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VI. SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT

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MARIGOLD

This study consists of two parts, a chronology of the principal events in the negotiating initiative known as Marigold (Part II), and an analytic discussion of some of the principal questions raised by Marigold (Part I). Part I is based on Part II, with citations to it indicated by date. While Part I can be read without reference to Part II, it may be easier going with just a few of the main dates and happenings in mind:

Late in June 1966, the Polish ICC Representative, Lewandowski, returned to Saigon from Hanoi with some ideas he felt could serve as a basis for negotiations. These were communicated to the US through the Italian government and followed up by discussions in Saigon with Lewandowski, D’Orlandi (the Italian Ambassador) and Lodge participating in various combinations. In addition, Lewandowski made several visits to Hanoi. On November 30, he presented a 10 point formulation, reflecting his understanding of the US position, which he said Hanoi would accept as a basis for direct "conversation" between US and DRV representatives in Warsaw. On December 2, Hanoi¹, which had not been bombed since mid-August, was hit by US airstrikes. On December 3, the Poles protested the attack as endangering the prospective Warsaw meeting; and the US officially accepted Lewandowski's 10 points, subject to "important differences of interpretation." On December 4, Hanoi was bombed again. During the next 10 days, the Poles and Americans argued about the pattern of US bombing and the "differences of interpretation" clause. In the interim (December 6), however, Hanoi was officially informed of the US acceptance, as qualified. On December 13 and 14, Hanoi was bombed again; and the DRV instructed the Poles to end all conversations about the proposed contact. On December 24, the US informed the Communists that it would refrain from bombing within a 10 mile radius of Hanoi's center, expressing the hope that this would permit the Warsaw meeting to take place; but the offer was not accepted.

¹Strictly, the area within 5 miles of the center of Hanoi
The Role of the Polish Intermediary

The part played in Marigold by the DRV is veiled in mystery, because all US transactions in the matter passed through Polish hands. The initiative for the contact can only be traced back as far as the Poles. It begins with Leventowski’s return from Hanoi in late June 1966. Whether he acted on Hanoi’s request, on Soviet urging, or his own sense of enterprise is not known. The subsequent flow of information on DRV views and reactions came almost entirely through the Polish channel, and the Poles were, intentionally, ambiguous in distinguishing between their own thoughts and Hanoi’s.

Drawing conclusions from the story is a compounded problem because the Poles, by their own account, conceived of their function as quite different from neutrally passing messages:

--They acted as brokers, probing us (and perhaps Hanoi) to find elements of "give" that would narrow the gap between US and DRV positions on the terms of settlement. Their most inventive act in this role was producing a Polish formulation of the official US position as a starting point for US-DRV talks. In this way, each side had a glimpse of possible areas of negotiation, without first committing itself to specific language or firm concessions.

--They tried to steer the exchanges away from topics we preferred (especially de-escalation) toward those they said had greater chance of acceptance in Hanoi (the terms of an overall settlement).

--They acted as friends of Hanoi, not neutrals.

--Most importantly, they applied pressure on the US to participate in good faith, by the ever present threat of disclosing their version of the matter to influential world leaders or the public at large. Thus our first intimation of Marigold came via the Italian Government, which had been informed in Saigon and Rome by the Poles. We knew immediately, and were forcefully reminded at critical moments later, that US responses which might be viewed by others as reluctance in the pursuit of peace, skepticism about finding a "political" solution, or intransigence on matters of substance, might be used against us.

The only tenable working assumptions on the US side, therefore, were that the Poles pursued at least three objectives in Marigold -- and most likely a fourth as well: (1) Ending the violence in Vietnam. (2) Doing so on terms relatively favorable to the Communist side. (3) Building a case that could be used against the US, as pressure during the development of the contact or as a source of embarrassment to the US should the whole venture fail. (In addition, the Poles no doubt sought to cast themselves in a role of historical importance.)
As so often with multiple objectives, none seems to have been maximized. For example, if the Poles were concerned solely with ending the war (regardless of the terms), they should have acted with greater discretion after the contact broke down, because this would better preserve their usefulness as an intermediary in the future. On the other hand, had they been concerned solely with discomfiting the US, they could have used their ammunition to greater effect by leaking earlier and more sensational to the press. Perhaps different individuals on the Polish side gave differing priorities to this objective or that. In any case, the fact that none of the objectives was pursued to its logical maximum must mean that, in some larger Polish scheme of things, all were accorded considerable importance.

This is critical in interpreting the episode as a whole, because it implies that, with whatever degree of imprecision, the Poles were in fact trying to find areas of compromise between the DRV and US on acceptable outcomes to the war. Their effort was taken seriously enough in Hanoi to result in DRV agreement to meet with a US representative in Warsaw. This in turn must mean they received some serious guidance on policy from the DRV, even though it is quite unlikely that they were privy to Hanoi's minimum bargaining positions. What they conveyed to us about promising directions for negotiations, therefore, should reflect something of Hanoi's considered judgments, but cannot of course be read as a map of firm and final DRV positions.

It was apparently not until after the Warsaw contact was canceled that the Poles were asked to specify those messages they had passed on explicit instruction from Hanoi. There were three, they said: Lewandowski's message to Lodge expressing DRV agreement to the Warsaw talks; the warning after the December 3 (sic) bombing of Hanoi that the contact was being reassessed by the DRV; and the decision to cancel the Warsaw meeting after the December 13-14 bombing of Hanoi. In addition, the Poles said they had numerous exchanges with Hanoi during the period of Gronowski's contacts with Rapacki in Warsaw (i.e., after December 5) and claimed that they were therefore able to reflect Hanoi's views accurately even when speaking on their own initiative.

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1For example, the cable traffic conveys a picture of Lewandowski as more detached than Rapacki, more concerned simply with bringing the contending parties together than with exacting concessions from the US or throwing the onus for failure upon it. On the other hand, this may reflect differences between the US reporters in Saigon and Warsaw as much as actual differences between the two Poles.

2We do not know what the DRV expected from the Warsaw meeting nor how its prospects were represented to Hanoi by the Poles. The evidence that the DRV did in fact agree to the meeting is examined in another section.
How accurate and explicit they were in transmitting US views to Hanoi is not known. They seem to have made at least one major blunder (described in the next section), and may well have made others.
Did the DRV Agree?

It is at least possible that the Poles had no commitment from the DRV at all, but on balance this seems highly improbable. By the beginning of December, they had gone far out on a limb in their contacts and arrangements with at least the Americans, the Italians and, apparently, the Russians. It is hard to see what could have motivated them to go this far purely on speculation, given the consequences for them of a revelation that the whole venture was built on air.

The evidence that the DRV did in fact agree to a meeting in Warsaw is:

(1) Rapacki's statement to Gronouski that Lewandowski was acting on DRV instructions in "the message he gave to Lodge . . . upon his return from Hanoi expressing NVN positive response to the Warsaw talks" (12/21/66);

(2) Zinchuk's statement to Bundy that "the Polish effort was serious and that the Soviets were fully with it" and that "he had been surprised, in discussing the Polish initiative in the Department . . . to see that it was treated as doubtful" (12/22/66);

(3) Burchett's statement to Isham that a DRV official had actually been en route to Warsaw for the proposed meeting when "the US resumed bombing Hanoi" and the contact was canceled (12/6/67).

If Burchett's information is accurate, it would mean that Hanoi had been informed by the Poles of US acceptance of the Lewandowski formulation and was satisfied with the US response. The US formally accepted Lewandowski's 10 points on December 3, with the qualification that "several specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation." If the Poles accurately conveyed the US position, therefore, it would also follow that the DRV had acquiesced in this extremely broad reservation.

Here, however, some further questions arise. Rapacki, in a meeting with Gronouski, indicated that Lodge had "confirmed" Lewandowski's formulation on December 1, introducing the "important differences of interpretation" clause as a further condition two days later. (12/5/66) This would imply that Lodge accepted Lewandowski's 10 points without referring them to Washington, which seems extremely unlikely. Apparently the Poles informed Hanoi prematurely of US acceptance, omitting the qualification about interpretation. (12/6/66) But by December 6 they had conveyed the US message in its final form. (12/7/66) If the DRV official was en route when the bombing of Hanoi resumed--December 13-14--the interpretation clause must have been transmitted and accepted by the North Vietnamese.
This would mean that the content of the interpretation clause did not in itself cause the contact to abort. However, three days (December 3-6) may have been lost while the Poles urged us to withdraw the clause and we demurred. Would the Warsaw talks actually have begun before the December 13-14 bombing if this time had been saved? Would they have been continued if the bombing occurred after the first meeting or two?
The Polish Vision of a Vietnam Solution

At four points during Marigold, Lewandowski offered sketches of a negotiated outcome to the war. None of these is precise or complete. None is an authoritative statement of what would be acceptable to the DRV. They differ in content, each serving a different purpose in his development of the contact. All, however, are consistent with each other, suggesting they derive from a single set of concepts. They are consistent, too, with several key planks of the revised NLF Program, released in August 1967 -- in particular, the call for new elections with universal suffrage and the establishment of a government with Communist participation.

His revelations have a pattern: The first was the come-on, couched in the most attractive but vaguest terms of all. The second and third were explorations of how much the traffic would bear, testing in turn the reactions of the Italians (perhaps as bellwethers of "world opinion") and of official Washington. The last was the most serious, his own formulation of the US position, designed to provide a substantive basis for direct talks between the US and DRV. Its language had therefore to encompass the minimum outcomes acceptable to both sides, using ambiguity to cloak the differences his brokerage could not eliminate.

Apparently, the best terms he hoped to obtain were eventual US military withdrawal based on US acceptance of the NLF in a coalition government, along with a sharp reduction in the role played in that government by militant anti-communists. The minimum he felt acceptable as a basis for talks is, naturally, harder to discern. It seems to have been less a final solution to the conflict than a change in the ground rules under which the struggle to rule SVN would continue. The principal elements seemed to be acceptance of the Communists as legitimate contenders for power; and the substitution of international machinery of some sort for US armed participation in regulating the outcome. Left open is the question of what, if anything, the Communists would give in exchange (e.g., NVA withdrawal, etc.)

Lewandowski's thoughts on settlement are described briefly below. More detail is given in the chronology, for which the relevant dates are also indicated below.

(1) The Teaser. US interest (and Italian) was first aroused by a statement of things the DRV did not demand as part of a final settlement. Lewandowski, just back from a trip to Hanoi in June 1966, billed this negative list as "a very specific peace offer," even though it lacked the positive demands that would inevitably be in a final settlement. What Hanoi did not demand included:

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immediate reunification; socialism in SVN; a change in SVN relations in foreign affairs; neutralization; immediate withdrawal of US forces; DRV interference in the SVN government. The last point, however, was modified to the extent of asking for a government led by "someone other than Ky."

On the positive side, Hanoi's demands seemed to concern negotiation procedures. It would enter negotiations if the NLF could "take part" (though not as sole representative of SVN) and if the bombing of the North were suspended. The first of these demands, of course, is not purely procedural, since giving the NLF a formal role in negotiations would move it toward a position of legitimacy in SVN politics, whatever the outcome of the negotiations.

Lewandowski, then, seemed to suggest that the war could be brought to an end by strengthening the position of the NLF, weakening that of Ky (and, no doubt, the anti-communist tendency in SVN he represented), fudging all other issues over at least the short run. (6/27/67)

(2) Ruminations. During September, Lewandowski communed with D'Orlandi in Saigon on possible solutions. All of his thoughts, however, returned to a single theme: coalition government. The bulk of the ministers could be "sensible SVN politicians," with a man or two from the right (meaning the Ky government) and a man or two from the left (meaning the NLF) in "unimportant ministries." Of perhaps even greater significance, he firmly opposed any development designed to reinforce the status quo with respect to the then existing SVN -- including, specifically, measures for mutual de-escalation of the war. (9/4/66-9/14/66)

Later, D'Orlandi outlined a settlement package that he thought would get immediate, serious consideration in Hanoi. It included US withdrawal "eventually"; internationally controlled elections "after one or two years"; leading to a neutral, coalition government. Coalition, in his mind, was "not a 'must.'" Whether this package reflected Lewandowski's appraisal, or D'Orlandi's softening of the Pole's view, is not clear. (10/16/66)

(3) Probing the US. Just before visiting Hanoi in mid-November, Levandowski tried to take a serious reading on US attitudes. His questions were so phrased as to make the response desired by the communist side apparent. They dealt with procedures that might follow a ceasefire and were no doubt an effort
to find a set of actions which, if accepted by the US, would ultimately result in a situation in SVN acceptable to the communists.

Specifically, he wanted to know if US troop withdrawal depended on GVN control over areas then governed or contested by the VC; if the US would withdraw from combat areas and not interfere in the creation of a new government in SVN; if the US would oppose progress toward peaceful reunification; if the US would accept the ICC as the machinery for bringing peace to SVN.

All but the third of these questions boil down essentially to one: to what extent would the US remove itself from the contest over who should rule in SVN? All were framed without indication of a quid pro quo. Thus they reveal nothing of DRV willingness to remove itself from the contest. (11/14/66)

(4) Speaking for the US. When Leandowski returned from Hanoi at the end of November, he brought along his own formulation of the US position on a final settlement. The critical points on the future of SVN include: US military withdrawal after the restoration of peace; US acceptance that "the present status quo in SVN would be changed in order to take into account the interests of the parties presently opposing the policy of the US in SVN"; and US acceptance of the results of "free and democratic elections," held "with the participation of all," under "the necessary control machinery." (12/7/66)

The political complexion of the new status quo is left open, but clearly SVN communists would be entitled to contend for power. Clearly, too, the phrase "necessary control machinery" could not refer in Communist minds to the US presence or the existing GVN. On the other hand, no piece of "machinery" less forceful than these could be expected by the communists to enforce an electoral outcome regarded as unacceptable to the armed parties contending in SVN. Thus the formulation does not provide a peaceful solution to the problem of who shall rule SVN. It offers a way for the US to end its part in the war. It leaves open the question of what the communist side would do in return. This, presumably, is what the formulation left as the subject of negotiation.
Unilateral Concessions

Lewandowski probed for US concessions on the terms of final settlement beyond previously stated official positions, such as the Fourteen Points and the Manila Communique. His method of operation was such as to conceal what reciprocity (if any) might come from the DRV. In the end, however, he got virtually no concessions of substance. As a result, it might be argued the greatest unilateral movement away from previous positions was on the DRV side, which agreed to meet with the US without a cessation of the bombing of the North. While the nature of the prospective contact remained in total obscurity -- we had no indication of what matters the DRV representative would be prepared to address -- the DRV must have hoped for something of value and was prepared to probe for it while the bombing continued. In effect, this meant tacitly accepting the bombing as an American blue chip in the bargaining process, something the DRV had sought tenaciously to avoid in the past. (See, however, the XYZ episode.)

In response to the four questions Lewandowski posed in mid-November, the US replied: the Manila formulation spoke for itself with respect to US troop withdrawal; the US supported the constitutional processes then emerging in Saigon as the route to representative government in SVN; the US would accept peaceful, freely chosen reunification (as already indicated in the Fourteen Points); the machinery needed to enforce and supervise a final settlement should be decided by negotiations, taking account of problems revealed in the recent past -- i.e., with the ICC. Nothing was conceded at all. (11/14-15/66)

The US accepted Lewandowski's final 10 Point formulation as broadly reflecting its position, but qualified this by stating, "We must add that several specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation." The qualifier was not elaborated, even though the Poles urged that the specific points at issue be indicated or that the formulation be revised to eliminate the need for this sweeping reservation. The point which raised the sharpest apprehension in Washington was that indicating US acceptance that the "status quo in SVN would be changed" to take account of communist interests. Even this language, however, as State pointed out, was broad enough to mean anything from putting the NLF into the government forthwith to a simple endorsement of the electoral processes then being elaborated in Saigon. US troop withdrawal is explicitly linked to the Manila Communique, though the specific conditions of the Manila offer are not repeated. Lewandowski's fifth point, however, may have added something to the previous US stance, by calling for a GVN based on "the participation of all through free democratic elections," held under "the necessary control machinery." The US seemed to be accepting universal suffrage (no exclusion of communists and neutralists, as later specified in the SVN constitution) and supervisory machinery not controlled by the non-Communist side, though what all this could mean in practice would have emerged only through negotiations. (12/5/66, 12/7/66)
Given the suspicion with which the DRV undoubtedly views US intentions, the Lewandowski formulation, especially when seasoned with the "important differences" clause, is unlikely to have struck the North Vietnamese as at all forthcoming. In spite of this, they agreed to meet. While they may not have intended to offer much at Warsaw, their willingness to come while the bombing continued undercut the seriousness we would attach from then on to their declarations of negotiating preconditions, their confidence about their military progress, etc., etc. These factors are weighty enough to give importance to the question: why were they willing to meet at all? According to the reasoning above, the answer does not lie in our responses to Lewandowski. If not, we should look for factors external to Marigold -- the rising confusion in China, perhaps, or a pessimistic estimate of Communist military prospects in SVN, or..... Furthermore, if we did not lure them toward the conference table with the attractions of our offer, the possibility arises that the other pressures pushing them in that direction were sufficient to induce significant concessions, had the contact occurred.
The Soviet Role in Marigold

In the materials available for this study, the first explicit discussion of Marigold between US and Soviet officials does not appear until well after the Warsaw contact had been canceled. On December 22, the Soviet Charge in Washington, Alexander Zinchuk, called on William Bundy to express Soviet support for the Polish initiative and to discourage the US from seeking a "militaristic" solution in Vietnam. Zinchuk indicated that the matter had been discussed with DRV leaders visiting Moscow in late November and again in early December. He implied that the Soviet Union had felt unable to encourage the DRV to continue with the contact because of the bombing of December 2 and 4.

The lateness of Zinchuk's approach to Bundy and the content of his message would suggest the Soviets played at most a passive role in Marigold. This would be consistent with their abandoning sponsorship of the prospective Conference on Cambodia in May 1965, their refusal to transmit the US letter to the DRV Embassy in Moscow during Mayflower (May 1965), and their frequent rebuffs thereafter of US efforts to invoke their mediation.

On the other hand, the Italians on several occasions early in Marigold indicated that they understood the Poles to be acting on Soviet instructions. D'Orlanz also quoted Lewandowski as saying that Hanoi was "tightly controlled" by the Chinese and hence preliminary talks would have to be between Washington and Moscow, with overt DRV participation only as an acceptable basis for negotiations emerged. (6/29/66, 7/9/66, 9/14/66) There are no further references of this sort, however, after mid-September.

It is at least possible, then, that the Russians were the principal sponsors of Marigold. If so, they minimized their visibility when Marigold appeared to be succeeding, emerging to express their interest to us only after the bombing of Hanoi and the collapse of the Warsaw contact. This is followed chronologically by the unusually active Soviet role in Sunflower. Given past Soviet reluctance to mediate, it is noteworthy that the Russians would come to the fore at a time when conditions seemed relatively unpropitious.

This raises at least two questions:

(1) As noted above (under "Unilateral Concessions") the DRV may have had reasons external to the Marigold exchanges for wanting direct talks with the US at just this time. Did the Russians receive encouragement from Hanoi to try further?
(2) Or was it the December bombing of Hanoi that stimulated the Russians? Zinchuk expressed apprehension both to Bundy and Harry MacPherson that Hanoi might call for Soviet volunteers under the terms of the Bucharest Declaration ("if the war escalates and if help is necessary"). The Russians no doubt wished to avoid such "escalation," whatever Hanoi's feelings in the matter.

The Trinh formula (of January 28, 1967) made these two possible motives compatible, by tying US-DRV talks to the "unconditional cessation of US bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV." At this point, the DRV attitude had hardened in one important respect, softened in another. It officially closed the door on the possibility of talks while the bombing continued, but it implied publicly (and made explicit privately) its willingness to talk if its conditions on bombing were met. This at last gave the Russians a license to try on Hanoi's behalf, even though worsening the chances for success because of the stiff conditions demanded of the US.
Leaks and Pressures

From the beginning, Lewandowski stressed the importance of secrecy to the possible success of Marigold, the reason given being opposition by communist hardliners, especially the Chinese. In spite of this, the Poles leaked portions of their version of the episode at strategic moments during the contact in a relatively obvious effort to put pressure on the US.

The US responded in part, as the Poles wished, by cooperating with Lewandowski's initiatives. Where this proved inadequate, we took counter measures which combined the defensive leaking of the US version of portions of the episode on the one hand with incentives and exhortations intended to induce other participants to maintain the privacy of the contact on the other.

The first Polish approach to the US in Marigold was conveyed through the Italians: D'Orlandi contacted Lodge in Saigon; Fenocchio contacted State in Washington. Meanwhile, Fanfani described the matter to U Thant. Somewhat later, Saragat took it up with Goldberg. It was immediately recognized in Washington that any indication of US reluctance to respond would quite soon be widely interpreted as lack of interest in a peaceful end to the war. We therefore undertook to develop the contact, even though skeptical about the real promise it held forth. At the same time, we protested politely to the Italians about trying to do business in this manner. (6/27-30/66, 7/6-10/66)

During the rest of the summer and fall, as Lewandowski felt he was making progress, the problem of leaks abated. Immediately following the December 13-14 bombing of Hanoi and the DRV's cancellation of the Warsaw meeting, however, pressure through leaks resumed.

On one day alone, December 15, Lewandowski revealed emotional tidbits of the episode to the Dutch Charge in Saigon, the Polish Ambassador in Rome managed to have the Pope quiz him about Vietnam, and Hanoi cabled Harrison Salisbury permission to visit the DRV. A few days later, the Polish Ambassador gave the Pope "the whole story." (12/15-19/66)

We responded first by suspending the Hanoi targets in Rolling Thunder 52, then by offering to halt all strikes within a 10 mile radius of the center of Hanoi in exchange for a similar show of restraint by the VC around Saigon, and finally putting the 10 mile Hanoi sanctuary into effect unilaterally—when the prospects of getting explicit reciprocity seemed too faint. Thus in order to revive Marigold, we offered formal assurances of restraint on our bombing that went well beyond those the Poles had urged us to accept informally after the strikes of December 2 and 4. (12/15/66, 12/21/66, 12/24/66) The US version of Marigold was explained in some detail to the Pope, U Thant, and the Canadian, Italian, Australian,
New Zealand and British Governments. The 10 mile sanctuary around Hanoi was stressed as a potential basis for reviving the contact, reflecting US goodwill and making it essential that the widening circle of those privy to the matter preserve the utmost discretion about it, secrecy being the sine qua non for success. Meanwhile a much less detailed report on the contact was given the GVN and other troop contributing countries, to forestall possible misgivings should they hear of the matter first from other sources.

By mid-January, then, Marigold was known in varying degree to a large circle of diplomats, some briefed by us, some by the Poles and most by both sides. On January 19, a brief reference to Marigold and its disruption by the mid-December bombing of Hanoi was filed in the press from Ottawa. The information was attributed to "high Canadian officials." By February 4, a much more complete version had been filed from UN Headquarters in New York. At this point, with so many possible sources for the story, there was no agreement among the Americans on the origin of the leak to the press. Goldberg thought the Poles were responsible, while Gronowski argued that it had been the Canadians. (2/1-2/67, 2/7-8/67)

The war of leaks gradually escalated during the spring. By May, the Poles were expressing concern to Gronowski over a rumor they had picked up in Washington—that the US contemplated publishing a white paper on Marigold. This would force them, they said, to retaliate in kind. Just at this time, an extremely detailed account of the episode was published by John Hightower of the AP. The most controversial point in his story was the statement that US "officials were not sure the Poles had any commitment from North Vietnam to begin talks. Some...doubted that Mr. Rapacki was in fact...making known Washington's readiness for talks to Hanoi." Washington felt the Hightower account was "essentially accurate and reasonably favorable." The Poles were told the US would publish no white paper. They replied that "US officials had apparently chosen another way to put out the story." However, no official Polish rebuttal was made public and the war of leaks simmered down on this acrimonious note. (5/8-9/67)

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the war of leaks is the silence of the DRV. Although Hanoi did mount a propaganda campaign against US bombing of the DRV immediately after the collapse of the Marigold contact—e.g., through the Harrison Salisbury visit, etc.—no mention was ever made of the prospective Warsaw contact and its cancellation after the mid-December bombing. Properly handled, this could have been made a telling point with world opinion. Presumably, secrecy about the contact was of greater value to the DRV. It is quite possible, therefore, that the Polish leaks were not appreciated in Hanoi and the Polish handling of the matter was criticized there, as in Washington. (Alternatively, however, it may be that the Polish leaks satisfied the DRV's propaganda requirements, within the constraints imposed by DRV relations with China, the maintenance of rank-and-file morale among Vietnamese communist forces, etc. In that case, Hanoi's silence would not in itself imply an adverse judgment on the Polish role.)
Bombing the North I: Blue Chip or Topic for Talks?

The US proposed repeatedly during Marigold that de-escalation be taken as the first topic between the two sides. What would the Communists do if the US stopped bombing?

Lewandowski with equal persistence refused to accept this question as a point of departure. The DRV would reject it, he said, because de-escalation would be viewed as strengthening the governmental status quo in SVN, whereas it was precisely a change in the SVN government that the Communist side required. Instead, therefore, he urged that this subject be left for last. Once both sides agreed on terms for the ultimate situation in SVN, finding the route there via de-escalation would be easy.

Although Lewandowski never, of course, made the argument himself, his approach meant Communist acceptance of the bombing as a blue chip in the bargaining process because the talks on settlement terms would have to take place while the bombing continued. One inducement the Communists would have to accept terms desired by the US would be that this would end the bombing. Too, his approach saved more face for the Communist side than ours, which required that the bombing be addressed explicitly.

When, finally, the US went along with Lewandowski’s approach, it upped the ante by the December bombings of Hanoi. The DRV cancellation of the contact meant, then, that it would neither accept de-escalation as a starting point for talks nor accept augmentation of the US blue chip through strikes on more sensitive targets.

The cancellation of the talks over this issue measures the failure of Lewandowski’s brokerage. He had not narrowed the gulf between the two sides sufficiently. His version of possible settlement terms was not attractive enough to make the US forego upping the ante, on the one hand, or to induce the DRV to accept the higher ante, on the other.
Bombing the North II: Signals, Intended and Inadvertant

As is shown in a separate study, beginning in June 1966, there was a marked increase in the amount of ordnance expended against North Vietnam. This was true for the country as a whole, for Route Package VI and for the areas within 10 miles of the center of Hanoi and 5 miles of the center of Haiphong. The general level of ordnance expenditure remained high until mid-November. During the last two weeks of November, probably on account of weather, air strikes against the North were at their lowest level since June, rising markedly again during the first and second weeks of December.

The most sensitive area of all, that within 5 miles of the center of Hanoi, was struck (with about 25 tons of ordnance) for the first time in the war during the last week of June, as part of a general attack on POL facilities. About 3 tons more were expended in this area in mid-August. It was not hit again until the first week in December (the 2nd and 4th) when almost 50 tons were expended, then hit yet again during the second week in December (the 13th and 14th) with over 100 tons. The intended targets in all of the December attacks were the Yen Vien Railroad Yard and the Van Dien Vehicle Depot, but apparently there was collateral damage in all cases. In particular, during the December 13-14 attacks, the Chinese and Rumanian Embassies seem to have been hit, along with some residential structures in central Hanoi. From the ground, then, there might appear to have been an increase in the intensity of attack, measured both in tons of ordnance expended and type of target, commencing December 2, i.e., immediately following Hanoi's assent to some form of US-DRV meeting in Warsaw.

The Poles expressed alarm about the "intensification of the bombing" on December 2, 7, 8, and 9, arguing that "such attacks could only threaten or destroy the possibility of contact in Warsaw." They expressed these views as their own, not as a message transmitted from Hanoi. However, Lewandowski told D'Oriand (who in turn told US on December 9) that he believed Hanoi had attached significance to the fact that during the two weeks he had been in Hanoi (approximately November 16-30) the bombing had appeared to be at a reduced level. Lewandowski thought Hanoi had interpreted this as a tacit signal of US support for his mission.

In fact, the targets near Hanoi which were the object of attack in December had been authorized as part of Rolling Thunder 52, for which the execute message was sent on November 10. This was prior to Lewandowski's departure for Hanoi, though the approximate timing of his impending visit ("after the US elections") was known in Washington when the execute message was sent. (10/15-16/66) Presumably, had weather not intervened, the strikes near Hanoi might well have occurred during his visit, rather than after his return with Hanoi's "positive response." Hanoi's review of Lewandowski's proposals would have occurred in quite a different context, one reflecting more accurately, perhaps, US attitudes.
On December 10, Washington informed both the Warsaw and Saigon Embassies that it had been decided to leave the bombing pattern unchanged. Gronouski was forewarned that this might involve some targets Rapacki would insist reflected further escalation.

Apparently, the strikes of December 13-14 were so interpreted in Hanoi, which instructed the Poles on December 14 to terminate all conversations.

On December 24, the US informed the Communists that bombing within 10 miles of the center of Hanoi had been suspended as an act of goodwill in the hopes of reviving the Warsaw contact. This was a more substantial concession on the bombing than the Poles had urged after the December 2 and 4 strikes, in that it reflected an explicit, well-defined commitment, rather than the tacit, unformalized restraint suggested by the Poles. The DRV may have concluded that propaganda repercussions, actual and prospective, had forced a change in the US posture, causing Hanoi in turn to stiffen the conditions it imposed in exchange for talks. The Trinh formula of January 28, 1967, demanding an end to all bombing of the DRV, may reflect this calculation.
US Good Faith

Prior to the December 2 bombing of Hanoi, no conditions with respect to US military actions had been demanded by the Communists as a price for the Warsaw meeting. The only terms, as expressed by Lewandowski to Lodge on November 30, were: "I am authorized to say that if the US are really of the views which I have presented (i.e., his 10 points), it would be advisable to confirm them directly by conversation with the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw." In addition to this, he urged only speed and secrecy.

The US had several times previously suggested that mutual de-escalation be undertaken by the two sides. In a major policy statement, Goldberg offered "a cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam--the moment we are assured, privately or otherwise, that this step will be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate de-escalation on the other side." (9/22/66) But de-escalation was rejected by Lewandowski as the wrong subject with which to start. Thus the US had no commitment to avoid bombing Hanoi stemming from the agreement to meet in Warsaw, and in fact, as noted above, strikes against Hanoi had been authorized since mid-November but had not occurred, presumably for reasons of weather.

The Poles argued that there was a difference between de-escalation and non-escalation. We should have been willing to trade the latter for talks, even if not the former. Secondly, they stretched the meaning of our official position. Rapacki claimed, "you have said over and over again that you would end all bombing if there was an assurance from Hanoi that there would be a response toward peace from Hanoi; however, we did not ask that you stop bombing but only that you not intensify it." And "recalling speeches of Goldberg, the President, Secretary Rusk and others, once we received the signal we did, we would have had every right to call for a stop in the bombing." (12/19/66) Without endorsing this particular formulation, D'Orlandi indicated his general agreement with the Polish interpretation. (12/18/66) Gronouski feared it would be widely shared and that the Communists "will have no trouble convincing the leadership in every capital of the world that our stated desire for peace negotiations is insincere." (12/18/66) In their minds, the issue turned less on the precise language of previous US expressions than on a general tenor which they felt was undercut by the December bombings. Washington apparently soon came to share this view, and the 10 mile bombing sanctuary around Hanoi's center was established to underline the seriousness of US intentions.
The following chronology consists of brief summaries and interpretative statements about each date, followed by indented documentation.
June 27, 1966

Marigold begins with a contact between D’Orlandi, the Italian Ambassador in Saigon, and Lewandowski, the Polish Representative on the ICC, also working out of Saigon. Lewandowski, just returned from Hanoi, reported that he had a "very specific peace offer" to transmit, one that would lead to a "political compromise" settling the whole Vietnam question once and for all. The attractive features were (a) Hanoi would not ask for immediate reunification, (b) it would not demand a socialist system in SVN, (c) SVN would not have to change its relationships in the field of foreign affairs, (d) "neutralization" would not be demanded, (e) U.S. withdrawal could be scheduled along a "reasonable calendar," (f) Hanoi did not seek to interfere with the SVN government.

Hanoi’s conditions for entering negotiations were that (a) the NLF "take part" and (b) there be a "suspension" of the bombing.

D’Orlandi communicated all this to Lodge in Saigon, two days later (June 29), on instructions from Fanfani, who was also transmitting it directly to Washington.

Saigon 5940 (to SecState), TS/Nodis, 29 June 1966
(Ssection 1 of 2)
Literally Eyes Only for the President, The Secretary, and the Acting Secretary

"1. This afternoon D’Orlandi, Italian Ambassador, telephoned to say it was urgent that I come to his office as soon as the Catholic service honoring the anniversary of the coronation of Pope Paul VI had ended. I went to his office at about 6:45, and he began as follows:

"2. Two days ago, the Polish representative on the ICC, Lewandowski, came to him with a 'very specific peace offer.'"

"3. D’Orlandi said he had requested instructions from Fanfani, who told him (1) to submit the whole proposal to me, and (2) said that he, Fanfani, would send the whole thing to Washington for their consideration."

....

"9. The Pole began by saying that Hanoi has been deeply disappointed by the proposals made by Ronning which, they are sure, had emanated originally from the United States and not from the Canadians. Ronning had
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proposed that the U.S. stop the bombing if North Viet-Nam stopped the infiltration, and had talked about the exchange of prisoners' parcels and letters. This had bitterly disappointed North Vietnam. The first point, they had said, would be unconditional surrender, and they could not accept it, but they are open to a 'political compromise' settling once and for all the entire Viet-Nam question.

"10. When D'Orlandi said that he was skeptical, the Pole said that Hanoi was prepared to go 'quite a long way.' 'It is useless for me to add,' said the Pole, 'that should there not be any kind of a preliminary agreement, Hanoi will deny flatly ever having made any offer.' According to the Pole, the North Vietnamese are 'tightly controlled' by the Chinese Communists. The preliminary talks, therefore, should be between Moscow and Washington. When and if proposals should emerge which could be considered as a basis for negotiations, Hanoi would at that time and under those circumstances get into it. The Pole said that Hanoi was afraid of the Chinese Communists who have an interest in dragging on the war for many years. D'Orlandi added that the Pole was evidently 'proud of himself' for having brought these proposals about.

"11. The proposals are as follows:

A. They insist that the so-called National Liberation Front 'take part' in the negotiations. The key word is 'take part.' According to D'Orlandi, there is 'no question of their being the representative; they are not to have any monopoly.'

B. There must be suspension of the bombing.

"12. These are the two proposals.

"13. Then there are other points, which D'Orlandi called 'negative ones,' which are that (a) Hanoi will not ask for immediate reunification, either by elections or otherwise, of North and South Vietnam.

Lodge

{(Section 2 of 2)}

"(b) They will not ask for establishment of a 'socialist' system in South Viet-Nam; (c) They will not ask South Viet-Nam to change the relationships which it has in the field of foreign affairs; and (d) They will not ask for neutralization.
(e) Although they will ask for U.S. withdrawal, they are ready to discuss a 'reasonable calendar.' (f) Although 'we would like someone other than Ky' - to quote the words of Hanoi - they do not want to interfere with the South Vietnamese Government."

"18. The Pole said that his Government would be willing to arrange for D'Orlandi to meet with appropriate Polish spokesmen anywhere - Hong Kong or Singapore. In response to a question by D'Orlandi as to why they had come to him, the Pole said they wanted 'an able debater to put the case to President Johnson, and we feel that the Italian Government has the sympathy of the United States Government.' Moreover, the Italians have the same interest we have in agreement between Washington and Moscow, and in shutting out Peking.

"19. D'Orlandi's impression is that the Poles are desperately seeking a way out on Moscow's instructions. This, he said, may need further exploration. He had the definite impression that now Hanoi 'was amenable to common sense' saying 'they do not want anything that would not stop the whole war. They want a political settlement, and are prepared to go a long way.'"

LODGE

June 29, 1966

On the same day that D'Orlandi saw Lodge in Saigon, the Italian Ambassador Fenclita brought the information to the State Department in Washington. State saw little new in it, with two exceptions. The Italians were therefore asked to inquire discreetly if there was real movement on the following points:

(1) Did the condition that the NLF "take part" in negotiations mean it need no longer be accepted as the "sole representative" of the SVN people?

(2) Did the word "suspension" mean that a bombing "cessation" was no longer a prerequisite to negotiations?
State 4108 (to Embassy Saigon), TE/Nodis, 29 June 1966

Literally Eyes Only for Ambassador
Embtl 5840

"Italian Ambassador Fenoaltea came in today with Faroche, Italian Ambassador-designate to Canada, who had hand-carried message similar to that contained ref tel and who said he was under instructions to hand-carry our reply back to Rome ...."

"We told Fenoaltea that, except for use of term 'participate' with respect to NLF, which could have implication Hanoi was not insisting NLF be 'sole representative' of SVN, and 'suspension of bombing' in place of 'cessation of bombing,' position Hanoi indicated to Pole was very similar to previous indications their position. Thus in light of various translations these words have gone through, it is not clear whether their use has any significance. Therefore, without indicating to Pole that message had been passed to USG, suggested Italian Government on its own responsibility, query Polish Rep on these two terms to determine whether formulations contained in Polish version of Hanoi's position were used advisedly by Hanoi and indicate some shift in position or were accidents of translation...."

BALL

June 30, 1966

Rusk expressed skepticism about the value of the DRV proposal, even if there were some movement on the points enumerated, because allowing the NLF to "take part" might lead it eventually to a major -- even "fatal" -- role in SVN politics, however the negotiations came out, and because a bombing "suspension" would produce pressures for a "cessation." Given the risks of recrimination from Fanfani and Rapacki, though, he felt it necessary to follow up. He also predicted, correctly, that the POL strikes then programmed for Rolling Thunder might stiffen the DRV position momentarily, arguing against trying to move too fast.

Lodge, on the other hand, thought the package so forthcoming as to arouse suspicions about the intermediary. Presumably, he was less familiar than State with the content of previous Hanoi communications of the sort. Much of the proposal, as conveyed, was old, but two points to which he drew attention were new: the apparent acceptance of the existing Saigon government and of its foreign relationships.
Canberra 58 (to SecState), S/Nodis, 30 June 1966
Eyes Only for Acting Secretary and Ambassador from Secretary

"2. I cannot from here make any full assessment of that message. The NLF part seems vague, encouraging only in that it abandons the 'sole representative' position. However, this position has always seemed a maximum opener, and we must keep in mind always that even 'taking part' on a full basis would go very far to give the NLF a major, and likely fatal, part in SVN politics. On the bombing, a 'suspension' could easily lead to heavy pressure for a 'cessation'. For the rest, the disclaimers of any immediate 'Socialist' set-up in SVN or of immediate reunification plans have a familiar ring from some past noises by DRV Reps trying to make themselves sound reasonable."

"4. All this being said, I suppose that if Fanfani asks us to let D'Orlandi follow up, we would virtually have to agree.... With careful instructions and reasonable precautions, we should be able to minimize risks. In any case refusal to follow up -- even if message wholly phony -- would expose us to recrimination from Fanfani and Rapacki alike...."

"5. Moreover, there might just be something in it. Poles and Italians may seem devious channels, but not all that implausible if Hanoi is having any second thoughts. If so, POL strike might stiffen them momentarily, to avoid any appearance of weakness or effect of strike, and this argues for not moving too fast."
TOP SECRET - NODIS

suspicion concerning the credibility of the Polish intermediary. It seems to us that not only is the so-called NLF being abandoned as the sole bargaining agent, but so also is the NLF program of a 'socialist' state, of unifying the North and South, and of 'neutralization.' Also the phrase 'reasonable calendar' indicates a definite softening of position regarding IGNS. Troops. The same is true of acceptance of the Government of South Viet-Nam and its foreign relationships."

....

LODGE

July 6 & 7, 1966

Fanfani also described the contact to U Thant, who in turn passed it on to Goldberg at UN headquarters. This increased fears of a leak from Fanfani on the US side. In fact, the disclosure to U Thant was considered such a leak and doubtless put pressure on the USG to protect itself by pursuing the contact, on the one hand, and by taking defensive positions on the other.

Geneva 61 (to State), Ts/Nodis, 6 July 1966
For Acting Secretary from Ambassador Goldberg

"5. Syg informed me that on recent visit to Italy Fanfani reported to him that P0L ICC Ambassador had had conversation with Ho Chi Minh on June 27 in which Ho presumably said that they would be prepared to engage in serious discussions with us, notwithstanding Chinese and Soviet objections, if bombings were suspended and if Viet-Cong participated in talks. According to Thant, this information relayed by P0L ICC Ambassador to Italian Ambassador in Saigon who in turn communicated it to Fanfani. Thant further reported that Fanfani believed message contained two new elements: (A) that Ho was not insisting on unconditional cessation of bombing, merely a suspension; and (3) Ho not insistent that Viet-Cong be sole representatives of South Vietnamese people at such negotiations. Fanfani had also told the Secretary General that he thought this message of such importance that it warranted sending a special Italian emissary to Washington to communicate the substance of it to United States officials. Syg said Fanfani did this and that special emissary was asked in Washington to remain there pending a probe through
Fanfani of the word, suspension, and also to inquire what Ho meant by saying Viet-Cong would have to participate in the talks. Fanfani swore U Thant to secrecy and the Secretary General therefore imparted this information to me in the strictest confidence saying he had not communicated to anyone in Secretariat. He asked in particular that I not raise this with Fanfani, but if latter mentioned it to me, I should disclaim knowledge of it from Syg, except as I might receive knowledge of it from Washington."

TUBBY

State 2673 (to Ambassador Tokyo), TS/Nodis, 7 July 1966
For the Secretary from the Acting Secretary

"As you will have already seen from TSEC 188, Fanfani has already begun to leak, having told U Thant of Polish message and in turn U Thant having passed it on to Goldberg ....

"I privately spoke to Fenoaltea today and, without mentioning Goldberg, said that we had indirectly heard that Fanfani had mentioned matter to U Thant. Fenoaltea said he would drop a private note to Fanfani. Fenoaltea expressed full understanding of problem of attempting to do business in this manner and much skepticism as to whether there was any real substance in approach. He said though that, as we knew, Fanfani felt impelled to 'do something.'

...."

State 2619 (to US Mission Geneva), TS/Nodis, 7 July 1966
Literally Eyes Only For Ambassador Goldberg from Acting Secretary

"Re paras 5 and 6 of Geneva's 61 strictly FYI, we have received report from Italians along lines indicated by Fanfani to U Thant...we are following up in very discreet manner to test its authenticity...."

BALL

July 7-9, 1966

Lodge was instructed to develop the contact further, by meeting with D'Orlandi and Lewandowski himself in Saigon, but to tell Ky something of
a general nature in case rumors began to circulate. Lodge’s inquiries were to address procedures, but one matter of substance was raised, as it would be again and again from the US side: What would Hanoi do to reciprocate the suspension of bombing? He carried out these instructions two days later (July 9).

State 2626 (to Amembassy Saigon), TS/Nodis, 7 July 1966

"...we suggest that Ambassador D’Orlandi seek discreetly to arrange a meeting between himself, Lewandowski and Ambassador Lodge in Saigon.

"... At such a meeting you should, referring to USG’s understandings of Lewandowski’s statements to D’Orlandi, and making clear that you are acting under instructions, state as follows:

"1. State that the United States shares the desire for an over-all political settlement.

"2. Inquire when, where and with what parties Hanoi contemplates that negotiations would take place.

"3. Inquire what if any action Hanoi on its part would propose to take or not take during the period of suspension of bombing.

"4. Inquire whether Hanoi believes it realistic to keep negotiations secret if the United States suspends bombing with the inevitable speculation this would entail.

"... We are inclined to feel it would be desirable for you to say something of a general nature to Ky without disclosing specifics...."

BALL

Saigon 604 (to SecState), TS/Nodis, 9 July 1966

"1. Lewandowski, D’Orlandi and I met at D’Orlandi's office at 4:30 July 9.

"2. After my saying it was a personal pleasure for me to see him again, I began, pursuant to your 2626, by referring to our understanding of Lewandowski’s indication that Hanoi was open to a ‘political settlement’ which would settle the Viet-Nam question once and for all.
"3. I added that we understood that Lewandowski had said to D'Orlandi that Hanoi in effect made two proposals:

(a) The National Liberation Front would 'take part' in the negotiations.

(b) There must be a suspension of the bombing in North Vietnam.

"4. Our understanding of Amb. Lewandowski's approach to Amb. D'Orlandi was, I said, that if proposals emerged as a basis for negotiations, then Hanoi would be prepared to enter into negotiations.

"5. I then said that acting under instructions of the United States Government, I was authorized to state the following:

"6. And I stated the four points in your 2626."

Lodge

July 9, 1966

Saragat gives Goldberg an account of the D'Orlandi-Lewandowski contacts in Saigon similar to that already passed by D'Orlandi to Lodge and by Fanfani to U Thant and Washington.

He adds two points to the previous versions:

1. Lewandowski's intention is that the negotiations take place substantially between Moscow and Washington. If secrecy is preserved, this will permit Peking to be ignored.

11. The US airstrikes against oil depots near Hanoi and Haiphong on June 28 have not, in Lewandowski's view, prejudged the effort to arrange contact.

Rome 145 (to SecState), TS/Nodis, 9 July 1966
From Goldberg and Sisco

"Amb Goldberg saw Saragat privately Friday night July 8..."

....
"Following in full is text of document which Saragat gave to Amb. Goldberg.... Begin text: On June 27 the Italian Ambassador in Saigon D'Orlandi reported that the Polish representative to the ICC Ambassador Savira just back from Hanoi had told him that the North Vietnam Government were prepared to enter secret pourparlers in order to reach a political compromise with the United States at two preliminary conditions: i.e., suspension of bombing over North Vietnam and Viet Cong participation in the negotiations. As to the nature of such compromise, the Hanoi Government were willing: (1) not to ask for the immediate reunification of North and South Vietnam; (2) to relinquish their claim to imposition of U.S. socialist system in South Vietnam; (3) not to ask for changes in the existing relations between South Vietnam and the western countries; (4) to discuss the timing of the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam while maintaining their request for such withdrawal.

"Moreover, the Polish representative made it clear that in his own opinion negotiations were to take place substantially between Moscow and Washington. If absolute secrecy were maintained about the preliminary contacts, Hanoi, he thought, could have ignored Peking.

"On June 28 it was reported that oil depots in Hanoi and Haiphong had been bombed. The Polish Ambassador expressed some reservations as to the consequences of such initiative but later reported that the attempt to open negotiations was not in his own eyes pre-judged.

"In connection with Ambassador D'Orlandi's reports, the Italian PrFMIn and the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who were then in Bonn, decided to send Signor Farace, Deputy Dir Gen for Political Affairs, to Washington so that he may sound, together with Ambassador Fenoaltea, the reactions of the American Govt.... Farace and Fenoaltea on July 1 met in Washington Acting Secy of State Ball (Rusk was then in Australia) and Ball's Deputy Alexis Johnson. The two American officials...suggested that D'Orlandi should request clarification from the Polish Rep on two points: (1) He should find out whether the words 'participation of the Front of Liberation to the negotiations' were meant to exclude the Govt of Saigon; (2) He should also find out whether the word 'suspension' as applied to bombing was deliberately meant as something different from 'cessation.' On July 2, 3, and 4 Ambassador D'Orlandi made clear that North Vietnam simply asked for suspension of the bombing as a preliminary condition for the beginning of negotiations aimed at reaching a political
compromise on the above-mentioned lines. Viet Cong participation, furthermore, obviously did not rule out the participation of the South Vietnam Govt. It was only suggested that once the negotiations had begun General Ky may be replaced with a less extremist political personality. On July 5 Fencaltea and Farace in the course of a new meeting with Ball and Alexis Johnson passed on to these two American officials the information received from D'Orlandi. The Americans... reserved their position because President Johnson was away in Texas and Mr. Rusk was still abroad. According to Ambassador Fencaltea, further American communications would not be forthcoming for two or three days.

"On July 7 Ambassador Fencaltea reported that he had again met together with Farace the two American officials. They had expressed their opinion that Ambassador D'Orlandi and Ambassador Cabot Lodge should get in touch jointly and unofficially with the Polish Ambassador to explore the possibilities of the North Vietnamese offer."

July 10, 1966

When Lodge mentioned the matter to Ky, he expressed doubt that it would turn out to have any real substance, but said it would be followed up. Ky apparently went along graciously, suggesting that it might be a good time for a US leaflet campaign in the DRV, stressing our desire for negotiations.

Saigon 642 (to SecState), S/Nodis, 10 July 1966

"1. Pursuant your 2626, I called on Ky ostensibly to discuss General Thi and acquisition of suitable premises for the US consul in Danang. But as I was leaving, I remarked that 'by the way' we had been getting some rumors out of Hanoi indicating a desire to find a way out. None of these seemed to have any real substance, but we would follow all of them up and, if anything important occurred, we would of course tell him at once."

"3. He made the following suggestion which I thought interesting:
"4. The time has come for the Americans to put on another 'good will leaflet' campaign. The message on the leaflets should be that we (Vietnamese and Americans) want negotiations; it is your rulers who don't."

Lodge

July 24, 1966

When Lewandowski replied to Lodge, under instructions from Warsaw, he could say only that there could be no results without a bombing cessation, that the DRV's 4 points must be recognized, etc. This seemed a step backward to all participants. The matter was left for some weeks.

Saigon 1785 (to SecState), S/Nodis, 24 July 1966

"1. D'Orlandi, Lewandowski and I met at D'Orlandi's office at 4:30. The meeting lasted for twenty minutes. Lewandowski talked as follows:

   "2. 'I have the following instructions from Warsaw which I have been asked to transmit to Ambassador Lodge:

   A. 'It is difficult to discuss any proposition during the current important escalation of war activities in the South, and of the bombing in the North.

   B. 'To hold such discussions could be looked upon as a maneuver to force the DRV to negotiate under American conditions.

   C. 'We know very well that the DRV will not give up the fight while the United States pursues its present policy of military pressure.

   D. 'We have reasons to state that no proposition without the cessation of the bombing of the DRV will produce results.

   E. 'United States Government has no right to bomb the DRV and no right to propose conditions for its cessation.

   F. 'If the United States desires a peaceful solution, it must recognize the four points proposed by the DRV and prove it in practice."
G. 'The United States must stop bombing and other military activity against North Viet-Nam. Only then can a political solution be expected.'"

"16. D'Orlandi then spoke as follows:

"17. 'This is definitely a step backward. I had thought that the first meeting was rather encouraging. Both the opening and the American questions were encouraging. I felt something might come out and, as a matter of fact, I still feel this as a hunch. Accordingly, I hope the stiffness of your reply today is due to prevailing circumstances, and that this channel may be kept open and resumed as soon as possible. We were expecting a reply. Now we have a statement. I understood what led to this statement. It is the circumstances of the moment.'

"18. I asked to what circumstances he was referring. He said to all of the rumors in the newspapers of peace talk.'"

Lodge

September 4-8, 1966

After a period of inactivity and a discouraging visit to Hanoi by Lewandowski, D'Orlandi and Lewandowski attempted to revive the contact. They saw two main problems: that their exercise not be viewed as probing for Hanoi's minimum position; and that it not be directed at reinforcing the status quo or facilitating deescalating, but rather at finding an overall settlement that would permit the war to end.

Saigon 5229 (to SecState), S/Nodis, 4 September 1966

"1. D'Orlandi said that Lewandowski had returned from 16 days in Hanoi profoundly discouraged. His two closest contacts from Van Dong and General Giap were both away. His talk with Ho Chi Minh produced nothing of interest. There was absolutely no sign of a desire to stop the war.'"
"4. D'Orlandi said he would be willing to work with Lewandowski to try to develop a compromise formula, which could then be submitted to Moscow or Washington.

"5. Comment: What are Department's views of this suggestion? It could be that some ideas and clarification might come out of it, and that it would not, of course, commit us to anything. I doubt whether the Pole will be authorized. End Comment."

....

LODGE

State 41695 (to AmEmbassy Saigon), 6 September 1966

"... we see no objection to D'Orlandi's pursuing this with Pole if latter is so authorized..."

Saigon 5517 (to SecState), S/Nodis, 8 September 1966

"1. D'Orlandi told me that in his recent talk with Lewandowski, the problem referred to in my last telegram regarding Lewandowski and D'Orlandi working up a proposal to submit to Washington and Moscow was discussed. Lewandowski made three points:

"A. He did not want the only outcome of the procedure between D'Orlandi and himself to be to inform the United States as to 'just how far the North Vietnamese would give in.'

"B. Although Lewandowski recognizes that I had already given him ample assurances, he feels that emphasis must be given to the need of the U.S. approaching the problem so as to concern South Viet-Nam alone and not South Viet-Nam as a 'piece of a general Chinese puzzle.' Lewandowski feels that the problem could be 'simple enough' if limited to South Viet-Nam -- but not if the United States is thinking of using conversations with Lewandowski (and Lewandowski's talks in Hanoi) as a way of getting at China or Chinese questions...."
"C. Lewandowski said that it was only fair to state that the 'aim of the exercise' between him and D'Orlandi should not be to reinforce the status quo, but to get a 'global' settlement. When he says 'global', he obviously does not mean world-wide; he means 'over all' as regards South Viet-Nam. This, said D'Orlandi, quoting Lewandowski, means 'guarantees, etc.'; therefore 'not just de-escalation.'"

....

"5. Lewandowski said he was sure that something could be done. Hanoi, he said, looks at the situation through the distorted spectacles of the Viet Cong through whom they get all their information about the situation. 'My job,' said Lewandowski, 'is to explain to Hanoi that they have a wrong view.' The last time he had been in Hanoi neither Pham Van Dong nor General Giap were there, and 'they are the only two in the whole place who talk sense and understand the real situation in the south.'"

....

LODGE

September 12, 1966

State agreed that the contact be pursued, reserved its position on "changes in the status quo," and offered to look for a gesture of good intent to encourage Hanoi (and D'Orlandi), such as a proposal of mutually-timed withdrawal, or trading a bombing cessation plus a halt in the US troop buildup for an end to infiltration.

State L4917 (to Amembassy Saigon), S/Dis, 12 September 1966
Ref: Saigon 5517

....

"2. Lewandowski's remark that the aim of the exercise should not be to 'reinforce the status quo' is all right if he is talking about the present status quo in South Viet-Nam. But we cannot buy a discarding of the status quo ante, i.e. the 1954 and 1962 Agreements...we do not rule out consideration of revisions of the provisions of the Geneva Agreements but we could accept no changes until we
had a clear picture of what was the total context of an understanding with the Communists...."

"5. ... we will consider here whether there is something that could be given to D'Orlandi for his 'possible agreement formula' which could demonstrate our earnest desire move forward and smoke out Hanoi's intentions. This might lie, for example, in realm of mutually-timed withdrawal formula, or quid pro quo on cessation of bombing and halt in expansion US forces against end to infiltration by Hanoi."

RUSK

September 14, 1966

D'Orlandi reports that Lewandowski is not interested in de-escalation or any other sequence that will lead to preserving the present personnel of the GVN. It is this part of the "status quo" which must change. On the other hand, the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962 need not be affected.

Saigon 5965 (to SecState), S/Nodis, 14 September 1966

"1. Pursuant to your 44917 I had a long session with D'Orlandi.

"2. He says the phrase 'status quo' refers exclusively to the political and governmental status quo in Saigon and has nothing whatever to do with the 1954 and 1962 agreements....

"3. Lewandowski was definitely not referring to the 1954 and 1962 agreements. He is not interested in de-escalation or any kind of negotiation which would lead to a settlement and which would at the same time perpetuate the personnel of the present government. Lewandowski means that those on his side are not interested in ending military activities if, by so doing, the political and governmental situation in Saigon is thereby frozen."

....
"12. D'Orlandi would like to test how influential Lewandowski is with Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap, with whom Lewandowski claims to be so close. He is looking around for 'some little thing' which could be interpreted as an indication. He is sure Lewandowski speaks for Rapacki and with Moscow approval every inch of the way. He is inclined to believe that Lewandowski speaks for Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap, but would like to make sure.

"13. I ventured the guess that nothing could be expected out of Hanoi until our November elections were over. The time between now and then, therefore, I suggested, could be valuable in discussing and formulating proposals.

"14. D'Orlandi did not agree. He thought we should not 'discard the possibility of discussions now' due to the internal upheaval in China, which he believes brought the Peking Government very close to a breach of diplomatic relations with Moscow. This, he surmised--and not our elections--was dominating official thinking in Hanoi...."

...
"5. If the Americans ever really cared, they should especially concentrate on Pham Van Dong's fourth point concerning 'who is to speak for South Vietnam.' This does not mean that Hanoi would be trying to ram the Viet Cong down our throats. We could consider the setting up of a coalition government the bulk of which would be made up of 'sensible South Vietnamese politicians.' To preserve appearances you could have 'on the fringe' men from the 'right' in one or two 'unimportant ministries' and from on the 'left' fill one or two 'unimportant ministries with the so-called NLF.'

"6. D'Orlandi -- this is unthinkable. If this is what you want to talk about, it is better for us to stop the talks.

"7. Lewandowski asked whether D'Orlandi realized that what he meant to say was that this would be the last step not the first.

"8. D'Orlandi said: What would be the ultimate goal? If it is to have the Viet Cong in the Government of Viet Nam, I won't even submit such a proposal to Ambassador Lodge.

"9. Lewandowski said that is not at all what he meant to put to D'Orlandi. Plainly, the ultimate aim would be: 'to make of South Vietnam a second Cambodia.'

"10. D'Orlandi said that makes more sense, it is at least worth talking about.

"11. Lewandowski said: 'But I don't believe the Americans really wish to talk. They are trying to do two things at once: military escalation grouped with political proposals. You can't do both. So long as they won't make up their minds, we can't do anything. We must wait until November.'"

----

LODGE

September 22, 1966

Goldberg's speech to the UN General Assembly stresses the US desire for a negotiated settlement, proposing a reduction in Communist military activities in SVN in response for a bombing cessation, and mutual withdrawal of military forces under international supervision. He reiterates President Johnson's statement that Vietcong representation in peace negotiations would not be an insurmountable problem.
New York Times, 23 September 1966
"Text of Goldberg's Address"
United Nations, New York, Sept. 22nd

"U.S. Offers 'First Step'

"...United States is willing once again to take the first step. We are prepared to order a cessation of all bombing of North Vietnam -- the moment we are assured, privately or otherwise, that this step will be answered promptly by a corresponding and appropriate de-escalation on the other side. We therefore urge before this Assembly that the Government in Hanoi be asked the following question, to which we would be prepared to receive either a private or a public response:

"Would it, in the interest of peace, and in response to a prior cessation by the United States of the bombing in North Vietnam, take corresponding and timely steps to reduce or bring to an end its own military activities against South Vietnam?

"Another obstacle is said to be North Vietnam's conviction or fear that the United States intends to establish a permanent military presence in Vietnam. There is no basis for such a fear. The United States stands ready to withdraw its forces as other withdraw theirs so that peace can be restored in South Vietnam, and favors international machinery -- either of the United Nations or other machinery -- to insure effective supervision of the withdrawal. We therefore urge that Hanoi be asked the following question also:

"Would North Vietnam be willing to agree to a time schedule for supervised, phased withdrawal from South Vietnam of all external forces -- those of North Vietnam as well as those from the United States and other countries aiding South Vietnam?

"A further obstacle is said to be disagreement over the place of the Vietcong in the negotiations. Some argue that, regardless of different views on who controls the Vietcong, it is a combatant force and, as such, should take part in the negotiations."
"Some time ago our view on this matter was stated by President Johnson, who made clear that, as far as we are concerned, this question would not be 'an insurmountable problem.' We therefore invite the authorities in Hanoi to consider whether this obstacle to negotiation may not be more imaginary than real."

October 5, 1966

When D'Orlandi tells Lewandowski he plans to return to Rome shortly, the latter protests, "You must not leave; there will be much to do after the 15th of November."

Saigon 7712 (to SecState), S/Nodis, 5 October 1966

"1. On Tuesday, October 4, at the Apostolic Delegation's reception, D'Orlandi said to Lewandowski that he intended to say to Fanfani that there was no longer any reason for him to stay on in Saigon at the expense of damage to his health when there was absolutely nothing to do.

"2. According to D'Orlandi, Lewandowski said with great emphasis and earnestness, 'You must not leave; there will be much to do after the fifteenth of November.'"

October 14, 1966

Lewandowski probes D'Orlandi with respect to possible US-Chinese collusion, reporting that Chinese permission for Soviet flights to Vietnam have been withdrawn. He also raises the possibility of ousting Ky, though whether as part of the negotiating arrangements or part of their outcome is not clear.

Saigon 8567 (to Sec State), S/Nodis, 14 October 1966

"5. Lewandowski went on to say that he was worried about reports about the Chinese, particularly that the
'Americans are trying to feel out the Chinese.' He added: 'In such a case, we are cut.'

"6. He said there were 'added strains' between China and Russia and that, due to a recent Chinese decision, there are now 'no Russian flights going through China to Viet-Nam.'

"7. Lewandowski then, according to D'Orlandi, asked whether he thought 'Ky could be ousted.'

"8. D'Orlandi says he replies that he absolutely refused to 'haggle' and would not get into a situation in which they agreed to this in exchange for our agreeing to that. In any case, this was a matter which would 'take care of itself' in a few months when the new constitution goes into effect.'

****

LODGE

October 15, 1966

State inquires if Lewandowski had a particular reason for attaching importance to the date of November 15.

State 66655 (to AmEmbassy SAIGON), S/Nodis
15 October 1966
Ref: Saigon 7712

****

"2. D'Orlandi at next suitable occasion should ask Lewandowski if he had particular reason to attach importance to the date of November 15 after which according to him there would be 'much to do' (Para 2, Saigon 7712)."

RUSK

October 16, 1966

D'Orlandi, on probing from Lodge, indicates that Lewandowski reflects the views of Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap. Neither D'Orlandi nor Lewandowski can judge the relative influence of these...
men in the Hanoi power structure. D'Orlandi refuses to pick up the lead given by Goldberg's UN speech and help devise a bombing-infiltration formula that might be acceptable to Hanoi. He says Lewandowski is interested only in a total package, something "final," not de-escalation or even a "truce to allow conversation."

To illustrate the total package he suggests: internationally controlled elections after one or two years; a neutral government; US withdrawal "eventually"; a coalition government ("not a 'must'!").

In response to State's query, Lodge reports that Lewandowski plans to go to Hanoi shortly after the U.S. elections.

Saigon 8583 (to SecState), S/Nodis, 16 October 1966

"1. This is in reply to your 66655.

"2. On Saturday I asked D'Orlandi this question:

Does Lewandowski's strong position against what he calls any form of 'barter', i.e. 'We stop doing this and you stop doing that' reflect his own appraisal of Hanoi's position or is it based explicitly on what he has been told by North Vietnamese?

"3. D'Orlandi's reply: This question is not phrased so as to reflect the realities. Lewandowski's views reflect Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap who are the only two North Vietnamese with whom Lewandowski has been in contact. Are or are these not the real power in Hanoi? Lewandowski does not know. D'Orlandi believes you know more than we do about that.

"4. Question: Could Lewandowski envisage any variation on Goldberg's September 22nd bombing-infiltration formula which would be compatible both with the principle of reasonable reciprocity and with Hanoi's apparent determination to avoid actions which could be interpreted as bowing to U.S. pressure?

"5. Answer: D'Orlandi says: I don't think he would answer that question. It would be going back on what he has said he refused to do. He wants an over-all agreement -- not a truce which would allow conversations. He wants a 'package deal' which covers everything and which thereby avoids any chance of publicity. Hanoi will buy something that is 'final.'
"6. When I asked D'Orlandi what would be the elements of a package deal he said for illustration: after one or two years, elections internationally controlled; a Vietnamese Government which would abide by a policy of neutrality; the United States to leave 'eventually' (this word was stressed); a coalition government (which he said was not a 'must') which would contain representatives of so-called 'extremists' having nominal ministries. By 'extremists' he meant the Ky regime on the one hand and the Viet Cong on the other. D'Orlandi was sure there would never be an answer to the question 'what will you do if the bombing stops?' But a 'real package deal' would get 'very serious' consideration and it would get it 'immediately.'"

"8. As far as the question of your paragraph 2 is concerned I think it is answered effectively by Lewandowski's intention to go to Hanoi immediately after the U.S. elections. Lewandowski says he 'attaches special importance' to these elections. Even though he says he does not understand our national politics he knows that the fact that the elections have been held will 'clear the air, whatever the results may be.' It will mean that the electoral question will have been removed and he will know that the United States 'can deal if it wants to.'

"9. Comment: I find this interesting since it confirms the belief which you and I have had for a long time that they must at all costs avoid publicity and consequent loss of face. I think long drawn out peace talks are very dangerous for us. It appears now that they are convinced that long drawn out peace talks are utterly unacceptable for them. End comment."

October 25, 1966

The USG, SVN and Troop Contributing Countries propose settlement terms at the Manila Conference. These include an end to aggression; territorial integrity for SVN; reunification by free choice, resolution of internal differences in SVN through a program of national reconciliation; and removal of all allied military forces and installations no later than six months after "the military and subversive forces of North Vietnam are withdrawn, infiltration ceases, and the level of violence thus subsides." The settlement would be assured by international guarantees, particulars of which are open to negotiation.
The pivotal features of the proposal are that (1) the future of the insurgents is to be settled through the national reconciliation program; and (2) allied withdrawal is to come after law and order are restored. These provisions would not allow a coalition government in which the Communists or HLF participated as an organized entity.

New York Times, 26 October 1966
TEXTS OF COMMUNIQUE AND DECLARATIONS SIGNED AT CLOSE OF THE MANILA CONFERENCE

The Communiqué

...  

"27. So that their aspirations and position would be clear to their allies at Manila and friends everywhere, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam solemnly stated its views as to the essential elements of peace in Vietnam:

(i) Cessation of aggression. At issue in Vietnam is a struggle for the preservation of values which people everywhere have cherished since the dawn of history: the independence of peoples and the freedom of individuals. The people of South Vietnam ask only that the aggression that threatens their independence and the externally supported terror that threatens their freedom be halted. No self-respecting people can ask for less. No peace-loving nation should ask for more.

(ii) Preservation of the territorial integrity of South Vietnam. The people of South Vietnam are defending their own territory against those seeking to obtain by force and terror what they have been unable to accomplish by peaceful means. While sympathizing with the plight of their brothers in the North and while disdaining the regime in the North, the South Vietnamese people have no desire to threaten or harm the people of the North or invade their country.

(iii) Reunification of Vietnam. The Government and people of South Vietnam deplore the partition of Vietnam into North and South. But this partition brought about by the Geneva agreements in 1954, however unfortunate and regrettable, will be respected until, by the free choice of all Vietnamese, reunification is achieved.
(iv) Resolution of internal problems. The people of South Vietnam seek to resolve their own internal differences and to this end are prepared to engage in a program of national reconciliation. When the aggression has stopped, the people of South Vietnam will move more rapidly toward reconciliation of all elements in the society and will move forward, through the democratic process, toward human dignity, prosperity and lasting peace.

(v) Removal of allied military forces. The people of South Vietnam will ask their allies to remove their forces and evacuate their installations as the military and subversive forces of North Vietnam are withdrawn, infiltration ceases, and the level of violence thus subsides.

Effective guarantees. The people of South Vietnam, mindful of their experience since 1954, insist that any negotiations leading to the end of hostilities incorporate effective international guarantees. They are open-minded as to how such guarantees can be applied and made effective.

"28. The other participating governments reviewed and endorsed these as essential elements of peace and agreed they would act on this basis in close consultation among themselves in regard to settlement of the conflict.

"29. In particular, they declared that allied forces are in the Republic of Vietnam because that country is the object of aggression and its Government requested support in the resistance of its people to aggression. They shall be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. These forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled."

November 10, 1966

Rolling Thunder 52 is authorized. The targets include the Yen Vien Railroad Yard and the Van Dien Vehicle Depot near Hanoi, the Thai Nguyen Steel Plant, the Haiphong Cement Plant and two other targets near Haiphong.
TOP SECRET - NODIS

JCS 7735 (to CINCPAC), TS/LIMDIS, 10 November 1966
Refs: (a) JCS 6008
(b) JCS 5427

"1. (U) This is an execute message.

"2. (TS) Guidance governing ROLLING THUNDER 51 set forth in reference (a) remains in effect for ROLLING THUNDER 52, except for added targets and additional guidance contained in this directive.

"3. (TS) Effective upon receipt of this message, you are authorized to conduct air strikes against the following objectives in North Vietnam:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TGT #</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>BE NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>18.42 Xuan Mai Hwy Br</td>
<td>616-0244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>19 Yen Vien RR Clf Yard</td>
<td>616-0221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>51.1 Ha Gia POL Stor SSW (Former Phuc Yen POL Stor)</td>
<td>616-0662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>51.18 Can Thon POL Stor (Former Kep POL Stor)</td>
<td>616-1340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e.</td>
<td>63.11 Van Dien Vehicle Dpo (Note 2)</td>
<td>616-0696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>---- Kinh No SAM Stor</td>
<td>616-09314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g.</td>
<td>---- Hanoi SAM Stor NE</td>
<td>616-0257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h.</td>
<td>---- Haiphong SAM Assembly</td>
<td>616-02044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>76 Thai Nguyen Steel Plant (Areas G, K, All Rolling Stock) (Notes 1 and 3)</td>
<td>616-0214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j.</td>
<td>76 Thai Nguyen Steel Plant (Area Q) (Notes 1 and 3)</td>
<td>616-0214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k.</td>
<td>77.1 Haiphong Cement Plant (Note 3)</td>
<td>616-0706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l.</td>
<td>80 Haiphong TPP W (Note 3)</td>
<td>616-0007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m.</td>
<td>82.12 Haiphong TPP E (Note 3)</td>
<td>616-0051</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
November 11, 1966

Rolling Thunder 52 is amended to defer strikes against the Thai Nguyen Steel Plant and the three targets near Haiphong.

JCS 7783 (to CINCPAC), TS/IMDIS, 11 November 1966
Ref: JCS 7735

"1. (TS) Air strikes will be deferred repeat deferred (not canceled) against the following objectives in North Vietnam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TGT #</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>BE NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Thai Nguyen Steel Plant</td>
<td>616-0214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>Haiphong Cement Plant</td>
<td>616-0706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Haiphong TPP W</td>
<td>616-0007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82.12</td>
<td>Haiphong TPP E</td>
<td>616-0051</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

November 13, 1966

On the eve of a major visit by Lewandowski to Hanoi, State tries through Lodge to clarify Lewandowski's relationship to Hanoi and his own conception of his role. His concept of offering Hanoi a "final" settlement is challenged, on the grounds that it requires the US to modify its position before any indication of concessions from the other side. Another attempt at finding a de-escalatory formula is offered, the "Phase A-Phase B" package. (Under this concept, the US would suspend bombing as Phase A. After a while, mutual de-escalatory steps would be taken as Phase B. Thus all the reciprocity would appear to be contained in Phase B, even though the total de-escalation on each side over both phases would be matching.) This formula is offered by State as a way to save face for Hanoi while retaining reciprocity for a bombing suspension.

State 83786 (to Amembassy Saigon), TS/Nodis
13 November 1966
Ref: Saigon's 1074

"3. These are queries to be put to Lewandowski:

a. What role does he envisage for himself?
Is he, on the one hand, seeking merely to facilitate a
better understanding on each side of the other's position in order to pave way toward some kind of direct contact, and, if so, does he have reason to believe Hanoi will agree to such contact? Or, on the other hand, does he contemplate serving as an intermediary, conveying a series of proposals and counterproposals between two sides to try to achieve agreement on specific issues?

b. What does Hanoi consider to be his role? Has Hanoi entrusted specific messages to him and, if so, to whom were they to be conveyed?

c. As we understand it, Lewandowski wants an overall agreement and says Hanoi will buy something that is 'final,' he doesn't want a truce just to 'allow conversations.' How does he propose to get from here to there? How would he envisage overcoming our considerable reluctance to modify our position on one point or another without having any indication of what if any helpful response this would evoke from Hanoi?

d. We understand that considerations of face inevitably play a role in Hanoi's thinking. Does this perhaps explain, in Lewandowski's view, why we are unable to get any meaningful response to the question 'what would happen if the bombing of NVN stopped?' Does Lewandowski see any way around this? Could some package deal be worked out which in its totality represented what both we and Hanoi would agree to as a reasonable measure of mutual de-escalation, but which would have two separate phases in its execution. Phase A would be a bombing suspension, while Phase B, which would follow after some adequate period, would see the execution of all the other agreed de-escalatory actions. Hanoi's actions taken in Phase B would appear to be in response to our actions in Phase B rather than to the bombing suspension.

"4. Lewandowski should understand that none of the foregoing represents a position which he is authorized to put to Hanoi on our behalf. We will review his replies to our questions and will then wish to determine what we wish to propose concerning his forthcoming visit to Hanoi."
November 14-15, 1966

Lewandowski answers State's queries: His role is part broker, part interlocutor. If he can narrow differences between the two sides sufficiently, they would wish to talk directly with each other and he would step out completely. He evades as "theoretical" the difficulties in his "final" settlement concept and chooses to interpret the Phase A - Phase B proposal as a US recognition that "you can't trade the bombing suspension for something else." He expects the package deal to begin its evolution without a bombing suspension, but with an end to the bombing fitting somewhere in the evolutionary process.

He too has questions to pose:

1. Does the Manila offer mean US troop withdrawal depends on GVN control of areas not now under Saigon control?

ii. In case of a cease-fire, would the US withdraw from combat areas and not interfere in the creation of a new government in Vietnam?

iii. In case of a cease-fire, would the US not interfere in peaceful reunification, whether brought about by referendum or election?

iv. In the case of a cease-fire and negotiations, would the US publicly declare its willingness to use the Geneva machinery and ICC to bring peace to Vietnam?

State's replies are carefully worded and not fully responsive to Lewandowski's probing:

i. The Manila formulation speaks for itself. It offers a "definite withdrawal period" as a basis for negotiations which could include the mechanics of phased withdrawal.

ii. We support the presently emerging constitutional process in SVN and would abide by the results of free elections.

iii. We would accept peaceful, freely chosen reunification, a pre-requisite for which is the restoration of peace and order in SVN.

iv. The 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements are an adequate basis for peace in SE Asia, but developments since 1954 suggest better machinery may be needed.

State reiterates that the route to a final settlement must begin with de-escalation and asks again what Hanoi would do if we stopped bombing.

The meaning of this exchange is not very clear. Lewandowski seems to be asking if we would accept procedures (troop withdrawal, international inspection, etc.) that would allow changes in the SVN...
government favorable to the communists. We seem to reply negatively.

Secondly, Lewandowski, by ostensibly putting the bombing question aside until more of the total package emerges, may be willing to accept our attack on the North as a pressure on Hanoi for compromising other issues. State, by attempting to address bombing as an identifiable issue, may be aggravating Hanoi's problem of face. The difficulty from State's point of view, of course, is knowing what, if any, concessions Hanoi is making on other issues as the total package is built up. Having Lewandowski, a Communist, as middleman aggravates this problem.

Saigon 10856 (to SecState), TS/Nodis, 14 November 1966

"1. I met Lewandowski at D'Orlandi's apartment at 3:00 p.m. Saigon time.

"2. ...on the eve of his visit to Hanoi.... He had four questions, as follows:

   a. 'Regarding the offer at Manila concerning the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Viet-Nam on the condition that the troops of North Viet-Nam would withdraw (and, he said, North Viet-Nam, of course, doesn't admit that they are there at all), does this condition mean the United States withdrawal depends on control by the present South Vietnamese Government of territories not now under the control of Saigon?

   b. 'In case of a cease-fire, would the United States be prepared to withdraw from the combat areas and not to interfere in the creation of a new government in Viet-Nam? The question of how the new government of Viet-Nam will be formed will certainly arise.

   c. 'In case of a cease-fire, would the United States undertake not to interfere in peaceful progress toward unification of Viet-Nam if the people so wish, whether by referendum or by election?

   d. 'In the case of a cease-fire and negotiations, would the United States be ready to use the Geneva Agreement and the machinery of the International Commission in bringing peace to Viet-Nam, and if so, would the United States publicly declare its intention to this effect?'

"3. I said that there were questions which I would have to refer to the U.S. Government, and that I would do so and provide answers as soon as I could.
"4. I then said I had some questions to ask, and I asked him the four sets of questions listed in your State 83786....

..."

"5. Without any prodding at all from me or D'Orlandi, he said well, some of your questions cannot be answered now. As to your Question No. 1, my present role is in accord with the instructions of my government who would be prepared for me to take any role which would bring peace nearer. The two roles set forth in your question, that is, on the one hand, to work to facilitate a better understanding and pave the way to contact or, on the other, to be an intermediary, do not exclude each other. In fact, they could be done together. If the ideas which can be developed are not too far apart, then there can be talks, and if the ideas then start separating, both sides can withdraw. On the other hand, if I am successful in bringing the two sides together and they agree on something together, I can withdraw feeling that I have achieved something useful.

"7. As to the second question, Lewandowski said 'you have worked in Southeast Asia and you realize that diplomacy in Viet-Nam is different than what it is in Europe or the United States. Clear-cut answers are very difficult to get, one has to be very patient and look for indirect symptoms.' He was not, he said, an agent of the Hanoi Government, but 'if and when they decide they want you to know something,' he said, 'they would tell me. Of this I am confident. Each time I go, the Prime Minister asks me about Americans and what the Americans think.'

"8. 'On your third question, it is a frame without a picture, it is very theoretical.'

"9. 'As to the fourth question, it recognizes that you can't trade bombing suspension for something else. The question of bombing suspension in the first instance could be discussed informally. But if well founded hopes developed for reaching some agreement, then the bombing suspension could be brought in in the second phase.'

"10. D'Orlandi remarked that in the beginning of our talks, Lewandowski had agreed that the bombing suspension would not be a precondition.
"11. Lewandowski said, 'Yes, there must be positive steps -- not speeches or declarations. A package deal is not only the most practical way of going at it; it is the only one. The A and B in your fourth question are the beginnings of the alphabet. It might be quite useful. We must go right through to Z, including everything that needs to be in the package deal.'"

LODGE

State 84238 (to Embassy Saigon), TS/Nodis, 14 November 1966
Ref: (a) Saigon's 10856
(b) State 83786

"4. ...while we remain intent on finding a path to a reasonable and honorable settlement, we are not prepared to withdraw and find that armed subversive elements from the North have moved in again. We are serious in expressing our willingness to remove our troops, to dismantle our bases, and accept a non-aligned South Viet-Nam so long as it is genuinely non-aligned. We do not regard the genuine neutrality of South Viet-Nam as opposed to our interests. With respect to our efforts to find an approach toward reciprocal actions of de-escalation, we are aware that Hanoi must assign weight to considerations of face, and we have said that so long as we were certain that the elements from the North were removed, we would not insist on any acknowledgement that these forces had ever been in the South.

"5. In addition to the foregoing, we have the following specific comments on Lewandowski's four questions:

A. The Manila formulation on withdrawal was considered and worded with the greatest care. It was included in the communiqué in the light of specific indications from Eastern European sources that such a mention of a definite withdrawal period would help in establishing an acceptable basis for negotiations. The mechanics of a phased withdrawal would probably have to be a matter for negotiation although the initial de-escalatory steps might be taken by mutual example."
B. We have often said that we supported free elections in South Viet-Nam to give the South Vietnamese people a government of their own choice. We are prepared to abide by the genuine manifestation of that free choice. We support the emerging constitutional process in South Viet-Nam. The orderly formation of a responsive and representative government based on free elections will receive our support.

C. We are on record that the question of the reunification of Viet-Nam should be determined by the Vietnamese of both North and South through their own free decision, without any interference from outside. How soon that can take place depends on a number of factors, above all the restoration of peace and order in South Viet-Nam so that South Viet-Nam will be in a position to treat freely with NVN on this matter.

D. We have already declared our view that the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements are an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia. Since 1954 there have been many developments which have revealed sharply the need for an effective and truly neutral mechanism of supervision and control. We would be prepared to discuss all matters bearing upon this complicated problem.

"E. We would also observe that what Lewandowski terms our 'theoretical' third question of how we get from here to there bears most directly upon his proposal for a 'package deal' including, as he put it, not only A and B but all the other letters of the alphabet. These range all the way from the reciprocal measures of de-escalation to the components of a final settlement. The immediate issue is to find out precisely and concretely even if quite privately what steps Hanoi would take if we stopped bombing...."

KATZENBACH

Saigon 10955 (to SecState), TS/Nodis, 15 November 1966

"2. When we three met, I read him slowly the full text of your 84238. Then I read it a second time. Both D’Orlando and Lewandowski took very careful notes and were at great pains to get everything exactly right. My reference to Item 3.D. of your 83786 was not lost on
Lewandowski. Comment: I am beginning to wonder if this is not becoming the crux of the matter. End Comment.

LODGE

November 16-20, 1966

A separate attempt to elicit a response to the Phase A - Phase B formulation is made by passing it to the Russians via George Brown during his visit to Moscow. They indicate interest, provided that the DRV's 4 points and the NLF's 5 points are accepted as a "basis for discussion" in the negotiations that follow. Brown is not informed of the Lewandowski contact, and it does not come up during his talks in Moscow.

State 86196 (to Ambassy London), S/Modis,
16 November 1966
Please pass following message from Secretary to FonSec Brown

"...Dear George: Your forthcoming visit to Moscow is obviously of the greatest importance in sounding out the Soviets on the possibilities of action toward peace in Viet-nam...."

"As one way of saving Hanoi's face, you may wish to explore on your own initiative the possibility of a package deal which in its totality represented what both we and Hanoi would agree to as a reasonable measure of mutual de-escalation, but which would have two separate phases in its execution. Phase A would be a bombing suspension, while Phase B, which would follow, would see the execution of all the other agreed de-escalatory actions. Hanoi's actions taken in Phase B might appear to them to be in response to our actions in Phase A rather than to the bombing suspension. Obviously, Hanoi cannot have the bombing suspension without also accepting Phase B. We would, of course, like to hear Moscow or Hanoi's reaction to this admittedly general proposition before we make any specific commitments."

RUSK
State 91787 (to Embassy London), S/Node, 20 November 1966
 Eyes Only for Ambassador from Secretary

"1. Following text message to me from George Brown delivered by UK Embassy here....

"On the first day I tried hard to get Gromyko to lay off his gramophone record and get down to the question of the three issues (paragraph 10 of your message). However, he gave no ground but his interest was sufficiently intent to encourage me to give him an outline of the package (paragraph 14 of your message). This I did orally before dinner on the first evening, giving it to him as my own proposal. Next morning, purely for the sake of clarity, I gave him a piece of paper. The actual words used are enclosed. He was pretty suspicious but promised to pass it on to Kosygin only.

"It was on the basis of this piece of paper that I talked with Kosygin this morning.... On his side after a lot of the usual stuff, pretty muted, about American aggression, he said that they were prepared to make the North Vietnamese four points and the NLF five points 'a basis for discussion.' When I said that I had interpreted a basis of discussion as meaning that they would be flexible neither he nor Mr. Gromyko contradicted me. Their package would seem to be an unconditional stopping of the bombing, some de-escalation in the South and then negotiations on the basis as above...."

RUSK

November 30-December 1, 1966

Lewandowski returns from Hanoi. He has formulated 10 points to reflect the US position with respect to an overall solution of the Vietnam war. There is sufficient interest in Hanoi, he says, that the U.S. should, if the formulation is acceptable, confirm it directly to the DRV Ambassador in Warsaw. He urges speed to guard against a leak or sabotage by those "working against a solution." His source in Hanoi, he says, is Pham Van Dong, who has the "Presidium behind him."

Most of Lewandowski's 10 points reiterate familiar US positions. His principal innovation is US acceptance that "the present status quo in SVN must be changed in order to take into account the interests of
the parties presently opposing the policy of the U.S. in SVN." He does not include the Phase A - Phase B formula for de-escalation, but states that the US would stop bombing to facilitate a peaceful solution, would "accept DRV modalities on the cessation," and would not require the DRV to admit infiltration into SVN. Lodge believes, however, that he did give his presentation in Hanoi in accord with the full Phase A - Phase B formulation.

Lodge refers the 10 points to Washington, to see if they are an acceptable representation of the US position. He points out two difficulties himself, however: the phrase "status quo in SVN must change" would be more acceptable if it read "status quo in SVN would change"; and the terms for de-escalation are poorly expressed.

Saigon 12247, TS/Nodis, 30 November 1966

"Lewandowski summarized the 10 points to Lodge as follows:

(1) The U.S. is interested in a peaceful solution through negotiations.

(2) Negotiations should not be interpreted as a way to negotiated surrender by those opposing the U.S. in Vietnam. A political negotiation would be aimed at finding an acceptable solution to all the problems, having in mind that the present status quo in SVN must be changed in order to take into account the interests of the parties presently opposing the policy of the U.S. in South Vietnam.

(3) The U.S. does not desire a permanent or a long-term military presence in SVN.

(4) The U.S. is willing to discuss all problems with respect to the settlement.

(5) The U.S. is willing to accept the participation of 'all' in elections and the supervision of these elections by an appropriate international body.

(6) The U.S. believes that reunification should be settled by the Vietnamese themselves after peace and proper representative organs are established in SVN.

(7) The U.S. is prepared to abide by a neutral South Vietnam.
(8) The U.S. is prepared to stop bombing 'if this will facilitate such a peaceful solution.' In this regard the U.S. is prepared to accept DRV modalities on the cessation and not require the DRV to admit infiltration into SVN.

(9) The U.S. will not agree to 'reunification under military pressure.'

(10) The U.S. 'will not declare now or in the future its acceptance of North Vietnam's 4 or 5 points.'

"Lewandowski asked if these 10 points were a proper formulation of the U.S. position. Lodge said that they seemed to be in order, but that the matter was of such sensitivity and importance that he would have to refer the points back to Washington for approval. Lodge added, however, that he saw two difficulties right off. First, he suggested changing Point 2 to read 'would' instead of 'must.' Second, he questioned the phraseology in Point 8 -- 'if this would facilitate such a peaceful solution.'

"Lewandowski insisted that his statement was a serious proposition based on conversations with the 'most respectable government sources in Hanoi.' Later Lewandowski admitted that Pham Van Dong was the source and that he had the 'Presidium behind him.'

"Lewandowski stated: 'I am authorized to say that if the U.S. are really of the views which I have presented, it would be advisable to confirm them directly by conversation with the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw.'

"Lewandowski said that there was a vital need to move quickly because (1) there was a danger of a leak and that secrecy was essential for Hanoi; and (2) that delays would give those 'working against a solution' time to 'put down the clamps on talks.'"

State 94660 (to Ambassador Saigon), TS/Nodis
1 December 1966

",(5) Do we interpret your comment at the end of para D-3 correctly to mean that Lewandowski presented our phasing formulation fully and accurately?"
Saigon 12323 (to SecState), TS/Nodis, 1 December 1966
Ref: State 94660

"5. Your para 5. Lewandowski did not repeat not present your phasing formulation 'fully and accurately' in his conversation with me. He merely cited 'your Phase A and Phase B,' with clear implication that HS (Sic) had given his presentation in Hanoi in accordance with your formulation."

LODGE

December 2, 1966

Airstrikes are run against the Van Dien Vehicle Depot and the Ha Gia POL Storage Facility 6.7 and 16 nautical miles, respectively, from the center of Hanoi.

December 3, 1966

(NB. DOD files do not contain Washington-Saigon or Washington-Warsaw traffic on Marigold for December 2-4. What follows is derived from later cables.)

On instructions from State, Lodge meets Lewandowski again to state that:

i. The U.S. Embassy in Warsaw will contact the DRV Embassy on December 6 or soon thereafter;

ii. Lewandowski's 10 points broadly reflect the US position; but

iii. "Several specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation."

Lewandowski, in turn, expresses concern about US bombing of Hanoi, acting on instructions from Rapacki. (Saigon 12428)

December 4, 1966

Airstrikes are run against the Yen Vien Railroad Yard and the Ha Gia POL Storage Facility, 5.5 and 16 nautical miles, respectively, from the center of Hanoi.
December 5, 1966

Grounowski is summoned by the Foreign Minister in Warsaw and given a Polish recapitulation of Marigold. According to Rapacki's account of the December 1 meeting in Saigon, Polish support for a US-DRV contact in Warsaw was extended "after Lodge confirmed Lewandowski's resume." Thus Lodge's December 3 statement about "important differences of interpretation" appears as a revision of earlier US acceptance.

Rapacki argues that the US reservations about interpretation are so broadly stated as to put the whole basis for the contact in doubt. Also, coming "after all the conversations which were held," the statement might undermine the role of Poland as intermediary. He urges instead that it be replaced by a statement defining the differences of interpretation the USG has in mind and asks Grounowski to take this up with the President.

He also refers to the "intensification of bombing near Hanoi subsequent to the Lodge-Lewandowski conversations" as likely to create doubts on the DRV side.

It is hard to know precisely what has happened in Polish-DRV communications at this point. Rapacki's account suggests that the Poles told Hanoi they had US approval of Lewandowski's 10 points after the December 1 meeting. If so, the events of December 3 (the air strikes near Hanoi and the "differences of interpretation") might well have been viewed in Hanoi as casting doubt on Polish reliability, on the sincerity of US interest in negotiations, or both. Alternatively, Rapacki may simply have been trying to extract additional concessions or statements of position from the Americans, using these developments for leverage.

Warsaw 1363 (to SecState), 5 December 1966
For the President and Secretary

"1. I was called to FormMin 11:30 a.m. Dec 5 by Dirgen Michalowski who, after determining that I knew what meeting was about, took me in to see FormMin Rapacki."

....

"4. Rapacki continued that on Dec 1, after return of Lewandowski from Hanoi, Lewandowski had third meeting with Lodge in which he gave a resume of USG position as he had understood it from the two previous conversations. After Lodge confirmed Lewandowski's resume, Lewandowski said contact of USG and North Vietnamese Ambassadors in Warsaw would have support of Poles."
"5. Continuing his account of prior events, Rapacki said that on the afternoon of Dec 3, at a fourth meeting between Lodge and Lewandowski, Lodge, on the basis of the President's instructions, read a statement as follows:

A. The President will instruct the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw to contact the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw on Dec 6 or as soon as possible thereafter.

B. The U.S. Embassy in Warsaw will be in a position on Dec 6 to confirm to the North Vietnamese Ambassador that the Lewandowski Dec 1 resume of the Lodge-Lewandowski conversations broadly reflects the position of the USG.

C. "We must add that several specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation."

"6. Rapacki said that Lodge was unable at the Dec 3 meeting to precisely say which points were subject to differences of interpretation and what the nature of these differences of interpretation might be.

"7. Rapacki then stated that question of interpretation put in doubt whole basis on which contact with North Vietnamese Ambassador in Warsaw was to have taken place. He expressed grave concern as to how equivocation will be read by Hanoi. He added that Poles must transmit USG position to NVN Govt.; and that rather than a general reference to differences of interpretation it would be better if position transmitted contained statement defining differences of interpretation we have in mind. He said such a statement might have a significant effect on Hanoi's attitude toward both a meeting in Warsaw and the whole problem.

"8. Rapacki then asked what can be the position of Poland in its role as intermediary if after all the conversations which were held and statements made there still remains this doubt? He asked again how this reservation will be read by Hanoi, particularly with intensification of bombing near Hanoi subsequent to the Lodge-Lewandowski conversations? He said these questions had already been raised by Lewandowski during his Dec 3 conversation with Lodge."
"12. Rapacki asked that I transmit to the President the Poles deep concern caused by modification of USG position which has been signaled by the Dec 3 declaration of Mr. Lodge and his hope that para on differences of interpretation can be deleted on grounds that it was based on misunderstandings which have since been clarified."

****

GRONOUSKI

December 5, 1966

Gronouski is instructed to stick with the reservation as worded on the grounds that we might be charged with bad faith if we did not make clear the wide latitude for interpretation of the general language used by Lewandowski.

State 97016 (to Amembassy Warsaw), Nodis, 5 December 1966
Ambassador Eyes Only TOSEC 14 Secretary Eyes Only
Ref: Your 1363

".... We might expose ourselves to charges of bad faith in any subsequent negotiations if we did not make clear that there is a wide latitude for interpretation of the general language used by Lewandowski.

"Lewandowski's formulation broadly reflects the position of the US Government on the issues covered and we would be prepared to accept it as the basis for direct discussions with the North Vietnamese if they are in fact interested in pursuing the matter, and if they were informed that latitude for interpretation of such general language is inevitable."

****

December 6, 1966

Gronouski carries out his instructions and is told by Rapacki that the US statement will now be transmitted to Hanoi.

Rapacki says that the DRV expects to receive at the first Warsaw meeting the precise and official position of the USG in order that it can express its position at an appropriate time. He apparently
understands Lodge to have indicated that such a package proposal would be forthcoming.

Gronouski replies that he had anticipated a more limited scope for the first meeting—confirming Lewandowski's formulation, dealing with matters such as time and place, etc. He refers the matter to Washington.

Meanwhile, Lewandowski makes many of the same points to Lodge in Saigon. He adds that the "Warsaw contact was shadowed by the bombing of Hanoi" and asks the US to "avoid adding to the difficulties."

Warsaw 1375 (to SecState), T3/Nodis, 6 December 1966
Ref: State 97016

"1. Met with FonMin Rapacki 1300 hours Dec 6 and conveyed material in ref tel."

....

"5. Rapacki said that he understood Lodge to have done the following:

A. Presented official USG position or principles for peaceful solution;

B. Stated that a new package deal of USG proposals would be forthcoming;

C. Expressed willingness of USG to discuss four points and any other points raised by other side. (FYI: This summary was apropos of nothing. It was simply interjected in the conversation.)

"6. After repeating his view that proposal for meeting in Warsaw was a significant NVM response, he said Poles must reserve judgment until they can study situation further to determine whether USG had actually made step forward. He expressed the opinion that what had transpired between Lodge and Lewandowski prior to latter's trip to Hanoi did represent step forward but the qualifications made by Lodge on Dec 3 cast doubt on this judgment."

....

"9. Rapacki said that at any rate they cannot delay any longer in transmitting information to Hanoi."
He added that the original position of Lodge is known to Hanoi, and it remains a question as to how the qualification of Dec 3 will be interpreted by sensitive elements in the NVN Govt. Rapacki said that information transmitted to NVN will reflect the material presented to him today, but Poles must also express their own doubts and misgivings over the question of interpretation raised by Lodge.

"10. Rapacki then turned to the substance of the first Warsaw meeting with NVN Ambassador 'in the event it takes place.' He said it is his understanding that during that meeting we will present to the NVN side the position of USG in order that the NVN Govt can express his position at an appropriate time on the attitude of the USG and on subsequent modes of procedure. He said the NVN Govt. expects to receive at the first Warsaw meeting the precise and official position of the USG and he assumes (with a smile) that it will not be different than the one presented to Lewandowski. He said he presumed I already have locked in my safe such a statement which will be able to identify the specific points on which there is wide latitude for interpretation. (FYI: Rapacki read from a Dec 3 statement given to Lewandowski by Lodge when making his reference to specific points.) He said he hoped at that meeting we will be able to discuss differences in interpretation (adding that he still was looking for an answer to the question 'differences with whom' inasmuch as the NVN Govt. has not yet presented their interpretation.)

"11. I said that I had presumed that the first meeting would be more limited in scope. I expected that the first meeting would be primarily concerned with establishing that both sides were interested in beginning negotiations, and deal with such matters as time and place of negotiation session. I added that we would also expect at the first meeting to confirm Mr. Lewandowski's formulation of our position as broadly reflecting the position of the USG with the qualification regarding interpretation. I added, however, that I would inform Washington of his understanding of the nature of the first meeting."

GRONOWSKI
Saigon 12601 (to SecState), TS/Nodis, 6 December 1966

"1. Lewandowski asked to meet me at D'Orlandi's today. He began by saying that he had asked for the meeting because of a communication which he had received from Mr. Rapacki in Warsaw, which asked him:

"2. 'Please turn the attention of Ambassador Lodge to the fact that the formulation of the last paragraph of the statement of December Three may be understood as raising a question about the whole position embodied in the ten paragraphs and which was to form the platform for the Warsaw Meeting.'"

....

"5. Lewandowski then said, rather as an afterthought, that 'the overture of the Warsaw contact was shadowed by the bombing of Hanoi and we should therefore, avoid adding to the difficulties.'"

December 7, 1967

Gronowski is told that the USG position was conveyed to Hanoi the previous day, that the intensification of the bombing is raising suspicions in Warsaw as well as Hanoi, and that the DRV will be keenly disappointed if the first meeting does not include a direct statement of the USG position. The DRV "is not interested in what Lewandowski said."

With respect to the bombing problem, the Poles reject the explanations that the target list cannot be suddenly altered without alerting many people that something unusual is happening and that what appears as an intensification of bombing is in fact due to improved weather conditions. Rapacki says "policy is more important than weather," and we are urged not to bomb in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong.

Warsaw 1376 (to SecState), TS/Nodis, 7 December 1966
Ref: State 97016 and Warsaw 1375

....

"3. Michalowski said Rapacki had conveyed USG position to Hanoi shortly after my meeting with him Dec 6...."

....

"5. Michalowski said...that NVN Govt. and even some in Polish Govt. are suspicious that recently
stepped up bombing outside Hanoi is the work of some elements in USG who are trying to undercut President's peace move. He added that when this question was raised with Lodge the latter had replied that such raids are planned long in advance, and that a quick reversal would alert many people that something unusual was happening. Michalowski said that to many people this is an unconvincing answer, and expressed fervent hope that we can avoid future highly sensitive bombing raids in vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong... 

"6. Michalowski said he wanted to underscore Rapacki's insistence that at the first meeting with the NVN Ambassador in Warsaw we do more than confirm, with qualification, Lewandowski's resume of Lodge's ten points. He said the NVN Govt. is not interested in what Lewandowski said, but rather in hearing USG position directly from us. He stressed extreme importance of first meeting, and said the NVN Govt. will be keenly disappointed if its expectation of receiving direct statement of USG position at first meeting is not realized...."

GRONOWSKI

Warsaw 1376 (to SecState), TS/Nodis, 7 December 1966
Ref: Warsaw 1376

"1. FonMin Rapacki called me to his office at 1800 hours Dec 7 ...."

....

"3. Rapacki then said that Poland could not continue in its role unless it is convinced that we have or will put an end to this intensified bombing. He added that if Poland has been satisfied on this score, and if it so happens that contact in Warsaw between the USG and NVN Govt. will occur, then 'I avail myself of this opportunity to state' that it is necessary for the USG to recapitulate to the NVN Representative its whole position as described by Lodge with a degree of clarity so that the other side would no longer fear that the USG position as formulated might subsequently be changed through recourse to Lodge's 'important differences of interpretation' clause...."
"4. ...I said that if I recall correctly, there was a lull in bombing flights in late October and early November simply because of bad weather conditions, and what appears to him to be an intensification of bombing may simply be a resumption of bombing to its normal level.

"5. Rapacki responded that 'policy is more important than weather'....

"6. ...Bombing against the whole of NVN was intensified and also was more directed to Hanoi. This, he added, clearly appears to be provoking.'

GRONOUSKI

December 7, 1966

Gronouski's instructions for the first meeting are refined. He is to stick with Lewandowski's formulation, indicating its acceptability as a basis for negotiation even though subject to further elaboration and clarification as talks proceed. We do not wish to reformulate it ourselves because we would have to take harder positions than Lewandowski's if we were to be held to precise language and because any formulation attributable directly to us could be used to embarrass the GVN or our relations with them. Gronouski is therefore to avoid being drawn out on specifics, though for purposes of illustration he may point to the following:

i. In negotiating a bombing cessation (point 8), the Phase A - Phase B formula might be considered.

ii. Changes in the governmental status quo would have to be made in accordance with the desires of the people of SVN. Electoral procedures or other arrangements could be ascertained through consultations and negotiations there (points 2 and 5).

(The most contentious point, he is warned, is that calling for a change in status quo, as it could mean anything from putting the NLF into the government immediately to a simple endorsement of the election process under the Constitution then being drafted by the GVN. Gronouski is to resist discussing this altogether.)

He is to reassure the DRV that our reservation about "differences of interpretation" means only that complex matters are inevitably subject to clarification. For example, the phrase "long-term" in point 3 has been partially clarified by the 6 months provision of the Manila Communique.
We urge direct, secret discussion with the DRV as a matter of the highest importance and urgency. We hope that the Poles have no idea of participating and Gronowski is to avoid further substantive discussions with them if the DRV contact materializes.

State 97930 (Embassy Warsaw), TS/Nodis,
7 December 1966
Ref: Warsaw's 1375

"1. Your reference telegram will receive urgent consideration here tomorrow and you will receive further guidance from us then.

"2. In the meantime, you should take no further initiative with GOP.

"3. In the unlikely event that, before receiving further instructions, you should receive notice that NVN representative is ready and available for talks with us, we submit the following for your interim guidance.

"4. If such a meeting with NVN representative should occur, you should follow prior instructions. If desirable, you are then authorized to read rpt read to him Lewandowski's 10-point presentation of USG position as set forth at end of this cable, stressing that it is Lewandowski's formulation.

"5. You should then inquire whether points as presented by you are the same in all particulars as those passed on to Hanoi by Lewandowski.

"6. For your information only, one of our principal concerns about the ten points is set forth in the next following paragraph, but even if pressed you should avoid discussing the substantive problems relating to these points with the NVN representative at this stage and stress that such discussions should be the subject of actual negotiations. We would assume that NVN representative would have no authority on this first contact to do more than report your presentation to Hanoi so we would not anticipate such probing at this time. Further cable tomorrow will spell out our thinking in greater detail and may suggest initiative to be taken if you have heard nothing after additional lapse of time.
"7. Lewandowski's point two relating to change of present status quo in SVN is obviously most troublesome. This point could be interpreted variously to mean (a) NLF must be put into government of South Vietnam forthwith or (b) simple endorsement of election process under constitution now being drafted. If it is necessary to point out ambiguities in Lewandowski's statement, however, you should not refer to this point but allude to less contentious ambiguities elsewhere in statement.

"8. Lewandowski's ten point statement follows:

1. I have insisted that the United States is interested in a peaceful solution through negotiations.

2. Negotiations should not be interpreted as a way to negotiated surrender by those opposing the United States in Viet-Nam. A political negotiation would be aimed at finding an acceptable solution to all the problems, having in mind that the present status quo in South Viet-Nam would be changed in order to take into account the interests of the parties presently opposing the policy of the United States in South Viet-Nam, and that such a solution may be reached in an honorable and dignified way not detrimental to national pride and prestige. (FYI: Lewandowski's original presentation states status quo 'must' be changed but when Lodge questioned this point Lewandowski said he would be glad to change word from 'must' to 'would', END FYI).

3. That the United States are not interested from a point of view of its national interests in having a permanent or long term military _________ in South Viet-Nam once a peaceful solution to the _________ reached. That is why the offer made in Manila regarding the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the liquidation of American bases should be considered in all seriousness.

4. The United States would be ready, should other parties show a constructive interest in a negotiated settlement, to work out and to discuss with them proposals of such a settlement covering all important problems involved from a cease-fire to a final solution and withdrawal of U.S. troops.

5. That the United States, within a general solution, would not oppose the formation of a South Vietnamese Government based on the true will of the Vietnamese people with participation of all through free democratic elections, and that the United States would
be prepared to accept the necessary control machinery to secure the democratic and free character of such elections and to respect the results of such elections.

6. The United States held the view that unification of Viet-Nam must be decided by the Vietnamese themselves for which the restoration of peace and the formation of proper representative organs of the people in South Viet-Nam is a necessary condition.

7. The United States are ready to accept and respect a true and complete neutrality of South Viet-Nam.

8. The United States are prepared to stop the bombing of the territory of North Viet-Nam if this will facilitate such a peaceful solution. In doing so, the United States are ready to avoid any appearance that North Viet-Nam is forced to negotiate by bombings or that North Viet-Nam have negotiated in exchange for cessation of bombing. Stopping of bombings would not involve recognition or confirmation by North Viet-Nam that its armed forces are or were infiltrating into South Viet-Nam.

"At this point you should interrupt recitation of Lewandowski's points and state as follows: QUOTE Mr. Lewandowski clearly implied to Ambassador Lodge that in Hanoi he had given his presentation in connection with the point on the bombing of North Viet-Nam in accordance with Ambassador Lodge's earlier formulation, which was as follows: A package could be worked out which in its totality represented what both the United States and North Viet-Nam would agree to as a reasonable measure of de-escalation, but which would have two separate phases in its execution. Phase A would be a bombing suspension, while Phase B, which would follow after some adequate period, would see the execution of all the other agreed de-escalatory actions. North Viet-Nam's actions taken in Phase B would appear to be in response to United States actions in Phase B rather than to the bombing suspension, END QUOTE. You should then resume the recitation of the ten points.

9. I have informed the proper governmental sources that at the same time, the United States, while not excluding the unification of Viet-Nam, would not agree to unification under military pressure.

10. While the United States are seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict, it would be unrealistic to expect that the United States will declare
now or in the future its acceptance of North Viet-Nam's four or five points."

"9. If NVN representative probes further on cessation of bombing, you should merely state that as you have already indicated Mr. Lewandowski has suggested a possible procedure for agreeing on phasing and timing which could be the subject of later discussions."

KATZENBACH

State 98754 (to Ambassador Warsaw), TS/Nodis
7 December 1966
Ref: State 97930

"1. If a meeting with the North Vietnamese is arranged, you should proceed in accordance with instructions contained in State 96235 and State 95711 except as modified below. As regards the presentation to the North Vietnamese representative of our position, you should follow closely the following formulation:

'a. Lewandowski has informed us of his discussions with your government in Hanoi and of the position he communicated to them as that of the U.S., based on Lewandowski's prior oral discussions with Ambassador Lodge in Saigon. We assume that his discussions in Hanoi were conducted entirely orally as they were with Lodge in Saigon and that no pieces of paper have been exchanged which purport to state governmental positions. We are prepared to enter into direct discussions with your government on the basis of the position which Lewandowski has informed us he presented to your government in Hanoi.

'b. The position was stated to us by Lewandowski as follows: (Here you should read the ten points as contained in State 97930, para 8 with the additional point about bombing covered under Point 8).

'c. We wish to emphasize that this language is that of Lewandowski and not that of the United States. Nevertheless it presents a general statement of the US position on the basis of which we would be prepared to enter into direct discussions."
"2. FYI The North Vietnamese and perhaps the Poles as well appear to be seeking a reformulation of our position in order to compare it with what Lewandowski has said. While we are entirely prepared to have Lewandowski's formulation stand as 'presenting a general statement of the US position,' we are anxious to avoid a restatement of our position in our own words because (a) this would oblige us to take some harder positions than those put forward by Lewandowski which apparently have gone far enough to make the North Vietnamese ready to consider talking with us and (b) any formulation which can be attributed directly to us could be used to embarrass the GVN or to embarrass us in our relations with them. In other words, if we stand on Lewandowski's formulation through the first step in discussions with the North Vietnamese, we can always say with regard to any specific point that we don't accept just those words used by Lewandowski and thus maintain some room for maneuver at least until we know the discussions are really under way. END FYI.

"3. After reading the ten points you should point out to the North Vietnamese that some matters, because of their complexity and the danger of varying interpretation, would be the subject of further elaboration by us as soon as discussions were to get under way. One of these has to do with the package agreement containing the so-called phases A and B with respect to bombing and a program of de-escalation. The second relates to certain points which directly involve matters of basic concern to the people of South Viet-Nam (as for example points 2 and 5). Whatever detailed arrangements are made on those matters would have to be acceptable to the South Vietnamese people; however, this could be ascertained through consultations and negotiations there.

"4. If the North Vietnamese refer to the earlier point made by us that several specific points are subject to important differences of interpretation, you should explain that this is not intended to suggest that the statement as it stands is any less a general statement of the U.S. position but rather that it is inevitable with matters as complex and controversial as those covered in the ten points that they would be subject to interpretation and that their clarification would be the normal function of the discussions which we hope we will be embarking on. If the North Vietnamese press for an illustration you might refer to the phrase 'long-term' in Point 3, noting that it was specifically to clarify this point that the Manila Communiqué specified a six-month period.
"5. Otherwise you should be guided in your discussion with the North Vietnamese by the limitation set forth in para 6 of State 97930, stressing that further discussion of substantive questions should be the subject of the actual direct negotiations which we hope can be got under way promptly.

"6. In conclusion you should say that your government is prepared to enter into secret discussions with the North Vietnamese Government at any time and we regard this as a matter of the highest importance and urgency.

"7. We understand from your latest reports that the next step, if all goes well, will be the opening of the direct discussions with the North Vietnamese and if this in fact materializes you should avoid any further substantive discussions with the Poles. We, of course, are anxious for direct and private discussions with the North Vietnamese and hope that the Poles have no idea of participating therein."

KATZENBACH

December 8, 1966

Rusk and Katzenbach reiterate our willingness to consider a bombing cessation or other de-escalatory measures on terms previously indicated, but not as a precondition for talks. If Rapacki threatens to interrupt the contact over this issue, he is to be warned the responsibility for the breakdown will be his.

State 98924 (to Ambassador Warsaw), TS/Nodis, 8 December 1966
For Ambassador Gronowski from Katzenbach

"1. In response to Rapacki's statements reported in your 1394...you should remind Rapacki that the subject of bombing was one of the matters discussed in Hanoi by Lewandowski and that we are prepared to pursue this matter with the North Vietnamese in the same terms which we affirmed to him. You should read reference on package contained in paragraph 8 of Lewandowski's 10 points (State 97930) to remind him of Lewandowski's statement to Lodge. You should underline that inherent in this formulation is the package approach to de-escalation.

State 98924 (to Ambassador Warsaw), TS/Nodis, 8 December 1966
For Ambassador Gronowski from Katzenbach
"2. If Rapacki attempt to nail us to anything on bombing beyond our first contact with the North Vietnamese, or again threatens to break off the operation, you should inform him in no uncertain terms that if he maintains this position he will have to accept the full responsibility for the breakdown of what appears to us to be a promising possibility for peace."

KATZENBACH

Taipei 1072 (to SecState), TS/Nodis,
8 December 1966
Ref: TOSEC 65
FOR the Acting Secretary from the Secretary

"... I do not believe we should be drawn into commitments about our own military operations without some indication from the other side as to what they are going to do about their military operations. Nevertheless, we should be ready to discuss this problem alongside or before a broader discussion of political matters."


December 8-9, 1966

Rapacki protests the "differences of interpretation" clause and the bombing of Hanoi in a strong demarche to Fanfani and, through Lewandowski, to D'Orlandi and hence Lodge in Saigon. Hanoi cannot be expected to enter discussions in the face of such "escalation." Fanfani on the one hand urges Rapacki to go ahead and arrange the contact in Warsaw, on the other instructs D'Orlandi to convey the message to Rusk (then in Saigon) and to seek a reply.

At their meeting on December 8, D'Orlandi tells Lewandowski that no contact has yet taken place because of Rapacki's apparent refusal to convey the US message to Hanoi. He is apparently unaware that the message was passed December 6.

On December 9, Rusk asks D'Orlandi to tell Lewandowski and Fanfani that we are in direct touch with Rapacki on both points. He adds that bombing can be the first topic for discussion, if this is of especial concern to Hanoi.
D’Orlandi gives the following as views of Lewandowski:

i. Clarifications prerequisite to the Warsaw contact should occur in Saigon, with a Lewandowski visit to Hanoi immediately possible if needed. Thus D’Orlandi surmises that Rapacki’s taking over this phase may be an effort “to be clever and get the U.S. to withdraw "all reservations" before the contact is made.

ii. De-escalation is a difficult topic to start on. It is more promising to look for a final package. This might be a cabinet of 14 positions, 2 each for the Ky Group and the NLF, the remaining 10 for "neutrals or whatever." (This is the formula proposed by Lewandowski September 18.)

iii. During November 16-30, when Lewandowski was in Hanoi, bombing appeared to be at a reduced level at least in the Hanoi area. This was interpreted in Hanoi as a tacit signal of US support for Lewandowski’s mission. (NB. In fact, these were the first two weeks of RT 52. Presumably, weather accounts for the lack of action against targets near Hanoi.)

Rusk stresses to D’Orlandi several times that the USG is indicating its position with no reciprocity from Hanoi or even assurance of how Lewandowski has presented the points to Hanoi. D’Orlandi urges “a little faith in Lewandowski.” He himself completely credits Lewandowski’s claim to have gotten Pham Van Dong to obtain Presidium agreement to the Warsaw contact.

Saigon 12353 (to SecState), TS/Nodis, 9 December 1966

“D’Orlandi asked to see Secretary and Ambassador this evening following dinner party in Secretary’s honor. Conversation was as follows:

"1. Lewandowski had called urgently on D’Orlandi evening of December 8, on instructions, to express grave concern that U.S. had carried out heavy bombing attacks in Hanoi area on December 2 and December 4, directly following December 1 conversation between Lewandowski and Lodge. Lewandowski conveyed lurid reports from Polish attaché Hanoi alleging that December 2 attack had included bombing and machine-gunning within city area and had caused 600 casualties. December 4 attack also described as serious and in Hanoi area. Lewandowski protested to D’Orlandi - urging him to convey message to Lodge and to Secretary if possible - that such attacks could only threaten or destroy possibility of contact in Warsaw. Lewandowski argued that Hanoi could not be expected to enter..."
discussions in face of such escalation. (While whole tenor of message was extremely strong, Lewandowski did not repeat nor state that he was actually reporting Hanoi's expressions of view, but rather Warsaw judgment.)

"2. D'Orlandi had responded to Lewandowski that no contact had in fact taken place as yet because of apparent refusal of Rapacki to convey firm message, that U.S. had taken forthcoming action in declaring itself ready for discussions and prepared to make contact on December 6, and that it was thus not fair to say possibility of contact destroyed by U.S. action. D'Orlandi went on to say that his hope had been to make contact in any event.

"3. In addition to Lewandowski message December 8, D'Orlandi had just received cable from Fanfani, on evening December 9, reporting that Rapacki had sent Fanfani strong démarche protesting U.S. insistence on reservations of interpretation, and further protesting U.S. bombing attacks. In this cable, Fanfani had instructed D'Orlandi to convey substance of message to Secretary, if possible, and ask for reply. Fanfani had also included in the cable statement that he himself had replied to Rapacki urging that he go ahead and arrange contact nonetheless.

"4. Secretary responded to D'Orlandi as follows:

A. He asked D'Orlandi to tell Lewandowski that we were in direct touch with Rapacki on the points raised....

B. D'Orlandi should reply to Fanfani with same first point, adding that if Hanoi was concerned about bombing, this could be first topic in discussions....

"5. During course of conversation, D'Orlandi provided following additional conjecture and information:

A. D'Orlandi was fairly sure that Lewandowski had wished Warsaw contact to take place, with any points requiring clarification to be explored through tripartite talks in Saigon and possible Lewandowski further visit to Hanoi (which Lewandowski had also suggested D'Orlandi as immediate possibility). D'Orlandi therefore surmised that Rapacki had 'tried to be clever' and get U.S. to withdraw all reservations before contact made. (U.S. side at no time confirmed that this was in fact exactly what Rapacki had said in Warsaw.) Secretary suggested
that— in light of prior expressed statement that Soviets informed— Rapacki actions might have been dictated from Moscow. D'Orlandi expressed doubt, on basis his reading of Lewandowski attitude and remarks by Lewandowski about Rapacki over a period of time. Matter was dropped at this point.

B. ...Lewandowski had particularly expounded to him difficulties he saw in getting discussions started on reciprocal actions in connection with bombing. Hence, at D'Orlandi's suggestion Lewandowski had started to work out how situation in SVN might look one or two years hence and might be described in acceptable form to Hanoi and Washington, so that in effect a package deal would emerge. D'Orlandi stated that, when he asked Lewandowski just what kind of role VC might have — would it be like Czechoslovakia, or what— Lewandowski had come up with sample formula of 14 cabinet positions with 2 each for present Ky Group and VC/NLF, and remaining 10 allotted to 'neutrals or whatever.' (This is of course formula given by D'Orlandi to Harriman, as D'Orlandi's own, in Rome conversation in early November.)

C. In connection with Hanoi attitudes on U.S. bombing of North, Lewandowski had told D'Orlandi that he believed Hanoi had attached significance to fact that during the two weeks Lewandowski had been in Hanoi (approximately November 16-30) bombing had appeared to be at reduced level at least in Hanoi area. D'Orlandi said Lewandowski thought Hanoi had interpreted this as tacit signal of U.S. support for Lewandowski mission.

"6. Secretary several times pointed out that whole episode to this point was unique in that we were acting on Lewandowski's statement of U.S. position without any clear indication whatever of Hanoi position, or even any assurance Lewandowski had discussed points with Hanoi in manner covered by statement. D'Orlandi appeared to accept that we had indeed taken forthcoming attitude in view of these circumstances, although he himself stressed view that one had to have a little faith in Lewandowski, and he appeared to credit completely Lewandowski claim that he had finally got Pham Van Dong to obtain Presidium agreement to Warsaw contact."

Lodge
December 9, 1966

In Warsaw, Gronouski assures the Poles that the Lewandowski formulation is consistent with our views, that he "assumes" Phase A - Phase B de-escalation formula is the "new package deal" the Poles believe Lodge to have promised, and that the pattern of our bombing is not related to the projected US-DRV contact.

Rapacki is satisfied with respect to the interpretation clause. He rejects de-escalation as too narrow a package but blurs the issue by suggesting that "de-escalation" may be US shorthand for a deal including all outstanding issues.

On the bombing, he is adamant in his dissatisfaction. He reads what he says is a November 14 statement by Lodge, declaring USG willingness to hear suggestions on "practical measures" it might take to show its good intentions and allay the distrust the NLF and Hanoi may have of it. He feels the Pole's bombing suggestions were not received in this spirit. He implies that Lodge's statement was not conveyed to Hanoi.

As Gronouski found no threat to break off the talks, he did not issue the warning on his instructions of December 8.

Warsaw 1421 (to SecState), TS/Nodis, 9 December 1966
Section 1 of 2
Ref: State 98924

"1. Met Rapacki at my request at 1600 Dec 9. Michalowski and Janczewski present.

"2. My opening remarks, based on ref tel, were as follows:

A. I have requested today's meeting as a result of consultations I have had with Washington since our meeting Wednesday afternoon.

B. I can now assure you that at the time of the first Warsaw meeting with representatives of the North Vietnamese Government, I will be prepared to confirm to the NVN Govt the position of the USG with respect to negotiations. I can also assure you that this confirmation will be consistent with the discussions Mr. Lewandowski had with them and with us.

C. With respect to the question you raised Wednesday on bombing, I can state flatly that the pattern of our bombing in NVN has nothing to do with with the current efforts of the Polish and USG's to get underway the projected US-NVN talks...."
D. You will recall that the subject of bombing NVN was one of the matters discussed in Hanoi by Mr. Lewandowski. After his return from Hanoi Mr. Lewandowski clearly implied to Amb Lodge that he had discussed this matter in Hanoi in accordance with Amb Lodge's earlier formulation. Amb Lodge had suggested that a package could be worked out.... Inherent in this formulation is the package approach to de-escalation which I assume you had in mind when you referred to 'a new package deal' during our conversation last Tuesday.

....

"3. Rapacki responded...."

"4. ...with respect to my first point (presentation of USG negotiating position to NVN) he said if this is done in a way which will dispel doubt on invoking interpretation clause, then one of the difficulties has been reduced.

"5. On bombing question, he said...bomming was clearly intensified at the precise time it would create provocation....

"6. Rapacki read what he said was Nov. 1st statement by Lodge: USG understands that the Liberation Front and Hanoi have deep-seated distrust of USG; that is why USG is willing to take practical measures to show good intentions, and would be willing to hear any suggestions. Rapacki said this statement by Lodge was treated as addressed 'only to Polish ears,' adding Poles have been proved right in treating it so because in the case of their bombing suggestion they have not found such readiness to listen to suggestions as Lodge indicated.

"7. Rapacki expressed concern over my use of term 'de-escalation,' noting that Lodge said Washington was convinced that not much can be accomplished in getting talks under way with partial de-escalation. He said Lodge's accent was on the package deal which would cover all problems, including withdrawal of US troops. If my use of de-escalation represents a short-cut for a package deal including cessation of hostilities and the resolution of a variety of other outstanding problems, then his concern over my use of the term is simply a matter of semantics. He asked if my use of the term was consistent with Lodge's declaration on a package deal."
Warsaw 1412 (to SecState), 9 December 1966
Section 2 of 2

"8. I said I did not clearly understand what he was driving at but referred to my opening text and pointed out that the degree or manner of de-escalation is not subject to unilateral determination. I said that this would have to be resolved in negotiating sessions between the USG and NVN..."

"17. Comment: Rapacki's position was much less intransigent today than during Dec 7 meeting. I thought it significant that when I stressed importance of initiating talks Michalowski, Rapacki's major adviser on Vietnam war, nodded his head affirmatively three or four times. Because I found no threat to break off talks that was implied Dec 7, I did not use para 2 of ref tel."

GRONOWSKI

December 10, 1966

Rusk and Gronouski are informed that Washington does not wish to withdraw authorization for RT 52 at this time. It is anticipated, therefore, that some targets may be hit which Rapacki will insist reflect further escalation.

State 100624 (to Amembassy Saigon), TS/Nodis
10 December 1966
Ref: A. Saigon 12953
   B. Warsaw 1421
   C. Warsaw 1422
For Secretary from Katzenbach

"2. On the bombing point, you should know that RT-52 stands as it was at time of your departure from Washington and targets earlier set aside remain in suspense."

KATZENBACH
State 10067 (to Amembassy Warsaw), TS/Nodis
10 December 1966
Ref: A. Warsaw 1421
B. Warsaw 1422

"4. FYI only (rpt. FYI only). You should be aware that for the immediate future the bombing pattern will remain unchanged from what it has been over the past several weeks. This may well involve some targets which Rapacki will insist represent further escalation, just as in the past he took to be escalation certain variations in our bombing pattern which in fact represented no real new departures in the pattern as a whole. With foregoing in mind you should avoid giving Poles even any slight indications which they might take to mean that we are escalating or de-escalating at present. Present bombing pattern has been authorized for some time and we do not wish to withdraw this authorization at this time."

KATZENBACH

December 13, 1966

Rapacki quotes a US Navy spokesman as saying that new targets have recently been placed on the bombing list, adding "you can assume what effects such statements have in Hanoi, given the fact that in recent weeks new targets have in fact been added." He again urges restraint in bombing, arguing that overt pressure "will be utilized by all those who have a different vision of this peace move than we have here in Warsaw."

Warsaw 1458 (to SecState), TS/Nodis, 13 December 1966
Section 1 of 2
Ref: Warsaw 1429

"5. Rapacki added that we should realize that leadership of DRVN does not want to and cannot yield under pressure; every step from our side that evokes impression that NVN is acting under pressure would be interpreted as sign of weakness and be utilized by all those who have a different vision of this peace move than we have here in Warsaw. (Comment: Rapacki repeated this point with emphasis and was, I believe, making a clear reference to Communist China.)
"9. Rapacki said that in first position expressed by Lodge it appeared that this truth was grasped by USG and this is why Poles were so hopeful. However the events of December mean, if the working hypothesis Poles are using is sound, that US does not fully appreciate this situation. He added that recent statements by USG officials leave the impression that USG wants to evoke pressure. He quoted from Reuter news story of Dec 12 US Navy spokesman's statement that US intends gradually to increase air raids on NVN; Rapacki interjected at this point his realization that Navy spokesman may not have known all that was going on and this could very well be an old idea. But he added that the Navy spokesman's subsequent reference to escalation and to new targets having been recently placed on bombing list represented current information. He said 'you can assume what effects such statements have in Hanoi, given the fact that in recent weeks new targets have in fact been added.'"

GRONOSKII

December 13-14, 1966

The Yen Vien Railroad Yard and Van Dien Vehicle Depot are bombed. They are both 5 nautical miles from the center of Hanoi, and have been struck previously. Tass claims, in addition, that residential areas in Hanoi and its suburbs were hit.

A later US official investigation shows that only these targets were intended, but it is possible that US ordnance fell within the Hanoi city limits by accident.

State 103586 (to Amembassy Warsaw), S/Ndis, 15 December 1966

"2. ... Washington approval of targets including high level review by Defense and State is required and takes into consideration location of targets with respect to population centers in effort to minimize civilian casualties. Types of targets struck have included lines of communication, bridges, POL storage, selected thermal power plants, military installations, and anti-aircraft missile sites and missile facilities that are a threat to our aircraft.
"3. Latest strikes near Hanoi were Yen Vien railroad yard and Van Dien vehicle depot, which are 5 nautical miles northeast and south of Hanoi respectively, and well outside of Hanoi city limits. Both of these targets were struck on December 13 and 14 but this was not first time in either case....

"4. Tass alleges our aircraft bombed built-up area of Hanoi at west end of Red River bridge and suburb of Dhatran to the southwest (have been unable locate Dhatran on any map). Hanoi has made similar charge. We have not received complete reports; however, nothing in reports so far to substantiate this and area alleged to have been attacked nowhere near areas targetted for attack. It is important to note that there was heavy SAM, anti-aircraft and MIG activity and our aircraft took action against SAM sites. Quite a number of SAMs were fired at our aircraft; errant SAMs or anti-aircraft shells of course could cause damage.

"5. ..... (c) There is no basis for charging us with escalation of conflict over past few days, either in geographic terms or as to types of targets. Hanoi's POL facility three nautical miles from center of Hanoi was struck on June 29, and POL facilities on edge of Haiphong were struck June 29, July 7 and August 2. Two targets of December 14 are both five nautical miles from Hanoi's center (farther than June 29 strikes); both had been struck earlier.

....

"(f) ..... In comparable periods of good weather, e.g., November 22 and 23, December 2, 3, 4 and 5; and Dec 13-14 essentially same type of targets were struck, some intensity of air activity in and around Hanoi took place as has frequently been the case for at least six months...."

KATZENBACH
TOP SECRET - NODIS

State 106358 (to Embassy Warsaw), 21 December 1966

"1. Our investigation of alleged bombing in Hanoi has been thorough. The only targets were military ones more than five miles from the Hanoi city center. However, we cannot rule out completely the possibility of an accident. Any US ordnance that may have fallen within the Hanoi city limits was the result of such an accident."

RUSK

December 14, 1966

State does not interpret Rapacki's December 13 statement as a negative reply from Hanoi, closing the Marigold door. It is, however, now inclined to wonder whether the Poles ever had a commitment from the DRV for the Warsaw contact. In any case, further conversations in Warsaw are to have two objectives:

i. Keeping the door open for talks to develop.

ii. Letting the record show our persistent efforts to move forward, while refuting Polish contentions that our actions and statements blocked the opening of conversations.

Gronowski is therefore instructed to make the following points to Rapacki:

i. Military actions by both sides were taking place throughout the conversations in Saigon.

ii. As soon as the US began talking with the Poles preparatory to meeting with the DRV, new terms and conditions were put forward for opening the talks.

iii. We are now confused about what reflects the views of Hanoi, as opposed to the Polish Government. Direct contact is needed.

iv. To leave no stone unturned, we suggest taking up de-escalation along the lines of the Phase A-Phase B formula, as a manageable opening piece of the total picture.

v. If the other side prefers, though, we will start at the other end, looking first at possible terms of an agreed settlement.

vi. Rapacki is to be warned that he will bear full responsibility if Polish obstructionism prevents the contact.

While these instructions are en route, however, Gronowski is summoned by Rapacki to learn that the DRV has asked for all conversations to be terminated. The "brutal raid on the residential area in Hanoi..."
TOP SECRET - NODIS

precisely at the moment when the USG knew that the matter of a Warsaw contact with Hanoi was actively being considered" is the reason. Rapacki claims that immediately after the Poles transmitted "a direct, positive response from Hanoi about the possibility of talks in Warsaw, ...the USG reserved the possibility of modifying its attitude and, of far greater importance, entered a new stage of escalation."

Gronowski appeals to the President. If the newspaper accounts of the Hanoi raids are true, "then we are in an incredibly difficult position. I am convinced that if this represents the breakdown of the current peace initiative...the Soviets, the Poles and the North Vietnamese will have no trouble convincing the leadership in every capital of the world that our stated desire for peace negotiations is insincere .... We have no choice but to take immediate action to try to get discussions back on the track."

He proposes, therefore, to accept Rapacki's reasoning: to give no impression of bombing intensification during the negotiations about opening talks in Warsaw -- in particular, to halt bombing near Hanoi and Haiphong. "We would again express our deep desire for the initiation of talks and ask the Poles to continue their efforts."

Thus just as Gronowski is ordered to launch a pre-emptive offensive, he is himself recommending retreat.

State 162295 (to Amembassy PARIS) TS/Nodis
14 December 1966
For the Secretary from the Acting Secretary
Ref: SEC62

"I do not rpt not interpret Rapacki's statement of December 13 to Gronowski as a negative reply from Hanoi in effect closing the Marigold door. Firm instructions are being prepared for Gronowski designed to keep the dialogue going, while at the same time making a clear record of the legitimacy of our participation in the MARIGOLD effort since its inception."

....

State 102960 (to Amembassy Warsaw), TS/Nodis
14 December 1966
Ref: Warsaw 1429
(Info to Amembassy Paris & Saigon: Paris for Secretary
Eyes Only; Saigon for Ambassador Porter Only)

"1. .... In light of Polish tactics we are now inclined to wonder whether they ever had any NVN commitment to a meeting in Warsaw or whether it is not more likely that they have been engaging in an effort to get us committed to something as close as possible to our maximum position and then see whether they could get Hanoi lined up to talk on that basis. In any event we must bear two following objectives in mind in further conversations with Poles on this subject:
(a) We mean to keep the door open as long as there seems to be any possibility of talks developing, but at the same time sticking to our position as generally represented by Lewandowski's 10 points, and

(b) We sincerely want to begin substantive talks and the record should clearly show our persistent efforts to move forward and that Polish contention that our actions and statements have thrown roadblock in the way of opening of conversations in Warsaw are thoroughly refuted.

"2. Therefore you should ask for further meeting with Rapacki and present him with following full statement of our position at present time:

(a) You should first review history of Lodge-D'Orlandi-Lewandowski conversations starting with November 14-15 conversations in Saigon....

(b) You should then point out to Rapacki that before, during and after all this was taking place, the conflict in Viet-Nam continued, including the bombing of North Viet-Nam, the infiltration of North Vietnamese men and supplies into South Viet-Nam, Viet Cong terrorist bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, etc....

(c) As soon as we began to talk with the Polish Government in Warsaw, presumably preparatory to our meeting directly with the North Vietnamese representatives, we found that new terms and conditions seemed to be put forward with the opening of direct talks contingent on our fulfilling them....

(d) But our desire is to move toward peace and our conviction is that the best road to take is one of direct discussion with Hanoi's representatives. We are somewhat confused as a result of the conversations in Warsaw as to what Hanoi has said and what represents the views of Polish Government. Our strong impression is that, in spite of our readiness both in Saigon with Lewandowski and now in Warsaw to present quite fully and frankly our position, we have not received any communication at all from the North Vietnamese Government....
(e) Nevertheless we want to leave no stone unturned in our search for peace and would like to turn for a moment from the total picture to one sector of it in which conceivably we might begin to move. This is with respect to the possible beginning of de-escalation through a two-phased arrangement referred to in Lewandowski's eighth point... Perhaps the coming holidays and the truces associated with them, offer an opportune occasion to take some useful steps along these lines; this in turn should make it easier for the authorities in Hanoi to proceed then to discuss other matters standing between us and a peaceful settlement.

(f) On the other hand, if they wish to proceed promptly to a total agreement representing the terms of an agreed settlement, we are prepared to move along that track including de-escalation as the final item. (FYI: In other words we will start at either end of a total agreement. END FYI)

(g) You should conclude your statement of our position with the language contained in para 2 of State 98924, leaving Rapacki in no doubt that we have done everything possible to open up the way to peaceful settlement and we are very much disturbed at our having been unable to move forward at Warsaw as we had been led to expect from the earlier conversations in Saigon."

KATZENBACH

Warsaw 1471 (to SecState), TS/Nodis,
15 December 1966
For the President from Ambassador Gronouski

"1. I met with Rapacki (Michalowski and Janczewski present) at Poles' request at 1800 Dec 14. (In contrast to previous meetings, Rapacki entered the room unsmiling, and during entire meeting maintained a calm, serious and matter-of-fact attitude.)

"2. Rapacki said that first he would like to bring some precision with respect to our conversation of yesterday (Warsaw 1458). He said that this conversation took place before Poles were aware of last
bombing of Hanoi. He said, 'If I had had this news then, our conversation of course would have had different character than it did.'

"3. Rapacki continued, 'Today I must state the following facts. First, that the U.S. had to be conscious of and realize the importance of establishing direct contact with Hanoi.' He added, 'You had stressed the unique possibility of a peaceful settlement that the Warsaw talks with Hanoi presented.' He continued, 'We thought so too, ever since we obtained the signal for which the USG had asked for so long in so many official statements.' He added, 'In this instance we received more than a signal; we received a direct, positive response from Hanoi about the possibility of talks in Warsaw.'

"4. Rapacki said that immediately after this direct response was transmitted to the USG the US reserved the possibility of modifying their attitude and, of far greater importance, entered a new stage of escalation.

"5. Rapacki continued that the USG was bound to be conscious of the reaction which its conduct would evoke and of the consequences of such action. He added that the Poles have done everything in their power to dispel any illusions, noting that on six occasions in Warsaw and Saigon, 'We have warned the USG side in all seriousness and with the greatest emphasis of the consequences of their actions.'

"6. 'Yesterday,' Rapacki continued, 'The US Air Force engaged in a new and particularly brutal raid on the residential area in Hanoi precisely at the moment when the USG knew that the matter of a Warsaw contact with Hanoi was actively being considered. This,' he added, 'was the last drop that spilled over the cup. From the moment, in Hanoi and Warsaw, all doubts as to the real intentions of the USG disappeared, including doubts not only in the present case but with respect to all other instances in the past when the US has advanced positions which it has described as peaceful initiatives.'

"7. Rapacki then said, 'We understand therefore and fully share the wish of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam, which was transmitted to us today, that we terminate all conversations begun months ago in Saigon. The Polish Govt states that the whole responsibility for losing this chance of a peaceful solution to the Vietnam
war rests on the USG.' He added, 'I would like to express more than regrets because of the utilization by the USG of our good will. Once again it becomes clear how difficult it is to believe in your words.' He added, 'In future only facts can be taken into consideration.'

8. I said that I would have no comment except to say that I regretted this turn of events and would immediately convey these observations to Washington.

9. Comment: If Moscow dateline account of latest Hanoi bombing published in Dec 14 Paris edition of New York Times and Herald Tribune, and recounted to me tonight by Rapacki, is true then we are in an incredibly difficult position. I am convinced that if this represents the breakdown of the current peace initiative -- and it surely does unless we take decisive and immediate action -- then the Soviets, the Poles and the North Vietnamese will have no trouble convincing the leadership in every capital of the world that our stated desire for peace negotiations is insincere. If we treat this turn of events as anything less than a crisis in our world leadership role then I believe we are making a tragic mistake.

10. I am convinced that up till now the Poles, accepting the genuineness of our interest in negotiation, have used whatever influence they have in Hanoi (in all likelihood with Soviet backing) in an effort to initiate US-NVN peace talks. I also am convinced that Rapacki was expressing genuine concern when he warned that the increase in bombing was destroying what appeared to him a good chance that NVN would overcome Chinese influence and engage in Warsaw talks.

11. We have no choice but to take immediate action to try to get discussions back on track. For any chance of success this would require, in my judgment, conveying to Poles that we are willing to accept Rapacki's Dec 13 reasoning (Warsaw 1458) and are prepared now to assure the Poles that we will take care not to create impression of bombing intensification in NVN during the period of delicate negotiations over the holding of Warsaw USG-NVN peace talks. We would also assure the Poles that we do not intend to bomb in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong during this period. We would again express our deep desire for the initiation of talks and ask the Poles to continue their efforts.

....

GRONOUSKI
TOP SECRET - NODIS

December 15, 1966

After consulting the President, State again instructs Gronouski to present a strong rejection of Rapacki's arguments. We doubt the accuracy of the Communists' bombing accounts and that the Poles really intend to sell their view of Marigold to world opinion.

At the same time, Rolling Thunder 52 is amended to suspend strikes against the two Hanoi targets hit December 13-14. This is not communicated, however, to the other participants in Marigold.

Meanwhile Lewandowski has begun to leak his version of Marigold by giving a few salient points to the Dutch Charge in Saigon. We do not learn of this until December 17, and know only that Lewandowski's conversation with the Dutch Charge occurred sometime between November 30 and December 15.

Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times receives a cable from Hanoi. A visa to visit the DRV, for which he had applied some months earlier, has been granted and may be picked up immediately in Paris.

The Polish Ambassador in Rome is contacted by the Pope who inquires if the former can "tell him anything with respect to Vietnam," according to a later conversation between the Polish Ambassador and Fanfani. (For source, see December 19 entry.)

State 103342 (to Embassy Warsaw), TS/Modis, 15 December 1966
For Ambassador Gronouski from Acting Secretary
Ref: (a) Warsaw 1471
(b) State 102960
(Info to Embassy Paris & Saigon: Paris for Secretary Eyes only; Saigon for Ambassador Eyes only)

"1. Your message (ref tel a) has been discussed with the President and he has approved the comments and additional instructions which are set forth below.

"2. Although Rapacki's message to you reported ref (a) is also discouraging it does not alter our basic assessment as conveyed to you in State's 102960.... In spite of his reference in paras 6 and 7 ref tel (a) to views and decisions of NVN, we remain doubtful about how much part Hanoi has played in scenario which has unfolded in Warsaw over past two weeks."

....

"7. Finally, and in spite of the fact that Rapacki's line as reported ref tel (a) makes it essential that he get
the full force of our rejection of his arguments and our indignation at the Polish Government's changing the signals and then seeking to put the blame on us, we feel nevertheless that you should in the course of your presentation to Rapacki leave no doubt about our continuing strong desire to move forward in direct conversations with the North Vietnamese..."

"8. Your further interpretation and discussion contained Warsaw's 1475 is very much appreciated and I am sure you fully realize that all of us here profoundly share your concern over the turn events have taken in the last few days. Likewise I can well imagine that in the atmosphere of Warsaw and without full information available, particularly concerning the bombing of North Viet-Nam, the Polish position may appear to be a strong one, whatever their motivation in presenting it as Rapacki has just done. We want to assure you, however, that on the basis of the over-all picture as we can see it from Washington, the Polish case, except for some fairly superficial and transitory matters, is a weak one and we wonder whether they will try to sell it to world opinion."

....

KATZENBACH

JCS 1471 (to CINCPAC), TS/LIBDIS, 15 December 1966
Ref: JCS 7735

"1. (TS) Ref authorizes air strikes against following targets in Hanoi area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET NO.</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>BE NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Yen Vien RR Clf Yd</td>
<td>616-0221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63.11</td>
<td>Van Dien Veh Dpo</td>
<td>616-0696</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"2. (TS) Suspend further air strikes against these targets until further notice."

70
Saigon 13640 (to SecState), TS/Nodis
17 December 1966

"1. CAS Station Chief came to political counselor Dec 17 and reported that one of his officers had been queried by Netherlands Charge Derksen about a statement by Lewandowski concerning negotiations with Hanoi.....

"2. In response to request CAS submitted following as Memorandum of conversation with Derksen:

A. In a conversation which took place in Saigon on an unspecified date between Nov 30 and Dec 15, 1966, Ambassador Lewandowski told Mr. Derksen that he was recently in Hanoi for a somewhat longer period than usual. He went on to say that 'an organization' -- later he used the word 'group' -- was negotiating with Hanoi on the subject of peace talks. Mr. Lewandowski did not further identify the group or organization.

B. Mr. Lewandowski was bitter because progress in these talks was halted by the recent American bombing of Hanoi (dates of air raids not specified). He told Mr. Derksen he was so bitter than he planned to write 'a paper on the subject...."

Behind the Lines--Hanoi, by Harrison E. Salisbury (Bantam, July 1967), p. 8

"Then, on the morning of December 15, Seymour Topping, the foreign editor of The Times, walked over to my desk and put a cablegram before me.... The visa to Hanoi did, indeed, await me in Paris."

December 17, 1966

State expresses alarm over the possible impact on the talks in Warsaw and also on Ky, should Lewandowski's leak to the Dutch Charge reach him. Lodge is told to give Ky a low key indication that a possible lead toward peace is being investigated.

State 104673 (to Embassy Saigon), TS/Nodis
17 December 1966
Ref: Saigon 13640

"1. Lewandowski's indiscretions are indeed most unfortunate and potentially harmful to talks in Warsaw...."
"2. This leads us to suggest you should be prepared with line to use with Ky should outright leak occur, should Ky raise with you on basis rumors floating around Saigon, or should you feel rumors have reached point where you should take initiative with Ky as preventive measures. Our thought is that in such eventuality, you would simply in low key take following line: As we have told Ky before we get many apparent leads on subject of peaceful settlement. We feel responsibility not to overlook any possible lead which might offer some promise. Most of these leads dissipate immediately, some seem slightly more productive and are pursued further. Lewandowski contact with us over past few months has been such lead. At times it has appeared to offer more possibilities and at times less. Ky may be assured that if any lead offers any real prospect of discussions with Hanoi, he will be promptly consulted."

KAPITZENBACH

December 18, 1966

D'Orlandi tends to reject our rationale for what has happened in favor of the Polish version. He feels there is a "strong prima facie case against us" and that we should do "something quickly in Warsaw," much the same view expressed by Gronouski on December 14.

Saigon 13618 (to SecState), TS/Nodis
18 December 1966
Ref: State 104673

"6. D'Orlandi then said to Habib that he was himself surprised at bombing on the 14th. He wondered 'If there were not some people in the US who had deliberately sought to create a problem.' This was denied in precise terms and with an expression of surprise that D'Orlandi would have such a thought. It was pointed out that as D'Orlandi knew there was no connection between bombings and Lewandowski's proposals. Habib then gave D'Orlandi the rebuttal material contained in State's Circular 103849 and went over it in detail, suggesting it be used if Lewandowski again raises issue of bombings."

72
"12. Comment: Our judgment is that foregoing confirms correctness of changing venue to Warsaw. D'Orlandi is not only showing his personal pique at turn of events, but is displaying definite tendency to discard our explanations while endeavoring to induce us to do 'something quickly in Warsaw.' Instead of focusing on information provided by Habib, he launched into extended presentation of Lewandowski's latest animadversions (sic), adding his own belief that there is 'strong prima-facie case against us,' as well as exhortation mentioned preceding sentence."


December 19, 1966

Gronowski carries out State's instructions of December 15. In an angry exchange, Rapacki attacks both the accusations leveled against the Polish role and the US suggestion that the Warsaw contact still be attempted.

In Rome, the Pope is given the "whole story" on Marigold by the Polish Ambassador, who later reports the episode to Fanfani, adding that he had been contacted by the Pope on December 15, to ask if the Poles "could tell him anything with respect to Vietnam."

Warsaw 1513 (to State), TS/Nodis
19 December 1966
Ref: Warsaw 1508

"9. .... He (Rapacki) added that Poles did not put forth new conditions but 'recalling speeches of Goldberg, the President, Secretary Rusk and others, once we received the signal we did we would have had every right to call for a stop in the bombing.' He said, 'you have said over and over again that you would end all bombing if there was an assurance from Hanoi that there would be a response toward peace from Hanoi; however, we did not ask that you stop bombing but only that you not intensify it.'"
"13. .... He said, 'I am astonished that at same time you accuse us of stalling talks, you ask us to help you get them going again.' .... Inasmuch as NVN asked Poles to discontinue these discussions, what was new to justify returning to NVN on this matter? ...." 

GRONOUSKI

Rome 3409 (to Sec State), TS/Nodis 28 December 1966

....

"4. Fanfani said that according to the Polish Ambassador the Pope on December 15 sent word to the Polish Government asking if they could tell him anything with respect to Vietnam. On December 19 the Polish Government responded by telling the Pope the whole story. Fanfani indicated he did not not not know just what the Polish Ambassador meant by the 'whole story' but presumably the Polish Government had told the Pope everything they knew."

....

REINHARDT

December 21, 1966

Rapacki clarifies the Polish role in Marigold. The following were conveyed to us on instruction from Hanoi:

i. Lewandowski's message to Lodge immediately upon his return from Hanoi expressing a positive response to the Warsaw talks.

ii. Rapacki's warning after the December 3 bombing, that Hanoi would have to reassess the situation.

iii. The decision to terminate discussions in Warsaw.

He added that there had been frequent exchanges between Hanoi and Warsaw during the conversations and felt confident the Poles accurately expressed Hanoi's views, even when acting on their own initiative.

While Gronouski is learning this in Warsaw, instructions are enroute for him to tell the Poles that any damage from US ordinance within Hanoi city limits was accidental. We are now prepared to state there will be no
bombed within 10 miles of the center of Hanoi for an indefinite period if talks with the DRV can begin shortly. We "anticipate" some "appropriate reciprocal action" with respect to NLF activities within 10 miles of the center of Saigon as "evidence of good faith."

Warsaw 1535 (to SecState), TS/Modis
21 December 1966
Ref: State 105909

....

"2. I asked Rapacki to clarify for me the role that Hanoi played in our discussions. Rapacki replied that the message Lewandowski gave to Lodge (he referred to 'three sentences!') upon his return from Hanoi expressing NVN positive response to Warsaw talks, Rapacki's warning after the Dec 3 bombing, that Hanoi would have to reassess the situation, and the decision to terminate discussions in Warsaw were all decisions by NVN which were conveyed to us by the Poles. He said further that comments Poles made regarding danger of creating the impression of pressure on Hanoi were comments of the Polish Govt, but the fears that Poles expressed in this regard were verified subsequently by Hanoi. He also said that during process of Warsaw discussions there were a number of other exchanges between Warsaw and Hanoi, adding that the Poles are confident that what they expressed on their own initiative accurately reflected Hanoi's opinion.

"3. Rapacki then made the point, in reference to our accusation that Poles have raised new conditions since talks shifted to Warsaw, that interpretation clause question was raised by Lewandowski immediately upon hearing it expressed by Lodge on Dec 3. He said 'clearly you know that we felt this was a matter of concern from the very beginning; it wasn't something interjected as a new condition afterwards.' He added, 'our concern was well taken because the reaction to interpretation clause from Hanoi turned out to be what we predicted.'"
State 106358 (to Amembassy Warsaw)  
21 December 1966

....

"1. Our investigation of alleged bombing in Hanoi has been thorough. The only targets were military ones more than five miles from the Hanoi city center. However we cannot rule out completely the possibility of an accident. Any US ordnance that may have fallen within the Hanoi city limits was the result of such an accident.

"2. Nonetheless we are prepared to state that there will be no bombing within ten miles of Hanoi city center measured from 21 degrees 1 minute 37 seconds north, 105 degrees 51 minutes 21 seconds East, for an indefinite period if talks with North Vietnamese can be gotten underway shortly. Appropriate reciprocal action with respect to bombs, mortar and similar terrorist activities within ten miles of the center of Saigon measured from 10 degrees, 46 minutes, 28 seconds north; 106 degrees, 41 minutes, 10 seconds East, would be anticipated by us as evidence of good faith."

....

RUSK

December 22, 1966

Rapacki prefers to wait a day or two (by which time Gronouski is to have returned to Washington for consultations) before transmitting the new US position to Hanoi. He is afraid the suspension of bombing near Hanoi appears to depend on reciprocal action from the NLF and a signal that Hanoi will establish contact. Gronouski argues that we are not asking a quid-pro-quo but simply removing the factor that had blocked the contact and suggesting a quiet way for Hanoi and the NLF to indicate readiness to discuss peace.

Rapacki repeats a theme expressed (less clearly) by him earlier: "Goldberg stated that if there was some indication from Hanoi regarding negotiations, bombing would cease throughout NVN and not simply around a small area of Hanoi." He is presumably referring to Goldberg's September 22 speech, though neither it nor Goldberg's December 20 letter to U Thant contain such a sweeping proposal.

On the same day, Zinchuk sees Bundy in Washington to indicate Soviet awareness of Marigold and Soviet support both for Polish actions
and the Polish interpretation of developments to date. He is apprehensive that the US will adopt a militaristic approach to the war. The Soviet concern to get US-DRV talks started arises in large part the possibility that Hanoi will call for volunteers under the Bucharest Declaration ("if the war escalates and if help is necessary").

Warsaw 1537 (to SecState), T6/Nodis
22 December 1966
Ref: State 106358

....

"2. Rapacki, expressing desire to understand precisely, asked for reiteration of message. In response to his question as to whether this meant we had no intention to bomb Hanoi proper but that it was possible we could have inadvertently hit residential area, I responded I did not exclude that possibility. In response his question whether orders would be issued to exclude from bombing area within coordinates described for indefinite period, I responded that this my understanding referred. After brief discussion of relationship of cessation of terrorist activities in Saigon to cessation bombing in Hanoi perimeter, I reread section again and pointed out there was no direct quid-pro-quo on cessation Saigon activities but that this was anticipated reaction by Hanoi as measure of good faith.

"3. I expressed again my personal conviction that this proposal provided basis for movement in resolving the problem of initiating negotiations....

"4. .... Rapacki noted however that two things intruded which might reduce the significance of this step: (A) The text of the communication appears to make U.S. action dependent on some signal that a contact will be established by Hanoi; (B) There is an indirect linking -- or request -- that an appropriate step (re Saigon) will be taken by the other side. He added that it would be very important to avoid the appearance of forcing NVN into negotiations.... Goldberg stated that if there was some indication from Hanoi regarding negotiations, bombing would cease throughout NVN and not simply around a small area of Hanoi. Furthermore, regarding the alleged NLF activities around Saigon, while this is admittedly expressed in terms of an expectation, the impression is given that you are trying to 'kill too many birds with one stone.' This is a matter to be resolved with the NLF and I (Rapacki) have tried to dissuade you from linking NVN action with NLF matters...."
"8. .... I argued that Rapacki must view our proposal not as an exercise of pressure by making cessation of bombing dependent on Hanoi's indication of a willingness to talk, but as a removal of what Poles had regarded as overt pressure which Rapacki had insisted interfered with the prospects for talks. Cessation of action in Saigon was not a direct quid-pro-quo but a quiet way for Hanoi and the NLF to give an indication of readiness to discuss peace.

"9. Rapacki...concluded with statement that he would prefer to delay day or two before transmitting our proposal but expressed willingness to convey it now if that was what I desired.

"10. I expressed willingness to discuss matter immediately on my arrival in Washington."

GRONOWSKI

MemCon, TS/Nodis/MARIGOLD, 22 December 1966
Participants: Alexander Zinchuk, Soviet Charge
William P. Bundy

"2. Immediately after these exchanges, Zinchuk launched into a discussion of MARIGOLD. After learning that I was fully aware of the exchanges between Levanдовski and Lodge, as he put it initially, he said that it was very hard for them to understand why we had intensified the bombing of the North with the attacks on December 2nd and 4th, and then again on December 13th and 14th. He said that there was great sensitivity in Hanoi on this subject, and strongly implied -- without directly saying so -- that there were differing schools of thought. Our bombing actions had left the Soviets -- and by implication, Hanoi -- in complete doubt as to what our intentions and views really were. Speaking more specifically for the Soviets, he said that he had thought they pretty well understood our views, but that this episode left them in real doubt whether there were military forces at work and whether they simply did not understand fully what we thought and meant to do.
"3. More specifically, he said that he himself had been in Moscow, in late November and had gained the impression that Hanoi (or elements in it) were seriously interested in starting something. They had been encouraged by the apparent slackening in the pace of our bomb- ing during this period. I at once asked whether this was just a general impression or whether it had something more specific behind it. He replied that it was 'more than a general sense.' Then, following the bombings of December 2nd and 4th, some Hanoi leaders (un-named) had been in Moscow on their way back from Budapest, and had met with top Soviet leaders. (I think he mentioned Kosygin and Brezhnev specifically). In the face of our bombings, the Soviet leaders had been unable to clarify U.S. thinking or (by clear implication) to encourage Hanoi to pursue the LeVandowski avenue. Then, he himself had seen Ambassador Kohler on December 9th, intending to convey a clear message against continued intensification of the bombing. He thus found it particularly difficult to understand our actions."

"6. I then said specifically that, while we had made a considered decision that we should not alter the planned bombing pattern earlier, we were definitely aware of Hanoi's sensitivity to intensification of the bombing. I said that therefore we had made a specific proposal within the last 24 hours, directed to precisely this point. I also noted that within the last 24 hours we had had a contact that had substantially illuminated exactly what the Polish contacts and discussions with Hanoi had been. Finally, I reiterated that we were prepared to see really quiet and secret talks get under way on the basis of the approaches that had been made."

"8. In short, Zinchuk did not really seek to defend Polish handling of the matter, but was most emphatically trying to get it across that the Polish effort was serious and that the Soviets were fully with it...."

"9. ...he said that he had been surprised, in dis- cussing the Polish initiative in the Department at some earlier stage in December, to see that it was treated as doubtful...."
"2. He then said (as he had to Harry MacPherson on Monday) that the Soviet concern to get something started arose from a number of factors, but above all the possibility that Hanoi, under the Bucharest Declaration ('if the war escalates and if help is necessary,' in essence) might at some point be faced with a Hanoi request for military volunteers. He noted the report today of North Korean pilots (which I of course did not deny) and something unspecified that the Cubans were doing. He said that the Soviets would be put in a most awkward and difficult position if Hanoi asked for volunteers, and they hoped the issue would not arise.

"3. He then asked me about some commentator's statement that the President saw two alternatives, seeking a peaceful solution or escalating the war markedly by bombing so that the American people would become engaged in simple loyalty to their armed forces.

....

December 23, 1966

The problems of reciprocal de-escalation are illustrated by a cable from Saigon, "assuming" that the proposed cessation of terrorist activity in the Saigon area does not require a cessation of GVN/US counter-VC activities.

Saigon 14089 (to SecState), TS/Nodeis, 23 December 1966
Ref: A. State 106358
B. State 105909

"1. ...we assume department proposal on cessation terrorist activity in Saigon area does not envisage cessation GVN/US counter-VC activities."

....
TOP SECRET - NODIS

December 24, 1966

We drop the request for reciprocal action from the DRV in maintaining the 10 mile bombing limit around Hanoi.

(NB. source needed)

December 26-27, 1966

After newspaper reports of bombing "12 miles from Hanoi," the Poles inquire if our circle about Hanoi is measured in nautical or statute miles. Gronouski expresses concern over strikes this close to the proscribed circle. He is told "not to be diverted from the main effort by niggling and haggling about whether a particular bomb fell on this side or that side of this or that circle."

Warsaw 1567 (to SecState), TS/Nodis, 27 December 1966
Ref: State 107911

"1. ...Michalowski... asked 'for the record' whether reference in ref tel to ten miles from Hanoi was in nautical or statute miles...."

"2. ...NY Times, AP Dispatch speaks of 'target only twelve miles from Hanoi'...."

"3. .... I am most concerned if we are choosing targets so close to the margin that even a slight error could put us in technical violation of our commitment...."

...Gronouski

State 108664 (to Amembassy Warsaw), TS/Nodis 27 December 1966

"...you may inform Michalowski or Rapacki that orders have been issued to refrain from bombing within the ten nautical miles from Hanoi city center.... It is very important for you and the Poles not to be diverted from the main effort by niggling and haggling about whether a particular bomb fell on this side or that side of this or that circle. The important thing is that an area of some 314 square nautical miles will be free from bombing and that, thus far, we have not seen any readiness on the part of Hanoi to sit down
and talk business. The next move is up to them and we cannot let them play games with a side issue in view of the major concession we have made to clear the way for talks...military briefers are not aware of MARIGOLD and that some looseness in language can be anticipated."

RUSK

December 27-28, 1966

Fanfani is told by the Polish Ambassador about the latter's contact with the Pope. We in turn tell Fanfani of the 10 mile bombing sanctuary around Hanoi and of our continuing hopes to get talks started. We stress the importance of secrecy, if talks are to succeed. Meanwhile we decide to move the operation out of Saigon to the maximum extent, for security reasons. Gronowski is instructed to take up the security problem with Rapacki, with special reference to the leak to the Pope. He is also apprised of doubts by Rusk that the Poles ever intended to press Hanoi for talks without an unconditional and un reciprocated cessation of the bombing.

Rome 3409 (to SecState), TS/Nodis, 28 December 1966

"1. Points contained State 108773 were conveyed privately to Fanfani evening Dec 28.

"2. Fanfani said he had been very severe in his conversation with Polish Ambassador, he had emphasized that:

A. Poles should initiate US contact with Hanoi without further delay;

B. Lewandowski should by all means remain in Saigon as would D'Orlandi; and

C. It was a great mistake break secrecy by informing the Pope.

"3. Fanfani said Polish Ambassador had returned to see him evening December 27. Polish Ambassador had said:

A. Poles cannot undertake initiate US contact with Hanoi unless there is a cessation of bombing;

B. Lewandowski will repeat will remain in Saigon; and

C. It was not repeat not the Polish Government which had taken the initiative in informing the Pope but rather it was the Pope who had approached the Polish Government.
"4. Fanfani said that according to the Polish Ambassador the Pope on December 15 sent word to the Polish Government asking if they could tell him anything with respect to Vietnam. On December 19 the Polish Government responded by telling the Pope the whole story. Fanfani indicated he did not know just what the Polish Ambassador meant by the 'whole story' but presumably the Polish Government had told the Pope everything they knew."

REINHARDT

State 109639 (to Embassy Warsaw), TS/Nodis
28 December 1966
FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

".... I call your attention to the statement made by the Polish Ambassador to Fanfani on the evening of December 27 that QTE Poles cannot undertake initiate US contact with Hanoi unless there is a cessation of bombing UNQTE. This could result from Polish Ambassador Rome not being informed of our move on December 24. But it also raises the possibility that the Poles have never had any intention of pressing Hanoi for talks without an unconditional and unreciprocal cessation of bombing."

REINHARDT

State 103773 (to Embassy Rome), TS/Nodis
27 December 1966

"1. ....

a. We are most grateful for prompt Fanfani report of his conversation with Polish Ambassador Rome, ....

b. Fanfani himself should be aware that on Dec 24 we conveyed to Papacki that we had given firm orders not repeat not to bomb within ten nautical miles of point in center of Hanoi for an indefinite period...."
c. We are most grateful to Fanfani for expressing concern that Pope has been informed. We too are concerned over this and would now appreciate Fanfani advice whether we should ourselves indicate to Pope our knowledge that he has been informed. We recognize that it may be desirable not repeat not to indicate such awareness, in order to preserve Fanfani's own sources and channels; however, we are also concerned if Pope may be receiving one-sided account.

....

"2. Saigon should take no action. For security reasons alone, we are trying to get this operation out of Saigon to maximum extent possible....

"3. .... If Rapacki or Michalowski admit that Pope has been informed you should say that you must report this to Washington and have no doubt it will have disturbing effect on security grounds alone...."

RUSK

December 30, 1966

Rapacki tells Gronouski the 10 mile sanctuary has come too late and that the Poles now consider their role "at this stage as terminated."

In Washington, Dobrynin tells Thompson the Soviet Government is "frankly baffled by (US) action in Vietnam.... He said there were many, and he was one, that wondered whether some of our military were deliberately trying to frustrate a policy of moving toward negotiations."

Warsaw 15956 (to SecState), TS/Nodis, 30 December 1966
Section 1 of 2

"1. Rapacki opened by saying Poles have taken further action on my statement of Dec 24, but unfortunately this step could not make up for damage done by previous actions, particularly Air Force, during first part of December.

"2. Rapacki added that 'we have to consider our role at this stage as terminated'."

....
"7. Rapacki said, ... if that step you brought from Washington (on 24 December) had occurred on December 4 -- admittedly after the first bombing of Hanoi -- then I feel personally we would have had the first contact with the DRV behind us. Moreover, I think I have sufficient reasons for my personal feeling. Even between Dec 4 and Dec 13, the matter was again actively being reconsidered. There had been no negative reaction as yet. We know, because we had contact with the proper quarter. The decision regarding breaking off the talks was made after Dec 13...."

....

MemCon, TS/Nodis/MARKSID, 30 December 1966
Participants: Ambassador Dobrynin, USSR
Ambassador Thompson

"I asked the Ambassador if he had brought back any reply to the President's letter to Kosygin. He replied that if he could speak completely off the record he could tell me that a reply had nearly been completed and that it was one we would have liked but then the bombing of Hanoi had occurred and this draft had been torn up and another one of quite a different character started. He said he had seen the report from their Embassy in Hanoi and that there was no doubt in the Soviet minds as a result of this report that our bombs had fallen on Hanoi itself...a reply would be made in due course."

....

"The Ambassador remarked that the initial stages of this affair had given the Soviet Government considerable hope and he said rather cryptically that they had other reasons for some optimism but that our action in bombing Hanoi had spoilt everything. I pointed out that our targets were selected several weeks in advance and that it had been pure coincidence that the attacks on the targets near Hanoi had occurred at this time.

"The Ambassador said that his Government was frankly baffled by our actions in Viet-Nam and did not know how to judge our policy. He said there were many,
and he was one of them, that wondered whether some of our military were deliberately trying to frustrate a policy of moving toward negotiations or whether our policy really was one of military victory."

December 31, 1966

Porter suggests from Saigon that we switch to a more trustworthy channel, from the Poles to the Canadians.

Saigon 14702 (to SecState), TS/Nodis
31 December 1966

"1. We have been watching with increasing puzzle­ment the Polish Minuet danced by Rapacki.... We cannot disregard possibility that Poles constantly manipulated terms of understanding whether involving 'ten points' or later attempts to add provisos. Rapacki's frequent return to question of cessation of bombing and his failure to arrange contact with Hanoi are suspicious."

"3. With the breakdown of the Polish channel... we suggest Department consider bringing in another party more trustworthy as an intermediary from US point of view...."

"6. We lean in favor of the Canadians. It just so happens that the Canadian Commissioner Victor Moore is going to Hanoi on January 6 to spend a few days making his farewell calls at the end of his tour...."

January 3, 1967

Goldberg gives the US view of Marigold to U Thant, who promises to hold it in confidence.
As incidental intelligence, U Thant mentions that Peter, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, was visited in Budapest by Le Duan (Secretary General of the Lao Dong) early in December. Le Duan took a very hard line, much harder, Peter believes, than would Trinh, the DRV Foreign Minister. The latter had been expected, but urgent problems in Hanoi detained him and LeDuan came instead.

USUN 3458 (to SecState), TS/Modis, 3 January 1967

"As agreed upon with the Secretary, I had an extensive discussion with U Thant this afternoon lasting almost 1-1/2 hours.

"I gave him the full account of Marigold,...."

....

"Syg assured me that he would keep this in confidence and I do not believe that we need be concerned about his making a public disclosure absent any additional dramatic events."

....

"...he told me that when FM Peter of Hungary was at the UN, Peter had told Syg that they were expecting a visit from the North Vietnamese FM in Budapest in early December. Syg said that he had since been advised by the Hungarians -- presumably the Hungarian UN Rep -- that the North Vietnamese FM found it impossible make the visit because of urgent problems at home. In his place Hanoi dispatched the Syg of the Communist Party who visited Budapest early last month and who has since returned to Hanoi. Hungarians reported that Syg of Communist Party took a very hard line about settlement of Vietnamese conflict -- a harder line than they believe would have been taken by North Vietnamese FM. Of possible interest to US in this connection was the observation of Syg of Communist Party that it was by no means certain that the NLF would support any peace proposal which might be acceptable to Hanoi. Syg observed that this was a similar line taken by North Vietnamese Rep in Algiers in September of last year as reported to him by his Algerian sources.

....

GOLDBERG
January 4, 1967

Rusk soothes George Brown's injured feelings over finding that he was not the sole intermediary for the Phase A-Phase B de-escalation proposal.

State 112632 (to Amembassy London), TS/Nodis 4 January 1967
PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

"Please deliver following personal message to Foreign Secretary George Brown: QTE Dear George:
Thank you for your message. I do want to clear up one point, namely, that there was nothing on which we could have informed you prior to your visit to Moscow. Your visit came at the time of Lewandowski's visit to Hanoi but before we had any information whatever from him on his visit. We understand he was in Hanoi most of the last half of November, and our first report upon his return to Saigon was received in a meeting on December 1. In fact, we gave you for your trip a major concession to the other side in the form of a two-phased proposal in which we would stop the bombing if they would agree that subsequently there could be a de-escalation of the violence. I am sorry if there has been any misunderstanding on this point. With personal regards, Sincerely, Dean Rusk. UNQTE."

RUSK

January 4, 1967

Gronouski takes issue with Porter, that the Canadians replace the Poles as our channel to Hanoi because they are more "trustworthy." He considers the Poles better suited to the mission because they carry more weight in Hanoi.

Warsaw 1631 (to SecState), TS/Nodis, 4 January 1967
Ref: Saigon 14702

"3. .... The fact that Poles presumably acted in Hanoi's interests in attempting to extract from US best possible terms prior to actual negotiations is no basis for concluding that Poles were not interested in initiating Warsaw talks as soon as feasible."
Feasibility, however, depended on Hanoi's agreement, and I submit Poles had no reason on their own initiative to delay that agreement ten minutes....

"4. Given this analysis, I cannot conceive of Canada or any other friend of the USG being more satisfactory than Poles as intermediary (see also paras 3 and 4, Warsaw 1630); true, they would be more trustworthy from our point of view. But for this reason they would also be even less effective than Poles were in convincing Hanoi. I have no doubt that Poles had access to and exchanges with top officials of NVN, and that they delivered our messages. I am also convinced, especially after Dec 24, that they encouraged Hanoi to meet with us in Warsaw. A trustworthy friend of USG could do no more and I suspect would be able to do much less. What we need is help of someone with more influence on Hanoi than Poles, not less. It is for this reason that I suggested we turn immediately to Soviets."

GRONOWSKI

January 4, 1967

Goldberg gives U Thant and Ignatieff (Canadian Ambassador to the UN) a review of "the entire Marigold episode" along the lines suggested by the Department. (Source: USUN 3465, 1/4/67, TS/nodis)

January 5, 1967

Saigon reports 13 VC incidents in the Saigon-Gia-Don area.

Saigon 14624 (to SecState), TS/Nodis, 5 January 1967

"1. We have been keeping a special watch on incidents and actions in the Saigon Gia-Don area ever since Christmas. As a rough approximation border of Gia-Don province averages about 11 miles from the center of Saigon.

"2. From Dec 28 to Jan 3 there were 13 incidents clearly initiated by VC in the area....

....
"5. .... In order not to call attention to our interest in the 10 mile radius we are using standard statistics derived from police reports which are not always complete or absolutely accurate."

January 5, 1967

Reinhardt gives the Pope a similar review. He stresses that the US has been forthcoming by offering its Phase A-Phase B formula, by affirming Lewandowski's statement of the US position without reciprocal act from the DRV side, and by offering to meet with the DRV to discuss all outstanding issues, and that no military preconditions for the talks were initially asked by the other side. Even now, we are keeping open our suspension of bombing within 10 miles of Hanoi's center. While the DRV has given a negative response, we continue to try to open talks. Secrecy is imperative if this effort is to succeed. We therefore request the Pope's cooperation in maintaining complete discretion.

State 112886 (to Amembassy Rome), S/Nodis
5 January 1967
Eyes Only for Ambassador

"1. Ambassador should see Pope Paul soonest, .... Since Poles, and according to their report Hanoi, have stressed vital need for complete secrecy, USG is deeply conscious of need to maintain rigid security this matter. However, in view of importance these discussions and their possible bearing on other initiatives to which His Holiness is a party, we now believe it essential that His Holiness receive full and accurate account."

"7. At this stage, the US had taken two important steps. It had put forward the possibility of a two-phase handling of the bombing question, together with the possibility of discussing in one setting the whole range of issues including the future situation within South Vietnam. Moreover, the USG had agreed to affirm the statement of its position to Hanoi, subject only to the obvious necessity of interpretation while Hanoi itself had indicated only, as reported to us, that it was prepared to listen to such an affirmation. The USG at this point had not -- and still has not -- received any statement of Hanoi's own views. Moreover, the message conveyed by Lewandowski contained no mention of any prior condition other than secrecy, for the direct contact in Warsaw that was proposed."
14. On December 22, Gronouski again saw Rapacki to convey a new proposal on behalf of the USG. This was that the USG was prepared to undertake that there would be no bombing within ten miles of the center of Hanoi for an indefinite period, if talks with the North Vietnamese could begin shortly; in the original proposal of December 22, this was linked with evidence of good faith in the form of action on the other side with respect to incidents near Saigon. However, when Rapacki demurred to the proposed linkage and asked reconsideration, Gronouski was authorized on December 24 to state that the US had now given firm orders not to bomb within ten miles of the center of Hanoi for an indefinite period. This revised US proposal stated the understanding that, on the basis of what Rapacki had told us, direct talks could now begin shortly. The message also noted that, in judging the good faith of the other side, we would be 'impressed' by similar restraint, for example, with respect to incidents, movement of forces (itself a violation of the Geneva Accords) in the DMZ, or action with respect to infiltration; it was stressed that there were examples, and the phrasing made clear that these were not preconditions. Rapacki indicated that he would convey this message promptly to Hanoi.

15. On December 30 Rapacki reported to Gronouski that Hanoi had given a negative response and was flatly not prepared for talks in Warsaw.

"Summary of Key Points"

6. Most basically of all, the US remains entirely prepared for secret bilateral contacts with Hanoi. Even though Rapacki has stated that he considers the channel now dead, the US order of December 24 remains in force and will so remain for the present. We have in fact reviewed this whole matter carefully with Soviet representatives, pointing out our difficulty in understanding Polish actions at several points. Moreover, we have in mind the continued possibility of constructive action by the Secretary General. For all these reasons, and in the light of our basic view that any disclosure of this whole series of discussions could affect Hanoi's willingness to participate, we have maintained the tightest security on the whole project, will continue to do so, and must ask you in the strongest terms to act in same manner."
January 6, 1967

Saigon is instructed to tell Ky a little more about Marigold, interpreting it primarily as a DRV peace offensive designed to get the bombing stopped and reassuring Ky about our resolution.

Rome is to tell Fanfani that we still hope to open contact with the DRV and it is, therefore, imperative to maintain the strictest security concerning what has happened in the past.

In Warsaw, the Poles tell Gronouski that the December 13-14 attacks tipped the scale in favor of DRV Presidium members who felt that talking with the USG made little sense. Only a complete cessation would restore the necessary level of confidence. On the other hand, if we stopped bombing it should be possible to get negotiations going over Phase B in 3-4 weeks. Gronouski urges the Poles to try again, proposing instead a Phase B agreement between the two sides before the bombing cessation and the opening of talks.

State replies by instructing Gronouski to avoid further initiatives for the time being.

State 114277 (to Amembassy Saigon), TS/Nodis
6 January 1967
EYES ONLY FOR PORTER AND HABIB

"1. ...Canadians on January 2 gave us report they had obtained from U Thant on December 28, and which U Thant had received from Poles on December 23, ....

"2. ...to seek to minimize leak risk, decision was taken to inform Pope, SYG, Canadians, and also British...."

....

"5. Our conclusion is that time has come when it is wise to convey word to Ky that would mitigate any MARIGOLD disclosure or any stories based on Indian or Salisbury matters. Moreover, Salisbury speculation gives us good cover for making statement to Ky now.

"6. Accordingly, you should see Ky if possible, and Tran Van do as well, to say that GVN may be noting wave of speculation on DRV willingness to talk. USG has been receiving a number of third country messages sometimes based on conversations with DRV representatives,
from which third nations are on occasion drawing conclusions we do not believe warranted. We ourselves are inclined to believe that DRV, as Salisbury visit alone shows, has become much more sophisticated in building up world opinion against the bombing. They may well be engaged, with help from U Thant, Soviets, and others, in a determined effort to get us to stop the bombing or cut it back in return for hints of DRV willingness to talk. Moreover, DRV may be probing for any change in our position. GVN may be assured that we have no intention of changing our well-known position on conditions for the cessation of bombing, or yielding to pressures on any element of our position. As Ambassador Lodge told Ky last July (Saigon 642 of July 10) we will of course be following up any rumors, however unlikely, that might indicate Hanoi was really seeking a way out. If anything of real substance or importance happens, we will of course be in touch with GVN at once....

RUSK

State 114278 (to Amembassy Rome), TS/Nodis
6 January 1967
Ref: State 112886

"1. .... You should emphasize to Fanfani that although Warsaw phase of exercise appears to have come to temporary conclusion we still mean to continue in whatever manner feasible to promote initiation of substantive discussions with North Vietnamese. Therefore it continued to be of prime importance that strictest security be maintained concerning what has occurred in past."

RUSK

Warsaw 1646 (to SecState), TS/Nodis
6 January 1967
Section 1 of 2

"4. Michalowski opened his reply by observing that at one point in my discussions with Rapacki I
had expressed the hope that someone was putting as much pressure on Hanoi as Poles were placing on us to get negotiations started. He said with some feeling that he could assure me that Poles put heavy pressure on Hanoi and in fact put prestige of GOP on line in getting Hanoi to agree at outset to idea of having talks in Warsaw. He added that he personally knew how much pressure was brought to bear because he was engaged in exercising some of it. He went on to say that leadership in Hanoi is by no means a monolithic group and that from the beginning, when Poles got agreement from Hanoi to initiate talks in Warsaw, it was a very close decision with many of the Hanoi leadership strongly opposed. He said they obtained such agreement after exerting strong pressure and putting Poland's prestige on the line; but it was a delicate matter in Hanoi, implying that agreement was by a narrow margin among the leadership. He said at this point the Poles had been able to convince Hanoi to have at least a small degree of confidence in intentions of U.S. He added that bombing of Dec 3 had given a weapon to those in Hanoi who had not wanted to agree to negotiations in first place. He said it was for this reason that Poles had repeatedly conveyed to Lodge and me their fear of negative effects of a repetition of Dec 3 bombing. But he said even after Dec 3 when bombing was explained by Lodge as no new departure but simply something in the military pipeline, Poles were able to prevail in Hanoi to keep possibility of talks open, and 'believe me we talked to them several times a day to keep pressure on them and convince them.' But he said bombing of Dec 13-14 'undercut our whole argument, destroyed that little bit of confidence that existed in Hanoi about intentions of U.S., and left us wide open to charges of being completely naive.' He said with bombing of Dec 13-14 those who had initially been skeptical about negotiations were given a powerful tool to support their case and in fact prevailed. He added that even with Dec 3 bombing, if we had been able to interval between Dec 3 and 13 to come in with the message we did come in with on the 24th, that part of leadership in Hanoi which wanted negotiations would have prevailed and he is confident that talks would have happened. But he said by Dec 24 a whole new condition existed; 'we were accused of being naive and had lost our effectiveness and those who on Dec 3 had been able to control situation and move toward negotiations were by this time discredited.' Thus he said situation by Dec 24 in Hanoi had so changed that it was
impossible to go back to Dec 1 or the Post-Dec 3 period. Now he said he feels that only stopping NVN bombing completely will restore influence of those who are interested in negotiations. He said if bombing stopped Poles would be willing to try for a third time and that he is quite confident that three or four weeks thereafter negotiations between U.S. and Hanoi on Phase B could become a reality. He said, 'short of this, I am very pessimistic of any effective role we could play, given pressure we had exerted in Nov and Dec and the undercutting of our position in Hanoi by events of Dec 13-14.' He went on to say that he will never understand how this could possibly have happened but 'this is past history, I guess.'

GRONOUSKI

Warsaw 1646 to State
Section 2

"Conversation between Michalowski and Gronouski.

"Michalowski said that the situation had now entirely changed. The Poles, he said, had been able to convince Hanoi to go on with the possibility of contact after the December 3rd U.S. bombings, but that the bombings of December 13 and 14 had made the future of negotiations between the DRV and the U.S. very bleak. He now maintained that only a complete cessation of U.S. bombings will restore the necessary level of confidence needed to get negotiations started. He added that Hanoi's original decision to talk with the U.S. in Warsaw had been hotly contested in the Presidium and that the bombings had now persuaded those who wanted to talk with the U.S. that there was little sense in doing so.

"Gronouski noted that this now put the parties back where they had started from. He suggested that the Poles try to get the thing going again by proposing to the DRV an initial Phase B agreement prior to the meeting between the U.S. and the DRV in Moscow. This, Gronouski said, would (1) meet Hanoi's insistence on stopping the bombing before talks began, and (2) meet the U.S. desire for some sort of indication that talks would occur in order to stop the bombing.

95
State 114370 (to Amembassy Warsaw), TS/Nodis
6 January 1967
Ref: Warsaw's 1648

"1. In view of complex of developments relating to Viet-Nam problem we would like you to avoid for the present any further initiatives along lines section 2 reftel."

....

"3. It has been our conception that... Hanoi's actions under Phase B would be expected to be generally equivalent to our actions in Phase B plus repeat plus our cessation of bombing of North Viet-Nam."

....

RUSK

January 9-10, 1967

Saigon and Rome carry out their instructions to brief the GVN, the Pope and Fanfani. The results reported are satisfactory.

In Washington, we learn that Brown is still very hurt. Bundy points out how complex the matter is and explains the necessity for the US to manage its own role.

Saigon 15204 (to SecState), TS/Nodis
9 January 1967
Ref: State 114277

"1. I sent Habib to see Tran Van do to convey substance paragraph 6 reftel. This was done, rather than a direct approach to Prime Minister, to keep our dialogue with GVN in appropriate low key....

"2. He was pleased to note our assurance that we have no intention of changing our position on cessation of bombing...."
Rome 3531 (to SecState), S/ nodis
9 January 1967

"2. The Pope reiterated his deep appreciation
of being informed.... He told me that he had publicly
encouraged the Wilson-Brown initiative because they
had officially informed him of it. He had been unable
to do the same with respect to U Thant’s efforts
because he had not been officially advised of them.
He had however sent a private message to the Secretary
General to avoid any feeling on his part that the Pope
was showing preferences with respect to various
initiatives for peace."

REINHARDT

Rome 3571 (to SecState), T3/ nodis
10 January 1967
Ref: State 114278

"1. I saw Fanfani last night Jan 9 and carried
out instructions in ref tel. He told me that shortly
after the New Year, Polish Ambassador had informed
him of the interruption of the procedural talks in
Warsaw and had said that it was impossible to expect
North Vietnamese to enter into discussions with the
US as long as the bombing of North Vietnam continued.
Fanfani said he had taken strong exception to this
statement and had pointed out that US proposal envis­
gaged termination of bombing and that Poles had known
this all along...."

REINHARDT

State 118905 (to Amembassy London), S/ nodis
10 January 1967

"2. Dean said Brown still very hurt over our
failure to tell him we were conveying new two-stage
proposal on stopping bombing through Lewandowski channel at same time that Brown was going to Moscow with it. Brown did not wish to raise direct with me, hence Bundy.

"3. Bundy made following points in reply, which we now assume will go direct to Brown and also to PM:

a. We gave proposal to Lewandowski on 13th or 14th and to Brown on 16th....

b. ...we felt that we should honor Polish insistence that L channel be kept totally secure,....

c. Brown message was the clear and solid one we were sure would get through. Moreover, Brown was armed in the rest of our letter to discuss the underlying principles in depth, as L was not. Brown could have a real exchange of views on the basis of total knowledge of our position.

d. In response to Dean remark that Soviets must have known of message to L, and that this perhaps accounted for cross-examination of Brown's authority to talk for us, Bundy said that we did not see how Brown's opportunity could have been prejudiced by this even if true...we had always regarded Soviets as much more serious and responsible, and Gromyko in October had responded to Secretary's question which Eastern Europeans were closest to Hanoi by saying pointedly: 'We are.'

"4. ..... Speaking on private basis, Bundy added that we recognized absolute obligation never to put British in false position and hence to provide them with all information they needed for any contacts they had. This applied to forthcoming Kosygin visit. At same time, we were playing a multiple chess game and could not be expected to cut the British in on all boards at all times....

"5. Bundy then...reminded Dean of account Secretary had given Friday night of our confidential read-out from Salisbury, in which Pham Van Dong's unpublished parts of interview had spoken of Hanoi taking 'an appropriate stand' and also said 'we know what we should do' if US stopped bombing; Secretary had told Dean this was same formula used last summer to Sainteny and that, since Pham Van Dong resolutely refused to elaborate, it
was at most atmospherics and did not get us much further. Since Friday night report to Dean, there had been following developments:

a. Baggs-Ashmore team had come out of Hanoi and would be giving us their report this week....

b. Sainteny had made strong pitch to go to Hanoi to pursue what would happen if bombing stopped and to get general reading. We were taking him up on this and would be arming him with the two-phase proposal ....

c. Thompson would be talking Vietnam seriously in Moscow, probably this week...."

"7. In light of all this, I am seeking authority for you to see Wilson soonest, perhaps Monday...."

"11. For your call on Wilson, you should know that he has sent two-sentence message to President speaking of his talk with you on matter seriously affecting our relationships...."

RUSK

January 18, 1967

Brown has forgiven us.

London 5692 (to SecState), TS/Nodis
18 January 1967
FOR SECRETARY FROM COOPER

"2. All is well. No apologies from me. No abuse from Brown. No whining from PM...."

BRUCE

January 19, 1967

Salisbury’s interview with Pham Van Dong produces a number of apparently forthcoming statements couched in very general language.
We surmise they are essentially mood music, accompanying a strong attempt to get us to stop bombing without reciprocity. Gronowski is to tell the Poles, if they raise the subject, that there must be reciprocal actions.

State 121586 (to Embassy Warsaw), S/Nodis 19 January 1967

"3. We have also received an extensive account from Harrison Salisbury of his observations in Hanoi, highlighted by Pham Van Dong's response to Salisbury's question as to what actions Hanoi would take if the US stopped bombing, namely 'we will take an appropriate stand.' He also said: (1) if the US 'stops doing harm to the North, we know what we should do'; (2) the moment the 'US puts an end to the war, we will respect each other and settle every question'; and (3) after the cessation of hostilities, there will be 'no lack of generosity on our part.' Our net judgment is that these statements are interesting mood music but do not get us very far. The first two statements are replays of earlier statements to other sources. The latter two appear to be without substance.

"4. At the same time, while we are treating these reports seriously for action purposes, we believe we may be dealing with a strong attempt by Hanoi, perhaps aided consciously by the Poles and in any case sympathized with by the Indians, to get us to stop bombing fully without any reciprocal action except possibly some claimed willingness to talk.

"5. ...if the Poles raise the subject, you leave them in no doubt whatever that any stopping of the bombing on our part requires a clear picture of reciprocal actions. Repeat actions that amount to an equitable reduction of hostilities."

Rusk

January 19, 1967

Estabrook of the Washington Post files a story from Ottawa which apparently alludes to Marigold: "Canadian authorities blame some of the difficulty (in beginning US-DRV talks) on the accidental US bombings of Hanoi in mid-December. Private soundings then underway were disrupted, they say, and the attitude in North Vietnam appeared to harden...."
Paris Herald Tribune, 20 January 1967
Estabrook - "Ottawa Sees Hanoi Ready to Ease War" -
Ottawa, Jan 19

"Some high Canadian officials believe that North Vietnam is now prepared to de-escalate the war in the south if the U.S. halts bombing in the North. This is essentially what United Nations Secretary General U Thant and others have been saying for some time, but there are two important distinctions: first, Canada has a representative on the ICC who regularly visits Hanoi and talks directly with authorities there; second, Canada is a close friend and ally and does not want to see the U.S. disadvantaged. The key unresolved question authorities here assert is how soon after a bombing halt a reciprocal move by NVN would take place. This move could be an end to the infiltration of the south, where U.S. sources say there are 20 identified North Vietnamese regiments, but it probably could not be expected immediately. These conclusions persist despite the fact that feelers for peace discussions have produced nothing tangible so far and are in abeyance at the moment. Canadian authorities blame some of the difficulty on the accidental U.S. bombings of Hanoi in mid-December. Private soundings then underway were disrupted they say and the attitude in North Vietnam appeared to harden. Now they cannot be sure whether North Vietnam wants to talk seriously because of the propaganda success it has enjoyed through world protests at the bombing. Nevertheless, they would take the chance on the ground that discussions, once started, and even with North Vietnam's unacceptable 4-points as part of the agenda, would inevitably broaden. They do not believe that Hanoi has really retracted its offer to make the 4-points a basis for discussion rather than a mandatory outline for settlement. Although they believe that the U.S. must be a bit more flexible, they do not believe that a bombing halt must be unconditional. They view as a distinct advance the U.S. offer to halt the bombing upon some sign, public or private, that the other side would be willing to make some comparable move. 'If I were the President,' said one high Canadian official, 'I would simply announce that the bombing had been stopped with no reference to conditions. If nothing developed over a period or if NVN took advantage of the situation the bombing of military targets could always be resumed and the world would know that the U.S. had tried.' Canada's own confidential initiatives on VN have
been centered in the ICC in which it shares responsibility with Poland and India. The Canadian Representative, Victor Moore, has just been summoned home after a 10-day visit to Hanoi and will be replaced by Norman Dier. Simultaneously, Canada is pressing Poland to agree to a meeting of the ICC powers at an Ambassadorial level in the hope that this will lead to a meeting of foreign ministers. Poland last week rejected an Indian suggestion for a conference in New Delhi."

January 20-21, 1967

Saigon continues to check on VC incidents in Saigon-Gia Dinh area. There may be some diminution. Permission is requested, therefore, to inform Westmoreland about Marigold so that he may participate more effectively in the incident watch.

State doubts that there has been a real VC slowdown and does not wish to enlarge the circle privy to details of Marigold.

Saigon 16144 (to SecState); TS/Nodis 20 January 1967
Ref: Saigon 14694

"1. A continuing check on VC incidents in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area raises question of whether there is not some diminution in number of incidents initiated by VC since January 4. This report is a sequel to that given ref tel. (underlining supplied)

"2. As best we can determine there have been five incidents of this sort from January 4 to 20 as follows:

A. January 4; Cholon; Body of Policeman found. Presumed to have been victim of terrorist act.

B. January 5; Go Vap (5 km from Saigon); Two U.S. soldiers injured when terrorists tossed grenade into their jeep.

C. January 6; Thu Duc (11 km from Saigon); Two ARVN soldiers injured when their steamroller exploded a mine.

D. January 13; Thu Duc (11 km from Saigon); National Police apprehended two VC in terrorist attempt against equipment, Inc. facility. One VC killed; other captured."
E. January 18; Eastern Gia Dinh Province (16 km northeast of Saigon); Vietcong platoon attacked three bridge sites, slightly damaged one. Four friendly wounded.

"3. The question now arises whether we are seeing a VC pause in the area ten miles around Saigon as a response to our own action in the Hanoi area. So far the answer on the surface would appear to be negative, but the number of incidents is small recently and some of them may not be properly counted as either VC initiated or within the ten mile limit, e.g., items A and E in Paragraph 2.

"4. General Westmoreland is not aware of the Marigold Exercise. He is, therefore, not aware of any connection between the Hanoi bomb-free area and our search for an equivalent VC pause in Saigon area. I would like to be able to tell him that we have made such a proposal to Hanoi, without revealing the Marigold context. I think we will be able to analyze VC actions in the Saigon area better with his help and, more significantly, we might possibly be able to use the knowledge to our own military advantage."

LODGE

State 123193 (to Embassy Saigon), S/Hodis
21 January 1967
Ref: Saigon 15017 and 16144

"1. Reur 16144, our impression is that recent action not far from Tan Son Nhat may have cancelled out your impression that there may be a real slowdown of any sort on other side. Moreover, we would prefer not to enlarge circle privy to details in this series. Can you not create a special quiet watch on incident rate within designated radius of Saigon on general basis without informing Westmoreland? ...."

....

RUSK

January 23, 1967

In Moscow, Podgorny says that mediation by the USSR would be fruitless until the bombing stopped. With respect to Thompson's question
about what the DRV or USSR would do if we did stop bombing, Podgorny suggests we stop and see. Thompson draws attention to the agreements about Laos, which were not kept by the other side.

Moscow 3159 (to SecState), S/Medis
23 January 1967

"4. .... Podgorny then asked whether end to Vietnam war was in sight.

"5. I replied we all very much hoped war would end soon and also hoped USSR could help us in bringing this about.... Podgorny said it was difficult expect something new and stressed that since main parties to conflict were US and Vietnam one could hardly count on mediation. He then said he did not exclude possibility of Vietnam taking certain steps but pointed out pre-condition for that would be at least minimum move by US, such as, initially, cessation of bombings. Since no such move evident, hardly anyone could mediate.

"6. I said.... It would be helpful if we knew at least when a response could be expected. Also, as Secretary had said to Dobrynin, it would be interesting to know what USSR would do if we stopped bombings and other side continued its activities.

"7. Podgorny asserted US had always placed conditions on cessation of bombings. US had said it would stop bombings if other side gave certain guarantees....

"8. .... As to reference to guarantees if we stopped bombing, we did not ask for guarantees but only for indication as to what would happen in response. For reason I mentioned earlier, this important to us. Podgorny interjected we could stop bombings and then we would see. I continued that in considering situation we had also to keep in mind fact that despite agreements which had been reached on Laos, Laotian territory had been used by North Vietnam to infiltrate south....

THOMPSON
January 27, 1967

Fried, the NY Daily News correspondent, tells Lodge in Saigon that he knows of Gronouski's contact with the Poles in Warsaw.

Saigon 16677 (to SecState), TS/Nodis
27 January 1967

"Joseph Fried, Viet-Nam correspondent of the New York Daily News, told me on Friday that he 'knows' that Ambassador Gronouski and the Polish Government had been having conversations about settling the war in Viet-Nam."

LODGE

January 29, 1967

Saigon continues to feel that VC incidents in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area may have abated.

Saigon 16785 (to SecState), 8/Nodis
29 January 1967

Ref: A. Saigon 16144
    B. State 123193

"1. This is another in the series of reports we have been providing on VC initiated incidents within ten miles of Saigon. We shall send these reports each week.

"2. For the period January 21-27 within the zone there were four incidents that can be characterized as VC initiated:

A. January 22, four miles west of Saigon, an unknown number of enemy fired two rifle grenades at police station, wounded 2 VN civilians.

B. January 23, Gia Dinh City, unknown person threw grenade at house, no casualties.

C. January 23, 9 miles west of Saigon, booby trap, 2 VN killed and two wounded.

D. January 24, Saigon, unknown person threw grenade, wounded three VN civilians."
"3. In addition to these incidents, there were two others in the area resulting from VN police and ARVN making a sweep and running on to VC. These do not meet the criteria of being VC initiated.

"4. With respect to the action not far from Tan Son Nhut on January 20 (cited para one ref B), we have looked into this. The record of the action shows that elements of two ARVN battalions on a search and destroy mission encountered a VC force nine miles west northwest of Saigon. The ensuing fight stemmed from that contact. There is no information as to whether VC was on the way to Tan Son Nhut, or any other special target. No available information as to which side fired first shot. ARVN units, however, were definitely on the prowl. From interrogation prisoners taken day later VC force was sixth battalion from VC 165 Regiment which is regularly present on fringes Gia Dinh Province.

"5. We have also examined the record of VC initiated incidents during the area for the month of November 1966. During that period there were 11 incidents, ranging from the shelling of Saigon on November 1, National Day, to platoon and squad attacks to isolated grenades. Of the 11 incidents, seven can be characterized as serious in the sense that they were obviously well-planned attacks by small VC units."

LODGE

February 1-2, 1967

Estabrook files a more complete story on Marigold from New York. In private, he gives different versions of the story's source. He apparently first got word of the matter from the Canadians in Ottawa and later confirmed it with U Thant. In one conversation he indicates that he also "had it from a high Polish source... corroborated by 'other Eastern European sources.'" In another, he denies that it "came from the Poles." Goldberg believes the Poles to be the original source of the story and recommends that neither they nor any other Bloc country be used as a channel to Hanoi.

USUN 3947 (to SecState), S/Nodis, 2 February 1967

"Estabrook (Wash Post Correspondent) told Nisoff Feb 2 that his story in Feb 2 Post about Hanoi readiness to talk just prior to Dec 13"
bombing of Hanoi was founded on several sources. He had it from high Polish source which he would not identify. It was corroborated by 'other Eastern European sources.' He had been given similar impression earlier in Jan from Can Fon Min Martin. He had taken story to U Thant who stated his belief that it was correct."

"(In separate brief conversation with Pedersen Estabrook denied story came from Poles. Said it came from Martin, while Estabrook was in Canada, and then from U Thant. Estabrook said he had had story for couple of weeks. In response expression of surprise he had used word 'learned' instead of something like 'alleged', Estabrook indicated this based on evaluations both of Martin and U Thant.)"

"My assessment is that the original source of this story is the Poles themselves. They have quietly been spreading this story throughout the UN; I even got some of it from the Danish Deputy Fon Min the other day, who attributed it to Poles."

"... This leads me to recommendation that we should no longer use Polani or any other Bloc country as channel to Hanoi. It would be far preferable in my opinion to deal directly or through Sovs than to continue with this type of intermediary."

GOLDBERG

State 131692 (to Amembassy Warsaw), O/Nodis 4 February 1967
Ref: Warsaw 1895

"Test of February 4 Washington Post story by Estabrook will reach you in form circlet. Text of February 2 story filed from New York under February 1 dateline follows:
BEGIN TEXT:

"A Polish initiative to establish peace discussions between North Vietnam and the United States failed because of American bombing of the Hanoi area in mid-December, it has been learned on excellent authority.

"Exactly how far the Poles had succeeded in obtaining commitments from Hanoi is not clear, but high-level outsiders who knew about it regarded the initiative as promising before the bombing hardened Hanoi's attitude. QUOTE The Americans bungled it END QUOTE, one informed source stated.

"U.S. officials said that any bombing of non-military targets was accidental, after Western reporters observed damage to civilian areas that the North Vietnamese claimed was caused by U.S. bombing. Since December, U.S. planes have reportedly been ordered to stay away from the Hanoi area unless engaged in self-defense.

"At the moment the Poles are said to have suspended their efforts. They are represented as extremely frustrated, not merely over the effect of the bombing, but more particularly with the uncooperative attitude of Hanoi.

"Recently Poland declined a suggestion of India that representatives of the three countries constituting the International Control Commission in Vietnam - Poland, India and Canada - meet in New Delhi to consider what could be done. Use of the Commission framework to promote peace discussions is an old suggestion of Canadian External Affairs Minister Paul Martin.

"Even after the attitude in Hanoi changed in the wake of the bombing, the Poles kept trying. Among other moves a top Polish diplomat, Jerzy Michalowski, made an unreported visit to the United States in January.

"Whether any American representative saw him cannot be learned, but two Canadian diplomats were sent to talk with him."
"Michalowski, a former delegate to the United Nations and more recently in the Polish Foreign Office, went on a special Mission to Hanoi in January 1966, as the result of the visit to Warsaw of roving U.S. Ambassador W. Averell Harriman.

"Apparently the Polish effort stemmed in part from a conversation between Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki and Martin when the Canadian Foreign Minister visited Warsaw last December.

"All this has transpired outside the United Nations. Although he has been given a mandate by the United States to do what he can to facilitate peace discussions, Secretary General U Thant is said by others to feel that nothing more can be accomplished at the moment.

"Diplomats from 11 non-aligned countries have met here three times within the last 10 days to discuss whether they can undertake any initiative to advance a solution. As a result, Sudanese delegate Fadreddine Mohamed was designated to call on Thant to inquire whether a new initiative would be useful. He reportedly received no encouragement. END TEXT."

RUSK

February 3, 1967

At his press conference, the President says it would not be helpful "to comment on any particular channel or communications at this point." Referring to Hanoi's attitude, he adds, "I must say that I do not interpret any action that I have observed as being a serious effort to either go to a conference table or to bring the war to an end."

New York Times, 3 February 1967
Transcript of the President's News Conference

"Following is a transcript of President Johnson's news conference in Washington yesterday as recorded by The New York Times:

...."
"1. Prospects in Vietnam

Q. We've been reading and writing a good deal lately about diplomacy aimed at a Vietnam settlement. I wonder if you could give us your assessment of the peace front at this time.

A. Mr. (Frank) Cormier of the Associated Press states a question that I know is on the minds of all the people here today and all the people in this country. As you know, I have underlined over and over again the very deep interest of the United States in a prompt and peaceful settlement of all of the problems in Southeast Asia.

I have said many times that we are ready to go more than half way in achieving this result. I would remind all of you that we would welcome a conference in Southeast Asia and this might be a Geneva conference, it could be an all-Asian conference, or any other generally acceptable forum.

We would be glad to see the unconditional discussions to which I referred in my statement of April, 1965, at Johns Hopkins. We would participate in preliminary discussions which might open the way for formal negotiations. We are prepared today to talk about mutual steps of de-escalation. We would be prepared to talk about such subjects as the exchange of prisoners, the demilitarization or the demilitarized zone or any other aspect which might take even a small step in the direction of peace.

We should be prepared to discuss any points which the other side wishes to bring up along with points which we and our allies very much want to raise ourselves, or there could be preliminary discussions to see whether there could be an agreed set of points which could be the basis for negotiation.

So it is against this background that we study very carefully all of the public statements made which appear from time to time and which bear upon Southeast Asia and all the views which we receive from or through other governments.

It would not be helpful to me -- and I do not intend to do so -- to comment on any particular channel or communications at this point. But you may be sure that we are diligent in our search for the possibility of a peaceful settlement.
In all candor I must say that I am not aware of any serious effort that the other side has made in my judgment to bring the fighting to a stop and to stop the war."

"2. Personal Role in Talks

Q. You've been so eloquent in the past about expressing your desire for peaceful negotiations. I'd like to ask you whether or not if you thought it would speed this war down the road to peace whether you would be willing personally to participate in negotiations with some of your opposite numbers, such as the leadership in Hanoi?

A. We have made clear that if the other side desires to discuss peace at any time well we will be very happy to have appropriate arrangements made to see that that's carried out.

Where we would talk and who would talk and what we would talk about are all matters that could be worked out between the two governments involved.

We have made clear to them and to the world the principles that we believe must govern a peace meeting of this kind, and a settlement that we would hope would come out of it like the honoring of the Geneva accords of '54 and '62, the right of self-determination of the people of South Vietnam, and to insure that they are freed from the threat or use of force.

But we have, I must say, as of today, no indication that the other side is prepared in any way to settle on these limited and decent terms. We hope very much that we can have some signals in that direction, but I, in candor, must say that as of now we do not have."

"3. Concessions for Peace

Q. Mr. President, does your expressed willingness to negotiate a peaceful settlement imply any willingness to compromise on any of our stated objectives in that part of the world?

A. I think that any peace agreement will involve understanding on both parts and certain concession on both parts and a certain understanding.

I don't think we can determine those before we come together or through any press conference techniques. I can only repeat what I said in the State
of the Union, that I wish that the conflict in Vietnam was over and I can only repeat what I've said so many times -- I will do anything I can on the part of this Government to go more than halfway to bring it at an end.

I must say that we face great costs, we face agony. We do plan to carry out our efforts out there, we are going to support our troops in the field, we are going to work with our Vietnamese allies toward pacification and constitutional government, but while we're doing that, every hour of every day the spokesmen for this Government are under instructions to explore every possibility for peace.

But I do not want to disillusion any of you and I don't want any of you to be caught by speculation. As of this moment I cannot report that there are any serious indications that the other side is ready to stop the war."

"4. Indications From Enemy

Q. You have three times now used that phrase: "no serious efforts by the other side to bring the war to a close." How would you characterize what has been going on in the last couple of weeks? Do you recognize any signs of maneuverability or fluidity in their position?

A. I see almost every day some speculation by some individual, or some hope or desire expressed by some Government. And I assume that different individuals get different impressions; certainly they have different hopes.

I can only 'speak for myself; John.' And with the information that I have, with the knowledge that's brought to me, I must say that I do not interpret any action that I have observed as being a serious effort to either go to a conference table or to bring the war to an end."

"Q. Would you discuss the reports that there has been a decline in the infiltration rate to the South and say whether you think the bombing has had any effect?

A. Well, I stated in my Baltimore speech in early '65 what we expected to come from the bombing. We felt that it would improve the morale of the people in South Vietnam who felt that they'd almost lost the war. We felt that it would make the North Vietnamese pay a much heavier price for what they were doing and we felt that it would make the infiltration more difficult.
We think it has achieved all of those expressed purposes. We cannot speak with cold assurance on the infiltration and the numbers each day or each week or each month.

In some quarters of the year our indications are that they increase. In other periods of the year -- the next quarter -- then they go down some. I know of nothing that I can conclude as highly significant from the guesses and the estimates that we have made.

Q. Sir, we have said in the past that we would be willing to suspend the bombing of North Vietnam in exchange for some suitable step by the other side. Are you prepared at all to tell us what kind of other steps the other side should take for this suspension of bombing?

A. Just almost any step. As far as we can see, they haven't taken any yet and we would be glad to explore any reciprocal action that they or any of their spokesmen would care to suggest.

We have made one proposal after the other -- we'd like to have a cease-fire; we'd be very glad to stop our bombing as we have on two previous occasions, if we could have any indication of reciprocal action, but as of now they have given none and I assume they are willing to give none until I hear further."

February 4, 1967

In Saigon, the VC are reported to mortar the 7th Precinct and carry out 4 grenade attacks during the period January 28-February 3.

Meanwhile, Ky is distressed by news stories of US-DRV contacts and asks Lodge if we still require concessions in return for a bombing suspension and whether there are "divergences on such matters between Washington and Saigon. Lodge is instructed to reply by giving Ky more background on Marigold, stressing (a) our doubts about the genuineness of the Polish contact, (b) on the other hand our obligation to follow all potential leads, and (c) the need to avoid publicity during this "extremely interesting and delicate" phase of diplomacy. In connection with the latter, his attention is to be drawn to the "recent public comments of Presidential Advisor Walt Rostow."
TOP SECRET - NODIS

Saigon 17295 (to SecState), S/Nodis 4 February 1967

"Following is the record of VC initiated incidents within 10 miles of Saigon during the period Jan 28 to Feb 3.

A. Jan 30, Saigon-grenade superficially wounds two US servicemen.

B. Jan 30, Saigon-grenade injures one US serviceman and one VN civilian.

C. Jan 31, 5 miles NE of Saigon-grenade killing policemen and civilian, wounding schoolteacher.

D. Feb 1, Saigon-six mortar shells fired into seventh precinct, wounding seven VN civilians.

E. Feb 2, Saigon-VC small arms and grenade attack on seventh precinct outpost, one civilian killed."

LODGE

Saigon 17317 (to SecState), S/Exdis 4 February 1967

Read: CINCPAC (FROM CINC-EXCLUSIVE FOR ADM SHARP)

"1. During a call on Ky....

"2. ... he said, 'Does Washington agree that there should be no publicity of any kind until there has been a concrete offer from the Communist side?'

"3. I said that I felt sure that Washington was very much in favor of not having publicity, since publicity not only presented awkward problems for us and for the Government of South Vietnam, but also made it difficult to get any kind of a peaceful understanding with Hanoi. He agreed that we should avoid forcing Hanoi up against the wall by making them lose face.

"4. It was evident that his attention had been attracted by the statements of Senator Robert Kennedy and the apparent leaks of the messages from Cairo and New Delhi to a point where he wanted to be sure that there were no 'divergencies' between Washington and Saigon. He asked whether we still believed that in
exchange for a bombing suspension we wanted some sort of concession on their part. Did we envisage a bargaining process or were we to suspend bombing with no quid pro quo?

"5. I called his attention to the President's press conference and to the fact that on three separate occasions during the press conference, the President had said that so far there was nothing of substance from Hanoi...."

....

LODGE

State 131715 (to Ambassy Saigon), S/Nodis 4 February 1967
Ref: Saigon 17317

....

"3. Believe you should also give Ky fill-in generally.... For his information, story is, as he may imagine, quite incomplete and misleading in a number of respects.... We were never sure whether the Poles were speaking for Hanoi or entirely for themselves and we concluded ultimately that the exercise had been primarily a fishing expedition by the Poles in order to get us to change our position with respect to bombing of North Viet-Nam.... Throughout this exercise we had not undertaken to make any change in our basic position. At the same time we had indicated a readiness to consider the possibility of direct talks without conditions with North Viet-Nam with the objective of bringing about a peaceful settlement. You should add that we would naturally be in touch with the GVN if there were really substantive developments in this field.

"4. With reference to Ky's query (para 2 of ref tel) about Washington views on publicity, suggest you call to his attention recent public comments of Presidential Advisor Walt Rostow. After referring to 'extremely interesting and delicate' phase of diplomatic probes now under way Rostow noted that publicity could destroy effectiveness of behind-the-scenes efforts to ascertain Hanoi's intent and added 'this is a bad time to talk about any particular stand which might turn out to be a negotiating situation.'"

RUSK
Washington Post, 5 February 1967
U.S. Is Wary on Report of Peace Bid, by Murrey Marder

"United States attempts to launch peace talks with North Vietnam are now in 'an extremely interesting and delicate phase,'" a White House adviser said yesterday.

"With that comment and variations upon it, the Administration declined to confirm or deny a report that the United States and North Vietnam had tried to start peace talks in Warsaw in December, at American initiative.

"Walt W. Rostow, President Johnson's special assistant for national security affairs, said:

"'This is an extremely interesting and delicate phase in what is or what might turn out to be a negotiating process. Nothing has yet happened that would justify us in saying we have a serious offer to negotiate. This is a bad time to discuss any particular negotiating track.'

"Lack of Vigor. Rostow's comments were made during a panel debate at a conference of college newspaper editors at the Sheraton-Park Hotel. Another panelist, Richard N. Goodwin, who had served as an adviser to both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, charged there was a lack of vigor in the present pursuit of negotiations.

"'If Hanoi wishes to negotiate seriously,' said Rostow, 'your government would not be embarrassed. It would be delighted.'

"Rostow was questioned specifically by the students about the validity of a report in The Washington Post yesterday, by staff writer Robert H. Estabrook at the United Nations.

"It reported that an authoritative Western source said that U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, in Saigon on Dec. 2 and 3, asked a Polish diplomat to set up contacts with North Vietnam. On Dec. 4, the report said, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki said Hanoi agreed to have ambassadorial-level talks with the United States in Warsaw. The report said that Hanoi attached no conditions about first halting the American bombing of North Vietnam."
"Withdrew in Anger. According to the report Hanoi angrily withdrew its agreement after American bombing raids near Hanoi on Dec. 13-14 allegedly hit civilian areas.

"Rostenko declined to get any more specific about that account except to repeat that 'this is a bad time to talk about a particular strand of what might be a negotiation.'

"Other sources sought to emphasize that the frustrated negotiating effort described in the report from the United Nations was only one of many efforts being made to launch talks.

"Some Administration sources said the point in The Washington Post account that they would challenge was that Hanoi had 'agreed' to the Warsaw talks. No official, however, would discuss whether this question of agreement was a matter of differing interpretations or not. There was no challenge by any official of the reported Lodge-initiative to arrange for talks in Warsaw.

"The State Department, in commenting Friday on earlier and considerably less-detailed versions of a similar report by The Washington Post and others said it saw 'no merit' to contentions that the bombing of North Vietnam interfered with efforts to start peace talks.

"In a new comment yesterday the State Department said:

"'As a matter of policy we do not believe it would promote the cause of peace in Vietnam to comment on accounts of any alleged private talks or events relating to them. The President fully characterized the situation at his press conference last Thursday.'

"At that press conference, President Johnson repeatedly said that 'I do not interpret any action that I have observed as being a serious effort to either go to a conference table or to bring the war to an end.' The United States, he said, was anxious 'to explore any reciprocal action' to curb or end the war.

"That comment, Administration sources said, amounted to turning down, as inadequate, a bid by North Vietnam's Foreign Minister in which he said there 'could' be talks
if there was an 'unconditional' end to the bombings of his country.

"Administration officials emphasized that the offer only held out the possibility, not the promise, of talks, in any event.

"The Soviet news agency, Tass, charged yesterday that President Johnson had spurned the 'goodwill' gesture by North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. Tass said the minister had displayed an 'indication of willingness' by the Hanoi regime to talk with the United States.

"The Soviet news agency added:

"'The unwillingness of U.S. ruling circles to stop the criminal bombing of the D.R.V. (North Vietnam) can only be regarded as a refusal to meet around the conference table, and as a sign of their determination to further escalate the aggressive war in Vietnam.'

"Tass's correspondent in Hanoi said President Johnson's statements produced 'legitimate indignation' in Hanoi.'"

February 6-7, 1967

Australia and New Zealand are briefed on Marigold in some detail. More general accounts are given to the GVN and the Manila countries.

Ky accepts our explanation in good spirit, but points to alarm about so-called "peace" talk among Catholic leaders, certain Buddhists and the military in SVN. His and Thieu's strong anti-communism would be reassuring to these elements, he believes.

State 132347 (to Embassy Canberra; Embassy Wellington), TS/Nodis, 6 February 1967
Ref: DEPCINTEL 131700
EYES ONLY FOR EMBASSADOR

"1. On February 4, Bundy separately gave Ambassador Waller and Charge d'Affaires Shepherd a full account of the discussions between USG and Poles about the possibility of direct discussions between USG and Hanoi...."
"27. .... While we may have erred in not informing you fully on this matter, we were guided throughout by the absolute necessity of secrecy in seeking to determine whether Hanoi was in fact prepared to sit down quietly without preconditions....

"28. This full account is being given to Australia and New Zealand, with the request for the preservation of total confidence. A more general account is being given to Saigon and to the Manila countries. We have assured Saigon, as we have repeatedly assured you, that if we should get clear evidence of a serious change in Hanoi's position we would keep them fully informed."

RUSK

Saigon 17482 (to SecState), S/Modis
7 February 1967
Ref: State 131715

"1. Pursuant to your 131715, I called on Prime Minister Ky Tuesday morning...."

....

"3. Ky seemed to accept all of the above in good spirit. He evidently thinks that the purpose of the rather careful wording is to make it possible to achieve some kind of understanding without making Hanoi lose face. In all my many talks with him, he has often voiced his belief that we should be trying to persuade Hanoi and make it easy for them to go along with us, and that we did not want to humiliate them, make them lose face, put them up against the wall.

"4. Changing the subject slightly, he then said that Catholic leaders in Viet-Nam were becoming alarmed by the so-called 'peace' talk which they feared would actually mean military advantage for Hanoi, and were taking an attitude very different from that of the Pope. He was afraid that similar divisions might occur among Buddhists and among the military. The hopeful element of the situation was that 'everyone knew' how strongly anti-Communist he, Ky, and Thieu were."

LODGE
February 7-8, 1967

Wilson comments in Parliament about discussion with the Poles and a definite "peace feeler" last December. Highest levels in Washington fear this may undercut the President's February 3 remarks.

Gronowski takes issue with Goldberg, arguing that the Canadians were probably Estabrook's source and that the Poles remain a better channel for communication with Hanoi.

State 133105 (to Amembassy London), S/Nodis
8 February 1967
FOR AMBASSADOR AND COOPER

"1. Highest levels are deeply disturbed by Wilson reference to December discussions with Poles in Parliamentary response yesterday. Wilson comment is of course widely reported as confirming that some definite 'peace feeler' did exist at that time, and is therefore being construed to 'undercut' President's remarks of last week. Moreover, revelation that Wilson has 'all the details' is bound to have serious complicating effect on our relations with Saigon and with Manila allies, who had not repeat not received any similar full account...."
of the difficulty on the accidental U.S. bombing of Hanoi in mid-December. Private soundings then under way were disrupted, they say, and the attitude in North Vietnam appeared to harden. Also, note that in his Feb 2 article Estabrook speaks of 'high level outsiders' as source, and links Polish peace effort to Martin-Rapacki discussions in December (which is not true, but it does not hurt Martin's image to be case in this role), also, note that Estabrook spoke of Western sources in his Feb 4 story.

....

"5. What does surprise me, if we accept Estabrook's statement that story came from Martin (and I see no a priori reason for Estabrook to implicate Martin and U Thant and protect the Poles), is that Feb 2 story places developments in so unfavorable a light from standpoint of USG...."

....

"6. I am particularly concerned with recommendation in final para of ref tel A, that 'we should no longer use Poland or any other Bloc country as channel to Hanoi.' As I noted in my analysis of Marigold role played by Poland (Warsaw 1631), I too had hoped that Soviets might play an intermediary role. But to my knowledge experience has been that Poles are only Communist country willing to take on this chore...."

GRONOWSKI

February 10, 18, 20, 1967

Sizeable VC incidents within 10 miles of Saigon lead Lodge to suggest that there is no further need to look for indications of reciprocity to our suspension of bombing near Hanoi. He suggests that the 10 mile limit around Hanoi be dropped.

Saigon 17759 (to SecState), S/Nodis
10 February 1967

"Following is the record of VC initiated incidents within ten miles of Saigon during the period February 4 to February 9."

....
TOP SECRET - NODIS

"C. February 6, four miles west of Saigon - unidentified platoon-sized unit fired submachine bursts near police station and then withdrew."

LODGE

Saigon 18329 (to SecState), S/Nodis 18 February 1967

"Following is the record of VC initiated incidents within ten miles of Saigon during the period February 10 to February 15."

LODGE

Saigon 18535 (to SecState), Ts/Nodis 20 February 1967

"2. The recent mortaring in town, other terrorist incidents in the Saigon area, and the likelihood that we will get more, prompts me to suggest we consider informing Hanoi, via the Poles, that we no longer consider ourselves bound by the 10 miles limit."

LODGE

March 3, 1967

Goldberg (accompanied by Lodge) sees D'Orlandi in Saigon, to hear the latter's version of Marigold. His objective is a first-hand confirmation from an independent source of the inaccuracy of the Polish version conveyed to U Thant. D'Orlandi's account, he finds, contains "no
discrepancies from the version we already have. In particular D'Orlandi is quite categoric in stating that the 10 points passed to Hanoi were formulated by Lewandowski, not by Lodge—as Goldberg believes the Poles told U Thant. On the other side, D'Orlandi is of the view that the December 13-14 bombing derailed the Warsaw talks. He expresses great confidence in Lewandowski's integrity.

USUN 4238 (to SecState), S/Nodis
6 March 1967
FROM GOLDBERG

"On March 3, day before leaving Saigon, I arranged entirely private and off record meeting with D'Orlandi, with agreement of and in presence Amb Lodge. My objective was to secure first-hand confirmation from entirely independent source of inaccuracy of Polish version of late November-early December Marigold events, i.e., that it was Lodge who had formulated ten point proposal, Lewandowski transmitted to Hanoi, only to take position subsequently that some of these points needed clarification. (underlining furnished)

"Without any prompting on my part, D'Orlandi really and fully recited course of events. His recital contained no discrepancies from version we already had and he was quite categoric in stating that ten points passed Hanoi by Lewandowski had been formulated by Lewandowski himself."

....

"It is necessary to add, however, that D'Orlandi is of view that bombing of Dec 13-14 derailed Warsaw talks. He also expressed view that it would have furthered progress towards negotiations if Rapacki had not insisted upon transferring venue to Warsaw. D'Orlandi's view is that it would have been preferable to carry on discussions through himself and Lewandowski in Saigon, with Lewandowski commuting to Hanoi.

"D'Orlandi expressed great confidence in Lewandowski's integrity and confirmed that both Lewandowski and he will be leaving Saigon for respective home or other posts."

BUFFUM
March 14, 1967

On returning to New York, Goldberg tries to arrive at a common version of the facts about Marigold with the Polish UN Representative, Tomorowicz. The Polish version agrees with ours that the 10 points were formulated by Lewandowski. Goldberg notes three points of difference, however:

i. Their version does not mention that Lodge indicated the need to clarify certain points at the December 1 meeting in Saigon.

ii. Their version indicates that Lodge first raised clarification at the December 3 meeting, through the "important differences of interpretation" clause.

iii. According to their version, the Poles stressed avoiding intensification of the bombing either before or during talks from the December 1 meeting on.

Goldberg urges Tomorowicz to review Marigold with Warsaw so that these factual differences can be cleared up.

USUN 4330 (to SecState), S/Nodis
15 March 1967

"1. I arranged meet with Polish Perm Rep Tomorowicz Mar 14 PM shortly after he had called on SYG and just before he was due leave for roughly ten days consultation in Warsaw."

....

"3. Specifically, I noted there is one point of some importance re developments in early Dec on which there are two differing versions, namely, who formulated ten points which Lewandowski presented to Hanoi...."

"1. I said I had talked with D'Orlandi privately while in Saigon, that D'Orlandi had reviewed Marigold developments without any prompting from me, and that his review entirely confirmed our understanding of facts on this point. Tomorowicz said that, in principle, facts of this point as we understood them were quite accurate. (underlining furnished)"

"5. His further comments, however, engendered discussion of Marigold developments throughout Dec which revealed three other points on which we and Poles have differing facts, specifically:
A) Polish version, as presented by Tomorowicz, makes no mention of fact that at Dec 1 mtg in Saigon, when Lewandowski presented ten points to Lodge, Lodge raised question of need to clarify some of points, noting Points B and H in particular. (underlining furnished)

B) According Polish version, Lodge first mentioned need for clarification at Dec 3 mtg, when he said there were important differences of interpretation on 'serious matters' in ten points, although Lodge would not reply when asked to identify points in need of clarification. (underlining furnished)

C) According Polish version, Poles placed stress on relation between bombing and progress toward US-NVN talks from Dec 1 mtg on: Lewandowski allegedly told Lodge on Dec 1 that there must be no intensification of bombing either before or during talks; at Dec 3 mtg with Lodge, he allegedly made strong representations re Dec 2 bombings; and, on Dec 5, Rapacki allegedly made another strong representation re bombing to Gronowski, claiming Dec 2 and 3 bombings had not ruled out chances of direct US-NVN talks but had certainly made progress toward talks more difficult. (underlining furnished)

"6. As these differences came to light during discussion, I presented our understanding of facts and urged Tomorowicz to review Marigold developments while in Warsaw so that we could clear up factual differences between us...."

GOLDBERG

March 16-17, 1967

Fanfani writes Rusk that Lewandowski has proposed a new initiative to D'Orlandi. Lodge is instructed to follow up, but he replies that D'Orlandi has left Saigon for Rome. Reinhardt is therefore instructed to contact D'Orlandi later in Rome.

Rome 4767 (to SecState), S/Modis, 16 March 1967

"My Dear Secretary of State,

....

125
"I would feel remiss in my duty if I failed to inform you of what Ambassador D'Orlandi has communicated to me after meeting with Lewandowski, a few days ago, and reviewing with him the current Vietnamese situation. D'Orlandi felt he had to tell me that, in the present circumstances, a resumption of negotiations would require a three week long suspension of bombings and the admission, on the part of the United States, that they are still willing to accept the well known ten points.

"D'Orlandi adds that the duration of the suspension could be kept secret and that it should not be difficult to secure a substantive counterpart from Hanoi, to be presented as a compensation for some other, purely token, concession from the United States."

State 156826 (to Embassy Saigon), 5/Nodis 16 March 1967

"1. By now you will have seen...message from FonMin Fanfani to Secretary Rusk....

"2. Points of greatest interest on which we most want clarification are following:

(a) When would the negotiations be resumed, after suspension had run three weeks or at initiation of three-week period? If the former, should it be assumed that suspension would be expected to continue as negotiations proceeded?

(b) What would be the 'substantive counterpart' from Hanoi? Presume it would not merely be resumption of negotiations but rather some de-escalatory action affecting infiltration, guerrilla or terror activity in the South or the like.

(c) In phrase 'resumption of negotiations' does this refer to (i) direct DRV/US talks which were to have been undertaken in Warsaw last December 2 and which we welcomed, or (ii) resumption of arid exchanges between Gronowski and Rapacki?"
TOP SECRET - NODIS

(a) What is entailed in 'accepting' the ten points? We assume this means nothing more than that we have in no way receded from acceptance in terms we made known to Lewandowski and Rapacki in November and December.

"3. Please review these matters with D'Orlandi...."

Saigon 20590 (to SecState), S/Nodis
16 March 1967

"1. In response to your 156826, D'Orlandi left Saigon yesterday, Thursday, March 16...."

LODGE

State 158132 (to Amembassy Rome), S/Nodis
17 March 1967
Ref: (a) Saigon 20590
(b) Rome 4767
(c) State 156826

"2. .... The Secretary would be most grateful if Minister Fanfani would let Ambassador Reinhardt know when Ambassador D'Orlandi has reached Rome so that the two Ambassadors might discuss Lewandowski's approach.

"3. For Reinhardt. Assuming the arrangement outlined above works out, we would appreciate your following up with D'Orlandi along lines sketched out Deptel 156826...."

....

RUSK

March 19, 1967

Rapacki has told Wilson and Brown that (1) Lodge first accepted Lewandowski's 10 points, then reneged through the "important differences of interpretation" clause, and (2) the December 13-14 bombing had sabotaged the entire project. State cables a rebuttal: (1) Lodge reserved the US position on the 10 points when first presented, December 1; hence he did not renge, (2) Although Lewandowski complained on December 3 about our bombing Hanoi, "there was no suggestion that the prospect for DRV-US talks depended in any direct way on such matters."
State 158246 (to Amembassy London), TS/NoDis
19 March 1967
Ref: London's 6998 and 7172 and State's 146303

"Account in London's 6998 of Rapacki's conversations with Brown and Wilson about the events of December provide further evidence of Rapacki's continuing vindictiveness. We assume that his feelings will badly disolor the Polish contribution to a 'more detailed post mortem' between the British and the Poles.

"During his London visit, Rapacki evidently made two charges against us: (1) Lodge had reneged after giving firm agreement to the Lewandowski Ten Point package and (2) the December 13-14 bombing had sabotaged the entire project.

"The cable exchanges between Lodge and the Department in the early days of December provide an absolutely clear record that Lodge did not repeat not agree to Lewandowski's version of the Ten Points and therefore did not repeat not renage. On December 1, Lewandowski told Lodge he had presented to Hanoi his understanding of the US position based on his conversations with Lodge on November 14 and earlier. He then read his Ten Points, which Lodge recorded precisely. Lodge was not, however, shown a paper containing the Ten Points.

"At the end of his statement, Lewandowski asked Lodge if he had correctly stated the US point of view. Lodge responded carefully that 'obviously on a matter of such importance, I would have to refer to my government for a definitive reply, but I could say off hand that much of what he cited was in keeping with the spirit of our policy.' He then pointed out specific difficulties with Point 2 and Points 8. Neither in this nor in later discussions with Lodge did Lewandowski indicate any misunderstanding of the qualified nature of Lodge's response to his presentation of the Ten Points. For example, Lodge informed him on December 3 that our Embassy in Warsaw would contact the DRV representative on December 6 to confirm that the Lewandowski formulation broadly represented our position, although several specific points were subject to important differences of interpretation....

"... It is also worthy of note that D'Orlandi told the Secretary on December 9 that Rapacki had
'tried to be clever' and to get the US to withdraw all its reservations about the Lewandowski formulation before he established a direct contact in Warsaw between the US and DRV representatives....

"... It is true that on December 3, Lewandowski under instructions, complained to Lodge about bombings in the vicinity of Hanoi but there was no suggestion that the prospect for DRV-US talks depended in any direct way on such matters.

"Subsequently, while Rapacki haggled, we were blocked from a direct contact with the DRV at which this and all other pertinent subjects could have been discussed...."

KATZENBACH

April 7, 1967

Reinhardt reviews prospects for resuming contact via Lewandowski with D'Orlandi in Rome. State instructs him to arrange a three-party meeting when Lewandowski passes through Rome in May.

Rome 5266 (to SecState), S/Nodis, 7 April 1967
State 164750 (Ref)

"1. In lengthy private conversation today at villa, D'Orlandi exposed his conviction that possibility to achieve something through Lewandowski was good and should be pursued without undue delay since Pole would be leaving Saigon in May. D'Orlandi believed lesson of last try was that more details should be clarified and mailed down through Lewandowski channel before actual negotiations between principals initiated. No doubt he had discussed these and other views in detail with Lodge. It was clear to me that D'Orlandi considered himself essential link to Lewandowski channel.

"2. Regarding specific questions (State 156826, para 2), he stated:

A. Lewandowski thought that suspension of bombing should be initiated not later than his arrival in Hanoi to sound North Vietnamese and that three or four weeks would be necessary to allow sufficient time for initial exchanges, suspension would of course be without any commitment, and whether it continued further would presumably depend on whether constructive developments take place.
B. 'Substantive contribution' would, he imagined, be something specific in military field which US Command considered useful.

C. 'Resumption of negotiations' he thought meant US/DRV but was not sure that Rapacki/Gronowsky stage could be completely finessed if venue were Warsaw.

D. 'Accepting ten points' he understood simply to mean reaffirmation of previous position including US reservations on interpretation and assurance that there had been no recession in US position.

"3. D'Orlandi said Lewandowski had revealed nothing rtp nothing in his conversation which might cast light on why Hanoi published Johnson-Ho-Chi Minh exchange."

REINHARDT

State 180271 (to Amembassy Rome), TS/Nodis
21 April 1967
Ref: Rome 5266

"1. We appreciate having these additional comments by D'Orlandi and suggest that in order to explore Hanoi's position further, as it is understood by Lewandowski, you propose quiet meeting between the three of you next month when Lewandowski passes through Rome en route to Warsaw."

RUSK

May 8, 1967

Hightower files a lengthy account of Marigold from Washington. The story contains enough detail to indicate that some of his sources were insiders. It is critical of the Polish role and reflects Washington's doubts the reliability of Poland as a channel to Hanoi.
New York Times, 9 May 1967

4-MONTH U.S. BID IGNORED BY HANOI, by John M. Hightower of the Associated Press

"One of the 10 points provided that the United States would not insist that North Vietnam acknowledge publicly the presence of its forces in South Vietnam. The Johnson Administration decided this should be clarified to require that if the troop issue was to be covered up for face-saving purposes, then the North Vietnamese forces should be withdrawn from the South.

"Mr. Lewandowski was informed of this and other clarification points. The others seemed mainly matters of wording. But this one seemed to be substantial."

"Mr. Rapacki's strong resistance to the clarification proposal caused some concern in Washington. Officials were not sure the Poles had any commitment from North Vietnam to begin the talks. Some high officials here doubted that Mr. Rapacki was in fact relaying United States views and making known Washington's readiness for talks to Hanoi."

"Informants say an important element in the Administration decision not to suspend the bombing plan was an attack by Communist forces on Saigon's main airfield and an unsuccessful attempt to blow up a major bridge in Saigon."

"United States officials publicly took issue with this. Privately they said that while the attack at Hanoi might have destroyed the Polish plan, it might also have presented Hanoi or Warsaw with a convenient pretext for not going through with it."

May 9-10, 1967

In Warsaw, Polish concern is expressed over rumors that the US plans to publish a white paper on Marigold. This would force them,
reluctantly, to publish their own account. Gronouski recommends against publication.

Washington replies that the Hightower piece is "essentially accurate and reasonably favorable from our point of view." The Poles are to be told that we will not publish a white paper.

When so informed, the Poles respond that "US officials had apparently chosen another way to put out the story." They are especially distressed at the question raised as to whether they had actually transmitted US messages to the North Vietnamese. They state that they had delivered the messages.

Warsaw 2700 (to SecState), S/Nodis, 9 May 1967

"1. During my separate calls on Winiewicz and Michalowski this morning, both of them expressed Polish concern about news reports originating in U.S. that U.S. intends to publish within next few days a white book covering Warsaw talks of last December...."

... "5. Poles would be most reluctant to publish their own white book but they would be left with no alternative if U.S. published its own."

... "7. I would therefore recommend against publication of official dept. version of MARKGOLD events...."

GRONOUSKI

State 190899 (to Amembassy Warsaw), S/Nodis
9 May 1967
Ref: Warsaw 2699 and 2700

"We consider news stories filed yesterday on December peace probes to be essentially accurate and reasonably favorable from our point of view. We would prefer let matter rest there avoiding to extent feasible public exchange of interpretations with the Polish Government. When queried about story yesterday, official spokesman said he preferred not rrt not to comment on story, adding FOR BACKGROUND that he 'would have no quarrel with it.' We intend maintain this position.

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"Since we have no desire exacerbate US-Polish relations over this matter, we have no present intentions publish 'White Book' on this subject. You should so inform Michalowski...."

RUSK

Warsaw 2727 (to SecState), S/Modis
10 May 1967
Ref: State 190899

"1. .... When Kaiser said U.S. has no present intention of publishing white book, Michalowski responded that U.S. officials had apparently chosen another way to put out the story. He then referred to Hightower article which, he said, according to summary received by Polish FonMin, seemed to be based on high level official sources. There were disturbing distortions, errors and innuendos challenging the integrity of Rapacki and questioning whether Polish side had actually transmitted messages to North Vietnamese. He added that Poles had of course delivered messages."

JENKINS

May 28, 1967

US Embassies in Tokyo and Seoul are given background information on Marigold.

State 203934 (to AmEmbassies: Tokyo, Seoul), S/Modis
28 May 1967
Ref: State 197426 to Tokyo
State 198946 to Seoul

"We are repeating to you State's 158246 and 132347 which provide background info on Polish initiatives re Vietnam which aborted last December. Text of Lewandowski's Ten Points which were presented to Ambassador Lodge on December 1 follows:

RUSK
June 6, 1967

The three-party talks in Rome will not be possible as Lewandowski is not passing through.

Rome 6506 (to SecState), S/Nodis
6 June 1967
State 191174 and Rome 5991

"D'Orlandi has informed me that Lewandowski is not repeating not coming to Rome."

REINHARDT

December 6, 1967

Wilfred Burchett tells US officials in Paris that the DRV had an official en route to the Marigold Warsaw meeting at the time of cancellation—"when the US resumed bombing Hanoi."

Paris 7540 (to SecState), S/Nodis,
6 December 1967

"Burchett said North Vietnamese accuse us of talking peace while intensifying war. For example, North Vietnamese had agreed to talk at Warsaw last December and even had official en route when US resumed bombing Hanoi. He also mentioned North Vietnamese readiness to talk at Rangoon during 37 day pause."

....