed of honour.

Theaet. But the description you have just given is very like someone of that sort.

Str. Yes, and a wolf is very like a dog, the wildest like the tamest of animals. But the cautious man must be especially on his guard in the matter of resemblances, for they are very slippery things. However, let us agree that they are the sophists; for I think the strife will not be about petty discriminations when people are sufficiently on their guard.

Theaet. No, probably not.

Str. Then let it be agreed that part of the discriminating art is purification, and as part of purification let that which is concerned with the soul be separated off, and as part of this, instruction, and as part of instruction, education; and let us agree that the cross-questioning of empty conceit of wisdom, which has come to light in our present discussion, is nothing else than the true-born art of sophistry.
THEAI. Λεγέσθω μὲν· ἀπορώ δὲ ἔγωγε ἦδη διὰ τὸ πολλὰ πεφύνθαι, τὸ χρῆ ποτε ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγοντα καὶ διαχυρίζόμενον εἰσεῖν ὄντως εἶναι τὸν σοφιστήν.

Εἴ. Εἰκότως γε οὐ ἀπορῶν. ἀλλὰ τοι κάκεινον ἠγείσθαι χρῆ νῦν ἦδη σφόδρα ἀπορεῖν ὅτι ποτὲ ἐτι διαδύσεται τὸν λόγον· ὅρθη γὰρ ἡ παρομία, τὸ τὰς ἀπάσας μὴ βάδιον εἶναι διαφεύγειν. νῦν οὖν καὶ μάλιστα ἐπιθετέον αὐτῷ.

THEAI. Καλῶς λέγεις.

19. Εἴ. Πρῶτον δὴ στάντες οἶον ἐξαναπνεύσωμεν, καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διαλογισμόμεθα ἀμα ἀνα—

Τις παυόμενοι, φέρε, ὅποστα ἡμῖν ὁ σοφιστὴς πέφανται. δοκῶ μὲν γὰρ, τὸ πρῶτον ἡπρέθη νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἐμμυσθὸς θηρευτὴς.

THEAI. Ναὶ.

Εἴ. Τὸ δὲ γε δεύτερον ἐμπορὸς τις περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθήματα.

THEAI. Πάνω γε.

Εἴ. Τρίτον δὲ ἄρα οὐ περὶ ταῦτα ταῦτα κάτηλος ἀνεφάνη.

THEAI. Ναί, καὶ τέταρτον γε αὐτοπώλης περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἡμῖν ἦν.

Εἴ. Ὁρθῶς ἐμμυσθεύσας. πέμπτον δὲ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι μνημονεύων· τῆς γὰρ ἀγωνιστικῆς Ἐ περὶ λόγους ἦν τις ἀθλητής, τὴν ἐριστικὴν τέχνην ἀφωρισμένος.

THEAI. Ἡν γὰρ οὖν.

Εἴ. Τὸ γε μὴν ἔκτον ἀμφισβητήσιμον μὲν, ὡμως δὲ ἐθέμεν αὐτῶ συγχωρήσαντες δοξῶν ἐμποδίων μαθήμασι περὶ ψυχῆν καθαρτὴν αὐτὸν εἴναι.

THEAI. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

1 γὰρ W; γὰρ ἃν BT. 2 ἦν add. Heindorf.

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THEAET. Let us agree to all that; but the sophist has by this time appeared to be so many things that I am at a loss to know what in the world to say he really is, with any assurance that I am speaking the truth.

STR. No wonder you are at a loss. But it is fair to suppose that by this time he is still more at a loss to know how he can any longer elude our argument; for the proverb is right which says it is not easy to escape all the wrestler's grips. So now we must attack him with redoubled vigour.

THEAET. You are right.

STR. First, then, let us stop to take breath and while we are resting let us count up the number of forms in which the sophist has appeared to us. First, I believe, he was found to be a paid hunter after the young and wealthy.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And secondly a kind of merchant in articles of knowledge for the soul.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. And thirdly did he not turn up as a retailer of these same articles of knowledge?

THEAET. Yes, and fourthly we found he was a seller of his own productions of knowledge.

STR. Your memory is good; but I will try to recall the fifth case myself. He was an athlete in contests of words, who had taken for his own the art of disputation.

THEAET. Yes, he was.

STR. The sixth case was doubtful, but nevertheless we agreed to consider him a purger of souls, who removes opinions that obstruct learning.

THEAET. Very true.
232 ΕΕ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐννοεῖς, ὅταν ἐπιστήμων τις πολλῶν φαίνηται, μιᾶς δὲ τέχνης ὅνωμαι προσ-
αγορεύεται, τὸ φάντασμα τούτῳ ὡς οὐκ ἔσθ' ὑμεῖς,
ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὡς ὁ πάσχων αὐτῷ πρὸς τινὰ τέχνην ὦ
δύναται κατιδείν ἐκείνῳ αὐτῆς εἰς ὃ πάντα τὰ
μαθήματα ταῦτα βλέπει, διὸ καὶ πολλοὶς ὅνωμασιν
ἀνθ' ἐνὸς τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὰ προσαγορεύει;
ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει τούτῳ ταύτῃ πῃ μάλιστα πεφυ-
κέναι.

Β 20. ΕΕ. Μή τοῦν ἥμισες γε αὐτό ἐν τῇ ἐπιτήςει
δι' ἀργίαι πάσχομεν, ἀλλ' ἀναλάβωμεν πρῶτόν τι
τῶν περὶ τον σοφιστὴν εἰρημένων. ἐν γάρ τι μοι
μάλιστα κατεφάνη αὐτὸν μηνύων.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον;
ΕΕ. Ἀντιλογικὸν αὐτὸν ἐφαμεν εἰναὶ που.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναι.
ΕΕ. Τί δ'; οὐ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοῦ τούτου διδά-
σκαλον γίγνεσθαι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;
ΕΕ. Σκοπῶμεν δή, περὶ τῶν ἄρα καὶ φασὶν οἱ
τοιοῦτοι ποιεῖν ἀντιλογικοὺς. ἢ δὲ σκέψις ἥμιὼν ἐξ
C ἀρχῆς ἐστώ τῇ δ' ἐπῇ. φέρε, περὶ τῶν θεῶν,
ὅσ' ἀφανῆ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀρ' ἰκανοὺς ποιοῦσι τούτῳ
δράν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεται γονί 1 δή περὶ αὐτῶν ταύτα.
ΕΕ. Τί δ' ὡσα φανερὰ γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ
τῶν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί γὰρ;
ΕΕ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐν γε ταῖς ἑδίαις συνονοιῶς,
ὅποταν γενέσεως τε καὶ οὐσίας περὶ κατὰ πάντων

1 γονί W; οὖν BT.
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str. Then do you see that when a man appears to know many things, but is called by the name of a single art, there is something wrong about this impression, and that, in fact, the person who labours under this impression in connexion with any art is clearly unable to see the common principle of the art, to which all these kinds of knowledge pertain, so that he calls him who possesses them by many names instead of one?

theaet. Something like that is very likely to be the case.

str. We must not let that happen to us in our search through lack of diligence. So let us first take up again one of our statements about the sophist. For there is one of them which seemed to me to designate him most plainly.

theaet. Which was it?

str. I think we said he was a disputer.

theaet. Yes.

str. And did we not also say that he taught this same art of disputing to others?

theaet. Certainly.

str. Now let us examine and see what the subjects are about which such men say they make their pupils able to dispute. Let us begin our examination at the beginning with this question: Is it about divine things which are invisible to others that they make people able to dispute?

theaet. That is their reputation, at any rate.

str. And how about the visible things of earth and heaven and the like?

theaet. Those are included, of course.

str. And furthermore in private conversations, when the talk is about generation and being in
λέγηται τι, ἢνυσμεν ὡς αὐτοὶ τε ἀντειπεῖν δεινοὶ τοὺς τε ἄλλους ὅτι ποιοῦσιν ἀπερ αὐτοὶ δυνατοὺς;

θεαὶ. Παντάπασι γε.

Δ ΕΕ. Τί δ’ αὖ περὶ νόμων καὶ ἐννέαντων τῶν πολιτικῶν, ἃρ’ οὖχ ὑπισχυοῦνται ποιεῖν ἀμφισβητητικοὺς 1;

θεαὶ. Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὁ αὐτοῖς, ὡς ἐποσ εἰπεῖν, διελέγετο μὴ τοῦτο ὑπισχυούμενοι.

ΕΕ. Τά γε μὴν περὶ πασών τε καὶ κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην τέχνην, ἃ δεὶ πρὸς ἑκαστὸν αὐτὸν τὸν ἰδίαν ὑπογροῦν ἀντειπεῖν, δεδημοσιωμένα ποὺ καταβέβληται γεγραμμένα τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν.

θεαὶ. Τά Πρωταγόρεια μοι φαίνει περὶ τε πάλης ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν εἴρηκενα.

ΕΕ. Καὶ πολλῶν γε, ὃ μακάρις, ἐτέρων. ἀτὰρ δὴ τὸ τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης ἃρ’ οὖν ἐν κεφαλαῖς περὶ πάντων πρὸς ἀμφισβητητικῆς ἰκανή τις δύναμις ἐνικ’ εἶναι;

θεαὶ. Φαίνεται γοῦν σχεδὸν οὐδὲν ὑπολιπεῖν.

ΕΕ. Σὺ δὴ πρὸς θεῶν, ὥς παῖ, δυνατὸν ἤγει τοῦτο; τάχα γὰρ ὃν ὑμεῖς μὲν ὃξυτερον οἱ νέοι πρὸς αὐτό βλέποντε, ἢμεῖς δὲ ἀμβλύτερον.

233 θεαὶ. Τὸ ποιοῦν, καὶ πρὸς τὰ μάλιστα λέγεις; οὐ γὰρ πω κατανοῦ τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.

ΕΕ. Εἰ πάντα ἐπιστασθαι τινα ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ δυνατὸν.

θεαὶ. Μακάριον μεντ’ ἃν ἡμῶν, ὃ ξένε, ἥν τὸ γένος.

ΕΕ. Πῶς οὖν ἃν ποτὲ τις πρὸς γε τὸν ἐπισταμενον αὐτοῖς ἀνεπιστήμων οὖν δύνατ’ ἃν ὑρίες τι λέγων ἀντειπεῖν;

1 ἀμφισβητητικοὺς] ἀμφισβητηκοὺς Τ.
general, we know (do we not?) that they are clever disputants themselves and impart equal ability to others.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. And how about laws and public affairs in general? Do they not promise to make men able to argue about those?

Theaet. Yes, for nobody, to speak broadly, would attend their classes if they did not make that promise.

Str. However in all arts jointly and severally what the professional ought to answer to every opponent is written down somewhere and published that he who will may learn.

Theaet. You seem to refer to the text-books of Protagoras on wrestling and the other arts.

Str. Yes, my friend, and to those of many other authors. But is not the art of disputation, in a word, a trained ability for arguing about all things?

Theaet. Well, at any rate, it does not seem to leave much out.

Str. For heaven's sake, my boy, do you think that is possible? For perhaps you young people may look at the matter with sharper vision than our duller sight.

Theaet. What do you mean and just what do you refer to? I do not yet understand your question.

Str. I ask whether it is possible for a man to know all things.

Theaet. If that were possible, Stranger, ours would indeed be a blessed race.

Str. How, then, can one who is himself ignorant say anything worth while in arguing with one who knows?
PLATO

ΩΕΑΙ. Οüδαμώς.
Τι ποτ' οὖν ἂν εἰή τὸ τῆς σοφιστικῆς δυνάμεως θαύμα;

Τοῦ δὴ πέρι;

Β Τι ποτ' ὅν τινα τρόπον ποτὲ δυνατοὶ τοῖς νέοις δόξαν παρασκευάζειν, ὡς εἰσὶ πάντα πάντων αὐτοὶ σοφώτατοι. δὴλον γὰρ ὡς εἰ μὴτε ἀντέλεγον ὅρθως μὴτε ἐκεῖνοι ἐφαίνοντο, φανόμενοι τε εἰ μηδὲν αὐτὸλ ἐδόκουν διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν εἶναι φρόνιμοι, τὸ σον 1 δὴ τούτο, σχολῆ ποτ' ἂν αὐτοῖς τις χρήματα διδοὺς ἦθελεν ἄν τούτων αὐτῶν μαθητῆς γίγνεσθαι.

ΩΕΑΙ. Σχολῆ μέντ' ἂν.

Νῦν δὲ γ' ἐθέλουσιν;

Καὶ μάλα.

C Δοκοῦσι γὰρ, οἶμαι, πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπιστημόνως ἔχειν αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀπερ ἀντιλέγουσιν.

Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

Δρῶσι δὲ γε τοῦτο πρὸς ἀπαντα, φαμέν;

Ναι.

Πάντα ἅρα σοφὸν τοῖς μαθηταῖς φαίνονται.

Τί μὴν;

Οὐκ ἀντες γε' ἀδύνατον γὰρ τοῦτο γε ἐφάνη.

Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἀδύνατον;

21. Δοξαστικήν ἅρα τινα περὶ πάντων ἐπιστήμην ὁ σοφιστής ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀλήθειαν ἔχων ἀναπέφανται.

1 τὸ σον] τόσον BTW.
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THEAET. He cannot at all.

STR. Then what in the world can the magical power of the sophistical art be?

THEAET. Magical power in what respect?

STR. In the way in which they are able to make young men think that they themselves are in all matters the wisest of men. For it is clear that if they neither disputed correctly nor seemed to the young men to do so, or again if they did seem to dispute rightly but were not considered wiser on that account, nobody, to quote from you,\(^1\) would care to pay them money to become their pupil in these subjects.

THEAET. Certainly not.

STR. But now people do care to do so?

THEAET. Very much.

STR. Yes, for they are supposed, I fancy, to have knowledge themselves of the things about which they dispute.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And they do that about all things, do they not?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Then they appear to their pupils to be wise in all things.

THEAET. To be sure.

STR. Though they are not; for that was shown to be impossible.

THEAET. Of course it is impossible.

STR. Then it is a sort of knowledge based upon mere opinion that the sophist has been shown to possess about all things, not true knowledge.

\(^1\) Cf. 232 d.
D θεαὶ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, καὶ κινδυνεύει γε τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον ὀρθότατα περὶ αὐτῶν εἰρήσθαι.

Ε. Λάβωμεν τοίνυν σαφέστερὸν τι παράδειγμα περὶ τούτων.

θεαὶ. Τὸ ποίον δή;

Ε. Τόδε. καὶ μοι πειρῶ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν εὖ μᾶλα ἀποκρίνασθαι.

θεαὶ. Τὸ ποίον;

Ε. Εἰ τις φαίη μὴ λέγειν μηδ' ἀντιλέγειν, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖν καὶ δρᾷν μιᾷ τέχνῃ ξυνάπαντα ἐπίστασθαι πράγματα.

Ε θεαὶ. Πῶς πάντα εἴπες;

Ε. Τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ βραδείτος σοῦ γ' ἡμῖν εὖθυς ἀγνοεῖς· τὰ γὰρ ξύμπαντα, ὡς ἑοίκας, οὐ μανθάνεις.

θεαὶ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Ε. Λέγω τοῖνυν σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν πάντων, καὶ πρὸς ἡμῖν τὰλλα ξῶα καὶ δένδρα.

θεαὶ. Πῶς λέγεις;

Ε. Εἰ τις ἔμε καὶ σὲ καὶ τᾶλλα φυτὰ πάντα ποιήσειν ἕναν χαί.

θεαὶ. Τίνα δὴ λέγων τὴν ποίησιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ 234 γεωργὸν γε ἔρεις τινα· καὶ γὰρ ξώων αὐτὸν εἴπες ποιητήν.

Ε. Φημὶ, καὶ πρὸς γε θαλάττης καὶ γῆς καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐξυμπάντων· καὶ τοῖνυν καὶ ταχὺ ποιήσας αὐτῶν ἔκαστα πάνιν σμικροῦ νομίσματος ἀποδίδοται.

θεαὶ. Παιδιάν λέγεις τινὰ.

Ε. Τί δέ; τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος δότι πάντα οἴδε καὶ

1 ποιήσειν W; ποιησιν BT. 2 καὶ γῆς W; om. BT.
THEAET. Certainly; and I shouldn't be surprised if that were the most accurate statement we have made about him so far.

STR. Let us then take a clearer example to explain this.

THEAET. What sort of an example?

STR. This one; and try to pay attention and to give a very careful answer to my question.

THEAET. What is the question?

STR. If anyone should say that by virtue of a single art he knew how, not to assert or dispute, but to do and make all things—

THEAET. What do you mean by all things?

STR. You fail to grasp the very beginning of what I said; for apparently you do not understand the word "all."

THEAET. No, I do not.

STR. I mean you and me among the "all," and the other animals besides, and the trees.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. If one should say that he would make you and me and all other created beings.

THEAET. What would he mean by "making"? Evidently you will not say that he means a husbandman; for you said he was a maker of animals also.

STR. Yes, and of sea and earth and heaven and gods and everything else besides; and, moreover, he makes them all quickly and sells them for very little.

THEAET. This is some joke of yours.

STR. Yes? And when a man says that he knows all things and can teach them to another for a small
ταῦτα ἐτερον ὡς διδάξειεν ὀλίγου καὶ ἐν ὀλίγων χρόνω, μᾶς οὐ παιδίαν νομιστεόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντως ποῦ.

Β ΞΕ. Παιδιᾶς δὲ ἐξεῖς ἡ τεχνικῶτερον ἡ καὶ χαριέστερον εἶδος ἡ τὸ μμητικόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς. πάμπολυ γὰρ εἰρηκας εἶδος εἰς ἐν πάντα ἀρισταρυ καὶ σχεδον ποικιλώτατον.

22. ΞΕ. Ὅνκοιν τὸν γ’ ὑπισχνούμενον δυνατόν εἶναι μία τέχνη πάντα ποιεῖν γιγνώσκομεν πον τοῦτο, ὅτι μμήματα καὶ ὅμωνμα τῶν ὄντων ἀπεργαζόμενος τῇ γραφικῇ τέχνῃ δυνατὸς ἔσται τοὺς ἀνοήτους τῶν νέων παιδῶν, πόρρωθεν τὰ γεγραμμένα ἐπιδεικνύσ, λανθάνειν ὡς ὀτιπερ ἀν ὑπολήθη δράν, τοῦτο ἱκανώτατος ὃν ἀποτελεῖν ἔργων.

C ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὕ;

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ δὴ; περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἃρ’ οὐ προσδοκῶμεν εἶναι τινὰ ἄλλην τέχνην, ἢ ἀὐ δυνατὸν ὡς τυχχᾶνει 1 τοὺς νέους καὶ ἐτί πόρρω τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφεστώτας διὰ τῶν ὄντων τοὺς λόγους γοητεύειν, δεικνύντας εἰδωλα λεγόμενα περὶ πάντων, ὥστε ποιεῖν ἀληθῆ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸν λέγοντα δὴ σοφώτατον πάντων ἀπαντ’ εἶναι;

D ΘΕΑΙ. Τί γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἄλλη τις τοιαύτη τέχνην;

ΞΕ. Τοὺς πολλοὺς οὖν, ὧ Θεαῖτητε, τῶν τότε ἀκουόντων ἃρ’ οὐκ ἀνάγκη χρόνον τε ἐπελθόντος αὐτοῖς ἱκανοῦ καὶ προϊούσης ἡλικίας τοῖς τε οὕτω προσπιττοντας ἐγγύθεν καὶ διὰ παθημάτων ἀναγκαζομένους ἐναργῶς ἐφάπτεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μετα-

1 ἢ αὐ δυνατὸν ὡς τυχχᾶνει Burnet; ἢ (ἡ T) οὐ δυνατὸν αὐ τυχχάνειν BT; ἢ ὡς δυνατὸν αὐ τυχχάνει Madvig.

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price in a little time, must we not consider that a joke?

THEAET. Surely we must.

STR. And is there any more artistic or charming kind of joke than the imitative kind?

THEAET. Certainly not; for it is of very frequent occurrence and, if I may say so, most diverse. Your expression is very comprehensive.

STR. And so we recognize that he who professes to be able by virtue of a single art to make all things will be able by virtue of the painter's art, to make imitations which have the same names as the real things, and by showing the pictures at a distance will be able to deceive the duller ones among young children into the belief that he is perfectly able to accomplish in fact whatever he wishes to do.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Well then, may we not expect to find that there is another art which has to do with words, by virtue of which it is possible to bewitch the young through their ears with words while they are still standing at a distance from the realities of truth, by exhibiting to them spoken images of all things, so as to make it seem that they are true and that the speaker is the wisest of all men in all things?

THEAET. Why should there not be such another art?

STR. Now most of the hearers, Theaetetus, when they have lived longer and grown older, will perforce come closer to realities and will be forced by sad experience \(^1\) openly to lay hold on realities; they

\(^1\) Apparently a reference to a proverbial expression. Cf. Hesiod, *Works*, 216 ἔγνω παθῶν; Herodotus, i. 207 τὰ παθήματα μαθήματα.
βάλλειν τὰς τότε γενομένας δόξας, ὡστε σμικρὰ μὲν φαίνεσθαι τὰ μεγάλα, χαλεπὰ δὲ τὰ βάδια, καὶ 
πάντα πάντη ἀνατετράφθαι τὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις 
φαντάσματα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ἔργων 
παραγενομένων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὄς γοῦν ἐμοὶ τηλικῶς ὁντι κρίναι. οἶμαι 
δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν ἐτὶ πόρρωθεν ἀφεστηκότων εἶναι.

ΕΕ. Τουγαροῦν ἢμεῖς σε οἰδε πάντες πειρασόμεθα 
καὶ νῦν πειρώμεθα ὅσ εἶγοτατα ἀνευ τῶν παθημάτων 
προσάγειν. περὶ δ' οὖν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ τόδε μοι

235 λέγει· πότερον ἢδη τοῦτο σαφές, ὅτι τῶν γονίων 
ἐστί τις, μιμητὴς ἃν τῶν ὄντων, ἢ διοικομέν ἐτι 
μὴ περὶ δόσωντες ἀντιλέγειν δοκεῖ δυνατὸς εἶναι, 
περὶ τοσούτων καὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀληθῶς ἔχων 
τυγχάνει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἄν, ὦ ξένε; ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ἢδη 
σαφές ἐκ τῶν εἰρήμενων, ὅτι τῶν τῆς παιδαίας μετ-

ἑχόντων ἐστὶ τις εἰς.1

ΕΕ. Γόητα μὲν ἰή καὶ μιμητὴν ἀρα θετεον 
αὐτὸν τινα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ θετέον;

23. ΕΕ. ''Ἀγε δή, νῦν ἢμέτερον ἔργον ἢδη τὸν 
Βθήρα μηκέτ', ἀνεῦναι· σχεδὸν γὰρ αὐτῶν περειλή-

φαμεν ἐν ἀμφιβλητρικῷ τιν τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις 
περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὄργανων, ὡστε οὐκέτ'2 ἐκφεύξεται 
τόδε γε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ3 ποίον;

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1 τις εἰς Heusde; τις μερὺν εἰς BT (giving eis to the stranger);

τις μερὺν εἰς W.

2 οὐκέτ W; οὐκ ἐτι B; οὐκ T.

3 τὸ W; om. BT.
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will have to change the opinions which they had at first accepted, so that what was great will appear small and what was easy, difficult, and all the apparent truths in arguments will be turned topsy-turvy by the facts that have come upon them in real life. Is not this true?

THEAET. Yes, at least so far as one of my age can judge. But I imagine I am one of those who are still standing at a distance.

STR. Therefore all of us elders here will try, and are now trying, to bring you as near as possible without the sad experience. So answer this question about the sophist: Is this now clear, that he is a kind of a juggler, an imitator of realities, or are we still uncertain whether he may not truly possess the knowledge of all the things about which he seems to be able to argue?

THEAET. How could that be, my dear sir? Surely it is pretty clear by this time from what has been said that he is one of those whose business is entertainment.

STR. That is to say, he must be classed as a juggler and imitator.

THEAET. Of course he must.

STR. Look sharp, then; it is now our business not to let the beast get away again, for we have almost got him into a kind of encircling net of the devices we employ in arguments about such subjects, so that he will not now escape the next thing.

THEAET. What next thing?
Τὸ μὴ οὗ τοῦ γένους εἶναι τοῦ τῶν θαυματοποιῶν τις εἰς.

Θεαί. Κάμοι τοῦτό γε οὕτω περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐξυνδοκεῖ.

ἐς. Δέδοκται 1 τοῖνυν ὅτι τάχιστα διαρέειν τὴν εἰδωλοποιικὴν τέχνην, καὶ καταβάντας εἰς αὐτὴν, εάν μὲν ἡμᾶς εὐθὺς ὁ σοφιστής ὑπομείνῃ, συλλαβεῖν αὐτὸν κατὰ τὰ ἐπεσταλμένα ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ

C λόγου, κάκεινῳ παραδόντας ἀποφήναι τὴν ἀγγαρ' εάν δ' ἄρα κατὰ μέρη τῆς μυθικῆς δύναται τῇ, ἔννακολουθεῖν αὐτῷ διαιροῦντας αἰς τὴν ὑποδεχομένην αὐτὸν μοῦραν, ἐωσπέρ ἄν ληφθῇ. πάντως οὔτε οὕτω οὔτε ἀλλο γένος οὐδὲν μὴ ποτε ἐκφυγὸν ἐπειδήσῃ τὴν τῶν οὕτω δυναμενὸν μετείναι καθ' ἐκαστὰ τε καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα μέθοδοι.

Θεαί. Δέγεις εὖ, καὶ ταῦτα ταύτη ποιητέον.

ἐς. Κατὰ δὴ τὸν παρεληλυθότα τρόπον τῆς

D διαιρέσεως ἐγγυγεῖ μοι καὶ νῦν φαινομαι δύο καθοράν εἶδη τῆς μυθικῆς. τὴν δὲ ζητουμενῆν ἰδέαν, ἐν ὁποτέρῳ ποθ' ἡμῖν οὖσα τυγχάνει, κατα-μαθεῖν οὐδέπω μοι δοκῶ νῦν δυνατὸς εἶναι.

Θεαί. Σὺ δὲ ἄλλ' εἴπε πρῶτον καὶ δίελε ἡμῖν, τίνε τοῦ δύο λέγεις.

ἐς. Μίαν μὲν τὴν εἰκαστικὴν ὅρων ἐν αὐτῇ τέχνῃ. ἔστι δ' αὐτή μάλιστα, ὅποταν κατὰ τὰς τοῦ παραδείγματος συμμετρίας τις ἐν μῆκει καὶ πλάτει καὶ βάθει, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἐτί χρώματα

Ε ἀποδιδοὺς τὰ προσήκοντα ἐκάστοις, 2 τὴν τοῦ μυθιμάτος γένεσιν ἀπεργάζεται.

Θεαί. Τί δ' τε οὐ πάντες οἱ μμούμενοι τι τοῦτ' ἐπιχειροῦσι δράν;

1 δέδοκται] δέδεικται BT; δέδεικται W.
2 ἐκάστοις Stobaeus, W; ἐκάστας BT.
str. The conclusion that he belongs to the class of conjurers.

THEAET. I agree to that opinion of him, too.

str. It is decided, then, that we will as quickly as possible divide the image-making art and go down into it, and if the sophist stands his ground against us at first, we will seize him by the orders of reason, our king, then deliver him up to the king and display his capture. But if he tries to take cover in any of the various sections of the imitative art, we must follow him, always dividing the section into which he has retreated, until he is caught. For assuredly neither he nor any other creature will ever boast of having escaped from pursuers who are able to follow up the pursuit in detail and everywhere in this methodical way.

THEAET. You are right. That is what we must do.

str. To return, then, to our previous method of division, I think I see this time also two classes of imitation, but I do not yet seem to be able to make out in which of them the form we are seeking is to be found.

THEAET. Please first make the division and tell us what two classes you mean.

str. I see the likeness-making art as one part of imitation. This is met with, as a rule, whenever anyone produces the imitation by following the proportions of the original in length, breadth, and depth, and giving, besides, the appropriate colours to each part.

THEAET. Yes, but do not all imitators try to do this?
Ε. Οὐκοῦν ὃσοι γε τῶν μεγάλων ποῦ τι πλάττουσιν ἔργων ἢ γράφουσιν. εἶ γάρ ἀποδιδοἶεν τὴν τῶν καλῶν ἀληθινῆς συμμετρίας, οἴσθ' ὅτι σμικρότερα 236 μὲν τοῦ δέοντος τὰ ἀνω, μείζω δὲ τὰ κάτω φαίνοντ' ἂν διὰ τὸ τὰ μὲν πόρρωθεν, τὰ δ' ἐγγύθεν ύφ' ἡμῶν ὀράσθαι.

θεαί. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.1

Ε. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ χαίρειν τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐάσαντες οἱ δημιουργοὶ νῦν οὐ τὰς οὕσας συμμετρίας, ἀλλὰ τὰς δοξούσας εἶναι καλὰς τοῖς εἰδῶλοις ἐναπεργάζονται;

θεαί. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.2

Ε. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἐτερον οὐ δίκαιον, εἰκὸς γε ὄν, εἰκόνα καλεῖν;

θεαί. Ναί.

Β Ε. Καὶ τῆς γε μυμητικῆς τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέρος κλητέον, ὅπερ εἴπομεν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, εἰκαστικῆν;

θεαί. Κλητέον.

Ε. Τὶ δὲ; τὸ φασιόμενον μὲν διὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐκ καλοῦ θέαν ἐοικέναι τῷ καλῷ, δύναμιν δὲ εἰ τὸς λάβοι τὰ τηλικαῦτα ἰκανῶς ὀρᾶν, μηδ' εἰκὸς ὡς φησιν ἐοικέναι, τὶ καλοῦμεν; ἄρ' οὐκ, ἑπείπερ φαίνεται μὲν, ἐσοκε δὲ οὐ, φάντασμα;

θεαί. Τὶ μὴν;

Ε. Οὐκοῦν πάμπολυ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ξωγραφίαν C τούτῳ τὸ μέρος ἐστὶ καὶ κατὰ ξύμπασαν μυμητικῆν;

θεαί. Πῶς δ' οὖ;

Ε. Τὴν δὴ φάντασμα 3 ἄλλ' οὐκ εἰκόνα ἀπεργα-ζομένην τέχνην ἃρ' οὐ φανταστικὴν ὀρθότατ' ἂν προσαγορεύομεν;

1 πάνω μὲν οὖν T, Stobaeus; om. B.
2 πάνω μὲν οὖν BT; παντάπασι γε W.
3 φάντασμα W; φαντάσματα BT.
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str. Not those who produce some large work of sculpture or painting. For if they reproduced the true proportions of beautiful forms, the upper parts, you know, would seem smaller and the lower parts larger than they ought, because we see the former from a distance, the latter from near at hand.

THEAET. Certainly.

str. So the artists abandon the truth and give their figures not the actual proportions but those which seem to be beautiful, do they not?

THEAET. Certainly.

str. That, then, which is other, but like, we may fairly call a likeness, may we not?

THEAET. Yes.

str. And the part of imitation which is concerned with such things, is to be called, as we called it before, likeness-making?

THEAET. It is to be so called.

str. Now then, what shall we call that which appears, because it is seen from an unfavourable position, to be like the beautiful, but which would not even be likely to resemble that which it claims to be like, if a person were able to see such large works adequately? Shall we not call it, since it appears, but is not like, an appearance?

THEAET. Certainly.

str. And this is very common in painting and in all imitation?

THEAET. Of course.

str. And to the art which produces appearance, but not likeness, the most correct name we could give would be "fantastic art," would it not?
THEAI. Πολύ γε.

ΕΕ. Τοῦτω τοίνυν τῷ δύο ἔλεγον εἰδή τῆς εἰδωλο-

ποικῆς, εἰκαστικὴν καὶ φανταστικὴν.

THEAI. Ὁ δὲ γε καὶ τὸτ' ἡμιφενύσουν, ἐν 1 ποτέρα 2

τὸν σοφιστὴν θετέον, οὐδὲ νῦν πω δύναμαι θεάσα-

θαι σαφῶς, ἀλλ' ὄντως θαυμαστός ἄνηρ 3 καὶ

κατιδείν παγχάλεπος, ἔπει καὶ νῦν μᾶλα εὖ καὶ

κομψῶς εἰς ἀπορον εἰδος διερευνήσασθαι κατα-

πέφευγεν.

THEAI. Ἑοίκεν.

ΕΕ. Ἄρ' οὖν αὐτὸ γιγνώσκων ξύμφης, ἢ σε

οἷν ρύμη τις ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου συνειδημένον συνεπε-

σπάσατο 4 πρὸς τὸ ταχὺ ξυμφήσαι;

THEAI. Πῶς καὶ πρὸς τί 5 τούτο εἶρηκας;

24. ΕΕ. Ὁντως, ὥ μακάριε, ἐσμὲν ἐν παντὰ-

Ε πασὶ χαλεπῇ σκέψει. τὸ γὰρ φανέσθαι τοῦτο καὶ

τὸ δοκεῖν, εἶναι δὲ μὴ, καὶ τὸ λέγειν μὲν ἄττα,

ἀληθῆ δὲ μή, πάντα ταῦτα ἐστὶ μεστὰ ἀπορίας ἀεὶ

ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ καὶ νῦν. ὅπως γὰρ εἰπόντα

χρὴ ψευδὴ λέγειν ἢ δοξάζειν ὄντως εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο

φθεγξάμενον ἐναντιολογία μὴ συνέχεσθαι, παντὰ-

237 πασὶν, ὥ Θεαίτητε, χαλεπόν.

THEAI. Τί δή;

ΕΕ. Τετόλμηκεν δὲ λόγος οὗτος ὑποθέσθαι τὸ μὴ

ὅν εἶναι· ψεύδος γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἐγίγνετο ὄν.

Παρμενίδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, ὥ παϊ, παισὼν ἡμῶν

1 ἐν add. Bessarionis liber.
2 ποτέρα B; ποτέρα TW.
3 ἄνηρ Bekker; ἄνηρ BT.
4 συνεπεσπάσατο W; νῦν ἐπεσπάσατο BT.
5 τί W; δτί BT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. By all means.

STR. These, then, are the two forms of the image-making art that I meant, the likeness-making and the fantastic.

THEAET. You are right.

STR. But I was uncertain before in which of the two the sophist should be placed, and even now I cannot see clearly. The fellow is really wonderful and very difficult to keep in sight, for once more, in the very cleverest manner he has withdrawn into a baffling classification where it is hard to track him.

THEAET. So it seems.

STR. Do you assent because you recognize the fact, or did the force of habit hurry you along to a speedy assent?

THEAET. What do you mean, and why did you say that?

STR. We are really, my dear friend, engaged in a very difficult investigation; for the matter of appearing and seeming, but not being, and of saying things, but not true ones—all this is now and always has been very perplexing. You see, Theaetetus, it is extremely difficult to understand how a man is to say or think that falsehood really exists and in saying this not be involved in contradiction.

THEAET. Why?

STR. This statement involves the bold assumption that not-being exists, for otherwise falsehood could not come into existence. But the great Parmenides, my boy, from the time when we were children to
PLATO

ἀρχόμενος τε καὶ διὰ τέλους τοῦτο ἀπεμαρτύρατο, πεξῆ τε ὅδε ἐκάστοτε λέγων καὶ μετὰ μέτρων.

οὐ γὰρ μὴ ποτὲ τοῦτο δαμῆ; φησίν, εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα· ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆς ἀφ’ ὅδου διξῆμενος εἶργε νόημα.

Β παρ’ ἔκεινου τε οὖν μαρτυρεῖται, καὶ μάλιστα γε δὴ πάντων ὁ λόγος αὐτὸς ἂν δηλώσει μέτρια βασανισθεῖσι. τοῦτο οὖν αὐτὸ πρῶτον θεασώμεθα, εἰ μή τί σοι διαφέρει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν ὅτι βούλει τίθεσο, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἢ βέλτιστα διεξεισι σκοπῶν αὐτὸς τε ίδι κάμε κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ὄδον ἀγε.

25. ΖΕ. 'Ἀλλὰ χρῆ δράν ταῦτα. καὶ μοι λέγε· τὸ μηδαμῶς οὖν τολμῶμεν που φθέγγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ΖΕ. Μὴ τούτων ἐριδὸς ἔνεκα μηδὲ παιδίας, ἀλλ’ ΤΕΙ σπουδῆ  ἐςιν οὐσιοσαντά τινα ἀποκρώνας τῶν ἄκρωτῶν ποι χρῆ τούνομ, ἐπιφέρεως τοῦτο τὸ μὴ ὄν· τὶ ἄν δοκοῦμεν ἃν εἰς τί καὶ ἐπὶ ποιόν αὐτὸν τε καταχρῆσαςθαι καὶ τῷ πνευματουμένῳ δεικνύναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Χαλεπὸν ήρου καὶ σχεδὸν εἰπὲιν οἷος γε ἐμοὶ παντάπασιν ἄπορον.

ΖΕ. 'Ἀλλ’ οὖν τοῦτο γε δῆλον, ὅτι τῶν ὄντων ἐπὶ τὶ ἄν οὐκ οἰςτέουν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν;

ΖΕ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειπέρ όικ ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν, οὖδ’ ἐπὶ τὸ τὶ φέρων ὀρθῶς ἂν τις φέροι.

1 τοῦτο δαμὴ Simplicius; τοῦτ’ οὐδαμὴ ΒΤ.
2 διξῆμενος ΒΤ (διξῆσις 258 n).
3 αὐτὸς ΒΤ; οὕτως ΒΤ.
4 ἀλλ’ εἰ σπουδῆ Bekker; ἀλλὰς ποὺ δὴ B; ἀλλὰ σπουδῆ T.
5 τὶ] ὅτι ΤΕΙ.
6 τὶ om. ΒΤ.
the end of his life, always protested against this and constantly repeated both in prose and in verse:

Never let this thought prevail, saith he, that not-being is; But keep your mind from this way of investigation.

So that is his testimony, and a reasonable examination of the statement itself would make it most absolutely clear. Let us then consider this matter first, if it's all the same to you.

THEAET. Assume my consent to anything you wish. Consider only the argument, how it may best be pursued; follow your own course, and take me along with you.

STR. Very well, then. Now tell me; do we venture to use the phrase absolute not-being?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. If, then, not merely for the sake of discussion or as a joke, but seriously, one of his pupils were asked to consider and answer the question "To what is the designation 'not-being' to be applied?" how do we think he would reply to his questioner, and how would he apply the term, for what purpose, and to what object?

THEAET. That is a difficult question; I may say that for a fellow like me it is unanswerable.

STR. But this is clear, anyhow, that the term "not-being" cannot be applied to any being.

THEAET. Of course not.

STR. And if not to being, then it could not properly be applied to something, either.
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θεαί. Πῶς δή;

Δ ξε. Καὶ τὸῦτο ἡμῖν ποὺ φανερόν, ὡς καὶ τὸ "τὶ" τοῦτο βῆμα ἐπ’ οὕτῳ λέγομεν ἐκάστοτε·
μόνον γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγειν, ὡσπερ γυμνὸν καὶ ἀπηρημω-
μένον ἀπὸ τῶν οὖντων ἀπάντων, ἀδύνατον· ἢ γὰρ;

θεαί. Ἀδύνατον.

ξε. Ἀρά τῆς σκοπῶν ξύμφης ὡς ἀνάγκη τὸν τι
λέγοντα ἐν γε τι λέγειν;

θεαί. Οὔτως.

ξε. 'Ενῶς γὰρ δὴ τὸ γε "τὶ" φήσεις σημεῖον
εἶναι, τὸ δὲ "τινὲς" δυοῦν, τὸ δὲ "τινὲς" πολλῶν.

θεαί. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;

Ε ξε. Τὸν δὲ δὴ μὴ τὶ λέγοντα ἀναγκαῖότατον,
ὡς έουκε, παντάπασι μηδὲν λέγειν.

θεαί. Ἀναγκαῖότατον μὲν οὖν.

ξε. Ἀρ’ οὖν οὐδὲ τοῦτο συγχωρητέον, τὸ τὸν
τοιοῦτον λέγειν μὲν,1 λέγειν μὲντοι μηδὲν, ἀλλ’
οὐδὲ λέγειν φατέον, ὡς γ’ ἂν ἐπιχειρή μὴ ὁν φθέγ-
γεσθαι;

θεαί. Τέλος γοῦν ἂν ἀπορίας ὁ λόγος ἔχοι.

238 26. ξε. Μήπως μέγ’ εἰπῆς· ἔτι γὰρ, ὡ μα-
κάρε, ἔστι, καὶ ταῦτα γε τῶν ἀποριῶν ἡ μεγίστη
καὶ πρώτη. περὶ γὰρ αὐτήν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἄρχην οὖσα
τυγχάνει.

θεαί. Πῶς φής; λέγε καὶ μηδὲν ἀποκαλήσῃς.

ξε. Τῷ μὲν οὖν που προσγένοιτ’ ἂν τι τῶν
οὖντων ἐτερον;

θεαί. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;

ξε. Μή οὖν δὲ τὶ 2 τῶν οὖντων ἀρὰ προσγίγνεσθαι
φήσομεν δυνατὸν εἶναι;

1 μὲν τὶ BT; τὶ om. Schleiermacher.
2 οὖν δὲ τἰ] ὁν δὲ τὶ B; οὖν δὲ T.

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THEAET. How could it?

STR. And this is plain to us, that we always use the word “something” of some being, for to speak of “something” in the abstract, naked, as it were, and disconnected from all beings is impossible, is it not?

THEAET. Yes, it is.

STR. You assent because you recognize that he who says something must say some one thing?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And you will agree that “something” or “some” in the singular is the sign of one, in the dual of two, and in the plural of many.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And he who says not something, must quite necessarily say absolutely nothing.

THEAET. Quite necessarily.

STR. Then we cannot even concede that such a person speaks, but says nothing? We must even declare that he who undertakes to say “not-being” does not speak at all?

THEAET. The argument could go no further in perplexity.

STR. Boast not too soon! For there still remains, my friend, the first and greatest of perplexities. It affects the very beginning of the matter.

THEAET. What do you mean? Do not hesitate to speak.

STR. To that which is may be added or attributed some other thing which is?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. But shall we assert that to that which is not anything which is can be attributed?
THEAEI. Καὶ πῶς;

ΞΕ. Ἄριθμὸν δὴ τὸν ἐξυπνατα τῶν ὄντων τίθεμεν.

Β ΘΕΑΙ. Εἴπερ γε καὶ ἀλλῳ τι θετέον ὡς ὦν.

ΞΕ. Μὴ τοίνυν μηδ’ ἐπιχειρῶμεν ἀριθμὸν μήτε πλῆθος μήτε τὸ ἐν πρὸς τὸ μὴ ὃν προσφέρειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοιν ἃν ὁρθῶς γε, ὡς ἐσοκεν, ἐπιχειροῦμεν, ὡς φήσων ὁ λόγος.

ΞΕ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν ἢ διὰ τοῦ στόματος φθέγξαιτο ἂν τις ἡ καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ παράπαν λάβοι τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἡ τὸ μὴ ὃν χωρὶς ἀριθμοῦ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγει πή; 

ΞΕ. Μὴ ὄντα μὲν ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν, ἄρα οὐ πλῆθος

C ἐπιχειροῦμεν ἀριθμοῦ προστιθέναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΞΕ. Μὴ ὄν δέ, ἄρα οὐ τὸ ἐν αὐ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Σαφέστατά γε.

ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν οὔτε δίκαιον γε οὔτε ὁρθόν φαμεν ὄν ἐπιχειρεῖν μὴ ὄντι προσαρμόττειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεις ἀληθέστατα.

ΞΕ. Συννοεῖς οὖν ὡς οὔτε φθέγξασθαι δυνατὸν ὁρθῶς οὔτ’ εἰπείν οὔτε διανοηθήναι τὸ μὴ ὃν αὐτό καθ’ αὐτό, ἀλλ’ ἐστιν ἀδιανοητὸν τε καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἀφθεγκτον καὶ ἀλογον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

D ΞΕ. ὅ ἀρτι λέγουσασάμην ἄρτι λέγων τὴν μεγίστην ἀπορίαν ἑρείν αὐτοῦ πέρι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦ δὲ ἡτί μείζω τινα λέγει καὶ αὐτὴν ἔχομεν;

ΞΕ. Τί δὲ; ἡ θαυμάσιε; οὐκ ἐννοεῖς αὐτοῖς ἄτις;

1 τοῦ δὲ in marg. T; τὸ δὲ BT; τὸ δὲ W; τὶ δὲ in marg. al.; τὸ δὲ (τὰ δὲ) . . . ἔχομεν attributed to the Stranger by Winckelmann and others.

2 τὶ δὲ B; τὶ δὰl T; τίνα δὴ Winckelmann and others.

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THEAET. Certainly not.
STR. Now we assume that all number is among the things which are.
THEAET. Yes, if anything can be assumed to be.
STR. Then let us not even undertake to attribute either the singular or the plural of number to not-being.
THEAET. We should, apparently, not be right in undertaking that, as our argument shows.
STR. How then could a man either utter in speech or even so much as conceive in his mind things which are not, or not-being, apart from number?
THEAET. Tell me how number is involved in such conceptions.
STR. When we say "things which are not," do we not attribute plurality to them?
THEAET. Certainly.
STR. And in saying "a thing which is not," do we not equally attribute the singular number?
THEAET. Obviously.
STR. And yet we assert that it is neither right nor fair to undertake to attribute being to not-being.
THEAET. Very true.
STR. Do you see, then, that it is impossible rightly to utter or to say or to think of not-being without any attribute, but it is a thing inconceivable, inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational?
THEAET. Absolutely.
STR. Then was I mistaken just now in saying that the difficulty I was going to speak of was the greatest in our subject?
THEAET. But is there a still greater one that we can mention?
STR. Why, my dear fellow, don't you see, by the
λεχθείσων ὅτι καὶ τὸν ἐλέγχοντα εἰς ἀπορίαν καθι-στησαί τὸ μὴ ὁν ὀυτῶς, ὡστε, ὅποταν αὐτὸ ἐπιχειρή
tις ἐλέγχειν, ἐναντία αὐτὸν αὐτῷ περὶ ἑκεῖνο
ἀναγκάζεσθαι λέγειν;

ὁεαί. Πῶς φής; εἰπὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον.

ἐε. Οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸ σαφέστερον ἐν ἐμοὶ σκοπεῖν.

Ε ἔγω μὲν γὰρ ὑποθέμενος οὔτε ἐνὸς οὔτε τῶν
πολλῶν τὸ μὴ ὁν δεῖν μετέχειν, ἀρτὶ τε καὶ νῦν
ὀυτῶς ἐν αὐτῷ εἰρήκα: τὸ μὴ ὁν γὰρ φημὶ. ξυνής
tοῦ;

ὁεαί. Ναὶ.

ἐε. Καὶ μὴν αὖ καὶ σμικρὸν ἐμπροσθεῖν ἀφθεγ-
κτόν τε αὐτὸ καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄλογον ἔφην εἰναι.

ξυνέπει;

ὁεαί. Ξυνέπομαι. πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ἐε. Οὐκοῦν τὸ γε εἰναί προσάπτειν πειρώμενος

239 ἐναντία τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλεγον;

ὁεαί. Φαίνει.

ἐε. Τί δέ; τούτῳ προσάπτων οὐχ ὡς ἐνὶ διελε-

γόμην;

ὁεαί. Ναὶ.

ἐε. Καὶ μὴν ἄλογον τε λέγων καὶ ἄρρητον καὶ
ἀφθεγκτόν ὡς γε πρὸς ἐν τὸν λόγον ἐποιούμην.

ὁεαί. Πῶς δ´ οὐ;

ἐε. Φαμέν δέ γε δεῖν, εἶπερ ὅρθως τις λέξει,
μήτε ὡς ἐν μήτε ὡς πολλὰ δισορίζειν αὐτό, μηδὲ τὸ
παράπαν αὐτὸ καλεῖν· ἔνὸς γὰρ εἴδει καὶ κατὰ
tαύτην ἀν τὴν πρόσφησιν προσαγορεύσωτο.

ὁεαί. Παντάπασι γε.

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very arguments we have used, that not-being reduces him who would refute it to such difficulties that when he attempts to refute it he is forced to contradict himself?

theaet. What do you mean? Speak still more clearly.

str. You must not look for more clearness in me; for although I maintained that not-being could have nothing to do with either the singular or the plural number, I spoke of it just now, and am still speaking of it, as one; for I say “that which is not.” You understand surely?

theaet. Yes.

str. And again a little while ago I said it was inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational. Do you follow me?

theaet. Yes, of course.

str. Then when I undertook to attach the verb “to be” to not-being I was contradicting what I said before.

theaet. Evidently.

str. Well, then; when I attached this verb to it, did I not address it in the singular?

theaet. Yes.

str. And when I called it irrational, inexpressible, and unspeakable, I addressed my speech to it as singular.

theaet. Of course you did.

str. But we say that, if one is to speak correctly, one must not define it as either singular or plural, and must not even call it “it” at all; for even by this manner of referring to it one would be giving it the form of the singular.

theaet. Certainly.
B 27. ἘΕ. Τὸν μὲν τοῖνυν ἐμὲ γ' ἐτὶ τί τις ἂν λέγω; καὶ γὰρ τὰλαὶ καὶ τὰν νῦν ἠττημένον ἂν εὑροῖ περὶ τοῦ τοῦ μὴ οὖντος ἐλεγχοῦ. ὥστε ἐν ἑμοίῳ λέγοντι, καθάπερ εἰπον, μὴ σκοπῶμεν τὴν ὀρθολογίαν περὶ τὸ μὴ οὖν, ἀλλ' εἰα 2 δὴ νῦν ἐν σοὶ σκεφώμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς φήσι;

ΕΕ. Ἡθὶ ἡμῖν εὖ καὶ γενναίως, ἀτε νέος ὑν, ὅτι μάλιστα δύνασαι συντείνας πειράθητι, μήτε οὐσίαν μήτε τὸ ἐν μήτε πλῆθος ἀριθμοῦ προστείες τῷ μὴ οὖντι, κατὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν 3 φθέγξασθαι τι περὶ αὐτοῦ.

C ΘΕΑΙ. Πολλή μέντ' ἂν με καὶ ἄτοποσ ἔχοι προθυμία τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως, εἰ σὲ τοιαῦτα ὤρων πάσχοντα αὐτὸς ἐπιχειροῖν.

ΕΕ. Ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, σὲ μὲν καὶ ἐμὲ χαίρειν ἐώμεν· ἐως δ' ἂν τοῖς δυναμένω δρᾶν τούτῳ ἐντυγχάνωμεν, μέχρι τούτου λέγωμεν ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον πανούργως εἰς ἀπορον ὃ σοφίστῆς τότον καταδέδυκεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα δὴ φαίνεται.

ΕΕ. Τουγαροῦν εἰ τίνα φήσομεν αὐτὸν ἐχειν φαν-

D ταστικὴν τέχνην, βαδίως ἐκ ταύτης τῆς χρείας τῶν λόγων ἀντιλαμβανόμενος ἡμῶν εἰς τούναντίον ἀποστρέφει 4 τοὺς λόγους, ὅταν εἰδωλοποιῶν αὐτὸν καλώμεν, ἀνερωτῶν τί ποτε τὸ παράπαν εἰδωλὸν λέγομεν. σκοπεῖν ὡν, ὧ Θεαίτητε, χρῆ, τί τις τῷ νεανίᾳ πρὸς τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρινεῖται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δήλου ὅτι φήσομεν τὰ τέ χρὸν εἰς οὗσιν καὶ κατόπτροις εἰδώλα, ἐτι καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα καὶ τὰ τετυπωμένα καὶ τάλλα ὥσα ποὺ τουαυτ' ἐσθ' ἐτερα.

1 ἐμὲ γ' ἐτὶ τί τις] ἐμὲ τε τι τις B; ἐμὲ γε ἐτι τις T; ἐμὲ ἐτι τι τις W.

2 εἰα Bessarion's copy; εἰα BT.

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str. But poor me, what can anyone say of me any longer? For you would find me now, as always before, defeated in the refutation of not-being. So, as I said before, we must not look to me for correctness of speech about not-being. But come now, let us look to you for it.

THEAET. What do you mean?

str. Come, I beg of you, make a sturdy effort, young man as you are, and try with might and main to say something correctly about not-being, without attributing to it either existence or unity or plurality.

THEAET. But I should be possessed of great and absurd eagerness for the attempt, if I were to undertake it with your experience before my eyes.

str. Well, if you like, let us say no more of you and me; but until we find someone who can accomplish this, let us confess that the sophist has in most rascally fashion hidden himself in a place we cannot explore.

THEAET. That seems to be decidedly the case.

str. And so, if we say he has an art, as it were, of making appearances, he will easily take advantage of our poverty of terms to make a counter attack, twisting our words to the opposite meaning; when we call him an image-maker, he will ask us what we mean by "image," exactly. So, Theaetetus, we must see what reply is to be made to the young man's question.

THEAET. Obviously we shall reply that we mean the images in water and in mirrors, and those in paintings, too, and sculptures, and all the other things of the same sort.
Ε 28. ΞΕ. Φανερός, ὃ Θεαίτητε, εἴ σοφιστὴν οὐχ ἐωρακὼς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή;

ΞΕ. Δόξει σοι μέν ἡ παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔχειν ὁμματα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΞΕ. Τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ὅταν οὔτως αὐτῷ διδόσ εἶν ἐν κατόπτροις ἡ πλάσμασι λέγης τι, καταγελάσεται σοι τῶν λόγων, ὅταν ὥς βλέποντι λέγης αὐτῷ, 240 προσποιούμενος οὔτε κάτοπτρα οὔτε ύδατα γιγνώσκειν οὔτε τὸ παράπαν ὄψιν, τὸ δ’ ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐρωτήσει σε μόνον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίον;

ΞΕ. Τὸ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἃ πολλὰ εἰπὼν ἡξίωσας ἐνι προσεπεῖν ὁνόματι φθεγξάμενος εἰδώλων ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὅς ἐν ὦν. λέγει οὖν καὶ ἀμύνον μηδὲν ὑποχωρῶν τὸν ἀνδρα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δήτα, ὃ ξένε, εἰδώλων ἃν φαίμεν εἰναι πλήν γε τὸ πρὸς τάληθινὸν ἄφωμοιμένον ἐτέρον τοιοῦτον;

ΞΕ. Ἐτέρον δὲ λέγεις τοιοῦτον ἀληθινόν, ἢ ἐπὶ Β τίνι τὸ τοιοῦτον εἴπες;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινὸν γε, ἀλλ’ ἔοικός μέν.

ΞΕ. Ἄρα τὸ ἀληθινὸν οὔτως ὧν λέγων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔτως.

ΞΕ. Τί δέ; τὸ μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἄρ’ ἐναντίον ἀληθοῦς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μην;

ΞΕ. Οὐκ οὔτως ἢ οὔτως ἢ ἀρα λέγεις τὸ ἔοικός, εἴπερ αὐτό γε μὴ ἀληθινὸν ἑρεῖς.

1 οὔτως W; οὔτων B; om. Τ.
2 ὡν T; οὐκὸν B; οὐκ ὡν W.
str. It is evident, Theaetetus, that you never saw a sophist.

THEAET. Why?
str. He will make you think his eyes are shut or he has none at all.

THEAET. How so?
str. When you give this answer, if you speak of something in mirrors or works of art, he will laugh at your words, when you talk to him as if he could see. He will feign ignorance of mirrors and water and of sight altogether, and will question you only about that which is deduced from your words.

THEAET. What is that?
str. That which exists throughout all these things which you say are many but which you saw fit to call by one name, when you said "image" of them all, as if they were all one thing. So speak and defend yourself. Do not give way to the man at all.

THEAET. Why, Stranger, what can we say an image is, except another such thing fashioned in the likeness of the true one?
str. Do you mean another such true one, or in what sense did you say "such"?

THEAET. Not a true one by any means, but only one like the true.
str. And by the true you mean that which really is?

THEAET. Exactly.
str. And the not true is the opposite of the true?
THEAET. Of course.
str. That which is like, then, you say does not really exist, if you say it is not true.
ΟΕΑΙ. 'Αλλ' ἐστι γε μὴν πως. ¹
ΞΕ. Οὔκον ² ἀληθῶς γε, φήσ.
ΟΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν πλὴν γ' εἰκὼν ὄντως.
ΞΕ. Οὐκ ὡν ³ ἀρα ⁴ ὄντως ἐστὶν ὄντως ἦν λέγομεν εἰκόνα;

C ΟΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει τοιαύτην τινὰ πεπλέχθαι συμπλοκὴν τὸ μὴ ὁν τῷ ὄντι, καὶ μάλα ἄτοπον.
ΞΕ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἄτοπον; ὥρας γοῦν ὅτι καὶ νῦν διὰ τῆς ἑπαλλάξεως ταύτης ὁ πολυκέφαλος σοφοσθῆς ἑνάγκακεν ἡμᾶς τὸ μὴ ὁν οὐχ ἐκόντας ὀμολογεῖν εἶναι πως.
ΟΕΑΙ. 'Ορῶ καὶ μάλα.
ΞΕ. Τί δὲ δή; τὴν τέχνην αὐτοῦ τίνα ἀφορίσαντες ἢμιν αὐτοῖς συμφωνεῖν οὐκ ἔσομεθα;
ΟΕΑΙ. Πῇ καὶ τὸ ποιόν τι φοβούμενος οὕτω λέγεις;

D ΞΕ. 'Οταν περὶ τὸ φάντασμα αὐτοῦ ἀπατᾶν φῶμεν καὶ τὴν τέχνην εἶναι τινα ἀπατητικὴν αὐτοῦ, τότε πότερον ψευδὴ δοξάζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν φήσομεν υπὸ τῆς ἑκείνου τέχνης, ἢ τί ποτ' ἔροῦμεν;
ΟΕΑΙ. Τούτῳ τί γὰρ ἄν ἄλλο εἶπαμεν;
ΞΕ. Ψευδῆς δ' αὐτά δόξα ἐσται τάναντια τοῖς οὕσι δοξάζουσα, ἢ πῶς;
ΟΕΑΙ. Τάναντια.
ΞΕ. Λέγεις ἀρα τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν τὴν ψευδὴ δόξαν;
ΟΕΑΙ. 'Ανάγκη.

Ε ΞΕ. Πότερον μὴ εἶναι τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζουσαν, ἢ πῶς εἶναι τὰ μηδαμῶς ὄντα;

¹ πῶς Hermann; πῶς; BT (the previous words being given to the stranger).
² οὔκον W; οὔκοιν T; οὔκον B.

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THEAET. But it does exist, in a way.
STR. But not truly, you mean.
THEAET. No, except that it is really a likeness.
STR. Then what we call a likeness, though not really existing, really does exist?
THEAET. Not-being does seem to have got into some such entanglement with being, and it is very absurd.
STR. Of course it is absurd. You see, at any rate, how by this interchange of words the many-headed sophist has once more forced us against our will to admit that not-being exists in a way.
THEAET. Yes, I see that very well.
STR. Well then, how can we define his art without contradicting ourselves?
THEAET. Why do you say that? What are you afraid of?
STR. When, in talking about appearance, we say that he deceives and that his art is an art of deception, shall we say that our mind is misled by his art to hold a false opinion, or what shall we say?
THEAET. We shall say that. What else could we say?
STR. But, again, false opinion will be that which thinks the opposite of reality, will it not?
THEAET. Yes.
STR. You mean, then, that false opinion thinks things which are not?
THEAET. Necessarily.
STR. Does it think that things which are not, are not, or that things which are not at all, in some sense are?

3 οὐκ ἐν ὡκὸν B; οὐκ οὐν T.
4 ἄρα Badham; ἄρα οὐκ BT.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰναι πως τὰ μὴ ὄντα δεῖ γε, εἰπερ ψεῦσται ποτὲ τίς τι καὶ κατὰ βραχύ.

ΕΕ. Τί δ'; οὐ καὶ μηδαμῶς εἶναι τὰ πάντως ὄντα δοξάζεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΕΕ. Καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ψεῦδος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτο.

ΕΕ. Καὶ λόγος, οἶμαι, ψευδὴς οὕτω κατὰ ταύτα 1 νομισθήσεται τὰ τε ὄντα λέγων μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως 2 τοιοῦτος γένοιτο;

ΕΕ. Σχεδὸν οὐδαμῶς· ἄλλα ταύτα ὁ σοφιστὴς οὐ φήσει. ἦ τὸς μηχανῆς συγχωρεῖν των τῶν εὖ φρονοῦντων, οταν ἄφθεγκτα καὶ ἀρρητα καὶ ἀλογα καὶ ἀδιανόητα προδιωμολογημένα 3 ἦ τὰ πρὸ τοῦτω ὁμολογηθέντα; μανθάνομεν, ὡ Θεαίτητε, τὰ λέγει 4 ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ μανθάνομεν ὅτι τὰν αναγκαία φήσει λέγειν ήμᾶς τοῖς νῦν δή, ψευδὴ τολμησάντας εἰπεῖν ὡς ἔστων ἐν δόξαις τε καὶ κατὰ λόγους; τῷ Β γὰρ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὃν προσάπτειν ήμᾶς πολλὰς ἀναγκαζομα, διομολογησαμένους νῦν δὴ που τοῦτο εἶναι πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον.

29. ΕΕ. Ὅρθως ἀπεμνημόνευσας. ἂλλ' ὥρα 5 δὴ βουλεύσασθαι 6 τὶ χρὴ δρᾶν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ πέρι τὰς γὰρ ἀντιλήψεις καὶ ἀπορίας, ἐὰν αὐτὸν διε- ρευνώμεν ἐν τῇ τῶν ψευδοργῶν καὶ γοήτων τέχνη τιθέντες, ὄρᾳ ὡς εὐποροὶ καὶ πολλαί.

1 ταύτα Stobaeus; ταύτα ταύτα B; ταύτα Τ; ταύτα ταύτα W.
2 ἄλλως W, Stobaeus; ἄλλος BT.
3 προδιωμολογημένα Τ; προσδιωμολογημένα B; ἄφθεγκτα . . . ἀδιανόητα om. Madvig, Schanz, Burnet.

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THEAET. It must think that things which are not in some sense are—that is, if anyone is ever to think falsely at all, even in a slight degree.

STR. And does it not also think that things which certainly are, are not at all?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And this too is falsehood?

THEAET. Yes, it is.

STR. And therefore a statement will likewise be considered false, if it declares that things which are, are not, or that things which are not, are.

THEAET. In what other way could a statement be made false?

STR. Virtually in no other way; but the sophist will not assent to this. Or how can any reasonable man assent to it, when the expressions we just agreed upon were previously agreed to be inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational, and inconceivable? Do we understand his meaning, Theaetetus?

THEAET. Of course we understand that he will say we are contradicting our recent statements, since we dare to say that falsehood exists in opinions and words; for he will say that we are thus forced repeatedly to attribute being to not-being, although we agreed a while ago that nothing could be more impossible than that.

STR. You are quite right to remind me. But I think it is high time to consider what ought to be done about the sophist; for you see how easily and repeatedly he can raise objections and difficulties, if we conduct our search by putting him in the guild of false-workers and jugglers.
 Platón.

 **ΣΕ.** Μικρόν μέρος τοίνυν αὐτῶν διεληλύθαμεν, οὐσῶν ὡς ἔποις εἶπεν ἀπεράντων.

 **ΘΕΑΙ.** Ἀδύνατόν γ’ ἄν, ἂν ὡς ἔουκεν, εἰ ὁ τὸν σοφιστήν ἔλειν, εἰ ταῦτα οὔτως ἔχει.

 **ΣΕ.** Τί οὖν; ἀποστησόμεθα νῦν μαλθακισθέντες;

 **ΘΕΑΙ.** Οὐκοιν ἔγγυε φήμι δεῖν, εἰ καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν οἷον τ’ ἐπιλαβέσθαι τῇ τάνδρῷ ἐσμεν.

 **ΣΕ.** Ἑξεις οὖν συγγνώμην καὶ καθάπερ νῦν εἶπες ἀγαπήσεις ἐάν πῃ καὶ κατὰ βραχῦ παρασπασώμεθα οὔτως ἰσχυροῦ λόγου;

 **ΘΕΑΙ.** Πῶς γὰρ οὖν ἐξώ;

 **D ΣΕ.** Τόδε τοίνυν ἔτι μᾶλλον παρατοῦμαι σε.

 **ΘΕΑΙ.** Τὸ ποῖον;

 **ΣΕ.** Μῇ μὲ οἶνον πατραλοίαν ὑπολάβῃς γίγνεσθαι τινα.

 **ΘΕΑΙ.** Τί δή;

 **ΣΕ.** Τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγκαίον ἡμῖν ἀμυνομένου ἔσται βασανίζειν, καὶ βιάζεσθαι τὸ τε μῇ ὅν ὡς ἔστι κατὰ τί καὶ τὸ ὅν αὖ πάλιν ὡς οὐκ ἐστί πη.

 **ΘΕΑΙ.** Φαίνεται τὸ τοιοῦτον διαμαχητέον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

 **ΣΕ.** Πῶς γὰρ οὐ φαίνεται καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο τυφλῷ; τούτων γὰρ μήτε ἐλεγχθέντων Ἐ μῆτε ὁμολογηθέντων σχολῆς ποτὲ τις οἶος τέ ἐσται περὶ λόγων ἑυδῶν λέγων ἢ δόξης, εἴτε εἰδώλων εἴτε εἰκόνων εἴτε μυθημάτων εἴτε φαντασμάτων αὐτῶν, ἢ καὶ περὶ τεχνῶν τῶν ὅσαν περὶ ταῦτα εἶσι, μὴ καταγέλαστος εἶναι τὰ ἐναντία ἀναγκαζόμενος αὐτῶ λέγειν.

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1 γ’ ἄν Burnet; γάρ BT; ἄρ’ W; γάρ ἄν al.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Very true.

STR. Yes, we have gone through only a small part of them, and they are, if I may say so, infinite.

THEAET. It would, apparently, be impossible to catch the sophist, if that is the case.

STR. Well, then, shall we weaken and give up the struggle now?

THEAET. No, I say; we must not do that, if we can in any way get the slightest hold of the fellow.

STR. Will you then pardon me, and, as your words imply, be content if I somehow withdraw just for a short distance from this strong argument of his?

THEAET. Of course I will.

STR. I have another still more urgent request to make of you.

THEAET. What is it?

STR. Do not assume that I am becoming a sort of parricide.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. In defending myself I shall have to test the theory of my father Parmenides, and contend forcibly that after a fashion not-being is and on the other hand in a sense being is not.

THEAET. It is plain that some such contention is necessary.

STR. Yes, plain even to a blind man, as they say; for unless these statements are either disproved or accepted, no one who speaks about false words, or false opinion—whether images or likenesses or imitations or appearances—or about the arts which have to do with them, can ever help being forced to contradict himself and make himself ridiculous.
242 ££. Διὰ ταῦτα μέντοι τολμητέον ἐπιτίθεσθαι τῷ πατρικῷ λόγῳ νῦν, ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἐστέον, εἰ τούτῳ τις εὑργεῖ δρᾶν ὅκνος.

£££. 'Αλλ' ἦμας τούτῳ γε μηδὲν μηδαμῆ εἰρξῇ.

££. Τρίτων τοίνυν ἔτι σε σμικρόν τι παρατη- 

£££. Δέγε μόνου.

££. Εἴπον ποὺ νῦν δὴ λέγων ὡς πρὸς τὸν περὶ ταῦτ' ἐλεγχον ἀεὶ τε ἀπειρηκῶς ἑγὼ τυγχάνω καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ νῦν.

£££. Εἴπες.

££. Φοβοῦμαι δὴ τὰ εἰρημένα, μὴ ποτὲ διὰ ταῦτα σοι μανικὸς εἶναι δόξω παρὰ πόδα μεταβαλὼν Ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω καὶ κάτω. σὴν γὰρ δὴ χάριν ἐλέγχειν τὸν λόγον ἐπιθυμομέθα, ἐάντερ ἐλέγχωμεν.

£££. 'Ὡς τοῖνυν ἔμοιγε μηδαμῇ δόξων μηδὲν πλημμελεῖν, ἀν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐλεγχον τούτον καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἢς, θαρρῶν θι τούτον γε ἑνεκα.

30. £££. Φέρε δὴ, τίνα ἀρχὴν τις ἃν ἄρξατο παρακυνδυνεύτικον λόγου; δοκῶ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ὅ, ὁ παί, τὴν ὅδον ἀναγκαιοτάτην ἦμεν εἶναι τρέπεσθαι.

£££. Ποιὰν δὴ;

££. Τὰ δοκοῦντα νῦν ἐναργῶς ἔχειν ἐπισκέψασθαι ὁ πρῶτον, μὴ πῃ τεταραγμένοι μὲν ὥμεν ¹ περὶ ταῦτα, ῥαδίως δ' ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογῶμεν ὡς εὐκρινῶς ἔχοντες.

£££. Δέγε σαφέστερον δ' λέγεις.

£££. Εὐκόλως μοι δοκεῖ Παρμενίδης ἦμῶν διει- 

². ἔχθει καὶ πᾶς ὁστὶς πώποτε ἐπὶ κρίσιν ὄρμησε

¹ μὲν ὥμεν W; μένωμεν BT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Very true.

STR. And so we must take courage and attack our father's theory here and now, or else, if any scruples prevent us from doing this, we must give the whole thing up.

THEAET. But nothing in the world must prevent us.

STR. Then I have a third little request to make of you.

THEAET. You have only to utter it.

STR. I said a while ago that I always have been too faint-hearted for the refutation of this theory, and so I am now.

THEAET. Yes, so you did.

STR. I am afraid that on account of what I have said you will think I am mad because I have at once reversed my position. You see it is for your sake that I am going to undertake the refutation, if I succeed in it.

THEAET. I certainly shall not think you are doing anything improper if you proceed to your refutation and proof; so go ahead boldly, so far as that is concerned.

STR. Well, what would be a good beginning of a perilous argument? Ah, my boy, I believe the way we certainly must take is this.

THEAET. What way?

STR. We must first examine the points which now seem clear, lest we may have fallen into some confusion about them and may therefore carelessly agree with one another, thinking that we are judging correctly.

THEAET. Express your meaning more clearly.

STR. It seems to me that Parmenides and all who ever undertook a critical definition of the number
PLATO

τοῦ τὰ ὅντα διορίσασθαι πόσα τε καὶ ποιά ἐστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πή;  

Εἴ. Μ公网安备ν τινὰ ἐκαστὸς φαύνεται μοι διηγεῖσθαι παισῶν ὡς οὖν ήμῖν, ὁ μὲν ὡς τρία τὰ ὅντα, πολεμεῖ δὲ ἀλλήλοις ἐνίοτε αὐτῶν ἀττα πη, τοτε δὲ 

D καὶ φίλα γιγνόμενα γάμους τε καὶ τόκους καὶ 

τροφὰς τῶν ἐκγόνων παρέχεται. δύο δὲ ἐτερος 

εἰπὼν, ὑγρὸν καὶ ἕρρον ἡ θέρμων καὶ ψυχρόν, συν-

οικίζει τε αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκδίδωσί το ἔτε παρ’ ήμῖν ¹ 

'Ελεατικὸν έθνος, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους τε καὶ ἐτι 

πρόσθεν ἀρξάμενον, ὡς ἐνὸς ὅντος τῶν πάντων 

καλουμένων οὕτω διεξέρχεται τοῖς μύθοις. Ιάδες 

δὲ καὶ Συκελαῖ τίνες ὑστερον Μοῦσαι ξυνενόησαν ² 

Ε ὅτι συμπλέκειν ἀσφαλέστατον ἀμφότερα καὶ λέγειν 

ὡς τὸ ὅν πολλὰ τε καὶ ἐν ἐστίν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ φιλία 

συνέχεται. διαφερόμενον γὰρ ἂει ἐξειφέρεται, φασίν 

αἰ συντονώτεραι τῶν Μουσῶν· αἰ δὲ μαλακῶτεραι 

τὸ μὲν ἂει ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν ἐχάλασαν, ἐν μέρει δὲ 

τοτε μὲν ἐν εἰναὶ φασι τὸ πᾶν καὶ φίλον ὑπ’ Άφρο-

243 δίτης, τοτε δὲ πολλὰ καὶ πολέμιον αὐτὸ αὐτῷ διὰ 

νεῖκὸς τι. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα εἱ μὲν ἄλθως τις ἡ 

μὴ τούτων εὐρήκε, χαλεπὸν καὶ πλημμέλεις οὕτω 

μεγάλα κλεινοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ ἀνδράσιν ἐπιτιμᾶν· 

ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον ἀποφήμασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον;

Εἴ. Ὅτι λιῶν τῶν πολλῶν ἡμῶν ὑπεριδόντες ¹ ἡμῖν al. Eusebius; ἡμῶν BTW.

2 ξυνενήσαν T, Eusebius, Simplicius; ξυνενόηκασιν B.

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and nature of realities have talked to us rather carelessly.

THEAET. How so?

STR. Every one of them seems to tell us a story, as if we were children. One says there are three principles, that some of them are sometimes waging a sort of war with each other, and sometimes become friends and marry and have children and bring them up; and another says there are two, wet and dry or hot and cold, which he settles together and unites in marriage. And the Eleatic sect in our region, beginning with Xenophanes and even earlier, have their story that all things, as they are called, are really one. Then some Ionian and later some Sicilian Muses reflected that it was safest to combine the two tales and to say that being is many and one, and is (or are) held together by enmity and friendship. For the more strenuous Muses say it is always simultaneously coming together and separating; but the gentler ones relaxed the strictness of the doctrine of perpetual strife; they say that the all is sometimes one and friendly, under the influence of Aphrodite, and sometimes many and at variance with itself by reason of some sort of strife. Now whether any of them spoke the truth in all this, or not, it is harsh and improper to impute to famous men of old such a great wrong as falsehood. But one assertion can be made without offence.

THEAET. What is that?

STR. That they paid too little attention and con-

1 This refers apparently to Pherecydes and the early Ionians.
2 Heracleitus and his followers.
3 Empedocles and his disciples.
PLATO

ὡλυγώρησαν· οὔδὲν γὰρ φροντίσαντες· εἴτ' ἐπι-
ακολουθοῦμεν αὐτοῖς λέγουσιν εἴτε ἀπολειπόμεθα,
Β περαινοῦσι τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

ἔε. "Οταν τις αὐτῶν φθέγξηται λέγων ὡς ἐστὶν
ἥ γέγονεν ἡ γίγνεται πολλὰ ἡ ἐν ἡ δύο, καὶ θερμὸν
ἀδ ψυχρῷ συγκεραυνύμενον, ἄλλοθι πὴ διακρίσεις
καὶ συγκρίσεις ὑποτιθεῖς, τοῦτων, ὦ Θεαίτητε,
ἐκάστοτε σὺ τι πρὸς θεῶν ξυνίῃς ὁ τι λέγουσιν; ἕγω
μὲν γὰρ ὡτε μὲν ἢν νεώτερος, τοῦτο τε τὸ νῦν
ἀπορούμενον ὅποτε τις εἴποι, τὸ μὴ ὃν, ἀκριβῶς
ὡμὴν ξυνίειν. νῦν δὲ ὅρας ἵν' ἐσμὲν αὐτοῦ πέρι
τῆς ἀπορίας.

C ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρῶ.

ἔε. Τάχα τοινύν ὅσως οὔχ ἦττον κατὰ τὸ ὃν
ταυτὸν τοῦτο πάθος εἰληφότες ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ περὶ
μὲν τοῦτο εὐπορεῖν φαμεν καὶ μανθάνειν ὅποταν τις
αὐτὸ φθέγξηται, περὶ δὲ θάτερον οὔ, πρὸς ἀμφότερα
ὁμοίως ἔχοντες.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄσως.

ἔε. Καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀλλων δὴ τῶν προειρημένων
ἡμῖν ταυτὸν τοῦτο εἰρήσθω.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάννυ γε.

31. ἔε. Τῶν μὲν τοινύν πολλῶν πέρι καὶ

D μετὰ τοῦτο σκεψόμεθα, ἃν δόξη, περὶ δὲ τοῦ
μεγίστου τε καὶ ἄρχηγον πρῶτου νῦν σκέπτεον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνος δὴ λέγεις; ἡ δὴ λοι ὅτι τὸ ὃν φῆς
πρῶτον δεῖν διερευνήσασθαι τί ποθ' οἴ λέγοντες
αὐτὸ δηλοῦν ἡγοῦνται; 360
consideration to the mass of people like ourselves. For they go on to the end, each in his own way, without caring whether their arguments carry us along with them, or whether we are left behind.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. When one of them says in his talk that many, or one, or two are, or have become, or are becoming, and again speaks of hot mingling with cold, and in some other part of his discourse suggests separations and combinations, for heaven's sake, Theaetetus, do you ever understand what they mean by any of these things? I used to think, when I was younger, that I understood perfectly whenever anyone used this term "not-being," which now perplexes us. But you see what a slough of perplexity we are in about it now.

THEAET. Yes, I see.

STR. And perhaps our minds are in this same condition as regards being also; we may think that it is plain sailing and that we understand when the word is used, though we are in difficulties about not-being, whereas really we understand equally little of both.

THEAET. Perhaps.

STR. And we may say the same of all the subjects about which we have been speaking.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. We will consider most of them later, if you please, but now the greatest and foremost chief of them must be considered.

THEAET. What do you mean? Or, obviously, do you mean that we must first investigate the term "being," and see what those who use it think it signifies?
Ευθύνη λέγεις, λέγοντες ἄμφω καὶ ἐκάτερον εἶναι; τί τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο ὑπολάβωμεν ὑμῶν; πότερον τρίτον παρὰ τὰ δύο ἐκεῖνα, καὶ τρία τὸ πᾶν ἄλλα μὴ δύο ἐτί καθ' ὑμᾶς τιθῶμεν; οὐ γὰρ ποὺ τοῖν γε δυοῖν καλοῦντες θάτερον ὃν ἀμφότερα ὁμοίως εἶναι λέγετε· σχεδὸν γὰρ ἂν ἀμφότερως ἐν, ἄλλ' οὐ δύο εἴτην.

καὶ θεἀτης λέγεις.

εὐθυνη λέγεις, λέγοντες ἄμφω βουλεσθε καλειν ὑν;

εὐθυνη ἵσως.

244 εὐθυνη ἄλλ', ὡς φίλοι, φήσομεν, καὶν οὕτω τὰ δύο λέγοντ' ἂν σαφεστατα ἐν.

εὐθυνη ὁρθοτατα εῦρηκας.

εὐθυνη ἐπειδὴ τοῖνυν ἡμεῖς ἡπορήκαμεν, ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ ἡμῶν ἐμφανίζετε ἱκανῶς τὶ ποτε βουλεσθε σημαίνειν ὅποταν ὃν φθέγγησε. δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ἡμεῖς μὲν ταῦτα πάλαι γιγνώσκετε, ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ὕμωθα, νῦν δ' ἡπορήκαμεν. διδάσκετε οὖν πρῶτον τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡμᾶς, ἢν μὴ δοξάζωμεν μανθάνειν μὲν τὰ λεγόμενα παρ' ὑμῶν, τὸ δὲ τοῦτο γίγνηται πᾶν ἐν τοναυτίον. ταῦτα δὴ λέγοντες τε καὶ ἄξιούντες παρὰ τε τοῦτων καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι πλεῖον ἐνός λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν εἶναι, μῶν, ὡς παῖ, τὶ πλημμελήσομεν;

1 πόδα T (emend.) W; πολλά B pr. T.
2 εἴτην W; εἰ τὴν BT.
3 λέγοντ'] λέγοιτο B; λέγετε T; λέγετ' W.
You have caught my meaning at once, Theaetetus. For I certainly do mean that this is the best method for us to use, by questioning them directly, as if they were present in person; so here goes: Come now, all you who say that hot and cold or any two such principles are the universe, what is this that you attribute to both of them when you say that both and each are? What are we to understand by this "being" (or "are") of yours? Is this a third principle besides those two others, and shall we suppose that the universe is three, and not two any longer, according to your doctrine? For surely when you call one only of the two "being" you do not mean that both of them equally are; for in both cases they would pretty certainly be one and not two.

THEAET. True.

str. Well, then, do you wish to call both of them together being?

THEAET. Perhaps.

str. But, friends, we will say, even in that way you would very clearly be saying that the two are one.

THEAET. You are perfectly right.

str. Then since we are in perplexity, do you tell us plainly what you wish to designate when you say "being." For it is clear that you have known this all along, whereas we formerly thought we knew, but are now perplexed. So first give us this information, that we may not think we understand what you say, when the exact opposite is the case.—If we speak in this way and make this request of them and of all who say that the universe is more than one, shall we, my boy, be doing anything improper?

1 "In both cases," i.e. whether you say that one only is or that both are, they would both be one, namely being.
PLATO

32. ΕΕ. Τί δέ; παρά τῶν ἐν τῷ πάν λεγόντων ἄρ' οὗ πευκοτέον εἷς δύναμιν τί ποτε λέγουσι τὸ ὃν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γάρ οὗ;

ΕΕ. Τόδε τοίνυν ἀποκρινόμεθαν. ἐν ποἰ ύ φατε μόνον εἶναι; φαμέν γάρ, φήσουσιν. ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΕΕ. Τί δέ; ὃν καλεῖτε τι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

C ΕΕ. Πότερον ὅπερ ἐν, ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρώμενοι δυοῖν ὀνόμασιν, ἢ πῶς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίς οὖν αὐτοῖς ἡ μετὰ τοῦτ', ὃ ἔνε, ἀπόκρισις;

ΕΕ. Δῆλον, ὃ Θεαίτητε, ὅτι τῷ ταύτῃ τῆς ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθεμένῳ πρὸς τὸ νῦν ἑρωτηθέν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλο δὲ ὅτι οὐ πάντων ῥάστον ἀποκρίνασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΕΕ. Τὸ τε δύο ὀνόματα ὀμολογεῖν εἰναι μηδὲν θέμενον πλὴν ἐν καταγελαστόν ποι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὗ;

ΕΕ. Καὶ τὸ παράπαν γε ἀποδέχεσθαι τοῦ λέγοντος ὡς ἐστιν ὀνομά τι, λόγον οὐκ ἄν ἔχον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πή.

ΕΕ. Τιθεῖσι τε τοῦ τοῦτο ὑπ' ἑτέρον δυὸ λέγει ποτ' τινε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΕΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἂν ταῦτα γε αὐτῷ τιθῇ τοῦ τοῦτο,  

1 ἀποκρινόμεθαν Simplicius; ἀποκρινόμεθωσαν BTW.  

2 τοῦ Hermann; τοῦ BT.
THEAET. Not in the least.
STR. Well then, must we not, so far as we can, try to learn from those who say that the universe is one\(^1\) what they mean when they say "being"?
THEAET. Of course we must.
STR. Then let them answer this question: Do you say that one only is? We do, they will say; will they not?
THEAET. Yes.
STR. Well then, do you give the name of being to anything?
THEAET. Yes.
STR. Is it what you call "one," using two names for the same thing, or how is this?
THEAET. What is their next answer, Stranger?
STR. It is plain, Theaetetus, that he who maintains their theory will not find it the easiest thing in the world to reply to our present question or to any other.
THEAET. Why not?
STR. It is rather ridiculous to assert that two names exist when you assert that nothing exists but unity.
THEAET. Of course it is.
STR. And in general there would be no sense in accepting the statement that a name has any existence.
THEAET. Why?
STR. Because he who asserts that the name is other than the thing, says that there are two entities.
THEAET. Yes.
STR. And further, if he asserts that the name is
\(^1\) The Eleatic Zeno and his school.
ἡ μηδενὸς ὄνομα ἀναγκασθήσεται λέγειν, εἴ δέ τινος αὐτὸ φήσει, συμβήσεται τὸ ὄνομα ὕφομας ὄνομα μόνον, ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενὸς ὄν.

θεαὶ. Οὔτως.

ἐς. Καὶ τὸ ἐν γε, ἐνὸς ὄνομα ὃν 1 καὶ τοῦ 2 ὕφομας αὐ τὸ 3 ἐν ὄν.

θεαὶ. Ἀνάγκη.

ἐς. Τὶ δὲ; τὸ ὅλον ἐπέρειν τοῦ ὅντος ἐνὸς ἡ ταυτὸν φήσουσι τούτων;

Ε Ἰ θεαὶ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ φήσουσί τε καὶ φασίν;

ἐς. Εἴ τοίνυν ὅλον ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ Παρμενίδης λέγει,

πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης 4 ἐναλίγκυν ὄγκως, μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλές πάντη· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον οὔτε τι βαϊότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστὶ τῇ ἡ τῇ,

tωούτων γε ὃ τὸ ὅν μέσον τε καὶ ἔσχατα ἔχει, 5 ταῦτα δὲ ἔχουν πάσα ἀνάγκη μέρη ἔχειν· ἡ πῶς;

θεαὶ. Οὔτως.

245 Ἐς Ἡ Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε μεμερισμένον πάθος μὲν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔχειν ἐπὶ τοὺς μέρεα πᾶσιν οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει, καὶ ταύτη δὴ παῦν τε ὅν καὶ ὅλον ἐν εἴναι.

θεαὶ. Τί δ' οὖ;

ἐς. Τὸ δὲ πεπουθὸς ταῦτα ἄρ' οὐκ ἄδυνατον αὐτὸ γε τὸ ἐν αὐτὸ εἶναι;

θεαὶ. Πῶς;

1 ὄνομα ὃν Apelt; ἐν ὃν μὸνον B; ὃν μὸνον T.
2 τοῦ BW; τοῦτο T.
3 αὐ τὸ Schleiermacher; αὐτὸ BTW.
4 σφαίρης Simplicius; σφαίρας BT.
5 ἔχει] ἔχειν al.
the same as the thing, he will be obliged to say that it is the name of nothing, or if he says it is the name of something, the name will turn out to be the name of a name merely and of nothing else.

THEAET. True.

STR. And the one will turn out to be the name of one and also the one of the name.¹

THEAET. Necessarily.

STR. And will they say that the whole is other than the one which exists or the same with it?

THEAET. Of course they will and do say it is the same.

STR. If then the whole is, as Parmenides says,

On all sides like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equally weighted in every direction from the middle; for neither greater nor less must needs be on this or that,

then being, being such as he describes it, has a centre and extremes, and, having these, must certainly have parts, must it not?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. But yet nothing hinders that which has parts from possessing the attribute of unity in all its parts and being in this way one, since it is all and whole.

THEAET. Very true.

STR. But is it not impossible for that which is in this condition to be itself absolute unity?

THEAET. Why?

¹ In other words, "one," considered as a word, will be the name of unity, but considered as a reality, it will be the unity of which the word "one" is the name. The sentence is made somewhat difficult of comprehension, doubtless for the purpose of indicating the confusion caused by the identification of the name with the thing.
εἰ. Ἀμερές δήπον δεῖ παντελῶς τὸ γε ἄληθῶς ἐν κατὰ τὸν ὅρθον λόγον εἰρήσθαι.

θεαί. Δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.

β εἰ. Τὸ δὲ γε τοιούτων ἐκ πολλῶν μερῶν ὃν οὐ συμφωνήσει τῷ λόγῳ. ¹

θεαί. Μανθάνω.

εἰ. Πότερον δὴ πάθος ἔχου τὸ ὃν τοῦ ἐνὸς οὐτῶς ἐν τε ἐσται καὶ ὅλον, ἣ παντάπασι μὴ λέγωμεν ὅλον εἶναι τὸ ὃν ἅ; ²

θεαί. Χαλεπῆν προβεβλήκας αἴρεσιν.

εἰ. Ἀληθέστατα μέντοι λέγεις. πεπονθὸς τε γὰρ τὸ ὃν ἐν εἶναι πως, οὐ ταὐτὸν ὃν τῷ ἐνὶ φανεῖται ³ καὶ πλέονα δὴ τὰ πάντα ἐνὸς ἐσται.

θεαί. Ναι.

εἰ. Καὶ μὴν ἐὰν γε τὸ ὃν ἣ μὴ ὅλον διὰ τὸ

θεαί. Πάνυ γε.

εἰ. Καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ἑαυτοῦ στερο-μενον οὐκ ὃν ἐσται τὸ ὃν.

θεαί. Οὕτως.

εἰ. Καὶ ἐνὸς γε αὖ πλείω τὰ πάντα γίγνεται, τοῦ τε ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὅλου χωρίς ἰδίων ἐκατέρου φύσιν εἴληφότος.

θεαί. Ναι.

εἰ. Μὴ ὄντος δὲ γε τὸ παράπαν τοῦ ὅλου, ταὐτά
tε ταῦτα ὑπάρχει τῷ ὄντι καὶ πρὸς τῷ μὴ εἶναι

θεαί. Ναι.
THE SOPHIST

str. Why surely that which is really one must, according to right reason, be affirmed to be absolutely without parts.

THEAET. Yes, it must.

str. But such a unity consisting of many parts will not harmonize with reason.

THEAET. I understand.

str. Then shall we agree that being is one and a whole because it has the attribute of unity, or shall we deny that being is a whole at all?

THEAET. It is a hard choice that you offer me.

str. That is very true; for being, having in a way had unity imposed upon it, will evidently not be the same as unity, and the all will be more than one.

THEAET. Yes.

str. And further, if being is not a whole through having had the attribute of unity imposed upon it, and the absolute whole exists, then it turns out that being lacks something of being.

THEAET. Certainly.

str. And so, by this reasoning, since being is deprived of being, it will be not-being.

THEAET. So it will.

str. And again the all becomes more than the one, since being and the whole have acquired each its own nature.

THEAET. Yes.

str. But if the whole does not exist at all, being is involved in the same difficulties as before, and besides not existing it could not even have ever come into existence.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή;

Το θενόμενον αει γέγονεν ὅλον· ὥστε οὕτε οὐσίαν οὕτε γένεσιν ὡς οὕσαν δεί προσαγορεύειν τὸ ὅλον ἕν τοῖς οὕσι μὴ τιθέντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασιν ἐνικε ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχειν.

Καὶ μὴν οὖθ' ὀποσονοῦν τι δεὶ τὸ μὴ ὅλον εἶναι: ποσόν τι γὰρ ὄν, ὀπόσον ἂν ἦ, τοσοῦτον ὅλον ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ γε.

Καὶ τοῖνυν ἀλλὰ μυρία ἀπεράντους ἀπορίας Ἐ ἐκαστον εἰληφός φανεῖται τῷ τὸ ὅν εἶτε δύο τινὲ εἴτε ἐν μόνον εἶναι λέγοντι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δὴ λοί σχεδὸν καὶ τὰ νῦν ὑποφαῖνοντα: συνάπτεται γὰρ ἑτερον ἐξ ἄλλου, μεῖζω καὶ χαλε-πυτέραν φέρον περὶ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν ἀεὶ ῥηθέντων πλάνῃ.

33. Τοὺς μὲν τοῖνυν διακριβολογούμενους ὄντος τε πέρι καὶ μὴ πάντας μὲν οὐ διεληλύθαμεν, ὃμως δὲ ἰκανῶς ἐχέτω: τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως λέγοντας αὖ θεατέον, ἢν ἐκ πάντων εἰδώμεν ὅτι τὸ ὃν τοῦ μὴ 246 ὄντος οὐδὲν εὐπροώτερον εἴπειν οὐ τι ποτ' ἔστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν πορεύεσθαι χρή καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις.

Καὶ μὴν ἔοικε γε ἐν αὐτοῖς οἷον γιγαντο-μαχία τις εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

Πῶς;

1 τὸ ὅλον Bekker; τὸ ἦ τὸ ὅλον VT.
2 αὐτὸ W, Simplicius; om. VT.
3 πάντας Eusebius; πάνυ VT.

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THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. That which comes into existence always comes into existence as a whole. Therefore no one who does not reckon the whole among things that are can speak of existence or generation as being.

THEAET. That certainly seems to be true.

STR. And moreover, that which is not a whole cannot have any quantity at all; for if it has any quantity, whatever that quantity may be, it must necessarily be of that quantity as a whole.

THEAET. Precisely.

STR. And so countless other problems, each one involving infinite difficulties, will confront him who says that being is, whether it be two or only one.

THEAET. The problems now in sight make that pretty clear; for each leads up to another which brings greater and more grievous wandering in connexion with whatever has previously been said.

STR. Now we have not discussed all those who treat accurately of being and not-being; however, let this suffice. But we must turn our eyes to those whose doctrines are less precise, that we may know from all sources that it is no easier to define the nature of being than that of not-being.

THEAET. Very well, then, we must proceed towards those others also.

STR. And indeed there seems to be a battle like that of the gods and the giants going on among them, because of their disagreement about existence.

THEAET. How so?

1 The Ionic philosophers, the Eleatics, Heracleitus, Empedocles, the Megarians, Gorgias, Protagoras, and Antisthenes all discussed the problem of being and not-being.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ζε. Οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἔλκουσιν, ταῖς χερσίν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ ὁπὸς περιλαμβάνοντες. τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων διοσχυρίζονται τούτο εἰναι μόνον ὁ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφὴν τινα, ταῦταν σῶμα Β καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι, τῶν δὲ ἀλλῶν εἰ τίς τί ¹ φήσει ² μὴ σῶμα έχον εἰναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν καὶ οὐδὲν ἑθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄνθρωποι, ἂν ἐρωτήσῃς ἄνδρας, ἂν γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ τοιούτων συχνοῖς προσέτυχον.

ζε. Τοιγαροῦν οἱ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἀνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται, νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἰδὴ βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἰναι. τὰ δὲ ἑκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν κατὰ σμικρὰ C διαθραύοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν ἅντ' οὐσίας φερομένην τινά προσαγορεύουσιν. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ ταύτα ἀπλετοὺς ἀμφότερων μάχη τις, οὐ Θεάτητε, ἂεὶ ἐξυνέστηκεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡ Ἀλήθη.

ζε. Παρ' ἀμφότερος τοῖν τοῦ τοῖν γενοῦς κατὰ μέρος λάβωμεν λόγον ὑπὲρ ἓς τίθενται τῆς οὐσίας.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς οὖν δῆ ληψόμεθα;

ζε. Παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἐν εἴδους αὐτῆς τιθεμένων

¹ τι al. ; om. ΒΤ.
² φήσει B, Eusebius; φησι Τ.
STR. Some of them drag down everything from heaven and the invisible to earth, actually grasping rocks and trees with their hands; for they lay their hands on all such things and maintain stoutly that that alone exists which can be touched and handled; for they define existence and body, or matter, as identical, and if anyone says that anything else, which has no body, exists, they despise him utterly, and will not listen to any other theory than their own.

THEAET. Terrible men they are of whom you speak. I myself have met with many of them.

STR. Therefore those who contend against them defend themselves very cautiously with weapons derived from the invisible world above, maintaining forcibly that real existence consists of certain ideas which are only conceived by the mind and have no body. But the bodies of their opponents, and that which is called by them truth, they break up into small fragments in their arguments, calling them, not existence, but a kind of generation combined with motion. There is always, Theaetetus, a tremendous battle being fought about these questions between the two parties.

THEAET. True.

STR. Let us, therefore, get from each party in turn a statement in defence of that which they regard as being.

THEAET. How shall we get it?

STR. It is comparatively easy to get it from those

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1 The atomists (Leucippus, Democritus, and their followers), who taught that nothing exists except atoms and the void. Possibly there is a covert reference to Aristippus who was, like Plato, a pupil of Socrates.
PLATO

ράνιν ἠμερώτεροι γάρ· παρὰ δὲ τῶν εἰς σῶμα
D πάντα ἐλκόντων βία χαλεπώτερον, ἵσως δὲ καὶ
σχεδὸν ἀδύνατον. ἄλλ' ὡδέ μοι δεῖν δοκεῖ περὶ
αὐτῶν δρᾶν.

ΟΕΑ. Πῶς;

ἑ. Μάλιστα μὲν, εἰ πὴ δυνατὸν ἦν, ἔργῳ βελ-
τίους αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ἐγχωρ.ί,
λόγῳ ποιῶμεν, ὑποτιθέμενοι νομιμώτερον αὐτοὺς
ἡ νῦν ἑθέλοντας ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι. τὸ γὰρ ὁμολο-
γηθὲν παρὰ βελτίονων ποι κυριώτέρον ἡ τὸ παρὰ
χειρόνων· ἤμεῖς δὲ οὐ τούτων φροντίζομεν, ἄλλα
τάληθες ἐξητοῦμεν.

Ε ΟΕΑ. Ἐρθότατα.

34. ἑ. Κέλευε δὴ τοὺς βελτίους γεγονότας
ἀποκρίνασθαι σοι, καὶ τὸ λεχθὲν παρ’ αὐτῶν ἀφερ-
μῆνεν.

ΟΕΑ. Ταῦτ’ ἔσται.

ἑ. Δειγόντων δὴ θνητὸν ζῷον εἰ φασιν εἶναι τι.
ΟΕΑ. Πῶς δ’ οὐ;

ἑ. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐ σῶμα ἐμψυχον ὁμολογοῦσιν;
ΟΕΑ. Πάνω γε.

ἑ. Τιθέντες τι τῶν ὀντων ψυχήν;

247 ΟΕΑ. Ναι.

ἑ. Τί δέ; ψυχήν οὐ τὴν μὲν δικαίαν, τὴν δὲ
ἀδικον' φασιν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνιμον, τὴν δὲ
ἀφρονά;

ΟΕΑ. Τί μήν;

ἑ. Ἀλλ’ οὐ δικαιοσύνης ἔξει καὶ παρουσία τοι-

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who say that it consists in ideas, for they are peaceful folk; but from those who violently drag down everything into matter, it is more difficult, perhaps even almost impossible, to get it. However, this is the way I think we must deal with them.

THEAET. What way?

STR. Our first duty would be to make them really better, if it were in any way possible; but if this cannot be done, let us pretend that they are better, by assuming that they would be willing to answer more in accordance with the rules of dialectic than they actually are. For the acknowledgement of anything by better men is more valid than if made by worse men. But it is not these men that we care about; we merely seek the truth.

THEAET. Quite right.

STR. Now tell them, assuming that they have become better, to answer you, and do you interpret what they say.

THEAET. I will do so.

STR. Let them tell whether they say there is such a thing as a mortal animal.

THEAET. Of course they do.

STR. And they agree that this is a body with a soul in it, do they not?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Giving to soul a place among things which exist?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Well then, do they not say that one soul is just and another unjust, one wise and another foolish?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And do they not say that each soul becomes just by the possession and presence of justice, and
αὕτην αὐτῶν ἐκάστην γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν ἐναντίαν;

Θεαί. Ναί, καὶ ταύτα ξύμφασιν.

ζη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε δυνατὸν τῷ ¹ παραγίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίγνεσθαι πάντως εἶναι τι φήσουσιν.

Θεαί. Φασί μὲν οὖν.

Β ζη. Οὔσης οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ δὴ καὶ ψυχῆς ἐν ἢ ταύτα ἐγγίγνεται, πότερον ὅρμον καὶ ἀπτόν εἶναι φασὶ τι αὐτῶν ἢ πάντα ἀόρατα;

Θεαί. Σχεδὸν οὐδὲν τούτων γε ὅρατόν.

ζη. Τί δὲ τῶν τοιούτων; μῶν σῶμα τι λέγουσιν ὰσχεν;

Θεαί. Τοῦτο οὐκέτι κατὰ ταύτα ² ἀποκρίνονται πᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν σφίσι σῶμα τι κεκτήσθαι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστὸν ὃν ηρώτηκας, αὐσχύνονται τὸ τολμᾶν ἢ μηδὲν τῶν

C ὀντῶν αὐτὰ ὠμολογεῖν ἢ πάντ’, εἶναι σῶματα διαχυρίζεσθαι.

ζη. Σαφῶς γὰρ ἢμῖν, ὡς Θεαίτητε, βελτίως γεγόνασιν ἄνδρες ³. ἐπεὶ τούτων οὐδ’ ἂν ἐν ἐπαυσκυνθεῖν οἶ γε αὐτῶν σπαρτοὶ τε καὶ αὐτό- χθονες, ἀλλὰ διατείνουτ’ ἂν πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατὸν ταῖς χερσὶ ξυμπιέζειν εἰσίν, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδέν τὸ παρά- παν ἐστίν.

Θεαί. Σχεδὸν οἰδα διανοοῦνται λέγεις.

ζη. Πάλιν τοῖς ἀνερωτώμεν αὐτούς: εἰ γὰρ τι καὶ σμικρῶν ἐθέλουσί τῶν ὀντῶν συγχωρεῖν ἄσω-

¹ τῷ] τῷ ΒΤ; τῷ Β.
² ταύτα] τὰ αὐτὰ ΒΤ; τὰ αὐτὰ ΒΤ.
³ ἄνδρες Bekker; ἄνδρες ΒΤ.

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the opposite by the possession and presence of the opposite?

**Theaet.** Yes, they agree to this also.

**Str.** But surely they will say that that which is capable of becoming present or absent exists.

**Theaet.** Yes, they say that.

**Str.** Granting, then, that justice and wisdom and virtue in general and their opposites exist, and also, of course, the soul in which they become present, do they say that any of these is visible and tangible, or that they are all invisible?

**Theaet.** That none of them is visible, or pretty nearly that.

**Str.** Now here are some other questions. Do they say they possess any body?

**Theaet.** They no longer answer the whole of that question in the same way. They say they believe the soul itself has a sort of body, but as to wisdom and the other several qualities about which you ask, they have not the face either to confess that they have no existence or to assert that they are all bodies.

**Str.** It is clear, Theaetetus, that our men have grown better; for the aboriginal sons of the dragon's teeth among them would not shrink from any such utterance; they would maintain that nothing which they cannot squeeze with their hands has any existence at all.

**Theaet.** That is pretty nearly what they believe.

**Str.** Then let us question them further; for if they are willing to admit that any existence, no

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1 This refers to the story of Cadmus, who killed a dragon and then sowed its teeth, from which sprang fierce warriors to be his companions. Born of the dragon's teeth and of earth, they would naturally be of the earth, earthy.
D ματον, ἐξαρκεί. τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ τε τοῦτοι ἄμα καὶ ἔπ᾽ ἐκείνοις ὡς ἔχει σώμα ἄμφωνες γεγονός, εἰς ὁ βλέποντες ἀμφότερα εἶναι λέγουσι, τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ῥητέον. τὰ χ᾽ οὖν ἦσαν ἀποροίεν· εἰ δὴ τι τοιοῦτον πεπόνθασι, σκόπει, προτεινομένων ἡμῶν, ἃρ’ ἐθέλουν ἃν δέχεσθαι καὶ ὁμολογεῖν τοιὸνδ᾽ εἶναι τὸ ὅν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον δὴ; λέγε, καὶ τάχα εἰσόμεθα.

ΞΕ. Λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁποιανοῦν τινα κεκτημένον δύναμιν εἶτ᾽ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἐτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκὸς Ε εἶτ’ εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰς ἀπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι· τίθεμαι γὰρ ὁρον ὀρίζειν τὰ ὅντα, ὡς ἐστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλῆν δύναμις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐπείπερ αὐτοῦ γε οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι τοῦτο βέλτιον λέγειν, δέχονται τοῦτο.

ΞΕ. Καλῶς· ἦσος γὰρ ἂν εἰς ὡστερον ἡμῖν τε καὶ τοῦτοι ἐτέρον ἂν φανεῖν. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τούτους τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἐνταῦθα μενέτω ἔξυμομολογηθέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μένει.

35. ΞΕ. Πρὸς δὴ τοὺς ἐτέρους ὤμεν, τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν φίλους· σοῦ δ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ παρὰ τούτων ἀφερμήνευε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τάῦτ᾽ ἐσται.

ΞΕ. Γένεσιν, τὴν δὲ οὕσιαν χωρίς πον διελόμενον λέγετε; ἢ γὰρ;

1 εἰτ᾽ εἰς W; εἳ τις BT.

1 i.e., between the process of coming into existence and existence itself. It is difficult to determine exactly who the idealists are whose doctrines are here discussed. Possibly 378
matter how small, is incorporeal, that is enough. They will then have to tell what that is which is inherent in the incorporeal and the corporeal alike, and which they have in mind when they say that both exist. Perhaps they would be at a loss for an answer; and if they are in that condition, consider whether they might not accept a suggestion if we offered it, and might not agree that the nature of being is as follows.

Theaet. What is it? Speak, and we shall soon know.

Str. I suggest that everything which possesses any power of any kind, either to produce a change in anything of any nature or to be affected even in the least degree by the slightest cause, though it be only on one occasion, has real existence. For I set up as a definition which defines being, that it is nothing else than power.

Theaet. Well, since they have at the moment nothing better of their own to offer, they accept this.

Str. Good; for perhaps later something else may occur both to them and to us. As between them and us, then, let us assume that this is for the present agreed upon and settled.

Theaet. It is settled.

Str. Then let us go to the others, the friends of ideas; and do you interpret for us their doctrines also.

Theaet. I will.

Str. You distinguish in your speech between generation and being, do you not?^1

Plato is restating or amending some of his own earlier beliefs.
PLATO

ΘΕΛ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Καὶ σώματι μὲν ἡμᾶς γενέσει δι’ αἰσθήσεως κοινωνεῖν, διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῆ πρὸς τὴν ὀντὸς οὐσίαν, ἂν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ὁσαύτως ἔχειν φατὲ, γένεσιν δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως.

Β ΘΕΛ. Φαμέν γὰρ ὁδὲν.

ΞΕ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ κοινωνεῖν, ὡς πάντων ἀριστοί, τί τούθ’ ἡμᾶς ἐπ’ ἀμφοῖν λέγειν φώμεν; ἃρ’ οὐ τὸ νῦν δὴ παρ’ ἡμῶν ῥηθέν;

ΘΕΛ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΞΕ. Πάθημα ἡ ποίημα ἐκ δυνάμεως τυνὸς ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐνιαύτων γιγνόμενον. τὰχ’ οὖν, ὡς Θεαίτητος, αὐτῶν τὴν πρὸς ταύτα ἀπόκρισιν οὐ μὲν οὐ κατακούεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἰσώς διὰ συνήθειαν.

ΘΕΛ. Τίν’ οὖν δῇ λέγουσι λόγον;

C ΞΕ. Οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥηθὲν πρὸς τοὺς γηγενεῖς οὐσίας πέρι.

ΘΕΛ. Τὸ ποίον;

ΞΕ. Ἱκανῶν ἔθεμεν ὅρον ποὺ τῶν ὀντῶν, ὅταν τῷ παρῆ ἡ τοῦ πάσχειν ἡ δρᾶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ σμικρότατον δύναμις;

ΘΕΛ. Ναί.

ΞΕ. Πρὸς δὴ ταύτα τὸδε λέγουσιν, ὅτι γενέσει μὲν μέτεστι τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν δυνάμεως, πρὸς δὲ οὐσίαν τούτων οὐδετέρου τὴν δύναμιν ἀρμόττειν φασίν.

ΘΕΛ. Οὐκοῦν λέγουσι τι;

ΞΕ. Πρὸς δ’ γε λεκτέον ἡμῖν ὅτι δεόμεθα παρ’ Δ αὐτῶν ἐτὶ πυθέσθαι σαφέστερον εἰ προσομολογοῦσι τὴν μὲν ψυχῆν γιγνώσκειν, τὴν δ’ οὐσίαν γιγνώσκεσθαι.

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THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Yes, we do.

STR. And you say that with the body, by means of perception, we participate in generation, and with the soul, by means of thought, we participate in real being, which last is always unchanged and the same, whereas generation is different at different times.

THEAET. Yes, that is what we say.

STR. But, most excellent men, how shall we define this participation which you attribute to both? Is it not that of which we were just speaking?

THEAET. What is that?

STR. A passive or active condition arising out of some power which is derived from a combination of elements. Possibly, Theaetetus, you do not hear their reply to this, but I hear it, perhaps, because I am used to them.

THEAET. What is it, then, that they say?

STR. They do not concede to us what we said just now to the aboriginal giants about being.

THEAET. What was it?

STR. We set up as a satisfactory sort of definition of being, the presence of the power to act or be acted upon in even the slightest degree.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. It is in reply to this that they say generation participates in the power of acting and of being acted upon, but that neither power is connected with being.

THEAET. And is there not something in that?

STR. Yes, something to which we must reply that we still need to learn more clearly from them whether they agree that the soul knows and that being is known.

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Theaï. Ἔσσι μὴν τοῦτο γέ.

Ε. Τί δέ; τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἡ τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι
φατε ποίημα ἡ πάθος ἡ ἀμφότερον; ἡ τὸ μὲν
πάθημα, τὸ δὲ θάτερον; ἡ παντάπασιν οὐδετέρον
οὐδετέρου τούτων μεταλαμβάνειν.

Theaï. Δῆλον ὡς οὐδετέρον οὐδετέρου· τάναντία
gὰρ ἂν τοὺς ἐμπροσθεν λέγοιεν.1

Ε. Μανθάνω· τόδε γε,2 ὡς τὸ γιγνώσκειν
Ε ἔσται ποιεῖν τι, τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον ἀναγκαῖον
αὐτῇ ἕμμαίνει πάσχειν. τὴν οὖσαν δὴ κατὰ τὸν
λόγον τούτον γιγνωσκομένην ὕπο τῆς γνώσεως,
καθ’ ὅσον γιγνώσκεται, κατὰ τοσοῦτον κινεῖται
dιὰ τὸ πάσχειν, δὴ ὁ φαμεν οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι περὶ
tὸ ἀρμοῦν.3

Theaï. Ὑρθῶς.

Ε. Τί δὲ πρὸς Διός; ὡς ἀληθῶς κίνησιν καὶ
ζωῆν καὶ ψυχῆν καὶ φρόνησιν ἡ ράδιως πεισθησόμεθα
τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι μὴ παρεῖναι, μηδὲ ζῆν αὐτὸ μηδὲ
249 φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ σεμνὸν καὶ ἄγιον, νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον,
ἀκίνητον ἐστὸς εἶναι;

Theaï. Δεινὸν μέντ’ ἂν, ὁ ἐξένε, λόγον συγχωροῖ-
μεν.

Ε. Ἀλλὰ νοῦν μὲν ἔχειν, ζωῆν δὲ μὴ φῶμεν;

Theaï. Καὶ πῶς;

Ε. Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀμφότερα ἐνόντ’ αὐτῷ
λέγομεν, οὐ μὴν ἐν ψυχῇ γε φήσομεν αὐτὸ ἔχειν
αὐτὰ;

Theaï. Καὶ τίν’ ἂν ἔτερον ἔχοι τρόπον;

Ε. Ἀλλὰ δὴτα νοῦν μὲν καὶ ζωῆν καὶ ψυχῆν

1 δῆλον . . . λέγοιεν first attributed to Theaetetus by
Heindorf.

2 τόδε γε] τὸ δὲ γε Τ; τὸ δὲ Β.

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THEAET. They certainly assent to that.

STR. Well then, do you say that knowing or being known is an active or passive condition, or both? Or that one is passive and the other active? Or that neither has any share at all in either of the two?

THEAET. Clearly they would say that neither has any share in either; for otherwise they would be contradicting themselves.

STR. I understand; this at least is true, that if to know is active, to be known must in turn be passive. Now being, since it is, according to this theory, known by the intelligence, in so far as it is known, is moved, since it is acted upon, which we say cannot be the case with that which is in a state of rest.

THEAET. Right.

STR. But for heaven's sake, shall we let ourselves easily be persuaded that motion and life and soul and mind are really not present to absolute being, that it neither lives nor thinks, but awful and holy, devoid of mind, is fixed and immovable?

THEAET. That would be a shocking admission to make, Stranger.

STR. But shall we say that it has mind, but not life?

THEAET. How can we?

STR. But do we say that both of these exist in it, and yet go on to say that it does not possess them in a soul?

THEAET. But how else can it possess them?

STR. Then shall we say that it has mind and
"\( \varepsilon \chi \varepsilon \nu,^1 \) ἀκίνητον μέντοι τὸ παράπαν ἐμφυχον ὥς ἔστάναι;

**B** ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντα ἐμοιγε ἄλογα ταὐτ' εἶναι φαίνεται.

ΕΕ. Καὶ τὸ κινούμενον δὴ καὶ κίνησιν συγχωρητέον ὥς ὄντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

ΕΕ. Εὐμβαίνει δ' οὖν, ὥ Θεαίτητε, ἀκίνητων τε ὄντων νοῦν μηδενὶ περὶ μηδενὸς εἶναι μηδαμοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.

ΕΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἔδω ἀυ φερόμενα καὶ κινούμενα πάντ' εἶναι συγχωρώμεν, καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ἔξαιρήσομεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΕΕ. Τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὦσαύτως καὶ περὶ τὸ

**C** αὐτὸ δοκεῖ σοι χωρὶς στάσεως γενέσθαι ποτ' ἂν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΕΕ. Τί δ'; ἀνευ τούτων νοῶν καθορῶς ὄντα ἢ γενόμενον ἃν καὶ ὅποιοῦν;

ΘΕΑΙ. "Ἡκιστα.

ΕΕ. Καὶ μὴν πρός γε τούτων παντὶ λόγῳ μαχετέον, ὅς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἢ φρόνησιν ἢ νοῦν ἀφανίζων ἵσχυρίζηται περὶ τινος ὅπηοὺν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΕΕ. Τῷ δὲ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τιμῶντι πᾶσα, ὡς ἐοικεν, ἀνάγκη διὰ ταῦτα μήτε τῶν ἐν ἢ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ εἰδὴ λεγόντων τὸ πᾶν ἔστηκός

Δ ἀποδέχεσθαι, τῶν τε αὖ πανταχῇ τὸ ὄν κινούντων

1 ἡειν add. Schleiermacher.
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life and soul, but, although endowed with soul, is absolutely immovable?

THEAET. All those things seem to me absurd.

STR. And it must be conceded that motion and that which is moved exist.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Then the result is, Theaetetus, that if there is no motion, there is no mind in anyone about anything anywhere.

THEAET. Exactly.

STR. And on the other hand, if we admit that all things are in flux and motion, we shall remove mind itself from the number of existing things by this theory also.

THEAET. How so?

STR. Do you think that sameness of quality or nature or relations could ever come into existence without the state of rest?

THEAET. Not at all.

STR. What then? Without these can you see how mind could exist or come into existence anywhere?

THEAET. By no means.

STR. And yet we certainly must contend by every argument against him who does away with knowledge or reason or mind and then makes any dogmatic assertion about anything.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Then the philosopher, who pays the highest honour to these things, must necessarily, as it seems, because of them refuse to accept the theory of those who say the universe is at rest, whether as a unity or in many forms, and must also refuse utterly to listen to those who say that being is universal.
μηδέ το παράπαν ἄκοινειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῶν παιδῶν εὑρίσκον, ὥσα ἀκούντα καὶ κεκινημένα, τὸ ὅν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν ξυναμφότερα λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

36. ΞΕ. Τί οὖν; ἄρ' οὖκ ἑπιεικῶς ἦδη φανό-
μεθα περιεληφέναι τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ὅν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν.

ΞΕ. Βαβαί μέντ' ἂν ἄρα, οἶ Θεαίτητε, ὡς μοι
δοκούμεν νῦν αὐτοῦ γνώσεσθαι πέρι τὴν ἀπορίαν
τῆς σκέψεως.

Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς αὖ καὶ τί τοῦτ' εἴρηκας;

ΞΕ. Ὡς μακάριε, οὖκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι νῦν ἐσμὲν ἐν
ἀγνοία τῇ πλείοτῃ περὶ αὐτοῦ, φανόμεθα δὲ τι
λέγειν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν· ὅπη δ' αὖ λελήθαμεν οὕτως
ἐχοντες, οὐ πάντα ἔννειμι.

ΞΕ. Σκόπει δ' ἑαυτόν, εἰ ταῦτα νῦν ξυν-
250 ὀμολογοῦντες δικαῖως ἂν ἐπερωτηθέωμεν ἀπέρ
αυτοῦ τότε ἡρωτώμεν τοὺς λέγοντας εἶναι τὸ πᾶν
θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποία; ὑπόμινησόν με.

ΞΕ. Πάντα μὲν οὖν· καὶ πειράσομαι γε ἰδρὰν
tοῦτο, ἐρωτῶν σὲ καθάπερ ἐκεῖνους τότε, ἢν ἄμα
τι καὶ προὶμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὄρθως.

ΞΕ. Εἶπεν δ' ἂν, κύνησον καὶ στάσω ἄρ' οὖκ ἐνα-
tιώτατα λέγεις ἀλλήλοις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;
motion; he must quote the children’s prayer,¹ “all things immovable and in motion,” and must say that being and the universe consist of both.

THEAET. Very true.

STR. Do we not, then, seem to have attained at last a pretty good definition of being?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. But dear me, Theaetetus! I think we are now going to discover the difficulty of the inquiry about being.

THEAET. What is this again? What do you mean?

STR. My dear fellow, don’t you see that we are now densely ignorant about it, but think that we are saying something worth while?

THEAET. I think so, at any rate, and I do not at all understand what hidden error we have fallen into.

STR. Then watch more closely and see whether, if we make these admissions, we may not justly be asked the same questions we asked a while ago of those who said the universe was hot and cold.²

THEAET. What questions? Remind me.

STR. Certainly; and I will try to do this by questioning you, as we questioned them at the time. I hope we shall at the same time make a little progress.

THEAET. That is right.

STR. Very well, then; you say that motion and rest are most directly opposed to each other, do you not?

THEAET. Of course.

¹ Nothing further seems to be known about this prayer. Stallbaum thought the reference was to a game in which the children said δος ἄκινητα καὶ κεκινημένα εἶτ, “may all unmoved things be moved.”

² Cf. 242D above.
καὶ μὴν εἶναι γε ὁμοίως φής ἀμφότερα αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκάτερον;

Β ὙΕΑΙ. Φησί γὰρ οὖν.

ἐξ. Ἁρα κινεῖσθαι λέγων ἀμφότερα καὶ ἐκάτερον, ὅταν εἶναι συνήχωρῆς;

ἡΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ἐξ. Ἀλλ' ἐστάναι σημαίνεις λέγων αὐτὰ ἀμφότερα εἶναι;

ἡΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

ἐξ. Τρίτον ἁρὰ τι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὅν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τιθεῖς, ὡς ὅτι ἐκεῖνον τὴν τε στάσιν καὶ τὴν κίνησιν περιεχόμενην, συλλαβῶν καὶ ἀπιδῶν αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν τῆς οὐσίας κοινωνίαν, ὦτως εἶναι προσείπον ἀμφότερα;

C ὙΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύομεν ὡς ἀληθῶς τρίτον ἀπομαντεύοσθαι τι τὸ ὅν, ὅταν κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν εἶναι λέγωμεν.

ἐξ. Οὐκ ἁρὰ κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἐστὶν ἀμφότερον τὸ ὅν, ἀλλ' ἐτερον δὴ τι τούτων.

ἡΕΑΙ. ὙΕικεν.

ἐξ. Κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἁρὰ τὸ ὅν οὔτε ἐστήκεν οὔτε κινεῖται.

ἡΕΑΙ. Σχεδὸν.

ἐξ. Ποι δὴ χρῆ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐτι τρέπειν τὸν βουλόμενον ἐναργεῖς τι περὶ αὐτοῦ παρ' ἑαυτῷ βεβαιώσασθαι;

ἡΕΑΙ. Ποι γὰρ;

ἐξ. Οἴμαι μὲν οὖν ὅπως ὁμοίως ἀμφότερα εἶναι τῷ διάδοι. εἰ γὰρ τι

D ἑαυτὸς κινεῖται, πῶς οὖχ ἐστήκεν; ἦ τὸ μηδαμῶς ἐστὸς πῶς ὁμοίως σὺν αὐτὶ κινεῖται; τὸ δὲ ὅν ἡμῖν νῦν ἐκτὸς τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀναπέφανται. ἢ δυνατὸν οὖν τούτο;
str. And yet you say that both and each of them equally exist?

THEAET. Yes, I do.

str. And in granting that they exist, do you mean to say that both and each are in motion?

THEAET. By no means.

str. But do you mean that they are at rest, when you say that both exist?

THEAET. Of course not.

str. Being, then, you consider to be something else in the soul, a third in addition to these two, inasmuch as you think rest and motion are embraced by it; and since you comprehend and observe that they participate in existence, you therefore said that they are. Eh?

THEAET. We really do seem to have a vague vision of being as some third thing, when we say that motion and rest are.

str. Then being is not motion and rest in combination, but something else, different from them.

THEAET. Apparently.

str. According to its own nature, then, being is neither at rest nor in motion.

THEAET. You are about right.

str. What is there left, then, to which a man can still turn his mind who wishes to establish within himself any clear conception of being?

THEAET. What indeed?

str. There is nothing left, I think, to which he can turn easily. For if a thing is not in motion, it must surely be at rest; and again, what is not at rest, must surely be in motion. But now we find that being has emerged outside of both these classes. Is that possible, then?
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντων μὲν οὖν ἀδυνατώτατον.
Ε. Τόδε τοῖνυν μην ἴησθηναι δίκαιον ἐπὶ τούτοις.
ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῦν;
Ε. Ὅτι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἐρωτηθέντες τοῦνομα ἢ
do τί ποτε δεῖ φέρειν, πάση συνεσχόμεθα ἀπορία.
mέμνησαι;
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;
Ε. Μᾶν οὖν ἐν ἐλάττονὶ τινὶ νῦν ἐσμὲν ἀπορία
Επερὶ τὸ ὸν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν, ὃ ξένε, εἰ δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν, ἐν
πλείονι φανόμεθα.
Ε. Τοῦτο μὲν τοῖνυν ἐνταῦθα κείσθω διηπορη-
μένον. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔξ istringstream τὸ τε ὅν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὃν ἀπο-
ρίας μετελήφατον, νῦν ἐλπὶς ἦδη καθ' ἄπερ ἂν
αὑτῶν θάτερον εἴτε ἀμυνδρότερον εἴτε σαφέστερον
ἀναφαίνηται, καὶ θάτερον οὕτως ἀναφαίνεσθαι. καὶ
251 ἐὰν αὖ μηδέτερον ἰδεῖν δυνόμεθα, τὸν γοῦν λόγον
ὀπτηπερ ἂν οἶδα τε ὃμεν εὑπρεπέστατα διωσόμεθα
οὕτως ἀμφοῖν ᾠμα.
ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς.
Ε. Λέγωμεν δὴ καθ' ὄντινα ποτε τρόπον πολλοῖς
ὄνομασι ταυτὸν τοῦτο ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύμεν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Οἶον δὴ τί; παράδειγμα εἰπέ.
37. Ε. Λέγομεν ἄνθρωπον δὴ ποὺ πόλλ' ἄττα
ἐπονομάζοντες, τά τε χρώματα ἐπιφέροντες αὐτῷ
καὶ τά σχῆματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετῶν,
Β ἐν οἷς πάσι καὶ ἐτέροις μυρίοις οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωπον
αὐτὸν εἶναι φαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄγαθὸν καὶ ἐτερα
ἀπερα, καὶ τάλλα δὴ κατὰ τῶν αὐτὸν λόγον οὐτος
ἐν ἐκαστον ὑποθέμενοι πάλιν αὐτὸ πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς
ὄνομασι λέγομεν.

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THEAET. No, nothing could be more impossible.

STR. Then there is this further thing which we ought to remember.

THEAET. What is it?

STR. That when we were asked to what the appellation of not-being should be applied, we were in the greatest perplexity. Do you remember?

THEAET. Of course I do.

STR. Well, then, are we now in any less perplexity about being?

THEAET. It seems to me, stranger, that we are, if possible, in even greater.

STR. This point, then, let us put down definitely as one of complete perplexity. But since being and not-being participate equally in the perplexity, there is now at last some hope that as either of them emerges more dimly or more clearly, so also will the other emerge. If, however, we are able to see neither of them, we will at any rate push our discussion through between both of them at once as creditably as we can.

THEAET. Good.

STR. Let us, then, explain how we come to be constantly calling this same thing by many names.

THEAET. What, for instance? Please give an example.

STR. We speak of man, you know, and give him many additional designations; we attribute to him colours and forms and sizes and vices and virtues, and in all these cases and countless others we say not only that he is man, but we say he is good and numberless other things. So in the same way every single thing which we supposed to be one, we treat as many and call by many names.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλήθη λέγεις.

ΕΕ. Ὅθεν γε, οίμαι, τοῖς τε νεόις καὶ τῶν γερών-
tων τοῖς ὄψιμαθέσι θούνην παρεσκευάκαμεν· εὐθὺς
gὰρ ἀντιλαβέσθαι παντὶ πρόχειρον ὡς ἀδύνατον τὰ
τε πολλὰ ἐν καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ εἴναι, καὶ δὴ που
χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἐώντες ἁγαθὸν λέγειν ἀνθρώπον,
Ο ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἁγαθὸν ἁγαθὸν, τὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπον
ἀνθρώπον. ἐντυγχάνεις γάρ, ὡς Θεαίτητε, ὡς
ἐγώμαι, πολλάκις τὰ τοιαύτα ἑστηκακότις, ἐνίοτε
προσβυτέρως ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ὑπὸ πενίας τῆς περὶ
φρόνησιν κτήσεως τὰ τοιαύτα τεθαυμακόσι, καὶ δὴ
τι καὶ πάσοσοφον οἰομένους τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἄνηρηκέναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνα μὲν οὖν.

ΕΕ. Ἰνα τοῖνυν πρὸς ἀπαντᾷς ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἢ
tους πώποτε περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὅτιον διαλεξθέντας,
D ἔστω καὶ πρὸς τούτους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους,
ὅσοι εἴμπροσθέν διειλέγμεθα, τὰ νῦν ὡς ἐν ἐρωτήσει
λεξηθήσομεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ποιὰ δή;

ΕΕ. Πότερον μήτε τῆν οὐσίαν κινήσει καὶ στάσει
προσάπτωμεν μήτε ἄλλο ἄλλω μηδὲν μηδενί, ἄλλῳ
ὡς ἁμικτα ὑντα καὶ ἀδύνατον μεταλαμβάνειν ἄλλη-
lων οὖτως αὐτὰ ἐν τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν λόγοις τιθώμεν;
ἡ πάντα εἰς ταυτὸν ξυνάγωμεν ὡς δυνατὰ ἐπικοι-

νωνεῖν ἄλληλοις; ἡ τὰ μὲν, τὰ δὲ μῆ; τούτων, ὡ
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THEAET. True.

STR. And it is in this way, I fancy, that we have provided a fine feast for youngsters and for old men whose learning has come to them late in life; for example, it is easy enough for anyone to grasp the notion that the many cannot possibly be one, nor the one many, and so, apparently, they take pleasure in saying that we must not call a man good, but must call the good good, and a man man. I fancy, Theaetetus, you often run across people who take such matters seriously; sometimes they are elderly men whose poverty of intellect makes them admire such quibbles, and who think this is a perfect mine of wisdom they have discovered.¹

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Then, to include in our discussion all those who have ever engaged in any talk whatsoever about being, let us address our present arguments to these men as well as to all those with whom we were conversing before, and let us employ the form of questions.

THEAET. What are the arguments?

STR. Shall we attribute neither being to rest and motion, nor any attribute to anything, but shall we in our discussions assume that they do not mingle and cannot participate in one another? Or shall we gather all things together, believing that they are capable of combining with one another? Or are some capable of it and others not? Which of these

¹ Those are here satirized who deny the possibility of all except identical predicition. Such were Antisthenes, Euthydemus, and Dionysodorus. The two last are probably those referred to as old men whose learning came late in life.
Ε Θεαίτητε, τί ποτ' ἂν αὐτοὺς προαιρεῖσθαι φήσαιμεν;

Θεαί. Ἡγὼ μὲν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχω πρὸς ταύτα ἀποκρίνασθαι.

ζε. Τι οὖν οὐ καθ᾽ ἐν ἀποκρινόμενοι ἐφ᾽ ἐκάστου τὰ ἐξυμβαινόντα ἐσκέψω; ¹

Θεαί. Καλῶς λέγεις. ²

ζε. Καὶ τιθῶμεν γε αὐτοὺς λέγεων, εἰ βούλει, πρῶτον μηδενὶ μηδὲν μηδεμίαν δύναμιν ἔχειν κοινωνίας εἰς μηδὲν. οὐκοῦν κίνησις τε καὶ στάσις οὐδαμὴ μεθέξετον ὀνόσιας;

252 Θεαί. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ζε. Τὶ δὲ; ἔσται πότερον αὐτῶν ὀνόσιας μὴ προσκοινωνοῦν ³;

Θεαί. Οὐκ ἔσται.

ζε. Ταχὺ δὴ ταύτῃ γε τῇ συνομολογίᾳ πάντα ἀνάστατα γέγονεν, ὡς ἐστίκεν, ἀμα τε τῶν τὸ πᾶν κινούσιν καὶ τῶν ὡς ἐν ἱστάντων καὶ ὅσιοι κατ᾽ εἴδη τὰ ὄντα κατὰ ταύτα ὤςαύτως ἔχοντα εἰναὶ φασιν ἄεὶ. πάντες γὰρ οὖτοι τὸ γε εἰναὶ προσ- ἀπτούσων, οἱ μὲν ὄντως κινεῖσθαι λέγοντες, οἱ δὲ ὄντως ἐστηκότε εἰναι.

Θεαί. Κομίδη μὲν οὖν.

Β ζε. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅσιο τοτὲ μὲν ἔστηθεασί τὰ πάντα, τοτὲ δὲ διαιροῦσιν, εἰτε εἰς ἐν καὶ εἰς ἐνὸς ἀπειρα εἰτε εἰς πέρας ἔχοντα στοιχεῖα διαιρούμενοι καὶ ἐκ τούτων συντιθέντες, ὁμοίως μὲν ἐὰν ἐν μέρει τοῦτο τιθῶσι γιγνόμενον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐὰν ἄει,

¹ τί οὖν . . . ἐσκέψω; attributed to the Stranger by Badham.
² καλῶς λέγεις attributed to Theaetetus by Badham.
³ προσκοινωνοῦν W; προσκοινωνεῖν BT.
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alternatives, I'heaetetus, should we say is their choice?

THEAET. I cannot answer these questions for them.

STR. Then why did you not answer each separately and see what the result was in each case?

THEAET. A good suggestion.

STR. And let us, if you please, assume that they say first that nothing has any power to combine with anything else. Then motion and rest will have no share in being, will they?

THEAET. No.

STR. Well, then, will either of them be, if it has no share in being?

THEAET. It will not.

STR. See how by this admission everything is overturned at once, as it seems—the doctrine of those who advocate universal motion, that of the partisans of unity and rest, and that of the men who teach that all existing things are distributed into invariable and everlasting kinds. For all of these make use of being as an attribute. One party says that the universe "is" in motion, another that it "is" at rest.

THEAET. Exactly.

STR. And further, all who teach that things combine at one time and separate at another, whether infinite elements combine in unity and are derived from unity or finite elements separate and then unite, regardless of whether they say that these changes take place successively or without interrup-
κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα λέγοιν ἀν οὐδέν, εἰπέρ μηδεμίᾳ ἐστι ξύμμεξις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως.

ξΕ. Ἐπὶ τοίνυν ἃν αὐτοὶ πάντων καταγελαστῶτα μετίοιεν ¹ τὸν λόγον οἱ μηδὲν ἐῶντες κοινωνίᾳ παθήματος ἑτέρου θάτερου προσαγορεῦεν.

C ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ξΕ. Τῷ τε “εἶναι” ποι περὶ πάντα ἀναγκᾶζοντα χρῆσθαι καὶ τῷ “χωρίς” καὶ τῷ “τῶν ἄλλων” ² καὶ τῷ “καθ’ αὐτὸ” καὶ μυρίοις ἑτέροις, ὃν ἀκρατείας ὄντες εἰργεσθαι καὶ μὴ συνάπτειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐκ ἄλλων δέονται τῶν ἐξελεγξόντων, ἀλλὰ τὸ λεγόμενον οἰκοδει τοῖς πολέμιοι καὶ ἐναντιωσόμενον ἔχοντες, ἐντὸς ὑποθεγγόμενον ὡσπερ τὸν ἄτοπον Εὐρυκλέα περιφέροντες ἄει πορεύονται.

D ΘΕΑΙ. Κομμῆ δέ λέγεις ὑμων τε καὶ ἀληθές.

ξΕ. Τὸ δ’, ἃν πάντα ἄλληλοις ἑώμεν δύναμιν ἐχειν ἐπικοινωνίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τούτο μὲν οἶος τε κἀγὼ διαλύειν.

ξΕ. Πῶς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅτι κάνησις τε ἀυτὴ παντάπασιν ἵστατι ἀν καὶ στάσις αὐτῷ πάλιν αὐτῇ κινοῖτο, εἰπέρ ἐπιγεγυνοίσθη ἐπ’ ἄλληλου.

ξΕ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο γέ που ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀνάγκαις ἀδύνατον, κάνησιν τε ἰστασθαί καὶ στάσιν κινεῖσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; ξΕ. Τῷ τρίτῳ δὴ μόνον λοιπόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

¹ μετίοιεν] μετίοιμεν ΒΤΩ.
² τῶν ἄλλων Β; ἄλλων Τ.
³ τε] γε ΒΤΩ.
tion, would be talking nonsense in all these doctrines, if there is no intermingling.

**Theaet.** Quite right.

**Str.** Then, too, the very men who forbid us to call anything by another name because it participates in the effect produced by another, would be made most especially ridiculous by this doctrine.

**Theaet.** How so?

**Str.** Because they are obliged in speaking of anything to use the expressions “to be,” “apart,” “from the rest,” “by itself,” and countless others; they are powerless to keep away from them or avoid working them into their discourse; and therefore there is no need of others to refute them, but, as the saying goes, their enemy and future opponent is of their own household whom they always carry about with them as they go, giving forth speech from within them, like the wonderful Eurycles.¹

**Theaet.** That is a remarkably accurate illustration.

**Str.** But what if we ascribe to all things the power of participation in one another?

**Theaet.** Even I can dispose of that assumption.

**Str.** How?

**Theaet.** Because motion itself would be wholly at rest, and rest in turn would itself be in motion, if these two could be joined with one another.

**Str.** But surely this at least is most absolutely impossible, that motion be at rest and rest be in motion?

**Theaet.** Of course.

**Str.** Then only the third possibility is left.

**Theaet.** Yes.

¹ Eurycles was a ventriloquist and soothsayer of the fifth century, *cf*. Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 1019.
Ε 38. ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν ἐν γέ τι τούτων ἀναγκαῖον, ἢ πάντα ἢ μὴδὲν ἢ τὰ μὲν ἐθέλειν, τὰ δὲ μὴ συμμείγνυσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; 
ΞΕ. Καὶ μὴν τὰ γε δύο ἀδύνατον εὑρέθη. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ. 
ΞΕ. Πᾶς ἄρα ὁ βουλόμενος ὁρθῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ λοιπὸν τῶν τριῶν θῆσαι. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν. 
ΞΕ. "Ὅτε δὴ τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει τοῦτο δρᾶν, τὰ δ’ οὖν, 253 σχεδὸν οἷον τὰ γράμματα πεποιθότ’ ἂν εἰη, καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων τὰ μὲν ἀναρμοστεὶ ποῦ πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὰ δὲ ἐξαρμόττετε. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ’ οὖ; 
ΞΕ. Τὰ δὲ γε φωνήσεις διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων οἷον δεσμὸς διὰ πάντων κεχώρηκεν, ὡστε ἄνευ τινὸς αὐτῶν ἀδύνατον ἁρμόττειν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑτερον ἑτέρως. 
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα γε. 
ΞΕ. Πᾶς οὖν οἶδεν ὅποια ὅποιοι δυνατὰ κοινωνεῖν, ἢ τέχνης δεὶ τῷ μέλλοντι δρᾶν ἰκανῶς αὐτά; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Τέχνης. 
ΞΕ. Ποίας; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Τῆς γραμματικῆς. 
ΞΕ. Τί δὲ; περὶ τοὺς τῶν ὁξέων καὶ βαρέων Β φθόγγοις ἃρ’ οὐχ οὕτως; ὃ μὲν τοὺς συγκεραννυμένους τε καὶ μὴ τέχνην ἔχων γιγνώσκειν μονοσικός, ὃ δὲ μὴ ἐννεῖς ἀμονοσός; 
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

1 εὑρέθη. val Heindorf; εὑρεθῆναι BT; εὑρεθῆναι val W.
And certainly one of these three must be true; either all things will mingle with one another, or none will do so, or some will and others will not.

Theaet. Of course.

Str. And certainly the first two were found to be impossible.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. Then everybody who wishes to answer correctly will adopt the remaining one of the three possibilities.

Theaet. Precisely.

Str. Now since some things will commingle and others will not, they are in much the same condition as the letters of the alphabet; for some of these do not fit each other, and others do.

Theaet. Of course.

Str. And the vowels, to a greater degree than the others, run through them all as a bond, so that without one of the vowels the other letters cannot be joined one to another.

Theaet. Certainly.

Str. Now does everybody know which letters can join with which others? Or does he who is to join them properly have need of art?

Theaet. He has need of art.

Str. What art?

Theaet. The art of grammar.

Str. And is not the same true in connexion with high and low sounds? Is not he who has the art to know the sounds which mingle and those which do not, musical, and he who does not know unmusical?

Theaet. Yes.
καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων δὴ τεχνῶν καὶ ἀτεχνῶν τοιαύτα εὐρήσομεν ἐτέρα.

Πῶς δ’ οὖ;  

Τί δ’; ἐπειδή καὶ τὰ γένη πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ ταύτα μίξεως ἔχειν ὁμολογήκαμεν, ἃρ’ οὐ μετ’ ἑπιστήμης τυνὸς ἀναγκαίον διὰ τῶν λόγων πορεύεσθαι τὸν ὁρθὸς μέλλοντα δείξειν ποία ποῖοις συμφωνεῖ τῶν γενῶν καὶ ποῖα ἄλληλα οὐ δέχεται;

καὶ δὴ καὶ διὰ πάντων εἰ συνέχοντ’ ἄττ’ αὔτ’ ἔστιν, ὡστε συμμίγνυσθαι δυνατὰ εἶναι, καὶ πάλιν ἐν ταῖς διαφέρον εἰ δ’ ὅλων ἐτέρα τῆς διαφέρον εἰσὶν αὕτα;

Πῶς γὰρ οὖκ ἑπιστήμης δεῖ, καὶ σχεδόν γε ἢ ὅσα τῆς μεγίστης;

39. Τίν’ οὖν αὖ προσεροῦμεν, δ’ Ἐφειστητε, ταύτην; ἢ πρὸς Διὸς ἐλάθομεν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐλευθερων ἐμπεσόντες ἑπιστήμην, καὶ κινδυνεύομεν ξητοῦντες τὸν σοφιστὴν πρότερον ἀνηρηκέναι τὸν φιλόσοφον;

Πῶς λέγεις;

Τὸ κατὰ γένη διαφέρεσθαι καὶ μήτε ταύτων εἰδος ἑτερον ἡγήσασθαι μήτε ἑτερον διὰ ταύτων μῶν οὐ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς φήσομεν ἑπιστήμης εἶναι;

Ναί, φήσομεν.

Ωὐκοίν ἢ γε τοῦτο δυνατὸς δρᾶν μίαν ἢ δεῖν διὰ πολλῶν, εὖν ἐκάστου κειμένου χωρίς, πάντη διατεταμένη ἰκανῶς διαισθάνεται, καὶ πολλὰς ἑτέρας ἄλληλων υπὸ μᾶς ἔξωθεν περιεχομένας, καὶ μίαν αὖ δι’ ὅλων πολλῶν ἐν ἕνι ξυνημμένην, καὶ

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1 συνέχοντ’ ἄττ’ αὔτ’ Wagner; συνέχοντα ταύτ’ BTW.

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str. And we shall find similar conditions, then, in all the other arts and processes which are devoid of art?

THEAET. Of course.

str. Now since we have agreed that the classes or genera also commingle with one another, or do not commingle, in the same way, must not he possess some science and proceed by the processes of reason who is to show correctly which of the classes harmonize with which, and which reject one another, and also if he is to show whether there are some elements extending through all and holding them together so that they can mingle, and again, when they separate, whether there are other universal causes of separation?

THEAET. Certainly he needs science, and perhaps even the greatest of sciences.

str. Then, Theaetetus, what name shall we give to this science? Or, by Zeus, have we unwittingly stumbled upon the science that belongs to free men and perhaps found the philosopher while we were looking for the sophist?

THEAET. What do you mean?

str. Shall we not say that the division of things by classes and the avoidance of the belief that the same class is another, or another the same, belongs to the science of dialectic?

THEAET. Yes, we shall.

str. Then he who is able to do this has a clear perception of one form or idea extending entirely through many individuals each of which lies apart, and of many forms differing from one another but included in one greater form, and again of one form evolved by the union of many wholes, and of many
Ε πολλὰς χωρὶς πάντη διωρισμένας· τούτο δ’ ἐστιν, ἢ τε κοινωνεῖν ἔκαστα δύναται καὶ ὃπῃ μὴ, διακρίνειν κατὰ γένος ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ζ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ γε διαλεκτικὸν οὐκ ἄλλῳ δόσεις, ὥσ ἐγώμαι, πλὴν τῷ καθαρῶς τε καὶ δικαίως 

θείοις φιλοσοφοῦντι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ δοῖς;

ζ. Τὸν μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφον ἐν τοιούτω τινὶ τόπῳ καὶ νῦν καὶ ἐπείτα ἀνευρήσομεν, ἐὰν ζητῶμεν, ἰδεῖν 254 μὲν χαλεπὸν ἐναργῶς καὶ τοῦτον, ἐτερον μὴν τρόπον ἢ τε τοῦ σοφιστοῦ χαλεπότης ἢ τε τούτου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ζ. Ὁ μὲν ἀποδιδράσκων εἰς τὴν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος σκοτεινότητα, τριβή̄ προσαπτόμενος αὖτής, διά τὸ σκοτεινὸν τοῦ τόπου κατανοῆσαι χαλεπός· ἢ γὰρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὡσὶν.

ζ. Ὁ δὲ γε φιλόσοφος, τῇ τοῦ ὄντος ἄεὶ διὰ λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ἰδέα, διὰ τὸ λαμπρὸν αὐτῆς χώρας οὐδαμῶς εὑπετῆς ὄφθηναι· τὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν Β πολλῶν ψυχῆς ὁμοματα καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀφορώντα ἀδύνατα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ταῦτα εἰκὸς οὐχ ἦττον ἐκείνων οὕτως ἔχειν.

ζ. Οὐκοῦν περὶ μὲν τούτου καὶ τάχα ἐπισκεψόμεθα σαφέστερον, ἂν ἑτὶ βουλομένους ἡμῖν ἢ· περὶ δὲ τοῦ σοφιστοῦ ποὺ δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἀνετέον, πρὶν ὃν ἵκανῶς αὐτὸν θεασώμεθα.
forms entirely apart and separate. This is the knowledge and ability to distinguish by classes how individual things can or cannot be associated with one another.

THEAET. Certainly it is.

STR. But you surely, I suppose, will not grant the art of dialectic to any but the man who pursues philosophy in purity and righteousness.

THEAET. How could it be granted to anyone else?

STR. Then it is in some region like this that we shall always, both now and hereafter, discover the philosopher, if we look for him; he also is hard to see clearly, but the difficulty is not the same in his case and that of the sophist.

THEAET. How do they differ?

STR. The sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being, feeling his way in it by practice, and is hard to discern on account of the darkness of the place. Don't you think so?

THEAET. It seems likely.

STR. But the philosopher, always devoting himself through reason to the idea of being, is also very difficult to see on account of the brilliant light of the place; for the eyes of the soul of the multitude are not strong enough to endure the sight of the divine.

THEAET. This also seems no less true than what you said about the sophist.

STR. Now we will make more accurate investigations about the philosopher hereafter, if we still care to do so; but as to the sophist, it is clear that we must not relax our efforts until we have a satisfactory view of him.

1 By practice, i.e., by empirical knowledge as opposed to reason.
40. ἔσ. Ἡ ὅτ’ ὄν ὅ τὰ μὲν ἥμιν τῶν γενόν ὁμολόγηται κοινωνεῖν ἐθέλειν ἀλλήλους, τὰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ ὁλίγον, τὰ δ’ ἐπὶ πολλά, τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ C πάντων οὐδέν κωλύει τοὺς πάσιν κεκοιμωνηκέναι, τὸ δὴ μετὰ τούτῳ ἄνεπισπώμεθα τῷ λόγῳ τῇδε οκοποῦντες, μὴ περὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν, ἵνα μὴ ταραττόμεθα ἐν πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ προελθοντει τῶν μεγίστων λεγομένων ἄττα, πρῶτον μὲν ποιὰ ἐκαστὰ ἔστων, ἐπειτα κοινωνίας ἀλλήλων πῶς ἔχει δυνάμεως, ἵνα τὸ τε ὃν καὶ μὴ ὃν εἰ μὴ πάση σαφηνεία δυνάμεθα λαβεῖν, ἀλλ’ οὖν λόγου γε ἐνδεείς μηδὲν γιγνώμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, καθ’ ὃσον ὁ τρόπος ἐνδέχεται τῆς νῦν σκέψεως, ἐὰν ἀρα ἥμιν πῃ D παρεικάθη ¹ τὸ μὴ ὃν λέγουσιν ὃς ἔστων ὃντως μὴ ὃν ἀθώοις ἀπαλλάττειν.

ἔσ. Οὐκοῦν χρῆ.

ἔσ. Μέγιστα μὴν τῶν γενῶν, ἀ νῦν δὴ διῆμεν, τὸ τε ὃν αὐτὸ καὶ στάσις καὶ κίνησις.

ἔσ. Πολὺ γέ.

ἔσ. Καὶ μὴν τῷ γε δύο φαμὲν αὐτοῖν ἀμίκτω πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ.

ἔσ. Σφόδρα γέ.

ἔσ. Τὸ δὲ γε ὃν μικτὸν ἀμφοῖν. ἔστων γὰρ ἀμφῶς ποι.

ἔσ. Πῶς δ’ οὖ;

ἔσ. Τρία δὴ γίγνεται ταῦτα.

ἔσ. Τί μὴν;

ἔσ. Οὐκοῦν αὐτῶν ἐκαστὸν τοῖν μὲν δυοῖν ἐτερὸν ἔστων, αὐτὸ δ’ ἐαυτῷ ταὐτών.

¹ παρεικάθη Boeckh; παρεικασθῇ BT.
theaet. You are right.

str. Since, therefore, we are agreed that some of the classes will mingle with one another, and others will not, and some will mingle with few and others with many, and that there is nothing to hinder some from mingling universally with all, let us next proceed with our discussion by investigating, not all the forms or ideas, lest we become confused among so many, but some only, selecting them from those that are considered the most important; let us first consider their several natures, then what their power of mingling with one another is, and so, if we cannot grasp being and not-being with perfect clearness, we shall at any rate not fail to reason fully about them, so far as the method of our present inquiry permits. Let us in this way see whether it is, after all, permitted us to say that not-being really is, although not being, and yet come off unscathed.

theaet. Yes; that is the proper thing for us to do.

str. The most important, surely, of the classes or genera are those which we just mentioned; being itself and rest and motion.

theaet. Yes, by far.

str. And further, two of them, we say, cannot mingle with each other.

theaet. Decidedly not.

str. But being can mingle with both of them, for they both are.

theaet. Of course.

str. Then these prove to be three.

theaet. To be sure.

str. Each of them is, then, other than the remaining two, but the same as itself.
Ε ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔτως.

Ἑ. Τί ποτ' αὖ νῦν οὔτως εἰρήκαμεν τὸ τε ταύτων καὶ θάτερον; πότερα δύο γένη τυνε ἀυτῶ, οἷς μὲν τριῶν ἄλλω, ἐξουσιαγγείους ὡς ἑκείνως ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄει, καὶ περὶ πέντε ἄλλ' οὖ περὶ τριῶν ὡς ὑπὸν αὐτῶν σκέπτεον, ἢ τὸ τε ταύτων τοῦτο καὶ θάτερον 255 ὡς ἑκείνων τι προσαγορεύοντες λανθάνομεν ἣμᾶς αὐτούς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡσιως.

Ε. Ἀλλ' οὔ τι μὴν κίνησις γε καὶ στάσις οὖθ' ἑτερον οὔτε ταύτων ἐστι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

Ε. Ὅτιπερ άν κοινῇ προσείπωμεν κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν, τοῦτο οὐδέτερον αὐτοῖς οἶον τε εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὶ δὴ;

Ε. Κίνησις τε στήσεται καὶ στάσις αὖ κινηθῆ-ποτὲ περὶ γὰρ ἀμφότερα θάτερον ὅποτερον διὸ γιγνόμενον αὐτοῖν ἀναγκάσει μεταβάλλειν αὖ θάτερον ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως, ἀτε Β μετασχῶν τοῦ ἑναντίου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κόμμη γε.

Ε. Μετέχεσθον μὴν ἀμφω ταύτω καὶ θάτερον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

Ε. Μὴ τούνυν λέγωμεν κίνησιν γ' εἶναι ταύτων ἢ θάτερον, μηδ' αὖ στάσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ γάρ.

Ε. Ἀλλ' ἄρα τὸ ὡς καὶ τὸ ταύτων ὡς ἐν τι δια-νοητέον ἡμῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡσιως.

Ε. Ἀλλ' εἰ τὸ ὡς καὶ τὸ ταύτων μηδὲν διάφορον σημαίνετον, κίνησιν αὖ πάλιν καὶ στάσιν ἀμφότερα 1 αὐτῶ] αυτοῦ Β; αὐτοῦ Τ.

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theaet. Yes.

str. But what do we mean by these words, "the same" and "other," which we have just used? Are they two new classes, different from the other three, but always of necessity mingled with them, and must we conduct our inquiry on the assumption that there are five classes, not three, or are we unconsciously speaking of one of those three when we say "the same" or "other"?

theaet. Perhaps.

str. But certainly motion and rest are neither other nor the same.

theaet. How so?

str. Whatever term we apply to rest and motion in common cannot be either of those two.

theaet. Why not?

str. Because motion would be at rest and rest would be in motion; in respect of both, for whichever of the two became "other" would force the other to change its nature into that of its opposite, since it would participate in its opposite.

theaet. Exactly so.

str. Both certainly partake of the same and the other.\footnote{i.e., sameness and difference can be predicated of both.}

theaet. Yes.

str. Then we must not say that motion, or rest either, is the same or other.

theaet. No.

str. But should we conceive of "being" and "the same" as one?

theaet. Perhaps.

str. But if "being" and "the same" have no difference of meaning, then when we go on and say
διαι λέγοντες ἀμφότερα οὕτως αὐτὰ ταῦτον ὡς
οὕτα προσεροῦμεν.

ἔθει. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο γε ἀδύνατον.

ἔθει. Ἀδύνατον ἄρα ταῦτον καὶ τὸ ὅν ἐν εἶναι.

ἔθει. Σχεδόν.

ἔθει. Τέταρτον δὴ πρὸς τοὺς τρισὶν εἶδες 1 τὸ
taυτὸν τιθώμεν;

ἔθει. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ἔθει. Τί δὲ; τὸ θάτερον ἄρα ἠμῖν λεκτέον πέμπτον;

ἔθει. Τό τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ὅν ὡς δυ' ἀττα ὄνόματα ἐφ' ἐνὶ γένει
diaνοεῖσθαι δεῖ;

ἔθει. Τάχ' ἄν.

ἔθει. 'Ἀλλ' οἶμαι σε συγχωρεῖν τῶν οὕτων τὰ μὲν

ἔθει. Τί δ' οὖ;

ἔθει. Τὸ δ' ἐτερόν ἄει πρὸς ἐτερον. ἢ γάρ;

ἔθει. Οὕτως.

ἔθει. Οὐκ ἄν, εἰ γε τὸ ὅν καὶ τὸ θάτερον μὴ

ἔθει. Αἰτιότερον ἀμφοῖν

ἔθει. Οὐκ ἄν, ἀν ποτὲ τι καὶ
tῶν ἐτέρων ἐτερον οὗ πρὸς ἐτερον. νῦν δὲ ἀτεχνῶς

ἔθει. Λέγεις καθάπερ ἐχεῖ.

ἔθει. Πέμπτον δὴ τῆν θατέρου φύσιν λεκτέον ἐν

ἔθει. Καὶ διὰ πάντων γε αὐτὴν αὐτῶν φήσομεν
eἶναι διεληλυθοῦναν. ἐν ἑκαστον γὰρ ἐτερον εἶναι

1 εἶδες BT; εἴδεσιν εἰδός W.

2 ἄλλα TW; ἄλληλα B.
that both rest and motion are, we shall be saying that they are both the same, since they are.

THEAET. But surely that is impossible.

STR. Then it is impossible for being and the same to be one.

THEAET. Pretty nearly.

STR. So we shall consider "the same" a fourth class in addition to the other three?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Then shall we call "the other" a fifth class? Or must we conceive of this and "being" as two names for one class?

THEAET. May be.

STR. But I fancy you admit that among the entities some are always conceived as absolute, and some as relative.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And other is always relative to other, is it not?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. It would not be so, if being and the other were not utterly different. If the other, like being, partook of both absolute and relative existence, there would be also among the others that exist another not in relation to any other; but as it is, we find that whatever is other is just what it is through compulsion of some other.

THEAET. The facts are as you say.

STR. Then we must place the nature of "the other" as a fifth among the classes in which we select our examples.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And we shall say that it permeates them all; for each of them is other than the rest, not by reason
τῶν ἄλλων οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, ἄλλα διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ἱδέας τῆς θατέρου.

Θεά. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.

41. Ξε. Ὁδὲ δὴ λέγωμεν ἐπὶ τῶν πέντε καθ' ἐν ἀναλαμβάνοντες.

Θεά. Πῶς;

Ξε. Πρῶτον μὲν κύνησιν, ὡς ἐστὶν παντάπασιν ἔτερον στάσεως. ἡ πώς λέγωμεν;

Θεά. Οὔτως.

Ξε. Οὐ στάσις ἀρ' ἐστίν.

Θεά. Οὔδαμώς.

256 Ξε. Ἡ ἑστὶ δὲ γε διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τοῦ ὄντος.

Θεά. Ὁ ἑστὶν.

Ξε. Ἀδίσι δὴ πάλιν ἡ κύνησις ἔτερον ταύτοις ἑστὶν.

Θεά. Σχεδόν.

Ξε. Οὐ ταύτοις ἀρα ἐστίν.

Θεά. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Ξε. Ἀλλὰ μὴν αὕτη γ' ἢν ταύτον διὰ τὸ μετέχειν αὖ πάντ' αὐτοῦ.

Θεά. Καὶ μάλα.

Ξε. Τὴν κύνησιν δὴ ταύτον τε εἶναι καὶ μὴ ταύτον ὁμολογητέου καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον. οὐ γὰρ ὅταν εἰπωμεν αὕτην ταύτον καὶ μὴ ταύτον, ὁμοίως εἰρήκαμεν, ἀλλ' ὁπόταν μὲν ταύτον, διὰ τὴν μέθεξιν Β ταύτοις πρὸς ἑαυτὴν οὕτω λέγομεν,1 ὅταν δὲ μὴ ταύτον, διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὐθατέρου, δι' ἃν ἀποχωριζομένη ταύτων γέγονεν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἀλλ' ἔτερον, ὅστε ὅρθως αὐθ' λέγεται πάλιν οὐ ταύτον.

Θεά. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Ξε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ τῇ μετελάμβανεν αὐτῇ

1 λέγομεν W; λέγωμεν BT.
of its own nature, but because it partakes of the idea of the other.

THEAET. Exactly.

STR. Let us now state our conclusions, taking up the five classes one at a time.

THEAET. How?

STR. Take motion first; we say that it is entirely other than rest, do we not?

THEAET. We do.

STR. Then it is not rest.

THEAET. Not at all.

STR. But it exists, by reason of its participation in being.

THEAET. Yes, it exists.

STR. Now motion again is other than the same.

THEAET. You're about right.

STR. Therefore it is not the same.

THEAET. No, it is not.

STR. But yet we found it was the same, because all things partake of the same.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Then we must admit that motion is the same and is not the same, and we must not be disturbed thereby; for when we say it is the same and not the same, we do not use the words alike. When we call it the same, we do so because it partakes of the same in relation to itself, and when we call it not the same, we do so on account of its participation in the other, by which it is separated from the same and becomes not that but other, so that it is correctly spoken of in turn as not the same.

THEAET. Yes, certainly.

STR. Then even if absolute motion partook in
κίνησις στάσεως, οὖδὲν ἂν άτοπον ἢ στάσιμον αὐτήν προσαγορεύειν;

ὁ θεά. Ὅρθοτατά γε, εὑπερ τῶν γενῶν συγχωρησόμεθα τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλους ἐθέλειν μίγνυσθαι, τὰ δὲ μὴ.

C ο. Καὶ μὴν ἐπί γε τὴν τούτον πρότερον ἀπόδειξιν ἢ τῶν νῦν ἀφικόμεθα, ἐλέγχοντες ὡς ἐστι κατὰ φύσιν ταύτη.

ὁ θεά. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ὁ. Δέγωμεν δὴ πάλιν. ἡ κίνησις ἐστὶν ἔτερον τοῦ ἔτερον, καθάπερ ταύτοι τε ἢν ἄλλο καὶ τῆς στάσεως;

ὁ θεά. 'Ἀναγκαῖον.

ὁ. Οὐχ ἔτερον ἃρ' ἐστὶ πὴ καὶ ἔτερον κατὰ τὸν νῦν δὴ λόγον.

ὁ θεά. Ἡληθῆ.

ὁ. Τί οὖν δὴ τὸ μετὰ τούτο; ἃρ' αὖ τῶν μὲν τριῶν ἔτερον αὐτήν φήσομεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ τετάρτου μὴ φῶμεν, ὀμολογήσαντες αὐτὰ εἶναι πέντε, περὶ D ὅν καὶ ἐν οἷς προσβέμεθα σκοπεῖν;

ὁ θεά. Καὶ πῶς; ἀδύνατον γὰρ συγχωρεῖν ἐλάττω τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ νῦν δὴ φανέντος.

ὁ. Ἀδειῶς ἃρα τὴν κίνησιν ἔτερον εἶναι τοῦ ὄντος διαμαχόμενοι λέγωμεν;

ὁ θεά. Ἀδειώτατα μὲν οὖν.

ὁ. Οὐκοῦν δὴ σαφῶς ἡ κίνησις ὄντως οὐκ ὃν ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ, ἐπείπερ τοῦ ὄντος μετέχει;

ὁ θεά. Σαφέστατα γε.

ὁ. Ἐστὶν ἃρα εὖ ἀνάγκης τὸ μὴ ὃν ἐπί τε κινήσεως εἶναι καὶ κατὰ πάντα τὰ γένη. κατὰ πάντα Ε γὰρ ἡ θατέρου φύσις ἔτερον ἀπεργαζόμενη τοῦ

1 αὖ Heindorf; οὐ BT.
any way of rest, it would not be absurd to say it was at rest?

THEAET. It would be perfectly right, if we are to admit that some of the classes will mingle with one another, and others will not.

STR. And surely we demonstrated that before we took up our present points; we proved that it was according to nature.¹

THEAET. Yes, of course.

STR. Then let us recapitulate: Motion is other than the other, just as we found it to be other than the same and than rest. Is that true?

THEAET. Inevitably.

STR. Then it is in a sense not other and also other, according to our present reasoning.

THEAET. True.

STR. Now how about the next point? Shall we say next that motion is other than the three, but not other than the fourth,—that is, if we have agreed that the classes about which and within which we undertook to carry on our inquiry are five in number?

THEAET. How can we say that? For we cannot admit that the number is less than was shown just now.

STR. Then we may fearlessly persist in contending that motion is other than being?

THEAET. Yes, most fearlessly.

STR. It is clear, then, that motion really is not, and also that it is, since it partakes of being?

THEAET. That is perfectly clear.

STR. In relation to motion, then, not-being is. That is inevitable. And this extends to all the classes; for in all of them the nature of other so operates as to make each one other than being, and

¹ See 251 e ff.
Being is many, for each and every thing in all the classes is; but not-being is infinite, for not only is it true that every thing in each of the classes is not, but not-being extends also to all conceptions which do not and cannot have any reality.
therefore not-being. So we may, from this point of view, rightly say of all of them alike that they are not; and again, since they partake of being, that they are and have being.

THEAET. Yes, I suppose so.

STR. And so, in relation to each of the classes, being is many, and not-being is infinite in number.¹

THEAET. So it seems.

STR. Then being itself must also be said to be other than all other things.

THEAET. Yes, it must.

STR. And we conclude that whatever the number of other things is, just that is the number of the things in relation to which being is not; for not being those things, it is itself one, and again, those other things are not unlimited in number.

THEAET. That is not far from the truth.

STR. Then we must not be disturbed by this either, since by their nature the classes have participation in one another. But if anyone refuses to accept our present results, let him reckon with our previous arguments and then proceed to reckon with the next step.²

THEAET. That is very fair.

STR. Then here is a point to consider.

THEAET. What is it?

STR. When we say not-being, we speak, I think, not of something that is the opposite of being, but only of something different.

THEAET. What do you mean?

² i.e., if he will not accept our proof that being is not, etc., he must disprove our arguments respecting the participation of ideas in one another, and then proceed to draw his inference.
ΠΛΑΤΟ

ἐΕ. Ὅλον ὅταν εἴπωμέν τι μή μέγα, τότε μᾶλλον τι σοι φανώμεθα τὸ σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ῥόσον δηλοῦν τῷ ῥήματι;

ὁΕΑΙ. Καὶ πώς;

ἐΕ. Οὐκ ἄρ’, ἐναντίον ὅταν ἀπόφασις λέγηται σημαίνει, συγχωρησόμεθα, τοσοῦτον δὲ μόνον, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων τί μηνύει τὸ μὴ καὶ τὸ οὐ προτιθέμενα C τῶν ἐπιόντων ὄνομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων περὶ ἄττ’ ἀν κέχται τὰ ἐπιφθεγγόμενα ὑστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὄνοματα.

ὁΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

42. ἐΕ. Τόδε δὲ διανοηθῶμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ ἔννοδοκεί.

ὁΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποίον;

ἐΕ. Ἡ θατέρου μοι φύσις φαίνεται κατακεκερ-ματίσθαι καθάπερ ἐπιστήμη.

ὁΕΑΙ. Πώς;

ἐΕ. Μία μὲν ἐστὶ ποι ἡ ἐκείνη,1 τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ τῷ γιγνόμενον μέρος αὐτῆς ἐκαστὸν ἀφορισθὲν ἐπω- D νυμίαν ἵσχει τινὰ ἐαυτῆς ἱδίαν: διὸ πολλὰ τέχνα τ’ εἰσὶν 2 λεγόμεναι καὶ ἐπιστήμαι.

ὁΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ἐΕ. ὠκοῦν καὶ τὰ τῆς θατέρου φύσεως μόρια μᾶς οὐσίας ταῦταν πέπονθε τοῦτο.

ὁΕΑΙ. Ῥάχ’ ἄν· ἀλλ’ ὅπῃ δῆ 3 λέγωμεν.

ἐΕ. Ἡ Ἑστὶ τῷ καλῷ τι θατέρου μόριον ἀντιτιθέ-μενον;

ὁΕΑΙ. Ἡ Ἑστίν.

ἐΕ. Τούτ’ οὖν ἀνώνυμον ἐροῦμεν ἢ τιν’ ἔχον ἐπωνυμίαν;

1 ἡ ἐκείνη W; ἡ ἐκείνη BT. 2 τε εἰσὶ W; τείσι T; τισιν B. 3 ἀλλ’ ὅπῃ δῆ W; ἀλλό πῇ T; ἀλλο πῇ B.

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str. For instance, when we speak of a thing as not great, do we seem to you to mean by the expression what is small any more than what is of middle size?

THEAET. No, of course not.

str. Then when we are told that the negative signifies the opposite, we shall not admit it; we shall admit only that the particle "not" indicates something different from the words to which it is prefixed, or rather from the things denoted by the words that follow the negative.

THEAET. Certainly.

str. Let us consider another point and see if you agree with me.

THEAET. What is it?

str. It seems to me that the nature of the other is all cut up into little bits, like knowledge.

THEAET. What do you mean?

str. Knowledge, like other, is one, but each separate part of it which applies to some particular subject has a name of its own; hence there are many arts, as they are called, and kinds of knowledge, or sciences.

THEAET. Yes, certainly.

str. And the same is true, by their nature, of the parts of the other, though it also is one concept.

THEAET. Perhaps; but let us discuss the matter and see how it comes about.

str. Is there a part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful?

THEAET. There is.

str. Shall we say that this is nameless or that it has a name?

1 The two particles ὁδ and μὴ in Greek.
ΟΕΑΙ. Ἐχον· δὲ γὰρ µὴ καλὸν ἐκάστοτε φθεγ- γόμεθα, τοῦτο οὐκ ἄλλου τυφὸς ἑτερόν ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς τοῦ καλοῦ φύσεως.

Ε ὉΕΑΙ. Τὸ τοῦτον;

ΕἜ. Ἀλλο τὶ τῶν ὄντων τυφὸς ἐνὸς γένους ἀφορισθέν καὶ πρὸς τὶ τῶν ὄντων αὖ πάλιν ἀντιτεθέν οὖτω εὔμβεβηκεν εἶναι τὸ µὴ καλὸν;

ΟΕΑΙ. Οὖτως.

ΕἜ. "Οντος δὴ πρὸς ὄν ἀντίθεσις, ὡς ἕοικ', εἶναι τις συμβαίνει τὸ µὴ καλὸν.

ΟΕΑΙ. Ὀρθότατα.

ΕἜ. Τὶ οὖν; κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἄρα µαλλον µὲν τὸ καλὸν ἡµῖν ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων, ἥττον δὲ τὸ µὴ καλὸν;

ΟΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲν.

258 ΕἜ. Ὡμοίως ἄρα τὸ µὴ µέγα καὶ τὸ µέγα αὐτὸ εἶναι λεκτέον;

ΟΕΑΙ. Ὡμοίως.

ΕἜ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ µὴ δίκαιον τῷ δικαίῳ κατὰ ταυτὰ θετέον πρὸς τὸ µηδέν τι µᾶλλον εἶναι θάτερον θατέρου;

ΟΕΑΙ. Τὶ µὴν;

ΕἜ. Καὶ τάλλα δὴ ταύτης λέξομεν, ἐπείπερ ἡ θατέρου φύσις ἐφάνη τῶν ὄντων ὁūσα, ἐκεῖνης δὲ οὐσις ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τὰ µόρια αὐτῆς µηδενὸς ἥττον ὄντα τιθέναι.

ΟΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

Β ΕἜ. Οὐκοῦν, ὡς ἑοικέν, ἡ τῆς θάτερου µορίου φύσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντι-

1 ἐνὸς γένους Τ; γένους Β.
2 εὔμβεβηκεν εἶναι Stephanus; εὔμβεβηκέναι BT.
theaet. That it has one; for that which in each case we call not-beautiful is surely the other of the nature of the beautiful and of nothing else.

str. Now, then, tell me something more.

theaet. What?

str. Does it not result from this that the not-beautiful is a distinct part of some one class of being and also, again, opposed to some class of being?

theaet. Yes.

str. Then, apparently, it follows that the not-beautiful is a contrast of being with being.

theaet. Quite right.

str. Can we, then, in that case, say that the beautiful is more and the not-beautiful less a part of being?

theaet. Not at all.

str. Hence the not-great must be said to be no less truly than the great?

theaet. No less truly.

str. And so we must recognize the same relation between the just and the not-just, in so far as neither has any more being than the other?

theaet. Of course.

str. And we shall, then, say the same of other things, since the nature of the other is proved to possess real being; and if it has being, we must necessarily ascribe being in no less degree to its parts also.

theaet. Of course.

str. Then, as it seems, the opposition of the nature of a part of the other, and of the nature of being, when they are opposed to one another, is no
κειμένων ἀντίθεσις οὐδὲν ἦττον, εἰ Θέμις εἶπεῖν, αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὀντός οὐσία ἐστίν, οὐκ ἑναντίον ἐκείνῳ σημαίνουσα, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ἔτερον ἐκείνου.

Θεαί. Σαφέστατά γε.

ἐξ. Τίν' οὖν αὐτὴν προσείπωμεν;

Θεαί. Δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὃν, ὁ διὰ τὸν σοφιστὴν ἐξητούμεν, αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τοῦτο.

ἐξ. Πότερον οὖν, ὃσπερ εἶπες, ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς τῶν ἀλλων οὐσίας ἐλλειπόμενον, καὶ δει θαρροῦντα ἡδη λέγειν ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὃν βεβαιώς ἐστὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ

C φύσιν ἔχον, ὃσπερ τὸ μέγα ἢν μέγα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἢν καλὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ μέγα μὴ μέγα 1 καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν μὴ καλὸν, 2 οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὃν κατὰ ταύτων ἢν τε καὶ ἐστὶ μὴ ὃν, ἐνάριθμον τῶν πολλῶν οὐτῶν εἰδος ἑν; ἡ τινα ἐτί πρὸς αὐτό, ὡθεαίτητε, ἀ-πιστίαν ἔχομεν;

Θεαί. Οὐδεμίαν.

43. ἐξ. Οἶσθ' οὖν ὅτι Παρμενίδη μακροτέρως τῆς ἀπορρήσεως ἡπιστήκαμεν;

Θεαί. Ὅ; ὡθ;

ἐξ. Πλεῖον ἡ 'κείνος ἀπείπε σκοπεῖν, ἡμεὶς εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἐτί ζητήσαντες ἀπεδείξαμεν αὐτῶ.

Θεαί. Πῶς;

D ἐξ. Ὅτι ὁ μὲν ποῦ φησιν,

ὁ γὰρ μὴ ποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ, 3 εἶναι μὴ ἐόντα, 4 ἀλλὰ οὐ τήσ' ἀφ' ὅδοι διζῆσιος 5 εἴργε νόμμα.

Θεαί. Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.

1 μή μέγα add. Boeckh.
2 μὴ καλὸν add. Boeckh.
3 τοῦτο δαμῇ Simplicius; τοῦτ' οὐδαμῇ BT.
4 ἐόντα Aristot.; ὁντα BT.
5 διζῆσιος BT (cf. 231 λ).
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less truly existence than is being itself, if it is not wrong for me to say so, for it signifies not the opposite of being, but only the other of being, and nothing more.

THEAET. That is perfectly clear.

STR. Then what shall we call this?

THEAET. Evidently this is precisely not-being, which we were looking for because of the sophist.

STR. And is this, as you were saying, as fully endowed with being as anything else, and shall we henceforth say with confidence that not-being has an assured existence and a nature of its own? Just as we found that the great was great and the beautiful was beautiful, the not-great was not-great and the not-beautiful was not-beautiful, shall we in the same way say that not-being was and is not-being, to be counted as one class among the many classes of being? Or have we, Theaetetus, any remaining distrust about the matter?

THEAET. None whatever.

STR. Do you observe, then, that we have gone farther in our distrust of Parmenides than the limit set by his prohibition?

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. We have proceeded farther in our investigation and have shown him more than that which he forbade us to examine.

THEAET. How so?

STR. Because he says somewhere

Never shall this thought prevail, that not-being is; Nay, keep your mind from this path of investigation.

THEAET. Yes, that is what he says.

1 Parmenides, 52 f., ed. Mullach.
ΕΕ. Ἡμεῖς δὲ γε οὐ μόνον ὡς ἔστι τὰ μὴ ὅντα ἀπεδείξαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὃ τυγχάνει ὃν τοῦ μὴ ὅντος ἀπεφηνώμεθα. τὴν γὰρ βαθέρου φύσιν ἀποδείξαντες οὕσαν τε καὶ κατακεκερματισμένην
Ε ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ὅντα πρὸς ἀλληλα, τὸ πρὸς τὸ ὅν ἐκαστὸν 1 μόριον αὐτῆς ἀντιτυθεμένων ἐτολμήσαμεν εἰπεῖν ὡς αὐτὸ τούτὸ ἔστιν ὅντως τὸ μὴ ὅν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ παντάπασι γε, ὃ ξένε, ἀληθεύστατα μοι δοκοῦμεν εἰρηκέναι.
ΕΕ. Μὴ τοινυν ἦμας εἶπῇ τις ὅτι τούναντίον τοῦ ὅντος τὸ μὴ ὅν ἀποφαινόμενοι τολμῶμεν λέγειν ὡς ἔστιν. Ἡμεῖς γὰρ περὶ μὲν ἐναντίον τῶν αὐτῶν χαίρειν πάλαι λέγομεν, εἰτ' ἔστιν εἰτὲ μὴ, λόγον
259 ἔχον ή καὶ παντάπασιν ἀλογον. δὲ δὲ νῦν εἰρήκαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὅν, ἡ πεισάτω τις ὡς οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν ἐλέγξας, ἡ μέχριτε ἢν ἀδυνατῇ, λεκτεόν καὶ ἐκεῖνω καθάπερ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, ὅτι συμμείνων τε ἀλληλοὺς τὰ γένη καὶ τὸ τε ὅν καὶ θάτερον διὰ πάντων καὶ δι' ἀλλήλων διελημμένοι τὸ μὲν ἐτερον μετασχον τοῦ ὅντος ἔστι μὲν διὰ ταύτην τὴν μέθεξιν, οἷον μὴν ἐκεῖνο γε οὐ μετέσχεν ἀλλ' ἐτερον, ἐτερον δὲ τοῦ ὅντος ὅν ἔστι σαφέστατα εἰς ἀνάγκης εἶναι μὴ ὅν.
Β τὸ δὲ ὅν αὐθεντέρου μετεληφός ἐτερον τῶν ἀλλῶν ἃν εἰγ' γενών, ἐτερον δ' ἐκείνων ἀπάντων ὃν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ξύμπαντα τὰ ἀλλα πλῆν αὐτὸ, ὥστε τὸ ὅν ἀναμφισβητήτως αὐθινῖ τοι' μιρίους οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ τὰλλα δὴ καθ' ἐκαστὸν οὖτω καὶ ξύμπαντα πολλαχῇ μὲν ἔστι, πολλαχῇ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

1 ἐκαστὸν Simplicius; ἐκάστον ΒΤ.
str. But we have not only pointed out that things which are not exist, but we have even shown what the form or class of not-being is; for we have pointed out that the nature of the other exists and is distributed in small bits throughout all existing things in their relations to one another, and we have ventured to say that each part of the other which is contrasted with being, really is exactly not-being.

theaet. And certainly, Stranger, I think that what we have said is perfectly true.

str. Then let not anyone assert that we declare that not-being is the opposite of being, and hence are so rash as to say that not-being exists. For we long ago gave up speaking of any opposite of being, whether it exists or not and is capable or totally incapable of definition. But as for our present definition of not-being, a man must either refute us and show that we are wrong, or, so long as he cannot do that, he too must say, as we do, that the classes mingle with one another, and being and the other permeate all things, including each other, and the other, since it participates in being, is, by reason of this participation, yet is not that in which it participates, but other, and since it is other than being, must inevitably be not-being. But being, in turn, participates in the other and is therefore other than the rest of the classes, and since it is other than all of them, it is not each one of them or all the rest, but only itself; there is therefore no doubt that there are thousands and thousands of things which being is not, and just so all other things, both individually and collectively, in many relations are, and in many are not.

theaet. True.
καὶ ταῦτας δὴ ταῖς ἐναντιώσεσιν εἴτε ἀπιστεῖ τις, σκεπτέον αὐτῷ καὶ λεκτέον βέλτιόν τι τῶν Οὐν εἰρημένων· εἴτε ὡς τα χαλεπῶν κατανενοθηκώς χαίρει τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τοτὲ δ’ ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς λόγους ἔλκων, οὐκ ἄξια πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἐσπούδακεν, ὡς οἷς νῦν λόγοι φασί. τούτῳ μὲν γὰρ οὔτε τι κομψὸν οὔτε χαλεπὸν εὑρεῖν, ἐκεῖνο δ’ ἡδη καὶ χαλεπὸν ἀμα καὶ καλὸν.

ὅει. Τὸ ποίον;

εἰ. "Ο καὶ πρόσθεν εὑρηται, τὸ ταῦτα ἐάσαντα ὡς δυνατὰ τοὺς λεγομένους οἷόν τ’ εἶναι καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἐλέγχοντα ἐπακολουθεῖν, ὅταν τε τις ἐτερον ὃν πῇ ταὐτὸν εἶναι φη καὶ ὅταν ταὐτὸν ὃν D ἐτερον, ἐκείνη καὶ κατ’ ἐκείνο ὃ φησὶ τούτων πεπονθέναι πότερον. τὸ δὲ ταὐτὸν ἐτερον ἀποφαινεῖν ἀμὴ γε πῇ καὶ τὸ θάτερον ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρὸν καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀνόμοιον, καὶ χαίρειν. οὕτω τὰναντία ἀεὶ προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὔτε τις ἐλεγχος οὕτος ἀληθινὸς ἄρτι τε τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἐφαπτομένου δήλος νεογενῆς ὃν.

ὅει. Κομψὴ μὲν οὖν.

44. εἰ. Καὶ γὰρ, ὡγαθε, τὸ γε πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποχωρίζειν ἀλλως τε ὁὐκ ἐμμελές Ἐ καὶ δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀμοῦσον τινὸς καὶ ἀφιλοσόφου.

ὅει. Τί δὴ;

εἰ. Τελεωτάτη πάντων λόγων ἐστιν ἀφάνισις τὸ διαλύειν ἐκαστὸν ἀπὸ πάντων. διὰ γὰρ τῆν

1 δυνατὰ BTW; δυνατῶτα Schanz; ἀνὴρτα Badham; δυνατὸν μάλιστα Campbell; δέν αὐτὰ? Apelt.; δυνατὰ is certainly wrong. Possibly οὐκ ὄντα or οὐκ ἄξια (the interpretation adopted in the translation).
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str. And if any man has doubts about these oppositions, he must make investigations and advance better doctrines than these of ours; or if he finds pleasure in dragging words about and applying them to different things at different times, with the notion that he has invented something difficult to explain, our present argument asserts that he has taken up seriously matters which are not worth serious attention; for this process is neither clever nor difficult, whereas here now is something both difficult and beautiful.

THEAET. What is it?

str. What I have spoken of before—the ability to let those quibbles go as of no account and to follow and refute in detail the arguments of a man who says that other is in a sense the same, or that the same is other, and to do this from that point of view and with regard for those relations which he presupposes for either of these conditions. But to show that in some sort of fashion the same is the other, and the other the same, and the great small, and the like unlike, and to take pleasure in thus always bringing forward opposites in the argument,—all that is no true refutation, but is plainly the newborn offspring of some brain that has just begun to lay hold upon the problem of realities.

THEAET. Exactly so.

str. For certainly, my friend, the attempt to separate everything from everything else is not only not in good taste but also shows that a man is utterly uncultivated and unphilosophical.

THEAET. Why so?

str. The complete separation of each thing from all is the utterly final obliteration of all discourse.
άλληλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκήν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν.

Θεαί. Ἀληθῆ.

260 Ξέ. Σκόπει τοῖνυν ὡς ἐν καίρῳ νῦν δὴ τοῖς τοιούτους διεμαχόμεθα καὶ προσηγαγκάζομεν ἕαν ἑτερον ἑτέρῳ μίγνυσθαι.

Θεαί. Πρὸς δὴ τί;

Ξέ. Πρὸς τὸ τὸν 1 λόγον ἡμῖν τῶν οὕτων ἐν τί γενῶν εἶναι. τούτου γὰρ στερηθέντες, τὸ μὲν μέγιστον, φιλοσοφίας ἄν στερηθείμεν, ἔτι δ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεῖ λόγον ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι τί ποτ' ἔστιν, εἰ δὲ ἀφηρέθημεν αὐτὸ μηδ' εἶναι τὸ παράπαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔτι ποιοῦσιν οἷοί τ' ἥμεν· ἀφηρέθημεν B δ' ἂν, εἰ συνεχωρήσαμεν μηδεμίαν εἶναι μίξιν μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδενῖ.

Θεαί. Ὅρθως τούτο γε· λόγον δὲ δι' ὧ τι νῦν διομολογητέον οὐκ ἔμαθον.

Ξέ. Ἄλλ' ἵσως τῇ δ' ἐπόμενος ῥᾶστ' ἀν μάθοις.

Θεαί. Πῇ;

Ξέ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ μὴ ὃν ἡμῖν ἐν τί τῶν ἄλλων γένος ὃν ἀνεφάνη, κατὰ πάντα τὰ οὕτα διεσπαρμένον.

Θεαί. Οὕτως.

Ξέ. Οὔκοιν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἰ δόξη τε καὶ λόγως μίγνυται.

Θεαί. Τί δὴ;

1 τὸν W; om. BT.

1 The denial, that is to say, of all interrelations of ideas leads to purely negative results. Examples of this are the exclusive antithesis of being and not-being and the mutual exclusion of rest and motion. The difficulty is solved at 426
For our power of discourse is derived from the interweaving of the classes or ideas with one another.  

Theaet. True.

Str. Observe, then, that we have now been just in time in carrying our point against the supporters of such doctrine, and in forcing them to admit that one thing mingles with another.

Theaet. What was our object?

Str. Our object was to establish discourse as one of our classes of being. For if we were deprived of this, we should be deprived of philosophy, which would be the greatest calamity; moreover, we must at the present moment come to an agreement about the nature of discourse, and if we were robbed of it by its absolute non-existence, we could no longer discourse; and we should be robbed of it if we agreed that there is no mixture of anything with anything.

Theaet. That is true enough; but I do not understand why we must come to an agreement about discourse just now.

Str. Perhaps the easiest way for you to understand is by following this line of argument.

Theaet. What line?

Str. We found that not-being was one of the classes of being, permeating all being.

Theaet. Yes.

Str. So the next thing is to inquire whether it mingles with opinion and speech.

Theaet. Why?

once when we recognize that positive and negative are necessarily interwoven in the nature of things, that the negative has only a relative existence and is not the opposite of the positive, but only different from it.
Μὴ μιγνυμένου μὲν αὐτοῦ τούτοις ἀναγέννητη πάντ' εἶναι, μιγνυμένου δὲ δόξα τε ἰδεῖν γίγνεται καὶ λόγος: τὸ γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἢ λέγειν, τοῦτ' ἐστι ποι ὁτι τὸ ἱερός ἐν διανοίᾳ τε καὶ λόγοις γιγνόμενον.

"Οντος δὲ γε ῥευδόσ αὐτοὶ ἀπάτη.

Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; τὸν δὲ γε οὐσίας ἑφαμεν ὑπὸ τοῦτῳ ποι ὁτι τὸτὶ καταπεθευγέναι μὲν, ἐξαρνοῦν δὲ γεγονέναι τὸ παράπαν μὴ εἶναι ῥευδὸς: τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὑπὸ διανοεῖσθαι τινα οὐτε λέγειν: οὔσίας γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδαμὴ τὸ μὴ ὅν μετέχειν.

"Ἡν ταῦτα.

Νῦν δὲ γε τούτῳ μὲν ἑφάνη μετέχον τοῦ ὄντος, ὡστε ταύτη μὲν ἑσθα οὐκ ἂν μάχοντο ἐτιμαίτης δὲ ἂν φαίη τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ μὲν μετέχειν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, τὰ δὲ οὖ, καὶ λόγον δὴ καὶ δόξαν εἶναι τῶν οὐ μετεχόντων, ὡστε τὴν εἰδωλοποιικήν καὶ φαντασκεφήν, ἐν ἂν φαμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, διαμάχοντ' ἂν πάλιν ὡς παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπειδὴ δόξα καὶ λόγος οὐ κοινωνεῖ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος: ρευδὸς γὰρ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ εἶναι ταύτης μὴ συνισταμένης τῆς κοινωνίας. διὰ ταύτ' οὖν λόγον πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν καὶ φαντασίαν διερευνητέον ὁ τί ποτ' ἔστω, ἢν 1 

1 The English word “fancy,” though etymologically identical with the Greek φαντασία, has lost the close con-
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STR. If it does not mingle with them, the necessary result is that all things are true, but if it does, then false opinion and false discourse come into being; for to think or say what is not—that is, I suppose, falsehood arising in mind or in words.

THEAET. So it is.

STR. But if falsehood exists, deceit exists.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And if deceit exists, all things must be henceforth full of images and likenesses and fancies.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. But we said that the sophist had taken refuge in this region and had absolutely denied the existence of falsehood: for he said that not-being could be neither conceived nor uttered, since not-being did not in any way participate in being.

THEAET. Yes, so it was.

STR. But now not-being has been found to partake of being, and so, perhaps, he would no longer keep up the fight in this direction; but he might say that some ideas partake of not-being and some do not, and that speech and opinion are among those which do not; and he would therefore again contend that the image-making and fantastic art, in which we placed him, has absolutely no existence, since opinion and speech have no participation in not-being; for falsehood cannot possibly exist unless such participation takes place. For this reason we must first inquire into the nature of speech and opinion and fancy, in order that when they are made clear we may perceive

nexion with “seeming” (falneodai) which the Greek retains. The Greek word is therefore more comprehensive than the English, denoting that which appears to be, whether as the result of imagination or of sensation. Cf. 235 D ff.

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φανέρων καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὐτῶν τῷ μὴ ὄντι
κατίδωμεν, κατιδόντες δὲ τὸ ψεῦδος ὅν ἀποδεί-
ξωμεν, ἀποδείξατες δὲ τὸν σοφιστήν εἰς αὐτὸν
ἐνδήσωμεν, εἴπερ ἔνοχός ἐστιν, ἡ καὶ ἀπολύσαντες
ἐν ἀλλῷ γένεις ζητῶμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδή γε, ὁ ξένε, ἑοίκεν ἀληθεῖς εἰναι
tὸ περὶ τὸν σοφιστήν καὶ ἄρχας λεγέναι, ὅτι δυσθή-
ρευντον εἴῃ τὸ γένος. φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν προβλημάτων
gέμειν, ὡς ἐπειδάν τι προβάλητος, τοῦτο πρότερον
ἀναγκαῖον διαμάχεσθαι πρὶν ἐπ’ αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον
ἀφικέσθαι. νῦν γὰρ μόνῳ μὲν τὸ μῆ ὅν ὡς οὐκ
Β ἐστι προβληθέν τι διεπεράσσει, ἐτερον δὲ προβε-
βληταί, καὶ δεὶ δὴ ψεῦδος ὡς ἐστι καὶ περὶ λόγων
καὶ περὶ δόξαν ἀποδείξαι, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἰσως
ἐτερον, καὶ ἐτ’ ἄλλο μετ’ ἐκείνοι καὶ πέρας, ὡς
ἐοίκεν, οὐδὲν φανήσεται ποτε.

Ε. Θαρρείν, ὁ Θεάτητε, χρῆ τὸν καὶ σμικρὸν
τι δυνάμενον εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἀεὶ προϊέναι. τὶ γὰρ ὁ
γ’ ἀθυμῶν ἐν τούτοις δράσειν ἀν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἡ μηδὲν
ἐν ἐκείνοις ἀνύτων ἡ καὶ πάλιν εἰς τοὺπισθεν ἀπ-
wαθεῖς; σχολὴ ποι, τὸ κατὰ τὴν παρομιάν λεγό-
μενον, ὃ γε τοιοῦτος ἂν ποτὲ ἐλοὶ τόλμην. νῦν δ’
ἐπεί, ὦγαθὲ, τοῦτο δ’ λέγεις διαπεράται, τὸ τοῦ
μέγιστον ἡμῖν τεῖχος ἦρμημένον ἂν εἰῇ, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα
ηδὴ βρέω καὶ σμικρότερα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καλῶς εἶπες.

45. Ε. Λόγον δὴ πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν, καθάπερ
ἐρρήθη νῦν δὴ, λάβωμεν, ἵνα ἐναργεῖστερον ἀπο-
λογισμῶμεθα πότερον αὐτῶν ἀπτεται τὸ μὴ ὅν ἡ

1 αὐτὸ W; αὐτὸν BT.
2 γε TW; δὲ γε B.
3 ἀπολογισμῶμεθα Heindorf; ἀπολογησισμῶμεθα BT.
that they participate in not-being, and when we have perceived that, may prove the existence of falsehood, and after proving that, may imprison the sophist therein, if he can be held on that charge, and if not, may set him free and seek him in another class.

THEAET. It certainly seems, Stranger, that what you said at first about the sophist—that he was a hard kind of creature to catch—is true; for he seems to have no end of defences,¹ and when he throws one of them up, his opponent has first to fight through it before he can reach the man himself; for now, you see, we have barely passed through the non-existence of being, which was his first prepared line of defence, when we find another line ready; and so we must prove that falsehood exists in relation to opinion and to speech; and after this, perhaps, there will be another line, and still another after that; and it seems no end will ever appear.

STR. No one should be discouraged, Theaetetus, who can make constant progress, even though it be slow. For if a man is discouraged under these conditions, what would he do under others—if he did not get ahead at all or were even pressed back? It would be a long time, as the saying is, before such a man would ever take a city. But now, my friend, since we have passed the line you speak of, the main defences would surely be in our hands, and the rest will now be smaller and easier to take.

THEAET. Good.

STR. First, then, let us take up speech and opinion, as I said just now, in order to come to a clearer understanding whether not-being touches

¹ Perhaps a sort of pun is intended, for πρόβλημα was already beginning to have the meaning of "problem."
The science of language, in all its branches, was young in the time of Plato. Words of general meaning were necessarily used in a technical sense. So here ὄνομα and ῥῆμα are used as parts of grammatical terminology in the

1 The science of language, in all its branches, was young in the time of Plato. Words of general meaning were necessarily used in a technical sense. So here ὄνομα and ῥῆμα are used as parts of grammatical terminology in the
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them, or they are both entirely true, and neither is ever false.

THEAET. Very well.

STR. Then let us now investigate names, just as we spoke a while ago about ideas and letters; for in that direction the object of our present search is coming in sight.

THEAET. What do we need to understand about names?

STR. Whether they all unite with one another, or none of them, or some will and some will not.

THEAET. Evidently the last; some will and some will not.

STR. This, perhaps, is what you mean, that those which are spoken in order and mean something do unite, but those that mean nothing in their sequence do not unite.

THEAET. How so, and what do you mean by that?

STR. What I supposed you had in mind when you assented; for we have two kinds of vocal indications of being.

THEAET. How so?

STR. One called nouns, the other verbs.¹

THEAET. Define each of them.

STR. The indication which relates to action we may call a verb.

THEAET. Yes.

sense of "verb" and "noun," though Plato elsewhere employs them with their ordinary meanings. Similarly the distinction between vowels and consonants (Theaetetus, 203; cf. The Sophist, 253) was at least relatively new, as was that between the active and the passive voice. How important Plato's part was in the development of linguistic study can no longer be accurately determined.

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ΕΕ. Τὸ δὲ γ’ ἐπὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἕκεινα πρᾶττοισι σημειῶν τῆς φωνῆς ἐπιτεθὲν ὄνομα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ΕΕ. Οὐκοῦν εἶ ὁνόματων μὲν μόνων συνεχῶς λεγομένων οὐκ ἔστι ποτὲ λόγος, οὐδ’ αὐθ ῥημάτων χωρίς ὁνόματων λεχθέντων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ταῦτ’ οὐκ ἔμαθον.

Β ΕΕ. Δὴλον γὰρ ὡς πρὸς ἑτερὸν τι βλέπων ἀρτι ἐννομολόγεις· ἐπεὶ τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ ἐβουλόμην εἰπεῖν, ὅτι συνεχῶς ὄδε λεγόμενα ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι λόγος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΕΕ. Οἶον “βαδίζει,” “πρέχει,” “καθεύδει,” καὶ τὰλλα ὃσα πράξεις σημαίνει ῥήματα, καὶ πάντα τις ἐφεξῆς αὐτ’ εἴπῃ, λόγον οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ἀπεργάζεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ;

ΕΕ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ πάλιν ὅταν λέγηται “λέων,” “ἐλαφος,” “ἵππος,” ὃσα τε ὁνόματα τῶν τὰς πράξεις αὐθ πραττόντων ὄνομασθῆ, καὶ κατὰ ταῦτην δὴ τὴν συνέχειαν οὐδεὶς πω ἐννέστῃ λόγος· οὐδεμίαν γὰρ οὐτε οὕτως οὕτ’ ἑκεῖνως πράξειν οὐδ’ ἀπραξίαν οὐδὲ οὐσίαν ὄντος οὐδὲ μὴ ὄντος δῆλοι τὰ φωνηθέντα, πρὶν ἀν τις τοῖς ὁνόμασι τὰ ῥήματα κεράσῃ· τότε δ’ ἡμοσέν τε καὶ λόγος ἐγένετο εὐθὺς ἡ πρώτη συμπλοκή, σχεδὸν τῶν λόγων ὁ πρώτος τε καὶ 2 σμικρότατος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς ἂρ’ ὃδε λέγεις;

ΕΕ. Ὅταν εἴπῃ τις· “ἄνθρωπος μανθάνει,” λόγον εἶναι φής τούτον ἐλάχιστον τε καὶ πρώτον;

D ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώγε.

1 αὐτοῖς τοῖς B, Stobaeus; αὐτοῖς T.
2 τε καὶ W, Stobaeus; εἰ καὶ T; καὶ B.
str. And the vocal sign applied to those who perform the actions in question we call a noun.

THEAET. Exactly.

str. Hence discourse is never composed of nouns alone spoken in succession, nor of verbs spoken without nouns.

THEAET. I do not understand that.

str. I see; you evidently had something else in mind when you assented just now; for what I wished to say was just this, that verbs and nouns do not make discourse if spoken successively in this way.

THEAET. In what way?

str. For instance, "walks," "runs," "sleeps" and the other verbs which denote actions, even if you utter all there are of them in succession, do not make discourse for all that.

THEAET. No, of course not.

str. And again, when "lion," "stag," "horse," and all other names of those who perform these actions are uttered, such a succession of words does not yet make discourse; for in neither case do the words uttered indicate action or inaction or existence of anything that exists or does not exist, until the verbs are mingled with the nouns; then the words fit, and their first combination is a sentence, about the first and shortest form of discourse.

THEAET. What do you mean by that?

str. When one says "a man learns," you agree that this is the least and first of sentences, do you not?

THEAET. Yes.
ΕΕ. Δηλοι γαρ ἡδη που τότε περὶ τῶν οὖν των ἡ γιγνωμένων ἡ γεγονότων ἡ μελλόντων, καὶ οὐκ ὄνομαζει μόνον, ἀλλά τι περαινει, συμπλέκων ὅτα ὄνομα τοῖς ὀνόμασι. διὸ λέγειν τε αὐτὸν ἀλλι οὐ μόνον ὄνομαζειν εἴπομεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ τῶ πλέγματι τοῦτω τὸ ὄνομα ἐφθειγξάμεθα λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως.

46. ΕΕ. Οὖν δὴ καθάπερ τὰ πράγματα τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλους ἤρμοτε, τὰ δ’ οὐ, καὶ περὶ τὰ τῆς φωνῆς αὐτη σημεῖα τὰ μὲν οὐχ ἀρμόττει, τὰ δὲ Ε ἀρμόττοντα αὐτῶν λόγον ἀπειργάσατο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΕΕ. Ἐτι δὴ σμικρὸν τόδε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποιοῦν;

ΕΕ. Λόγον ἀναγκαῖον, ὅτανπερ ἢ, τινὸς εἰναι λόγον, μὴ δὲ τινὸς ἀδύνατον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔτως.

ΕΕ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ποιοῦν τινα αὐτὸν εἰναι δεί;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ’ οὐ;

ΕΕ. Προσέχωμεν δὴ τὸν νοῦν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δεὶ γοῦν.

ΕΕ. Λέξω τοῖνυν σοι λόγον συνθεὶς πράγμα πράξει δι’ ὄνοματος καὶ ῥήματος. ὅτου δ’ ἁν ὁ λόγος ἢ, σὺ μοι φράζειν.

263 ΘΕΑΙ. Ταῦτ’ ἐσται κατὰ δύναμιν.

ΕΕ. Θεαίητος κάθηται. μῶν μὴ μακρὸς ὁ λόγος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ μέτριος.

ΕΕ. Σον ἔργον δὴ φράζειν περὶ οὐ τ’ ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον οτι περὶ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ ἐμός.

1 εἴπομεν Stobaeus; εἴπομεν ΒΤ.
str. For when he says that, he makes a statement about that which is or is becoming or has become or is to be; he does not merely give names, but he reaches a conclusion by combining verbs with nouns. That is why we said that he discourses and does not merely give names, and therefore we gave to this combination the name of discourse.

theaet. That was right.

str. So, then, just as of things some fit each other and some do not, so too some vocal signs do not fit, but some of them do fit and form discourse.

theaet. Certainly.

str. Now there is another little point.

theaet. What is it?

str. A sentence, if it is to be a sentence, must have a subject; without a subject it is impossible.

theaet. True.

str. And it must also be of some quality, must it not?

theaet. Of course.

str. Now let us pay attention to each other.

theaet. Yes, at any rate we ought to do so.

str. Now, then, I will speak a sentence to you in which an action and the result of action are combined by means of a noun and a verb, and whatever the subject of the sentence is do you tell me.

theaet. I will, to the best of my ability.

str. “Theaetetus sits.” It isn’t a long sentence, is it?

theaet. No, it is fairly short.

str. Now it is for you to say what it is about and what its subject is.

theaet. Clearly it is about me, and I am its subject.

2 πρᾶγματα BTW; γράμματα, letters, Bury (cf. 253).
ΣΕ. Τί δέ ὤδ' αὕ;  
ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖος;  
ΣΕ. Θεαίτητος, ὃ νῦν ἐγώ διαλέγομαι, πέτεταί.  
ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτον οὖδ' ἂν εἰς ἄλλως εἴποι πλὴν ἐμόν τε καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ.  
ΣΕ. Ποιόν δέ γέ τινα φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον ἐκαστὸν εἶναι τῶν λόγων.

Β  
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.  
ΣΕ. Τούτων δὴ ποίον τινα ἐκάτερον φατέον εἶναι;  
ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν μὲν ψευδὴ ποι, τὸν δὲ ἀληθῆ.  
ΣΕ. Λέγει δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ μὲν ἀληθῆς τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἐστὶ περὶ σοῦ.  
ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;  
ΣΕ. 'Ο δὲ δὴ ψευδῆς ἔτερα τῶν ὄντων.  
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.  
ΣΕ. Τὰ μὴ ὄντ' ἁρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει.  
ΘΕΑΙ. Σχεδόν.  
ΣΕ. Ὄντων ¹ δέ γε ὄντα ἔτερα περὶ σοῦ. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔφαμεν ὄντα περὶ ἐκαστὸν εἶναι ποι, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα.  
ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν.  

Γ  
ΣΕ. Ὄν ύστερον δὴ λόγον εἴρηκα περὶ σοῦ, πρῶτον μὲν, ἐξ ὧν ὑρισάμεθα τί ποτ' ἐστὶ λόγος, ἀναγκαιότατον αὐτῶν ἐνα τῶν βραχυτάτων εἶναι.  
ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν δὴ γοῦν ταύτῃ ἕνωμι προβόλησαι.  
ΣΕ. Ἐπειτα δέ γε τινός.  
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐτωσ.  
ΣΕ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι σός, οὐκ ἄλλου γε οὐδενός.

¹ οντων Cornarius; οντως BT.
str. And how about this sentence?
theaet. What one?
str. "Theaetetus, with whom I am now talking, flies."

theaet. Every one would agree that this also is about me and I am its subject.
str. But we agree that every sentence must have some quality.
theaet. Yes.
str. Now what quality shall be ascribed to each of these sentences?

theaet. One is false, I suppose, the other true.
str. The true one states facts as they are about you.

theaet. Certainly.
str. And the false one states things that are other than the facts.
theaet. Yes.
str. In other words, it speaks of things that are not as if they were.
theaet. Yes, that is pretty much what it does.
str. And states with reference to you that things are which are other than things which actually are; for we said, you know, that in respect to everything there are many things that are and many that are not.
theaet. To be sure.
str. Now the second of my sentences about you is in the first place by sheer necessity one of the shortest which conform to our definition of sentence.
theaet. At any rate we just now agreed on that point.
str. And secondly it has a subject.
theaet. Yes.
str. And if you are not the subject, there is none.
Πλάτων. Πώς γὰρ;

Ες. Μηδενὸς δὲ ὁν οὐδ’ ἂν λόγος εἰς τὸ παράπαν. ἀπεφήναμεν γὰρ ὅτι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἢν λόγον ὄντα μηδενὸς εἶναι λόγον.

Ες. Ὄρθωτετα.

Δ Ες. Περὶ δὴ σοῦ λεγόμενα, λεγόμενα μέντοι θάτερα ὡς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα, πανταπασιν ἐσοκεν ἢ τοιαύτη σύνθεσις ἐκ τε ῥημάτων γιγνομένη καὶ ὀνοματών ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθῶς γίγνεσθαι λόγος ψευδής.

Ες. Ἀληθεύτητα μὲν οὖν.

47. Ες. Τί δὲ δὴ; διάνοια τε καὶ δόξα καὶ φαντασία, μῶν οὐκ ἦδη δῆλον ὅτι ταύτα τὰ γένη ψευδή τε καὶ ἀληθῆ πάνθ’ ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνεται;

Ες. Πῶς;

Ες. Ὅδ’ εἴσει βάον, ἂν πρῶτον λάβης αὐτά, τί ποτ’ ἐστὶ καὶ τί διαφέροντοι ἕκαστα ἄλληλων.

Ες. Δίδοι μόνον.

Ες. Οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταύτων· πλῆν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τούτ’ αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπωνομάσθη, διάνοια;

Ες. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

Ες. Τὸ δὲ γ’ ἀπ’ ἑκείνης ρέωμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἱδ’ μετα φθόγγον κέκληται λόγος;

Ες. Ἀληθῆ.

Ες. Καὶ μὴν ἐν λόγοις αὐτὸ ἱσμεν οὖ—

Ες. Τὸ ποίουν;

Ες. Ψάσω τε καὶ ἀπόφασιν.

1 δὲ emend. apogr. Parisinum 1811; γὲ BT; ἃ δὲ or ὅ δὲ γὲ Heindorf.

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THEAET. Certainly not.

STR. And if there is no subject, it would not be a sentence at all; for we showed that a sentence without a subject is impossible.

THEAET. Quite right.

STR. Now when things are said about you, but things other are said as the same and things that are not as things that are, it appears that when such a combination is formed of verbs and nouns we have really and truly false discourse.

THEAET. Yes, very truly.

STR. Is it, then, not already plain that the three classes, thought, opinion, and fancy, all arise in our minds as both false and true?

THEAET. How is it plain?

STR. You will understand more easily if you first grasp their natures and the several differences between them.

THEAET. Give me an opportunity.

STR. Well, then, thought and speech are the same; only the former, which is a silent inner conversation of the soul with itself, has been given the special name of thought. Is not that true?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. But the stream that flows from the soul in vocal utterance through the mouth has the name of speech?

THEAET. True.

STR. And in speech we know there is just—

THEAET. What?

STR. Affirmation and negation.

2 λεγόμενα add. Badham.
3 ἔοικεν W; ὂς ἔοικεν BT.
4 αὐτά W, Stobaeus; om. BT.
264 εἰ. ὅταν οὖν τοῦτο ἐν φυσιᾷ κατὰ διάνοιαν ἐγγίγνηται μετὰ σιγῆς, πλὴν δόξης ἔχεις ὁ τι προσεῖπης αὐτῷ;

οἰκεῖοι. Καὶ πῶς;

εἰ. Τί δ’ ὅταν μὴ καθ’ αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ δι’ αἰσθήσεως παρῇ τῷ τοιούτῳ αὖ πάθος, ἀρ’ οἶον τε ὅρθως εἰπεῖν ἐτερὸν τι πλὴν φαντασίαν;

οἰκεῖοι. Οὐδέν.

εἰ. Οὕκοιν ἐπείπερ λόγος ἀληθῆς ἦν καὶ ψευδῆς, τούτων δ’ ἐφάνη διάνοια μὲν αὐτῆς πρὸς έαυτὴν ψυχὴς διάλογος, δόξα δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεύτησις, Β “φαίνεται” δὲ δ’ λέγομεν σύμμετρος αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, ἀνάγκη δὴ καὶ τούτων τῷ λόγῳ ἐγγεγεγοῦν ὄντων ψευδῆ τε αὐτῶν εὖν καὶ εἰσότε εἰναι.

οἰκεῖοι. Πῶς δ’ οὖ; Οὐκοίοις οὖν ὅτι πρότερον ηὐρέθη ψευδῆς δόξαι καὶ λόγους ἦν κατὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν ἦν ἐφοβήθησεν ἀρτι, μὴ παντάπασιν ἀνήνυτον ἔργον ἐπιβαλλομεθα ἔθοτοῦτες αὐτό; οἰκεῖοι. Κατανώθηκα.

48. εἰ. Μὴ τοῖνυν μηδ’ εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ ἀθυγμόμεν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πέφανται ταύτα, τῶν ἐμπροσθεν ἀναμμηνασθῶμεν κατ’ εἰδὴ διαφέρεσων.

οἰκεῖοι. Ποίων δὴ;

εἰ. Διελόμεθα τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς εἰδῆ δύο, τῆς μὲν εἰκαστικῆς, τῆς δὲ φανταστικῆς.

οἰκεῖοι. Ναι.

εἰ. Καὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἴπομεν ὃς ἀποροῦμεν εἰς ὑποτέραν θήσομεν.

1 αὐτὸ Stobaeus; αὐτὴν BT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Yes, we know that

STR. Now when this arises in the soul silently by way of thought, can you give it any other name than opinion?

THEAET. Certainly not.

STR. And when such a condition is brought about in anyone, not independently, but through sensation, can it properly be called anything but seeming, or fancy?

THEAET. No.

STR. Then since speech, as we found, is true and false, and we saw that thought is conversation of the soul with itself, and opinion is the final result of thought, and what we mean when we say "it seems" is a mixture of sensation and opinion, it is inevitable that, since these are all akin to speech, some of them must sometimes be false.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Do you see, then, that false opinion and false discourse were found sooner than we expected when we feared a few moments ago that in looking for them we were undertaking an endless task?

THEAET. Yes, I see.

STR. Then let us not be discouraged about the rest of our search, either; for now that these points are settled, we have only to revert to our previous divisions into classes.

THEAET. What divisions?

STR. We made two classes of image-making, the likeness-making and the fantastic.¹

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And we said that we did not know to which of the two the sophist should be assigned.

¹ See 235 n ff.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡν ταύτα.

ΕΕ. Καὶ τοῦθ’ ἡμῶν ἀπορουμένων ἐτὶ μείζων κατεχύθη σκοτοδινία, φανέντος τοῦ λόγου τοῦ πᾶσιν ἀμφισβητοῦντος, ὃς οὔτε εἰκὼν οὔτε εἴδωλον ὁ οὐτε φάντασμα εἰη τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲν διὰ τὸ μηδαμώς μηδέποτε μηδαμοῦ ψεύδος εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγεις ἀληθῆ.

ΕΕ. Νῦν δὲ γ’ ἐπειδὴ πέφανται μὲν λόγοι, πέφανται δ’ οὖσα δόξα ψευδῆς, ἐγχωρεὶ δὴ μιμήματα τῶν ὁντών εἶναι καὶ τέχνην ἐκ ταύτης γίγνεσθαι τῆς διαθέσεως ἀπατητικῆν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγχωρεὶ.

ΕΕ. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γ’ ἢν ὁ σοφιστὴς τούτων πότερον, διωμολογημένου ἡμῶν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἥν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΕΕ. Πάλιν τούν τε ἐπιχειρῶμεν, σχίζοντες διχῇ τὸ Ἕ προτεθέν γένος, πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τούτι δεξιὰ ἀεὶ μέρος τοῦ τμηθέντος, ἑχόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σοφιστοῦ κοινωνίας, ἐως ἃν αὐτοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πάντα περιελόντες, τήν οἰκείαν λυπώντες φύσιν ἐπιδείξωμεν μάλιστα 265 μὲν ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς, ἔσειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐγγυτάτω γένει τῆς τοιαύτης μεθόδου πεφυκόσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρθῶς.

ΕΕ. Οὐκοῦν τότε μὲν ἡρχόμεθα ποιητικὴν καὶ κτητικὴν τέχνην διαιροῦμενοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναὶ.

ΕΕ. Καὶ τῆς κτητικῆς ἐν θηρευτικῇ καὶ ἀγωνίᾳ καὶ ἐμπορικῇ καὶ τισιν ἐν τοιούτοις εἴδεσιν ἐφαντάζομαι ἡμῶν;

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theaet. You are right.

str. And in the midst of our perplexity about that, we were overwhelmed by a still greater dizziness when the doctrine appeared which challenges everybody and asserts that neither likeness nor image nor appearance exists at all, because falsehood never exists anywhere in any way.

theaet. True.

str. But now, since the existence of false speech and false opinion has been proved, it is possible for imitations of realities to exist and for an art of deception to arise from this condition of mind.

theaet. Yes, it is possible.

str. And we decided some time ago that the sophist was in one of those two divisions of the image-making class.

theaet. Yes.

str. Then let us try again; let us divide in two the class we have taken up for discussion, and proceed always by way of the right-hand part of the thing divided, clinging close to the company to which the sophist belongs, until, having stripped him of all common properties and left him only his own peculiar nature, we shall show him plainly first to ourselves and secondly to those who are most closely akin to the dialectic method.

theaet. Right.

str. We began by making two divisions of art, the productive and the acquisitive, did we not? ¹

theaet. Yes.

str. And the sophist showed himself to us in the arts of hunting, contests, commerce, and the like, which were subdivisions of acquisitive art?

¹ See 219.
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

Ε. Νῦν δὲ γ' ἐπειδὴ μμητική περιείληφεν αὐτὸν τέχνη, δῆλον ός αὐτῆν τὴν ποιητικὴν δίχα

Β διαρετέον πρῶτην. ἢ γὰρ ποῦ μίμησις ποιησὶς τις ἐστιν, εἰδώλων μέντοι, φαμέν, ἄλλ' οὖν αὐτῶν ἐκάστων: ἢ γὰρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Ε. Ποιητικής δὴ πρῶτον δύο ἐστω μέρη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίω;

Ε. Τὸ μὲν θείον, τὸ δ' ἀνθρώπινον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω μεμάθηκα.

49. Ε. Ποιητικὴν, εἶτερ μεμνήμεθα τὰ κατ' ἀρχὰς λεχθέντα, πάσαν ἔφαμεν εἰναὶ δύναμιν ἤτις ἂν αἰτία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὕσων ὑστερον γίγνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μεμνήμεθα.

C Ε. Ζῶα δὴ πάντα θυντᾷ καὶ φυτὰ ὅσα τ' ἐπὶ γῆς ἐκ σπερμάτων καὶ ρίζων φύεται καὶ ὅσα ἄψυχα ἐν γῇ ξυνιστᾶται σώματα τηκτὰ καὶ ἄτηκτα, μῶν ἄλλου τινὸς ἡ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὑστερον γίγνεσθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα; ἢ τῷ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματι καὶ ἡμῖν χρώμενοι—

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίω;

Ε. Τῷ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὰ γεννᾷν ἀπὸ τινὸς αἰτίας αὐτομάτης καὶ ἀνευ διανοίας φυούσης, ἢ μετὰ λόγου τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης θείας ἀπὸ θεοῦ γεγονομένης;

D ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγω μὲν ἵσως διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν πολλάκις ἀμφότερα μεταδοξάζων. νῦν μὴν 1 βλέπων εἰς σὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνων οἴεσθαι σε κατὰ γε θεὸν αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι, ταύτῃ καὶ αὐτὸς νενόμικα.

Ε. Καλῶς γε, ὦ Θεάιτητε· καὶ εἰ μὲν γε σε

1 μὴν b; μην BT.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Certainly.

str. But now, since imitative art has taken him over, it is clear that our first step must be the division of productive art into two parts; for imitative art is a kind of production—of images, however, we say, not of real things in each case. Do you agree?

THEAET. By all means.

str. Then let us first assume two parts of productive art.

THEAET. What are they?

str. The divine and the human.

THEAET. I don't yet understand.

str. We said, if we remember the beginning of our conversation, that every power is productive which causes things to come into being which did not exist before.

THEAET. Yes, we remember.

str. There are all the animals, and all the plants that grow out of the earth from seeds and roots, and all the lifeless substances, fusible and infusible, that are formed within the earth. Shall we say that they came into being, not having been before, in any other way than through God’s workmanship? Or, accepting the commonly expressed belief—

THEAET. What belief?

str. That nature brings them forth from some self-acting cause, without creative intelligence. Or shall we say that they are created by reason and by divine knowledge that comes from God?

THEAET. I, perhaps because I am young, often change from one opinion to the other; but now, looking at you and considering that you think they are created by God, I also adopt that view.

str. Well said, Theaetetus; and if I thought you
ήγούμεθα τῶν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἀλλοις πως
dοξαζόντων εἶναι, νῦν ἂν τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθοῦς
ἀναγκαίας ἐπεχειροῦμεν ποιεῖν ὁμολογεῖν· ἐπειδὴ
dὲ σοι καταμανθάνω τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι καὶ ἄνευ τῶν
Επαρ' ἡμῶν λόγων αὕτη ἑφ' ἀπερ νῦν
ἐλκεσθαί φής, ἐάσω· χρόνος γὰρ ἐκ περιττοῦ
γίγνοντ' ἂν· ἀλλὰ θῆσον τὰ μὲν φύσει λεγόμενα
ποιεῖσθαι θεία τέχνη, τὰ δ' ἐκ τούτων ὑπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων
ζυγιστάμενα ἀνθρωπίνη, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν
λόγον δύο ποιητικῆς γένη, τὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι,
tὸ δὲ θεῖον.

 theano. Ὅρθως.
ἐς. Τέμυς δὴ δυνών οὕσαν δίχα ἐκατέραν αὕθις.
 theano. Πῶς;
266 ἐς. Ὁλὸν τότε μὲν κατὰ πλάτος τέμνων τὴν
ποιητικὴν πάσαν, νῦν δὲ αὐ κατὰ μῆκος.
 theano. Τετμήσθω.
ἐς. Τέτταρα μὴν αὕτης οὗ τῷ πάντα μέρη
γίγνεται, δύο μὲν τὰ πρὸς ἡμῶν, ἀνθρώπεια, δύο
δ' αὐ τὰ πρὸς θεῶν, θεία.
 theano. Ναὶ.
ἐς. Τὰ δὲ γ' ὡς ἐτέρως αὖ δυρχημένα, μέρος μὲν
ἐν ἀφ' ἐκατέρας τῆς μερίδος αὐτοποιητικόν, τῶν δ' ὑπολοίπων
σχεδὸν μάλιστ' ἂν λεγολόθην εἰδωλο-
pouikw· καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα δὴ πάλιν ἡ ποιητικὴ
diçh' διαιρεῖται.

β theao. Λέγει ὅτη 2 ἐκατέρα αὕθις.
50. ἐς. Ἡμεῖς μὲν ποι καὶ τάλλα ζῶα καὶ ἔξ
διν τὰ πεθυκότ' ἐστί, πῦρ καὶ ὑδωρ καὶ τὰ τούτων
ἀδελφά, θεοῦ γεννήματα πάντα ἴσμεν αὐτὰ ἀπειργα-
σμένα ἐκατα· ἡ πῶς;
1 αὕτη W; αὕτη B; αὕτη T. 2 ὅτη inferior mss.; ὅποι BT.
THE SOPHIST

were one of those who would think differently by and by, I should try now, by argument and urgent persuasion, to make you agree with my opinion; but since I understand your nature and see that it of itself inclines, without any words of mine, towards that to which you say you are at present attracted, I will let that go; for it would be a waste of time. But I will assume that things which people call natural are made by divine art, and things put together by man out of those as materials are made by human art, and that there are accordingly two kinds of art, the one human and the other divine.

THEAET. Quite right.

STR. Now that there are two, divide each of them again.

THEAET. How?

STR. You divided all productive art widthwise, as it were, before; now divide it lengthwise.

THEAET. Assume that it is done.

STR. In that way we now get four parts in all; two belong to us and are human, and two belong to the gods and are divine.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And again, when the section is made the other way, one part of each half has to do with the making of real things, and the two remaining parts may very well be called image-making; and so productive art is again divided into two parts.

THEAET. Tell me again how each part is distinguished.

STR. We know that we and all the other animals, and fire, water, and their kindred elements, out of which natural objects are formed, are one and all the very offspring and creations of God, do we not?
PLATO

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐτῶς.

Εἴ. Τούτων δὲ γε ἐκάστων εἰδωλα, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὰ παρέπεται, δαιμονία καὶ ταῦτα μηχανῇ γεγονότα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποια;

Εἴ. Τά τε ἐν τοῖς ὑπνοῖς καὶ ὅσα μεθ' ἡμέραν φαντάσματα αὐτοφυὴ λέγεται, σκιὰ μὲν ὅταν ἐν τῷ πυρὶ σκότος ἐγγίγνῃται, διπλοῦν δὲ ἡνίκ' ἀν φῶς οἰκείον τε καὶ ἀλλότριον περὶ τὰ λαμπρα καὶ λεία εἰς ἐν ἔνυπελθὸν τῆς ἔμπροσθεν εἰσνεώς ὄψεως ἐναντίαν αὐτοθησιν παρέχον εἴδος ἀπεργάζηται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δύο γὰρ οὖν ἐστι ταῦτα θείας ἐργα ποιήσεως, αὐτὸ τε καὶ τὸ παρακολούθον εἰδωλον ἐκάστω.

Εἴ. Τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην; ἄρ' οὖκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικῆς φήσομεν ποιεῖν, γραφικῇ δὲ τιν' ἐτέραν, οὖν ὅναρ ἄνθρωπινον ἐγγυηγορώσιν ἀπειργασμένην;

D ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.

Εἴ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰλλα οὕτω κατὰ δύο δικτὰ ἔργα τῆς ἡμετέρας αὐτοποιητικῆς πράξεως, τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ, φαμέν, αὐτοφυή;¹ τὸ δὲ εἰδωλον εἰδωλοποιή;²

ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν μᾶλλον ἔμαθον, καὶ τίθημι δύο διχῆ ποιητικῆς ἐιδῆς. θείαν ³ μὲν καὶ ἄνθρωπιναν ⁴ κατὰ θάτερον τυμῆμα, κατὰ δὲ θάτερον τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ὅν, τὸ δὲ ὀμοιωμάτων τινῶν γέννημα.

¹ αὐτοφυή Heindorf; αὐτοφυή BT.
² εἰδωλοποιή Heindorf; εἰδωλοποιή BT.
³ θεία Heindorf; θεία B; θεία T.
⁴ ἄνθρωπινα Heindorf; ἄνθρωπιν B; ἄνθρωπιν T.

¹ This was the current explanation of reflection. Mirrors and smooth objects were supposed to contain a luminous principle which met on the smooth surface with the light.
THE SOPHIST

THEAET. Yes.

STR. And corresponding to each and all of these there are images, not the things themselves, which are also made by superhuman skill.

THEAET. What are they?

STR. The appearances in dreams, and those that arise by day and are said to be spontaneous—a shadow when a dark object interrupts the firelight, or when twofold light, from the objects themselves and from outside, meets on smooth and bright surfaces and causes upon our senses an effect the reverse of our ordinary sight, thus producing an image.  

THEAET. Yes, these are two works of divine creation, the thing itself and the corresponding image in each case.

STR. And how about our own art? Shall we not say that we make a house by the art of building, and by the art of painting make another house, a sort of man-made dream produced for those who are awake?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. And in the same way, we say, all the other works of our creative activity also are twofold and go in pairs—the thing itself, produced by the art that creates real things, and the image, produced by the image-making art.

THEAET. I understand better now; and I agree that there are two kinds of production, each of them twofold—the divine and the human by one method of bisection, and by the other real things and the product that consists of a sort of likenesses.

coming from the object reflected. So in the act of vision the fire within the eye united with the external fire (Timaeus, 46 Α). The words τῆς ἔμπροσθεν . . . ἐναντίων αἰσθησιν refer to the transposition of right and left in the reflection (cf. Theaetetus, 193 c).
51. ΕΕ. Τῆς τούνν εἰδωλουργικῆς ἀναμνησθῶ-μεν ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἰκαστικὸν, τὸ δὲ φανταστικὸν ἐμελῆ.
Ε λεν εἶναι γένος, εἰ τὸ ψεῦδος οὕτως ὃν ψεῦδος καὶ τῶν ὦτων εἶ τι φανεῖ εἰ ψεύδω.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ἡν γὰρ οὖν.
ΕΕ. Οὐκοῦν ἐφάνη τε καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ κατ-αριθμήσομεν αὐτῷ ἕν ἀναμφισβητήτως εἰδὴ δύο;
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
267 ΕΕ. Τὸ τοίνυν φανταστικὸν αὕτης διορίζωμεν δίχα.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πη;  
ΕΕ. Τὸ μὲν δ' ὄργανων γιγνόμενον, τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ παρέχοντος έαυτόν ὄργανον τοῦ ποιοῦντος τὸ φάντασμα.
ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς φής;
ΕΕ. ὁΤαν, οἶμαι, τὸ σοῦ σχῆμα τῆς τῶν ἐαυτοῦ χρώμενος σώματι προσόμοιον ἡ φωνὴν φωνὴ φαίνεσθαι ποιή, μίμησις τοῦτο τῆς φαντασκῆς μάλιστα κέκληται ποι.
ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.
ΕΕ. Μηντικὸν δὴ τοῦτο αὕτης προσεπόντες ἀπονεμώμεθα. τὸ δ' ἄλλο πάν ἀφώμεν μαλακι-βοθέιτες καὶ παρέπτεις ἐτέρῳ συναγαγεῖν τε εἰς ἐν καὶ πρέπουσαν ἐπωνυμίαν ἀποδοὺναὶ τιν' αὐτῷ.
ΘΕΑΙ. Νενεμήσθω, τὸ δὲ μεθείσθω.
ΕΕ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τοῦτο ἐτί διπλοῦν, ὃ Θεαίτητε, ἄξιον ἠγείροθαι. δὶ' ὃ δὲ, σκόπει.
ΘΕΑΙ. Δέγε.
ΕΕ. Τῶν μυμομενῶν οἱ μὲν εἰδότες δ ὀμοῦνται

1 αὐτῷ| αὐτῷ BT.
2 ἀπονεμώμεθα W; ἀπονεμώμεθα BT.

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STR. We must remember that there were to be two parts of the image-making class, the likeness-making and the fantastic, if we should find that falsehood really existed and was in the class of real being.

THEAET. Yes, there were.

STR. But we found that falsehood does exist, and therefore we shall now, without any doubts, number the kinds of image-making art as two, shall we not?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Let us, then, again bisect the fantastic art.

THEAET. How?

STR. One kind is that produced by instruments, the other that in which the producer of the appearance offers himself as the instrument.

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. When anyone, by employing his own person as his instrument, makes his own figure or voice seem similar to yours, that kind of fantastic art is called mimetic.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Let us, then, classify this part under the name of mimetic art; but as for all the rest, let us be so self-indulgent as to let it go and leave it for someone else to unify and name appropriately.

THEAET. Very well, let us adopt that classification and let the other part go.

STR. But it is surely worth while to consider, Theaetetus, that the mimetic art also has two parts; and I will tell you why.

THEAET. Please do.

STR. Some who imitate do so with knowledge of that which they imitate, and others without such
τούτο πράττοντιν, οί δ' ούκ εἰδότες. καὶ τοι πίνα
μείζω διαίρεσιν ἀγνωσίας τε καὶ γνώσεως θήσομεν;
οἰ. Οὐδεμίαν.

ἐ. Οὐκοῦν τὸ γε ἄρτι λεχθὲν εἰδότων ἢ μήμημα;
τὸ γὰρ σὸν σχῆμα καὶ σὲ γιγνώσκων ἂν τις μιμη-
σαιτο.

C οἰ. Πῶς δ' οὖ;

ἐ. Τί δὲ δικαιοσύνης τὸ σχῆμα καὶ ὅλης ξυλῆ-
βδῆν ἄρετῆς; ἢ' οὔκ ἀγνοοῦντες μὲν, δοξάζοντες
dὲ πη, σφόδρα ἐπιχειροῦσι πολλοί τὸ δοκοῦν σφίσι
tούτο ὡς ἐνὸν αὐτοῖς προθυμεῖσθαι φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖν,
ὅτι μάλιστα ἔργοις τε καὶ λόγοις μιμούμενοι;
οἰ. Καὶ πάνυ γε πολλοῖ.

ἐ. Μών οὖν πάντες ἀποτυγχάνουσι τοῦ δοκεῖν
eῖναι δίκαιοι μηδαμῶς οντες; ἢ τούτου πᾶν τοῦναν-
tίνοι;
οἰ. Πάν.

ἐ. Μιμητήν δὴ τούτον γε ἔτερον ἐκεῖνον
D λεκτέον οἴμαι, τὸν ἀγνοοῦντα τοῦ γιγνώσκοντος.
οἰ. Ναι.

52. ἐ. Πόθεν οὖν ὅνωμα ἐκατέρω τις αὐτῶν
λήμεται πρέπον; ἢ δὴλον δὴ χαλέπον ὅν, διὸτι τῆς
tῶν γενῶν κατ' εἴδη διαίρεσεως παλαιὰ τις, ὡς
ἐσικεῖν, ἀργία 1 τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν καὶ ἀσύννους παρῆν,
ὡςτε μηδ' ἐπιχειρεῖν μηδένα διαιρεῖσθαις καθό
dὴ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνάγκη μή σφόδρα εὐπορεῖν.
ὁμως δὲ, κἂν εἰ τολμηρότερον εἰρήσθαι, διαγνώσεως
ένεκα τὴν μὲν μετὰ δόξης μίμησιν δοξομιμητικήν

1 ἀργία Madvig; altria BT.
knowledge. And yet what division can we imagine more complete than that which separates knowledge and ignorance?

THEAET. None.

STR. The example I just gave was of imitation by those who know, was it not? For a man who imitates you would know you and your figure.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. But what of the figure of justice and, in a word, of virtue in general? Are there not many who have no knowledge of it, but only a sort of opinion, and who try with the greatest eagerness to make this which they themselves think is virtue seem to exist within them, by imitating it in acts and words to the best of their ability?

THEAET. Yes, there are very many such people.

STR. Do all of them, then, fail in the attempt to seem to be just when they are not so at all? Or is quite the opposite the case?

THEAET. Quite the opposite.

STR. Then I think we must say that such an imitator is quite distinct from the other, the one who does not know from the one who knows.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Where, then, can the fitting name for each of the two be found? Clearly it is not an easy task, because there was, it seems, among the earlier thinkers a long established and careless indolence in respect to the division of classes or genera into forms or species, so that nobody even tried to make such divisions; therefore there cannot be a great abundance of names. However, even though the innovation in language be a trifle bold, let us, for the sake of making a distinction, call the imitation which is
Επροσείπωμεν, τὴν δὲ μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἱστορικήν τινα μύησεν.

Θεαὶ. Ἔστω.

Στ. Θατέρῳ τοῖνυν χρηστέον, ὁ γὰρ σοφιστὴς οὐκ ἐν τοῖς εἰδῶσιν ἂν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς μιμομένοις δ' ἂν.

Θεαὶ. Καὶ μάλα.

Στ. Τὸν δοξομυθητήν δὴ σκοπώμεθα ὁστερ σύδηρον, εἴτε υγιῆς εἴτε διπλόην ἐτ' ἐχὼν τινά ἐστων ἐν ἑαυτῷ.

Θεαὶ. Σκοπώμεν.

268 Στ. Ἐχει τοῖνυν καὶ μάλα συχνὴν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὐθύθης αὐτῶν ἐστων, οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ταῦτα ἀδοξάζει: τὸ δὲ θατέρου σχῆμα διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κυλίνδησιν ἐχει πολλὴν ύποψίαν καὶ φόβον, ὡς ἄγνοεῖ ταῦτα ἀ πρὸς τοὺς ἀλλους ὃς εἴδως ἐσχημάτισται.

Θεαὶ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν ἐστῶν ἐκατέρου γένους ὅν εἴρηκας.

Στ. Οὐκοῦν τὸν μὲν ἄπλοῦν μιμητὴν τινα, τὸν δὲ εἰρωνικὸν μιμητὴν θήσομεν;

Θεαὶ. Εἰκὸς γοῦν.

Στ. Τούτου δ' αὖ τὸ γένος ἐν ἧ δύο φῶμεν;

Θεαὶ. Ὅρα σύ.

Β Στ. Σκοπῶ· καὶ μοι διττῶ καταφαίνεσθον τινε· τὸν μὲν δημοσία τε καὶ μακροῖς λόγοις πρὸς πλῆθη δυνατὸν εἰρωνεύεσθαι καθορῶ, τὸν δὲ ἱδία τε καὶ βραχέσι λόγοις ἀναγκάζοντα τὸν προσδιάλεγόμενον ἐναντιολογεῖν αὐτῶν αὐτῷ.

Θεαὶ. Λέγεις ὀρθότατα.
THE SOPHIST

based on opinion, opinion-imitation, and that which is founded on knowledge, a sort of scientific imitation.

THEAET. Agreed.

STR. We must therefore apply ourselves to the former, for we found that the sophist was among those who imitate but was not among those who know.

THEAET. Very true.

STR. Then let us examine the opinion-imitator as if he were a piece of iron, and see whether he is sound or there is still some seam in him.

THEAET. Let us do so.

STR. Well, there is a very marked seam. For some of these imitators are simple-minded and think they know that about which they have only opinion, but the other kind because of their experience in the rough and tumble of arguments, strongly suspect and fear that they are ignorant of the things which they pretend before the public to know.

THEAET. Certainly the two classes you mention both exist.

STR. Then shall we call one the simple imitator and the other the dissembling imitator?

THEAET. That is reasonable, at any rate.

STR. And shall we say that the latter forms one class or two again?

THEAET. That is your affair.

STR. I am considering, and I think I can see two classes. I see one who can dissemble in long speeches in public before a multitude, and the other who does it in private in short speeches and forces the person who converses with him to contradict himself.

THEAET. You are quite right.
ΕΕ. Τίνα οὖν ἀποφαίνωμεθα τὸν μακρολογώτερον εἶναι; πóτερα πολιτικὸν ἢ δημολογικόν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Δημολογικόν.
ΕΕ. Τί δὲ τὸν ἑτερον ἔρούμεν; σοφὸν ἢ σοφιστικόν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ 1 μὲν που σοφὸν ἀδύνατον, ἑπείπερ οὐκ οἰκεύται αὐτὸν ἐθέμεν. μιμητής δὲ ὄν τοῦ σοφοῦ δήλον ὅτι παρωνύμιον αὐτοῦ τι λήψεται, καὶ σχέδον ἦδη μεμάθηκα ὅτι τοῦτον δεὶ προσειπεῖν ἀληθῶς αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον τὸν παντάπασιν ἀντις σοφιστὴν.
ΕΕ. Οὐκοῦν συνδήσομεν αὐτοῦ, καθάπερ ἐμπροσθεν, τούνομα συμπλέξαντες ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἐπ' ἀρχήν;
ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν.
ΕΕ. Τὸ 2 δὴ τῆς ἐναντιοποιολογικῆς εἰρωνικοῦ μέρους τῆς δοξαστικῆς μιμητικοῦ, τοῦ φανταστικοῦ γένους ἀπὸ τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς οὐ θείου, ἀλλ' ἀνθρωπικοῦ τῆς ποιήσεως ἀφωρισμένον ἐν λόγοις τὸ θαυματοποιικὸν μόριον, ταύτης τῆς γενεὰς τε καὶ αἵματος ὃς ἄν φη τὸν ἀντις σοφιστὴν εἶναι, τάληθέστατα, ως έοικεν, ἐρεί.
ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

1 τὸ Stephanus; τὸν ΒΤ.
2 τὸ Schleiermacher; τὸν ΒΤ.
THE SOPHIST

STR. And what name shall we give to him who makes the longer speeches? Statesman or popular orator?

THEAET. Popular orator.

STR. And what shall we call the other? Philosopher or sophist?

THEAET. We cannot very well call him philosopher, since by our hypothesis he is ignorant; but since he is an imitator of the philosopher, he will evidently have a name derived from his, and I think I am sure at last that we must truly call him the absolutely real and actual sophist.

STR. Shall we then bind up his name as we did before, winding it up from the end to the beginning?

THEAET. By all means.

STR. The imitative kind of the dissembling part of the art of opinion which is part of the art of contradiction and belongs to the fantastic class of the image-making art, and is not divine, but human, and has been defined in arguments as the juggling part of productive activity—he who says that the true sophist is of this descent and blood will, in my opinion, speak the exact truth.

THEAET. Yes, he certainly will.

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